F.

Revocation of wills and Testamentary Disposition

By subsequent will
Viuda de molo vs. molo, 1951
Facts:
The testator executed a subsequent will 21 years after execution a prior will. The
subsequent will contained a revocation clause but was NOT admitted into probate for
failure to comply with the requirements of law. Thus, the subsequent will was void.
The court held that the first will was still effective and not considered revoked since
the subsequent will containing the revocatory clause was void. Thus, if the will is
void, the revocatory clause in such will is likewise void and inefficacious.
‣ The opponents countered by saying that the prior will remains void as it could not
be found and thus presumed to have been destroyed by the testator (note that this is
also a mode of revocation, by physical destruction)
‣ Court held that even if such will can be considered physically destroyed, the
revocation cannot be given effect due to the Doctrine of Dependent Relative
Revocation. The prior will remains valid.

It is essential however, that the revoking will be itself a valid will (validly executed as
to form), otherwise there is no revocation.
The revocation made in the subsequent will must indeed be a definite one. A mere
declaration that sometime in the future, the fi rst would be revoked, is not enough.
However, there is nothing wrong in making the revocation conditional, that is, the
revocation takes place only if the condition is fulfilled (doctrine of “conditional
revocation,” also called “dependent relative revocation”).
To put it in another way, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation — the
revocation by destruction or overt act was good only if this condition is fulfilled,
namely, that the revoking will was valid. The condition was not fulfilled; therefore, the
revocation by overt act did not really materialize.
‣ This doctrine is known as that of “dependent relative revocation”, and is usually
applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will OR executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if
made, fails of effect for some reason.
‣ The doctrine is not limited to the existence of some other document, however, and
has been applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law
‣ In this case, the court concluded that, the destruction of the prior will by the testator
cannot have the effect of defeating the effectivity of such prior will because of the
fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the subsequent will of 1939 has
been validly executed and would be given due effect.
‣ The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to
die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two
different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore
be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
Bustamante vs. Arevalo,1942
A second will referred to by the testator as his “last will” revokes completely the fi rst
will, particularly if the provision of the two, as to who were being instituted as heirs,
are inconsistent.

By Physical destruction
Diaz v. de leon, 1922
‣ In this case, a subsequent will was executed by the testator which contained a
revocation clause to revoke his prior will. The testator also revoked the prior will by
means of physical destruction. However, the subsequent will was later disallowed in
probate as it did not comply with the requirements of validity.
‣ The issue was whether or not the prior will should be given effect
‣ Court said it should NOT be given effect. The intention of revoking the will is
manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the
testator’s own statements to the witnesses.The original will herein presented for
probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as
the will and last testament.
‣ Thus, if the prior will was revoked not only by express revocation by a subsequent
will but also with physical destruction it can be said that the intent of the testator was
to definitely revoke such prior will. It seems that the doctrine of Dependent Relative
Revocation is NOT applicable to give it effect.
‣ For DRR to apply, it must clearly appear that the testator intended the first will to
be effective if the subsequent will later turns out to be void or ineffective.
Testate of Adriana maloto v. ca, 1988
/In the case, the estate was distributed equally by intestacy bet. the 4 heirs.
Subsequently, a will was found. In the will, more was given to 2 of the heirs. As such,
the 2 who got more sought the probate of the will. The other 2 objected claiming that
the will had been revoked. The issue is whether or not there had been a valid
revocation. The SC held no. While there may have been intent to revoke, there was
no corpus. There is no evidence to show that what was revoked was the will of the
testator. Also, the destruction was not proven to have been done in the presence
and under the expression of the testator./
FACTS: Adriana Maloto was initially believed to have died without a will so an
intestate proceeding was commenced by her heirs, a niece and a nephew. During
the pendency of this action, said heirs decided to extra-judicially settle the estate of
Adriana Maloto by dividing it into 4 equal parts among themselves, which settlement
was approved by the court. However, 3 years after said extrajudicial settlement
among the heirs, a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana
was discovered. In said will, all 4 heirs were instituted as heirs but 2 of them were
bequeathed bigger and more valuable shares than what they received in the
extrajudicial settlement they earlier executed. The will also gave devises and
legacies to other parties. In the petition for probate of the discovered will of Adriana,
the trial court ruled that said will had already been revoked by the testratrix Adriana,
based on the testimony of Adriana’s househelp that she burned said will on the
instructions of the testatrix. Thus, the trial court denied the petition for probate. On
appeal, the appellate court although having found contradictions in the allegation of
the revocation of the will by burning, found animus revocandi in the destruction of the
will to be present.
ISSUE: Was there a proper revocation of the will?
HELD:
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does
not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with
animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical
destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in the presence of the testor. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case, while
animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of
mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffi ce. Animus revocandi is only one of the
necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The
intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning,
tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express direction. There is scarcity of evidence
to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana’s maid, Gaudalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will
at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven
to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning
was not in her presence. Hence, the will is not considered revoked.
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does
not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with
animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical
destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
Issues to be resolved in probate proceedings
Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, 1967
Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another.
The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity
of the testator; the second deals with descent and distribution.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE OF WILLS. — In petitions for probate the Court’s
area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, as the testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions thereof or the legality of any devise
or legacy is premature. (Nuguid v. Nuguid, L-23445, June 23, 1996).

2. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED REVOCATION DOES NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF

PETITION FOR PROBATE. — An alleged disposal by testator to prior to his death of
the properties involved in his will is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for
probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another.
The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the
testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

3. ID.; ID.; LACK OF INTEREST BARS OPPOSITION TO PROBATE. — In order

that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding, he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as
executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ñgo The Hua v. Chuang Kiat Hua, Et Al., L-
17019, Sept 30, 1963) and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
(Teotico v. Del Val, L-18753, March 26, 1965). Where oppositors do not take issue
with the probate court’s finding that they are totally strangers to the deceased, or do
not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which must be
protected, the order striking out their opposition and all other pleadings pertinent
thereto must be affirmed.

4. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; ORDER STRIKING OUT OPPOSITION TO PROBATE NOT

INTERLOCUTORY. — An order striking out an opposition to the probate of the will
on the ground that the oppositors have no personality to intervene in the case is
final, and therefore appealable insofar as they are concerned.
FACTS: On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and
testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. Said document,
written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner as sole heir of
the testator.
The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors — appellants herein
— who questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made
under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and
testament. Aside from merely opposing the petition for probate, the first set of
oppositors — Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa — also claimed that they, instead
of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The other oppositors
representing themselves simply as next of kin, appropriately prayed only for the
disallowance of the will.
At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his evidence, and then rested his
case on February 16, 1961. Reception of oppositors' evidence was set for July 14,
1961. However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for
probate mainly on the ground that "the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter
because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed by
him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death." Oppositors
alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano
Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the
time of the testator's death the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.
1. Whether or not oppositors have legal standing in court and they are bereft of
personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament of the testators.
2. Whether or not oppositors have valid claim and interest in the distribution of (the)
estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right whatsoever.
HELD: To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that
a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a
condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings, for the probate of a
will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more.
The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate.
Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another.itc-alf. The
first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the
testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in
favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question
of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to
probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous: in
law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again,
the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but
merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties
concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the
particular devise or legacy.itc-alf.
In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that they
"have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and
therefore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate."
They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which must
be protected.
The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties'
baptism and marriage certificates, support the said court's finding in this respect.
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. The reason for
the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may
be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the
intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would
entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.s

Coso v. Fernandez, 1921

FACTS: Frederico Gimenez Zoboli, a married man and resident of the Philippines,
met Rosario Lopez in Spain and had illicit relations with her for many years
thereafter. After his return to the Philippines, she followed him and remained in close
communication with him until his death. The CFI set aside his will on the ground of
undue infl uence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by
Rosario Lopez. The will gives tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimate son of the
testator with Rosario and also provides the payment to her of 1,900 Spanish duros
by the way of reimbursement for the expenses incurred by her in taking care of the
testator when he is alleged to have suffered from a severe illness.
ISSUE: Whether the influence exercised by Rosario was of such a character as to
vitiate the will.
HELD:

To be sufficient to avoid a will, the

influence exerted must be of a kind
that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind
of the testator as to destroy his free
agency and make his express the will
of another, rather than his own. Mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not
undue influence and does not
invalidate a
will. No imposition or fraud has been
shown in the present case.
To be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency
and make his express the will of another, rather than his own. Mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. No imposition or
fraud has been shown in the present case.
“The mere or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will.
To have that effect, the influence must be “undue.” The “undue influence” to be
sufficient to avoid a will must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the
mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another, rather than his own.”
“Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the
execution of the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so
near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of
particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which
the testator would not otherwise have made. And while the same amount of
influence may become “undue” when exercised by one occupying an improper and
adulterous relation to the testator, the mere fact that some influence exercised by a
person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown
that the influence destroys the testator’s free agency.” The burden is upon the
parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of its
execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for
Rosario, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his
mind as to destroy “his free agency and make him express the will of another rather
than his own.” He is an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appear to have
known his mind, and may well have been actuated by a legitimate sense of duly and
a proper feeling of gratitude. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue
influence and does not invalidate a will. No imposition or fraud has been shown in
this case.
 Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no
imposition or fraud is practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an
unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed
to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made
Casiano v. Maloto, 1977 (L-32328)
Facts:
Adriana Maloto died on October 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence. On
November 1963, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and
Felino Maloto, niece and nephews respectively, of Adriana Maloto commenced an
intestate proceeding in the CFI of Iloilo that was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 1736.
They executed an intestate proceeding and divided the estate in the proportion of
one-fourth (1/4) share for each. The CFI judge approved the partition.

Subsequently, on April 1, 1967, a document purporting to be the last will and

testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the CFI of Iloilo. Aldina et al. were all
named as heirs but Aldina and Constancio appeared to have bigger shares in the will
than what they received in the extrajudicial partition. There were also dispositions in
favor of Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldino and Constancio, along with the other devisees and legatees, filed a motion in
S.P. No. 1736 for, among others, the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto. The
CFI judge denied the motion on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of
time. The petitioners (Aldino et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the SC but it was denied on the ground of improper remedy.

The petitioners then commenced S.P. No. 2176 in the CFI of Iloilo for the probate of
the alleged last will and testament. The probate court dismissed the petition on the
basis of the finding of said court in S.P. No. 1736 that the alleged will sought to be
probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of S.P. No. 2176 by the CFI of Iloilo was proper?

Held: No. The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the
probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto in S.P. No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to
reopen the proceedings was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a
finding in an intestate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. In fact,
the probate court in S.P. No. 1736 stated in its order that “Movants should have filed
a separate action for the probate of the will”. Even this Court, in dismissing the
petition for certiorari, said that the more appropriate remedy is a separate proceeding
for the probate of the alleged will.

Thus, the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 1736 is not a bar to the present
petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

Doctrine: It is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding regarding the

validity of an alleged will.

Digest 2
FACTS:Adriana Maloto was believed to have died intestate on October 20, 1963.
Her niecesand nephew who were her heirs instituted an intestate proceeding.
However, duringthe course of proceeding, the four heirs decided to settle the
estate into four equalparts among themselves extra judicially which was approved
by the court. On April 1,1967, a document surfaced which appears to be
Adriana’s last will and testament.Two of the heirs were given a bigger share in
the said will so they a petition for theallowance of the last will and testament for
a probate proceeding in court. But thetwo other heirs opposed the said motion on
the ground that the alleged will had beendestroyed and revoked by the testatrix.
ISSUE:Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the petition for probate of
the last willand testament of the testatrix.
RULING:The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the
probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736.
Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied because the same was filed out of
time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate
proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the
probate court in Special Proceeding No.1736 stated in the order of November
16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of
the Will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution o f M a y 1 4 , 1 9 6 9 t h a t " T h e
m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e r e m e d y o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r s i n t h e premises stated in
the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the
alleged with in question.
Exceptions: when practical considerations demands the intrinsic validity of
the will
Nuguid v. Nuguid,1966
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the
court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the com
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is
limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the
will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before
it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.
Rosario Nuguid a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962 single
without descendants legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents Felix and Paz Nuguid, and her six (6) brothers and sisters.
 
            On May 18, 1963 Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance now
the Regional Trial Court, a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid.
Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that the letters of
administration with the will annexed be granted to her.
 
            Felix Nuguid and Paz Nuguid, the legitimate parents of the decedent entered
their opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that they are the com-pulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in
the consequence the institution of the heir is void.
 
            On November 08, 1963, the Court held that the will in question is a complete
nullity and dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration is denied hence this
appeal.
 
            Appellant insist that the case is for the probate of a will, that the court’s area
of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, or the testamentary capacity of
testator and the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law, that the court at this
stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.

ISSUE:
Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of
the Will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it
void. Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
HELD:
No.
Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. The probate of a Will does not look
into its intrinsic validity.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The
intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate
because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the
Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in
fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will
should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of
the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the
Will demanded.
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to:
1. an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will;
2. the due execution thereof;
3. the testatrix’s testamentary capacity; and
4. the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed the by law.
In the case at bar, however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties shunted aside the
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. They questioned the
intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate
of the will, nothing will be gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the
will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before this Court on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. The result would be waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These practical considerations induce this
Court to meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the will in question ,
there being a justiciable controversy awaiting solution. Where the one sentence will
institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the
testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution
of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

Effect of Final Decree

De la cerna v. Potot, 1964
DOCTRINE:
Where a husband and wife executed a joint will and upon the death of the husband
said will as admitted to probate by a final decree of the court although erroneous,
and the wife dies later, it is held that said first decree of probate affects only the
estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife, considering that a join
twill is a separate will of each testator; and a joint will being prohibited by law, the
estate of the wife sould pass upon her death to her isntestate heirs and not the
testamentary heir.
FACTS:May 9, 1939- sps Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebeca executed a
joint last will and testament in the local dialect and willed in this manner:
“Our two parcels of land shall be given to Manuela Rebeca, our niece, whom we
have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union,
Manuela Rebecca being married to Nicolas Potol”
Aug. 30, 1939- Bernabe (husband) dies. Gervasia (wife) and Manuela submitted to
probate the will in the CFI of Cebu, which the court admitted. (Decree of Probate
1939)
Oct. 14, 1952- Gervasia died. Another petition for probate of the will of the same will
insofar sd Gervasia is concerned was filed. But for failure of Manuela and her
attorney, Manuel Potol to appear for he hearing of said petition, the case was
dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will of Gervasia may be probated.NO

The SC held that the first probate was valid only as to the share of the husband.
However, such earlier probate cannot be applied for the share of the wife bec. she
was still living at the time the first probate was made. As such, there is no res
judicata as to the share of the wife. As to the wife, since it is against a joint will,
then it is void and her property will pass by intestacy.

Petitioners, as heirs and successors

of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are
concluded by the 1939 decree
admitting his will to probate. The
contention that
being void the will cannot be
validated, overlooks that the ultimate
decision on
Whether an act is valid or void rests
with the courts, and here they have
spoken
with finality when the will was
probated in 1939. On this court, the
dismissal of
their action for partition was correct
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded
by the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the
will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act is
valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the
will was probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of their action for partition was
correct.

HELD:
Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it was
probated by a court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a final
judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole
world. However, this is only with respect to the estate of the husband but cannot
affect the estate of the wife; considering that a joint will is a separate will of each
testator.

The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife
is concerned, must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.

The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs
and not to the testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife, the will
cannot be given effect.

A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal
validity of the will subject to such probate.

AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE JOINT WILL

The final decree of probate, entered in 1939, by the CFI of Cebu (when Bernabe
died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that
even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills.
The ultimate decision on whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and
here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939 . A final
judgement rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole
world.
AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE JOINT WILL
It could ONLY affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe. It could NOT
include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia, who was then still alive,
and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be an issue. A will could not
be probated during the testator’s lifetime.
Hence, the validity of the will, in so far as the estate of the wiffe was concerned, must
be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is
considered a separate will of each other. Thus the joint will be one prohibited by law
as to the participation of the wife, Gervasia, in the properties in question.
Therefore, as a joint will is being prohibited by law, the estate of the wife should pass
upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary heir (unless some
other valid will is shown to exist in favor of the latter or unless the testamentary heir
is the only heir of said wife.)

Dorothea v. CA, 1999

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro
died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to
have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the
probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said
order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void."
The trial court granted the motion and issued an order. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took
care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married
to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief
within the extended period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on
February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the
Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. An Order was issued on November 29, 1990
setting aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, (Order which
declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro’s will that was earlier admitted to probate) as
well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that
the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added
that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate
of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991.
ISSUE: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically
void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
HELD: No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. It should be noted that probate
proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated, particularly on three aspects: - whether the will submitted is indeed, the
decedent's last will and testament; - compliance with the prescribed formalities for
the execution of wills; - the testamentary capacity of the testator; and - the due
execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely
executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence
and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary
age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. The
intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow
that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. The only
instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which
circumstances do not concur herein. Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the
declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30,
1986. wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those
who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the
same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation
otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum
shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by
some other court. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro
and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession. It
can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional
rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate
distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law
considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the
voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur
donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will
had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void,
the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether
the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case,
the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by
the trial court.
This case also enumerates what formal validity encompasses:
1. Whether the will submitted is indeed the decedent’s last will and testament;
2. 2. Compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
3. 3. Testamentary capacity
4. 4. Due execution of the will

‣ Due execution means: a. The testator’s sound and disposing mind; b.

Freedom from vitiating factors (duress, menace, undue influence); c. Will
genuine, not a forgery d. Proper testamentary age e. The testator is not
expressly prohibited by law from making a will

Even if the will was validly executed if the testator provides for dispositions
that deprive or impair the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions
thereof cannot be given effect.

Due execution of a will includes a determination of whethter the testator was

of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely
executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue
infl uence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the
proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by
law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another
matter and questions regarding the
same may
still be raised even after the will has
been authenticated. Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always
intrinsically valid
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may
still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid.