22102128, 22:37 lingen Habermas: A Plea for Negotiations - SZ.de
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Jirgen Habermasin SZen the Ukraine
A Plea for Negotiations
The W
Ukraine: But this entails
has good reasons for supplying weapons to
ared responsibility for the
further course of the war.
he decision to supply Leopard tanks had just been hailed as,
“historic”, and the news was already overtaken - and relativi-
zed ~ by vociferous demands for combat aircraft, long-range miss:
les, warships and submarines. The appeals for help, as dramatic as
they are understandable, from a Ukraine invaded in violation of in-
ternational law met with the expected response in the West. The only
hntps:archive.ph2025.02.14.161857Intps:wm.sueddeutsche.deproekttartkelkuluuergen-habermas-ukraine-s-negotatons-e480179) 111322002123, 22:37
Jorgen Habermas: A Pla for Negotiation -8Z.de
novel aspect was the acceleration of the familiar game of morally in-
dignant calls for more powerful weapons and for the duly delivered
repeated, albeit hesitant, upgrading of the promised weapon types.
Also from circles within the German Social Democratic Party it was
now rumoured that there were no “red lines”. With the exception of
the Chancellor and his entourage, the government, the political par-
ties and the press are almost united in taking to heart the imploring
words of the Lithuanian foreign minister: “We must conquer the fear
of defeating Russia” The vague prospect of a “victory” that can mean
all sorts of things is supposed to obviate any further discussion of
the goal of our military assistance ~ and of how to achieve it. Thus,
the armament process seems to be acquiring a momentum of its
own, Although prompted by the very understandable urging of the
Ukrainian government, it is being driven in Germany by the bellicose
tenor of an almost uniform published opinion, in which the hesit-
ance and reflection of half of the German population do not have a
voice.
Or perhaps this is not entirely true. In the meantime, thoughtful
voices are making themselves heard not only to defend the
Chancellor's stance but also to plead for public reflection on the dif-
ficult path to negotiations. If add my voice to these, then it is pre-
cisely because the statement: “Ukraine must not lose the war!” is
correct. My concern is with the preventive character of timely nego-
tiations, negotiations that prevent a prolonged war from claiming
even more lives and causing even more destruction, and from pre-
senting us in the end with a hopeless choice:
tively in the war or to leave Ukraine to its fate in order not to trigger
the first world war between nuclear-armed powers.
either to intervene ac-
‘The war is dragging on, the scale of the destruction is increasing and
the casualties are mounting, Should the momentum of the military
assistance we have provided for good reasons now shed its defensive
character because victory over Putin is the only possible goal? Wa-
shington and the governments of the other Nato member states were
in agreement from the outset to stop short of the point of no return ~
entry into the war.
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ans.22002123, 22:37 lingen Habermas: A Plea for Negotiations - SZ.de
The evidently not only technically, but also strategically, motivated
hesitancy that Chancellor Scholz encountered on the part of the U.S.
President already at the prospect of delivering battle tanks provided
further confirmation of this premise of the Western assistance to
Ukraine. Until now, the main focus of Western concern has been on
the problem that it is entirely up to the Russian leadership to define
at what point it considers the extent and quality of Western arms de-
liveries to constitute entering into war.
But since China has also declared its opposition to the use of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons, this concern has receded into the
background. Therefore, Western governments should shift their
concern to another aspect of this problem. From the perspective of
victory at any cost, the increase in the quality of our arms deliveries
has acquired a momentum of its own that could propel us more or
less imperceptibly over the threshold of a Third World War. There-
fore, “one should not strangle any debate about when partisanship
could actually turn into becoming a party to the conflict by arguing
that even to conduct such a debate is to do Russia's business” (as,
Kurt Kister wrote in the feature pages of the
February 11/12, 2023).
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lingen Habermas: A Plea for Negotiations - SZ.de
Only Ukraine can decide the ti
ons? That's inconsistent
ing and goal of possible negotiati-
Sleepwalking on the edge of the abyss is becoming a real danger es-
pecially because the Western alliance is not only strengthening
Ukraine’s hand, but is tirelessly reiterating that it will support the
Ukrainian government for “as long as necessary” and that the Ukrai
nian government alone can decide the timing and goal of possible
negotiations. This protestation is meant to discourage opponents,
but it is inconsistent and obscures differences that are obvious.
Above all, it can lead us to deceive ourselves about the need to take
our own initiatives for negotiations.
On the one hand, it is a truism that only a party involved in the war
can determine its war objective and, if necessary, the timing of nego-
tiations. On the other hand, how long Ukraine can hold out at all also
depends on Western support.
‘The West also has legitimate interests and obligations of its own. The
Western governments are operating on a wider geopolitical scale and
must take other interests into account besides those of Ukraine in
this war. They have legal obligations to the security needs of their
own citizens and also, quite independently of the attitudes of the
Ukrainian population, share moral responsibility for casualties and
destruction caused by weapons from the West. Therefore, they can-
not also shift to the Ukrainian government the responsibility for the
brutal consequences of a prolongation of hostilities that is only pos-
sible due to their military support.
‘The fact that the West itself cannot avoid making, and taking re-
sponsibility for, important decisions is also evident from the situa~
tion it fears most ~ namely, the aforementioned scenario in which
Russian military superiority would confront it with the alternative of
either caving in or becoming a party to the war.
portant that the.
ning" does not already separate paci
\ction between “not losing" and
ists from non-pacifists
Also for reasons closer to home, such as the exhaustion of human re-
serves and material resources necessary for the war, the time for
negotiations is pressing. The time factor is likewise playing a role in
the beliefs and dispositions among the broader populations of Wes
tern countries. In this context, it is too easy to reduce the positions
on the contentious issue of the timing of negotiations to the simple
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opposition between morality and self-interest. It is primarily moral
reasons that are pressing for an end to the war.
‘Thus, the duration of the war influences the perspectives from which
populations perceive it. The longer a war lasts, the more insistently
the perception of the exploding violence characteristic of modern
wars in particular imposes itself and determines the perspective on
the relationship between war and peace in general. Iam interested in
these perspectives with a view to the discussion that is gradually be-
ginning in Germany about the point and the possibility of peace
negotiations.
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lingen Habermas: A Plea for Negotiations - SZ.de
Already at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, two perspectives
from which we regard and evaluate wars found expression in our
country in the controversy over two vague but competing formulati-
ons of the war aim: Is the aim of our arms deliveries that Ukraine
“must not lose” the war, or are they not rather aimed at achieving a
“victory” over Russia?
‘This conceptually ambivalent difference has little to do with taking
sides for or against pacifism, Although the pacifist movement that
emerged at the end of the 19th century politicized the violent dimen-
sion of wars, the issue driving the movement was not the gradual
overcoming of wars as a means of settling international conflicts,
but the refusal to take up arms in the first place. In this respect, pa~
cifism plays no role for the two perspectives that are differentiated
by the weights they attach to the victims of war.
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lrgen Habermas: A Pea for Negotiations - SZ.de
‘This is important because the subtle rhetorical distinction between
the expressions “not losing” the war and “winning” the war does not
already separate pacifists from non-pacifists. Today, it also marks
oppositions within the political camp that considers the Western alli-
ance to be not only justified in supporting, but is also politically obli-
gated to support, Ukraine with arms deliveries, logistical support
and civilian services in its courageous struggle against an attack,
conducted in violation of international law and even in a criminal
manner, on the existence and independence of a sovereign state.
For months the front has been frozen. It reminds us of the western
frontin 1916
‘This partisanship is connected with sympathy for the suffering of a
population which, after many centuries of Polish and Russian, and
also Austrian foreign domination, only achieved independent state-
hood with the fall of the Soviet Union. Ukraine is the latest of all
among the “delayed” European nations. Itis still a nation in the
making.
But the broad camp of emphatic supporters of Ukraine is also curr-
ently divided over the right moment for peace negotiations. One side
identifies with the Ukrainian government's demand for military sup-
port, increasing without limit, to defeat Russia and thus restore the
country’s territorial integrity, including Crimea. The other side
‘wants to push for attempts to bring about a cease-fire and negotiati-
ons that would at least avert a possible defeat by restoring the status
quo ante of February 23, 2022. The pros and cons of these positions
reflect historical experiences.
tis not a coincidence that this smouldering conflict is now pressing
for clarification. The front has been frozen for months. Under the
headline “The War of Attrition Favours Russia” for example, the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (of January 25, 2023) reports on the
static warfare around Bachmut in the northern region of the Don-
bass involving heavy losses for both sides, and quotes the harrowing
statement of a senior Nato official: “It looks like Verdun there” Com-
parisons with that gruesome battle, the longest and most deadly of
the First World War, are of only remote relevance for the Ukraine
war, and only insofar as prolonged static warfare without major
shifts in the front lines, in contrast to the “meaningful” political goal
of the war, makes us aware above all of the suffering of its victims.
Sonja Zckri's harrowing report on the front (Siiddeutsche Zeitung,
February 3, 2023), which does not conceal its sympathies but does
not gloss over anything either, is indeed reminiscent of depictions of
the horror on the western front in 1916, Soldiers “at each other's
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Jtrgen Habermas: A Plea for Negotiations - SZ de
throats”, mountains of dead and wounded, the rubble of homes, cli-
nics and schools ~ in other words, the obliteration of civilized life ~
this reflects the destructive core of the war, which puts our foreign
minister's statement that “our arms deliveries are protecting human
lives” in a different light.
To the extent that the casualties and destruction of war force them-
selves on our attention as such, the other side of war comes to the
fore - then it is not only a means of defence against an unscrupulous
aggressor; the course of the war itself is experienced as crushing vio-
lence that should cease as soon as possible. And the more the
weights shift from the one aspect to the other, the more clearly this
sense that there should not be war imposes itself. In wars, the desire
to overcome the enemy has always been combined with the desire to
end death and destruction. And as the “devastation” has increased
along with the potency of the weapons, the relative weights of these
two aspects have also shifted.
‘The West must never forget the number of victims that is accepted
for the sake of the legitimate objective
The barbaric experiences of the two world wars and the nervous ten-
sion of the Cold War had generally given rise to a latent conceptual
shift in the minds of the affected populations during the past cen-
tury. They had often unconsciously drawn the conclusion from their
experiences that wars - this hitherto self-evident mode of conduc-
ting and resolving international conflicts - were absolutely ineom-
patible with the standards of civilized coexistence.
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Jtrgen Habermas: A Plea for Negotiations - SZ de
‘The violent character of war had, in a sense, lost its aura of natural~
ness. This broad-based change in consciousness also left its mark on
legal developments. International humanitarian law prohibiting war
crimes already represented a not very successful attempt to tame the
use of violence in war. But at the end of the Second World War, the
violence of war itself was to be pacified by legal means and replaced
by lawas the only mode of interstate conflict resolution. The United
Nations Charter, which came into force on October 24, 1945, and the
establishment of the International Court of Justice in The Hague re-
volutionized international law. Article 2 of the UN Charter obliges all
states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. It was
the shock of the violent excesses of war that give birth to this
revolution.
‘The eloquent moving words of the preamble reflect the horror at the
sight of the victims of the Second World War. The key statement is
the call to “unite our strength ... to ensure, by the acceptance of
principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not,
be used, save in the common interest” - that is, in the interest of the
citizens of all states and all societies in the world, as spelled out in
international law. This consideration for the victims of war explains,
on the one hand, the abolition of the ius ad bellum, that is, of the
ominous “right” of sovereign states to wage war at will; but it also
explains why the ethically based doctrine of just war has by no me-
ans been renewed, but has instead been abolished except for the
right of self-defence of the attacked. The various measures against
acts of aggression listed in Chapter VII are directed against war as,
such, and in the language of law alone. For this, the moral content,
inherent in modern international law itself is sufficient.
Itis in the light of this development that I understood the formula
tion that Ukraine “must not lose the war”, For | interpret the moment
of restraint as a warning that the West, which is enabling Ukraine to
continue the fight against a criminal aggressor, must neither forget
the number of victims, nor the risk to which the possible victims are
exposed, nor the extent of the actual and potential destruction that
is accepted with a heavy heart for the sake of the legitimate objec-
tive. Even the most altruistic supporter is not relieved of the respon-
sibility to weigh up this proportionality.
‘The hesitant formulation “must not lose” calls into question a fri-
end-foe perspective that regards the belligerent resolu
national conflicts as “natural” and without alternative, even in the
2st century. A war, and all the more so the war started by Putin, isa
symptom of a regression behind the historically achieved level of ci-
vilized interaction between powers ~ especially between powers that
mn of inter-
9322002123, 22:37
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lrgen Habermas: A Pea for Negotiations - SZ.de
have been able to learn their lesson from the two world wars. If the
outbreak of armed conflict cannot be prevented by painful sane-
tions, sanctions that are also painful for the defenders of violated in-
ternational law themselves, the requisite alternative - compared
with a continuation of war with ever more victims ~ is to seek tolera
ble compromises.
‘The Western alliance's mistake was to deliberately keep Rus:
the dark about the goal of its mi
ary support from the outset
‘The objection is obvious: At present, there is no sign that Putin is
willing to engage in negotiations. Doesn't he have to be forced to
relent by military means for this reason alone? Moreover, he has ta-
ken decisions that make it almost impossible to enter into promising
negotiations. Because with the annexation of the eastern provinces
of Ukraine, he has created facts and cemented claims that are unac-
ceptable to Ukraine.
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lingen Habermas: A Plea for Negotiations - SZ.de
On the other hand, this was perhaps a response, however ill-advised,
to the Western alliance’s mistake of deliberately keeping Russia in
the dark about the goal of its military support from the outset. For
that left open the prospect of regime change, which was unaccepta-
ble to Putin, In contrast, the stated goal of restoring the status quo
ante as of February 23, 2022, would have facilitated the subsequent
path to negotiations. But both sides wanted to discourage each other
by driving ambitious and seemingly immovable stakes into the
ground, These are not promising conditions, but neither are they
hopeless.
For apart from the human lives that war claims with each passing
day, there is an increasing cost in material resources that cannot be
replaced to an arbitrary extent. And the clock is ticking for the Biden
administration, too. This thought alone should prompt us to press
for energetic attempts to start negotiations and search for a compro-
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Jorgen Habermas: A Pla for Negotiation -8Z.de
mise solution that would not give the Russian side any territorial
gain beyond the status quo before the beginning of the war and yet
‘would allow it to save face.
Apart from the fact that Western heads of government such as
Scholz. and Macron maintain telephone contact with Putin, the U.S.
government, which is apparently divided on this question, cannot
maintain the formal role of an uninvolved party. A tenable negotia~
ted outcome cannot be embedded in the context of far-reaching
agreements without the involvement of the United States. Both war-
ring parties are interested in this. This applies to security guarantees
that the West must provide for Ukraine. But it also applies to the
principle that the overthrow of an authoritarian regime is credible
and stable only to the extent that it is driven by its own population,
and hence enjoys internal support.
In general, the war has focused attention on an acute need for regu-
lation in the entire Central and Eastern European region, which ex-
tends beyond the objects of contention of the warring parties. Eas-
tern Europe expert and former director of the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs in Berlin, Hans-Henning Schréder,
has pointed (in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of January 24,
2023) to the agreements on disarmament and economic framework
conditions without which there cannot be a stable agreement bet-
ween the immediate parties. Putin could take credit for the very wil-
lingness of the United States to engage in such negotiations of geo-
political scope.
Precisely because the conflict affects a broader network of interests,
it cannot be ruled out from the outset that a compromise that saves
face for both sides could also be found for the present diametrically
opposed demands.
Translated by Ciaran Cronin
Here you can read the german version of this article.
Team
Text Firgen Habermas
Ubersetzung Ciaran Cronin
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lingen Habermas: A Plea for Negotiations - SZ.de
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