facilitate domestic and international dealings, transactions,

arrangements, agreements, contracts and exchanges and storage of

information through the utilization of electronic, optical and
similar medium, mode, instrumentality and technology to recognize the
authenticity and reliability of electronic documents related to such
activities and to promote the universal use of electronic transaction
in the government and general public.

apply to any kind of data message and electronic document used in the
context of commercial and non-commercial activities to include
domestic and international dealings, transactions, arrangements,
agreements, contracts and exchanges and storage of information.

"Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic

and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a
person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic
data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures
employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such
person with the intention of authenticating or approving an
electronic data message or electronic document.

MCC Industrial Sales Corp. vs. Ssangyong Corp.

--------facsimile not included in the definition of electronic
data message and electronic document
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original
paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone
line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to
speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the
same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably,
the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as
aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,” could not
have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-
based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received.
These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different
legal effects.  While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it
excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer
development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine
transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data message.”
[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,”
as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include
a facsimile transmission.  Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence.  It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and
is not admissible as electronic evidence.

GARCILLANO

n 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between Gloria

Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano surfaced. The
said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor
Arroyo. The recordings then became subject of legislative hearings
conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen.
Chiz Escudero moved for a congressional investigation jointly
conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House
Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
conversation emerged. Sen. Ping Lacson’s motion for a senate inquiry
was referred to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed
by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon. Garcillano (referred to as “Garci” by
Arroyo in the leaked tapes) subsequently filed two petitions. One to
prevent the playing of the tapes in each house for they are alleged
to be inadmissible and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of
the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.

HELD: Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be

granted. The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes
were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by
these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second
petition must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.

ANG vs CA

Facts:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face superimposed
on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused for
violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.

The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-

8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he
copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in
Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be
easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. 
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation
of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC
decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-
SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility
of the obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court.
The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered
in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground
for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal
action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each
and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

AZNAR

Facts:  The herein petitioner, Emmanuel B. Aznar, is a prominent

businessman and entrepreneur in Cebu.  He decided to treat his wife
together with their grandchildren for an Asian Tour using his
Citibank credit card.  He deposited P485,000 to his account to
increase his ordinary credit limit from P150,000 to P635,000.  He
bought tickets to Kuala Lumpur amounting to P235,000.  When they
were in Kuala Lumpur, they decided to purchases things to which the
credit card was dishonoured for over the limit.  Eventually the
agency further dishonoured the card and even mentioned that the
petitioner be a swindler.  In that note, they decided to go back
Philippines and instantly filed a complaint for damages.  The lower
court initially dismissed the complaint on the ground that their was
no proper authentication as to the print out of the computer
generated document presented as evidence before the court.  The
petitioner filed a motion for the re-raffle of the case, raising the
contention that the judge was also a holder of Citibank credit card.
The judge later acceded with the contention of petitioner and ordered
for the company to pay enormous amount of damages to the plaintiff.
When the case was elevated before the CA the latter denied such.
Issue:  Whether or not the print out of the computer generated
document was properly authenticated to be admissible before the
court?

Held:  No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be excluded
as it qualifies as electronic evidence following the Rules on
Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals
for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule;

Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that

whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by
(a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to
introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the
burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this
Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person
purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices
as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for
authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document;
or
(c) By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.

Indeed there was no proper authentication of the electronic evidence

presented by the petitioner before the court which is the print out
of the computer generated document where on it printed that the card
was over the limit.  During the trial the petitioner mentioned that
desk officer phoned someone and eventually the hard copy was given to
him signed by one named Nubi, however such was not witnessed by the
petitioner or he does not have personal knowledge of such
authentication.
The high court denied the petition.

NAPOCOR

Facts:
M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by
private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and
damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the
Cebu International Port. Thus, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a
complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping
Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case,
filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court.
Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem
Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioner’s
formal offer of evidence.
Public respondent judge later issued the assailed order denying the
admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits and
its sub-markings. The Court finds merit in the objections raised and
the motion to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The
record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to
present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it
offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to
justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that “the
photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document”
on the basis of the Electronic Evidence. The information in those
Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or
produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be
authenticated, which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the
required Affidavit to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight
of the alleged electronic evidence was not executed, much less
presented in evidence. The Xerox or photocopies offered should,
therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside from their being not
properly identified by any competent witness, the loss of the
principals thereof was not established by any competent proof.
The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioner’s obstinate
contention that the photocopies it offered as formal evidence before
the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based
on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial
court and the appellate court, the photocopies it presented as
documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on
its own premise that an “electronic document” as defined under
Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not
limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or
produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an
“electronic document” can also refer to other modes of written
expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as
included in the section’s catch-all proviso: “any print-out or
output, readable by sight or other means”.
Issue:
Whether or not the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as
contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on
Electronic Evidence?
Held:
No. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents
therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed
the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no
stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually
be considered as information electronically received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced
through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic
documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously
an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having
thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to
electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be
considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed
in the law.