Torts and Damages
legal basis of torts.
February 21, 2022
General Considerations
Tort – is an unlawful violation of private
right, not created by contract, and which
gives rise to an action for damages
▪ The definition of tort is almost
similar with negligence.
▪ If it is a violation of a public right,
perhaps it is not tort.
▪ If it is created by contract, it is not
a source of tort. HOWEVER, if the
breach of contract was the very
reason why the contract was
violated, could also be considered
as tort which gives rise an action
for damages.
▪ The violation of the private right
will be the basis for the right to
claim damages.
▪ Damages can be in different forms.
1. Moral
2. Nominal
3. Exemplary
4. Actual
▪ Torts is a civil case and the proof
required in civil cases is
preponderance of evidence.
▪ It is also defined as “a private or
civil wrong or injury, other than
breach of contract”, for which the
court will provide a remedy in the
form of an action for damages.
▪ The elements of tort have already
evolved. You must establish the
causal link of the overt act or the
omission which gave rise to an
injury against another person.
▪ Article 2176 of the NCC is the first
Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter. (1902a)
▪ Act – an overt act
▪ Omission – non-doing of something
which is expected of you to
perform or an act you are obliged
to perform. If you did not do
something that is not expected of
you, it is not an omission.
▪ In negligence, there is an absence
of intent. Committing something
not so grave a wrong, falls under
the category of negligence.
Elements of Quasi-Delict
1. An act or omission committed
through fault or negligence
2. The damage or injury is caused by
such act or omission
3. The act does not arise under a pre-
existing contractual obligation.
Note: Jurisprudence replaces the
third element with causal
connection. [PNR vs Brunty, G.R.
No. 169891 (2006); Andamo vs
IAC, G.R. No. 74761 (1990)]
Causal connection refers to act or
omission committed through fault
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or negligence vis-à-vis the damage
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 or injury by reason of such act or
omission.
Ex: If the overt act of slapping
someone resulted to the
permanent dislocation of the jaw of
that person that affected his or her
physical appearance, you can
create that link of the very overt
act of slapping to the injury
sustained. Had that person not
slapped someone forcefully, there
could have been no dislocation of
that person’s jaw.
PNR vs Brunty
Issue: Whether or not PNR should be
held liable for the death of Rhonda
Brunty.
Ruling: YES
Negligence – is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.
It is relative or comparative, not
absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require.
In this case, it is, however, worthy to
emphasize that petitioner was found
negligent because of its failure to
provide the necessary safety device to
ensure the safety of motorists in
crossing the railroad track. As such, it is
liable for damages for violating the
provisions of Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code, viz:
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or
omission, causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
In a long line of cases, the Court held
that in order to sustain a claim based
on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must concur:
1. damage to plaintiff
2. negligence, by act or omission, of
which defendant, or some person
for whose acts he must respond
was guilty
3. connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and
damage.
Applying the foregoing requisites, the
CA correctly made the following
conclusions:
It was clearly established that
plaintiffs-appellees (respondents
herein) sustained damage or injury
as a result of the collision. That
there was negligence on the part of
PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil.
Considering the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the fatal
accident, the alleged safety
measures installed by the PNR at
the railroad crossing is not only
inadequate but does not satisfy
well-settled safety standards in
transportation.
It may broadly be stated that railroad
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companies owe to the public a duty of
exercising a reasonable degree of care
to avoid injury to persons and property
at railroad crossings, which duties
pertain both in the operation of trains
and in the maintenance of the
crossings. Moreover, every corporation
constructing or operating a railway
shall make and construct at all points
where such railway crosses any public
road, good, sufficient, and safe
crossings and erect at such points, at a
sufficient elevation from such road as to
admit a free passage of vehicles of
every kind, a sign with large and
distinct letters placed thereon, to give
notice of the proximity of the railway,
and warn persons of the necessity of
looking out for trains.
This Court has previously determined
the liability of the PNR for damages for
its failure to put a cross bar, or signal
light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphores. Such failure is evidence of
negligence and disregard of the safety
of the public, even if there is no law or
ordinance requiring it because public
safety demands that said device or
equipment be installed.
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the
factual findings of the CA as well as its
conclusion on petitioner’s negligence.
Issue: Whether or not Mercelita, the
driver of Mercedes Benz is guilty of
contributory negligence which would
mitigate the award of damages.
Ruling: NO
Contributory negligence – is the
conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection.
To hold a person as having contributed
to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about
his injuries in disregard of warning or
signs of an impending danger to health
and body. To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, although not
proximate, between the negligence of
the party and the succeeding injury. In
a legal sense, negligence is contributory
only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition
for its occurrence.
The court below found that there was a
slight curve before approaching the
tracks; the place was not properly
illuminated; one’s view was blocked by
a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not
familiar with the road. Yet, it was also
established that Mercelita was then
driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of
70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a
vehicle a few yards before reaching the
railroad track. Mercelita should not
have driven the car the way he did.
However, while his acts contributed to
the collision, they nevertheless do not
negate petitioner’s liability. Pursuant to
Article 217962 of the New Civil Code,
the only effect such contributory
negligence could have is to mitigate
liability, which, however, is not
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applicable in this case.
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We note that the damages awarded by
the appellate court consist of (1)
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death
of Rhonda Brunty; (2) ₱1,000,000.00 as
actual and moral damages due the heirs
of Rhonda Brunty; and (3) ₱50,000.00
as and by way of attorney’s fees. No
damages, however, were awarded for
the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the
latter never interposed an appeal
before the CA nor even before this
Court. The record is, likewise, bereft of
any allegation and proof as to the
relationship between Mercelita (the
driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the
earlier finding of contributory
negligence on the part of Mercelita,
which generally has the effect of
mitigation of liability, does not apply.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of
last clear chance is applicable.
Ruling: NO
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – states
that where both parties are negligent
but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other,
or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed
to do so, is chargeable with the loss.
The antecedent negligence of plaintiff
does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening
negligence of defendant, who had the
last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. The proximate cause of the
injury having been established to be the
negligence of petitioner (PNR), we hold
that the above doctrine finds no
application in the instant case.
Andamo vs IAC
Issue: Whether or not the Civil Case for
damages can proceed independently
with the criminal case.
Ruling: YES
It is axiomatic that the nature of an
action filed in court is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. The
purpose of an action or suit and the law
to govern it, including the period of
prescription, is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. The
nature of an action is not necessarily
determined or controlled by its title or
heading but the body of the pleading or
complaint itself. To avoid possible
denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as
remedial laws should be liberally
construed so that the litigants may have
ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims.
A careful examination of the
aforequoted complaint shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. All the elements of a quasi-
delict are present, to wit:
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1. damages suffered by the plaintiff
2. fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond
3. the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the
waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to
have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a
causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for
the recovery of damages.
The recitals of the complaint, the
alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the
causal connection between the act and
the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the
parties make a clear case of a quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's
property is not without limitations.
Article 431 of the Civil Code provides
that "the owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person."
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a
civil liability on a person for damage
caused by his act or omission
constituting fault or negligence. Article
2176, whenever it refers to "fault or
negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to
recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is
shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault
or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code
Commission "the foregoing provision
though at first sight startling, is not so
novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the
latter is a distinct and independent
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negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana"
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 or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal
negligence.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or
crime — a distinction exists between
the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for quasi-delicts
or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create
an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in
the criminal case is entirely irrelevant
in the civil case, UNLESS, of course, in
the event of an acquittal where the
court has declared that the fact from
which the civil action arose did not
exist, in which case the extinction of the
criminal liability would carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability.
What is a Human Relations Tort and
where can you find its legal bases?
▪ Liability for personal acts or
omission is founded on that
indisputable PRINCIPLE OF
JUSTICE recognized by all
legislators that when a person by
his act or omission causes damage
or prejudice to another, a juridical
relation is created by virtue of
which the injured person acquires
a right to be indemnified and the
person causing the damage is
charged with the corresponding
duty of repairing the damage. The
reason for this is found in the
obvious truth that man should
subordinate his acts to the
precepts of prudence and if he fails
to observe them and cause damage
to another, he must repair the
damage (Manresa).
▪ If you did something intentional or
unintentional to another person,
and your actions causes injury or
prejudiced another person, you
should repair that damage either
by returning the thing you
destroyed in its actual state or at
least 80% of its original state, and
if the same cannot be done, such as
when the thing lost or destroyed
was a specific thing, then you are to
replace it monetarily.
▪ The legal bases here is not a
codified provision of the law. it is
simply the principle of justice.
▪ Human Relations provisions in the
Civil Code include (the legal bases
that where codified):
 Article 19 – Abuse of Rights
 Article 20 – Acts Contrary to
Law
 Article 21 – Acts Contrary to
Morals
 Article 26 – Violations of
Human Dignity
These are all founded on the
principle of justice.
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Sources of Philippine Tort Law
1. Civil Code
2. RPC
3. Quasi-delict (this source of
obligation is classified as extra-
contractual obligation and is
governed by Chapter XVII, Chapter
2 of the Code consisting of Articles
2176 to 2194)
4. Other provisions that are
considered as “tort provisions” that
can be found on other titles of the
Code and in special laws.
▪ New Civil Code is the primary
statute that governs torts in the
Philippines.
Scope and Applicable Laws
▪ The Commission later decided
against the use of the word “tort”
because the members believed that
such word would not be accurate
because “tort” in Anglo-American
law “is much broader than the
Spanish-Philippine concept
obligations arising from non-
contractual negligence.
▪ Tort in Anglo-American
jurisprudence includes not only
negligence, but also intentional
criminal acts such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and
deceit.
▪ Don’t automatically relate torts to
negligence because there is what
you called “intentional torts”
(which arises from criminal acts),
(involve INTENT)
▪ As a general legal classification,
tort encompasses a number of
different civil causes of action
providing a private remedy, almost
always in the form of money
damages, for an injury to a person
caused by the tortious conduct of
another.
▪ Each tort is separately named and
defined. Although some rules or
principles are common to various
torts or groups of torts, there is no
universal formula for tort liability.
▪ As thus defined, tort in common
law includes intentional torts,
negligence, and strict liability in
tort.
▪ Intentional torts include conduct
where the actor desires to cause
the consequences of his act or
believes the consequences are
substantially certain to result from
it. Intentional torts include assault,
battery, false imprisonment,
defamation, invasion of privacy
and interference of property.
▪ Negligence, on the other hand,
involves voluntary acts or
omissions which result in injury to
others, without intending to cause
the same. The actor fails to exercise
due care in performing such acts or
omissions.
▪ There is strict liability in tort
where the person is made liable
independent of fault or negligence
upon submission of proof of
certain facts.
Torts in Philippine Laws
a. Defamation
b. Fraud
c. Physical Injuries
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d. Violation of Constitutional Rights
 e. Negligence
f. Interference with Contractual
Relations
g. Violation of Privacy
h. Malicious Prosecution
i. Product Liability
j. Strict liability for possession of
animals
k. Abuse of Right (Article 19 of the
Civil Code)
l. Acts which violate good morals and
customs (Article 21, NCC)
m. Tort is even broad to include civil
liability arising from criminal
liability
Naguiat vs NLRC
Issue: Whether or not Naguiat Ent Inc.
and Clark Field Taxi, Inc. and their
respective offices are liable to the
respondents who are previously
employed by CTFI as taxicab drivers.
(Are officers of corporations ipso facto
liable jointly and severally with the
companies they represent for the
payment of separation pay?)
Ruling: Naguiat Ent. is NOT liable but
CTFI President is solidarily liable.
From the evidence proffered by both
parties, there is no substantial basis to
hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an
indirect employer of individual
respondents much less a labor only
contractor. On the contrary, petitioners
submitted documents such as the
drivers' applications for employment
with CFTI, and social security
remittances and payroll of Naguiat
Enterprises showing that none of the
individual respondents were its
employees. Moreover, in the contract
between CFTI and AAFES, the former,
as concessionaire, agreed to purchase
from AAFES for a certain amount
within a specified period a fleet of
vehicles to be "kept” on the road" by
CFTI, pursuant to their concessionaire's
contract. This indicates that CFTI
became the owner of the taxicabs which
became the principal investment and
asset of the company.
Private respondents failed to
substantiate their claim that Naguiat
Enterprises managed, supervised and
controlled their employment. It appears
that they were confused on the
personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat as an
individual who was the president of
CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises,
Inc., as a separate corporate entity with
a separate business. They presumed
that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the
same time a stockholder and director of
Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was
managing and controlling the taxi
business on behalf of the latter. A closer
scrutiny and analysis of the records,
however, evince the truth of the matter:
that Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising
the taxi drivers and determining their
employment terms, was rather carrying
out his responsibilities as president of
CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a
separate corporation does not appear
to be involved at all in the taxi business.
In the broader interest of justice, we,
however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in
his capacity as president of CFTI,
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cannot be exonerated from joint and
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several liability in the payment of
separation pay to individual
respondents.
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the
president of CFTI who actively
managed the business. Thus, applying
the ruling in A.C. Ransom, he falls
within the meaning of an "employer" as
contemplated by the Labor Code, who
may be held jointly and severally liable
for the obligations of the corporation to
its dismissed employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded
that both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises
were "close family corporations"
owned by the Naguiat family. Section
100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on
Close Corporations) of the Corporation
Code, states:
(5) To the extent that the
stockholders are actively engaged
in the management or operation of
the business and affairs of a close
corporation, the stockholders shall
be held to strict fiduciary duties to
each other and among themselves.
Said stockholders shall be
personally liable for corporate torts
unless the corporation has obtained
reasonably adequate liability
insurance.
Nothing in the records show whether
CFTI obtained "reasonably adequate
liability insurance;" thus, what remains
is to determine whether there was
corporate tort.
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the
definite scope of "corporate tort."
Essentially, "tort" consists in the
violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law.
Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal
duty.
Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates
the employer to grant separation pay to
employees in case of closure or
cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial
reverses, which is the condition
obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply
with this law-imposed duty or
obligation. Consequently, its
stockholder who was actively engaged
in the management or operation of the
business should be held personally
liable.
Pecho vs Sandiganbayan
Issue: Whether or not the attempted or
frustrated stage of the crime defined in
Section 3(e) of RA No 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) is
punishable.
Ruling: NO
Firstly, Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable to
offenses committed under
Special laws. Special Laws can
only punish consummated
offenses.
Secondly, no actual or injury or
damage having been caused to
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the Government due to the
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timely 100% examination of the
 shipment and the subsequent
issuance of a hold order and a
warrant of seizure and detention,
the petitioner must, perforce, be
acquitted of the violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
The elements of Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019 which Petitioner Odon Pecho
violated are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer or
private person charged in
conspiracy with him
2. Said public officer commits the
prohibited acts during the
performance of his official duties
or in relation to his public
position
3. He causes undue injury to any
party, whether the government
or private party
4. Such undue injury is caused by
giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such
parties
5. The public officer has acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable
negligence
In this case, there is no doubt in our
minds that without the early discovery
of the fraud through the timely
recommendation by the Chief
Intelligence Officer for a 100%
examination of the shipment and the
spot check of the shipment by Customs
Senior Agent Ruperto Santiago, the
Government would have been
defrauded in the sum of P1,027,321.00
corresponding to the deficiency in
taxes. Such discovery and the
immediate issuance of a hold order and
a warrant of seizure and detention by
the District Collector of Customs
against the said articles effectively
prevented the consummation of the
offense. The Government incurred no
undue injury or damage. At most then,
the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 reached only the attempted stage
because the perpetrators had
commenced the commission of the
offense directly by overt acts but failed
to perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced the felony
as a consequence by reason or some
cause other than their own
spontaneous desistance, namely, the
timely intervention of alert customs
officials before the release of the
cargoes.
There are two principal reasons why
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, can be said to penalize only
consummated offenses.
Firstly, the penalty imposed therefor
per Section 9 is "imprisonment for not
less than six years and one month nor
more than fifteen years, perpetual
disqualification from office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the
Government of any prohibited interest
and unexplained wealth manifestly out
of proportion to his salary and other
lawful income." The imposable
imprisonment penalty does not have
the nomenclature and duration of any
specific penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, there can be no valid
basis for the application of, inter alia,
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Articles 50 and 51 on the penalty to be
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imposed on the principal of a frustrated
and attempted felony. The penalty of
perpetual disqualification is only from
office, unlike either the perpetual
absolute and perpetual special
disqualifications under Articles 30 and
31 of the Revised Penal Code.
Secondly, the third requisite of Section
3(e), viz., "causing undue injury to any
party, including the government," could
only mean actual injury or damage
which must be established by evidence.
The word causing is the present
participle of the word cause. As a verb,
the latter means "to be the cause or
occasion of; to effect as an agent; to
bring about; to bring into existence; to
make to induce; to compel." The word
undue means "more than necessary;
not proper; illegal." And the word
injury means "any wrong or damage
done to another, either in his person,
rights, reputation or property. The
invasion of any legally protected
interest of another." Taken together,
proof of actual injury or damage is
required.
No actual injury or damage having been
caused to the Government due to the
timely 100% examination of the
shipment and the subsequent issuance
of a hold order and a warrant of seizure
and detention, the petitioner must,
perforce, be acquitted of the violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Issue: Is Petitioner no longer liable for
any offenses under the law?
HOWEVER, fortunately, for the State,
the offense charged in the information
in Criminal Case No. 14844 necessarily
includes the complex crime of estafa
(under paragraph 2(a), Article 315,
Revised Penal Code) through
falsification of public documents (under
Article 171, Revised Penal Code).
The information alleges in no uncertain
terms the essential ingredients of estafa
under said paragraph 2 (a), viz., (1)
false or fraudulent representation of co-
accused Jose Catre that he was the duly
authorized representative of Eversun
Commercial Trading, the alleged
importer of agricultural disc blades and
irrigation water pumps in the container
van when, in truth and in fact, said
importer is non-existent or fictitious
with an equally spurious Tax Account
Number, and that the cargoes imported
were not as declared but 300 units of
diesel engines, which fraudulent acts
were done with the use of falsified
documents such as import entry
declaration, packing list, commercial
invoice and bill of lading; (2) the false
pretenses or fraudulent acts were
executed prior to the commission of the
fraud; and (3) the defraudation of the
Government in the amount of
P1,027,321.00 in taxes representing the
difference between the correct taxes
and duties due and that earlier
computed on the basis of the false
declaration. In other words some of the
essential ingredients of the offense
charged constitute the essential
requisites of estafa through falsification
of official documents. If duly proved by
the evidence for the prosecution that
satisfies the quantum of proof required
for conviction, the petitioner can, under
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the information be convicted of estafa
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through falsification of official and
commercial documents, an offense
which is, as stated earlier, included in
that which is charged.
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance
between allegation and proof. —
When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or
of the offense charged included in
that which is proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or
is included in another. — An offense
charged necessarily includes that
which is proved, when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.
The information in this case can also be
considered as charging two offenses:
the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 and the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification
of official and commercial documents.
The accused having failed to object
before trial to the duplicitous
information, he may be validly
convicted of both or either of the
offenses charged and proved.
Posadas vs Sandiganbayan
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are
liable under the law for causing undue
injury to the government in appointing
Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director
with evident bad faith?
Ruling: NO.
The appointments were in good
faith. Dr. Dayco chose the most
qualified for the project (Dr.
Posadas). The misstep was
essentially of the administrative
kind. The prosecution did not
prove unwarranted benefit or
undue injury.
The bad faith that Section 3(e) of
Republic 3019 requires, said this Court,
does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence. It imputes a dishonest
purpose, some moral obliquity, and a
conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it
partakes of the nature of fraud.
Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to
have taken advantage of his brief
designation as OIC Chancellor to
appoint the absent Chancellor, Dr.
Posadas, as Director and consultant of
the TMC Project. But it cannot be said
that Dr. Dayco made those
appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted
them, fraudulently, knowing fully well
that Dr. Dayco did not have that
authority as OIC Chancellor.
12
All indications are that they acted in
Page
good faith. They were scientists, not
lawyers, hence unfamiliar with Civil
Service rules and regulations. The
world of the academe is usually
preoccupied with studies, researches,
and lectures. Thus, those appointments
appear to have been taken for granted
at UP. It did not invite any immediate
protest from those who could have had
an interest in the positions. It was only
after about a year that the COA
Resident Auditor issued a notice of
suspension covering payments out of
the Project to all UP personnel involved,
including Dr. Posadas.
Still, in response to this notice, the UP
Diliman Legal Office itself rendered a
legal opinion that "confirmed the
authority of Dr. Dayco, while he was
OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas
as project director and consultant of the
TMC Project." Not only this, the COA
Resident Auditor, who at first thought
that the OIC Chancellor had no power
to make the designations, later
accepted the Legal Office’s opinion and
withdrew the Notices of Suspension of
payment that he issued. All these
indicate a need for the Court to
reexamine its position that Dr. Dayco
and Dr. Posadas acted in bad faith in the
matter of those appointments.
This Court has always interpreted
"undue injury" as "actual damage."
What is more, such "actual damage"
must not only be capable of proof; it
must be actually proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty.
A finding of "undue injury" cannot be
based on flimsy and non-substantial
evidence or upon speculation,
conjecture, or guesswork. The Court
held in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan that
the element of undue injury cannot be
presumed even after the supposed
wrong has been established. It must be
proved as one of the elements of the
crime.
Here, the majority assumed that the
payment to Dr. Posadas of ₱30 000.00
monthly as TMC Project Director
caused actual injury to the Government.
The record shows, however, that the
₱247 500.00 payment to him that the
COA Resident Auditor disallowed was
deducted from his terminal leave
benefits.
The prosecution also failed to prove
that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas
"unwarranted advantage" as a result of
the appointments in question. The
honoraria he received cannot be
considered "unwarranted" since there
is no evidence that he did not discharge
the additional responsibilities that such
appointments entailed.
13
Page
Expanded Scope of Quasi-delict
▪ Article 1902, this law is prior to
NCC. The law on quasi-delict under
the Civil Code of Spain which was
ten in force states:
Art. 1902. Any person who by any
act or omission causes damage to
another by his fault or negligence
shall be liable for the damage so
done.
▪ The Supreme Court applied the
above-quoted provision to an
alleged case of malicious
interference in the performance of
contract in the 1919 case of
Daywalt vs La Corporacion de los
Padres Agustinos Recoletos (G.R.
No. 13505, February 4, 1919, 39
Phil. 587), stating that
▪ NOTE THIS! The extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is
NOT EXTINGUISHED even by a
declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.
▪ Criminal liability – proof beyond
reasonable grounds
▪ Civil liability – preponderance of
evidence

“Article 1902 of the Civil Code

declares that any person who by
any act or omission, characterized
by fault or negligence, causes
damage to another shall be liable
for the damage so done. Ignoring
so much of this article as relates to
liability of negligence, we take the
rule to be that a person is liable for
damage done to another by any
culpable act; and by “culpable act’’
we mean any act which is
blameworthy when judged by
accepted legal standards. The idea
thus expressed is undoubtedly
broad enough to include any
rational conception of liability for
the tortious acts likely to be
developed in any society. x x x”
14
Page
February 28, 2022
View that Art. 2176 is limited to
negligence
▪ The view that intentional acts fall
within the purview of Article 2176
on quasi-delict is subject to a
minority opinion to the contrary.
There are authorities for the view
that quasi-delict refers merely to
negligent acts. (Padilla, Civil Code
Annotated, Vol. VII-A, p. 37).
▪ But as times passes by, the concept
of torts evolved wherein there are
now “intentional torts”.
▪ So, torts is not only about negligent
acts but also involves intentional
acts.
▪ Under this view (limited to
negligence), quasi-delict is
homologous but not identical to
tort of common law. (Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Cia Translantica,
38 Phil. 875). In Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Company (38 Phil. 768
[1918]), the Supreme Court cited
Manresa (Vol. 8, p. 68) who
declared that the liability arising
from extra-contractual culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act
or omission which, without willful
intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to
another.
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Cia Transantica
Issue: Is the steamship company liable
to the Plaintiff Manila Railroad
Company by reason of having delivered
the boiler in question in a damaged
condition?
Ruling: YES
Under the contract for transportation
from England to Manila, the Steamship
company is liable to the plaintiff (MRC)
for the injury done to the boiler while it
was being discharged from the ship.
The obligation to transport the boiler
necessarily involves the duty to convey
and deliver it in a proper condition
according to its nature, and
conformably with good faith, custom,
and the law (Article 1258, OCC). The
contract to convey import the duty to
convey and deliver safely and securely
with reference to the degree of care
which, under the circumstances, are
required by law and custom applicable
to the case. The duty to carry and to
carry safely is all one.
Such being the contract of the
Steamship Company, said company is
necessarily liable, under Articles 1103
and 1104 of the (Old) Civil Code, for the
consequences of the omission of the
care necessary to the proper
performance of this obligation. The
contact to transport and deliver at the
port of Manila a locomotive boiler,
which was received by it in proper
condition, is not complied with the
delivery at the port of destination of a
mass of iron the utility of which had
15
been destroyed.
Page
Issue: Is the Atlantic Company liable to
Steamship Company for the damages
which the latter may be compelled to
pay MRC?
Ruling: YES
Reference to a number of these letters
will show that no particular formula
was used by the Atlantic Company in
defining its exemption, and the tenor of
these various communications differs
materially. We think, however, that
some of the letters are of value as an aid
in interpreting the reservation which
the Atlantic Company may have
intended to make.
The idea expressed in these letters is,
we think entirely consonant with the
interpretation which the vice-president
of the company placed upon the
contract which was made with the
steamship company upon this occasion,
that is, the company recognized its duty
to exercise due supervisory care; and
the exemption from liability, whatever
may have been its precise words had
reference to disasters which might
result from some inherent hidden
defect in the lifting apparatus or other
unforeseen occurrence not directly
attributable to negligence of the
company in the lifting operations.
Neither party could have supposed for
a moment that it was intended to
absolve the Atlantic Company from its
duty to use due care in the work.
It is not pretended that negligence on
the part of the Atlantic Company or its
employees was expressly included in
the excepted risk, and we are of the
opinion that the contract should not be
understood as covering such an
exemption. It is a rudimentary principle
that the contractor is responsible for
the work executed by persons whom he
employees in its performance, and this
expressed in the Civil Code in the form
of a positive rule of law (Art. 1596). It is
also expressly declared by law that
liability arising from negligence is
demandable in the fulfillment of all
kinds of obligations (Art. 1103, Civil
Code). Every contract for the
presentation of service therefore has
annexed to it, as an inseparable implicit
obligation, the duty to exercise due care
in the accomplishment of the work; and
no reservation whereby the person
rendering the services seeks to escape
from the consequences of a violation of
this obligations can viewed with favor.
Even admitting that, generally
speaking, a person may stipulate
against liability for the consequences of
negligence, at least in those cases
where the negligence is not gross or
willful, the contract conferring such
exemption must be so clear as to leave
no room for the operation of the
ordinary rules of liability consecrated
by experience and sanctioned by the
express provisions of law.
If the exemption should be understood
in the scene that counsel for the
Atlantic Company now insists it should
bear, that is, as an absolute exemption
from all responsibility for negligence, it
is evident that the agreement was a
most inequitable and unfair one, and
hence it is one that the steamship
16
company cannot be lightly assumed to
Page
have made. Understood in that sense it
is the equivalent of licensing the
Atlantic Company to perform its tasks
in any manner and fashion that it might
please, and to hold it harmless from the
consequences.
Issue: Did the liability of the Atlantic
Company ceased under Article 1903
(Old Civil Code) which declared that the
liability shall cease when the person
proved that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of the family?
Ruling: NO
The obligation of the Atlantic Company
was created by contract, and Article
1903 is not applicable to negligence
arising in the course of the performance
of a contractual obligation. Article 1903
is exclusively concerned with cases
where the negligence arises in the
absence of agreement.
Issue: Can the Atlantic Company be held
DIRECTLY liable to the MRC?
Ruling: NO
Having regard then to the bare fact that
the Atlantic Company undertook to
remove the boiler from the ship's hold
and for this purpose took the property
into its power and control, there arose a
duty to the owner to use due care in the
performance of that service and to
avoid damaging was obviously in
existence before the negligent act may,
if we still ignore the existence of the
express contract, be considered as an
act done in violation of this duty.
The duty thus to use due care is an
implied obligation, of a quasi-
contractual nature, since it is created by
implication of liability with which we
are here confronted is somewhat
similar to that which is revealed in the
case of the depositary, or commodatary,
whose legal duty with respect to the
property committed to their care is
defined by law even in the absence of
express contract; and it cannot be
doubted that a person who takes
possession of the property of another
for the purpose of moving or conveying
it from one place to another, or for the
purpose of performing any other
service in connection therewith (locatio
operis faciendi), owes to the owner a
positive duty to refrain from damaging
it, to the same extent as if an agreement
for the performance of such service had
been expressly made with the owner.
The obligation as if an agreement made
with the owner. The obligation here is
really a species of contract re, and it has
its source and explanation in vital fact,
that the active party has taken upon
himself to do something with or to the
property and has taken it into his
power and control for the purpose of
performing such service. (Compare art.
1889, Civil Code).
In the passage which we have already
from the decision in the Rakes case this
Court recognized the fact that the
violation of a quasi-contractual duty is
subject to articles 1101, 1103, 1104 of
the Civil Code, and not within the
purview of article 1903. Manresa also,
in the paragraph reproduced above is
17
of the opinion that negligence,
Page
considered a substantive and
independent source of liability, does
not include cases where the parties are
previously bound by any other
obligation. Again, it is instructive in this
connection to refer to the contents of
Article 1103 of the Civil Code, where it
is demandable in the fulfillment of all
kinds of obligations. These words
evidently comprehend both forms of
positive obligations, whether arising
from express contract or from implied
contract (quasi contract).
The conclusion must therefore be that if
there had been no contract of any sort
between the Atlantic Company and the
Steamship Company, an action could
have been maintained by the Railroad
Company, as owner, against the Atlantic
Company to recover the damages
sustained by the former. Such damages
would have been demandable under
Article 1103 of the Civil Code and the
action would not have been subject to
the qualification expressed in the last
paragraph of Article 1903.
The circumstance that a contract was
made between the Atlantic Company
and the Steamship company introduces,
however, an important, and in our
opinion controlling factor into this
branch of the case. It cannot be denied
that the Steamship company has
possession of this boiler in the capacity
of carrier and that as such it was
authorized to make a contract with
Atlantic Company to discharge the
same from the ship. Indeed, it appears
in evidence that even before the
contract of affreightment was made the
Railroad Company was informed that it
would necessary for steamship
company to procure the services of
some contractor in the port of Manila to
handle the discharge, as the ship's
tackle was inadequate to handle heavy
cargo. It is therefore to be assumed that
the Railroad Company had in fact
assented to the employment of a
contractor to perform this service.
Now, it cannot be admitted that a
person who contract to do a service like
that rendered by the Atlantic company
in this case incurs a double
responsibility upon entering upon
performance, namely, a responsibility
to the party with whom he contracted,
and another entirely different
responsibility to the owner, based on
an implied contract. The two liabilities
cannot in our opinion coexist. It is a
general rule that an implied contract
never arises where an express contract
has been made.
If double responsibility existed in such
case as this, it would result that a
person who had limited his liability by
express stipulation might find himself
liable to the owner without regard to
the limitation which he had seen fit to
impose by contract. There appears to
be no possibility of reconciling the
conflict that would be developed in
attempting to give effect to those
inconsistent liabilities. The contract,
which was in fact made, in our opinion,
determine not only the character and
extent of the liability of the Atlantic
Company but also the person or entity
by whom the obligation is eligible. It is
of course quite clear that if the Atlantic
18
company had refused to carry out its
Page
agreement to discharge the cargo, the
plaintiff could have enforced specific
performance and could not have
recovered damages for non-
performance.
In view of the preceding discussion it is
equally obvious that, for lack of privity
with the contract, the Railroad
Company can have no right of action to
recover damages from the Atlantic
Company for the wrongful act which
constituted the violation of said
contract. The rights of the plaintiff can
only be made effective through the
Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona
with whom the contract of
affreightment was made.
Cangco vs Manila Railroad Company
Issue: Whether or not MRC is liable to
Cangco.
Ruling: YES
It cannot be doubted that the
employees of the railroad company
were guilty of negligence in piling these
sacks on the platform in the manner
above stated; that their presence
caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted
from the train; and that they therefore
constituted an effective legal cause of
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It
necessarily follows that the defendant
company is liable for the damage
thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence. In resolving
this problem, it is necessary that each
of these conceptions of liability, to-wit,
the primary responsibility of the
defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff
should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the
foundation of the legal liability of the
defendant is the contract of carriage,
and that the obligation to respond for
the damage which plaintiff has suffered
arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability
is direct and immediate, differing
essentially, in legal viewpoint from that
presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by
Article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
can be rebutted by proof of the exercise
of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil
Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
contractual obligations — or to use the
technical form of expression, that
article relates only to culpa aquiliana
and not to culpa contractual.
Distinction between culpa aquiliana
and culpa contractual
This distinction is of the utmost
importance. The liability, which, under
the Spanish law, is, in certain cases
imposed upon employers with respect
to damages occasioned by the
negligence of their employees to
persons to whom they are not bound by
contract, is not based, as in the English
Common Law, upon the principle of
respondeat superior — if it were, the
master would be liable in every case
19
and unconditionally — but upon the
Page
principle announced in Article 1902 of
the Civil Code, which imposes upon all
persons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to another, the
obligation of making good the damage
caused. One who places a powerful
automobile in the hands of a servant
whom he knows to be ignorant of the
method of managing such a vehicle, is
himself guilty of an act of negligence
which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The
obligation to make good the damage
arises at the very instant that the
unskillful servant, while acting within
the scope of his employment causes the
injury. The liability of the master is
personal and direct. But, if the master
has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction
of the servant, he is not liable for the
acts of the latter, whatever done within
the scope of his employment or not, if
the damage done by the servant does
not amount to a breach of the contract
between the master and the person
injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of
diligence and care in the selection and
control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latter's acts
— on the contrary, that proof shows
that the responsibility has never
existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68)
the liability arising from extra-
contractual culpa is always based upon
a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another. A master who
exercises all possible care in the
selection of his servant, taking into
consideration the qualifications they
should possess for the discharge of the
duties which it is his purpose to confide
to them, and directs them with equal
diligence, thereby performs his duty to
third persons to whom he is bound by
no contractual ties, and he incurs no
liability whatever if, by reason of the
negligence of his servants, even within
the scope of their employment, such
third person suffer damage. True it is
that under Article 1903 of the Civil
Code the law creates a presumption
that he has been negligent in the
selection or direction of his servant, but
the presumption is rebuttable and yield
to proof of due care and diligence in
this respect.
The opinion there expressed by this
Court, to the effect that in case of extra-
contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there
shall have been some fault attributable
to the defendant personally, and that
the last paragraph of Article 1903
merely establishes a rebuttable
presumption, is in complete accord
with the authoritative opinion of
Manresa, who says that the liability
created by Article 1903 is imposed by
reason of the breach of the duties
inherent in the special relations of
authority or superiority existing
between the person called upon to
repair the damage and the one who, by
his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of
masters and employers for the
negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or
20
omissions cause damages which
Page
amount to the breach of a contact, is not
based upon a mere presumption of the
master's negligence in their selection or
control, and proof of exercise of the
utmost diligence and care in this regard
does not relieve the master of his
liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity
be extra-contractual or contractual.
Extra-contractual obligation has its
source in the breach or omission of
those mutual duties which civilized
society imposes upon its members, or
which arise from these relations, other
than contractual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in
the concept of status. The legal rights of
each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal
duties, mainly negative in character,
which the existence of those rights
imposes upon all other members of
society. The breach of these general
duties whether due to willful intent or
to mere inattention, if productive of
injury, give rise to an obligation to
indemnify the injured party. The
fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those
which arise from contract, rests upon
the fact that in cases of non-contractual
obligation it is the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual relations the vinculum
exists independently of the breach of
the voluntary duty assumed by the
parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
The position of a natural or juridical
person who has undertaken by contract
to render service to another, is wholly
different from that to which article
1903 relates. When the sources of the
obligation upon which plaintiff's cause
of action depends is a negligent act or
omission, the burden of proof rests
upon plaintiff to prove the negligence
— if he does not his action fails. But
when the facts averred show a
CONTRACTUAL UNDERTAKING by
defendant for the benefit of plaintiff,
and it is alleged that plaintiff has
FAILED OR REFUSED TO PERFORM
THE CONTRACT, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to specify in his pleadings
whether the breach of the contract is
due to willful fault or to negligence on
the part of the defendant, or of his
servants or agents. Proof of the contract
and of its nonperformance is sufficient
prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that
in case of extra-contractual culpa, a
suing creditor should assume the
burden of proof of its existence, as
the only fact upon which his action
is based; while on the contrary, in a
case of negligence which
presupposes the existence of a
contractual obligation, if the
creditor shows that it exists and
that it has been broken, it is not
necessary for him to prove
negligence.
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in
an action for the breach of a contract to
show that the breach was due to the
negligent conduct of defendant or of his
servants, even though such be in fact
the actual cause of the breach, it is
obvious that proof on the part of
21
defendant that the negligence or
Page
omission of his servants or agents
caused the breach of the contract would
not constitute a defense to the action. If
the negligence of servants or agents
could be invoked as a means of
discharging the liability arising from
contract, the anomalous result would
be that person acting through the
medium of agents or servants in the
performance of their contracts, would
be in a better position than those acting
in person. If one delivers a valuable
watch to watchmaker who contract to
repair it, and the bailee, by a personal
negligent act causes its destruction, he
is unquestionably liable. Would it be
logical to free him from his liability for
the breach of his contract, which
involves the duty to exercise due care
in the preservation of the watch, if he
shows that it was his servant whose
negligence caused the injury? If such a
theory could be accepted, juridical
persons would enjoy practically
complete immunity from damages
arising from the breach of their
contracts if caused by negligent acts as
such juridical persons can of necessity
only act through agents or servants,
and it would no doubt be true in most
instances that reasonable care had been
taken in selection and direction of such
servants.
The field of non- contractual obligation
is much more broader than that of
contractual obligations, comprising, as
it does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is
to say, the mere fact that a person is
bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor
may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which
constitutes the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport
plaintiff carried with it, by implication,
the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and
leaving its trains (Civil Code, Article
1258). That duty, being contractual,
was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by
proof that the fault was morally
imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense
involves the assumption that even
granting that the negligent conduct of
its servants in placing an obstruction
upon the platform was a breach of its
contractual obligation to maintain safe
means of approaching and leaving its
trains, the direct and proximate cause
of the injury suffered by plaintiff was
his own contributory negligence in
failing to wait until the train had come
to a complete stop before alighting.
Under the doctrine of comparative
negligence announced in the Rakes case
(supra), if the accident was caused by
plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is
imposed upon defendant's negligence
and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages
should be apportioned. It is, therefore,
important to ascertain if defendant was
in fact guilty of negligence.
22
It may be admitted that had plaintiff
Page
waited until the train had come to a full
stop before alighting, the particular
injury suffered by him could not have
occurred. Defendant contends, and cites
many authorities in support of the
contention, that it is negligence per se
for a passenger to alight from a moving
train. We are not disposed to subscribe
to this doctrine in its absolute form. We
are of the opinion that this proposition
is too badly stated and is at variance
with the experience of every-day life. In
this particular instance, that the train
was barely moving when plaintiff
alighted is shown conclusively by the
fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he
stepped from it. Thousands of person
alight from trains under these
conditions every day of the year, and
sustain no injury where the company
has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions. There is no
reason to believe that plaintiff would
have suffered any injury whatever in
alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform
its duty to provide a safe alighting
place.
We are of the opinion that the correct
doctrine relating to this subject is that
expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence as follows:
The test by which to determine
whether the passenger has been
guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train,
is that of ordinary or reasonable
care. It is to be considered whether
an ordinarily prudent person, of the
age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been
defined to be, not the care which
may or should be used by the
prudent man generally, but the care
which a man of ordinary prudence
would use under similar
circumstances, to avoid injury."
As the case now before us presents
itself, the only fact from which a
conclusion can be drawn to the effect
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence is that he stepped off the car
without being able to discern clearly
the condition of the platform and while
the train was yet slowly moving. In
considering the situation thus
presented, it should not be overlooked
that the plaintiff was, as we find,
ignorant of the fact that the obstruction
which was caused by the sacks of
melons piled on the platform existed;
and as the defendant was bound by
reason of its duty as a public carrier to
afford to its passengers facilities for
safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff
had a right to assume, in the absence of
some circumstance to warn him to the
contrary, that the platform was clear.
The place, as we have already stated,
was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also
is proof of a failure upon the part of the
defendant in the performance of a duty
owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were
by any possibility concede that it had
right to pile these sacks in the path of
alighting passengers, the placing of
them adequately so that their presence
would be revealed.
23
Page
As pertinent to the question of
contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The
company's platform was constructed
upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground.
The distance from the steps of the car
to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the
platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The nature of the platform,
constructed as it was of cement
material, also assured to the passenger
a stable and even surface on which to
alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was
possessed of the vigor and agility of
young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while
the train was yet moving as the same
act would have been in an aged or
feeble person. In determining the
question of contributory negligence in
performing such act — that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently
or recklessly — the age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the
safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. Women, it has been
observed, as a general rule are less
capable than men of alighting with
safety under such conditions, as the
nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the
limbs. Again, it may be noted that the
place was perfectly familiar to the
plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get
on and of the train at this station. There
could, therefore, be no uncertainty in
his mind with regard either to the
length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the
platform where he was alighting. Our
conclusion is that the conduct of the
plaintiff in undertaking to alight while
the train was yet slightly under way
was not characterized by imprudence
and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
▪ Chief Justice Davide (then
Associate Justice) expressed the
same view in Gashem Shookat
Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (219
SCRA 115 [1993]). He observed
that Article 2176 “is limited to
negligent acts or omissions and
excludes the notion of willingness
or intent.
▪ Quasi-delict, known in Spanish
legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is
a civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law
concept.
▪ Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as
assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
Issue: Whether or not Gashem Shookat
Baksh is liable to Marilou Gonzales
under Article 21 of the Civil Code for
the alleged violation of their agreement
to get married.
Ruling: YES
The existing rule is that a breach of
24
promise to marry per se is not an
Page
actionable wrong.
This notwithstanding, the said Code
contains a provision, Article 21, which
is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
defines a quasi-delict is limited to
negligent acts or omissions and
excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish
legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a
civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than
culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
In the general scheme of the Philippine
legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting
the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions,
are to be governed by the Revised Penal
Code while negligent acts or omissions
are to be covered by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. In between these opposite
spectrums are injurious acts which, in
the absence of Article 21, would have
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21
fills that vacuum. It is even postulated
that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts.
In the light of the above laudable
purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him
in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant
to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court
found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations
of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed
marriage."
25
In short, the private respondent
Page
surrendered her virginity, the
 cherished possession of every single Dignity
Filipina, not because of lust but because Reputation Defamation (Art.
of moral seduction — the kind 33)
illustrated by the Code Commission in Privacy Violation of
its example earlier adverted to. The Privacy (Art. 26)
Freedom from Malicious
petitioner could not be held liable for
wrongful actions Prosecution (Arts.
criminal seduction punished under
20 and 21)
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the
Property
Revised Penal Code because the private
Real Property Nuisance (Arts.
respondent was above eighteen (18) 694-770) Quasi-
years of age at the time of the Delict (Art. 2176)
seduction. Economic/Pecuniary
Contracts Interference with
Prior decisions of this Court clearly contractual rights
suggest that Article 21 may be applied (Art. 1314)
in a breach of promise to marry where Freedom from Fraud (Art. 33)
the woman is a victim of moral Deception
seduction.

Equity and Justice

Purposes of Tort Law ▪ The provisions of the Code “uphold
1. to provide a peaceful means for the spirit that giveth life rather
adjusting the rights of parties who than the letter that killeth.” These
might otherwise take the law into general considerations are
their own hands embodied in Articles 21 and 26 of
2. deter wrongful conduct the Civil Code.
3. to encourage socially responsible ▪ Thus, justice and equity demand
behavior that persons who may have been
4. to restore injured parties to their damaged by the wrongful or
original condition, insofar as the negligent act of another are
law can do this, by compensating compensated. This is the general
them for their injury. principle that always applies in
torts law.
▪ Acting with justice involves the
Torts and/or duty to indemnify for damage
Interests Protected Provisions caused under Arts. 20, 21, 28, 27;
involved person to indemnify by reason of unjust
People enrichment under Arts. 22 and 23.
Freedom from contact Physical Injuries
(Art. 32), Quasi-
Delict (Art. 2176)
26

Freedom from Moral Damages

distress (Arts. 2217-2220)
Page
Persons who can sue in case of Torts
▪ As already pointed out earlier, any
person who had been injured by
reason of a tortious conduct can
sue the tortfeasor.
▪ Such plaintiff can be a natural
person or an artificial person like a
corporation.
▪ For example, if a taxi driver was
physically injured when his vehicle
was bumped by another vehicle,
both the driver and the corporation
that owns the taxi unit can sue the
negligent driver of the other.
▪ A defendant may be held liable
even if he does not know the
identity of the plaintiff at the time
of the accident.
▪ How about the local government?
Can it be sued?
Note:
▪ Civil Cases – Plaintiff-Defendant (if in the
nature of a Complaint); Petitioner-
Respondent (if in the nature of a Petition)
▪ Criminal Case – Private Complainant-
Respondent
Defendants: Persons who may be held
liable
▪ Defendants in tort cases can either
be natural or artificial beings. Thus,
the Supreme Court explained that a
corporation is civilly liable in the
same manner as natural persons.
(Philippine National Bank vs. Court
of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978],
citing Fletcher’s Cyclopedia of
Corporations).
▪ The employee or officer concerned
is not free from liability but the
corporation may be held directly
and primarily liable under the
concept of vicarious liability.
▪ In other words, the acts of the
employee can be attributed to the
employer. The employer cannot
feign liability simply because it is
his employee who was responsible
for the injury/damage done to an
individual.
▪ The principle of vicarious liability
is related to the doctrine of
respondeat susperior.
▪ Doctrine of Respondeat Superior is
a legal doctrine, most commonly
used in tort, that holds an
employer or principal legally
responsible for the wrongful acts of
an employee or agent, if such acts
occur within the scope of the
employment or agency. Typically,
when respondeat superior is
invoked, a plaintiff will look to hold
both the employer and the
employee liable. As such, a court
will generally look to the doctrine
of joint and several liability when
assigning damages.
Philippine National Bank vs. CA
Issue: Whether or not Philippine
National Bank is liable for the damages
caused on Private Respondents?
Ruling: YES
As observed by the trial court, time is of
the essence in the approval of the lease
of sugar quota allotments, since the
same must be utilized during the
milling season, because any allotment
27
which is not filled during such milling
Page
season may be reallocated by the Sugar
Quota Administration to other holders
of allotments.
There was no proof that there was any
other person at that time willing to
lease the sugar quota allotment of
private respondents for a price higher
than P2.80 per picul. "The fact that
there were isolated transactions
wherein the consideration for the lease
was P3.00 a picul", according to the
trial court, "does not necessarily mean
that there are always ready takers of
said price. " The unreasonableness of
the position adopted by the petitioner's
Board of Directors is shown by the fact
that the difference between the amount
of P2.80 per picul offered by Tuazon
and the P3.00 per picul demanded by
the Board amounted only to a total sum
of P200.00. Considering that all the
accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the
Bank were secured by chattel mortgage
on standing crops, assignment of
leasehold rights and interests on her
properties, and surety bonds and that
she had apparently "the means to pay
her obligation to the Bank, as shown by
the fact that she has been granted
several sugar crop loans of the total
value of almost P80,000.00 for the
agricultural years from 1952 to 1956",
there was no reasonable basis for the
Board of Directors of petitioner to have
rejected the lease agreement because of
a measly sum of P200.00.
While petitioner had the ultimate
authority of approving or disapproving
the proposed lease since the quota was
mortgaged to the Bank, the latter
certainly cannot escape its
responsibility of observing, for the
protection of the interest of private
respondents, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand in
approving or disapproving the lease of
said sugar quota. The law makes it
imperative that every person "must in
the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. This
petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it
knew that the agricultural year was
about to expire, that by its disapproval
of the lease private respondents would
be unable to utilize the sugar quota in
question. In failing to observe the
reasonable degree of care and vigilance
which the surrounding circumstances
reasonably impose, petitioner is
consequently liable for the damages
caused on private respondents.
Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code,
"any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage." The afore-cited
provisions on human relations were
intended to expand the concept of torts
in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide in the statutes.
A corporation is civilly liable in the
same manner as natural persons for
torts, because "generally speaking, the
rules governing the liability of a
28
principal or master for a tort
Page
committed by an agent or servant are
the same whether the principal or
master be a natural person or a
corporation, and whether the servant
or agent be a natural or artificial
person. All of the authorities agree that
a principal or master is liable for every
tort which he expressly directs or
authorizes, and this is just as true of a
corporation as of a natural person. A
corporation is liable, therefore,
whenever a tortious act is committed
by an officer or agent under express
direction or authority from the
stockholders or members acting as a
body, or, generally, from the directors
as the governing body."
Remedies
▪ Legal remedies are either
a. Preventive
b. Compensatory
▪ Preventive Remedy example:
Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO).
▪ Compensatory Remedy – the
damage has already been done.
Compensation is awarded to
appease the injured party for the
damages done.
▪ The primary purpose of a tort
action is to provide compensation
to a person who was injured by the
tortious conduct of the defendant.
▪ The remedy of the injured person
is therefore primarily an ACTION
FOR DAMAGES against the
defendant. This will only apply if
the case is civil in nature. But
damages can be availed as ancillary
action to the main action. Thus,
action for damages can either be
the principal action or the ancillary
action to the principal action.
▪ Preventive remedy is available in
some cases. A prayer for injunction
and a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary
restraining order may be justified
under certain circumstances. Thus,
in proper cases, the defendant may
be enjoined from continuing with
the performance of a tortious
conduct.
▪ For instance, if a building that is
about to be constructed will
unnecessarily pollute the
environment, the persons affected
may go to court and ask for
injunctive relief. The issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction may
be justified.
Kinds of Negligence
▪ Actionable negligence may either
be
a. culpa aquiliana (quasi-
delict)
b. criminal negligence (delict)
c. culpa contractual
▪ Thus, an action for damages for the
negligent acts of the defendant may
be based on contract, quasi-delict
or delict.
▪ The bases of liability are
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
EACH OTHER even if only one act
or omission is involved.
29
Page
Quasi-Delict: Statutory Basis and
Requisites
▪ Quasi-delict was used by the Code
Commission to designate
negligence as a separate source of
obligation because it “more nearly
corresponds to the Roman Law
classification of obligations and is
in harmony with the nature of this
kind of liability.”
▪ Quasi-delict is governed mainly by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which states that:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
▪ Payment for the damage done talks
about monetary payment.
▪ Thus, you can invoke Article 2176
as legal basis for quasi delict.
Essential Requisites for a Quasi-Delictual
Action
1. an act or omission constituting
fault or negligence
2. damage caused by the said act or
omission
3. the causal relation between the
damage and the act or omission.
▪ Failure to establish the link
between the act or omission and
the damage caused, the defendant
may not be held liable for quasi-
delict.
▪ ALL of these elements must concur.
Absence of one will not result to
liability.
Delict
▪ Criminal negligence, on the other
hand, is governed by Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and
negligence. — Any person who,
by RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE,
shall commit any act which, had
it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its
maximum period; if it would
have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by SIMPLE
IMPRUDENCE OR NEGLIGENCE,
shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would
have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period
shall be imposed.
30
Page
xxx

RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person
performing or failing to perform
on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into
consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and
place.
Simple imprudence consists in
the lack of precaution displayed
in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused
is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest.
xxx
▪ Reckless Imprudence – lack of skill,
lack of foresight. No intent
▪ Example: While driving a car while
intoxicated by alcohol, you bump
someone, and that person died.
You will be liable for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide.
You will not be liable for homicide
because there is not intent to kill.
Elements of the crime (Reckless
Imprudence) defined under Article 365 of
the RPC
1. that the offender does or fails to do
an act
2. that the doing or the failure to do
that act is voluntary
3. that it be without malice
4. that material damage results from
the reckless imprudence
5. that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
Cruz vs CA
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Cruz is guilty
of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide.
Ruling: NO
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Ninevetch
Cruz is liable for damages.
Ruling: YES
This Court finds the foregoing
circumstances insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the
petitioner for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
The elements of reckless imprudence
are:
1) that the offender does or fails to
do an act
31
2) that the doing or the failure to do
Page
that act is voluntary
 3) that it be without malice
4) that material damage results
from the reckless imprudence
and
5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into
consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and
place.
Whether or not a physician has
committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to
the standard of care observed by other
members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of
the profession at the time of treatment
or the present state of medical science.
Whether a physician or surgeon has
exercised the requisite degree of skill
and care in the treatment of his patient
is, in the generality of cases, a matter of
expert opinion. The deference of courts
to the expert opinion of qualified
physicians stems from its realization
that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most
instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating.
Expert testimony should have been
offered to prove that the circumstances
cited by the courts below are
constitutive of conduct falling below
the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when
performing the same operation. It must
be remembered that when the
qualifications of a physician are
admitted, as in the instant case, there is
an inevitable presumption that in
proper cases he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his
knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is
sufficiently established. This
presumption is rebuttable by expert
opinion which is so sadly lacking in the
case at bench.
Even granting arguendo that the
inadequacy of the facilities and
untidiness of the clinic; the lack of
provisions; the failure to conduct pre-
operation tests on the patient; and the
subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San
Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
performed on her by the petitioner do
indicate, even without expert
testimony, that petitioner was
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of
her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof
exists that any of these circumstances
caused petitioner's death. Thus, the
absence of the fourth element of
reckless imprudence: that the injury to
the person or property was a
consequence of the reckless
imprudence.
In litigations involving medical
negligence, the plaintiff has the burden
of establishing appellant's negligence
and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the
surgeon as well as a causal connection
32
of such breach and the resulting death
Page
of his patient.

In order that there may be a recovery
for an injury, it must be shown that the
"injury for which recovery is sought
must be the legitimate consequence of
the wrong done; the CONNECTION
between the negligence and the injury
must be a DIRECT and NATURAL
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, UNBROKEN BY
INTERVENING EFFICIENT CAUSES."
In other words, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury.
For, "negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action
unless it is the PROXIMATE CAUSE of
the injury complained of ."
And "the proximate cause of an injury is
that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."
In this case, the testimonies of both
doctors establish hemorrhage or
hemorrhagic shock as the cause of
death. However, as likewise testified to
by the expert witnesses in open court,
hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock
during surgery may be caused by
several different factors.
According to both doctors, the possible
causes of hemorrhage during an
operation are: (1) the failure of the
surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood
vessel; (2) allowing a cut blood vessel
to get out of control; (3) the subsequent
loosening of the tie or suture applied to
a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a
clotting defect known as DIC. It is
significant to state at this juncture that
the autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on
the body of Lydia did not reveal any
untied or unsutured cut blood vessel
nor was there any indication that the
tie or suture of a cut blood vessel had
become loose thereby causing the
hemorrhage.
xxx
On the other hand, the findings of all
three doctors do not preclude the
probability that DIC caused the
hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's
death. DIC which is a clotting defect
creates a serious bleeding tendency and
when massive DIC occurs as a
complication of surgery leaving raw
surface, major hemorrhage occurs. And
as testified to by defense witness, Dr.
Bu C. Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC
"cannot be prevented, it will happen to
anyone, anytime."
This Court has no recourse but to rely
on the expert testimonies rendered by
both prosecution and defense
witnesses that substantiate rather than
contradict petitioner's allegation that
the cause of Lydia's death was DIC
which, as attested to by an expert
witness, cannot be attributed to the
petitioner's fault or negligence.
The probability that Lydia's death was
caused by DIC was unrebutted during
trial and has engendered in the mind of
this Court a reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of
33
the crime of reckless imprudence
Page
resulting in homicide. While we
condole with the family of Lydia Umali,
our hands are bound by the dictates of
justice and fair dealing which hold
inviolable the right of an accused to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, this Court finds the
petitioner civilly liable for the death of
Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a
crime requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required
to establish civil liability.
Culpa Contractual
▪ Culpa contractual is governed by
the Civil Code provisions on
Obligations and Contracts
particularly Articles 1170 to 1174.
▪ Article 1170 provides that those,
who in the performance of the
obligation are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, are liable for
damages.

The petitioner is a doctor in whose

hands a patient puts his life and limb.
For insufficiency of evidence this Court
was not able to render a sentence of
conviction but it is not blind to the
reckless and imprudent manner in
which the petitioner carried out her
duties. A precious life has been lost and
the circumstances leading thereto
exacerbated the grief of those left
behind. The heirs of the deceased
continue to feel the loss of their mother
up to the present time and this Court is
aware that no amount of compassion
and commiseration nor words of
bereavement can suffice to assuage the
sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one.

Certainly, the award of moral and

exemplary damages in favor of the
heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the
instant case.
34
Page
March 14, 2022
Distinctions between Culpa Aquiliana and
Culpa Contractual
▪ Culpa Contractual – the foundation
of the liability of the defendant is
the contract.
▪ The obligation to answer for the
damage that the plaintiff has
suffered arises from breach of the
contract by reason of defendant’s
failure to exercise due care in its
performance.
▪ Culpa Aquiliana – is a separate
source of obligation independent of
contract.
▪ For instance, when breach of
contract was committed through
the negligence of an employee, the
employer cannot erase his primary
and direct liability by setting up the
defense of the diligence of a good
father of a family in the election
and supervision of the employee.
▪ That is to say the employer’s
liability is direct and immediate,
differing essentially from his
presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of his servants based on
quasi delict under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, which can be
rebutted by proof of the exercise of
due care in their selection and
supervision.
American Express International vs
Cordero
Issue: Whether or not American
Express International, Inc. is liable to
Noel Cordero for damages.
Ruling: NO
Respondent anchors his cause of action
on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
In order that an obligation based on
quasi-delict may arise, there must be no
pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties. But there are
exceptions.
There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a
subsisting contract between the parties.
A liability for tort may arise even under
a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract.
Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would
have itself constituted the source of a
quasi-delictual liability, the contract can
be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict,
the fault or negligence must be the
proximate cause of the damage or
injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury and without
35
which the result would not have
Page
occurred. Proximate cause is
determined by the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent.
According to the trial court, petitioner
should have informed respondent that
on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong
Kong attempted to use a charge card
bearing similar number to that of
respondent’s card; and that petitioner’s
inexcusable failure to do so is the
proximate cause of the "confiscation
and cutting of respondent’s extension
card which exposed the latter to public
humiliation for which petitioner should
be held liable."
We cannot sustain the trial court’s
conclusion.
As explained by respondent himself, he
could have used his card upon
verification by the sales clerk of Watson
that indeed he is the authorized
cardholder. This could have been
accomplished had respondent talked to
petitioner’s representative, enabling
the latter to determine that respondent
is indeed the true holder of the card.
Clearly, no negligence which breaches
the contract can be attributed to
petitioner. If at all, the cause of
respondent’s humiliation and
embarrassment was his refusal to talk
to petitioner’s representative.
Pursuant to the stipulation in the
Cardmember Agreement signed by
respondent, petitioner can revoke
respondent’s card without notice, as
was done here. It bears reiterating that
the subject card would not have been
confiscated and cut had respondent
talked to petitioner’s representative
and identified himself as the genuine
cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude
that there was no negligence on the
part of petitioner and that, therefore, it
cannot be held liable to respondent for
damages.
YHT Realty Corporation vs CA
Issue: Whether or not YHT Realty
Corporation should be held liable for
damages.
Ruling: YES
We are not impressed by petitioners'
argument that the finding of gross
negligence by the lower court as
affirmed by the appellate court is not
supported by evidence. The evidence
reveals that two keys are required to
open the safety deposit boxes of
Tropicana. One key is assigned to the
guest while the other remains in the
possession of the management. If the
guest desires to open his safety deposit
box, he must request the management
for the other key to open the same. In
other words, the guest alone cannot
open the safety deposit box without the
assistance of the management or its
employees. With more reason that
access to the safety deposit box should
be denied if the one requesting for the
opening of the safety deposit box is a
stranger. Thus, in case of loss of any
item deposited in the safety deposit
box, it is inevitable to conclude that the
management had at least a hand in the
consummation of the taking, unless the
36
reason for the loss is force majeure.
Page
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and
Lainez, who were employees of
Tropicana, had custody of the master
key of the management when the loss
took place. In fact, they even admitted
that they assisted Tan on three separate
occasions in opening McLoughlin's
safety deposit box. This only proves
that Tropicana had prior knowledge
that a person aside from the registered
guest had access to the safety deposit
box. Yet the management failed to
notify McLoughlin of the incident and
waited for him to discover the taking
before it disclosed the matter to him.
Therefore, Tropicana should be held
responsible for the damage suffered by
McLoughlin by reason of the negligence
of its employees.
The management contends, however,
that McLoughlin, by his act, made its
employees believe that Tan was his
spouse for she was always with him
most of the time. The evidence on
record, however, is bereft of any
showing that McLoughlin introduced
Tan to the management as his wife.
Such an inference from the act of
McLoughlin will not exculpate the
petitioners from liability in the absence
of any showing that he made the
management believe that Tan was his
wife or was duly authorized to have
access to the safety deposit box.
Mere close companionship and
intimacy are not enough to warrant
such conclusion considering that what
is involved in the instant case is the
very safety of McLoughlin's deposit. If
only petitioners exercised due diligence
in taking care of McLoughlin's safety
deposit box, they should have
confronted him as to his relationship
with Tan considering that the latter had
been observed opening McLoughlin's
safety deposit box a number of times at
the early hours of the morning. Tan's
acts should have prompted the
management to investigate her
relationship with McLoughlin. Then,
petitioners would have exercised due
diligence required of them. Failure to
do so warrants the conclusion that the
management had been remiss in
complying with the obligations
imposed upon hotel-keepers under the
law.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil
Code, those who, in the performance of
their obligations, are guilty of
negligence, are liable for damages. As to
who shall bear the burden of paying
damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of
the same Code provides that the
owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion
of their functions.
Also, this Court has ruled that if an
employee is found negligent, it is
presumed that the employer was
negligent in selecting and/or
supervising him for it is hard for the
victim to prove the negligence of such
employer.
37
Page
Thus, given the fact that the loss of
McLoughlin's money was consummated
through the negligence of Tropicana's
employees in allowing Tan to open the
safety deposit box without the guest's
consent, both the assisting employees
and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as
owner and operator of Tropicana,
should be held solidarily liable
pursuant to Article 2193.
Issue: Whether a hotel may evade
liability for the loss of items left with it
for safekeeping by its guests, by having
these guests execute written waivers
holding the establishment or its
employees free from blame for such
loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil
Code which voids such waivers.
Ruling: NO
The undertaking is null and void.
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot
free himself from responsibility by
posting notices to the effect that he
is not liable for the articles brought
by the guest. Any stipulation
between the hotel-keeper and the
guest whereby the responsibility of
the former as set forth in Articles
1998 to 200137 is suppressed or
diminished shall be void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the
New Civil Code as an expression of
public policy precisely to apply to
situations such as that presented in this
case.
The hotel business like the common
carrier's business is imbued with public
interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not
only lodging for hotel guests and
security to their persons and
belongings. The twin duty constitutes
the essence of the business. The law in
turn does not allow such duty to the
public to be negated or diluted by any
contrary stipulation in so-called
"undertakings" that ordinarily appear
in prepared forms imposed by hotel
keepers on guests for their signature.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the
"undertaking" manifestly contravene
Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for
they allow Tropicana to be released
from liability arising from any loss in
the contents and/or use of the safety
deposit box for any cause whatsoever.
Evidently, the undertaking was
intended to bar any claim against
Tropicana for any loss of the contents
of the safety deposit box whether or not
negligence was incurred by Tropicana
or its employees. The New Civil Code is
explicit that the responsibility of the
hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or
injury to, the personal property of the
guests even if caused by servants or
employees of the keepers of hotels or
inns as well as by strangers, except as it
may proceed from any force majeure. It
is the loss through force majeure that
may spare the hotel-keeper from
liability. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that the act of the thief or
robber was done with the use of arms
or through an irresistible force to
qualify the same as force majeure.
38
Page
Leordina vs Phuture Visions Co.
Issue: Whether or not the City of
Bacolod (Mayor Leonardia) could be
held liable to pay respondents damages.
Ruling: NO
Note that the City of Bacolod is immue
from suit since it has not given its
consent to be sued. But even without
the immunity from suit, petitioner is
still NOT liable for damages.
Respondent Phuture alleged that
petitioners are guilty of surreptitiously
padlocking its SM bingo outlet in a
"patently arbitrary, whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, irregular,
immoral and shamelessly politically
motivated" manner and with clear
discrimination since the majority
owners of the company are the sons of
petitioner Mayor Leonardia's political
rival, then Congressman Monico
Puentevella. Such contention is clearly
but non sequitur, grounded as it is in
pure conjecture.
Sticking closely to the facts, it is best to
recapitulate that while the CA ruled
that respondent was not given due
notice and hearing as to the closure of
its business establishment at SM
Bacolod, it nevertheless remanded the
issue of the award of damages to the
trial court for further proceedings. Such
action would only be an exercise in
futility, as the trial court had already
ruled in its September 6, 2007 Decision
that respondent Phuture had no right
and/or authority to operate bingo
games at SM Bacolod because it did not
have a Business Permit and has not
paid assessment for bingo operation.
Thus, it held that petitioners acted
lawfully in stopping respondent's bingo
operation on March 2, 2007 and closing
its establishment for lack of any
business permit.
The trial court further found that the
Mayor's Office had already decided and
released a Business Permit for
"Professional Services,
Band/Entertainment Services" dated
January 19, 2007 to respondent, which
cannot reasonably expect to receive a
Mayor's Permit for "Bingo Operations"
unless and until it files a new
application for bingo operations,
submit the necessary requirements
therefor, and pay the corresponding
assessment.
Aside from this, the RTC had also found
that respondent's reliance on the GOA
issued by PAGCOR, the SM Award
Notice, and the "questionable" Claim
Slip and Application paper tainted with
alteration/falsification did not appear
to be a right that is clear and
unmistakable. From this, the trial court
concluded that the right being claimed
by respondent to operate bingo games
at SM Bacolod was, at the very least,
doubtful.
Based on the above observations made
by the trial court, it appears that
respondent had no clear and
unmistakable legal right to operate its
bingo operations at the onset.
39
Page
Respondent failed to establish that it
had duly applied for the proper permit
for bingo operations with the Office of
the Mayor and, instead, merely relied
on the questionable claim stub to
support its claim. The trial court also
found that the application form
submitted by respondent pertained to a
renewal of respondent's business for
"Professional Services,
Band/Entertainment Services" located
at "RH Bldg., 26th Lacson St." and not at
SM Bacolod. These factual findings by
the trial court belie respondent's claim
that it had the right to operate its bingo
operations at SM Bacolod.
Certainly, respondent's claim that it had
applied for a license for bingo
operations is questionable since, as it
had admitted in its Petition for
Mandamus and Damages, the primary
purpose in its AOI was only amended to
reflect bingo operations on February
14, 2007 or more than a month after it
had supposedly applied for a license for
bingo operations with the Office of the
Mayor.
It is settled that a judicial admission is
binding on the person who makes it,
and absent any showing that it was
made through palpable mistake, no
amount of rationalization can offset
such admission. This admission clearly
casts doubt on respondent's so-called
right to operate its business of bingo
operations.
Petitioners, in ordering the closure of
respondent's bingo operations, were
exercising their duty to implement laws
and ordinances which include the local
government's authority to issue
licenses and permits for business
operations in the city. This authority is
granted to them as a delegated exercise
of the police power of the State. It must
be emphasized that the nature of bingo
operations is a form of gambling; thus,
its operation is a mere privilege which
could not only be regulated, but may
also very well be revoked or closed
down when public interests so require.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
principle that injury alone does not give
respondent the right to recover
damages, but it must also have a right
of action for the legal wrong inflicted by
petitioners.
In order that the law will give redress
for an act causing damage, there must
be damnum et injuria that act must be
not only hurtful, but wrongful.
The mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered losses does not give rise to
a right to recover damages. To
warrant the recovery of damages,
there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to
the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong
without damage, or damage without
wrong, does not constitute a cause
of action, since damages are merely
part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong.
In order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries
of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted
40
from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff - a
Page
 concurrence of injury to the plaintiff
and legal responsibility by the
person causing it. The underlying
basis for the award of tort damages
is the premise that an individual
was injured in contemplation of
law. Thus, there must first be the
breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be
awarded; it is not sufficient to state
that there should be tort liability
merely because the plaintiff
suffered some pain and suffering.
In other words, in order that the law
will give redress for an act causing
damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be
damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in
many cases, a person sustains actual
damage, that is, harm or loss to his
person or property, without sustaining
any legal injury, that is, an act or
omission which the law does not deem
an injury, the damage is regarded as
damnum absque injuria.
Considering that respondent had no
legal right to operate the bingo
operations at the outset, then it is not
entitled to the damages which it is
demanding from petitioners.
Distinctions between Culpa Aquiliana and
Crimes
1. Crimes affect the public interest
while cuasi-delitos are only of
private concern.
2. The Penal Code punishes or
corrects criminal acts while the
Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs
the damage.
3. Delicts are not as broad as quasi-
delicts because the former are
punished only if there is a penal
law clearly covering them, while
the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all
acts in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes
4. The liability of the employer of the
actor-employee is subsidiary in
crimes while his liability is direct
and primary in quasi-delict.
Concurrence of Causes of Action
▪ A single act or omission may give
rise to two or more causes of
action.
▪ The obligation based on one is
separate and distinct from the
other. That is, an act or omission
may give rise to an action based on
delict, quasi-delict and even
contract.
▪ The same act or omission may
result in both culpa contractual
and culpa aquiliana, in which
event, Article 2194 of the Civil
Code can well apply when two
persons are involved.
▪ Thus, the same negligence of a
guard who is employed by an
41
independent contractor to man a
Page
common carrier may result in the
 solidary liability of the carrier as
well as the independent contractor.
▪ The liability of the carrier is based
on contract and liability of the
contractor is based on quasi-delict.
▪ In fine, a liability for tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort
is that which breaches the contract.
▪ There may also be concurrence of
causes of action even if only one
person is sought to be held liable.
▪ Thus, a common carrier’s liability
may arise ex contractu and at the
same time quasi ex-contractu even
if there is only a single act or
omission.
Definition and Test of Negligence
▪ Article 1173 defines NEGLIGENCE
as the omission of that degree of
diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and
place.
▪ The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as
follows:
Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care
and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the
same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of
negligence.
▪ Reasonable care and caution
should be applied in a case-to-case
basis. Reasonable care and caution
may be different from different
circumstances.
▪ Hence, they can be expected to take
care only when there is something
before them to suggest or warn
danger.
Could a prudent man, in
the case under
consideration, foresee
harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the
actor to take precautions
to guard against harm.
Test of Foreseeability
▪ The test to determine the existence
of negligence is to ask if the
defendant used reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used.
▪ However, to determine what a
reasonable man would have done
requires the application of the test
of foreseeability.
▪ As stated in Picart vs Smith
(supra), the question is “Could a
prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually
pursued?”
42
Page
Picart vs Smith
Issue: Whether or not the defendant in
maneuvering his car was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done.
Ruling: YES
As the defendant started across the
bridge, he had the right to assume that
the horse and the rider would pass over
to the proper side; but as he moved
toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a
moment have perceived that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in
front of the moving vehicle. In the
nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this
moment it was not longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being
run down by going to a place of greater
safety. The control of the situation had
then passed entirely to the defendant;
and it was his duty either to bring his
car to an immediate stop or, seeing that
there were no other persons on the
bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to
avoid the danger of collision. Instead of
doing this, the defendant ran straight
on until he was almost upon the horse.
He was, we think, deceived into doing
this by the fact that the horse had not
yet exhibited fright. But in view of the
known nature of horses, there was an
appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with
automobiles, he might get exited and
jump under the conditions which here
confronted him. When the defendant
exposed the horse and rider to this
danger he was, in our opinion, negligent
in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case
is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy,
or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would
constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course
be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot here be of
much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern
their conduct by the circumstances
which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be, omniscient of the
43
future. Hence they can be expected to
Page
take care only when there is something
before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the
case under consideration, foresee harm
as a result of the course actually
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the
actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by ignoring of the suggestion born of
this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper
criterion for determining the existence
of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against
its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the
defendant in the present case we think
that negligence is clearly established. A
prudent man, placed in the position of
the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which
he was pursuing was fraught with risk,
and would therefore have foreseen
harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law
imposed on the defendant the duty to
guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff
himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. But as we have already stated,
the defendant was also negligent; and
in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately
and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
▪ In determining whether or not the
actor was negligent, the court will
place itself in the position of the
actor and see if a prudent man
could have foreseen the harm that
would result if the conduct is
pursued.
▪ However, the courts should look
more on the possibility of hazard of
some form than the particular
chance that happened.
Standard of Conduct: Good Father of a
Family
▪ The Supreme Court explained in
Picart vs Smith that the standard of
conduct used in the Philippines is
that of paterfamilias in Roman Law
or that who is referred to in Article
1173 of the Civil Code (in relation
to Article 2178) as a good father of
a family.
44
▪ What should be determined in
Page
negligence cases is what is
 foreseeable to a good father of a
family.
▪ A good father of a family is likewise
referred to as the reasonable man,
man, man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence, or ordinary
reasonable prudent man. In
English law, he is sometimes
referred to as the man on top of a
Clapham omnibus.
Principles of Torts
▪ Abuse of Right
Article 19. Every person
must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the
performance of his duties,
act with justice, give
everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good
faith.
▪ Almost every action for damages
initiated in courts used Article 19
as legal basis because there are
many words and phrases that you
can interpret independently and
take it contextually as a whole
under said article.
▪ The exercise of one’s own rights
and performance of one’s own
obligations is not absolute.
▪ You cannot exercise your rights
whimsically at the expense of
another person. It has limitations.
▪ If your action is contrary to Article
19, it may give rise to an action for
damages subject to the
qualifications or elements needed
to establish the case.
▪ Generally, the exercise of any right
must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was
established. It must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to injure.
▪ There is abuse of rights when:
a. The right is exercised for the
only purpose of prejudicing
or injuring another
b. The objective of the act is
illegitimate
c. There is an absence of good
faith
Effects of the Application of Article 19
▪ A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some
illegality. (Globe Mackay vs CA)
▪ It precludes the defenase of
damnum absque injuria. Damnum
absque injuria does not apply
when thereis an abuse of a
person’s right. (Amonoy vs
Gutierrez)
Globe Mackay vs CA
Issue: Whether or not Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp/ is liable to
Restituto Tobias for damages.
Ruling: YES
Article 19, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle
of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not
45
only in the exercise of one's rights but
Page
also in the performance of one's duties.
 however, leave private respondent with
These standards are the following: no relief because Article 21 of the Civil
a. to act with justice Code provides that:
b. to give everyone his due and
c. to observe honesty and good Art. 21. Any person who wilfully
faith. causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals,
The law, therefore, recognizes a good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
primordial limitation on all rights; that
damage.
in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
This article, adopted to remedy the
observed. A right, though by itself legal
"countless gaps in the statutes, which
because recognized or granted by law
leave so many victims of moral wrongs
as such, may nevertheless become the
helpless, even though they have
source of some illegality. When a right
actually suffered material and moral
is exercised in a manner which does not
injur.,”
conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to
In determining whether or not the
another, a legal wrong is thereby
principle of abuse of rights may be
committed for which the wrongdoer
invoked, there is no rigid test which can
must be held responsible.
be applied. The question of whether or
not the principle of abuse of rights has
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of
been violated resulting in damages
conduct for the government of human
under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
relations and for the maintenance of
applicable provision of law, depends on
social order, it does not provide a
the circumstances of each case.
remedy for its violation. Generally, an
action for damages under either Article
And in the instant case, the Court, after
20 or Article 21 would be proper.
examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds
Article 20, which pertains to damage
that all petitioners have indeed abused
arising from a violation of law, provides
the right that they invoke, causing
that:
damage to private respondent and for
Art. 20. Every person who contrary
which the latter must now be
to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify indemnified.
the latter for the same.
Regardless of whether or not it was
However, in the case at bar, petitioners private respondent Tobias who
claim that they did not violate any reported the anomalies to petitioners,
provision of law since they were merely the latter's reaction towards the former
46

exercising their legal right to dismiss upon uncovering the anomalies was
less than civil.
Page

private respondent. This does not,


An employer who harbors suspicions
that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking
the appropriate action such as ordering
an investigation and directing the
employee to go on a leave. Firmness
and the resolve to uncover the truth
would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by
petitioners was certainly uncalled for.
And this reprehensible attitude of
petitioners was to continue when
private respondent returned to work
on November 20, 1972 after his one
week forced leave. Upon reporting for
work, Tobias was confronted by
Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the
crook and swindler in this company."
Considering that the first report made
by the police investigators was
submitted only on December 10, 1972
the statement made by petitioner
Hendry was baseless.
The imputation of guilt without basis
and the pattern of harassment during
the investigations of Tobias transgress
the standards of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the
right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with
the manner in which the right is
exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable
for damages to the employee.
Under the circumstances of the instant
case, the petitioners clearly failed to
exercise in a legitimate manner their
right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter
the right to recover damages under
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
While sound principles of justice and
public policy dictate that persons shall
have free resort to the courts for
redress of wrongs and vindication of
their rights, the right to institute
criminal prosecutions cannot be
exercised maliciously and in bad faith.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the
award of damages was improper,
invoking the principle of damnum
absque injuria. It is argued that "the
only probable actual damage that
Tobias could have suffered was a direct
result of his having been dismissed
from his employment, which was a
valid and legal act of Globe Mackay.
According to the principle of damnum
absque injuria, damage or loss which
does not constitute a violation of a legal
right or amount to a legal wrong is not
actionable.
This principle finds no application in
this case. It bears repeating that even
granting that petitioners might have
had the right to dismiss Tobias from
work, the abusive manner in which that
right was exercised amounted to a legal
wrong for which petitioners must now
be held liable.
Moreover, the damage incurred by
Tobias was not only in connection with
47
the abusive manner in which he was
Page
dismissed but was also the result of
 several other quasi-delictual acts
committed by petitioners (filing of
several criminal complaints, writing of
a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias
had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY
due to dishonesty and that he is the one
responsible for the anomalous
transactions) .
Damnum absque injuria
▪ Under this principle, the legitimate
exercise of a person's rights, even if
it causes loss to another, does not
automatically result in an
actionable injury.
▪ The law does not prescribe a
remedy for the loss. This principle
does not, however, apply when
there is an abuse of a person's
right, or when the exercise of this
right is suspended or extinguished
pursuant to a court order.
▪ Indeed, in the availment of one's
rights, one must act with justice,
give their due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Amonoy vs Gutierrez
Issue: Whether or not the Court of
Appeals was correct was correct in
deciding that the petitioner Amonoy is
liable to the respondents for damages.
Ruling: YES
Well-settled is the maxim that damage
resulting from the legitimate exercise of
a person's rights is a loss without
injury- damnum absque injuria - for
which the law gives NO remedy.
In other words, one who merely
exercises one's rights does no
actionable injury and cannot be held
liable for damages.
Damnum absque injuria finds no
application to this case.
True, petitioner commenced the
demolition of respondents' house on
May 30, 1986 under the authority of a
Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC.
But the records show that a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the
demolition of respondents' house, was
issued by the Supreme Court on June 2,
1986. The CA also found, based on the
Certificate of Service of the Supreme
Court process server, that a copy of the
TRO was served on petitioner himself
on June 4, 1986.
Petitioner, however, did not heed the
TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA
that he unlawfully pursued the
demolition of respondents' house.
The testimony of Angela Gutierrez,
disproves the claim of petitioner that
the demolition, which allegedly
commenced only on May 30, 1986, was
completed the following day. It likewise
belies his allegation that the
demolitions had already ceased when
he received notice of the TRO.
Although the acts of petitioner may
have been legally justified at the outset,
their continuation after the issuance of
the TRO amounted to an insidious
abuse of his right.
48
Page
Indubitably, his actions were tainted
with bad faith. Had he not insisted on
completing the demolition, respondents
would not have suffered the loss that
engendered the suit before the RTC.
Verily, his acts constituted not only an
abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise
of a right that had been suspended
when he received the TRO from this
Court on June 4, 1986. By then he was
no longer entitled to proceed with the
demolition.
The exercise of a right ends when the
right disappears, and it disappears
when it is abused, especially to the
prejudice of others.
The mask of a right without the spirit of
justcie which gives it life, is repugnant
to the modern concept of social law. It
cannot be said that a person exercises a
right when he unnecessarily prejudices
another xxx. Over and above the
specific precepts of postive law are the
supreme norms of justice xxx; and he
who violates them violates the law. For
this reason it is not permissible to
abuse our rights to prejudice others.
Artilce 19, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle
of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not
only in the exercise of one's rights but
also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his
due; recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights: that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible
xxx."
Clearly then, the demolition of
respondents' house by petitioner,
despite his receipt of the TRO, was not
only an abuse but also an unlawful
exercise of such right. In insisting on his
alleged right, he wantonly violated this
Court's Order and wittingly caused the
destruction of respondents’ house.
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke
damnum absque injuria, a principle
premised on the valid exercise of a
right. Anything less or beyond such
exercise will not give rise to the legal
protection that the principle accords.
And when damage or prejudice to
another is occasioned thereby, liability
cannot be obscured, much less abated.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's
liability is premised on the obligation to
repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of one's act
or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law.
49
Page
March 28, 2022
University of the East vs Jader
Issue: Whether or not an educational
institution be held liable for damages
for misleading a student into believing
that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such
is not the case.
Ruling: YES
When a student is enrolled in any
educational or learning institution, a
contract of education is entered into
between said institution and the
student. The professors, teachers or
instructors hired by the school are
considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the
school's commitment under the
contract.
Since the contracting parties are the
school and the student, the latter is not
duty-bound to deal with the former's
agents, such as the professors with
respect to the status or result of his
grades, although nothing prevents
either professors or students from
sharing with each other such
information.
The Court takes judicial notice of the
traditional practice in educational
institutions wherein the professor
directly furnishes his/her students
their grades. It is the contractual
obligation of the school to timely
inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student
as to whether he or she had already
complied with all the requirements for
the conferment of a degree or whether
they would be included among those
who will graduate.
Although commencement exercises are
but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is
not an ordinary occasion, since such
ceremony is the educational
institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included
in the list of those who will be
conferred a degree during the
baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied
all the requirements for such degree.
Prior or subsequent to the ceremony,
the school has the obligation to
promptly inform the student of any
problem involving the latter's grades
and performance and also most
importantly, of the procedures for
remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing
respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time
when he had already commenced
preparing for the bar exams, cannot be
said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be
sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a
suit for abuse of right under Article 19
of the Civil Code.
Good faith connotes an honest intention
to abstain from taking undue advantage
of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with
the absence of all information or belief
of facts, would render the transaction
50
unconscientious.
Page
It is the school that has access to those
information and it is only the school
that can compel its professors to act
and comply with its rules, regulations
and policies with respect to the
computation and the prompt
submission of grades. Students do not
exercise control, much less influence,
over the way an educational institution
should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers
and ensuring their compliance with the
school's rules and orders.
Being the party that hired them, it is the
school that exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over
the professors with respect to the
submission of reports involving the
students' standing. Exclusive control
means that no other person or entity
had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the
damage or injury.
The negligent act of a professor who
fails to observe the rules of the school,
for instance by not promptly submitting
a student's grade, is not only imputable
to the professor but is an act of the
school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution
of learning involved herein is a
university which is engaged in legal
education, it should have practiced
what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good
dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and
20 of the Civil Code.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the
concept of torts by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide specifically
in statutory law.
The ultimate thing in the theory of
liability is justifiable reliance under
conditions of civilized society.
Schools and professors cannot just take
students for granted and be indifferent
to them, for without the latter, the
former are useless. Educational
institutions are duty-bound to inform
the students of their academic status
and not wait for the latter to inquire
from the former.
The conscious indifference of a person
to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected
by his act or omission can support a
claim for damages. Want of care to the
conscious disregard of civil obligations
coupled with a conscious knowledge of
the cause naturally calculated to
produce them would make the erring
party liable.
Petitioner ought to have known that
time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform
respondent of his grade. It cannot feign
ignorance that respondent will not
prepare himself for the bar exams since
that is precisely the immediate concern
after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It
failed to act seasonably. Petitioner
cannot just give out its student's grades
51
at any time because a student has to
Page
comply with certain deadlines set by
the Supreme Court on the submission
of requirements for taking the bar.
Petitioner's liability arose from its
failure to promptly inform respondent
of the result of an examination and in
misleading the latter into believing that
he had satisfied all requirements for the
course.
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to
the professors to justify its own
negligence that led to the delayed relay
of information to respondent. When
one of two innocent parties must suffer,
he through whose agency the loss
occurred must bear it.
The modern tendency is to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where
there is abuse of right, even when the
act is not illicit. If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can make him
liable for damages for injury caused
thereby, with more reason should
abuse or bad faith make him liable.
A person should be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise
of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse.
However, while petitioner was guilty of
negligence and thus liable to
respondent for the latter's actual
damages, we hold that respondent
should not have been awarded moral
damages. We do not agree with the
Court of Appeals' findings that
respondent suffered shock, trauma and
pain when he was informed that he
could not graduate and will not be
allowed to take the bar examinations.
At the very least, it behooved on
respondent to verify for himself
whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student,
respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all
his affairs, specifically those pertaining
to his academic achievement, are in
order.
Given these considerations, we fail to
see how respondent could have
suffered untold embarrassment in
attending the graduation rites,
enrolling in the bar review classes and
not being able to take the bar exams. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by
his failure to take the bar, he brought
this upon himself by not verifying if he
has satisfied all the requirements
including his school records, before
preparing himself for the bar
examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a
mental preparation on the subjects
thereof; there are also prerequisites of
documentation and submission of
requirements which the prospective
examinee must meet.
52
Page
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Reyes
Issue: Whether or not Ruby Lim acted
abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to
leave the party where he was not
invited by the celebrant thereof thereby
becoming liable under Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code. If Ruby Lim is
liable, whether or not Nikko Hotel, as
her employer, is solidarily liable with
her.
Ruling: NO
In the absence of any proof of motive
on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr.
Reyes and expose him to ridicule and
shame, it is highly unlikely that she
would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the
hotel business for twenty years
wherein being polite and discreet are
virtues to be emulated, the testimony of
Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary
does not inspire belief and is indeed
incredible.
Considering the closeness of defendant
Lim to plaintiff when the request for the
latter to leave the party was made such
that they nearly kissed each other, the
request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no
intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s
reaction to the request that must have
made the other guests aware of what
transpired between them.
Had plaintiff simply left the party as
requested, there was no need for the
police to take him out.
Moreover, another problem with Mr.
Reyes’s version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil
cases that he who alleges proves. Mr.
Reyes, however, had not presented any
witness to back his story up. All his
witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito
Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved
only that it was Dr. Filart who invited
him to the party.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to
ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to
which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable to pay for damages under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee.
"A right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible."
The object of this article, therefore, is
to set certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance
of one’s duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith.
Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following:
a. There is a legal right or duty
53
b. which is exercised in bad faith
Page
 c. for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.
When Article 19 is violated, an action
for damages is proper under Articles 20
or 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 20 pertains to damages arising
from a violation of law which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly
within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave.
A common theme runs through Articles
19 and 21, and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.
As applied to herein case and as earlier
discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown
that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
against him. These two people did not
know each other personally before the
evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
Reyes had nothing to offer for an
explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged
abusive conduct except the statement
that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years
old," had a "very strong bias and
prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly
influenced by her associates in her
work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen." The lameness of this
argument need not be belabored.
Suffice it to say that a complaint based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code
must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and
conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which
Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
likewise acceptable and humane under
the circumstances.
Without proof of any ill-motive on her
part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs.
Filart cannot amount to abusive
conduct especially because she did
inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion
who told her that Mrs. Filart did not
invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is
guilty only of bad judgment which, if
done with good intentions, cannot
amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and
moral damages, neither can petitioners
Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel
Nikko are concerned, any damage
which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a
legitimate right done within the bounds
of propriety and good faith, must be his
to bear alone.
Acts Contrary to Law
Article 20. Every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
▪ The provision is intended to
provide a remedy in cases where
the law declares an act illegal but
fails to provide for a relief to the
party injured.
54
Page
 ▪ The New Civil Code does not
distinguish, and the act may e done
willfully or negligently.
Requisites for Article 20 to apply
1. The act must be willful or
negligent
2. It must be contrary to law
3. Damages must be suffered by
the injured party
Acts Contrary to Morals
Article 21. Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
▪ This article is designed to fill in the
“countless gaps” in the statutes
which would otherwise leave
victims of moral wrongs helpless.
Elements of Article 21
1. Legal action
2. Contrary to morals, public
policy, good customs
3. Intent to injure
Wassmer vs Velez
Issue: Whether or not Francisco Velez
should be held liable to Beatriz
Wassmer for breach of promise to
marry.
Ruling: YES
Mere breach of a promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong.
It must not be overlooked, however,
that the extent to which acts not
contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that
"any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23,
1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for
a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued. Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances. The bride-to-be's
trousseau, party dresses and other
apparel for the important occasion
were purchased. Dresses for the maid
of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts received.
And then, with but two days before the
wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old, simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding
— My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao,
and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon."
But he never returned and was never
heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach
of promise to marry.
55
Page
As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But
to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
Per express provision of Article 2219
(10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As
to exemplary damages, defendant
contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-
narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ...,
reckless and oppressive manner."
Baksh vs CA
Where a man's promise to marry is in
fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind
it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
Tanjanco vs CA
Issue: Whether or not Apolonio
Tanjanco should be held liable under
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Ruling: NO
In holding that the complaint stated a
cause of action for damages, under
Article 21 above mentioned, the Court
of Appeals relied upon and quoted from
the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature in
1949 to support the original draft of the
Civil Code.
But the Code Commission has gone
farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material
and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in
the proposed Civil Code the
56
following rule:
Page
 "ART. 23. Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage."
An example will illustrate the
purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made,
or cannot be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as
the girl is above eighteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be
filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and
her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and
her parents cannot bring any action
for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of
action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have
overlooked that the example set forth
in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a
minor who has been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in
law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman
has yielded.
To constitute seduction there must in
all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other
inducement.
If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction. She must
be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her
ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer.
In this case, based on the allegations in
the complaint, the facts stand out that
for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult
age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated
acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant
been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut chart all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant
did not intend to fulfill his promises.
Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the
57
Court of First Instance in dismissing the
Page
complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be
understood as without prejudice to
whatever actions may correspond to
the child of the plaintiff against the
defendant-appellant
Malicious Prosecution
▪ Malicious Prosecution – is the
institution of any action or
proceeding, either civil or criminal,
maliciously and without probable
cause.
Elements of Malicious Prosecution
1. The fact of the prosecution
and the defendant was
himself the prosecutor, and
that the action was finally
terminated with an acquittal
2. The prosecutor acted
without probable cause
3. The prosecutor was
impelled by legal malice.
Public Humiliation
▪ It is against morals, good customs
and public policy to humiliate,
embarrass and degrade the dignity
of a person. Everyone must respect
the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mine of his neighbors
and other persons (Article 26 of
the Civil Code).
▪ One must act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith (Article 19,
Civil Code).
Grand Union vs Espino
Issue: Whether or not Grand Union
Supermarket, Inc. should be held liable
to Jose Espino Jr. under Article 19 and
21 of the Civil Code for public
humiliation.
Ruling: YES
We agree with the holding of the
respondent appellate court that "the
evidence sustains the court's finding
that the plaintiff had absolutely no
intention to steal the file."
The totality of the facts and
circumstances as found by the Court of
Appeals unerringly points to the
conclusion that private respondent did
not intend to steal the file and that is
act of picking up the file from the open
shelf was not criminal nor done with
malice or criminal intent for on the
contrary, he took the item with the
intention of buying and paying for it.
This Court needs only to stress the
following undisputed facts which
strongly and convincingly uphold the
conclusion that private respondent was
not "shoplifting." Thus, the facts that
private respondent after picking the
cylindrical "rat-tail" file costing P3.85
had placed it inside his left front breast
pocket with a good portion of the item
exposed to view and that he did not
conceal it in his person or hid it from
sight as well as the fact that he paid the
purchases of his wife amounting to
P77.00 at the checkout counter of the
Supermarket, owed that he was not
58
acting suspiciously or furtively. And the
Page
circumstance that he was with his
family consisting of his wife Mrs.
Caridad Jayme Espino, and their two
daughters at the time negated any
criminal intent on his part to steal.
Moreover, when private respondent
was approached by the guard of the
Supermarket as he was leaving by the
exit to his car who told him, "Excuse
me, Mr., I think you have something in
your pocket which you have not paid
for," Espino, immediately apologized
and answered, "I am sorry," which
indicated his sincere apology or regrets.
He turned back towards the cashier to
pay for the file which proved his
honesty sincerity and good faith in
buying the item, and not to shoplift the
same. His brief statement on the sheet
of paper called the Incident Report
where private respondent wrote the
following: "While talking to my aunt's
maid with my wife, I put this item in in
my shirt pocket. I forgot to check it out
with my wife's item," was an instant
and contemporaneous explanation of
the incident.
We likewise concur with the Court of
Appeals that "upon the facts and under
the law, plaintiff has clearly made the
cause of action for damages against the
defendants. Defendants willfully caused
loss or injury to plaintiff in a manner
that was contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, making them
amenable to damages under Articles 19
and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code." That private respondent
was falsely accused of shoplifting is
evident. ln plain words, private
respondent was regarded and
pronounced a shoplifter and had
committed "shoplifting" as what can be
gleaned from the entries in the Incident
Report.
We also affirm the Court of Appeals'
finding that petitioner Nelia Santos
Fandino, after reading the incident
report, remarked the following: "Ano,
nakaw na naman ito". Such a remark
made in the presence of private
respondent and with reference to the
incident report with its entries, was
offensive to private respondent's
dignity and defamatory to his character
and honesty. When Espino explained
that he was going to pay the file but
simply forgot to do so, Fandino doubted
the explanation saying: "That is all what
they say, the people whom we caught
not paying for the goods say... they all
intended to pay for the things that are
found to them." Private respondent
objected and said that he was a regular
customer of the Supermarket.
The admission of Fandino that she
required private respondent to pay a
fine of P5.00 and did in fact take the
P5.00 bill of private respondent
tendered by the latter to pay for the file,
as a fine which would be given as an
incentive to the guards who apprehend
pilferers clearly proved that Fandino
branded private respondent as a thief
which was not right nor justified.
The false accusation charged against
the private respondent after detaining
and interrogating him by the uniformed
guards and the mode and manner in
which he was subjected, shouting at
59
him, imposing upon him a fine,
Page
threatening to call the police and in the
presence and hearing of many people at
the Supermarket which brought and
caused him humiliation and
embarrassment, sufficiently rendered
the petitioners liable for damages
under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
We rule that under the facts of the case
at bar, petitioners wilfully caused loss
or injury to private respondent in a
manner that was contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. It is
against morals, good customs and
public policy to humiliate, embarrass
and degrade the dignity of a person.
Everyone must respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons
(Article 26, Civil Code). And one must
act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith
(Article 19, Civil Code).
Private respondent is entitled to moral
damages.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages may be adjudicated, the
assessment of such damages, except
liquidated ones, is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case (Art. 2216,
New Civil Code).
In the case at bar, there is no question
that the whole incident that befell
respondent had arisen in such a
manner that was created unwittingly by
his own act of forgetting to pay for the
file. It was his forgetfulness in checking
out the item and paying for it that
started the chain of events which led to
his embarassment and humiliation
thereby causing him mental anguish,
wounded feelings and serious anxiety.
Yet, private respondent's act of
omission contributed to the occurrence
of his injury or loss and such
contributory negligence is a factor
which may reduce the damages that
private respondent may recover (Art.
2214, New Civil Code).
Moreover, that many people were
present and they saw and heard the
ensuing interrogation and altercation
appears to be simply a matter of
coincidence in a supermarket which is a
public place and the crowd of
onlookers, hearers or bystanders was
not deliberately sought or called by
management to witness private
respondent's predicament. We do not
believe that private respondent was
intentionally paraded in order to
humiliate or embarrass him because
petitioner's business depended for its
success and patronage the good will of
the buying public which can only be
preserved and promoted by good
public relations.
The purpose of moral damages is
essentially indemnity or reparation,
both punishment or correction. Moral
damages are emphatically not intended
to enrich a complainant at the expense
of a defendant; they are awarded only
to enable the injured party to obtain
60
means, diversion or amusements that
Page
will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason
of the defendant's culpable action. In
other words, the award of moral
damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante and, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
The grant of exemplary damages is
unjustified.
Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages
(Art. 2229, New Civil Code). Exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they could be
adjudicated (Art. 2223, New Civil
Code).
Considering that exemplary damages
are awarded for wanton acts, that they
are penal in character granted not by
way of compensation but as a
punishment to the offender and as a
warning to others as a sort of deterrent,
We hold that the facts and
circumstances of the case at bar do not
warrant the grant of exemplary
damages.
Petitioners acted in good faith in trying
to protect and recover their property, a
right which the law accords to them.
Under Article 429, New Civil Code, the
owner or lawful possessor of a thing
has a right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof and
for this purpose, he may use such force
as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property. And since
a person who acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office exempts him from civil or
criminal liability, petitioner may not be
punished by imposing exemplary
damages against him. We agree that
petitioners acted upon probable cause
in stopping and investigating private
respondent for taking the file without
paying for it, hence, the imposition of
exemplary damages as a warning to
others by way of a deterrent is without
legal basis. We, therefore, eliminate the
grant of exemplary damages to the
private respondent.
Classification of Torts
According to the Manner of Commission:
1. Negligent Tort – consists in the
failure to act according to the
standard of diligence required
under the attendant circumstances.
It is a voluntary act or omission
which results in injury to others,
without intending to cause the
same.
2. Intentional Tort – perpetrated by
one who intends to do that which
the law has declared to be wrong.
It is conduct where the actor
desires to cause the consequence
of the actor that he believes that
61
the consequences are substantially
Page
certain to result therefrom.

Note: Article 2176 where it refers
to “fault or negligence” covers not
only acts “not punishable by law”
but also criminal acts in character,
whether intentional, voluntary or
negligent.
3. Strict Liability – one is liable
independent of fault or negligence.
It only requires proof of certain set
of facts. Liability here is based on
the breach of an absolute duty to
make something safe. It most often
applies to ultra-hazardous
activities or in product liability
cases.
It is also known as “Absolute
Liability” or “Liability without
Fault”.
The Tortfeasor
▪ Tortfeasor – refers to all person
who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a ort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit.
▪ A tortfeasor may not necessarily be
the one performing the overt acts.
He could be the one who instigated
someone to do it. He could be the
principal who made the command
to do an act or omission which was
perpetrated by another person.
▪ One acting as principal by
inducement or principal by direct
participation may still be
considered as tortfeasor.
Direct Tortfeasor
Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done.
▪ Note: The tortfeasor may be a
natural or juridical person.
Persons made Liable for Others
Article 2180 (1). The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
Principle of Vicarious Liability
▪ A person who has not committed
the act or omission which caused
damage or injury to another may
nevertheless be held civilly liable
to the latter either directly or
subsidiary under certain
circumstances.
▪ This is also known as the “Doctrine
of Imputed Negligence”.
▪ GENERAL RULE: Proper defense is
the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family (bonus
paterfamilias) in cases where
vicarious liability is invoked.
▪ EXCEPTION: Common carriers and
all others subject to extraordinary
62
diligence.
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Liability of Actual Tortfeasor
▪ The author of the act is not
exempted from personal liability.
▪ He may be sued alone or with the
person responsible for him.
Presumption of Negligence on Persons
Indirectly Responsible
▪ Liability arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible under
the article, derived from their
failure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of the
subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage.
▪ This presumption is disputable. If
you can present proof to the
contrary, you are not liable.
▪ The nonperformance of certain
duties of precaution and prudence
imposed upon the persons who
become responsible by civil bond
uniting the actor to them.
▪ The basis of vicarious, although
primary, liability is, as in Article
2176, fault or negligence, which is
presumed from that which
accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may
therefore be rebutted.
Nature of Liability
▪ The liability of the vicarious
obligor is PRIMARY and DIRECT
(solidary liable with tortfeasor),
not subsidiary.
▪ His responsibility is not
conditioned upon the insolvency of
or prior recourse against the
negligent tortfeasor.
Persons Vicariously Liable (Article 2180)
Who are liable for Minors?
1. Parents (father, and in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother)
2. Adopters
3. Court-Appointed Guardians
4. Substitute Parental Authorities
a. Grandparents
b. Oldest Qualified Sibling over
21 years old
c. Child’s Actual Custodian,
provided he is qualified and
over 21 years old
5. Special Parental Authorities
Note: Follow this particular order.
Parents and Adopters
▪ Basis of Liability: It is based on the
presumption of failure on their
part to properly exercise their
parental authority for the good
education of their children and
exert adequate vigilance over
them.
▪ It is imposed only when children
are living with the parents.
▪ If there is just cause for separation,
the responsibility ceases. Ex. Order
for Civil Interdiction.
▪ Note: The responsibility of the
father and mother is not
simultaneous but alternate.
63
Page
Adopted Children
▪ Judicially adopted children are
considered legitimate children of
their adopting parents.
▪ Thus, adopters are civilly liable for
their tortious/criminal acts if the
children live with them and are
below 21 years old.
y cannot invoke due diligence as a
▪ What if the child did not undergo
the legal process of adoption but it
is common knowledge that the
child is adopted in paper
(simulated the birth of the child)?
▪ Liability of adopters under Article
2180 will only apply if the child is
judicially adopted.
▪ Take Note: Administrative
Adoption that will take effect this
2022.
Illegitimate Children
▪ Responsibility is with the mother
whom the law vests parental
authority.
Reasons for Vicarious Liability
▪ The civil liability which the law
imposes upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that
maybe caused by the minor
children who live with them is
obvious.
▪ This is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the duty of
supporting them, keeping them in
their company, educating them in
proportion to their means, while
on the other hand, gives them the
right to correct and punish them in
moderation.
▪ The parent’s liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code is primary
and not subsidiary.
▪ If it were subsidiary, the parents
defense.
▪ Such interpretation reconciles
Article 2180 with Article 2194
which calls for solidary liability of
joint tortfeasors.
Requisites for the Liability of Parents to
Attach
1. The child is below 21 years old
2. The Child is under parental
authority of the parents
3. The child is living in the company
of the parents.
Liability of Guardians
▪ Are we referring to Guardians
because they are the one exercising
control and supervision over their
wards or Legal Guardians where
there is a letter of guardianship
issued by court to one who will act
in behalf of his ward?
▪ A guardian is a person in whom the
law has entrusted the custody and
control of the person or estate or
both of an infant, insane, or other
persons incapable of managing his
own affair.
▪ Guardianship involves not only
custody, that is immediate care and
64
control, but those of one in loco
Page
parentis as well. Hence, even if
 their ward is already of age,
guardians have the same liability
as persons exercising parental
authority.
Article 2180, par. 3. Guardians
are liable for damages caused by
the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their
authority and live in their
company.
▪ The liability of guardians with
respect to their wards is governed
by the same rule as in the liability
of parents with respect to their
children below 21 years and who
live with them.
▪ “Incompetent” (who needs a
guardian) includes:
1. Those suffering the penalty of
School, Teachers and Administrators
civil interdiction
2. Prodigals
3. Deaf and dumb who are
unable to read and write
4. Unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals
5. Being of sound mind, but by
reason of age, disease, weak
mind, and other similar
causes, cannot take care of
themselves or manage their
property. (Rule 92, Rules of
Court)
▪ Not all guardians of incompetents
specified in Rule are vicariously
liable. In Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, liability is imposed
only on guardians of imbecile and
insane persons. On the other hand,
Article 2180 of the Civil Code limits
the liability of guardians to acts of
incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and who live
in their company.
▪ The legal authority referred to in
Article 2180 is legal authority over
the person of the ward and not
legal authority only with respect to
the property of a person declared
as incompetent although of
majority age.
▪ Such limitation and the
requirement that the ward must
live in their company virtually
limits the liability of guardians to
the acts of persons of unsound
mind who live in the company of
the guardian (in addition to acts of
minors).
Article 2180, par. 7. Teachers or
head of establishment of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody.
▪ Parental Authority of Special
Parental Authorities may only be
exercised while under their
supervision, instruction, or
custody. This attaches to all
authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the school, entity
or institution.
▪ As long as it is shown that the
student is in the school premises
65
pursuant to a legitimate student
Page
objective, in the exercise of a
 legitimate right, or the enjoyment
of a legitimate student privilege,
the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student
continues.
Amadora vs CA
Issue: Whether or not the Colegio De
San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable
for damages for the death of its student
Alfredo Amadora under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.
Ruling: NO
Resolution of all these disagreements
will depend on the interpretation of
Article 2180 which, as it happens, is
invoked by both parties in support of
their conflicting positions. The
pertinent part of this article reads as
follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
After an exhaustive examination of the
problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in
question (Article 2180) should apply to
all schools, academic as well as non-
academic.
There is really no substantial
distinction between the academic and
the non-academic schools insofar as
torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the TEACHER over the
students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching. The
teacher certainly should not be able to
excuse himself by simply showing that
he is teaching in an academic school
where, on the other hand, the head
would be held liable if the school were
non-academic.
The other matter to be resolved is the
duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the
period when the student is actually
undergoing studies during the school
term, as contended by the respondents
and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under
examination, it is clear that while the
custody requirement, does not mean
that the student must be boarding with
the school authorities, it does signify
that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the
school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not
necessarily mean that such, custody be
co-terminous with the semester,
beginning with the start of classes and
ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of
registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before
the commencement exercises.
66
In the view of the Court, the student is
Page
in the custody of the school authorities
as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the
student comes under the discipline of
the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he
has already registered and thus placed
himself under its rules. Neither should
such discipline be deemed ended upon
the last day of classes notwithstanding
that there may still be certain requisites
to be satisfied for completion of the
course, such as submission of reports,
term papers, clearances and the like.
During such periods, the student is still
subject to the disciplinary authority of
the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of
its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the
student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities
over the student continues.
Indeed, even if the student should be
doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the
ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of
Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is
obviously the teacher-in-charge who
must answer for his students' torts, in
practically the same way that the
parents are responsible for the child
when he is in their custody. The
teacher-in-charge is the one designated
by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which
they are assigned. It is not necessary
that at the time of the injury, the
teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it. Custody does not
connote immediate and actual physical
control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused
by the student, the teacher and not the
parent shall be held responsible if the
tort was committed within the
premises of the school at any time
when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.
In this connection, it should be
observed that the teacher will be held
liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require
that the offending student be of
minority age. Unlike the parent, who
will be liable only if his child is still a
minor, the teacher is held answerable
by the law for the act of the student
under him regardless of the student's
age.
It is not the school that will be held
67
directly liable. Moreover, the defense of
Page
due diligence is available to it in case it
is sought to be held answerable as
principal for the acts or omission of its
head or the teacher in its employ.
In this case, the rector, the high school
principal and the dean of boys cannot
be held liable because none of them
was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising
only a general authority over the
student body and not the direct control
and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or
sections and thus immediately involved
in its discipline. The evidence of the
parties does not disclose who the
teacher-in-charge of the offending
student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did
not necessarily make the physics
teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,
the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the
teacher-in-charge, there is no showing
that Dicon was negligent in enforcing
discipline upon Daffon or that he had
waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned
their non-observance. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be
considered against him because he was
not supposed or required to report to
school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in
the custody of the teacher-in-charge
even if the latter was physically absent
when the tort was committed, it has not
been established that it was caused by
his laxness in enforcing discipline upon
the student. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that
they had exercised due diligence,
through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that
discipline.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it
is probably the dean of boys who
should be held liable especially in view
of the unrefuted evidence that he had
earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun
from one of the students and returned
the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the
matter to higher authorities. While this
was clearly negligence on his part, for
which he deserves sanctions from the
school, it does not necessarily link him
to the shooting of Amador as it has not
been shown that he confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed
the petitioners' son.
Finally, as previously observed, the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be
held directly liable under the article
because only the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by
the student or apprentice. Neither can it
be held to answer for the tort
committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been
found to have been charged with the
custody of the offending student or has
been remiss in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts
as disclosed by the record and in the
light of the principles herein announced
that none of the respondents is liable
68
for the injury inflicted by Pablito
Page
Damon on Alfredo Amadora that
 resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son
under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to
extend them the material relief they
seek, as a balm to their grief, under the
law they have invoked.
Note: Academic institutions cannot
exempt from liability in view of a waiver
that was executed by the students
exempting the school from liability while
the student is under the control and
supervision of the school while in an
activity (ex. field trip).
Ylarde vs Aquino
Issue: Whether or not under Article
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, both
Aquino and Soriano respectively can be
held liable for damages.
Ruling: NO to Soriano, YES to Aquino.
As regards the principal (Soriano), the
Supreme Court held that he cannot be
made responsible for the death of the
child Ylarde, he being the head of an
academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. Under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and
not the head of an academic school who
should be answerable for torts
committed by their students.
Where the school is academic
rather than technical or
vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and
only he, who shall be held liable
as an exception to the general
rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts
of their students except where
the school is technical in nature,
in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable.
Soriano, as principal, cannot be held
liable for the reason that the school he
heads is an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades. Besides, as
clearly admitted by private respondent
Aquino, private respondent Soriano did
not give any instruction regarding the
digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily
seen that private respondent Aquino
can be held liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge
of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to
take the necessary precautions to
prevent any injury on their persons.
However, petitioners base the alleged
liability of private respondent Aquino
on Article 2176 which is separate and
distinct from that provided for in
Article 2180.
Under Article 2176, Aquino is still liable
69
for damages.
Page
The negligent act of Aquino in leaving
his pupils in such a dangerous site has a
direct causal connection to the death of
the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it
was but natural for the children to play
around. Tired from the strenuous
digging, they just had to amuse
themselves with whatever they found.
Driven by their playful and
adventurous instincts and not knowing
the risk they were facing three of them
jumped into the hole while the other
one jumped on the stone. Since the
stone was so heavy and the soil was
loose from the digging, it was also a
natural consequence that the stone
would fall into the hole beside it,
causing injury on the unfortunate child
caught by its heavy weight. Everything
that occurred was the natural and
probable effect of the negligent acts of
private respondent Aquino. Needless to
say, the child Ylarde would not have
died were it not for the unsafe situation
created by private respondent Aquino
which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger.

70
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April 5, 2022
Owners and Managers of Establishment
and Enterprises
Article 2180, par. 4. The owners
and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which
the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
▪ Owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise does
not include a manager of a
corporation.
▪ Spanish term “directores” connotes
“employer.” Manger of a
corporation is not an employer, but
rather merely an employee of the
owner.
Philippine Rabbit vs Philam Forwarders
Issue: Whether the terms "employers"
and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" used in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code embrace
the manager of a corporation owning a
truck, the reckless operation of which
allegedly resulted in the vehicular
accident from which the damage arose.
Ruling: NO
We are of the opinion that those terms
do not include the manager of a
corporation.
It may be gathered from the context of
Article 2180 that the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) is
used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the
complaint, no tortious or quasi-
delictual liability can be fastened on
Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the
vehicular accident already mentioned
because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of his
employer, Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc.
Employers in general
Article 2180, par. 4. Employers
shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not
engaged in any business or
industry.
Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) vs
Natividad and Agana
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Ampil is liable
for negligence and malpractice.
Ruling: YES
The glaring truth is that all the major
circumstances, taken together, as
specified by the Court of Appeals,
directly point to Dr. Ampil as the
negligent party.
An operation requiring the placing of
71
sponges in the incision is not complete
Page
until the sponges are properly
removed, and it is settled that the
leaving of sponges or other foreign
substances in the wound after the
incision has been closed is at least
prima facie negligence by the operating
surgeon. To put it simply, such act is
considered so inconsistent with due
care as to raise an inference of
negligence. There are even legions of
authorities to the effect that such act is
negligence per se.
Of course, the Court is not blind to the
reality that there are times when
danger to a patient’s life precludes a
surgeon from further searching missing
sponges or foreign objects left in the
body. But this does not leave him free
from any obligation. Even if it has been
shown that a surgeon was required by
the urgent necessities of the case to
leave a sponge in his patient’s
abdomen, because of the dangers
attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal
duty to so inform his patient within a
reasonable time thereafter by advising
her of what he had been compelled to
do. This is in order that she might seek
relief from the effects of the foreign
object left in her body as her condition
might permit.
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform
Natividad about the missing two pieces
of gauze. Worse, he even misled her
that the pain she was experiencing was
the ordinary consequence of her
operation. Had he been more candid,
Natividad could have taken the
immediate and appropriate medical
remedy to remove the gauzes from her
body. To our mind, what was initially
an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has
ripened into a deliberate wrongful act
of deceiving his patient.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Fuentes
should be held liable.
Ruling: NO
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by
the trial court of the case against Dr.
Fuentes on the ground that it is
contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. According to them, the fact
that the two pieces of gauze were left
inside Natividad’s body is a prima facie
evidence of Dr. Fuentes’ negligence.
We are not convinced.
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the
thing speaks for itself."
Where the thing which caused the
injury, without the fault of the injured,
is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such that it
should not have occurred if he, having
such control used proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation that the injury arose from
the defendant’s want of care, and the
burden of proof is shifted to him to
establish that he has observed due care
and diligence.
From the foregoing statements of the
rule, the requisites for the applicability
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
1. the occurrence of an injury
2. the thing which caused the injury
72
was under the control and
Page
management of the defendant
 3. the occurrence was such that in
the ordinary course of things,
would not have happened if
those who had control or
management used proper care
4. the absence of explanation by the
defendant.
Of the foregoing requisites, the most
instrumental is the "control and
management of the thing which caused
the injury."
We find the element of "control and
management of the thing which caused
the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
It was duly established that Dr. Ampil
was the lead surgeon during the
operation of Natividad. He requested
the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to
perform hysterectomy when he (Dr.
Ampil) found that the malignancy in
her sigmoid area had spread to her left
ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the
surgery and thereafter reported and
showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The
latter examined it and finding
everything to be in order, allowed Dr.
Fuentes to leave the operating room.
Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on
Natividad. He was about to finish the
procedure when the attending nurses
informed him that two pieces of gauze
were missing. A "diligent search" was
conducted, but the misplaced gauzes
were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed
that the incision be closed. During this
entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no
longer in the operating room and had,
in fact, left the hospital.
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the
operating surgeon is the person in
complete charge of the surgery room
and all personnel connected with the
operation. Their duty is to obey his
orders. Clearly, the control and
management of the thing which caused
the injury was in the hands of Dr.
Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
Issue: Whether or not PSI Is liable for
the negligence of Dr. Ampil.
Ruling: YES
Based on the historical development of
hospitals, many courts now allow
claims for hospital vicarious liability
under the theories of respondeat
superior, apparent authority, ostensible
authority, or agency by estoppel.
In this jurisdiction, the statute
governing liability for negligent acts is
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. A
derivative of this provision is Article
2180, the rule governing vicarious
liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
Article 2180. The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is
responsible.
x x x
The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages
73
caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the
Page
 latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned
tasks even though the former are
not engaged in any business or
industry.
x x x
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent
damage.
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise
real control over their attending and
visiting ‘consultant’ staff. While
consultants are not, technically
employees, the control exercised, the
hiring, and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages. In assessing
whether such a relationship in fact
exists, the control test is determining.
Accordingly, on the basis of the
foregoing, we rule that for the purpose
of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending
and visiting physicians.
PSI’s liability is also anchored upon the
agency principle of apparent authority
or agency by estoppel and the doctrine
of corporate negligence which have
gained acceptance in the determination
of a hospital’s liability for negligent acts
of health professionals.
Apparent authority, or what is
sometimes referred to as the "holding
out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible
agency or agency by estoppel, has its
origin from the law of agency. It
imposes liability, not as the result of the
reality of a contractual relationship, but
rather because of the actions of a
principal or an employer in somehow
MISLEADING THE PUBLIC into
believing that the relationship or the
authority exists. The concept is
essentially one of estoppel.
Our jurisdiction recognizes the concept
of an agency by implication or estoppel.
Article 1869. Agency may be
express, or implied from the acts of
the principal, from his silence or
lack of action, or his failure to
repudiate the agency, knowing that
another person is acting on his
behalf without authority.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the
lobby of the Medical City Hospital the
names and specializations of the
physicians associated or accredited by
it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes.
We concur with the Court of Appeals’
conclusion that it "is now estopped
from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly
paraded in the public directory leading
the public to believe that it vouched for
74
their skill and competence." Indeed,
PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to
Page
the public that Medical City Hospital,
through its accredited physicians, offers
quality health care services. By
accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
and publicly advertising their
qualifications, the hospital created the
impression that they were its agents,
authorized to perform medical or
surgical services for its patients. As
expected, these patients, Natividad
being one of them, accepted the
services on the reasonable belief that
such were being rendered by the
hospital or its employees, agents, or
servants.
The wisdom of the foregoing
ratiocination is easy to discern.
Corporate entities, like PSI, are capable
of acting only through other
individuals, such as physicians. If these
accredited physicians do their job well,
the hospital succeeds in its mission of
offering quality medical services and
thus profits financially. Logically, where
negligence mars the quality of its
services, the hospital should not be
allowed to escape liability for the acts
of its ostensible agents.
Doctrine of corporate negligence or
corporate responsibility.
Recent years have seen the doctrine of
corporate negligence as the judicial
answer to the problem of allocating
hospital’s liability for the negligent acts
of health practitioners, absent facts to
support the application of respondeat
superior or apparent authority. Its
formulation proceeds from the
judiciary’s acknowledgment that in
these modern times, the duty of
providing quality medical service is no
longer the sole prerogative and
responsibility of the physician. The
modern hospitals have changed
structure. Hospitals now tend to
organize a highly professional medical
staff whose competence and
performance need to be monitored by
the hospitals commensurate with their
inherent responsibility to provide
quality medical care.
With the passage of time, more duties
were expected from hospitals, among
them:
1. the use of reasonable care in the
maintenance of safe and
adequate facilities and
equipment
2. the selection and retention of
competent physicians
3. the overseeing or supervision of
all persons who practice
medicine within its walls
4. the formulation, adoption and
enforcement of adequate rules
and policies that ensure quality
care for its patients.
Following the doctrine of corporate
responsibility, the hospital has the duty
to see that it meets the standards of
responsibilities for the care of patients.
Such duty includes the proper
supervision of the members of its
medical staff. A patient who enters a
hospital does so with the reasonable
expectation that it will attempt to cure
him. The hospital accordingly has the
duty to make a reasonable effort to
monitor and oversee the treatment
75
prescribed and administered by the
Page
physicians practicing in its premises.

In the present case, it was duly
established that PSI operates the
Medical City Hospital for the purpose
and under the concept of providing
comprehensive medical services to the
public. Accordingly, it has the duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect
from harm all patients admitted into its
facility for medical treatment.
Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform
such duty.
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and
Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with
the assistance of the Medical City
Hospital’s staff, composed of resident
doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it
is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as
the operator of the hospital, has actual
or constructive knowledge of the
procedures carried out, particularly the
report of the attending nurses that the
two pieces of gauze were missing.
A corporation is bound by the
knowledge acquired by or notice given
to its agents or officers within the scope
of their authority and in reference to a
matter to which their authority
extends.
This means that the knowledge of any
of the staff of Medical City Hospital
constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the
failure of PSI, despite the attending
nurses’ report, to investigate and
inform Natividad regarding the missing
gauzes amounts to callous negligence.
Not only did PSI breach its duties to
oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it
also failed to take an active step in
fixing the negligence committed. This
renders PSI, not only vicariously liable
for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also
directly liable for its own negligence
under Article 2176.
Issue: Whether or not PSI is solidarily
liable with Dr. Ampil for damages.
Ruling: YES
Let it be emphasized that PSI, apart
from a general denial of its
responsibility, failed to adduce
evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in
the accreditation and supervision of the
latter.
In neglecting to offer such proof, PSI
failed to discharge its burden under the
last paragraph of Article 2180 cited
earlier, and, therefore, must be
adjudged solidarily liable with Dr.
Ampil.
Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is
also directly liable to the Aganas.
One final word. Once a physician
undertakes the treatment and care of a
patient, the law imposes on him certain
obligations. In order to escape liability,
he must possess that reasonable degree
of learning, skill and experience
required by his profession. At the same
time, he must apply reasonable care
and diligence in the exercise of his skill
and the application of his knowledge,
and exert his best judgment.
76
Page
PSI vs CA and Agana (2010)
This Court still employs the “Control
Test” to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship
between hospital and doctor.
Under the control test, an employment
relationship exist between a physician
and a hospital if the hospital controls
both the means and the details of the
process by which the physician is to
accomplish his task.
Independent Contractors
▪ GENERAL RULE: The Master is not
generally liable for the fault of
negligence of an independent
contractor performing some work
for him.
▪ EXCEPTION: One who hires an
independent contractor, but
controls the latter’s work is also
responsible for the independent
contractor’s negligence.
▪ The existence of an ER-EE
relationship must first be
established before an employer
may be held vicariously liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. He who claims that the
relationship exists has the burden
to prove the existence of such
relationship.
Filamer vs IAC
Issue: Whether or not Filamer Christian
Institute should be held liable to
Pntenciano Kapunan Sr. for damages
when the school jeep driven by its
janitor bumped the latter.
Ruling: YES
Driving the vehicle to and from the
house of the school president where
both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act
in furtherance of the interest of the
petitioner-school.
Allan's job demands that he drive home
the school jeep so he can use it to fetch
students in the morning of the next
school day.
It is indubitable under the
circumstances that the school president
had knowledge that the jeep was
routinely driven home for the said
purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable
that the school president also had
knowledge of Funtecha's possession of
a student driver's license and his desire
to undergo driving lessons during the
time that he was not in his classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking
the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was
not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not
driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own"
but ultimately, for the service for which
the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school.
77
Therefore, the Court is constrained to
Page
conclude that the act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one
done for and in behalf of his employer
for which act the petitioner-school
cannot deny any responsibility by
arguing that it was done beyond the
scope of his janitorial duties.
The clause "within the scope of their
assigned tasks" for purposes of raising
the presumption of liability of an
employer, includes any act done by an
employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of
the infliction of the injury or damage.
Even if somehow, the employee driving
the vehicle derived some benefit from
the act, the existence of a presumptive
liability of the employer is determined
by answering the question of whether
or not the servant was at the time of the
accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business.
There is evidence to show that there
exists in the present case an extra-
contractual obligation arising from the
negligence or reckless imprudence of a
person "whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over him."
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner
Filamer. He need not have an official
appointment for a driver's position in
order that the petitioner may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent
act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was
for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence,
the fact that Funtecha was not the
school driver or was not acting within
the scope of his janitorial duties does
not relieve the petitioner of the burden
of rebutting the presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence on its
part either in the selection of a servant
or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show
proof of its having exercised the
required diligence of a good father of a
family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision
includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance
of its employees and the issuance of
proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons
with whom the employer has relations
through his employees.
An employer is expected to impose
upon its employees the necessary
discipline called for in the performance
of any act indispensable to the business
and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has
not shown that it has set forth such
rules and guidelines as would prohibit
any one of its employees from taking
control over its vehicles if one is not the
official driver or prohibiting the driver
and son of the Filamer president from
authorizing another employee to drive
the school vehicle. Furthermore, the
petitioner has failed to prove that it had
imposed sanctions or warned its
employees against the use of its
vehicles by persons other than the
78
driver.
Page
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation
to pay damages for injury arising from
the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle.
In the absence of evidence that the
petitioner had exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law
imposes upon it the vicarious liability
for acts or omissions of its employees.
The liability of the employer is, under
Article 2180, primary and solidary.
However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent
employee for whatever damages are
paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
▪ Employer need not be riding in
the vehicle to become liable for a
driver’s negligence.
▪ Article 2184 mandating that the
owner is only held solidarily liable
if he is riding in the vehicle at the
time of the mishap, only applies to
those owners of vehicles, who do
not come within the ambit of
Article 2180 (as owners of an
establishment or enterprise).
De Leon Brokerage vs CA
Issue: Whether or not De Leon
Brokerage Inc. should be held liable to
Angeline Steen based on quasi-delict.
Ruling: YES
The court of origin and the appellate
court correctly considered
respondent's complaint to be based on
a quasidelict.
She alleged that she suffered injuries
because of the carelessness and
imprudence of petitioner's chauffeur
who was driving the cargo truck
belonging to petitioner, which truck
collided with the passenger jeepney
wherein shwe was riding. Since
averment had been made of the
employer-employee relationship and of
the damages caused by the employee
on occasion of his function, there is a
clear statement of a right of action
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The complaint does not and did not
have to allege that petitioner did not
exercise due diligence in choosing and
supervising Luna, because this is a
matter of defense.
Her allegation "that the acts of the
defendants above described constitute
gross negligence and recklessness",
plainly refers to petitioner's act of
employing Luna as driver of its cargo
truck, and to Luna's careless manner of
driving it.
Whatever doubts remain as to the
nature of respondent's action are
resolved by her prayer that petitioner
and its employee be held solidarily
liable.
According to petitioner, what causes
confusion as to the nature of
respondent's action are the allegations
of Luna's conviction (a copy of the
judgment of conviction was attached of
79
her civil action — circumstances,
Page
petitionerargues, which infallibly
characterize an action for civil
indemnityunder the criminal code.
But respondent clearly did not base her
suit on the criminal conviction. This
fact, it is true, was alleged in a
paragraph separate from her allegation
of Luna's negligence as having been the
cause of her injuries; but mention of the
criminal conviction merely tended to
support her claim that Luna had been
recklessly negligent in driving the
truck. Being evidentiary, the allegation
could have been disregarded.
Plainly, the reservation made in the
criminal action does not preclude a
subsequent action based on a quasi-
delict. It cannot be inferred therefrom
that respondent had chosen to file the
very civil action she had reserved.
The only conclusion that can
reasonably be drawn is that she did not
want the question of damages threshed
out in the criminal action but preferred
to have this issue decided in a separate
civil action.
Petitioner invites attention to Art. 2184,
of the Civil Code, and insists that it is
only in the instance covered thereby —
when the owner of the motor vehicle is
riding therein at the time of the mishap
— that the employer becomes solidarily
liable with the driver for any accident
resulting from the latter's negligence.
That article refers to owners of vehicles
who are not included in the terms of
Art. 2180 "as owners of an
establishment or enterprise."
Employer’s Negligence
1. In the selection of their employees
(culpa in eigiendo)
2. In the supervision over their
employees (culpa in vigilando)
The basis for civil liability of employers is
pater familias.
Cuison vs Norton & Harrison
Issue: Whether or not Norton &
Harrison Co. should be held liable to
Balbino Cuison for damages caused by
the death of the latter’s son in view of
the former’s negligence.
Ruling: YES
It is evident from the testimony of Ora
that he was a contractor and an
employee at the same time of Norton &
Harrison Co.
The Penal Code makes provision for the
civil liability of persons criminally
liable, and establishes subsidiary
liability for persons and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies and misdemeanors committed
by their servants in the discharge of
their duties.
In this instance, recurring to facts, it
should have been mentioned that the
two youths, Binoya and Bautista,
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide
through reckless negligence, and were
sentenced accordingly.
80
The basis of civil law liability is not
Page
respondeat superior but the
relationship of paterfamilias. This
theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant.
Under the civil law an employer is only
liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their
respective duties.
Here Ora was a contractor, but it does
not necessarily follow that he was an
independent contractor. The reason for
this distinction is that the employer
retained the power of directing and
controlling the work. The chauffeur and
the two persons on the truck were the
employees of Ora, the contractor, but
Ora, the contractor, was an employee of
Norton & Harrison Co., charged with
the duty of directing the loading and
transportation of the lumber. And it
was the negligence in loading the
lumber and the use of minors on the
truck which caused the death of the
unfortunate boy.
On the facts and the law, Ora was not an
independent contractor, but was the
servant of the defendant, and for his
negligence defendant was responsible.
▪ For the employer to avoid the
soldiary liability for a tort
committed by his employee, an
employer must rebut the
presumption by presenting
adequate and convincing proof that
in the selection and supervision of
his employees, he or she exercised
the case and diligence of a good
father of a family.
▪ Twin requirement: Selection AND
Supervision
▪ Employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary
evidence, that they complied with
everything that was encumber on
them.
Ramos vs C.O.L Realty Corp.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner
Lambert Ramos can be held solidarily
liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo,
to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty actual
damages suffered in a vehicular
collision.
Ruling: NO
There is no doubt in the appellate
court’s mind that Aquilino’s violation of
the MMDA prohibition against crossing
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda
Street was the proximate cause of the
accident. Respondent does not dispute
this; in its Comment to the instant
petition, it even conceded that
petitioner was guilty of mere
contributory negligence.
C.O.L. Realty admitted that there were
barricades along the intersection of
Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda
Street. The barricades were placed
thereon to caution drivers not to pass
through the intersecting roads. This
prohibition stands even if, as (C.O.L.
Realty) claimed, the "barriers were
broken" at that point creating a small
81
gap through which any vehicle could
Page
pass.
 Regrettably, Ramos’ evidence which
What is clear to Us is that Aquilino consisted mainly of testimonial
recklessly ignored these barricades and evidence remained unsubstantiated
drove through it. Without doubt, his and are thus, barren of significant
negligence is established by the fact weight. There is nothing on the records
that he violated a traffic regulation. This which would support (Ramos’) bare
finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil allegation of Rodel’s 10-year
Code – unblemished driving record. He failed
"Unless there is proof to the to present convincing proof that he
contrary, it is presumed that a went to the extent of verifying Rodel’s
person driving a motor vehicle has qualifications, safety record, and
been negligent if at the time of the driving history.
mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation."
So too, Ramos did not bother to refute
C.O.L. Realty’s stance that his driver
Accordingly, there ought to be no
was texting with his cellphone while
question on (C.O.L. Realty’s) negligence
running at a high speed and that the
which resulted in the vehicular mishap.
latter did not slow down albeit he knew
that Katipunan Avenue was then
However, it also declared Ramos liable
undergoing repairs and that the road
vicariously for Rodel’s contributory
was barricaded with barriers. The
negligence in driving the Ford
presumption juris tantum that there
Expedition at high speed along a busy
was negligence in the selection of
intersection. Having thus settled the
driver remains unrebutted.
contributory negligence of Rodel, this
created a presumption of negligence on
As the employer of Rodel, (Ramos) is
the part of his employer, (Ramos).
solidarily liable for the quasi-delict
committed by the former.
For the employer to avoid the solidary
liability for a tort committed by his
Certainly, in the selection of
employee, an employer must rebut the
prospective employees, employers are
presumption by presenting adequate
required to examine them as to their
and convincing proof that in the
qualifications, experience and service
selection and supervision of his
records. In the supervision of
employee, he or she exercises the care
employees, the employer must
and diligence of a good father of a
formulate standard operating
family. Employers must submit
procedures, monitor their
concrete proof, including documentary
implementation and impose
evidence, that they complied with
disciplinary measures for the breach
everything that was incumbent on
thereof. These, Ramos failed to do.
them.
82

Petitioner argues, however, that since

Page

Aquilino’s willful disregard of the

MMDA prohibition was the sole
proximate cause of the accident, then
respondent alone should suffer the
consequences of the accident and the
damages it incurred.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case,
viz:
Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s
own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof
to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the
negligence of a third person and by
the concurring contributory
negligence of his own servant or
agent, the latter’s negligence is
imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superior’s action against
the third person, assuming of
course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause
of the injury of which complaint is
made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law
to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah
Matanda constitutes negligence
because it was prohibited by law.
Moreover, it was the proximate cause of
the accident, and thus precludes any
recovery for any damages suffered by
respondent from the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not
have occurred.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA
prohibition against crossing Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened.
This specific untoward event is exactly
what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and
intelligent person who resides within
the vicinity where the accident
occurred, Aquilino had reasonable
ground to expect that the accident
would be a natural and probable result
if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since
such crossing is considered dangerous
on account of the busy nature of the
thoroughfare and the ongoing
construction of the Katipunan-Boni
Avenue underpass. It was manifest
error for the Court of Appeals to have
overlooked the principle embodied in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that
when the plaintiff’s own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve
83
into the issue of Rodel’s contributory
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negligence, since it cannot overcome or
 defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is
the immediate and proximate cause of
the accident.
▪ The phrase “even though the
former are not engaged in any
business or industry” found in the
5th paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not
necessary for the employer to be
engaged in any business or
industry to be held liable for the
negligence of his employee who is
acting within the scope of his
assigned task.
Castilix Industrial Corp. vs Vasquez
Issue: Whether or not an employer may
be held liable for the death resulting
from the negligent operation by a
managerial employee of a company-
issued vehicle.
Ruling: NO
The negligence of ABAD is not an issue
at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX
presumes said negligence but claims
that it is not vicariously liable for the
injuries and subsequent death caused
by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code should only apply to instances
where the employer is not engaged in
business or industry. Since it is engaged
in the business of manufacturing and
selling furniture it is therefore not
covered by said provision. Instead, the
fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth
paragraph is not accurate.
The phrase "even though the former
are not engaged in any business or
industry" found in the fifth paragraph
should be interpreted to mean that it is
not necessary for the employer to be
engaged in any business or industry to
be liable for the negligence of his
employee who is acting within the
scope of his assigned task.
Negligent acts of employees, whether
or not the employer is engaged in a
business or industry, are covered so
long as they were acting within the
scope of their assigned task, even
though committed neither in the
service of the branches nor on the
occasion of their functions. For,
admittedly, employees oftentimes wear
different hats. They perform functions
which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless,
are still within the call of duty.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article
2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is
liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his
assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee
relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the
84
employer may find it necessary to
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interpose the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the
employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a
Production Manager of petitioner
CASTILEX at the time of the tort
occurrence.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile
witness, testified that at the time of the
incident, he was driving a company-
issued vehicle, registered under the
name of petitioner. He was then leaving
the restaurant where he had some
snacks and had a chat with his friends
after having done overtime work for
the petitioner.
Acts done within the scope of the
employee's assigned tasks includes any
act done by an employee in furtherance
of the interests of the employer or for
the account of the employer at the time
of the infliction of the injury or
damages.
The mere fact that ABAD was using a
service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself
sufficient to charge petitioner with
liability for the negligent operation of
said vehicle unless it appears that he
was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that
ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office, which was located in
Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter,
he went to Goldie's Restaurant in
Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is
about seven kilometers away from
petitioner's place of business. A
witness for the private respondents, a
sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente
Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn
because Goldie's Restaurant and Back
Street were still open and people were
drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes,
pimps, and drug addicts littered the
place.
At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took
some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving
the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred. That same witness
for the private respondents testified
that at the time of the vehicular
accident, ABAD was with a woman in
his car, who then shouted: "Daddy,
Daddy!" This woman could not have
been ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was
only 29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was
engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in
line with his duties at the time he
figured in a vehicular accident.
Since there is paucity of evidence that
ABAD was acting within the scope of
the functions entrusted to him,
petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to
show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in providing
ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus,
justice and equity require that
petitioner be relieved of vicarious
liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its
vehicle.
85
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Defense of Diligence in Selection and
Supervision of Employees
▪ Due diligence in the SUPERVISION
of employees includes the
formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of
proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and
persons with whim the employer
as relations through his or her
employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures
upon employees in case of breach
or as may be warranted to ensure
performance of acts as
indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employee.
Metro Manila Transit vs CA
Issue: Whether or not the Metro Manila
Transit Corporation should be held
solidarily liable with the other
defendants for damages because of its
negligence in the supervision of its
employee.
Ruling: YES
Coming now to the case at bar, while
there is no rule which requires that
testimonial evidence, to hold sway,
must be corroborated by documentary
evidence, or even object evidence for
that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses'
testimonies dwelt on mere generalities,
we cannot consider the same as
sufficiently persuasive proof that there
was observance of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees.
Petitioner's attempt to prove its
diligentissimi patris familias in the
selection and supervision of employees
through oral evidence must fail as it
was unable to buttress the same with
any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the
apparent biased nature of the
testimony.
Our view that the evidence for
petitioner MMTC falls short of the
required evidentiary quantum as would
convincingly and undoubtedly prove its
observance of the diligence of a good
father of a family.
Whether or not the diligence of a good
father of a family has been observed by
petitioner is a matter of proof which
under the circumstances in the case at
bar has not been clearly established. It
is not felt by the Court that there is
enough evidence on record as would
overturn the presumption of
negligence, and for failure to submit all
evidence within its control, assuming
the putative existence thereof,
petitioner MMTC must suffer the
consequences of its own inaction and
indifference.
Due diligence in the supervision of
employees, on the other hand, includes
the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection
of the public and persons with whom
the employer has relations through his
or its employees and the imposition of
86
necessary disciplinary measures upon
Page
employees in case of breach or as may
be warranted to ensure the
performance of acts indispensable to
the business of and beneficial to their
employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the
employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly
report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due
diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is
not enough to emptily invoke the
existence of said company guidelines
and policies on hiring and supervision.
As the negligence of the employee gives
rise to the presumption of negligence
on the part of the employer, the latter
has the burden of proving that it has
been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies,
without anything more, is decidedly not
sufficient to overcome such
presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding,
as a warning to all employers, that the
mere formulation of various company
policies on safety without showing that
they were being complied with is not
sufficient to exempt petitioner from
liability arising from negligence of its
employees. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that in recruiting
and employing the erring driver the
recruitment procedures and company
policies on efficiency and safety were
followed.
Nature of Employer’s Liability
▪ The employer is PRIMARILY and
SOLIDARILY liable for the tortious
act of the employee.
▪ The employer may recover from
the employee, the amount it will
have to pay the offended party’s
claim.
▪ Such recovery, however, is NOT for
the entire amount. To allow such
would be as if to say that the
employer as not negligent.
▪ The liability of the registered
owner and driver is solidary,
primary and direct.
Criminal Negligence
▪ The vicarious liability of the
employer for criminal negligence of
his employee is governed by Article
103 of the RPC.
▪ Conviction of the employee
conclusively binds the employer.
▪ Liability is limited to damages or to
the amount that may be meted out
against the erring employee.
Fernando vs Franco
Issue: Whether or not respondents
should be held liable for damages based
on the allegation contained in the
complaint.
(Whether or not the action for recovery
87
of damages instituted by herein private
Page
respondents was predicated upon
crime or quasi-delict.) – quasi-delict
Ruling: YES
Petitioners contend that the allegations
in paragraph 9 of the Amended
Complaint of herein private
respondents as plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2154 unequivocally claim that the
former as the employers of Macario
Yuro, the driver of the Franco Bus who
caused the vehicular mishap, are jointly
and severally liable to the latter for the
damages suffered by them which thus
makes Civil Case No. 2154 an action
predicated upon a quasi-delict under
the Civil Code subject to the defense
that the employer exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their
employees.
We find merit in this contention.
Distinction should be made between
the subsidiary liability of the employer
under the Revised Penal Code and the
employer’s primary liability under the
Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or
tortious in character.
The first type of liability is governed by
Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code while the second kind is
governed by the Article 2176, 2177 and
2180 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, liability originates from a delict
committed by the employee who is
primarily liable therefor and upon
whose primary liability his employer’s
subsidiary liability is to be based.
Before the employer’s subsidiary
liability may be proceeded against, it is
imperative that there should be a
criminal action whereby the employee’s
criminal negligence or delict and
corresponding liability therefor are
proved. If no criminal action was
instituted, the employer’s liability
would not be predicated under Article
103.
In the case at bar, no criminal action
was instituted because the person who
should stand as the accused and the
party supposed to be primarily liable
for the damages suffered by private
respondents as a consequence of the
vehicular mishap died. Thus,
petitioners’ subsidiary liability has no
leg to stand on considering that their
liability is merely secondary to their
employee’s primary liability. Logically
therefore, recourse under this remedy
is not possible.
On the other hand, under Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is
based on culpa aquiliana which holds
the employer primarily liable for
tortious acts of its employees subject,
however, to the defense that the former
exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employees.
Having thus established that Civil Case
No. 2154 is a civil action to impose the
primary liability of the employer as a
result of the tortious act of its alleged
88
reckless driver, we confront ourselves
Page
with the plausibility of defendants-
petitioners’ defense that they observed
due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision
of their employees.
A perusal of the record shows that the
appellants were not able to establish
the defense of a good father of a family
in the supervision of their bus driver.
The evidence presented by the
appellants in this regard is purely self-
serving. No independent evidence was
presented as to the alleged supervision
of appellants’ bus drivers, especially
with regard to driving habits and
reaction to actual traffic conditions. The
appellants in fact admitted that the only
kind of supervision given the drivers
referred to the running time between
the terminal points of the line.
Moreover, the appellants who ran a
fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila-
Laoag line, have only two inspectors
whose duties were only ticket
inspection. There is no evidence that
they are really safety inspectors.
▪ Defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the
employee is NOT available in
criminal negligence.
▪ The employer cannot appeal the
conviction.
▪ Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by security guards
attaches to the employer agency,
not to the clients or customers of
such agency.
Soliman vs Tuazon
Issue: Whether or not it is the Republic
central Colleges that should be held
liable for the death of its student
committed by it security guard that is
employed by an agency.
Ruling: NO
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
the obligation to respond for damage
inflicted by one against another by fault
or negligence exists not only for one's
own act or omission, but also for acts or
omissions of a person for whom one is
by law responsible. Among the persons
held vicariously responsible for acts or
omissions of another person are the
following:
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils, their students or
apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
xxx
The first paragraph quoted above offers no
basis for holding the Colleges liable for the
89
alleged wrongful acts of security guard
Page
Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner
Soliman, Jr. Private respondent school was
not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The
employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., while the school was
the client or customer of the R.L. Security
Agency Inc.
It is settled that where the security agency,
as here, recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or security guards,
the agency is the employer of such guards
or watchmen.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches
to the employer agency, and not to the
clients or customers of such agency.
As a general rule, a client or customer of a
security agency has no hand in selecting
who among the pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency shall be
assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded
from the client whose premises or
property are protected by the security
guards.
The fact that a client company may give
instructions or directions to the security
guards assigned to it, does not, by itself,
render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned
and liable for their wrongful acts or
omissions. Those instructions or directions
are ordinarily no more than requests
commonly envisaged in the contract for
services entered into with the security
agency. There being no employer-
employee relationship between the
Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner
student cannot impose vicarious liability
upon the Colleges for the acts of security
guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy
Solomon was not a pupil or student or
an apprentice of the Colleges, he being
in fact an employee of the R.L. Security
Agency Inc., the other above-quoted
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is similarly not available for
imposing liability upon the Republic
Central Colleges for the acts or
omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
Registered Owner Rule
▪ The registered owner of the vehicle
is primarily responsible o the
public for whatever damage or
injury the vehicle may have caused,
even if he had already sold the
same to someone else.
▪ The policy is the easy identification
of the owner who can be held
responsible as to not
inconvenience or prejudice the
third party injured.
Cadiente vs Macas
Issue: Whether the petitioner Medardo
Cadiente (registered owner of the
vehivle) and third-party defendant
Jalipa are jointly and severally liable to
the victim.
Ruling: YES
The registered owner of any vehicle,
even if he had already sold it to
someone else, is primarily responsible
to the public for whatever damage or
injury the vehicle may cause.
90
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 Were a registered owner allowed to
evade responsibility by proving who
the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him, by collusion
with others or otherwise, to escape said
responsibility and transfer the same to
an indefinite person, or to one who
possesses no property with which to
respond financially for the damage or
injury done. A victim of recklessness on
the public highways is usually without
means to discover or identify the
person actually causing the injury or
damage. He has no means other than by
a recourse to the registration in the
Motor Vehicles Office to determine who
is the owner. The protection that the
law aims to extend to him would
become illusory were the registered
owner given the opportunity to escape
liability by disproving his ownership.
The policy behind vehicle registration
is the easy identification of the owner
who can be held responsible in case of
accident, damage or injury caused by
the vehicle. This is so as not to
inconvenience or prejudice a third
party injured by one whose identity
cannot be secured.
Remedy of the Registered Owner
▪ His liability is subject to his right of
recourse against the transferee or
buyer.
Joint Tortfeasors
Article 2194. The responsibility
of two or more person who are
liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
▪ The provision applies when there
are 2 or more person who have
participated in the commission of a
single quasi-delict.
▪ The injury must be indivisible.
▪ Joint Tortfeasor – They are persons
who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet in the
commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit.
Filipinas Broadcasting Network vs AMEC-
BCCM
Issue: Whether or not FBNI should be
held solidarily liable with Rima and
Alegre for payment of damages to
AMEC.
Ruling: YES
The basis of the present action is a tort.
Joint tort feasors are jointly and
severally liable for the tort which they
commit.
Joint tortfeasors are all the persons
who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of
it after it is done, if done for their
91
benefit.
Page
Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its
cause of action against FBNI on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
As operator of DZRC-AM and employer
of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily
liable to pay for damages arising from
the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the
Court of Appeals, "recovery for
defamatory statements published by
radio or television may be had from the
owner of the station, a licensee, the
operator of the station, or a person who
procures, or participates in, the making
of the defamatory statements."
An employer and employee are
solidarily liable for a defamatory
statement by the employee within the
course and scope of his or her
employment, at least when the
employer authorizes or ratifies the
defamation.
In this case, Rima and Alegre were
clearly performing their official duties
as hosts of FBNI’s radio program
Exposé when they aired the broadcasts.
FBNI neither alleged nor proved that
Rima and Alegre went beyond the
scope of their work at that time. There
was likewise no showing that FBNI did
not authorize and ratify the defamatory
broadcasts.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence
on record that FBNI exercised due
diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees,
particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI
merely showed that it exercised
diligence in the selection of its
broadcasters without introducing any
evidence to prove that it observed the
same diligence in the supervision of
Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show
how it exercised diligence in
supervising its broadcasters. FBNI’s
alleged constant reminder to its
broadcasters to "observe truth, fairness
and objectivity and to refrain from
using libelous and indecent language" is
not enough to prove due diligence in
the supervision of its broadcasters.
Adequate training of the broadcasters
on the industry’s code of conduct,
sufficient information on libel laws, and
continuous evaluation of the
broadcasters’ performance are but a
few of the many ways of showing
diligence in the supervision of
broadcasters.
FBNI claims that it "has taken all the
precaution in the selection of Rima and
Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind
their qualifications." However, no clear
and convincing evidence shows that
Rima and Alegre underwent FBNI’s
"regimented process" of application.
Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima
and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP
accreditation, which is one of FBNI’s
requirements before it hires a
broadcaster. Significantly, membership
in the KBP, while voluntary, indicates
the broadcaster’s strong commitment
to observe the broadcast industry’s
rules and regulations. Clearly, these
circumstances show FBNI’s lack of
diligence in selecting and supervising
Rima and Alegre.
Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay
92
damages together with Rima and
Page
Alegre.
Nature of Liability of Joint Tortfeasors
▪ SOLIDARY – The person injured
may sue all of them, or any number
less than all, and they are all
together solidarily liable for the
whole damage.

Acts of Omission and its Modalities

▪ Human conduct can be described
alternatively as an act or omission.
▪ In relation to the existence of a
legal duty, conduct may be
described in terms of action or
inaction, or “misfeasance” or
“nonfeasance”.

▪ Liability for personal acts or

omission is founded on that
indisputable PRINCIPLE OF
JUSTICE recognized by all
legislators that when a person by
his act or omission causes damage
or prejudice to another, a juridical
relation is created by virtue of
which the injured person acquires
a right to be indemnified and the
person causing the damage is
charged with the corresponding
duty of repairing the damage.
▪ The reason for this is hound in the
obvious truth that man should
subordinate his acts to the
precepts of prudence and if he fails
to observe them and cause damage
to another, he must repair the
damage. (Manresa)
93
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April 30, 2022
Concept of Proximate Cause
▪ In order that civil liability for
negligence may arise, there must
be a direct causal connection
between the damage suffered by
the plaintiff and the act or omission
of the defendant.
▪ Thusly, the act or omission of the
defendant must be the proximate
cause of the loss or damage of the
plaintiff.
▪ Proximate Cause – That cause,
which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have
occurred.
Remote Cause
▪ A prior remote cause cannot be
made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or
occasion.
▪ Example: Mr. A stabbed Mr. B’s
heart, lungs, and 2 more organs
somewhere in the stomach area
which were also considered as fatal
by the medico legal expert. During
the lifetime of B, he is already
suffering from advance stage
tuberculosis. When Mr. B was
found, he was not dead yet and
undergone surgeries. According to
the medico legal findings, what
triggered the death of Mr. B was
the advance stage of tuberculosis
which was affected by the stabbed
wounds he sustained which results
to a slim chance of survival. After
48 hours, Mr. B died. In the death
certificate, the cause of death is
multiple organ failure. The heirs of
B instituted an action before the
office of the City Prosecutor for the
crime of murder qualified by
treachery and evident
premeditation. The case was then
elevated to the court. Which
aggravated which? Is it the
tuberculosis that was aggravated
by the stabbed wounds or is it the
stabbed wounds that was
aggravated by the tuberculosis?
Given the facts, what is the
proximate cause, immediate cause
and remote cause?
▪ Proximate cause – Act of stabbing
the vital organs (Multiple stabbed
wounds)
▪ Remote cause – Advance stage of
tuberculosis
▪ Immediate cause – Multiple organ
failure
Manila Electric vs Remoquillo
Issue: Whether or not Manila Electric
Company should be held liable for the
electrocution of Efren Magno which
resulted to his death.
94
Page
Ruling: NO

Although the city ordinance called for a
distance of 3 feet of its wires from any
building, there was actually a distance
of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires
from the side of the house of Peñaloza.
Even considering said regulation
distance of 3 feet as referring not to the
side of a building, but to any projecting
part thereof, such as a "media agua",
had the house owner followed the
terms of the permit given him by the
city for the construction of his "media
agua", namely, one meter or 39 3/8
inches wide, the distance from the
wires to the edge of said "media agua"
would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8
inches. In fixing said one meter width
for the "media agua" the city authorities
must have wanted to preserve the
distance of at least 3 feet between the
wires and any portion of a building.
Unfortunately, however, the house
owner disregarding the permit,
exceeded the one meter fixed by the
same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only
a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the
"Media agua" as illegally constructed
and the electric wires. And added to
this violation of the permit by the house
owner, was its approval by the city
through its agent, possibly an inspector.
Surely we cannot lay these serious
violations of a city ordinance and
permit at the door of the Company,
guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
regulation. The Company cannot be
expected to be always on the lookout
for any illegal construction which
reduces the distance between its wires
and said construction, and after finding
that said distance of 3 feet had been
reduced, to change the stringing or
installation of its wires so as to
preserve said distance. It would be
much easier for the City, or rather it is
its duty, to be ever on the alert and to
see to it that its ordinances are strictly
followed by house owners and to
condemn or disapprove all illegal
constructions.
Of course, in the present case, the
violation of the permit for the
construction of the "media agua" was
not the direct cause of the accident. It
merely contributed to it. Had said
"media agua" been only one meter wide
as allowed by the permit, Magno
standing on it, would instinctively have
stayed closer to or hugged the side of
the house in order to keep a safe
margin between the edge of the "media
agua" and the yawning 2-story distance
or height from the ground, and possibly
if not probably avoided the fatal contact
between the lower end of the iron sheet
and the wires.
We may not hold said company as
guilty of negligence or wanting in due
diligence in failing to insulate said
wires. As to their proximity to the
house it is to be supposed that distance
of 3 feet was considered sufficiently
safe by the technical men of the city
such as its electrician or engineer. Of
course, a greater distance of say 6 feet
or 12 feet would have increased the
margin of safety but other factors had
to be considered such as that the wires
95
could not be strung or the posts
Page
supporting them could not be located
too far toward the middle of the street.
Thus, the real cause of the accident or
death was the reckless or negligent act
of Magno himself. When he was called
by his stepbrother to repair the "media
agua" just below the third story
window, it is to be presumed that due
to his age and experience he was
qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a
tinsmith or carpenter and had training
and experience for the job. So, he could
not have been entirely a stranger to
electric wires and the danger lurking in
them. But unfortunately, in the instant
care, his training and experience failed
him, and forgetting where he was
standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet
with both hands and at arms length,
evidently without looking, and
throwing all prudence and discretion to
the winds, he turned around swinging
his arms with the motion of his body,
thereby causing his own electrocution.
Although it is a well- established rule
that the liability of electric companies
for damages or personal injuries is
governed by the rules of negligence,
nevertheless such companies are not
insurers of the safety of the public.
But even assuming for a moment that
under the facts of the present case the
defendant electric company could be
considered negligent in installing its
electric wires so close to the house and
"media agua" in question, and in failing
to properly insulate those wires
(although according to the unrefuted
claim of said company it was
impossible to make the insulation of
that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold
the defendant liable in damages for the
death of Magno, such supposed
negligence of the company must have
been the proximate and principal cause
of the accident, because if the act of
Magno in turning around and swinging
the galvanized iron sheet with his
hands was the proximate and principal
cause of the electrocution, then his
heirs may not recover.
To us it is clear that the principal and
proximate cause of the electrocution
was not the electric wire, evidently a
remote cause, but rather the reckless
and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet without taking any
precaution, such as looking back
toward the street and at the wire to
avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latter's length of 6 feet.
A prior and remote cause cannot be
made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or
occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause.
96
Page
 And if an independent negligent act or being in the command and navigation
defective condition sets into operation of the ship, and his orders must be
the circumstances which result in obeyed in all matters connected with
injury because of the prior defective her navigation. He becomes the master
condition, such subsequent act or pro hac vice and should give all
condition is the proximate cause. directions as to speed, course, stopping
and reversing, anchoring, towing and
the like. And when a licensed pilot is
employed in a place where pilotage is
Concurrent Cause
compulsory, it is his duty to insist on
▪ Several causes producing the
having effective control of the vessel, or
injury, and each is an efficient
to decline to act as pilot. Under certain
cause without which the injury
systems of foreign law, the pilot does
would not have happened.
not take entire charge of the vessel, but
▪ The injury is attributed to any or
is deemed merely the adviser of the
all of those responsible.
master, who retains command and
control of the navigation even in
▪ Where the concurrent or
localities where pilotage is compulsory.
successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons,
It is quite common for states and
although acting independently, are
localities to provide for compulsory
in combination the direct and
pilotage, and safety laws have been
proximate cause of a single injury
enacted requiring vessels approaching
to a third person, it is impossible to
their ports, with certain exceptions, to
determine in what proportion each
take on board pilots duly licensed
contributed to the injury and either
under local law. The purpose of these
of them is responsible for the
laws is to create a body of seamen
whole injury.
thoroughly acquainted with the harbor,
▪ Where their concurring negligence
to pilot vessels seeking to enter or
resulted in injury to a third party,
depart, and thus protect life and
they become joint tortfeasors and
property from the dangers of
are solidarily liable for the damage.
navigation.

Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was

Far Eastern Shipping vs CA
assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into
Issue: Whether or not Captain Gavino
Berth 4 of the Manila International
was negligent.
Port. Upon assuming such office as
compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held
Ruling: YES
to the universally accepted high
standards of care and diligence
Under English and American
required of a pilot, whereby he assumes
97

authorities, generally speaking, the

to have skill and knowledge in respect
pilot supersedes the master for the time
Page

to navigation in the particular waters

over which his license extends superior
to and more to be trusted than that of
the master. A pilot should have a
thorough knowledge of general and
local regulations and physical
conditions affecting the vessel in his
charge and the waters for which he is
licensed, such as a particular harbor or
river. He is not held to the highest
possible degree of skill and care, but
must have and exercise the ordinary
skill and care demanded by the
circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under
extraordinary circumstances, a pilot
must exercise extraordinary care.
Based on the testimony of Capt. Gavino,
we affirm respondent court's finding
that Capt. Gavino failed to measure up
to such strict standard of care and
diligence required of pilots in the
performance of their duties.
It is disconcertingly riddled with too
much incertitude and manifests a
seeming indifference for the possibly
injurious consequences his commands
as pilot may have. Prudence required
that he, as pilot, should have made sure
that his directions were promptly and
strictly followed. As correctly noted by
the trial court —
Moreover, assuming that he did
indeed give the command to
drop the anchor on time, as pilot
he should have seen to it that the
order was carried out, and he
could have done this in a number
of ways, one of which was to
inspect the bow of the vessel
where the anchor mechanism
was installed. Of course, Captain
Gavino makes reference to a
commotion among the crew
members which supposedly
caused the delay in the execution
of the command. This account
was reflected in the pilot's report
prepared four hours later, but
Capt. Kavankov, while not
admitting whether or not such a
commotion occurred, maintained
that the command to drop
anchor was followed
"immediately and precisely."
Hence, the Court cannot give
much weight or consideration to
this portion of Gavino's
testimony."
An act may be negligent if it is done
without the competence that a
reasonable person in the position of the
actor would recognize as necessary to
prevent it from creating an
unreasonable risk of harm to another.
Those who undertake any work calling
for special skills are required not only
to exercise reasonable care in what
they do but also possess a standard
minimum of special knowledge and
ability.
Issue: Whether or not Capt. Kabankov
was negligent.
Issue: YES
The negligence on the part of Capt.
Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabankov is
no less responsible for the collision. His
unconcerned lethargy as master of the
98
ship in the face of troublous exigence
Page
constitutes negligence.

While it is indubitable that in exercising
his functions a pilot is in sole command
of the ship and supersedes the master
for the time being in the command and
navigation of a ship and that he
becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel
piloted by him, there is overwhelming
authority to the effect that the master
does not surrender his vessel to the
pilot and the pilot is not the master. The
master is still in command of the vessel
notwithstanding the presence of a pilot.
There are occasions when the master
may and should interfere and even
displace the pilot, as when the pilot is
obviously incompetent or intoxicated
and the circumstances may require the
master to displace a compulsory pilot
because of incompetency or physical
incapacity. If, however, the master does
not observe that a compulsory pilot is
incompetent or physically
incapacitated, the master is justified in
relying on the pilot, but not blindly.
The master is not wholly absolved from
his duties while a pilot is on board his
vessel, and may advise with or offer
suggestions to him. He is still in
command of the vessel, except so far as
her navigation is concerned, and must
cause the ordinary work of the vessel to
be properly carried on and the usual
precaution taken. Thus, in particular, he
is bound to see that there is sufficient
watch on deck, and that the men are
attentive to their duties, also that
engines are stopped, towlines cast off,
and the anchors clear and ready to go at
the pilot's order.
A perusal of Capt. Kabankov' s
testimony makes it apparent that he
was remiss in the discharge of his
duties as master of the ship leaving the
entire docking procedure up to the
pilot, instead of maintaining watchful
vigilance over this risky maneuver.
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in
charge of a ship, the master being
required to permit him to navigate it, if
the master observes that the pilot is
incompetent or physically incapable,
then it is the duty of the master to
refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if
no such reasons are present, then the
master is justified in relying upon the
pilot, but not blindly. Under the
circumstances of this case, if a situation
arose where the master, exercising that
reasonable vigilance which the master
of a ship should exercise, observed, or
should have observed, that the pilot
was so navigating the vessel that she
was going, or was likely to go, into
danger, and there was in the exercise of
reasonable care and vigilance an
opportunity for the master to intervene
so as to save the ship from danger, the
master should have acted accordingly.
The master of a vessel must exercise a
degree of vigilance commensurate with
the circumstances.
Our own evaluation is that Capt.
Kabankov's shared liability is due
mainly to the fact that he failed to act
when the perilous situation should
have spurred him into quick and
decisive action as master of the ship. In
the face of imminent or actual danger,
99
he did not have to wait for the
Page
happenstance to occur before
countermanding or overruling the pilot.
By his own admission, Capt. Kabankov
concurred with Capt. Gavino's
decisions.
Issue: Whether or not Far Eastern
Shipping Company should be held
solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino to
PPA.
Ruling: YES
In general, a pilot is personally liable
for damages caused by his own
negligence or default to the owners of
the vessel, and to third parties for
damages sustained in a collision. Such
negligence of the pilot in the
performance of duty constitutes a
maritime tort. At common law, a
shipowner is not liable for injuries
inflicted exclusively by the negligence
of a pilot accepted by a vessel
compulsorily. The exemption from
liability for such negligence shall apply
if the pilot is actually in charge and
solely in fault. Since, a pilot is
responsible only for his own personal
negligence, he cannot be held
accountable for damages proximately
caused by the default of others, or, if
there be anything which concurred
with the fault of the pilot in producing
the accident, the vessel master and
owners are liable.
Since the colliding vessel is prima facie
responsible, the burden of proof is
upon the party claiming benefit of the
exemption from liability. It must be
shown affirmatively that the pilot was
at fault, and that there was no fault on
the part of the officers or crew, which
might have been conducive to the
damage. The fact that the law
compelled the master to take the pilot
does not exonerate the vessel from
liability. The parties who suffer are
entitled to have their remedy against
the vessel that occasioned the damage,
and are not under necessity to look to
the pilot from whom redress is not
always had for compensation. The
owners of the vessel are responsible to
the injured party for the acts of the
pilot, and they must be left to recover
the amount as well as they can against
him. It cannot be maintained that the
circumstance of having a pilot on board,
and acting in conformity to his
directions operate as a discharge of
responsibility of the owners. Except
insofar as their liability is limited or
exempted by statute, the vessel or her
owner are liable for all damages caused
by the negligence or other wrongs of
the owners or those in charge of the
vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel is not
a compulsory one in the sense that the
owner or master of the vessel are
bound to accept him, but is employed
voluntarily, the owners of the vessel
are, all the more, liable for his negligent
act.
In the United States, the owners of a
vessel are not personally liable for the
negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but
by admiralty law, the fault or
negligence of a compulsory pilot is
imputable to the vessel and it may be
held liable therefor in rem. Where,
however, by the provisions of the
100
statute the pilot is compulsory only in
the sense that his fee must be paid, and
Page
is not in compulsory charge of the
vessel, there is no exemption from
liability. Even though the pilot is
compulsory, if his negligence was not
the sole cause of the injury, but the
negligence of the master or crew
contributed thereto, the owners are
liable. But the liability of the ship in rem
does not release the pilot from the
consequences of his own negligence.
The rationale for this rule is that the
master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to
navigation when a compulsory pilot is
in charge.
It may be said, as a general rule, that
negligence in order to render a person
liable need not be the sole cause of an
injury. It is sufficient that his
negligence, concurring with one or
more efficient causes other than
plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the
injury.
Accordingly, where several causes
combine to produce injuries, person is
not relieved from liability because he is
responsible for only one of them, it
being sufficient that the negligence of
the person charged with injury is an
efficient cause without which the injury
would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not
attributable to the person injured. It is
no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the injury would not
have resulted from his negligence
alone, without the negligence or
wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasor.
Where several causes producing an
injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of
the case, it may appear that one of them
was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person
was not the same. No actor's negligence
ceases to be a proximate cause merely
because it does not exceed the
negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though his acts
were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the
total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions
of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the
direct and pro
ximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to
the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where
their concurring negligence resulted in
injury or damage to a third party, they
become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting
damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.
Issue: Whether or not MPA (one who
assigned Capt. Gavino to conduct
101
docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing of the vessel) should be held
Page
solidarily liable with Far Eastern
Shipping Company.
Ruling: YES
The Court of Appeals, while affirming
the trial court's finding of solidary
liability on the part of FESC, MPA and
Capt. Gavino, correctly based MPA's
liability not on the concept of
employer-employee relationship
between Capt. Gavino and itself, but on
the provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65.
No reliance can be placed by MPA on
the cited American rulings as to
immunity from liability of a pilots'
association in light of existing positive
regulation under Philippine law.
Ultimately, the rights and liabilities
between a pilots' association and an
individual member depend largely
upon the constitution, articles or by-
laws of the association, subject to
appropriate government regulations.
The Court of Appeals properly applied
the clear and unequivocal provisions of
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-
65. In doing so, it was just being
consistent with its finding of the non-
existence of employer-employee
relationship between MPA and Capt.
Gavino which precludes the application
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
True, Customs Administrative Order
No. 15 -65 does not categorically
characterize or label MPA's liability as
solidary in nature. Nevertheless, a
careful reading and proper analysis of
the correlated provisions lead to the
conclusion that MPA is solidarily liable
for the negligence of its member pilots,
without prejudice to subsequent
reimbursement from the pilot at fault.
Article 1207 of the Civil Code provides
that there is solidary liability only when
the obligation expressly so states, or
when the law or the nature of the
obligation requires solidarity. Plainly,
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-
65, which as an implementing rule has
the force and effect of law, can validly
provide for solidary liability.
Intervening Cause
▪ If the intervening cause is one
which in ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular
circumstances.
▪ The defendant may be negligent,
among other reasons, because of
failure to guard against it.
Phoenix Construction vs IAC
Issue: Whether or not Leonardo
Dionisio was negligent on the night of
the accident.
Ruling: YES
Issue: Whether or not Phoenix
Construction Inc. should be held liable
for the injuries sustained by Dionisio.
102
Ruling: NO
Page
The conclusion we draw from the
factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was
negligent the night of the accident. He
was hurrying home that night and
driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights
at or near the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets and
thus did not see the dump truck that
was parked askew and sticking out onto
the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of
First Instance and the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful —
or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That
there was a reasonable relationship
between petitioner Carbonel's
negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondent's injuries on
the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a
slightly different manner, the collision
of Dionisio's car with the dump truck
was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the
truck driver's negligence was merely a
"passive and static condition" and that
private respondent Dionisio's
negligence was an "efficient intervening
cause and that consequently Dionisio's
negligence must be regarded as the
legal and proximate cause of the
accident rather than the earlier
negligence of Carbonel.
. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result
it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive
situations, particularly since, as is
invariably the case, the latter are the
result of other active forces which have
gone before.
Even the lapse of a considerable time
during which the "condition" remains
static will not necessarily affect liability.
Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but
the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity
at all, it must refer to the type of case
where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some
new force intervenes. But even in such
cases, it is not the distinction between
"cause" and "condition" which is
important but the nature of the risk and
the character of the intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck
driver's negligence far from being a
"passive and static condition" was
rather an indispensable and efficient
cause. The collision between the dump
truck and the private respondent's car
would in an probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck
103
created an unreasonable risk of injury
for anyone driving down General
Page
Lacuna Street and for having so created
this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible.
Dionisio's negligence, although later in
point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the
accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.
What the Petitioners describe as an
"intervening cause" was no more than a
foreseeable consequent manner which
the truck driver had parked the dump
truck.
In other words, the petitioner truck
driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others
similarly situated not to impose upon
them the very risk the truck driver had
created. Dionisio's negligence was not
of an independent and overpowering
nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper
parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability.
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the
intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is
reasonably to be anticipated or one
which the defendant has reason to
anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or
the defendant may be negligent only for
that reason.
We hold that private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent
Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation
by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code
of the Philippines).
Test to determine Proximate Cause
1. CAUSE IN FACT: The first step is to
determine whether the defendant’s
conduct, in point of fact, was a
factor in causing plaintiff’s damage.
2. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CAUSE
(“But For” Rule): Whether such
negligent conduct is a cause
without which the injury would not
have taken place (sine qua non
rule) or is the efficient cause which
set in motion the chain of
circumstances leading to the
injury.
3. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST: If
the actor’s conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to
another, the fact that the actor
neither foresees nor should have
foreseen the harm or the manner
in which it occurred, does not
prevent him from being liable.
4. FORESEEABILITY TEST:
Anticipation of consequence is a
necessary element in determining
not only whether a particular act or
omission was negligent, but also
whether the injury complained of
104
was proximately caused by such
act or omission.
Page
 5. HINDSIGHT TEST: A party guilty of
negligence or omission of duty is
responsible for all the
consequences which a prudent and
experienced party, fully acquainted
with all the circumstances which in
fact exist, whether they could have
been ascertained by reasonable
diligence, or not, would have
thought at the time of the negligent
act as reasonably possible to
follow, if they had been suggested
to his mind.
Tison vs Spouses Pomasin
Issue: Who was negligent party or the
party at fault?
Ruling: The jitney driver was negligent.
One reason why the trial court found
credible the version of Jabon was
because his concentration as driver is
more focused than that of a mere
passenger. The trial court expounded,
thus:
In the appreciation of the
testimony of eye-witnesses, one
overriding consideration is their
opportunity for observation in
getting to know or actually
seeing or observing the matter
they testify to. This most
particularly holds true in
vehicular collision or accident
cases which oftentimes happen
merely momentarily or in the
split of a second. In the case of a
running or travelling vehicle,
especially in highway travel
which doubtless involves faster
speed than in ordinary roads, the
driver is concentrated on his
driving continuously from
moment to moment even in long
trips. While in the case of a mere
passenger, he does not have to
direct his attention to the safe
conduct of the travelling vehicle,
as in fact he may converse with
other passengers and pay no
attention to the driving or safe
conduct of the travelling vehicle,
as he may even doze off to sleep
if he wants to, rendering his
opportunity for observation on
the precise cause of the accident
or collision or immediately
preceding thereto not as much as
that of the driver whose
attention is continuously focused
on his driving. So that as
between the respective versions
of the plaintiffs thru their
passenger and that of the
defendants thru their driver as to
the cause or antecedent causes
that led to the vehicular collision
in this case, the version of the
driver of defendant should
ordinarily be more reliable than
the version of a mere passenger
of Plaintiffs’ vehicle, simply
because the attention of the
passenger is not as much
concentrated on the driving as
that of the driver, consequently
the capacity for observation of
the latter of the latter on the
matter testified to which is the
precise point of inquiry --- the
105
proximate cause of the accident -
-- is more reasonably reliable.
Page
Moreover, the passenger’s vision
 is not as good as that of the
driver from the vantage point of
the driver’s seat especially in
nighttime, thus rendering a
passenger’s opportunity for
observation on the antecedent
causes of the collision lesser than
that of the driver. This being so,
this Court is more inclined to
believe the story of defendant’s
driver Claudio Jabon that the
jitney driven by Laarni Pomasin
fell off the shoulder of the curved
road causing it to run thereafter
in a zigzag manner and in the
process the two vehicles
approaching each other from
opposite directions at highway
speed came in contact with each
other, the zigzagging jeep hitting
the left fender of the truck all the
way to the fuel tank, the violent
impact resulting in the lighter
vehicle, the jitney, being thrown
away due to the disparate size of
the truck.
The appellate court labelled the trial
court’s rationalization as a "sweeping
conjecture" and countered that
Gregorio was actually occupying the
front seat of the jitney and had actually
a clear view of the incident despite the
fact that he was not driving.
While it is logical that a driver’s
attention to the road travelled is keener
than that of a mere passenger, it should
also be considered that the logic will
hold only if the two are similarly
circumstanced, and only as a general
rule, so that, it does not necessarily
follow that between the opposing
testimonies of a driver and a passenger,
the former is more credible. The factual
setting of the event testified on must
certainly be considered.
(after direct and cross examination)
The fact that the jitney easily fell into
the road shoulder, an undebated fact,
supports the trial court’s conclusion
that the jitney was indeed going
downhill which, it may be repeated,
was the original testimony of Gregorio
that the road was "curving and
downward."
It is this conclusion, prodded by the
inconsistency of Gregorio’s testimony,
that gives credence to the further
testimony of Jabon that the herein
respondent’s jitney, "loaded with
passengers with top-load" "was
running in a zigzag manner.
Going downward, the jitney had the
tendency to accelerate. The fall into the
shoulder of the road can result in the
loss of control of the jitney, which
explains why it was running in a zigzag
manner before it hit the tractor-trailer.
There was no showing that the tractor-
trailer was speeding. There is a
preponderance of evidence that the
tractor-trailer was in fact ascending.
Considering its size and the weight of
the tractor-trailer, its speed could not
be more than that of a fully loaded
jitney which was running downhill in a
zigzagging manner.
106
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon
Page
was negligent. In hindsight, it can be
argued that Jabon should have swerved
to the right upon seeing the jitney
zigzagging before it collided with the
tractor-trailer. Accidents, though,
happen in an instant, and,
understandably in this case, leaving the
driver without sufficient time and space
to maneuver a vehicle the size of a
tractor-trailer uphill and away from
collision with the jitney oncoming
downhill.
Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio’s
daughter, Laarni was the proximate
cause of the accident.
In addition, at the time of the incident,
Jabon was prohibited from driving the
truck due to the restriction imposed on
his driver’s license. Driving without a
proper license is a violation of traffic
regulation. Under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code, the legal presumption of
negligence arises if at the time of the
mishap, a person was violating any
traffic regulation.
However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a
causal connection must exist between
the injury received and the violation of
the traffic regulation. It must be proven
that the violation of the traffic
regulation was the proximate or legal
cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in
part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing
cause of the injury.
Negligence per se, arising from the
mere violation of a traffic statute, need
not be sufficient in itself in establishing
liability for damages.
The rule on negligence per se must
admit qualifications that may arise
from the logical consequences of the
facts leading to the mishap. The
doctrine (and Article 2185, for that
matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for
it seeks to impute culpability arising
from the failure of the actor to perform
up to a standard established by a legal
fiat. But the doctrine should not be
rendered inflexible so as to deny relief
when in fact there is no causal relation
between the statutory violation and the
injury sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient,
are not intractable so as to forbid
rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law
is remunerative in spirit, aiming to
provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have
been invaded owing to the conduct of
other.
In the instant case, no causal
connection was established between
the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions
on his license to the vehicular collision.
Furthermore, Jabon was able to
sufficiently explain that the Land
Transportation Office merely erred in
not including restriction code 8 in his
license.
107
Page
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
▪ Also known as
✓ “Doctrine of Discovered
Peril”
✓ “Doctrine of Supervening
Negligence”
✓ “Humanitarian Doctrine”
▪ The negligence of the plaintiff does
not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where
it appears that the defendant by
exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s own negligence.
Picart vs Smith
If both parties are found to be negligent
but their negligence are not
contemporaneous, the person which
has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
See page 43
Elements for the Doctrine of Last Clear
Chance to apply
1. Plaintiff’s own negligence puts
himself in a dangerous situation
2. Defendant saw or discovered, by
exercising reasonable care, the
perilous position of plaintiff
3. In due time to avoid injuring him
4. Despite notice and imminent peril,
defendant failed to employ care to
avoid injury
5. Injury of plaintiff resulted
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance covers
Successive Acts of Negligence
1. Primary negligence of the
defendant
2. Contributory negligence of the
plaintiff
3. Subsequent negligent of the
defendant in failing to avoid the
injury to the plaintiff
PNR vs Brunty
See page 2
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is
INAPPLICABLE to Joint Tortfeasors
▪ The doctrine cannot be extended
into a field of joint tortfeasors as a
test of whether only one of them
should be held liable to the injured
person by reason of his discovery
of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be
invoked as between defendants
concurrently negligent.
▪ If the plaintiff is the proximate
cause – NO RECOVERY can be
made.
▪ If plaintiff is NOT the proximate
cause – RECOVERY can be made
but such will be MITIGATED.
▪ If negligence of parties is equal in
degree – EACH BEARS HIS OWN
LOSS.
▪ Last clear chance applies only if the
person who allegedly had the last
opportunity to aver the accident
was aware of the existence of peril
108
or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it.
Page
Pantranco vs Baesa
Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance applies in this case.
Ruling: NO
The doctrine of the last clear chance
simply, means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and failed
to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of
the plaintiff.
The subsequent negligence of the
defendant in failing to exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes
the immediate or proximate cause of
the accident which intervenes between
the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making
the defendant liable to the plaintiff.
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine
is invoked for the purpose of making a
defendant liable to a plaintiff who was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence,
although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim for damages.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention,
the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds
no application in this case. For the
doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary
to show that the person who allegedly
had the last opportunity to avert the
accident was aware of the existence of
the peril or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it.
One cannot be expected to avoid an
accident or injury if he does not know
or could not have known the existence
of the peril.
In this case, there is nothing to show
that the jeepney driver David Ico knew
of the impending danger. When he saw
at a distance that the approaching bus
was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the
dirt shoulder on his right since he must
have assumed that the bus driver will
return the bus to its own lane upon
seeing the jeepney approaching from
the opposite direction. There was
nothing to indicate to David Ico that the
bus could not return to its own lane or
was prevented from returning to the
proper lane by anything beyond the
control of its driver.
By the time David Ico must have
realized that the bus was not returning
to its own lane, it was already too late
to swerve the jeepney to his right to
prevent an accident. The speed at
which the approaching bus was
running prevented David Ico from
swerving the jeepney to the right
109
shoulder of the road in time to avoid
the collision. Thus, even assuming that
Page
the jeepney driver perceived the danger
a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to
avoid it.
This Court has held that the last clear
chance doctrine "can never apply
where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of
all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered".
Issue: Whether or not PANTRANCO, as
the employer, should be held liable.
Ruling: YES
When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption that the
employer has been negligent either in
the selection of his employees or in the
supervision over their acts. Although
this presumption is only a disputable
presumption which could be overcome
by proof of diligence of a good father of
a family, this Court believes that the
evidence submitted by the defendant to
show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the case of
Ramirez, as a company driver is far
from sufficient.
The finding of negligence on the part of
its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise
to the presumption of negligence on the
part of petitioner and the burden of
proving that it exercised due diligence
not only in the selection of its
employees but also in adequately
supervising their work rests with the
petitioner.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is
no presumption that the usual
recruitment procedures and safety
standards were observed.
The mere issuance of rules and
regulations and the formulation of
various company policies on safety,
without showing that they are being
complied with, are not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising
from the negligence of its employee. It
is incumbent upon petitioner to show
that in recruiting and employing the
erring driver, the recruitment
procedures and company policies on
efficiency and safety were followed.
Petitioner failed to do this.
▪ Last clear chance does not apply
where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously,
and of the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at
hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered.
Ong vs Metropolitan
Issue: Whether the death of minor
Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of defendant and/or its
employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to
recover damages.
Ruling: YES
Since the present action is one for
damages founded on culpable
negligence, the principle to be observed
110
is that the person claiming damages has
the burden of proving that the damage
Page
is caused by the fault or negligence of
the person from whom the damage is
claimed, or of one of his employees.
The question then that arises is: Have
appellants established by sufficient
evidence the existence of fault or
negligence on the part of appellee so as
to render it liable for damages for the
death of Dominador Ong?
Two boys admitted in the investigation
that they narrated in their statements
everything they knew of the accident,
but, as found by the trial, nowhere in
said statements do they state that the
lifeguard was chatting with the security
guard at the gate of the swimming pool
or was reading a comic magazine when
the alarm was given for which reason
he failed to immediately respond to the
alarm. On the contrary, what Ruben
Ong particularly emphasized therein
was that after the lifeguard heard the
shouts for help, the latter immediately
dived into the pool to retrieve the
person under water who turned out to
be his brother. For this reason, the trial
court made this conclusion: "The
testimony of Ruben Ong and Andres
Hagad, Jr. as to the alleged failure of the
lifeguard Abaño to immediately
respond to their call may therefore be
disregarded because they are belied by
their written statements.
On the other hand, there is sufficient
evidence to show that appellee has
taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of its patrons
or prevent accident which may cause
their death.
Thus, it has been shown that the
swimming pools of appellee are
provided with a ring buoy, toy roof,
towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a
first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the
pools is painted with black colors so as
to insure clear visibility. There is on
display in a conspicuous place within
the area certain rules and regulations
governing the use of the pools. Appellee
employs six lifeguards who are all
trained as they had taken a course for
that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These
lifeguards work on schedule prepared
by their chief and arranged in such a
way as to have two guards at a time on
duty to look after the safety of the
bathers. There is a male nurse and a
sanitary inspector with a clinic
provided with oxygen resuscitator. And
there are security guards who are
available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the
body of minor Ong was retrieved from
the bottom of the pool, the employees
of appellee did everything possible to
bring him back to life.
Sensing that their former theory as
regards the liability of appellee may not
be of much help, appellants now switch
to the theory that even if it be assumed
that the deceased is partly to be blamed
for the unfortunate incident, still
appellee may be held liable under the
doctrine of "last clear chance" for the
reason that, having the last opportunity
to save the victim, it failed to do so.
111
We do not see how this doctrine may
Page
apply considering that the record does
not show how minor Ong came into the
big swimming pool. The only thing the
record discloses is that minor Ong
informed his elder brothers that he was
going to the locker room to drink a
bottle of coke but that from that time
on nobody knew what happened to him
until his lifeless body was retrieved.
The doctrine of last clear chance simply
means that the negligence of a claimant
does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually
is stated, a person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding
an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or the
negligence of a third person which is
imputed to his opponent, is considered
in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.
Since it is not known how minor Ong
came into the big swimming pool and it
being apparent that he went there
without any companion in violation of
one of the regulations of appellee as
regards the use of the pools, and it
appearing that lifeguard Abano
responded to the call for help as soon as
his attention was called to it and
immediately after retrieving the body
all efforts at the disposal of appellee
had been put into play in order to bring
him back to life, it is clear that there is
no room for the application of the
doctrine now invoked by appellants to
impute liability to appellee.
The last clear chance doctrine can
never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if
the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which
any previous negligence of the party
charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury.
▪ The doctrine of last clear chance
applies in a suit between owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles.
▪ It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility form the
carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations.
▪ It will be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver of the jeepney and
its owners on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.
Bustamante vs CA
Issue: Whether the respondent court
has properly and legally applied the
doctrine of "last clear chance" in the
present case despite its own finding
that appellant cargo truck driver
Edilberto Montesiano was admittedly
negligent in driving his cargo truck very
fast on a descending road and in the
presence of the bus driver coming from
the opposite direction.
Ruling: NO
112
The trial court found and We are
convinced that the cargo truck was
Page
running fast. It did not overlook the fact
that the road was descending as in fact
it mentioned this circumstance as one
of the factors disregarded by the cargo
truck driver along with the fact that he
was driving an old 1947 cargo truck
whose front wheels are already
wiggling and the fact that there is a
passenger bus approaching it.
In holding that the driver of the cargo
truck was negligent, the trial court
certainly took into account all these
factors so it was incorrect for the
respondent court to disturb the factual
findings of the trial court, which is in a
better position to decide the question,
having heard the witness themselves
and observed their deportment.
The respondent court adopted the
doctrine of "last clear chance." The
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that
the defendant, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence.
In other words, the doctrine of last
clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him
in a position of peril, and an injury
results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery.
As the doctrine is usually stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of
his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered
in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.
The practical import of the doctrine is
that a negligent defendant is held liable
to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a
plaintiff who has been grossly negligent
in placing himself in peril, if he, aware
of the plaintiffs peril, or according to
some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of
due case, had in fact an opportunity
later than that of the plaintiff to avoid
an accident.
Furthermore, "as between defendants:
The doctrine cannot be extended into
the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of
whether only one of them should be
held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter's
peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently
negligent. As against third persons, a
negligent actor cannot defend by
pleading that another had negligently
failed to take action which could have
avoided the injury."
All premises considered, the Court is
convinced that the respondent Court
committed an error of law in applying
the doctrine of last clear chance as
between the defendants, since the case
at bar is not a suit between the owners
and drivers of the colliding vehicles but
a suit brought by the heirs of the
deceased passengers against both
owners and drivers of the colliding
113
vehicles. Therefore, the respondent
court erred in absolving the owner and
Page
driver of the cargo truck from liability.
 ▪ Doctrine of last clear chance does
not seem to have a role to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence
as an absolute bar to recovery by
the plaintiff, has itself been
rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code.
Phoenix vs IAC
see page 102
▪ Is the doctrine of last clear chance
applicable in a sea mishap?
▪ search
Contributory Negligence
▪ The conduct on the part of the
injured party, which contributed as
a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered which falls below the
standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection.
Valenzuela vs CA
Issue: Whether or not Valenzuela was
likewise guilty of contributory
negligence in parking her car alongside
Aurora Boulevard.
Ruling: NO
Contributory negligence is conduct on
the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection.
Based on the foregoing definition, the
standard or act to which, according to
petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
conformed for her own protection was
not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We
cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been
compelled to recognize that an actor
who is confronted with an emergency is
not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation.
The law takes stock of impulses of
humanity when placed in threatening
or dangerous situations and does not
require the same standard of thoughtful
and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes
threatening conditions.
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by
this Court in Gan vs. Court of
Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much
time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he
fails to undertake what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence.
While the emergency rule applies to
those cases in which reflective thought,
or the opportunity to adequately weigh
a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an
individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the
event which absolutely negates
thoroughful care, but by the over-all
114
nature of the circumstances
Page
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly
crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night
will not be faulted for stopping at a
point which is both convenient for her
to do so and which is not a hazard to
other motorists. She is not expected to
run the entire boulevard in search for a
parking zone or turn on a dark street or
alley where she would likely find no
one to help her. It would be hazardous
for her not to stop and assess the
emergency (simply because the entire
length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-
parking zone) because the hobbling
vehicle would be both a threat to her
safety and to other motorists. In the
instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching
that portion of Aurora Boulevard close
to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat
tire. To avoid putting herself and other
motorists in danger, she did what was
best under the situation. As narrated by
respondent court: "She stopped at a
lighted place where there were people,
to verify whether she had a flat tire and
to solicit help if needed. Having been
told by the people present that her rear
right tire was flat and that she cannot
reach her home she parked along the
sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind
a Toyota Corona Car."
Under the circumstances described,
Valenzuela did exercise the standard
reasonably dictated by the emergency
and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate
circumstances which eventually led to
the amputation of one of her lower
extremities. The emergency which led
her to park her car on a sidewalk in
Aurora Boulevard was not of her own
making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.
Issue: Whether or not Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, should
be eld solidarily liable.
Ruling: YES
We agree with the respondent court
that the relationship in question is not
based on the principle of respondeat
superior, which holds the master liable
for acts of the servant, but that of pater
familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for
his failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his
employees. It is up to this point,
however, that our agreement with the
respondent court ends. Utilizing the
bonus pater familias standard
expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's
employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc.
is jointly and solidarily liable for the
damage caused by the accident of June
24, 1990.
The employer's primary liability under
the concept of pater familias embodied
by Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of
the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or
tortious in character. His liability is
relieved on a showing that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision
of its employees. Once evidence is
introduced showing that the employer
115
exercised the required amount of care
in selecting its employees, half of the
Page
employer's burden is overcome. The
question of diligent supervision,
however, depends on the circumstances
of employment.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has
not demonstrated, to our satisfaction,
that it exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li. No
allegations were made as to whether or
not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the
driving proficiency and history of Li, to
whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car. Not having been able to
overcome the burden of demonstrating
that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of
bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly
and severally liable with the former for
the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.
▪ Contributory negligence does not
defeat an action if it can be shown
that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the injured party’s
negligence.
MH Rakes vs Atlantic
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff was
negligent. (That having noticed the
depression in the track he continued his
work)
Ruling: NO
The depression in the track night
indicate either a serious or a rival
difficulty. There is nothing in the
evidence to show that the plaintiff did
or could see the displaced timber
underneath the sleeper.
While the method of construction may
have been known to the men who had
helped build the road, it was otherwise
with the plaintiff who had worked at
this job less than two days. A man may
easily walk along a railway without
perceiving a displacement of the
underlying timbers. The foreman
testified that he knew the state of the
track on the day of the accident and
that it was then in good condition, and
one Danridge, a witness for the
defendant, working on the same job,
swore that he never noticed the
depression in the track and never saw
any bad place in it.
His lack of caution in continuing at his
work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so
gross a nature as to constitute
negligence. On this point we accept the
conclusion of the trial judge who found
as facts that "the plaintiff did not know
the cause of the one rail being lower
than then other" and "it does not
appear in this case that the plaintiff
knew before the accident occurred that
the stringers and rails joined in the
same place.
Issue: What effect is to be given such an
act of contributory negligence? Does it
defeat a recovery or is it to be taken
only in reduction of damages?
116
Ruling: Reduction of damages
Page
Although the defendant's' negligence
may have been the primary cause of the
injury complained of, yet an action for
such injury cannot be maintained if the
proximate and immediate cause of the
injury can be traced to the want of
ordinary care and caution in the person
injured; subject to this qualification,
which has grown up in recent years
that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the action
if it be shown that the defendant might,
by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the injured party's
negligence.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in
deciding which acts of the injured party
shall be considered immediate causes
of the accident. The test is simple.
Distinction must be between the
accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing
under review was the displacement of
the crosspiece or the failure to replace
it.
This produced the event giving
occasion for damages — that is, the
shinking of the track and the sliding of
the iron rails. To this event, the act of
the plaintiff in walking by the side of
the car did not contribute, although it
was an element of the damage which
came to himself. Had the crosspiece
been out of place wholly or partly
thorough his act of omission of duty,
the last would have been one of the
determining causes of the event or
accident, for which he would have been
responsible.
Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining
factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event
should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed a suitable equivalent for his
own imprudence.
When is Contributory Negligence a BAR
to recovery?
▪ Only when the proximate cause is
on the part of the plaintiff.
▪ Where the plaintiff contributes to
the principal occurrence, as of its
determining factors, he cannot
recover.
▪ Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to
his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed suitable equivalent for his
own impudence.
Legal Injury
▪ Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right.
▪ Legal Right – a legal claim enforced
by sanctions. It is sourced from
provisions of the law.
▪ Legal Duty – that which the law
requires to be done to a
117
determinate person
Page
Elements to invoke Legal Injury
1. Legal right in favor of a person
2. Correlative legal duty on the part of
another
3. Wrong in the form of an act or
omission or violation of said legal
right and duty with consequent
injury or damage
▪ To warrant recovery of damages,
there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant and damage resulting to
the plaintiff therefrom.
Custodio vs CA
Issue: Whether or not the award of
damages is in order.
Ruling: NO
we agree with petitioners that the
Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages in favor of private
respondents. The award of damages
has no substantial legal basis. A reading
of the decision of the Court of Appeals
will show that the award of damages
was based solely on the fact that the
original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa,
incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants
vacated the leased premises by reason
of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered losses does not give rise to a
right to recover damages.
To warrant the recovery of damages,
there must be both a right of action for
a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom.
Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for
the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between
damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage
suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain
an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it.
The underlying basis for the award of
tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be the
breach of some duty and the imposition
118
of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; it is not
Page
sufficient to state that there should be
tort liability merely because the
plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering.
Many accidents occur and many
injuries are inflicted by acts or
omissions which cause damage or loss
to another but which violate no legal
duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action
in his favor. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone. The law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law
will give redress for an act causing
damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be
damnum et injuria.
If, as may happen in many cases, a
person sustains actual damage, that is,
harm or loss to his person or property,
without sustaining any legal injury, that
is, an act or omission which the law
does not deem an injury, the damage is
regarded as damnum absque injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was
damage, there was no legal injury.
Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be
said to have violated the principle of
abuse of right.
In order that the principle of abuse of
right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that
the following requisites concur:
(1) The defendant should have acted in
a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy
(2) The acts should be willful
(3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a
fence within their lot is a valid exercise
of their right as owners, hence not
contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
The law recognizes in the owner the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those
established by law. It is within the right
of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and
fence their property. Article 430 of the
Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner
may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches,
live or dead hedges, or by any other
means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the
fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitudes. There was no easement of
way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by
contract. The fact that private
respondents had no existing right over
the said passageway is confirmed by
the very decision of the trial court
granting a compulsory right of way in
their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision
which gave private respondents the
right to use the said passageway after
119
payment of the compensation and
imposed a corresponding duty on
Page
petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision,
petitioners had an absolute right over
their property and their act of fencing
and enclosing the same was an act
which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right.
To repeat, whatever injury or damage
may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful
use of the said land by petitioners is
damnum absque injuria.
▪ The exercise of a right ends when
the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of
others.
▪ The mask of a right without the
spirit of justice which gives its life,
is repugnant to the modern
concept of social law. it cannot be
said that a person exercises a right
when he unnecessarily prejudices
another.
▪ Over and above the specific
precepts of positive law are the
supreme norms of justice and he
who violates them violates the law.
▪ For this reason, it is not
permissible to abuse our rights to
prejudice others.
Amonoy vs Gutierrez
See page 48
Classes of Injury
1. Injury to Persons
2. Injury to Property
3. Injury to Relations
Injury to Persons
Article 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary
to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in
manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Injury to Property
Article 23. Even when an act or event
causing damage to another's property
was not due to the fault or negligence of
the defendant, the latter shall be liable
for indemnity if through the act or
event he was benefited.
Injury to Relations
Article 26. Every person shall respect
the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and
120
similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall
Page
 produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of
another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing
the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to
be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating
another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal
condition.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Intentional Torts
▪ Under Article 2176, a person is also
liable for intentional and malicious
acts.
▪ The liability is founded on the
indisputable principle of justice
recognized by all legislations that
when a person, by huis act or
omission, causes damage or
prejudice to another, a juridical
relation is created by virtue of
which the injured person acquires
a right to be indemnified and the
person causing the damage is
charged with the corresponding
duty of repairing the damage.
▪ Article 21 to 36 of the Civil Code
serve as a catch all provisions or
dragnet clauses.
▪ They cover any imaginable tort
action, because these articles were
intended to expand the concept of
torts in our jurisdiction.
▪ It grants adequate legal remedies
for the (otherwise) untold number
of moral wrongs, which is
impossible for human foresight to
provide in out statutes.
PNB vs CA
See page 27
Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries
▪ In defamation, separate civil action
may be consolidated with the
criminal action.
▪ Defamation – is that which tends to
injure reputation or diminish
esteem, respect, good will, or
confidence of the plaintiff, or excite
derogatory feelings about him.
▪ It must be personal.
▪ What is definitive is not the level of
hurt, but the effect of the statement
on the reputation or standing of
the person.
▪ Note: In a case decided by the SC,
“gaga” is not defamatory.
Defamatory remarks are
considered defamatory in a case to
case basis
121
Page
MVRS vs Islamic Da’wah
Issue: Whether or not the Bulgar article
is libelous and is actionable.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner
(Muslims as a class) has cause of action.
Ruling: NO
Defamation, which includes libel and
slander, means the offense of injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation
through false and malicious statements.
It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem,
respect, good will or confidence in the
plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings
or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the
publication of anything which is
injurious to the good name or
reputation of another or tends to bring
him into disrepute.
Defamation is an invasion of a
relational interest since it involves the
opinion which others in the community
may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiff.
It must be stressed that words which
are merely insulting are not actionable
as libel or slander per se, and mere
words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious,
whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an
allegation for special damages.
The fact that the language is offensive
to the plaintiff does not make it
actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of
people cannot be interpreted to advert
to an identified or identifiable
individual. Absent circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to a
particular member of a class, no
member of such class has a right of
action without at all impairing the
equally demanding right of free speech
and expression, as well as of the press,
under the Bill of Rights.
In the present case, there was no fairly
identifiable person who was allegedly
injured by the Bulgar article. Since the
persons allegedly defamed could not be
identifiable, private respondents have
no individual causes of action; hence,
they cannot sue for a class allegedly
disparaged. Private respondents must
have a cause of action in common with
the class to which they belong to in
order for the case to prosper.
An individual Muslim has a reputation
that is personal, separate and distinct in
the community. Each Muslim, as part of
the larger Muslim community in the
Philippines of over 5 million people,
belongs to a different trade and
profession; each has a varying interest
and a divergent political and religious
view — some may be conservative,
others liberal.
A Muslim may find the article
dishonorable, even blasphemous;
others may find it as an opportunity to
strengthen their faith and educate the
non-believers and the "infidels." There
122
is no injury to the reputation of the
individual Muslims who constitute this
Page
community that can give rise to an
 action for group libel. Each reputation
is personal in character to every
person. Together, the Muslims do not
have a single common reputation that
will give them a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.
Our conclusion therefore is that the
statements published by petitioners in
the instant case did not specifically
identify nor refer to any particular
individuals who were purportedly the
subject of the alleged libelous
publication. Respondents can scarcely
claim to having been singled out for
social censure pointedly resulting in
damages.
May 2, 2022
▪ In actions for damages for libel, it is
axiomatic that the published work
alleged to contain libelous material
must be examined and viewed as a
whole.
Arafiles vs Philippine Journalists
Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding
that the publication of the news item
was not attended with malice to thus
free respondents of liability for
damages.
Ruling: NO
It bears noting that the complaint
petitioner instituted is one for damages
under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Article 33 contemplates a civil action
for the recovery of damages that is
entirely unrelated to the purely
criminal aspect of the case.
A civil action for libel under this article
shall be instituted and prosecuted to
final judgment and proved by
preponderance of evidence separately
from and entirely independent of the
institution, pendency or result of the
criminal action because it is governed
by the provisions of the New Civil Code
and not by the Revised Penal Code
governing the criminal offense charged
and the civil liability arising therefrom.
In actions for damages for libel, it is
axiomatic that the published work
alleged to contain libelous material
must be examined and viewed as a
whole.
The article must be construed as an
entirety including the headlines, as they
may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be
enlarged, explained or strengthened or
restricted by the context. Whether or
not it is libelous, depends upon the
scope, spirit and motive of the
publication taken in its entirety.
A publication claimed to be defamatory
must be read and construed in the
sense in which the readers to whom it
is addressed would ordinarily
understand it. So, the whole item,
including display lines, should be read
and construed together, and its
meaning and signification thus
determined.
123
Petitioner’s anchoring of his complaint
for damages on a charge of "malicious"
Page
sensationalization of fabricated facts
thus fails.
The presentation of the news item
subject of petitioner’s complaint may
have been in a sensational manner, but
it is not per se illegal.
In determining the manner in which a
given event should be presented as a
news item and the importance to be
attached thereto, newspapers must
enjoy a certain degree of discretion.
Every citizen of course has the right to
enjoy a good name and reputation, but
we do not consider that the
respondents, under the circumstances
of this case, had violated said right or
abused the freedom of the press.
The newspapers should be given such
leeway and tolerance as to enable them
to courageously and effectively perform
their important role in our democracy.
In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and [editors] usually have to
race with their deadlines; and
consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be
held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words.
In fine, this Court finds that case against
respondents has not been sufficiently
established by preponderance of
evidence.
Defenses for Libel
1. Absence of elements
2. Privilege communication
▪ Truth is not a defense for libel.
Fraud or Misrepresentation (formerly
Deceit)
▪ Independent civil actions are
permitted to be filed separately
regardless of the result of the
criminal action.
▪ Unfair competition under the
Intellectual Property Code and
fraud under Article 33 of the Civil
Code are independent actions.
▪ Article 33 does not operate as a
prejudicial question to justify the
suspension of the criminal cases at
bar.
Salta vs De Veyra
Issue: Whether a decision of acquittal in
a criminal case operates to dismiss a
separate civil action filed on the basis of
the same facts as alleged in the criminal
case.
Ruling: NO
the filing in this case of a civil action
separate from the criminal action is
fully warranted under the provision of
Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
The criminal case is for the prosecution
of an offense the main element of which
is fraud, one of the kinds of crime
mentioned in the aforecited provision.
124
Based on the same acts for which the
criminal action was filed, the civil
Page
actions very clearly alleged fraud and
negligence as having given rise to the
cause of action averred in the
complaints.
We hold that the following allegation in
the complaints unmistakably shows
that the complaints do contain
sufficient averment of fraud:
13. That there was fraud
committed by the defendant in
granting the aforesaid loans
which rendered him liable for his
acts, which fraud is positively
and easily Identifiable in the
manner and scheme
aforementioned.
That there is allegation of negligence is
also unmistakably shown when the
complaint states that "the defendant as
manager of Malolos Branch, in gross
violation of the bank rules and
regulations, and without exercising
necessary prudence, ... extended a
number of credit accommodations . . ."
On this allegation of negligence alone,
the civil case may be maintained as an
entirely independent action from the
criminal case.
It is significant to note that under
Article 31 of the New Civil Code, it is
made clear that the civil action
permitted therein to be filed separately
from the criminal action may proceed
independently of the criminal
proceedings "regardless of the result of
the latter." It seems perfectly
reasonable to conclude that the civil
actions mentioned in Article 33,
permitted in the same manner to be
filed separately from the criminal case,
may proceed similarly regardless of the
result of the criminal case.
"Acquittal in the criminal case will not
be an obstacle for the civil case to
prosper unless in the criminal case the
Court makes a finding that even civilly,
the accused would not be liable-there is
no such finding."
Samson vs Daway
Issue: Which court has jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases for violation of
intellectual property rights?
Ruling: RTC
Issue: Did the respondent Judge gravely
abuse his discretion in refusing to
suspend the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
02-108043-44 on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question?
Ruling: NO
Petitioner failed to substantiate his
claim that there was a prejudicial
question. In his petition, he prayed for
the reversal of the March 26, 2003
order which sustained the denial of his
motion to suspend arraignment and
other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-02-108043-44. For unknown
reasons, however, he made no
discussion in support of said prayer in
his petition and reply to comment.
Neither did he attach a copy of the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446
125
nor quote the pertinent portion thereof
to prove the existence of a prejudicial
Page
question.

At any rate, there is no prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element
in the acts constituting unfair
competition under Section 168 of R.A.
No. 8293 is fraud.
Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,
in cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Hence,
Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as
admitted by private respondent also
relate to unfair competition, is an
independent civil action under Article
33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not
operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of the
criminal cases at bar.
Economic Relations
Interference with Contractual Relations
Article 1314. Any third person who
induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party. (n)
Elements of Interference
1. Existence of a valid contract
2. Knowledge of the third person of
the existence of a valid contract
3. Interference without legal
justification or excuse
▪ There is no interference in a VOID
contract.
Article 28. Unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use
of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall
give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage.
▪ Applies for agricultural,
commercial, industrial or labor
enterprises only.
Negligence
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of
the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the
126
place. When negligence shows bad
Page
 faith, the provisions of Articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of
a good father of a family shall be
required. (1104a)
▪ Good father of the family is the
standard minimum required for
diligence.
Elements of Negligence
1. Legal duty
2. Breach of legal duty
3. Causation
4. Damages
Test of Negligence
▪ Did the defendant, in doing the
alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which
an ordinary prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If
not, the person is guilty of
negligence.
▪ The law in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet peter familias of the
Roman law.
PNR vs Brunty
See page 2
Good Father of a Family (Bonus Pater
Familias
▪ A standard man does not mean an
ideal or perfect man, but an
ordinary member of the
community. He is usually spoken of
as an ordinarily, reasonable,
careful, and prudent man.
▪ Test: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent man would
have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is negligent.
▪ Negligence in a given case is not
determined b reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in
the situation before him, but is
determined in the light of human
experience and the facts involved
in the particular case.
Picart vs Smith
See page 43
Standard of Care required of Banks
▪ In the case of banks, the degree of
negligence required is more than
that of a good father of a family.
▪ Considering the fiduciary nature of
their relationship with their
depositors, banks are duty bound
to treat the accounts of their clients
with the highest degree of care.
▪ Functions of bank are imbued with
public interest.
▪ Even testifying in courts (even
execution of JA), bank employees
must be subpoena by the court.
Philippine Bank of Commerce vs CA
Issue: What is the proximate cause of
the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74,
suffered by the private respondent RMC
— petitioner bank's negligence or that
of private respondent's?
127
Ruling: Negligence of the bank.
Page
There are three elements of a quasi-
delict:
a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond
c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute
as to the damage suffered by the
private respondent (plaintiff in the trial
court) RMC in the amount of
P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault or
negligence which caused the damage
where the parties point to each other as
the culprit.
Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.
The case of Picart v. Smith, provides the
TEST by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular
case which may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence.
Applying the above test, it appears that
the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
was negligent in validating, officially
stamping and signing all the deposit
slips prepared and presented by Ms.
Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the
duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-
imposed procedure of the bank with
respect to the proper validation of
deposit slips, original or duplicate, as
testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
(testimony)
Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe
this very important procedure. The fact
that the duplicate slip was not
compulsorily required by the bank in
accepting deposits should not relieve
the petitioner bank of responsibility.
The odd circumstance alone that such
duplicate copy lacked one vital
information — that of the name of the
account holder — should have already
put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than
readily validating the incomplete
duplicate copy, she should have
proceeded more cautiously by being
more probing as to the true reason why
the name of the account holder in the
duplicate slip was left blank while that
in the original was filled up.
She should not have been so naive in
accepting hook, line and sinker the too
shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the
effect that since the duplicate copy was
only for her personal record, she would
simply fill up the blank space later on.
128
A "reasonable man of ordinary
prudence" would not have given
Page
credence to such explanation and
would have insisted that the space left
blank be filled up as a condition for
validation. Unfortunately, this was not
how bank teller Mabayad proceeded
thus resulting in huge losses to the
private respondent.
Negligence here lies not only on the
part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the
part of the bank itself in its
lackadaisical selection and supervision
of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified
in the testimony of Mr. Romeo
Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig
Branch of the petitioner bank and now
its Vice-President, to the effect that,
while he ordered the investigation of
the incident, he never came to know
that blank deposit slips were validated
in total disregard of the bank's
validation procedures.
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena
Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of
the petitioner bank in the selection and
supervision of its bank teller, which
was the proximate cause of the loss
suffered by the private respondent, and
not the latter's act of entrusting cash to
a dishonest employee, as insisted by the
petitioners.
Proximate cause is determined on the
facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent.
Proximate cause is defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not
have occurred.
In this case, absent the act of Ms.
Mabayad in negligently validating the
incomplete duplicate copy of the
deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not
have the facility with which to
perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with
impunity.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of
"last clear chance" (also referred to, at
times as "supervening negligence" or as
"discovered peril"), petitioner bank was
indeed the culpable party.
This doctrine, in essence, states that
where both parties are negligent, but
the negligent act of one is appreciably
later in time than that of the other, or
when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid
the impending harm and failed to do so
is chargeable with the consequences
thereof.
Stated differently, the rule would also
mean that an antecedent negligence of
a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a
defense against liability sought by
another, if the latter, who had the last
fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
Here, assuming that private respondent
RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to
a dishonest employee, thus providing
129
the latter with the opportunity to
defraud the company, as advanced by
Page
the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied
that the petitioner bank, thru its teller,
had the last clear opportunity to avert
the injury incurred by its client, simply
by faithfully observing their self-
imposed validation procedure.
The degree of diligence ought to be
exercised by banks in dealing with their
clients.
(see to Art. 1173)
In the case of banks, however, the
degree of diligence required is more
than that of a good father of a family.
Considering the fiduciary nature of
their relationship with their depositors,
banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the
highest degree of care.
In every case, the depositor expects the
bank to treat his account with the
utmost fidelity, whether such account
consists only of a few hundred pesos or
of millions. The bank must record every
single transaction accurately, down to
the last centavo, and as promptly as
possible. This has to be done if the
account is to reflect at any given time
the amount of money the depositor can
dispose as he sees fit, confident that the
bank will deliver it as and to whomever
he directs. A blunder on the part of the
bank, such as the failure to duly credit
him his deposits as soon as they are
made, can cause the depositor not a
little embarrassment if not financial
loss and perhaps even civil and criminal
litigation.
The point is that as a business affected
with public interest and because of the
nature of its functions, the bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts
of its depositors with meticulous care,
always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. In the case
before us, it is apparent that the
petitioner bank was remiss in that duty
and violated that relationship.
Standard of Care of Children
▪ Children must be expected to act
upon childlike instincts and
impulses and others chargeable
with a duty of care and caution
toward them must take
precautions accordingly.
▪ If they leave exposed to the
observation of children anything
which would be tempting to them,
and which they in their immature
judgement might naturally suppose
they were at liberty to play with,
they should expect that liberty to
be taken.
▪ The fact of minority or the fact that
he is a child does not completely
except him with any obligation
especially in instances where he is
proven to be capable of
understanding the consequences of
his action.
▪ In such case, the degree of care
may be lowered.
Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Compnay
Issue: Whether or not MERLC should be
held liable to plaintiff.
130
Ruling: NO?
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▪ The degree of care required to be
exercised must vary with the
capacity of the person endangered
to care for himself.
▪ A minor should not be held to the
same degree of care as an adult,
but his conduct should be judged
according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience:
that degree of care ordinarily
exercised by children of the same
age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge, and experience under
the same or similar circumstances.
Ylarde vs Aquino
See page 69
Standard of Care of Experts/Professionals
▪ When a person holds himself out as
being competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will
be held liable for negligence if he
fails to exhibit the care and skill of
one ordinary skilled in the
particular work which he attempts
to do.
▪ He is also estopped in claiming that
the degree of diligence must be
lower because he already declared
that he is an expert.
Cuilon vs Philippine
▪ Whether or not a physician has
committed an “inexcusable lack f
precaution” in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care
observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under
similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advance ___
Cruz vs CA
See page 31
In case of Insane Persons
Article 2180. xxx
Guardians are liable for damages
caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
xxx
▪ The minors or incapacitated
persons must live in the company
of the guardians so that there is
supervision.
Article 2182. If the minor or insane
person causing damage has no parents
or guardian, the minor or insane person
shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him
where a guardian ad litem shall be
appointed. (n)
Emergency Rule or Sudden Peril Doctrine
▪ An individual, who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much
time to consider the best means
131
that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of
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negligence if he fails to undertake
 what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
Valenzuela vs CA
Quantum of Proof in Quasi-Delict vs
Quantum of Proof in Breach of Contract
▪ In quasi-delict, the negligence or
faut should be clearly established
because it is the basis of action,
whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of a contract
and the fact that the obligor failed
to comply his obligation.
Calalas vs CA
Presumption of Negligence
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps,
the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of the
due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed
that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding two
months.
If the owner was not in the motor
vehicle, the provisions of article 2180
are applicable. (n)
▪ Owner – registered owner, if not
registered, owner in the deed of
sale.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. (n)
Article 2188. There is prima facie
presumption of negligence on the part
of the defendant if the death or injury
results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such
as firearms and poison, except when
the possession or use thereof is
indispensable in his occupation or
business. (n)
Res Ipsa Loquitor
▪ The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
(the thing speaks for itself) is a rule
in evidence (not substantive law)
peculiar to the law of negligence.
3 conditions for the applicability of the
doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor
1. The thing causing the injury is
under the control of the defendant
or his servant
2. In the ordinary cause of things, the
accident does not happen if those
who have control used proper care
3. In the absence of explanation for
the defendant, a presumption of
negligence results
132
F.F Cruz vs CA
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▪ Where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
Layugan vs IAC
▪ The injury itself, taken together
with the circumstances, raises the
presumption of negligence that the
defendant must meet with an
explanation.
▪ The defendant has to convince the
court that the presumption must
not be interpreted in favor of the
complainant.
Ramos vs CA
Elements of Res Ipsa Loquitor
1. The accident is such that it would
not have happened in the ordinary
course of events without the
negligence of someone
2. The defendant exercises control
and management
3. There is NO contributory
negligence on the part of the
plaintiff.
▪ For the res ipsa loquitor doctrine
to apply, it must appear that the
injured party had no knowledge as
to the cause of the accident, or that
the party to be charged with
negligence has superior knowledge
or opportunity for explanation of
the accident.
Defenses (to exempt or mitigate liability)
1. Due diligence
2. Acts of public officers
3. Accident or fortuitous events
Due Diligence
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
▪ The defense of due diligence is
plausible when defendant has
presented enough evidence to
overcome the presumption of
negligence. It is not enough that it
is alleged.
▪ He who alleges must prove.
Metro Manila vs CA
133
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Acts of Public Officers
 ▪ When what is involved is a duty
owing to the public in general, an
individual cannot have a cause of
action against the public officer
although he may have been injured
by the action or inaction of the
officer, except when the individual
suffers a particular or special
injury.
▪ Presumption of regularity.
Vinzons-Chato vs Fortune
Accident of Fortuitous Events
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly
specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or
when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were
inevitable. (1105a)
Elements of Caso Fortuito
1) The cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation, must be
independent of the human will.
2) It must be impossible to foresee
the event or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid
3) The occurrence must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner
4) The obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of
the injury resulting to the creditor
Juntilla vs Fontanar
Hernandez vs COA
Res Ipsa Loquitor
▪ Res ipsa loquitor is literally
translated as “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself”.
▪ The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
means that where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc vs
Spouses Sarangya
May 14, 2022
Damnum Absque Injuria
▪ Right to recover damages does not
arise from the mere fact that the
plaintiff suffered losses.
▪ To warrant recovery of damages,
there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant and damage resulting to
the plaintiff therefrom.
134
▪ Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute
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a cause of action, since damages
 mare merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a
breach or wrong.
Custodio vs CA
Authority of Law
Article 5. Acts executed against the
provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity. (4a)
▪ General Rule: Acts executed against
the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void.
▪ The fact that it is void is not even
subject to ratification.
▪ Exception: When the law itself
authorizes their validity.
(RPC) Article 11. Justifying
circumstances. – The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
xxx
5) Any person who acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or
office.
6) Any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful
purpose.
▪ Example: Buy-bust operation
▪ Presumption of Regularity
Assumption of Risk (Volenti Non Fit
Injura)
▪ One who voluntarily assumed the
risk of injury from a known danger
is debarred from recovery.
▪ A plaintiff who, by his conduct,
brought himself with the operation
of the maxim, “volenti non fit
injuria” (that which a person
assents is not presumed in law an
injury), cannot recover on the basis
of the defendant’s negligence.
Requisites (Volenti Non Fit Injura)
1. The plaintiff had actual knowledge
of the danger
2. He understood and appreciated the
risk from the danger
3. He voluntarily exposed himself to
such risk
Exception (Volenti Non Fit Injura)
▪ A person is excused form the force
of the rule (volenti non fit injuria),
that when he voluntarily assents to
a known danger he must abide by
the consequences, if an emergency
is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril or
when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
Ilocos Norte vs CA
Last Clear Chance
▪ A negligent defendant is liable to a
135
negligent plaintiff, or even to a
plaintiff who has been grossly
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 negligent in placing himself in
peril, if the defendant, aware of the
plaintiff’s peril, had in fact a later
opportunity that the plaintiff to
avoid the accident.
Double Recovery NOT allowed
Prescription
Article 1144. The following actions
must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created
by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)
Article 1146. The following actions
must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights
of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
Article 1150. The time for prescription
for all kinds of actions, when there is no
special provision which ordains
otherwise, shall be counted from the
day they may be brought. (1969)
Waiver
Actions available to Victims of Negligence
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless
the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
(4a)
Article 1171. Responsibility arising
from fraud is demandable in all
obligations. Any waiver of an action for
future fraud is void. (1102a)
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.(n)
(RPC) Article 100. Civil liability of a
person guilty of felony. - Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
▪ Article 2177 distinguishes 2 kinds
of negligence:
1. Civil
2. Criminal
▪ The same negligence causing
damage may produce liability
arising from crime, if the act or
omission is punished by the RPC or
may create an action for quasi-
delict under the New Civil Code.
1. An action to enforce the liability
arising from culpa criminal under
Article 100 of the RPC
2. An action for quasi-delict under
136
Article 2176-2194 of the NCC
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 ▪ The only limitation is that the
injured party cannot recover twice
for the same act or omission.
The judgment of acquittal does not
necessarily extinguish the civil liability of
the accused EXCEPT:
1. When it declares that the facts
from which the civil liability might
rise did not exist
2. When it declares that the accused
is not the author of the crime
3. When the judgment expressly
declares that the liability is only
civil in nature
4. Where the civil liability is not
derived or based on the criminal
act of which the accused was
acquitted
5. Where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt
6. Where the civil action has
prescribed
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
Rule 111
Section 3. When civil action may
proceeded independently. — In the
cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal
action. (3a)
Problem
▪ As a result of a collision between a
taxicab owned by A and another
taxicab owned by B, X, a passenger
of the first taxicab, was seriously
injured. X later filed a criminal
action against both drivers.
Questions
a) It is necessary for X to reserve his
right to institute a civil action for
damages against both taxicab
owners before he can file a civil
action for damages against them?
Why?
b) May both taxicab owners raise the
defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their
drivers to be absolved from
liability for damages to X? Reason.
Suggested Answer
a) It depends. If the separate civil
action is to recover damages
arising from the criminal act,
reservation is necessary. It the civil
action against the taxicab owners is
based on culpa contractual or on
quasi-delict, there is no need for
reservation.
b) It depends. If the civil action is
based on quasi-delict, the taxicab
owners may raise the defense of
diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and
supervision of the driver. If the
action against them is based on
culpa contractual or civil liability
arising from a crime, they cannot
137
raise the defense.
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Alternative Answer
a) No such reservation is necessary.
Under Section 1, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
what is “deemed instituted” with
the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability
arising from the crime or ex
delicto.
b) All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the New
Civil Code are no longer “deemed
instituted” and may be filed
separately and prosecuted
independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action
(Section, 3 Rule 111, 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure). The
failure to make a reservation of the
criminal action is not a waiver of
the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on
these articles of the New Civil Code.
Special Liability in Particular Cases
Article 2183. The possessor of an
animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage. (1905)
Applicability of Provision (Article 2183)
▪ Since the law makes no distinction,
this is applicable to both wild (in
case the wild animal is kept) and
domestic animals.
Can you invoke liability if the possessor is
not the owner of the animal?
▪ Possession of the animal, not
ownership, is determinative of
liability under Article 2183.
▪ The obligation imposed by said
article is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack
of vigilance of the possessor or
user of the animal causing damage.
▪ It is based on natural equity and on
the principle of social interest that
he who possesses animals for his
utility, pleasure, or service, must
answer for any damage which such
animal may cause.
▪ It is enough that the defendant is
the possessor, owner, or user of the
animal at the time it caused the
damage complained of, to hold him
liable therefor.
Vestil vs IAC
Possible Defenses against this liability
1. Force majeure
2. Fault of person suffering damage
3. Act of third persons
▪ In some cases, tort law imposes
liability on defendants who are
neither negligent not guilty of
intentional wrongdoing.
▪ Known as Strict Liability, or
liability without fault, this branch
of torts seeks to regulate those
138
activities that are useful and
necessary but that create
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 abnormally dangerous risks to
society.
Products Liability
Article 2187. Manufacturers and
processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods shall be liable
for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers. (n)
▪ Under the foregoing provision,
liability is not made to depend
upon fault or negligence of the
manufacturer or processor.
▪ The provision likewise dispensed
with any contractual relation
between the manufacturer and the
consumer, thereby clearly implying
that liability is imposed by law as a
matter of public policy.
Is proof of negligence necessary?
(Products Liability)
▪ NO. Proof of negligence under this
provision is not necessary, as such,
traditional contract and warranty
defenses as
1. Lack of privity
2. Lack of reliance on a warranty
3. Lack of notice to the
defendant of the breach of
warranty
4. Disclaimer of implied
warranties
are INAPPLICABLE.
Requisites of Products Liability
1. Defendant is a manufacturer or
possessor of foodstuff, drinks,
toilet articles and similar goods
2. He used noxious or harmful
substances in the manufacture or
processing of the foodstuff, drinks
or toilet article consumed or used
by the plaintiff
3. Plaintiff’s death or injury was
caused by the product so
consumed or used
4. The damages sustained and
claimed by the plaintiff and the
amount thereof
▪ The burden of proof that the
product was in a defective
condition at the time it left the
hands of the manufacturer and
particular seller is upon the injured
plaintiff.
Who may recover?
▪ Although the article used the term
“consumer”, such term includes a
“user” ad “purchaser” of the
injuriously defective food product
or toilet article.
▪ The person who may recover a
need not be the purchaser of the
foodstuff or toilet article.
Article 2188. There is prima facie
presumption of negligence on the part
of the defendant if the death or injury
results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such
as firearms and poison, except when
the possession or use thereof is
indispensable in his occupation or
139
business. (n)
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Article 2189. Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or
supervision. (n)
Bernardino Jimenez vs City of Manila
Article 2190. The proprietor of a
building or structure is responsible for
the damages resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to
the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be
responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of
machinery which has not been
taken care of with due diligence,
and the inflammation of
explosive substances which have
not been kept in a safe and
adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which
may be harmful to persons or
property;
(3) By the falling of trees
situated at or near highways or
lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes,
canals, sewers or deposits of
infectious matter, constructed
without precautions suitable to
the place. (1908)
Article 2192. If damage referred to in
the two preceding articles should be
the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in Article 1723,
the third person suffering damages may
proceed only against the engineer or
architect or contractor in accordance
with said article, within the period
therein fixed. (1909)
▪ The owner or proprietor of a place
of public amusement impliedly
warrants that the premises,
appliances and amusement devices
are safe for the purpose for which
they are designed, the doctrine
being subject to no other exception
or qualification than that he does
not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by
ordinary or reasonable means.
Gotesco Investment Corp vs Chatto
Article 2193. The head of a family that
lives in a building or a part thereof, is
responsible for damages caused by
things thrown or falling from the same.
(1910)
Article 2194. The responsibility of two
or more persons who are liable for
quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
Consumer Act (RA 7394 Sections 92-107)
140
▪ Consumer – means a natural
person who is a purchaser, lessee,
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recipient or prospective purchaser,
 lessor or recipient of consumer
products, services or credit.
▪ Manufacturer – means any person
who manufactures, assembles or
processes consumer products,
except that if the goods are
manufactured, assembled or
processed for another person who
attaches his own brand name to
the consumer products, the latter
shall be deemed the manufacturer.
In case of imported products, the
manufacturer's representatives or,
in his absence, the importer, shall
be deemed the manufacturer.
(RA 7394)
Article 92. Exemptions. – If the
concerned department finds that for
good or sufficient reasons, full
compliance with the labeling
requirements otherwise applicable
under this Act is impracticable or is not
necessary for the adequate protection
of public health and safety, it shall
promulgate regulations exempting such
substances from these requirements to
the extent it deems consistent with the
objective of adequately safeguarding
public health and safety, and any
hazardous substance which does not
bear a label in accordance with such
regulations shall be deemed mislabeled
hazardous substance.
(RA 7394)
Article 94. Labeling Requirements of
Cigarettes. – All cigarettes for sale or
distribution within the country shall be
contained in a package which shall bear
the following statement or its
equivalent in Filipino: "Warning"
“Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to
Your Health". Such statement shall be
located in conspicuous place on every
cigarette package and shall appear in
conspicuous and legible type in
contrast by typography, layout or color
with other printed matter on the
package. Any advertisement of cigarette
shall contain the name warning as
indicated in the label.
▪ While it may be true that the pre-
existing contract between the
parties may, as a general rule, bar
the applicability of the law on
quasi-delict, the liability may itself
be deemed to arise from quasi-
delict if the act which breaks the
contract is also a quasi-delict.
Coca-Cola vs CA
May 28, 2022 (late because of brownout)
………
Article 696. Every successive owner or
possessor of property who fails or
refuses to abate a nuisance in that
property started by a former owner or
possessor is liable therefor in the same
manner as the one who created it.
Article 697. The abatement of a
nuisance does not preclude the right of
any person injured to recover damages
for its past existence.
141
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Article 698. Lapse of time cannot
legalize any nuisance, whether public
or private.
What is Nuisance?
Nuisance per se
▪ It is recognized as a nuisance under
and all circumstances because its
constitutes a direct menace to
public health and safely and, for
that reason, may be abated
summarily under the undefined
law of necessity.
▪ It becomes a nuisance depending
upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot
be abated without the due hearing
thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such thing does in
law constitute a nuisance.
Public Nuisance
Article 695. Nuisance is either public or
private. A public nuisance affects a
community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals
may be unequal. A private nuisance is
one that is not included in the foregoing
definition.
Article 699. The remedies against a
public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the
Penal Code or any local
ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial
proceedings.
Article 701. If a civil action is brought
by reason of the maintenance of a
public nuisance, such action shall be
commenced by the city or municipal
mayor.
Article 702. The district health officer
shall determine whether or not
abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against
a public nuisance.
Article 703. A private person may file
an action on account of a public
nuisance, if it is specially injurious to
himself.
Article 704. Any private person may
abate a public nuisance which is
specially injurious to him by removing,
or if necessary, by destroying the thing
which constitutes the same, without
committing a breach of the peace, or
doing unnecessary injury. But it is
necessary:
(1) That demand be first made
upon the owner or possessor of
the property to abate the
nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been
rejected;
(3) That the abatement be
142
approved by the district health
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 officer and executed with the
assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the
destruction does not exceed
three thousand pesos
Article 705. The remedies against a
private nuisance are:
(1) A civil action; or
(2) Abatement, without judicial
proceedings.
Article 706. Any person injured by a
private nuisance may abate it by
removing, or if necessary, by destroying
the thing which constitutes the
nuisance, without committing a breach
of the peace or doing unnecessary
injury. However, it is indispensable that
the procedure for extrajudicial
abatement of a public nuisance by a
private person be followed.
Article 707. A private person or a public
official extrajudicially abating a
nuisance shall be liable for damages:
(1) If he causes unnecessary
injury; or
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later
declared by the courts to be not a
real nuisance.
What is an Attractive Nuisance?
▪ Contributory negligence of a minor
does not bar recovery, where his
immaturity and natural curiosity
impelled him to act tohis injury,
but discretion shown by the child is
the decisive factor.
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc vs Balandan
Violation of Constitutional Rights and
Violation of Civil Liberties
Article 32. Any public officer or
employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the
press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or
illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation
of property without due process
of law;
(7) The right to a just
compensation when private
property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal
protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in
one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of
changing the same;
143
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(11) The privacy of
communication and
correspondence;
(12) The right to become a
member of associations or
societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a
peaceable assembly to petition
the Government for redress of
grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from
involuntary servitude in any
form;
(15) The right of the accused
against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to
be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance
of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being
compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make
such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a
State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive
fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which
has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the
courts.
In any of the cases referred to in
this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense,
the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for
damages, and for other relief.
Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral
damages. Exemplary damages may also
be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is
not demandable from a judge unless his
act or omission constitutes a violation
of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.
Can you independently prosecute on the
aforementioned violations?
▪ YES. In any of the cases referred to
it this article, whether or not the
defendant’s act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to
commence an ENTIRELY
SEPARATE and DISTINCT civil
action for DAMAGES, and for other
relief.
▪ Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be
instituted) and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
▪ The indemnity shall include moral
144
damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
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 ▪ The responsibility herein set forth
is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the penal
code and any other penal statute.
Aberca vs Ver
Owners of Motor Vehicles
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps,
the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of the
due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed
that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding two
months.
If the owner was not in the motor
vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180
are applicable. (n)
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. (n)
Article 2186. Every owner of a motor
vehicle shall file with the proper
government office a bond executed by a
government-controlled corporation or
office, to answer for damages to third
persons. The amount of the bond and
other terms shall be fixed by the
competent public official. (n)
▪ The owner is solidarily liable with
the driver for motor vehicle
mishaps when:
1. The owner was IN the vehicle
at the time AND
2. The owner could have, by sue
of due diligence, prevented
the misfortune
Owner of the Vehicle
▪ Owner – shall mean the actual legal
owner of the motor vehicle, in
whose name such vehicle is duly
registered with the LTO.
▪ Registration of motor vehicle is
required not because it is the
operative act which transfers
ownership in vehicles, but because
it is the means by which the owner
can be identified so that if any
accident occurs, or damage or
injury is caused in the operation of
the vehicle, responsibility can be
fixed.
▪ As held in Vargas vs Langcay, the
registered owner/operator of a
passenger vehicle is jointly and
severally liable with the driver for
damages incurred by passengers or
third persons as consequence of
injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicles.
▪ Regardless of who the actual
owner of a vehicle is, the operator
of record continues to be the
operator of the vehicle as regards
the public and third persons and as
such is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences
145
incident to its operation, so that in
contemplation of law, such
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owner/operator of record is the
 employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being
considered merely as his agent.
▪ The registered owner of the vehicle
is primarily liable for the damage
or injury caused to another, but he
has a right to be indemnified by the
real owner for the amount he was
required to pay.
▪ This rule applies both to private
and to common carriers with
respect to their passengers.

▪ If the owner is NOT inside the

vehicle, Article 2180 applies.
▪ The presumption is AGAINST the
owner of the motor vehicle. He has
the burden of proving due
diligence.
▪ Thus, once a driver is proven
negligent in causing damage, the
law presumes the vehicle owner
equally negligent and imposes
upon the latter the burden of
proving proper selection of
employee as a defense.

Damages

Injury vs Damage vs Damages

▪ There is a material distinction
between damages and injury.
▪ Injury – is the illegal invasion of a
legal right.
▪ Damage – is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury
146

▪ Damages – are the recompense or

compensation awarded for the
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damage suffered.
 ▪ Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result
of a violation of a legal duty.
▪ These situations are often called
damnun absque injuria.
Occena vs Icamina
▪ Damages alone can be used as a
principal cause of action.
▪ It can also co-exist with other
causes of action.
Elements for Recovery of Damages
1. Right of action
2. For a wrong inflicted by the
defendant
3. Damage resulting to plaintiff
Classification of Damages
Article 2197. Damages may be:
(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.
Classification of Damages
according to Purpose
1. For adequate reparation of the
injury
a. Compensatory – reparation
of pecuniary losses
b. Moral – reparation for non-
pecuniary losses; injury to
feelings; physical sufferings,
etc.
2. For vindication of the right violated
– Nominal
3. For less than adequate reparation –
Moderate
4. For deterring future violations –
Exemplary or Corrective
Classification of Damages
according to Manner of Determination
1. Conventional (or liquidated)
2. Non-conventional, which may
either be:
a. Statutory – fixed by law, as
in moratory interest
b. Judicial – determined by the
courts
Actual and Compensatory Damages
▪ Compensatory damages – are
damages in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury
sustained.
▪ The phrase “actual damages” is
sometimes used as synonymous
with compensatory damages.
Requisites to claim Actual Damages
▪ To seek recovery of actual
damages, it is necessary to prove
the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence
obtainable.
147
Asilio Jr. vs People and Spouses Bomasi
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When is a person entitled to Actual
Damages?
1. When there is a pecuniary loss
suffered by him
2. When he has alleged and prayed
for such relief
3. When he has duly prove it
4. When provided by law or by
stipulation

▪ No proof of pecuniary loss is

necessary for moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages.
▪ The assessment of such damages is
discretionary upon the court,
except liquidated damages.

Article 2194. The responsibility of two

or more persons who are liable for
quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

Ruks Konsult and Construction vs

Adworld Sign and Advertising Corp.

June 4, 2022

Alleged and Proved with Certainty

Article 2199. Except as provided by law

or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he
has duly proved. Such compensation is
148

referred to as actual or compensatory

damages.
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Damages must be proven by Competent
Evidence (Admissible or Probative)
▪ It is necessary to prove with a
reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party, the
actual amount of loss.
▪ Damages must be proved and
cannot be presumed. It must be
established by clear evidence.
Integrated Packaging Corp. vs CA
Issue: Whether or not private
respondent violated the order
agreement.
Ruling: NO
The transaction between the parties is a
contract of sale whereby private
respondent (seller) obligates itself to
deliver printing paper to petitioner
(buyer) which, in turn, binds itself to
pay therefor a sum of money or its
equivalent (price).
Both parties concede that the order
agreement gives rise to a reciprocal
obligations such that the obligation of
one is dependent upon the obligation of
the other. Reciprocal obligations are to
be performed simultaneously, so that
the performance of one is conditioned
upon the simultaneous fulfillment of
the other. Thus, private respondent
undertakes to deliver printing paper of
various quantities subject to
petitioner's corresponding obligation to
pay, on a maximum 90-day credit, for
these materials.
Note that in the contract, petitioner is
not even required to make any deposit,
down payment or advance payment,
hence, the undertaking of private
respondent to deliver the materials is
conditional upon payment by petitioner
within the prescribed period.
Clearly, petitioner did not fulfill its side
of the contract as its last payment in
August 1981 could cover only materials
covered by delivery invoices dated
September and October 1980.
There is no dispute that the agreement
provides for the delivery of printing
paper on different dates and a separate
price has been agreed upon for each
delivery. It is also admitted that it is the
standard practice of the parties that the
materials be paid within a minimum
period of thirty (30) days and a
maximum of ninety (90) days from
each delivery. Accordingly, the private
respondent's suspension of its
deliveries to petitioner whenever the
latter failed to pay on time, as in this
case, is legally justified under the
second paragraph of Article 1583 of the
Civil Code.
In this case, as found a quo petitioner's
evidence failed to establish that it had
paid for the printing paper covered by
the delivery invoices on time.
Consequently, private respondent has
the right to cease making further
delivery, hence the private respondent
did not violate the order agreement. On
149
the contrary, it was petitioner which
breached the agreement as it failed to
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pay on time the materials delivered by
private respondent. Respondent
appellate court correctly ruled that
private respondent did not violate the
order agreement.
Issue: Whether or not private
respondent is liable for petitioner's
breach of contract with Philacor.
Ruling: NO
Private respondent cannot be held
liable under the contracts entered into
by petitioner with Philacor.
Private respondent is not a party to
said agreements. It is also not a
contract pour autrui. Aforesaid
contracts could not affect third persons
like private respondent because of the
basic civil law principle of relativity of
contracts which provides that contracts
can only bind the parties who entered
into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice
a third person, even if he is aware of
such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof.
True, indemnification for damages
comprehends not only the loss suffered,
that is to say actual damages (damnum
emergens), but also profits which the
obligee failed to obtain, referred to as
compensatory damages (lucrum
cessans). However, to justify a grant of
actual or compensatory damages, it is
necessary to prove with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable by the injured
party, the actual amount of loss.
In the case at bar, the trial court
erroneously concluded that petitioner
could have sold books to Philacor at the
quoted selling price of P1,850,750.55
and by deducting the production cost of
P1,060,426.20, petitioner could have
earned profit of P790,324.30.
Admittedly, the evidence relied upon by
the trial court in arriving at the amount
are mere estimates prepared by
petitioner. Said evidence is highly
speculative and manifestly
hypothetical. It could not provide
sufficient legal and factual basis for the
award of P790,324.30 as compensatory
damages representing petitioner's self-
serving claim of unrealized profit.
Further, the deletion of the award of
moral damages is proper, since private
respondent could not be held liable for
breach of contract.
Moral damages may be awarded when
in a breach of contract the defendant
acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in
wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation.
Finally, since the award of moral
damages is eliminated, so must the
award for attorney's fees be also
deleted.
Fuentes vs CA
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was
positively and categorically identified
as the killer of Malaspina.
150
Ruling: YES
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Issue: Whether or not petitioner is
liable for damages the heirs of the
victim.
Ruling: NO
Petitioner maintains that assuming that
he committed the crime it is error to
hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as
actual damages on the basis of the mere
testimony of the victim's sister,
Angelina Serrano, without any tangible
document to support such claim. This is
a valid point.
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant is liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission
complained of.
To seek recovery for actual damages it
is essential that the injured party
proves the actual amount of loss with
reasonable degree of certainty
premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence available.
Courts cannot simply, rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of
damages.
The award by the court a quo of
P8,300.00 as actual damages is not
supported by the evidence on record.
We have only the testimony of the
victim's elder sister stating that she
incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in
connection with the death of Malaspina.
However, no proof of the actual
damages was ever presented in court.
Of the expenses alleged to have been
incurred, the Court can only give
credence to those supported by
receipts and which appear to have been
genuinely expended in connection with
the death of the victim.
Since the actual amount was not
substantiated, the same cannot be
granted.
Degree of Certainty required as to: Fact,
Cause, and Amount of damages
▪ Damages not rendered uncertain
just because they cannot be
calculated with absolute exactness
or because the consequences of the
wrong are not precisely define in
pecuniary amount.
▪ The principle which will disallow
recovery of damages when their
existence rests solely on
speculation applies both to the fact
and cause of damages.
▪ The requirement of certainty does
not prevent the drawing of
reasonable inferences from the fact
and circumstance in evidence.
▪ Events which occur after the wrong
complained of may sere to render
the damage sufficiently certain.
▪ The damages must be susceptible
of ascertainment in some manner
other than by mere speculation,
conjecture or surmise and by
reference to some fairly definite
standard, such as market value,
151
established experience or direct
inference from known
Page
circumstances.

▪ Where however, it is reasonably
certain that injury consisting of
failure to realize otherwise
reasonably expected profits had
been incurred, uncertainty as to
the precise amount of such
unrealized profits will not prevent
recovery or the award of damages.
Talisay-Silay vs Asociacion De
Agricultores De Talisay-Silay, Inc.
Issue: Whether AATSI, Et. Al. are, in
fact, liable to TSMC and TSICA.
Ruling: YES
We find no cogent reason to disturb the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals and
the court a quo that the transfer of
export sugar quota by AATSI and
certain individual sugar planters from
TSMC to FFMCI was illegal and invalid
for having been effected despite the
absence of the second condition
imposed by Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 1825, that is, that TSMC was not
willing to give AATSI, Et. Al. the
participation of the plantation owner
laid down in Republic Act No. 809 vis-a-
vis the sugar mill.
From the foregoing (2 circumstances
not included here), it clearly appears
that AATSI, Et. Al. had no legal basis for
transferring its sugar allotment or
quota to FFMCI since TSMC never
refused and in fact was complying with
the participation scheme required by
Republic Act No. 809.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and
the trial court that, by so transferring
their sugar allotments, AATSI as well as
the individual sugar planters similarly
situated became liable to TSMC and
TSICA. By accepting AATSI, et al’s
invalidly transferred sugar allotments,
FFMCI became solidarily liable with the
transferors to TSMC and TSICA.
Issue: Assuming AATSI, Et. Al. are liable,
whether the Court of Appeals erred in
reducing the amount of damages
awarded by the trial court to TSMC and
TSICA from P15.4 million to P1 million.
Ruling: YES
In reducing the amount of damages
awarded by the court a quo to
petitioners TSMC and TSICA from
roughly P15.4 million to only P1
million, the Court of Appeals, citing
Malayan Insurance Co.. Inc. v. Manila
Port Services reasoned that the
reduction was dictated by the failure or
TSMC and TSICA to comply with Section
5, Rule 10 of the Rule of Court, i.e.,
TSMC and TSICA’s failure to amend
their complaint to conform to the
evidence presented during trial which
showed that TSMC and TSICA suffered
damages amounting to more than P1
million by virtue of the illegal transfer
of export sugar quota from TSMC to
FFMCI.
We are unable to agree with the Court
of Appeals on this point.
In the case of J.M. Tuason & Co. v.
Santiago, this Court ruled that here the
152
plaintiff failed to amend the prayer of
its complaint as to the amount of
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damages so as to make it conform to
the evidence, the amount demanded in
the complaint should be awarded as
damages. There having been no
amendment to the prayer in the
complaint to conform with evidence,
the award to the appellee should be
reduced to the sum of P3,235.46, on all
causes of action, plus interest thereon
at the rate of 6 per annum from the
filing of the complaint.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant
to the above-mentioned rule and in
light of the decisions cited, the trial
court should not be precluded from
awarding an amount higher that
claimed in the pleadings
notwithstanding the absence of the
required amendment. But this is upon
the condition that the evidence of such
higher amount has been presented
properly, with full opportunity on the
part of the opposing parties to support
their respective contentions and to
refute each other’s evidence."
Clearly, a court may rule and render
judgment on the basis of the evidence
before it even though the relevant
pleading had not been previously
amended, so long as no surprise or
prejudice is thereby caused to the
adverse party. Put a little differently, so
long as the basic requirements of fair
play had been met, as where litigants
were given full opportunity to support
their respective contentions and to
object to or refute each other’s
evidence, the court may validly treat
the pleadings as if they had been
amended to conform to the evidence
and proceed to adjudicate on the basis
of all the evidence before it.
The point that may be here
underscored is that AATSI, Et Al.,
having been given the opportunity and
having in fact been able to register their
objections to the evidence formally
offered by TSMC and TSICA including,
in particular, Exhibits "P-1" - "P-8" and
"W-1" - "W-6," were not in any way
prejudiced by the discrepancy between
the allegations in the complaint filed
and the propositions which the
evidence submitted by TSMC and TSICA
tended to establish.
We conclude that the Court of Appeals
erred when it failed to treat the
amended and supplemental complaint
of TSMC and TSICA as if such complaint
had in fact been amended to conform to
the evidence, and when it limited the
damages due to TSMC and TSICA to the
amount prayed for in their original
complaint.
Issue: Assuming error on the part of the
Court of Appeals, whether the amount
of damages awarded by the trial court
is supported by the evidence of record.
Ruling: NO
The familiar rule is that damages
consisting of unrealized profits,
frequently referred as ‘ganacias
frustradas’ or "lucrum cessans," are not
to be granted on the basis of mere
speculation, conjecture or surmise but
rather by reference to some reasonably
definite standard such as market value,
153
established experience or direct
inference from known circumstances.
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Uncertainty as to whether or not a
claimant suffered unrealized profits at
all — i.e., uncertainty as to the very fact
of injury — will, of course, preclude
recovery of this species of damages.
Where, however, it is reasonably
certain that injury consisting of failure
to realize otherwise reasonably
expected profits had been incurred,
uncertainty as to the precise amount of
such unrealized profits will not prevent
recovery or the award of damages.
The problem then would be the
ascertainment of the amount of such
unrealized profits.
We consider, therefore, that there is
need for recalculation of the damages
due to TSMC and TSICA, in the interest
of substantial and impartial justice.
To this end, and following the course of
action taken by the Court in the
Northern Cement Corporation case, the
Court finds it necessary and
appropriate to remand this case to the
Court of Appeals in accordance with
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 for a more
careful evaluation of the evidence
already adduced by the parties and re-
computation of the damages
appropriately due to TSMC and TSICA.
The Court also directs that, in
computing the actual amount of
damages due, the Court of Appeals
should provide for legal interest in
accordance with recent caselaw of this
Court.
Not Speculative
▪ Actual damages to be compensable
must be proved be clear evidence,
a court cannot rely on speculation,
conjectures or guesswork as the
fact and amount of damages, but
must depend on actual proof that
damages has been suffered and on
evidence of the actual amount.
What components may constitute Actual
Damages?
▪ Actual damage covers the
following:
1. Value of loss; unrealized
profit
2. Attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation
3. Interest
Value of Loss; Unrealized Profit
Article 2200. Indemnification for
damages shall comprehend not only the
value of the loss suffered, but also that
of the profits which the obligee failed to
obtain. (1106)
▪ In other words, indemnification for
damages is not limited to damnum
emergens (actual loss) but extends
to lucrum cessans (a cession of
gain or amount of profit loss).
Attorney’s fees and Expenses of Litigation
Article 2208. In the absence of
stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
154
except:
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(1) When exemplary damages
are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious
prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded
civil action or proceeding against
the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in
gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of
wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity
under workmen's compensation
and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to
recover civil liability arising from
a crime;
(10) When at least double
judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the
court deems it just and equitable
that attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
▪ General Rule: Attorney’s fees and
cost of litigation are recoverable IF
STIPULATED.
▪ Exceptions: If there is no
stipulation, they are recoverable
only in the following cases:
1. By reason of malice or bad
faith
a. When exemplary
damages are awarded
b. In case of a clearly
unfounded civil action
c. Where the defendant
acted in gross and
evident bad faith
d. When at least double
judicial costs are
awarded
2. By reason of plaintiff’s indigence in
a. Actions for legal support
b. Actions for recovery of ages
of laborers, etc.
c. Actions for workmen’s
compensation
3. By reason of crimes in
a. Criminal case of malicious
prosecution
b. Separate actions to recover
civil liability arising from
crime
4. By reason of equity
155
a. Where the defendant’s act
compelled plaintiff to litigate
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with third persons
 b. Where the court deems it
just and equitable
▪ In all cases, attorney’s fees and
costs of litigation must be
reasonable.
▪ Even if expressly stipulated,
attorney’s fees are subject to
control by the Courts.
Interests
Article 2209. If the obligation consists
in the payment of a sum of money, and
the debtor incurs in delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the
payment of the interest agreed upon,
and in the absence of stipulation, the
legal interest, which is six per cent per
annum. (1108)
Article 2210. Interest may, in the
discretion of the court, be allowed upon
damages awarded for breach of
contract
Article 2211. In crimes and quasi-
delicts, interest as a part of the
damages may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the
court.
Article 2212. Interest due shall earn
legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this
point. (1109a)
Article 2213. Interest cannot be
recovered upon unliquidated claims or
damages, except when the demand can
be established with reasonable
certainty.
When does interest accrue?
Interest accrues when:
1. The obligation consists in payment
of a sum of money
2. Debtor incurs in delay
3. There being no stipulation to the
contrary
▪ No interest may be recovered on
unliquidated (not fixed in amount)
claims or damages, except when
the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty at the
Court’s discretion.
Compounding of Interest
▪ Interest due shall earn legal
interest from the time it is
judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent on the
point.
▪ Note that interest due can earn
only at 6% whether the rate of
interest of the principal is greater
than 6%.
Determination of Legal Interest
▪ When an obligation, regardless of
its source (i.e., law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-
delicts) is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for
damages.
156
Eastern Shipping vs CA
Issue: Whether or not a claim for
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damage sustained on a shipment of
goods can be a solidary, or joint and
several, liability of the common carrier,
the arrastre operator and the customs
broker.
Ruling: YES (but)
In Fireman's Fund Insurance vs. Metro
Port Services (182 SCRA 455), we have
explained, in holding the carrier and the
arrastre operator liable in solidum,
thus:
The legal relationship between
the consignee and the arrastre
operator is akin to that of a
depositor and warehouseman.
The relationship between the
consignee and the common
carrier is similar to that of the
consignee and the arrastre
operator.
Since it is the duty of the
ARRASTRE to take good care of
the goods that are in its custody
and to deliver them in good
condition to the consignee, such
responsibility also devolves upon
the CARRIER. Both the
ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are
therefore charged with the
obligation to deliver the goods in
good condition to the consignee.
We do not, of course, imply by the
above pronouncement that the arrastre
operator and the customs broker are
themselves always and necessarily
liable solidarily with the carrier, or
vice-versa, nor that attendant facts in a
given case may not vary the rule. The
instant petition has been brought solely
by Eastern Shipping Lines, which, being
the carrier and not having been able to
rebut the presumption of fault, is, in
any event, to be held liable in this
particular case. A factual finding of both
the court a quo and the appellate court,
we take note, is that "there is sufficient
evidence that the shipment sustained
damage while in the successive
possession of appellants" (the herein
petitioner among them). Accordingly,
the liability imposed on Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole petitioner
in this case, is inevitable regardless of
whether there are others solidarily
liable with it.
Issue: Whether the payment of legal
interest on an award for loss or damage
is to be computed from the time the
complaint is filed or from the date the
decision appealed from is rendered.
Ruling: It depends
(discussion of cases)
Concededly, there have been seeming
variances in the above holdings. The
cases can perhaps be classified into two
groups according to the similarity of
the issues involved and the
corresponding rulings rendered by the
court.
In the "FIRST GROUP", the basic issue
focuses on the application of either the
6% (under the Civil Code) OR 12%
(under the Central Bank Circular)
interest per annum.
157
It is easily discernible in these cases
Page
that there has been a consistent holding
that the Central Bank Circular imposing
the 12% INTEREST per annum applies
only to loans or forbearance of money,
goods or credits, as well as to
judgments involving such loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits,
and that the 6% INTEREST under the
Civil Code governs when the
transaction involves the payment of
indemnities in the concept of damage
arising from the breach or a delay in the
performance of obligations in general.
Observe, too, that in these cases, a
common time frame in the computation
of the 6% interest per annum has been
applied, i.e., from the time the
complaint is filed until the adjudged
amount is fully paid.
The "SECOND GROUP", did not alter the
pronounced rule on the application of
the 6% or 12% interest per annum,
depending on whether or not the
amount involved is a loan or
forbearance, on the one hand, or one of
indemnity for damage, on the other
hand.
Unlike, however, the "first group"
which remained consistent in holding
that the running of the legal interest
should be from the time of the filing of
the complaint until fully paid, the
"second group" varied on the
commencement of the running of the
legal interest.
The factual circumstances may have
called for different applications, guided
by the rule that the courts are vested
with discretion, depending on the
equities of each case, on the award of
interest. Nonetheless, it may not be
unwise, by way of clarification and
reconciliation, to suggest the following
rules of thumb for future guidance.
I. When an obligation, regardless of
its source, i.e., law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-
delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable
for damages.
The provisions under Title XVIII
on "Damages" of the Civil Code
govern in determining the
measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an
award of interest in the concept
of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as
well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is
breached, and it consists in
the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the
interest due should be that
which may have been
STIPULATED in writing.
Furthermore, the interest
due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is
judicially demanded.
IN THE ABSENCE OF
STIPULATION, the rate of
158
interest shall be 12% per
annum to be computed
Page
from default, i.e., from
 judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject
to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not
constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion
of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum.
No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims
or damages except when or until
the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand
is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin
to run from the time the claim is
made judicially or extrajudicially
(Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when
such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only
from the date the judgment of
the court is made (at which time
the quantification of damages
may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation
of legal interest shall, in any case,
be on the amount finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the
case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12%
per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim
period being deemed to be by
then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.
Issue: Whether the applicable rate of
interest, referred to above, is twelve
percent (12%) or six percent (6%).
Ruling: 6% and 12%
The appealed decision is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the legal
interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT
(6%) on the amount due computed
from the decision, dated
03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A
TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in
lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be
imposed on such amount upon finality
of this decision until the payment
thereof.
In Contracts and Quasi-contracts
Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-
contracts, the damages for which the
obligor who acted in good faith is liable
shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation, and which the parties
159
have foreseen or could have reasonably
Page
foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or
wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may
be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation. (1107a)
Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff
shall reduce the damages that he may
recover.
Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-
contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court
may equitably mitigate the damages
under circumstances other than the
case referred to in the preceding article,
as in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has
contravened the terms of the
contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived
some benefit as a result of the
contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary
damages are to be awarded, that
the defendant acted upon the
advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have
resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the
action, the defendant has done
his best to lessen the plaintiff's
loss or injury.
▪ The obligor IN GOOD FAITH is
liable for such damages”
a. That are the natural and
probable consequences of
the breach of the obligation
b. That the parties have
foreseen (or could have
reasonably foreseen) such
damages at the time the
obligation was constituted.
▪ Natural and probable consequence
requires:
a. Causality – that the damage
would not have resulted
without fault or negligence
of the defendant (But For
Rule)
b. Adequacy – that the fault of
the obligor would normally
(ordinarily) result in the
damager suffered by the
oblige.
▪ In case of Fraud, Bad Faith, Malice
or Want of Attitude, the obligor
answers for:
a. All damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the
obligation, whether foreseen
or not
b. Exemplary or corrective
damages
▪ Interest may be allowed on
damages awarded, in the discretion
of the court.
▪ The damages recoverable upon
breach of contract are primarily
the ordinary, natural and in a sense
160
the necessary damages resulting
from the breach.
Page
 ▪ Other damages, known as special reference to the number of the cattle
damages, are recoverable where it grazed and the period when the land
appears that the particular was used, for substituting our guess for
conditions which made such the estimate made by the trial court.
damages a probable consequence
of the breach were known to the Issue: Whether or not plaintiff is
delinquent party at the time the
entitled to recover from the defendant
contract was made.
corporation the sum of P500,000, as
damages, on the ground that said
Daywalt vs Recoletos
corporation, for its own selfish
Issue: Whether the damages can be
purposes, unlawfully induced
increased when the plaintiff appealed
Teodorica Endencia to refrain from the
and the defendant did not appeal. (from
performance of her contract for the sale
P2,497 to P24,000)
of the land in question.
Ruling: NO, P2497 is sufficient.
Ruling: In this case, NO
We are of the opinion that the damages
We deem it well it dispose of the
assessed are sufficient to compensate
contention that the members of the
the plaintiff for the use and occupation
defendants corporation, in advising and
of the land during the whole time it was
prompting Teodorica Endencia not to
used.
comply with the contract of sale, were
actuated by improper and malicious
There is evidence in the record strongly
motives. The trial court found that this
tending to show that the wrongful use
contention was not sustained,
of the land by the defendant was not
observing that while it was true that the
continuous throughout the year but
circumstances pointed to an entire
was confined mostly to the reason
sympathy on the part of the defendant
when the forage obtainable on the land
corporation with the efforts of
of the defendant corporation was not
Teodorica Endencia to defeat the
sufficient to maintain its cattle, for
plaintiff's claim to the land, the fact that
which reason it became necessary to
its officials may have advised her not to
allow them to go over to pasture on the
carry the contract into effect would not
land in question; and it is not clear that
constitute actionable interference with
the whole of the land was used for
such contract.
pasturage at any time. Considerations
of this character probably led the trial
To our mind a fair conclusion on this
court to adopt four years as roughly
feature of the case is that father Juan
being the period during which
Labarga and his associates believed in
compensation should be allowed. But
good faith that the contract could not
whether this was advertently done or
161

be enforced and that Teodorica would

not, we see no sufficient reason, in the
be wronged if it should be carried into
uncertainty of the record with
Page

effect. Any advice or assistance which

they may have given was, therefore,
prompted by no mean or improper
motive. It is not, in our opinion, to be
denied that Teodorica would have
surrendered the documents of title and
given possession of the land but for the
influence and promptings of members
of the defendants corporation. But we
do not credit the idea that they were in
any degree influenced to the giving of
such advice by the desire to secure to
themselves the paltry privilege of
grazing their cattle upon the land in
question to the prejudice of the just
rights of the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether a person who is not a
party to a contract for the sale of land
makes himself liable for damages to the
vendee, beyond the value of the use and
occupation, by colluding with the
vendor and maintaining him in the
effort to resist an action for specific
performance.
Ruling: NO
It must be admitted that the codes and
jurisprudence of the civil law furnish a
somewhat uncongenial field in which to
propagate the idea that a stranger to a
contract may sued for the breach
thereof.
Article 1257 of the Civil Code declares
that contracts are binding only between
the parties and their privies. In
conformity with this it has been held
that a stranger to a contract has no
right of action for the nonfulfillment of
the contract except in the case
especially contemplated in the second
paragraph of the same article.
A contract, when effectually entered
into between certain parties,
determines not only the character and
extent of the liability of the contracting
parties but also the person or entity by
whom the obligation is exigible. The
same idea should apparently be
applicable with respect to the person
against whom the obligation of the
contract may be enforced; for it is
evident that there must be a certain
mutuality in the obligation, and if the
stranger to a contract is not permitted
to sue to enforce it, he cannot
consistently be held liable upon it.
Whatever may be the character of the
liability which a stranger to a contract
may incur by advising or assisting one
of the parties to evade performance,
there is one proposition upon which all
must agree. This is, that the stranger
cannot become more extensively liable
in damages for the nonperformance of
the contract than the party in whose
behalf he intermeddles.
To hold the stranger liable for damages
in excess of those that could be
recovered against the immediate party
to the contract would lead to results at
once grotesque and unjust.
In the case at bar, as Teodorica
Endencia was the party directly bound
by the contract, it is obvious that the
liability of the defendant corporation,
162
even admitting that it has made itself
coparticipant in the breach of the
Page
contract, can in no even exceed hers.
This leads us to consider at this point
the extent of the liability of Teodorica
Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of
her failure to surrender the certificate
of title and to place the plaintiff in
possession.
Issue: Whether the damages which the
plaintiff seeks to recover are too
remote and speculative to be the
subject of recovery.
Ruling: YES
It should in the first place be noted that
the liability of Teodorica Endencia for
damages resulting from the breach of
her contract with Daywalt was a proper
subject for adjudication in the action for
specific performance which Daywalt
instituted against her in 1909 and
which was litigated by him to a
successful conclusion in this court, but
without obtaining any special
adjudication with reference to
damages. Indemnification for damages
resulting from the breach of a contract
is a right inseparably annexed to every
action for the fulfillment of the
obligation (Art. 1124, Civil Code); and
its is clear that if damages are not
sought or recovered in the action to
enforce performance they cannot be
recovered in an independent action. As
to Teodorica Endencia, therefore, it
should be considered that the right of
action to recover damages for the
breach of the contract in question was
exhausted in the prior suit.
However, her attorneys have not seen
fit to interpose the defense of res
judicata in her behalf; and as the
defendant corporation was not a party
to that action, and such defense could
not in any event be of any avail to it, we
proceed to consider the question of the
liability of Teodorica Endencia for
damages without reference to this
point.
(discussion)
In the preceding discussion we have
considered the plaintiff's right chiefly
against Teodorica Endencia; and what
has been said suffices in our opinion to
demonstrate that the damages laid
under the second cause of action in the
complaint could not be recovered from
her, first, because the damages in
question are special damages which
were not within contemplation of the
parties when the contract was made,
and secondly, because said damages are
too remote to be the subject of
recovery. This conclusion is also
necessarily fatal to the right of the
plaintiff to recover such damages from
the defendant corporation, for, as
already suggested, by advising
Teodorica not to perform the contract,
said corporation could in no event
render itself more extensively liable
than the principle in the contract.
Note:
Ordinary damages is found in all
breaches of contract where the are no
special circumstances to distinguish the
case specially from other contracts. The
consideration paid for an unperformed
163
promise is an instance of this sort of
damage. In all such cases the damages
Page
recoverable are such as naturally and
 generally would result from such a
breach, "according to the usual course
of things." In case involving only
ordinary damage no discussion is ever
indulged as to whether that damage
was contemplated or not. This is
conclusively presumed from the
immediateness and inevitableness of
the damage, and the recovery of such
damage follows as a necessary legal
consequence of the breach. Ordinary
damage is assumed as a matter of law
to be within the contemplation of the
parties.
Special damage, on the other hand, is
such as follows less directly from the
breach than ordinary damage. It is only
found in case where some external
condition, apart from the actual terms
to the contract exists or intervenes, as it
were, to give a turn to affairs and to
increase damage in a way that the
promisor, without actual notice of that
external condition, could not
reasonably be expected to foresee.
Concerning this sort of damage, Hadley
vs. Baxendale (1854) lays down the
definite and just rule that before such
damage can be recovered the plaintiff
must show that the particular condition
which made the damage a possible and
likely consequence of the breach was
known to the defendant at the time the
contract was made.
In Crimes and Quasi-delicts
Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for
all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.
Article 2206. The amount of damages
for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable
for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged
to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate
or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the
court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may
164
demand moral damages for
Page
 mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.
Algarra vs Sandejas
Issue: Whether or not there is actual or
compensatory damage despite the
absence of malicious intent.
Ruling: YES
Articles 1106 and 1107 of the Civil
Code read as follows:
1106. Indemnity for losses and
damages includes not only the
amount of the loss which may
have been suffered, but also that
of the profit which the creditor
may have failed to realize,
reserving the provisions
contained in the following
articles.
1107. The losses and damages
for which a debtor in good faith
is liable, are those foreseen or
which may have been foreseen,
at the time of constituting the
obligation, and which may be a
necessary consequence of its
nonfulfillment.
In case of fraud, the debtor shall
be liable for all those which
clearly may originate from the
nonfulfillment of the obligation."
Fraud is not an element of the present
case, and we are not therefore
concerned with it.
The liability of the present defendant
includes only those damages which
were "foreseen or may have been
foreseen" at the time of the accident,
and which are the necessary and
immediate consequences of his fault.
The general rule, as frequently stated, is
that in order that an act or omission
may be the proximate cause of an
injury, the injury must be the natural
and probable consequence of the act or
omission and such as might have been
foreseen by an ordinarily responsible
and prudent man, in the light of the
attendant circumstances, as likely to
result therefrom.
The plaintiff in an action such as that
under consideration, in order to
establish his right to a recovery, must
establish by competent evidence:
1) Damages to the plaintiff.
2) Negligence by act or omission of
which defendant personally, or
some person for whose acts it
must respond, was guilty.
3) The connection of cause and
effect between the negligence
and the damages.
These propositions are, of course,
elementary, and do not admit of
discussion, the real difficulty arising in
the application of these principles to
the particular facts developed in the
case under consideration.
Issue: How is the damage measured?
Ruling:
165
Page
The rules for the measure of damages,
once that liability is determined, are,
however, somewhat different.
The Civil Code requires that the
defendant repair the damage caused by
his fault or negligence. No distinction is
made therein between damage caused
maliciously and intentionally and
damages caused through mere
negligence in so far as the civil liability
of the wrongdoer is concerned.
Nor is the defendant required to do
more than repair the damage done, or,
in other words, to put the plaintiff in
the same position, so far as pecuniary
compensation can do so, that he would
have been in had the damage not been
inflicted.
The purpose of the law in awarding
actual damages is to repair the wrong
that has been done, to compensate for
the injury inflicted, and not to impose a
penalty. Actual damages are not
dependent on nor graded by the intent
with which the wrongful act is done.
The words ’actual damages’ shall be
construed to include all damages that
the plaintiff may show he has suffered
in respect to his property, business,
trade, profession, or occupation, and no
other damages whatever.
Actual damages are compensatory
only." Compensatory damages as
indicated by the word employed to
characterize them, simply make good
or replace the loss caused by the wrong.
They proceed from a sense of natural
justice, and are designed to repair that
of which one has been deprived by the
wrong of another.
Except in those cases where the law
authorizes the imposition of punitive or
exemplary damages, the party claiming
damages must establish by competent
evidence the amount of such damages,
and courts cannot give judgment for a
greater amount than those actually
proven.
Pursuant to Articles 1106 and 1107 of
the same Code, which govern in general
the matter of indemnity due for the
nonfulfillment of obligations, the
indemnity comprises, not only the
value of the loss suffered, but also that
of the prospective profit that was not
realized, and the obligation of the
debtor in good faith is limited to such
losses and damages as were foreseen or
might have been foreseen at the time
the obligation was incurred and which
are a necessary consequence of his
failure of fulfillment. Losses and
damages under such limitations and
frustrated profits must, therefore, be
proved directly by means of the
evidence the law authorizes.
The case at bar involves actual
incapacity of the plaintiff for two
months, and loss of the greater portion
of his business. As to the damages
resulting from the actual incapacity of
the plaintiff to attend to his business
there is no question. They are, of
course, to be allowed on the basis of his
earning capacity, which in this case, is
166
P50 per month. The difficult question in
the present case is to determine the
Page
damage which has resulted to his
business through his enforced absence.
The business of the present plaintiff
required his immediate supervision. All
the profits derived therefrom were
wholly due to his own exertions. The
question therefore resolves itself into
whether this damage to his business
can be so nearly ascertained as to
justify a court in awarding any amount
whatever.
We are of the opinion that the lower
court had before it sufficient evidence
of the damage to plaintiff’s business in
the way of prospective loss of profits to
justify it in calculating his damages as
to this item. That evidence has been
properly elevated to this court for
review. We are of the opinion that the
evidence presented as to the damage
done to plaintiff’s business is credible
and that it is sufficient and clear enough
upon which to base a judgment for
damages.
▪ Damages are to be increased or
decreased (in case of crimes only)
according to aggravating or
mitigating circumstances present.
▪ Interest, as part of damages, may
be adjudicated in a proper case, in
the Court’s discretion.
▪ Contributory negligence of the
plaintiff, in case of quasi-delicts,
shall reduce the damages to which
he may be entitled.
▪ In crimes, no mitigation for
contributory negligence.
Kinds of Damages (MENTAL)
1. Moral Damages – awarded only to
enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion or amusement
that will alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, y
reason of defendant’s culpable
action. (Articles 2217 to 2220)
2. Exemplary or Corrective Damages
– are intended to serve as
deterrent to serious wrongdoings.
(Articles 2229 to 2235)
3. Nominal Damages – vindicating or
recognizing the injured party’s
right to a property that has been
violated or invaded. (Articles 2221
to 2223)
4. Temperate Damages – When the
court is convinced that there has
been a loss, the judge is
empowered to calculate moderate
damages rather than let the
complainant suffer without
redress. (Articles 2224 to 2225)
5. Actual or Compensatory Damages
– are those awarded in satisfaction
of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained. They simply make
good or replace the loss caused by
the wrong. (Articles 2199 to 2215)
6. Liquidated Damages – are those
agreed upon by the parties to a
contract, to be paid in case of
breach thereof. The parties to a
contract are allowed to stipulate on
liquidated damages to be paid in
167
case of breach. (Articles 2226 to
2228)
Page
What are Moral Damages?
Article 2217. Moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act
for omission.
Article 2218. In the adjudication of
moral damages, the sentimental value
of property, real or personal, may be
considered.
▪ Moral damages are emphatically
not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of the
defendant.
▪ Its award is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante, and it must be proportional to
the suffering inflicted.
Visayas Sawmill vs CA
Issue: Whether or not petitioner
Visayan Sawmill Company is justified in
cancelling the contract.
Ruling: YES
Both the trial court and the public
respondent erred in the appreciation of
the nature of the transaction between
the petitioner corporation and the
private respondent. To this Court's
mind, what obtains in the case at bar is
a mere contract to sell or promise to
sell, and not a contract of sale.
In the agreement in question, entitled
PURCHASE AND SALE OF SCRAP IRON,
12 the seller bound and promised itself
to sell the scrap iron upon the
fulfillment by the private respondent of
his obligation to make or indorse an
irrevocable and unconditional letter of
credit in payment of the purchase price.
The petitioner corporation's obligation
to sell is unequivocally subject to a
positive suspensive condition, i.e., the
private respondent's opening, making
or indorsing of an irrevocable and
unconditional letter of credit.
The former agreed to deliver the scrap
iron only upon payment of the purchase
price by means of an irrevocable and
unconditional letter of credit.
Otherwise stated, the contract is not
one of sale where the buyer acquired
ownership over the property subject to
the resolutory condition that the
purchase price would be paid after
delivery.
Thus, there was to be no actual sale
until the opening, making or indorsing
of the irrevocable and unconditional
letter of credit. Since what obtains in
the case at bar is a mere promise to sell,
the failure of the private respondent to
comply with the positive suspensive
condition cannot even be considered a
breach — casual or serious — but
simply an event that prevented the
obligation of petitioner corporation to
convey title from acquiring binding
168
force.
Page
In this case, the private respondent
failed to fulfill its obligations as stated
in the contract.
Consequently, the obligation of the
petitioner corporation to sell did not
arise; it therefore cannot be compelled
by specific performance to comply with
its prestation. In short, Article 1191 of
the Civil Code does not apply; on the
contrary, pursuant to Article 1597 of
the Civil Code, the petitioner
corporation may totally rescind, as it
did in this case, the contract.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff (RJH
Building) is entitled to moral damages.
Ruling: NO
In contracts, such as in the instant case,
MORAL DAMAGES may be recovered if
defendants acted fraudulently and in
bad faith, while EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
may only be awarded if defendants
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
In the instant case, the refusal of the
petitioners to deliver the scrap iron was
founded on the non-fulfillment by the
private respondent of a suspensive
condition. It cannot, therefore, be said
that the herein petitioners had acted
fraudulently and in bad faith or in a
wanton, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
For, indeed, moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to
enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion or amusements that
will serve to obviate the moral suffering
he has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. Its award
is aimed at the restoration, within the
limits of the possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante, and it must be
proportional to the suffering inflicted.
▪ Mental suffering or serious pain as
distinguished from annoyance,
regret or vexation.
▪ Mental anguish is the intense
mental suffering.
▪ There is no jurisprudence that
requires psychological examination
to prove mental suffering.
▪ Generally, damages for mental
anguish are limited to cases in
which there has been a personal
physical injury or where the
defendant willfully, wantonly,
recklessly, or intentionally caused
the mental anguish.
Bagumbayan Corp. vs IAC
Issue: Whether or not private
respondents are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages due to the alleged
negligence of a waiter.
Ruling: NO
While the award for actual damages has
some basis, the grant of moral and
exemplary damages is devoid of legal
justification because it was not
predicated upon any of the cases
enumerated in the Civil Code.
169
Refer to Article 2217 and 2219 of the
Civil Code.
Page
The instant case is not specifically
mentioned in Article 2219 which refers
to quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries. The Appellate Court erred in
considering it as analogous to the cases
mentioned therein without indicating
what specific case the instant case
resembles or is analogous to.
Generally, there can be no recovery of
moral damages if the case is not
mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220.
What we call moral damages are
treated in American jurisprudence as
compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental
anguish resulting from a wrong.
Mental suffering means distress or
serious pain as distinguished from
annoyance, regret or vexation.
Generally, damages for mental anguish
are limited to cases in which there has
been a personal physical injury or
where the defendant wilfully, wantonly,
recklessly, or intentionally caused the
mental anguish. Nor will damages
generally be awarded for mental
anguish which is not accompanied by a
physical injury, at least where
maliciousness, wantonness, or
intentional conduct is not involved.
Damages for mental anguish and
suffering have been held recoverable
where the act complained of was done
with such gross carelessness or
recklessness as to show an utter
indifference to the consequences.
We hold that the "embarrassment" to
which Mrs. Seña was exposed by the
incident is not the mental anguish
contemplated in Article 2217 for which
moral damages can be recovered.
In this case, it would not be just and
proper to include moral damages in the
corporation's vicarious liability as
employer. The award of P5,000 as
exemplary or corrective damages
cannot also be sustained because there
was no gross negligence in this case.
Moral Damages are awarded when injury
consists of: (PCMF-MWSSS)
1) Physical suffering
2) Besmirch reputation
3) Mental anguish
4) Fright
5) Moral shock
6) Wounded feelings
7) Social humiliation
8) Serious anxiety
9) Similar injury
Requisites for awarding Moral Damages
1. There must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological,
clearly sustained by the claimant
2. There must be a culpable act or
omission factually established
3. The wrongful act or omission of the
defendant must be the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant
4. The award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases
stated in Art. 2219.
170
General Principles of Recovery of Moral
Page
Damages
▪ Moral damages must somehow be
proportional to the suffering
inflicted.
▪ In culpa contractual or breach of
contract, moral damages may be
recovered when the defendant
acted in bad faith or was guilty of
gross negligence (amounting to
bad faith) or in wanton disregard
of his contractual obligation and,
exceptionally, when the act of
breach of contract itself is
constitutive of tort resulting in
physical injuries.
▪ By special rule in Article 1764, in
relation to Article 2206, moral
damages may also be awarded in
case the death of a passenger
results from a breach of carriage.
▪ In culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict:
a. When an act or omission
causes physical injuries or
b. Where the defendant is
guilty of intentional tort,
moral damages may aptly be
recovered. This rule also
applies to contracts when
breached by tort.
▪ In culpa criminal, moral damages
could be lawfully due when the
accused is found guilty of physical
injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or
concubinage, illegal or arbitrary
detention, illegal arrest, illegal
search, or defamation.
▪ Malicious prosecution can also give
rise to a claim for moral damages.
The term “analogous” referred to
in Article 2219 following the
ejusdem generis rule, must be held
similar to those expressly
enumerated by the law.
▪ Although the institution of a clearly
unfounded civil suit can at times be
a legal justification for awards of
attorney’s fees, such filing,
however, has almost invariably
been held not to be a ground for an
award of moral damages.
▪ The burden rests on the person
claiming moral damages to show
convincing evidence for good faith
is presumed.
▪ In a case involving simple
negligence, moral damages cannot
be recovered.
▪ Failure to use the precise legal
terms or “sacramental phrases” of
“mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings or moral
shock” does not justify the denial of
the claim for damages. It is
sufficient that these exact terms
have been pleaded in the complaint
and evidence has been adduced.
▪ Even in the allegations regarding
the amount of damages in the
complaint are not specifically
denied in the answer, such
damages are not deemed admitted.
Is Moral Damages only Natural Persons?
▪ As a general rule, YES.
▪ An exception is when a provision of
the law awards moral damages and
171
does not distinguish natural
persons from juridical person.
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 ▪ An example is in Article 2219 (7) of
the Civil Code which expressly
authorizes the recovery of moral
damages in cases of libel, slander
or any other form of defamation
and such provision does not qualify
whether the plaintiff is a natural or
juridical person.
Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. vs
Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol
Christian College of Medicine (AMEC)
Issue: Whether the broadcasts are
libelous.
Ruling: YES
A libel is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act or
omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
There is no question that the broasts
were made public and imputed to
AMEC defects or circumstances tending
to cause it dishonor, discredit and
contempt.
Every defamatory imputation is
presumed malicious.
Rima and Alegre failed to show
adequately their good intention and
justifiable motive in airing the
supposed gripes of the students. As
hosts of a documentary or public affairs
program, Rima and Alegre should have
presented the public issues "free from
inaccurate and misleading information.
"Hearing the students' alleged
complaints a month before the exposé,
they had sufficient time to verify their
sources and information. However,
Rima and Alegre hardly made a
thorough investigation of the students'
alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire
about nor confirm the purported
irregularities in AMEC from the
Department of Education, Culture and
Sports. Alegre testified that he merely
went to AMEC to verify his report from
an alleged AMEC official who refused to
disclose any information. Alegre simply
relied on the words of the students
"because they were many and not
because there is proof that what they
are saying is true." This plainly shows
Rima and Alegre's reckless disregard of
whether their report was true or not.
Issue: Whether the AMEC is entitled to
moral damages
Ruling: YES
A juridical person is generally not
entitled to moral damages because,
unlike a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such
sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock.
Nevertheless, AMEC's claim for moral
damages falls under item 7 of Article
2219 of the Civil Code. This provision
expressly authorizes the recovery of
moral damages in cases of libel, slander
172
or any other form of defamation.
Page
Article 2219(7) does not qualify
whether the plaintiff is a natural or
juridical person. Therefore, a juridical
person such as a corporation can
validly complain for libel or any other
form of defamation and claim for moral
damages.
Moreover, where the broast is libelous
per se, the law implies damages. In such
a case, evidence of an honest mistake or
the want of character or reputation of
the party libeled goes only in
MITIGATION of damages.
Neither in such a case is the plaintiff
required to introduce evidence of
actual damages as a condition
precedent to the recovery of some
damages. In this case, the broasts are
libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled
to moral damages.
Issue: Whether the award of attorney’s
fees is proper.
Ruling: NO
The award of attorney's fees is not
proper because AMEC failed to justify
satisfactorily its claim for attorney's
fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to
warrant the award of attorney's fees.
Moreover, both the trial and appellate
courts failed to explicitly state in their
respective decisions the rationale for
the award of attorney's fees.
It is an accepted doctrine that the
award of attorney’s fees as an item of
damages is the exception rather than
the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit.
The power of the court to award
attorney's fees under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code demands factual, legal
and equitable justification, without
which the award is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and
conjecture.
In all events, the court must explicitly
state in the text of the decision, and not
only in the decretal portion thereof, the
legal reason for the award of attorney's
fees.
Issue: Whether FBNI is solidarily liable
with Rima and Alegre for payment of
moral damages, attorney's fees and
costs of suit.
Ruling: YES
The basis of the present action is a tort.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and
severally liable for the tort which they
commit.
Joint tortfeasors are all the persons
who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of
it after it is done, if done for their
benefit.
Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its
cause of action against FBNI on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
173
As operator of DZRC-AM and employer
of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily
Page
liable to pay for damages arising from
the libelous broasts. As stated by the
Court of Appeals, "recovery for
defamatory statements published by
radio or television may be had from the
owner of the station, a licensee, the
operator of the station, or a person who
procures, or participates in, the making
of the defamatory statements."
An employer and employee are
solidarily liable for a defamatory
statement by the employee within the
course and scope of his or her
employment, at least when the
employer authorizes or ratifies the
defamation.
In this case, Rima and Alegre were
clearly performing their official duties
as hosts of FBNI's radio program
Exposé when they aired the broasts.
FBNI neither alleged nor proved that
Rima and Alegre went beyond the
scope of their work at that time. There
was likewise no showing that FBNI did
not authorize and ratify the defamatory
broasts.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence
on record that FBNI exercised due
diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees,
particularly Rima and Alegre.
FBNI merely showed that it exercised
diligence in the selection of its
broasters without introducing any
evidence to prove that it observed the
same diligence in the supervision of
Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show
how it exercised diligence in
supervising its broasters. FBNI's
alleged constant reminder to its
broasters to "observe truth, fairness
and objectivity and to refrain from
using libelous and indecent language" is
not enough to prove due diligence in
the supervision of its broasters.
Adequate training of the broasters on
the industry's code of conduct,
sufficient information on libel laws, and
continuous evaluation of the broasters'
performance are but a few of the many
ways of showing diligence in the
supervision of broasters.
Article 2219. Moral damages may be
recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting
in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or
other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention
or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other
form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article
309;
174
Page
 (10) Acts and actions referred to
in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced,
abducted, raped, or abused, referred to
in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants,
and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article,
in the order named.
Article 2220. Willful injury to property
may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find
that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
Rape and other Lascivious Acts
▪ Anent the award of damages, civil
indemnity of ex delicto is
mandatory upon finding of the fact
of rape while moral damages is
awarded upon such finding
without need of further proof
because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral
injuries entitling the victim to such
award.
▪ If without factual and legal bases,
no award of exemplary damages
should be allowed.
People vs Calongui
Issue: Whether the prosecution proved
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling: YES
Regarding the January 1, 1998 rape
incident, appellant offers his bare and
unsubstantiated denial; a weak,
negative and self-serving defense which
cannot overcome affirmative
testimonies from credible witnesses. In
the case at bar, the clear, candid and
straightforward testimony of Marinel
firmly established that appellant raped
her on January 1, 1998.
As regards the September 26, 1998
rape incident, we are not persuaded
that what transpired between appellant
and Marinel was consensual sexual
intercourse. Well-settled is the rule that
the sweethearts defense must be
proven by compelling evidence,
specifically, that the accused and the
victim were lovers and that the victim
consented to the alleged sexual
relations. Appellant's claim that he and
Marinel were lovers remained
uncorroborated and unsubstantiated.
No documentary evidence like
mementos, love letters, notes, pictures
and the like were presented. Marinel
denied the alleged love relationship on
direct and cross-examination. Besides,
the sweethearts defense does not rule
out rape. Even if it were true, the
relationship does not, by itself,
establish consent for love is not a
license for lust.
175
In sum, we find that the prosecution
Page
satisfactorily proved beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant had
carnal knowledge of Marinel through
force, threats and intimidation on
January 1, 1998 and September 26,
1998.
Issue: Whether the victim is entitled to
moral and exemplary damages.
Ruling: YES to moral damages. NO to
exemplary damages.
Anent the award of damages, civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon
finding of the fact of rape while moral
damages is awarded upon such finding
without need of further proof because
it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award.
Thus, the trial court correctly awarded
the sum of P50,000.00 as civil liability
and P50,000.00 as moral damages to
the offended party in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.
However, with respect to the award of
exemplary damages, the trial court
failed to cite any factual and legal bases
therefor. In People v. Catubig, we held
that the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, entitles the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages. The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which took effect on December 1, 2000
now provides that aggravating
circumstances must be alleged in the
information in order to be validly
appreciated by the court.
However, the acts of rape and the filing
of the two informations in the instant
case occurred prior to the effectivity of
these rules. Thus, aggravating
circumstances which were not alleged
in the informations but proved during
the trial may be appreciated for the
limited purpose of determining the
accused's liability for exemplary
damages.
This notwithstanding, a review of the
records shows that there are no
aggravating circumstances present in
the case at bar.
In cases of Malicious Prosecution
▪ Moral damages cannot be
recovered from a person who has
filed a complaint against another in
good faith, or without malice or
bad faith.
▪ If damage results from the filing of
the complaint, it is damnum
absque injuria.
▪ The adverse result of an action
does not per se make the act
wrongful and subject the actor to
the payment of moral damages.
▪ The law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to
litigate.
▪ Such right is so precious that moral
damages may not be charged on
those who may exercise it
erroneously.
Mijares vs CA
176
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are
liable to private respondent.
Page
Ruling: NO
It is evident, therefore, that private
respondent was barking up the wrong
tree when it sought to hold petitioners
liable for the value of the
pharmaceutical products delivered at
the drugstore in question.
The evidence clearly shows that
petitioners were not the owners of said
drugstore when the deliveries were
made. Hence, no meeting of the minds
between them and private respondent
could have taken place; no contract of
sale could have arisen. The absence of
any privity of relations between the
parties at the time of the deliveries
precludes any cause of action in favor of
private respondent against petitioners.
The Regional Trial Court therefore did
not err when it dismissed private
respondent's complaint against
petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are
entitled to moral damages.
Ruling: NO
The trial court however erred when it
awarded moral damages in favor of
petitioners. Petitioners have failed to
show that private respondent was
motivated by bad faith when it
instituted the action for collection
below.
Malicious prosecution, both in criminal
and civil cases, requires the presence of
two elements, to wit:
1) Malice
2) Absence of probable cause.
Moreover, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person,
and that it was initialed deliberately
knowing that the charge was false and
baseless.
Hence, mere filing of a suit does not
render a person liable for malicious
prosecution should he be unsuccessful,
for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule
that moral damages cannot be
recovered from a person who has filed
a complaint against another in good
faith, or without malice or bad faith.
Concept of Nominal Damages
▪ Nominal damages consist in
damages awarded, not for the
purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered, but
for the vindication or recognition
of a right violated by the defendant.
Requisites and Characteristics
1. Invasion or violation of any legal or
property right
2. No proof loss is required
3. The award is to vindicate the right
violated
Article 2221. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or
177
invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for
Page
 the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Article 2222. The court may award
nominal damages in every obligation
arising from any source enumerated in
Article 1157, or in every case where
any property right has been invaded.
Article 2223. The adjudication of
nominal damages shall preclude further
contest upon the right involved and all
accessory questions, as between the
parties to the suit, or their respective
heirs and assigns.
▪ General Rule: One does not ask for
nominal damages, and it is in lieu
of the actual, moral, temperate, or
liquidated damages.
▪ Nominal damages are
INCOMPATIBLE with actual,
temperate and exemplary
damages.
Francisco vs Ferrer
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the trial court's
award of moral damages and increasing
the amount from P30,000.00 to
P250,000.00
Ruling: YES
To recover MORAL DAMAGES in an
action for breach of contract, the breach
must be palpably wanton, reckless,
malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive.
In culpa contractual or breach of
contract, moral damages may be
recovered when the defendant acted in
bad faith or was guilty of gross
negligence (amounting to bad faith) or
in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation and, exceptionally, when the
act of breach of contract itself is
constitutive of tort resulting in physical
injuries.
Moral damages may be awarded in
breaches of contracts where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence, it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud.
In this case, We find no such fraud or
bad faith.
Moral damages are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.
The person claiming moral damages
must prove the existence of bad faith by
clear and convincing evidence for the
law always presumes good faith. It is
not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish,
serious anxiety as the result of the
actuations of the other party.
178
Invariably such action must be shown
to have been willfully done in bad faith
Page
or will ill motive. Mere allegations of
besmirched reputation, embarrassment
and sleepless nights are insufficient to
warrant an award for moral damages. It
must be shown that the proximate
cause thereof was the unlawful act or
omission of the [private respondent]
petitioners.
An award of moral damages would
require certain conditions to be met, to
wit:
1) there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained
by the claimant
2) there must be culpable act or
omission factually established
3) the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant
4) the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals
was justified in awarding in addition to
moral damages, exemplary damages of
P100,000.00
Ruling: NO
To warrant the award of EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES, the wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and an
award of damages would be allowed
only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless or
malevolent manner.
The requirements of an award of
exemplary damages are:
1) they may be imposed by way of
example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only
after the claimant's right to them
has been established
2) that they cannot be recovered as
a matter of right, their
determination depending upon
the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to
the claimant
3) the act must be accompanied by
bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
Nevertheless, the facts show that when
confronted with their failure to deliver
on the wedding day the wedding cake
ordered and paid for, petitioners gave
the lame excuse that delivery was
probably delayed because of the traffic,
when in truth, no cake could be
delivered because the order slip got
lost.
For such prevarication, petitioners
must be held liable for nominal
damages for insensitivity, inadvertence
or inattention to their customer's
anxiety and need of the hour.
Nominal damages are recoverable
where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against
an invasion that has produced no actual
present loss of any kind or where there
179
has been a breach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages
Page
whatsoever have been or can be shown.

Nominal damages may be awarded to a
plaintiff whose right has been violated
or invaded by the defendant, for the
purpose of vindicating or recognizing
that right, not for indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered.
Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation vs
DMC-Construction Resources Inc.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in
awarding nominal damages to
respondent after having ruled that the
actual damages awarded by the RTC
was unfounded.
Ruling: YES
We rule that TEMPERATE, AND NOT
NOMINAL, damages should be awarded
to respondent in the amount of
₱3,523,175.92.
To resolve the issue at hand, we must
first determine whether there was
indeed a violation of petitioner’s right.
In this light, we are inclined to adopt
the factual findings of the RTC and the
CA as this Court has repeatedly held
that petitions for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court may be brought
only on questions of law, not on
questions of fact. Moreover, the factual
findings of trial courts are entitled to
great weight and respect on appeal,
especially when established by
unrebutted testimonial and
documentary evidence. And the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive and binding on the
Supreme Court except when they
conflict with the findings of the trial
court.
In this case, two facts have been
established by the appellate and trial
courts:
1) that respondent suffered a loss
caused by petitioner
2) that respondent failed to
sufficiently establish the amount
due to him, as no actual receipt
was presented.
Under the Civil Code, when an injury
has been sustained, actual damages
may be awarded.
Actual or compensatory damages
cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved, and proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. A court cannot rely
on speculation, conjecture or guess
work as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon
competent proof that they have
suffered and on evidence of the actual
amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy
and unsubstantial, no damages will be
awarded.
Jurisprudence has consistently held
that to justify an award of actual
damages, credence can be given only to
claims which are duly SUPPORTED BY
RECEIPTS. We take this to mean by
credible evidence. Otherwise, the law
mandates that other forms of damages
must be awarded.
180
Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code,
nominal damages may be awarded in
Page
order that the plaintiff’s right, which
has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered.
Nominal damages are recoverable
where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against
an invasion that has produced no actual
present loss of any kind or where there
has been a breach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown.
In contrast, under Article 2224,
TEMPERATE or moderate damages
may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty.
to establish by competent evidence the
exact amount of damages it suffered,
we are constrained to award temperate
damages.
Considering that the lower courts have
factually established that the conveyor
facility had a remaining life of only five
of its estimated total life of ten years
during the time of the collision, then the
replacement cost of ₱7,046,351.84
should rightly be reduced to 50% or
₱3,523, 175.92. This is a fair and
reasonable valuation, having taking into
account the remaining useful life of the
facility.

Given these findings, we are of the

belief that temperate and not nominal
damages should have been awarded,
considering that it has been established
that respondent herein suffered a loss,
even if the amount thereof cannot be
proven with certainty.

The amount of temperate damages to

be awarded is usually left to the
discretion of the courts, but such
amount must be reasonable bearing in
mind that temperate damages should
be more than nominal but less than June 11, 2022
compensatory.
What is your understanding of Temperate
Here, we are convinced that respondent Damages?
181

sustained damages to its conveyor

facility due to petitioner's negligence. Article 2224. Temperate or moderate
Page

Nonetheless, for failure of respondent damages, which are more than nominal
 but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty.
Article 2225. Temperate damages must
be reasonable under the circumstances.
▪ These damages are awarded for
pecuniary loss, in an amount that,
from the nature of the case, cannot
be proved with certainty.
Requisites to claim Temperate Damages
1. Actual existence of pecuniary loss
2. The nature and circumstances of
the loss prevents proof of the exact
amount
3. They are more than nominal and
less than compensatory
4. Causal connection between the loss
and the defendant’s act or omission
5. Amount must be reasonable.
▪ In cases where the resulting injury
might be continuing and possible
future complications directly
arising from the injury, while
certain to occur are difficult to
predict, temperate damages can
and should be awarded on top od
actual or compensatory damages.
▪ In such cases, there is no
incompatibility between actual and
temperate damages.
What are Liquidated Damages?
Article 2226. Liquidated damages are
those agreed upon by the parties to a
contract, to be paid in case of breach
thereof.
Article 2227. Liquidated damages,
whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if
they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
▪ Liquidated damages are those
damages agreed upon by the
parties to a contract to be paid in
case of breach thereof.
▪ It differs from a penal clause in that
the latter case the amount agreed
to be paid may bear no relation to
the probable damages resulting
from the breach.
▪ Basically, a penalty is “ad
terrorem” while liquidated
damages are “ad reparationem”.
▪ The reduction of the liquidated
damages shall depend on the
sound discretion of the court.
Requisites and Characteristics of
Liquidated Damages
1. Liquidated damages must be
validly stipulated
2. There is no need to prove the
amount of actual damages
3. Breach of the principal contract
must be proved.
Rules governing Breach of Contract
Article 2228. When the breach of the
contract committed by the defendant is
182
not the one contemplated by the parties
in agreeing upon the liquidated
Page
damages, the law shall determine the
measure of damages, and not the
stipulation.
▪ These damages are agreed upon in
a contract in case of breach thereof
▪ There is no need to prove the
amount, only the fact of breach.
▪ The amount can be reduced if:
1. Unconscionable as
determined by the court
2. Partial or irregular
performance
▪ General Rule: The penalty shall
substitute the indemnity for
damages and the payment of the
interest in case or breach.
▪ Exceptions:
1. When there is a stipulation
to the contrary
2. When the obligor is sued for
refusal to pay the agreed
penalty
3. When the obligor is guilty of
fraud.
When can you award Exemplary or
Corrective Damages?
Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public
good, IN ADDITION to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
PNB vs CA
Issue: Whether or not the SPA ever
existed.
Ruling: NO
There is no question that no payment
had ever been made to private
respondent as the check was never
delivered to him. When the court
ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent the amount of P32,480.00,
it had the obligation to deliver the same
to him. Under Art. 1233 of the Civil
Code, a debt shall not be understood to
have been paid unless the thing or
service in which the obligation consists
has been completely delivered or
rendered, as the case may be.
The burden of proof of such payment
lies with the debtor. In the instant case,
neither the SPA nor the check issued by
petitioner was ever presented in court.
The testimonies of petitioner's own
witnesses regarding the check were
conflicting. Tagamolila testified that the
check was issued to the order of "Sonia
Gonzaga as attorney-in-fact of Loreto
Tan," while Elvira Tibon, assistant
cashier of PNB (Bacolod Branch), stated
that the check was issued to the order
of "Loreto Tan."
Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's
183
contention that all that is needed to be
proved is the existence of the SPA, it is
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also necessary for evidence to be
presented regarding the nature and
extent of the alleged powers and
authority granted to Sonia Gonzaga;
more specifically, to determine whether
the document indeed authorized her to
receive payment intended for private
respondent. However, no such evidence
was ever presented.
Issue: Whether or not private
respondent Tan is entitled to attorney’s
fees.
Ruling: YES
Art. 2208 of the Civil Code allows
attorney's fees to be awarded if the
claimant is compelled to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest by reason of an
unjustified act or omission of the party
from whom it is sought.
When a party is forced to litigate to
protect his rights, he is entitled to an
award of attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not private
respondent Tan is entitled to
exemplary damages.
Ruling: NO
Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be awarded if
a party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. However, they cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court
has yet to decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated.
Jurisprudence has set down the
requirements for exemplary damages
to be awarded:
1) they may be imposed by way of
example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only
after the claimant's right to them
has been established;
2) they cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, their
determination depending upon
the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to
the claimant;
3) the act must be accompanied by
bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
In the case at bench, while there is a
clear breach of petitioner's obligation
to pay private respondents, there is no
evidence that it acted in a fraudulent,
wanton, reckless or oppressive manner.
Furthermore, there is no award of
compensatory damages which is a
prerequisite before exemplary damages
may be awarded. Therefore, the award
by the trial court of P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages is baseless.
When are Exemplary Damages
recoverable in Criminal Offenses?
Article 2230. In criminal offenses,
184
exemplary damages as a part of the civil
liability may be imposed when the
Page
crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended
party.
▪ Award of exemplary damages is
part of the civil liability, not
penalty.
▪ Damages are paid to the offended
party separately from the fines.
Article 2231. In quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-
contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Is Exemplary Damages a matter of Right?
Article 2233. Exemplary damages
cannot be recovered as a matter of
right; the court will decide whether or
not they should be adjudicated.
Article 2234. While the amount of the
exemplary damages need not be
proved, the plaintiff must show that he
is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon,
although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages
may be recovered, nevertheless, before
the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the
liquidated damages, the plaintiff must
show that he would be entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory
damages were it not for the stipulation
for liquidated damages.
Article 2235. A stipulation whereby
exemplary damages are renounced in
advance shall be null and void.
General Principles of Exemplary Damages
1. Exemplary damages cannot be
awarded alone. They must be
awarded IN ADDITION to moral,
temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
2. The purpose of the award is to
deter the defendant and others in
similar condition from a repetition
of the acts which exemplary
damages were awarded. Hence,
they are not recoverable as a
matter of right.
3. The defendant must be guilty of
other malice or else negligence
above the ordinary
4. Plaintiff is not required to prove
the amount of exemplary damages.
Damages in Case of Death (in re: Crimes
and Quasi-delicts)
Article 2206. The amount of damages
for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict shall be at least three thousand
185
pesos, even though there may have
Page
 been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable

for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged

to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate
or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the
court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and

illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.

Formula for Net Earning Capacity

People vs Aringue

Net
186

Life
Earning = x (Gross Annual Income - Reasonable Living Expenses)
Expectancy
Page

Capacity

Where
 As a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to
substantiate the claim for loss or
earning capacity.
▪ By way of exception, damages for
loss or earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when:
1. The deceased is self-
employed and earning less
than the minimum wage
under current labor laws, in
which case, judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased’s line of
work, no documentary
evidence is available
2. The deceased is employed as
a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.
Tan vs OMC Carriers
Issue: Whether or not petitioners the
CA erred when it modified the RTC’s
awarded damages.
 reducing the actual damages
award from ₱355,895.00 to
₱72,295.00
 deleted the RTC’s award for loss
of earning capacity
 reduced the exemplary damages
from ₱500,000.00 to
₱200,000.00
 deleted the award of attorney’s
fees
Ruling: NO
Actual Damages
Actual damages, to be recoverable,
must not only be capable of proof, but
must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Courts
cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of
damages. To justify an award of actual
damages, there must be competent
proof of the actual amount of loss,
credence can be given only to claims
which are duly supported by receipts.
The petitioners do not deny that they
did not submit any receipt to support
187
their claim for actual damages to prove
the monetary value of the damage
Page
caused to the house and tailoring shop
when the truck rammed into them.
Thus, no actual damages for the
destruction to petitioner Leticia Tan’s
house and tailoring shop can be
awarded.
Nonetheless, absent competent proof
on the actual damages suffered, a party
still has the option of claiming
temperate damages, which may be
allowed in cases where, from the nature
of the case, definite proof of pecuniary
loss cannot be adduced although the
court is convinced that the aggrieved
party suffered some pecuniary loss.
The photographs the petitioners
presented as evidence show the extent
of the damage done to the house, the
tailoring shop and the petitioners’
appliances and equipment. Irrefutably,
this damage was directly attributable to
Arambala’s gross negligence in
handling OMC’s truck.
Unfortunately, these photographs are
not enough to establish the amount of
the loss with certainty. From the
attendant circumstances and given the
property destroyed, we find the amount
of ₱200,000.00 as a fair and sufficient
award by way of temperate damages.
Loss of Earning Capacity
Damages for loss of earning capacity
are awarded pursuant to Article 2206
of the Civil Code.
As a RULE, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the
claim for loss of earning capacity.
By way of EXCEPTION, damages for loss
of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary
evidence when:
1) the deceased is self-employed
and earning less than the
minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case, judicial
notice may be taken of the fact
that in the deceased's line of
work, no documentary evidence
is available; or
2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
In the present case, the income-earning
capacity of the deceased was never
disputed.
Under these facts and taking into
account the unrebutted annual earnings
of the deceased, we hold that the
petitioners are entitled to temperate
damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00
[or roughly, the gross income for two
(2) years] to compensate for damages
for loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased.
Exemplary Damages
Exemplary or corrective damages are
188
imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, IN
Page
ADDITION to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence.
Celedonio Tan’s death and the
destruction of the petitioners’ home
and tailoring shop were unquestionably
caused by the respondents’ gross
negligence. The law allows the grant of
exemplary damages in cases such as
this to serve as a warning to the public
and as a deterrent against the
repetition of this kind of deleterious
actions.
The grant, however, should be
tempered, as it is not intended to enrich
one party or to impoverish another.
From this perspective, we find the CA’s
reduction of the exemplary damages
awarded to the petitioners from
₱500,000.00 to ₱200,000.00 to be
proper.
Attorney’s Fees
In view of the award of exemplary
damages, we find it also proper to
award the petitioners attorney's fees, in
consonance with Article 2208(1) of the
Civil Code.
Determining Loss of Earning Capacity;
Formula
▪ The law allows recovery of actual
damages for loss of earning
capacity in consideration of the
heirs of the deceased or those who
are legally entitled to support from
the deceased.
▪ The damages do not pertain to the
full amount of foregone earnings
BUT of the support they received
or would have received from the
deceased had not died in
consequence of the negligence or
fault of the tortfeasor or the
accused.
▪ This form of actual damages
quantified the loss of the
deceased’s family in terms of
financial support they will received
from the deceased.
▪ A widow does not only grieve for
the loss of her husband; she also
has to worry about finding an
additional source of livelihood.
▪ The condition is often worsened
when the deceased is the sole
breadwinner of the family and is
already experiencing difficulties
making ends meet.
▪ While this might not always be the
case, the law devised the concept of
actual damages in the form of loss
of earning capacity to ensure that a
art of the family’s loss is mitigated.
▪ In Villa Rey Transit vs CA, the
Supreme Court considered 2
factors in determining loss of
189
earning capacity:
Page
 1) The number of years on the
basis of which the damages
shall be computed
2) The rate at which the losses
sustained by said
respondents should be fixed
▪ The number of years if often
pegged at life expectancy (instead
of work expectancy) while rate of
losses is derived from annual
income.
▪ The general formula applied is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy
x (Gross Annual Income – Necessary
Expenses)
▪ To approximate the first factor of
life expectancy, the Supreme Court
has applied the formula in the
American Expectancy Table of
Mortality or the Actuarial of
Combined Experience Table of
Mortality.
▪ Hence,
Life Expectancy – 2/3 x (80 – Age of the
deceased at the time of death)
Robert Da Jose vs Francisco Ocampo
Issue: Whether the CA erred in
awarding the sum of ₱2,316,000 for
loss of earning capacity.
Ruling: YES
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code,
the heirs of the victim are entitled to
indemnity for loss of earning capacity.
Compensation of this nature is awarded
not for loss of earnings, but for loss of
capacity to earn money. The
indemnification for loss of earning
capacity partakes of the nature of actual
damages which must be duly proven by
competent proof and the best
obtainable evidence thereof.
Thus, as a RULE, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity.
By way of EXCEPTION, damages for loss
of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary
evidence when
1) the deceased is self-employed
and earning less than the
minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case, judicial
notice may be taken of the fact
that in the deceased’s line of
work no documentary evidence
is available; or
2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
Based on the foregoing and in line with
respondents’ claim that Eduardo during
his lifetime earned more or less an
annual income of ₱1,000,000, the case
falls under the purview of the general
rule rather than the exceptions.
Now, while it is true that respondents
submitted cash vouchers to prove
Eduardo’s income, it is lamentable as
duly observed by the RTC that the
officers and/or employees who
prepared, checked or approved the
same were not presented on the
witness stand.
190
It bears stressing that the cash
vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus
Page
were not identified by Celerina
 contrary to the findings of the CA but by
Celine in her testimony before the RTC
on November 13, 2002 and Celine,
under cross-examination, admitted by
way of stipulation that she had no
participation in the preparation thereof.
We thus agree with the RTC’s ruling
that said cash vouchers though
admitted in evidence, whether objected
to or not, have no probative value for
being hearsay.
Except for the award for the loss of
earning capacity, the Court concurs
with the findings of the CA and sustains
the other awards made in so far as they
are in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.
Graduation of Damages
Duty of the Injured Party
Article 2203. The party suffering loss or
injury must exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family to minimize the
damages resulting from the act or
omission in question.
Burden of Proof
▪ The DEFENDANT has the burden of
proof to establish that the victim,
by the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family, could have
mitigated the damages. In the
absence of such proof, the amount
of damages cannot be reduced.
▪ The victim is required only to take
such steps as an ordinary prudent
man would reasonably adopt for
his own interest.
In Crimes
Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to
be adjudicated may be respectively
increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
In Quasi-delicts
Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff
shall reduce the damages that he may
recover.
Contributory Negligence
▪ The alleged contributory
negligence of the victim, if any,
does not exonerate the accused in
criminal cases committed through
reckless imprudence, since one
cannot alleged the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his
own negligence.
Genobiagon vs CA
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in
increasing the civil liability of the
petitioner from P6,000.00 to
P12,000.00.
Ruling: NO
The alleged contributory negligence of
the victim, if any, does not exonerate
the accused.
The defense of contributory negligence
does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the
negligence of another to evade the
effects of his own negligence.
The petitioner's contention that the
Court of Appeals unjustly increased his
191
civil liability to P12,000, is devoid of
merit.
Page
 (4) That the loss would have
Plaintiff’s Negligence resulted in any event;
▪ To be held liable, negligence must
be the proximate and direct cause (5) That since the filing of the
of the accident. action, the defendant has done
his best to lessen the plaintiff's
loss or injury.
Manila Electric vs Remonquillo
See page 94
Miscellaneous Rules
▪ If both of the parties contributed to
Damages that Cannot Co-Exist
the proximate cause, they cannot
recover from each other.
▪ Nominal damages with other
damages
Bernardo vs Legaspi
Where the plaintiff in a negligence
Article 2223. The adjudication of
action, by his own carelessness
nominal damages shall preclude further
contributes to the principal occurrence,
contest upon the right involved and all
that is, to the accident, as one of the
accessory questions, as between the
determining causes thereof, he cannot
parties to the suit, or their respective
recover.
heirs and assigns.
This is equally true of the defendant;
and as both of them, by their negligent ▪ Actual and Liquidated damages
acts, contributed to the determining
cause of the accident, neither can Article 2226. Liquidated damages are
recover. those agreed upon by the parties to a
contract, to be paid in case of breach
In Contracts thereof.

Article 2215. In contracts, quasi- Damages that Must stand Alone

contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court
may equitably mitigate the damages
under circumstances other than the
case referred to in the preceding article,
as in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has
contravened the terms of the
contract;
Article 2223. The adjudication of
nominal damages shall preclude further
contest upon the right involved and all
accessory questions, as between the
parties to the suit, or their respective
heirs and assigns.

(2) That the plaintiff has derived

some benefit as a result of the
contract;

(3) In cases where exemplary

damages are to be awarded, that
192

the defendant acted upon the

advice of counsel;
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