4.Surviving Spouse- Art.

995-1002

Santillon v. Miranda, 14 SCRA 563, 1965

FACTS: Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During
his marriage, pedro acquired several parcels of land

1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for letters of administration. His mother, Perfecta
and spouses Benito Miranda opposed the petition on the following grounds:
a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except for 3 parcels which
Perfecta claims to be her exclusive property
b. Perfecta conveyed ¾ of her undivided share in most of the properties to spouses Miranda
c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over her spouse’s estate
2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to “declare shares of heirs” and resolve the conflicting claims
of the parties with respect to their rights in the estate. Invoking Art 892, Claro insisted that
after deducting Perfecta’s ½ share from the conjugal property, the remaining property shall be
divided as: ¼ for Perfecta and ¾ for him
3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitled under Art 996 to another ½ of the
remaining half
4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring that the surviving spouse Perfecta is entitled
to ½ of Pedro’s estate and the remaining ½ is given to Claro

ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the
spouse and one legitimate child?

HELD: Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.

Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession, whereas Art 996 comes under the
chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on
Art 892 to support his claim to ¾ of his father’s share. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the
surviving spouse and Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it
may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse
should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such
child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. As such, the pertinent provision on
intestate succession shally apply, i.e. Art 996.

In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only one legitimate child surviving with the
spouse, since they share equally, ½ of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to
the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to “children or descendants,” the rule in
statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular in this case.

The theory of commentator’s sharing Claro’s position are premised on the following arguments:

a. Art 996 speaks of “children” therefore it does not apply when there is only one “child” and as
such Art 892 should be applied through a process of judicial construction and analogy
b. Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widow gets only ¼ while in testacy, she
would get ½ shares

It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. As such, “children” in
Art 996 also refers to a “child.”
The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from the circumstance whereas Art 834
Spanish Civil Code, from which Art 996 was taken, contained 2 paragraphs governing two
contingencies: (a) where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children; and (b) where the
widow or widower survives with only one child. Since Art 996 NCC omitted to provide for the
second situation, it can be deemed that the legislator’s intent was to promulgate only one
general rule applicable to both situations

5. Collateral Relatives- Arrt. 1003-1010

Alviar v. Alviar, 1969

FACTS:

Clemente Alviar and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar and Bibiana Carillo.
Sometime after the latter's deatH, Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot him five (5)
children, namely; Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor, all surnamed Alviar. Belen Alviar
died intestate. She was single and had been survived by her brother Clemente Alviar, and five (5) half
brothers and sisters. Belen's estate consisted of two (2) parcels of agricultural land and a residential
lot.

The six brothers and sisters executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente Alviar
the two parcels of agricultural land, and to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the deceased the
residential lot. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took possession of their respective shares.
Moreover, Clemente Alviar titles to said Lots 2 and 3. The residential land in Pasay City was, in turn,
partitioned among his aforesaid half brothers and sisters and subdivided into lots Nos. 223-D-1 and
223-D-2. The first was allotted to Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, who secured thereto TCT No. 8495 in
their names, whereas the second was covered by TCT No. 8496 in the name of Cesareo Alviar, his
sister Fabiana having renounced her share therein in his favor. Their brother Castor had, likewise,
waived his share in said residential land.

Over five years later, Clemente commenced the present action, against his half brother and sisters,
Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, and their mother, and his step-mother, Flora Erasga, to
annul the deed of extrajudicial partition, upon the ground that, acting in bad faith and conspiring,
confederating and conniving with each other, as well as "taking advantage of plaintiff's lack of
education, illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing fully well that" the "children by second marriage of
Florentino Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over" the 3 lots left by Belen Alviar, the
defendants had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed. Inasmuch as Clemente Alviar died soon
thereafter, his widow, Paulina Pamulaklakin and their children, Ramon and Norma Alviar, substituted
him as plaintiff in this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, as a full brother of Belen Alviar, the degree of relationship to her of the deceased
Clemente Alviar was nearer than that of their half brothers and sisters, the children of their father by
second marriage.

The lower court decided this question in the negative and correctly. Indeed, "proximity of relationship
HELD:
is determined by the number of generations" and "each generation forms a degree." In relation to
Belen Alviar, her full brother, Clemente Alviar, is, therefore, in the same degree of relationship as their
half brothers and sisters, the aforementioned defendants, for all of them constitute the first generation
of descendants of their common father, Florentino Alviar. In fact, this rationalization is rendered
superfluous, apart from being confirmed, by the explicit language of Arts. 1003, 1004 and 1006 of our
Civil Code, reading:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
 ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in
equal shares.

ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of
the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.

These provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood
do not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the concurrence of
both classes and the application of said Art. 1006.

More important than this, however, is the fact that Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his
half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar
and that there is nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment or
rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no reason
why the same should be disturbed.

Arellano, et. Al. v. Pascual, 2010

FACTS:Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely:  petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes)
and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. The controversy
centers on a parcel of land located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation,
transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, “may be
considered as an advance legitime” of petitioner. The probate court found the donation valid hence
said property is subject to collation.The CA sustained the probate court’s ruling that the property
donated to petitioner is subject to collation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.

RULING:
NO. Collation is defined as a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations
made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate and the return to the hereditary estate of
property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime to secure equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime,
so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Considering that the decedent left no primary,
secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs and was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime no collation should take place.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to
donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit.  His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid is deemed as donation made to a “stranger,”
chargeable against the free portion of the estate.There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.Hence the decedent’s remaining estate should thus be
partitioned equally  among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents,
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code.
6. State- Art. 1011-1014

V. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession

A. Right of Accretion- Art. 1015-1023

Torres & Lopez v. Lopez, 1926

FACTS:

This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez. Tomas
Rodriguez died in the City of Manila and leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel
Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition
was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased. In the said will, the testator
instituted as his only heirs his cousin, and the latter’s daughter. But the cousin was incapacitated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the share of the cousin should go to the testator’s legal heirs, or should it go to the co-
heir, namely, the cousin’s daughter.

HELD:

The co-heir gets the share by accretion. It follows therefore that the instate heirs cannot claim by
intestacy said share, for accretion is preferred over intestacy. As has been stated by the Supreme
Court, intestate succession to vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.

FACTS: Testator instituted as his only heirs his cousin, and the latter’s daughter. But the cousin was
incapacitated. Should his share go to the testator’s legal heirs, or should it go to the co-heir, namely,
the cousin’s daughter?

HELD: The co-heir gets the share by accretion, for intestacy will take place here only when accretion
is not possible.

Ynza v. Rodriguez, 1954

B. Capacity to Succeed by Will or Intestacy- Art. 1024-1040

Villavicencio v. Quirino, 1939

FACTS:

Eugenio Zuñiga del Rosario died, leaving a will executed with all the legal formalities, which was
probated, over the opposition of some relatives.

The third clause of the said will translated from Tagalog into Spanish, reads as follows:
“TERCERO: Declaro que tengo bienes inmuebles, muebles, semovientes, casa y camarin que he
heredado de mis padres y hermanos y, no teniendo yo heredero forzoso como ya he dicho mas
arriba, he dispuesto que mis citados bienes sean destinados solamente para la paz y felicidad de mi
alma y de las de mis padres y hermanos, y tambien para el beneficio de la iglesia, en la manera
siguiente: x x x”
Subsequently, Santiago Quinio and twenty-eight relatives of the testatrix within the fifth degree in the
collateral line, filed a motion with the conformity of the Bishop of Lipa wherein they asked that they be
declared heirs of said testatrix charged with the duty to comply with its provisions and contended that
after the deduction of the amounts for the alms and masses provided for by the testatrix in her will,
there will still be a sizable balance left out of her properties, which, in the absence of any disposition
made by the said testatrix, must pass by operation of law to her legal or intestate heirs. The executor
Vicente Reyes Villavicencio opposed the foregoing petition and the court denied the latter. The
movants appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the relatives of the deceased are entitled to succeed as to the remaining properties

HELD:

No. Such contention on the part of the appellants is based on something entirely inconsistent with
what the testatrix has ordered in the third clause of her will. The testatrix in said clause had disposed
of her proportions in accordance with the provision of Article 747 (now Art. 1029) of the Civil Code, a
disposition absolutely within her right, having no forced heirs.

The collateral relatives of the deceased, not being forced heirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to
the remainder of her properties, which does not exist, or as to the naked ownership of the same. The
provisions of the will disposing her properties for masses and pious works, the validity of which is not
questioned herein, should be complied with because the testatrix, not having forced heirs, may
dispose of her properties as she did in her will, for masses and pious works for the benefit of her soul
and those of her relatives.

The third clause of the last will and testament of Eugenia Zuniga del Rosario, which was duly
probated, is as follows:

“Tercero: Declaro que tengo bienes inmuebles, muebles, semimovientes, vasa y camarin que he
heredado de mis padres y hermanos y, no, teniendo yo heredero forzoso como ya ha dicho mas
arriba, he dispuesto que mis citados bienes sean destinados solamente para la paz y felicidad de mi
alma y de las mis padres y hermanos, y tambien para el benefi cio de la iglesia, en la manera
siguiente: x x x”

Relatives of the testatrix within the fifth degree fi led a motion, approved by the Bishop of Lipa,
praying that they be declared the intestate heirs of the said testatrix on the ground that, after the
deduction of the amounts for the alms and masses provided for by the testatrix in her will, there will
still be a sizeable balance left out of her properties, which, in the absence of any disposition made by
the said testatrix, must pass by operation of law to her legal or intestate heirs. The Supreme Court,
however, ruled:

“Such contention on the part of the movant is based on something entirely inconsistent with what
the testatrix has ordered in the third clause of her will. The testatrix in said clause had disposed of
her proportions in accordance with the provision of Article 747 (now Art. 1029) of the Civil Code, a
disposition absolutely within her right, having no forced heirs.

“The collateral relatives of the deceased, E. Z. del Rosario, not being forced heirs, are not entitled to
succeed her as to the remainder of her properties, which does not exist, or as to the naked
ownership of the same. The provisions of the will disposing her properties for masses and pious
works, the validity of which is not questioned herein, should be complied with because the testatrix,
not having forced heirs, may dispose of her properties as she did in her will, for masses and pious
works for the benefit of her soul and those of her relatives.”