Evolution and Conservatism

Abstract

The two concepts given in the title seem to contradict though, as we try to argue in this

paper, there is an intrinsic relation between them. We will present evidence for the statement

that only basic constructs are conserved during evolution, thus there is no room for the

emergence of something completely new, which does not have a predecessor. “There is

nothing new under the Sun” (Ecclesiasts 1:9-11).

A generalized concept of evolution

First of all we have to define our terms. In the following we will not consider

evolution in the strict biological sense; rather we speak generally about a gradual,

spontaneous process in which a structure, composed of elementary particles, molecules, cells,

living organisms, symbols or behavioral patterns, transforms into a different and usually more

complex form. In general, this means that the new form fits better within a given environment

than the earlier ones, i.e. it proves to be more durable – either in its concrete existence or in its

type – than its alternatives, thus either its own individual being becomes permanent, or the

production of similar forms becomes continuous. This evolutionary process increases the
complexity of a certain region of the universe, while complexity may remain constant or

decrease in other regions. Spontaneity means here that the whole structure is not a conscious

human constitution, though some components of the structure may arise through human

planning. E.g. a spontaneously emerging culture supposes that individuals realize countless

conscious actions, while they do not necessarily foresee the overall effect of their acts on the

society as a whole.

The modern scientific theory of evolution of life is based on the principle of natural

selection formulated by Darwin,1 where he outlined that organisms reproduce with only small

changes between generations, therefore the species had been changing for a very long time. In

the light of the theory of the Big Bang, it is straightforward to extend the concept of evolution

to the whole history of the Universe. As Teilhard de Chardin formulated: “Historiquement,

l’étoffe de l’Univers va se concentrant en formes toujours plus organisées de Matière.” i.e.

“Historically, the Universe concentrates in more and more organized forms of matter.” 2

Under the term “organized forms of matter” we mean complexity, and under evolution

we mean the increase in complexity of a given system. Beyond mathematical definitions of

complexity (see e.g. Adami3), a quite general one has been formulated by LaPorte 4 who states

that complexity of organized social systems is determined by the number of components as

well as the degree of their integration and differentiation. According to this definition a

research team is a simpler entity than the City of New York. Clearly, the definition can be

generalized to other systems, composed of elementary particles, molecules, cells, and even

living organisms.

Using the above definition of complexity, it is possible to extend the concept of

biological evolution to the whole history of the Universe. According to the second law of

thermodynamics, in a closed system as a whole the amount of disorder (entropy) increases

(i.e. the complexity decreases) on the long term and in average. Even if this statement remains
valid for the Universe, which may be open or closed, complexity may increase in finite

regions at the expense of a yet greater net increase in disorder elsewhere. Looking at certain

regions as time passed after the Big Bang, the increase in complexity can be “observed”.

Clearly direct observation was not possible during the times, since at early ages human

observers did not yet exist, however, based on indirect, but convincing, scientific conclusions

the appearance of more and more complex systems can be acknowledged. After the Big Bang

separate elementary particles appeared, which were combined to more and more complex

atoms and molecules. In the light of the LaPorte definition it is not absurd to call a planetary

system more complex than an isolated star, since it contains more components with a degree

of integration (gravitation) and differentiation (varying size and distance from the central

star), which is higher than that, attributed to the lonely star.

As time passed the manifold of chemical molecules organized into more and more

complex biological polymers, which allowed emergence of life on Earth. Vertebrates are

more complex than living cells and the human organism is the most complex system among

vertebrates. Again, groups formed by humans are more complex than individuals, and the

information society exceeds a tribe of Neanderthal humans in complexity. This “observation”

does not mean that we consider the increase of complexity as a contradiction to Darwinism,

both concepts can be harmonized.5 We do not have enough scientific information to decide,

whether complexity will or will not increase perpetually in our region or in other parts of the

Universe, however, the aforementioned series of events can be put into a logical order.

Conservatism: what is it?

1
C.R. Darwin, On the Origin of Species (London: John Murray, 1859).
2
P. Teilhard de Chardin, Le phénomène humain (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1955), p.44.
3
C. Adami, “What is Complexity?” BioEssays 24 (2002): 1085-1094.
4
T. La Porte, Organized Social Complexity: Challenge to Politics and Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975).
5
J.T. Bonner, The Evolution of Complexity by Means of Natural Selection (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988).
 It is much more difficult to define conservatism. Two basic forms can be

distinguished, substantive and procedural (formal, methodological) conservatism, these may

mix in the conservative approach.6 Terminology is not uniform here. Under substantive

conservatism we mean a way of thinking, which idealizes a certain, old (already disappeared

or endangered) social system because of its concrete content, and if this already broke off,

emphasizes its rebirth. On the other hand, procedural conservatives are people who do not

have a well-defined paragon, but simply stick to the already existing and would allow only

slight, slow and gradual changes. They undervalue the significance of purposeful, planned

changes in society and emphasize spontaneous processes. Substantive conservatism may be

procedurally conservative, too, which means that it is simply cautious defending the well-

working old, however, it must become at once procedurally radical if the old became extinct

in the name of a utopian, inorganic series of events and there is no hope for its spontaneous

rebirth. It is not always clear, what is the difference between these two meanings. Someone

may believe in small steps and organic evolution because rejecting violence and

unconditionally esteeming human life, this latter feature is, however, a substantive element. It

is therefore more appropriate to speak about substantial and procedural elements of

conservatism as such and these elements mix in various proportions from author to author.

Conservatism means also a mentality, prudential and moderate action, respect of

traditions and tolerance in front of other views.7 Thus, conservatism is a political philosophy

that emphasizes the value of traditional institutions and practices and prefers the historically

inherited rather than the abstract and ideal. Conservatives prefer institutions and practices that

have evolved gradually and are manifestations of continuity and stability. According to John

Kekes8 conservatives deny “that the reasons are to be derived from a hypothetical contract, or

6
On distinction between substantive conservatism and procedural conservatism see, e.g., Iain McLean –
Alistair McMillan, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 114.
7
E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
8
J. Kekes, What Is Conservatism? http://www.deepleafproductions.com/utopialibrary/text/kekes-
conservatism.html [30 June, 2010].
from an imagined ideal order, or from what is supposed to be beneficial for the whole of

humanity. In preference to these and other alternatives, conservatives look to the history of

their own society because it exerts a formative influence on their present lives and on how it is

reasonable for them to want to live in the future. The conservative attitude, however, is not an

unexamined prejudice in favor of the historical arrangements of the conservatives’ society.

They are in favor of conserving only those arrangements that their history has shown to be

conducive to good lives.”

To decide whether conservatism may or may not use the concept of evolution we have

to answer at least two further questions. First, we have to select between substantive and

procedural conservatism; second, extension of facts and arguments of evolution theory to

explain social events should be verified. In case of the first question we have to make further

distinction between two subclasses. For a conservative thinker evolution may serve as a

procedural analogy (e.g. he may refer to the slowness of changes induced by biological

mutations) on the one hand, as well as a solid basis, some kind of a substantive verification,

on the other. An example for the latter is the explanation of the foreseen conservation of a

structure or one of its features bearing a positive meaning for a conservative, e.g. explaining

the formation of some specifically masculine or feminine characteristics by selection

preferences.

The aforementioned arguments do not mean that the latter and preceding forms of

reference to evolution are used only by substantive and procedural conservatisms,

respectively. Four different combinations may exist. Most straightforward is to attempt

verification of substantive conservative values based on reference to products of evolution,

while verification of procedural theories may be based on a parallelism with the evolutionary

process (we gave examples for these in the preceding section). The reverse may also be true:

it is a good argument for the procedural conservative wishing to hold up or to slow changes,
e.g. if a biologist comes to the conclusion that there is an evolutionary and genetically fixed

inclination in humans to conserve certain structures, humans by nature resist to changes. On

the other hand the substantive conservative may give a substantive, intrinsic value to a certain

formal element of evolution (e.g. fight, as the analogue of selection, as a final value) e.g.

when he renders “fight” a fundamental value, on the analogy of natural selection, and may

argue for the conscious conservation or reestablishment of a societal order where competition

among individuals or groups is a substantive value. This man, in contrast to his chosen values,

would not be a procedural conservative, since he would not insist on the existing, the given as

such and he would be better interested in the content of, not the way of approach to his

society paragon.

Truth is certainly even more complicated, since; in general, substantive and procedural

elements mix in the views of really existing conservatives. Let us now focus on pure cases

and discuss the point, which aspect of conservatism we wish to defend.

Purely procedural conservatism, as easily understandable, can hardly avoid overall

relativism. If, in case of the evaluation of a society, the only important thing is that something

evolved spontaneously (either gradually or “organically”) or it de facto exists already,

practically everything can be justified from cannibalism via polygamy to totalitarianism. This

can be avoided only if we look for such a conservatism, which holds at least one substantive

value, irrespective of whether it accepts procedurally conservative values at all. Later on we

will call such defined conservatisms “substantive”, and disregard the study of any procedural

variants.

Let us take now one of substantive conservatisms as an example to understand, how it

is possible to use evolution as an argument. Let us chose Christianity for that purpose since,

after all, Western world is based on that and even non-explicitly Christian conservatisms

select from the arguments derived from its traditional values. For example Larry Arnhart,
whose theory we shall touch later, represents a form of non-explicitly Christian conservatism,

still he appreciates for instance traditional monogamous and heterosexual marriage, the

classical – and perhaps the most consequent – form of which is defended by Christianity. 9

Most of these were recognized even in the ancient times, but they became known to the West

through Christianity, which represents them nowadays most coherently. It is true, that many

Christians would protest now against the conservative label. Nowadays it is more fashionable

to speak about “dynamism”, “openness” and “progression”, and as we now, according to

several theologians, God does not “exist”, rather he “comes”. However, Christianity, if it will

conserve its identity, has to insist on some old concepts, like natural law and institutions based

on them. For a religion based on an already closed revelation, it is unavoidable, in any case,

to maintain some fixed elements.

Speaking on the relation of Christianity and evolution we cannot avoid mentioning

Teilhard de Chardin, since his conception is believed to be the first attempt to harmonize

evolution theory and catholic theology. In fact evolution can also be coordinated with

traditional catholic thinking; however, we do not have enough room to go into details. 10

Without doubt, Teilhard de Chardin did a lot to popularize this reconciliation, but for this sake

he diverged from the traditional catholic way of thinking – unnecessarily in our views – and

made dogmatically disputable statements in some points. Again, discussion of this point in

detail would extend the frame of the present work, therefore we will examine, what Teilhard

does tell us about our narrower topics and what Christianity as conservatism may profit from

this.

9
See below the endnote n 15.
10
God as the First Cause acts on the immanent world through its beings, i.e. „per causas secundas” or
secondary causes. He moves the things (as Thomas Aquinas says) according to their nature, thus the causes of all
secular events are simultaneously God and worldly factors. Thus, the causes of the manifold of species can be
evolution and divine, creative act at the same time. What is really interesting in the biblical creation history is
that anything existing has been created by God; theology does not deal with the concrete way of creation, rather
it is a question to be studied by natural sciences. It was already St. Augustine, who noted that the six-day
creation history should not be interpreted word by word.
 According to Teilhard the basic trend in evolution of the world is the increase in

complexity, combination of simpler units to more complex ones. Like molecules are formed

from atoms, cells are constituted of molecules; living systems are constituted from cells, and

so on. This process did not finish by the appearance of man. Unification of humans will lead

to the birth of some kind of “super mankind” and at the very end of the process the whole

Universe will unite in the “cosmic body” of Jesus Christ.

The guiding principle of Teilhard is thus unification, this is the basis of his moral

standard: good is what serves unification and evil works against this. Thus, he applies a rule,

which we call procedural and he does it in a univocal mode, at every levels of being,

irrespectively of the essential differences between lifeless, living and human forms of being.

This results in strange consequences. It is enough to refer here to the positive attitude of

Teilhard toward totalitarian regimes emerging in Europe between the two world wars,

because, by incorporation of individuals into higher units, they work on the “line of cosmic

movement”.11 The main basis of this over generalized view, which is inapplicable to concrete

problems of the human world, could be the inclination of Teilhard de Chardin to biological

reductionism. He does not see a basic difference between the wings of a bird and those of an

aircraft.12 He considers both to be the product of the same evolutionary process and neglects

the basic ontological difference that the wing of an aircraft is – like every man-made product

– the result of conscious, purposeful activity.

Needless to say, we do not deny that spontaneous processes do occur in society, too.

For example, cultural evolution does exist. Recognition of this is not far from the catholic way

of thinking. E.g. Jacques Maritain explains the evolution of ethics on this basis, making a

distinction between ontological and epistemological sides of natural moral law. 13 On the one

11
P. Teilhard de Chardin, La Grande Option, in: L’Avenir de l’homme, Œuvres V (Paris: Editions du
Seuil, March 3, 1939), p. 62.
12
P. Teilhard de Chardin, L’Energie humaine, in: L’Avenir de l’homme, Œuvres VI, (Paris: Editions du
Seuil, August 6, 1937), p. 182.
13
J. Maritain, La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite, (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg, 1986), p. 20.
side it is true from the beginnings that certain norms fit best to human nature, on the other

their recognition is a historical “trial and error” process; appropriate norms crystallize slowly,

through attempts, successes and failures.14 Spontaneity does have a role here. At the same

time, it is clear from the mere fact that this theory could emerge that mankind recognizes the,

originally spontaneous, process and continues it consciously, in the present case within the

frame of ethics as a scientific discipline, which, on the other hand, reacts on its subject.

Although social development has several spontaneous elements, consciousness plays a

continuous role in it. Within the basically spontaneous cultural evolution process there are

humans who play as actors, setting goals for themselves consciously, moreover, they mutually

try to consider each others’ aspirations. This process is thus intrinsically different from any,

merely biological or physical ones.

The pitfalls of Teilhard’s theory clearly show why it is not justified to use evolution

characteristics as procedural analogies. It seems to be more profitable to follow another way,

namely to argue for the emergence and foreseeable permanence of certain substantive values

referring to them as products of the evolution process. A variety of scientific results support

this aspect. Both sociobiology and ethology point out that a manifold of phenomena,

properties, organization and other forms, usually traced back to merely societal, cultural,

historically altering and temporal causes and thus considered as transformable, are based on

congenital aptitudes of humans, and this can be explained just in terms of evolution, since

they aroused as selection preferences in a very long historical epoch, paleolithicum, the end of

which coincides with that of the Pleistocene, finished about 11,000 years ago, when the

hunting-gathering way of life of our ancestors had been replaced by agriculture. 15 Certainly,

this epoch is already over, but the more than ten thousand years passed away since then are by

historical measures too short for adapting to altering conditions biologically and cultural

14
Maritain, op. c. p. 188.
15
L. Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism, in: K.C. Blanchard, jr. (ed.), Darwinian Conservatism. A
Disputed Question. (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009). p. 27.
evolution accelerated to such an extent that such a conformity would not have a reason any

more. Furthermore, a considerable part of these features remained valid even in our time, thus

it would be superfluous to change them merely in the name of some kind of “progression”.

Thus, biological evolution of humans can be considered practically as finished; we possess

even today that inheritable ensemble of aptitudes, which emerged in the process of adaptation

to the conditions of paleolithicum long, long ago. On this basis we can explain e.g. the

existence of the family and specific gender roles, the insistence to property and group identity,

the difference between male and female characteristics, and several other issues. Since these

elements belong to the content of the Natural Law in traditional Christian (in particular

Catholic) sense, too, their defense means indirectly the use of evolution theory by the

Christian form of substantive conservatism. Certainly, in a strict sense this evidence cannot be

considered as an argument for the value of these characteristics, since we cannot surpass the

border between Is and Ought (of which more later), merely we can set the biologically

determined nature of these features. However, this can be well used in practice, e.g. in the

argumentation against authors claiming that these features are simply products of socialization

and can be eliminated by appropriate education. We can point out that it is not rewarding to

try to support this statement because we trigger only unnecessary tensions, unjustified

anticipations and subsequent frustration, or we come to a result, which endangers the future of

the society as a whole (e.g. if we wish to undermine the authority of the family as an

institution). This is a real danger, since humans do not possess merely these inherited features,

but also have characteristics picked up during the course of socialization, and these latter may

(at least provisionally) overwrite – but not eliminate – the former, so temporarily we can be

deluded by cultural factors, underestimating the role of biologically rooted inclinations. (We

have to underline this, for the very reason that, as we shall see later, sometimes it is inevitable

to overwrite some of inherited features, e. g. when they are in conflict with one another, and
by overwriting we cause tension anyway, so it is unreasonable to multiply these tensions

without necessity.)

Nevertheless, procedural conservative features may have some role in the defense of

substantive values. A single example: as we often stressed, functioning of society is a not

designed process as a whole, and most probably we will not be able to foresee and control its

components perfectly. This leads us to perform voluntary and conscious changes in small

steps in order not to trigger irreparable losses.

From molecules to living organisms

After the Big Bang, protons, neutrons and electrons aggregated into atoms and

molecules, like hydrogen and water. These entities exist since several billion years; to our

present knowledge their physical properties did not change to the slightest extent. According

to the theory of abiogenesis, life has started with the formation of nucleic acids, large

molecular weight biopolymers, which are composed of only four different building blocks,

the nucleotides.16 These building blocks can be combined to form a large number of different

sequences, each having its biological role, which may be quite different; however, the

building blocks remain the same, as they were billions of years ago. Nucleic acids control

inheritance and the formation of molecular factories, another type of biopolymers: the

proteins. Again, these polymers are composed of a finite number of amino-acid residues,

which did not alter throughout the ages. Though we know a multitude of various protein

sequences and three-dimensional structures with different biological function, the amino-acid

building blocks remained unchanged.

It is known that point mutations play a crucial role in protein evolution. Here again

conservatism can be observed, since the overall sequence and in most cases the basic features

16
P.L. Luisi, The Emergence of Life: From Chemical Origins to Synthetic Biology, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
of the three-dimensional structure remain unchanged. If too many residues are replaced by

others the protein may loose its original function, even its overall structure. In the introduction

we referred to Darwin, who stated that organisms reproduce with only small changes between

generations. This might be the reason, why certain entities have been conserved for very long

time. The cell as the basic unit of living organisms remained conserved, though differentiated

in almost all subsequent forms of life. Now we know several dozens of different cell types, all

of which including a nucleus and surrounded by a membrane isolating it to a certain extent

from the outside world.

Vertebrates preserved their spinal column; mammals retained their womb for hundreds

of millions of years. The hypothalamus, which links the nervous system to the endocrine

system via the pituitary gland, is found in all mammalian brains, including humans. It is

probable that it originates in the insect neuroendocrine system17 maintaining the status quo in

the body, and controlling, among others, emotions and sexual activity in mammals. While it

remained part of the human brain, its activity became controlled by more developed parts of

it, allowing defeating distress and presiding over aggression. In general, biological evolution

of mammals is very conservative; the overlap between various regions of the mouse and

human TIP39 gene varies between 80 and 96 %, while the genetic material of humans

overlaps with that of chimpanzee within 99.4 %.18 It has to be stressed that this spectacularly

close relationship refers only to those genes, which encode proteins; in other ones much larger

differences can be observed.

Environment and Society

17
B. De Velasco, T. Erclik, D. Shy, J. Sclafani, H. Lipshitz, R. McInnes and V. Hartenstein,
„Specification and development of the pars intercerebralis and pars lateralis, neuroendocrine command centers in
the Drosophila brain” Dev. Biol. 302 (2007): 309–323.
18
D.F. Wildman, M. Uddin, G. Lui, L.I. Grossman, and M. Goodman, “Implications of natural selection
in shaping 99.4% nonsynonymous DNA identity between humans and chimpanzees: enlarging genus Homo”
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 100 (2003): 7181-7188.
 Preservation of old constructions while maintaining continuous progress, i.e.

evolution, can be observed also in the environment as well as in its most complex subsystem,

human society. A substantive conservatism referring to our planet is outlined in the Gaia

hypothesis of Lovelock and Margulis.19 These authors suggest that the biosphere and the

physical components of the Earth are closely integrated to form a robust and complex system

that maintains the optimal physical conditions for life. Gaia is a complex entity involving the

Earth's biosphere, atmosphere, oceans, and soil, which supports an optimal physical and

chemical environment for life on this planet. Though parts of the system may, and in fact do,

change in time and space, basic conditions for life remain conserved on the long term.

One example of conservative evolution in society is the family, which, as a group of

persons of common ancestry, is as old as the human race. The family is an essential vehicle

for the transmission of knowledge, values, attitudes and practices which are essential for the

survival of a culture.20 Early families were held together merely by physiological needs.

During the nine months spent in the mother’s womb the child does not have enough time to

achieve skills, which are needed for its nourishment just after the birth, therefore the maternal

care is indispensable. However, for survival, the mother alone cannot collect enough food for

both herself and her child, therefore at least one further person, logically the father, is needed

to maintain the community. The role of family continuously changed, often extended during

human history. In the feudalism noble families played a crucial role in the distribution of

power, then with the advancement of the industrial revolution well-organized family

enterprises appeared, which play an important role even nowadays, e.g. in running a

flourishing economy in Middle Italy.21

19
J.E. Lovelock and L. Margulis, L. (1974). "Atmospheric homeostasis by and for the biosphere. The
Gaia hypothesis". Tellus 26 (1974): 2-10.
20
J. Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: A short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years, (London:
Vintage, 2005).
21
F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995).
 The Roman law was followed in European jurisdiction until the end of the 18 th

century, in some countries like Germany even longer. For this reason, many modern civil law

systems in Europe and elsewhere, especially private law, are strongly influenced by Roman

law. The influence of Roman law is shown by the wealth of legal terminology, retained by all

legal systems. For example, the institution of lawyer remained conserved, even if in a

somewhat different form. Originally, throughout the proceedings, the lawyer, or patronus,

could offer strategic advice and could give a speech on behalf of his client, but he was not

allowed to be paid money for his services.22

Human choice and spontaneous evolution

However, by saying that every change in nature – and generally in the world – is based

on the already existing formations we touch only one side of the question. The other side is

that not each of the given formations existing in a certain moment of the cosmic history will

develop into a new one. While we are speaking about a spontaneous natural process under

human level, this is not a problem. But what shall we do, when the continuation of the process

depends – at least partly – on human decisions and we have to choose from the given

formations till now equally „legitimized” by the mere fact that they have survived, or if the

existing formations are in conflict with one another and we have to find a solution? The

existence of these formations itself doesn't give us any criterion.

A good example of this problem can be the difficulty found by the critics of Larry

Arnhart's famous work, Darwinian Conservatism. This book is all the more important for us,

since it tries to harmonize evolution and conservatism, like our present article.

As is well-known, Arnhart enumerates „twenty natural desires” 23 shaped by the

evolution and being biologically given in all the members of our species. The twenty desires
22
O. Tellegen-Couperus (2006). A Short History of Roman Law,
http://www.ebookmall.com/ebook/94852-ebook.htm [6 July, 2010].
23
L. Arnhart, op. cit., pp. 26-34.
furnish, according to the author, the foundations of a moral law. The critics say that these

desires are nothing but natural facts, sometimes being even in contradiction with one another,

so we need some measure beyond nature to evaluate and rank them. (See, e. g., the remark of

Carson Holloway.24 He also raises objections to Arnhart's statement according to which there

is a morality existing independently from religion.25)

Arnhart answers that „[t]here is a range of human goods” corresponding to the desires

of his list,26 the concrete expression of which „varies for different individuals in different

societies”.27 „Human flourishing or happiness is constituted by these goods.” 28 But each

individual have to decide himself „how to arrange and integrate these goods in a way that is

fitting for the contingent and particular circumstances of the individual and for the

individual's propensities, abilities and history. In this view […] the ranking of goods will

properly differ for different individuals with different forms of life.”29

But is this a satisfying solution? We do not think so. From Arnhart's answer seems as

if the only function of morals were the provision for the well-being of individuals, by the

satisfaction of the enumerated desires. He apparently identifies natural law with the

fulfillment of biologically rooted individual motivations. But his critics, too, commit the same

error, saying that Arnhart's natural desires have to be completed with religious belief. Richard

Sherlock, for example, writes: „Nature requires supernature to comprehend it.” 30 According to

Holloway „Darwinian conservatism needs religion”.31 John G. West has a similar opinion: „If

one believes that natural desires have been implanted in human beings by intelligent design,

or that they represent permanent truths inherent in the nature of the universe, it would be

24
C. Holloway, Darwinian Conservatism and the First Cause of All Things, in: K.C. Blanchard, jr. (ed.),
Darwinian Conservatism. A Disputed Question. (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009). p. 167.
25
Holloway, op. cit. p. 173.
26
Arnhart, Vindicating Darwinian Conservatism, in: K.C. Blanchard, jr. (ed.), Darwinian Conservatism.
A Disputed Question. (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009)., p. 239.
27
Arnhart, op. cit., p. 238.
28
Arnhart, op. cit., p. 239.
29
Ibidem
rational to accept those desires as grounding for a universal code of morality.” 32 This latter

quotation suggests that a biological desire, in itself lacking normativity, becomes normative if

we attribute its existence to a conscious Designer or to an eternal inherent truth. Apparently

the author sees only two possibilities: either there is nothing but the merely biological level,

or this level is completed immediately by some supra-human entity; the possibility of some

non-biological regulator in the man himself does not arise.

In both cases (i. e. in Arnhart's thought and in that of his critics) we meet a concept of

human nature which is too narrow: it contains only biological properties, which according to

Arnhart are sufficient in themselves to establish morality, while according to the above-

mentioned criticism they need some directly divine – or at least directly supra-human, e.g.

cosmic – supplement.

From this point of view is typical the way Arnhart interprets Saint Thomas's concept

of „ius naturale”. He quotes approvingly Aquinas's following statement: „natural right is that

which nature has taught all animals”.33 But he does not add that this is only one of the

possible senses of the expression „ius naturale” in the texts of Saint Thomas. This (narrower)

sense corresponds to the opinion of Ulpianus and a considerable part of Roman jurists

following him: here the „ius naturale” contains only those elements which are common to all

animals, including humans, too. But Thomas says that human beings have a double nature

(duplex natura): beyond common animal features we, humans – as rational animals – are

capable of reflection about moral questions and the conclusions made this way belong to the

„ius gentium”, which also can be said a part of the „ius naturale” if the latter expression is

used in a broader sense.34

30
R. Sherlock, Darwinism and the Limitations of Naturalism, in: K.C. Blanchard, jr. (ed.), Darwinian
Conservatism. A Disputed Question. (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009). p. 204.
31
Holloway, op. cit., p. 173.
32
J.G. West, The Misguided Quest for Darwinian Conservatism, in: K.C. Blanchard, jr. (ed.), Darwinian
Conservatism. A Disputed Question. (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009). p. 211. - Our italics. - G. N.-Sz., Z. T.
33
Arnhart, op. cit., p. 232; cf. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, liber 4, dist. 33, q.
1, a. 1, ad 4: „ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit”.
34
Thomas Aquinas, In V. Ethic. l. 12.; cf. Summa Theologica, II-II. 57. 3.
 Thus, although Arnhart has perfectly right when he denies the theoretical necessity of

a supernatural addition to natural moral law (apparently thinking that in Aquinas' theory there

is – at least theoretically – a place for morals based only on nature, without any reference to

supernatural belief), his statement can be true only if we use the term „nature” in the correct

way.

The nature of something, in a Thomistic sense, is nothing but its essence, seen from

the point of view of operation or activity. 35 The common activity of all animals is the

preservation of themselves and their species. But humans have an activity differing from that

of other animals both in its contents and in the way they do it: on the one hand beyond the two

fundamental biological needs (i. e. preservation of themselves and their species) they have an

increasing number of specifically human needs, on the other hand the satisfaction of both the

biological needs (fulfilled in a humanized way)36 and the specifically human ones happens

under rational control, which latter is also increasing in the course of history. Today we know

that the existence of specifically human needs and the possibility of rational control are due to

an evolutionary process. Saint Thomas certainly was not aware of this, but he also has seen

the results of the mentioned process. The functioning of the rational control was known for

him for the very reason that he used the classical definition of man as „animal rationale”,

while the fact that he has perceived the existence of specifically human needs is perfectly

clear from his famous classification of inclinations. Man as a substance and a living being has

inclination to preservation of himself and of his species respectively, but as a rational being he

also inclines to live in society and to look for the truth (in particular about God). 37 Although

according to Aquinas man is inclined to use his reason, looking for the truth, at the same time

reason functions also on a level superior to the inclinations, judging them: not every

35
Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, cap. 1.
36
This humanization in the case of eating means e.g. culinary art and table manners, in the case of
sexuality love, and the institution of marriage.
37
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II- 94. 2.
inclination is equally good in itself (unlike the desires of Arnhart's list), there is e. g. the

concupiscence as a bad inclination, contradicting the order of reason.38

So it is clear both for Aquinas and for us that we as humans have specifically human

needs and corresponding human activities, too. By this we can grasp better the specificity of

our nature than by referring to the soul, because the existence of these activities is an

empirical fact.

Of course these specifically human needs and activities, too, have biological roots:

their conditions are innate. But the way they – and the two original biological needs and

activities, too – function in us is completely new in the cosmic history: they are inserted in a

comprehensive teleological framework. To formulate the foregoing otherwise: on the course

of our operations we can construct in advance the mental models of the desired results of our

activity. Of course in some sense there are already anticipated models in subhuman nature,

too: namely genetic codes. But the latter normally are copied without changes, and mutations

happen as anomalies, even if sometimes by chance they prove to be successful under fortunate

circumstances. In turn, human teleological activity creates intentionally quite new mental

models of future extra-mental realities. (Of course if there is God, then teleology isn't an

exclusively human feature. But even then remains true that in the immanent world teleology

arises with rational animals, and in subhuman world the increase of complexity happens by

chance. The compatibility of this latter fact with the existence of the omnipotent God is a very

interesting question, but here we have no space to speak about it. We can only refer briefly to

the possible solution: we have to accept the classical conception of „concursus divinus”: as

we have already seen,10 God moves every being according to its own nature, so He makes the

necessary cause work necessarily, the contingent cause work contingently.39)

38
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II. 91. 6.
39
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. 19. 8. ad 2.
 Our teleological activity is on the one hand a product of evolution and so a

biologically rooted need (Arnhart also mentions activities of this kind among the objects of

his twenty desires, e.g. arts), on the other hand it could be the control and canalizing factor of

the evolutionary process itself. This latter function is strongly underestimated by Arnhart and

generally by conservatives. Still we can easily realize its importance. Although the Arnhartian

desires are made by evolution, this latter, being a spontaneous, unintentional process, does not

favor them automatically. So, if we are motivated by nature to follow the desires in question,

to seize all the opportunities to make possible or to facilitate their fulfillment, why should we

renounce deliberately one of these opportunities, namely the rational canalization of the

originally spontaneous evolutionary process? This rational canalization or control should not

be confused with the utopian leftist experiments to transform human nature. By „rational

control” we simply mean the deepest possible cognition of objective reality (our nature

included) and the activity based strictly on this cognition, without any voluntaristic

adventurism. But the recognition of realities includes the consideration of the above-

mentioned non-existence of objective teleology, too. There is no natural guarantee for the

automatic success of human desires, evolution (both in biological and in cultural sense) being

in itself a „trial-and-error” process, as we have already said. There is a kind of naivety in

some conservative statements on this topic, e. g. in the following one: „human beings in a free

society will spontaneously manifest their natural moral sense”. 40 Well, the recent history of

western society is a living denial of this. American and European societies are free, freedom

even is their principal declared value (let us think on the cult of human rights), and still we

cannot speak about a dominance of the morals corresponding the twenty desires enumerated

by Arnhart. To mention only one example: the catastrophic demographical situation of our

societies show that people (in particular when freedom means the free possibility of

manipulations, too) do not follow always spontaneously the traditional sexual morals,
40
Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism, p. 35.
although this would have to be the natural consequence of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th desires in the

list of Arnhart.

But even if we do not want to use this possibility of controlling evolution, we cannot

avoid rational projecting: if once we have already begun rational reflection, then even if we

renounce it, we do this necessarily by a rational decision.

Well, now we see that it is possible to canalize rationally the process of evolution. But

we do not see the direction of this canalization yet. What shall we do in the case of conflict

between desires? Which is preferable among them? And, what is more: why should we prefer

any of them, at all? Their existence is, after all, nothing but a fact. They function in us as

innate motivations, but not without exceptions. Arnhart himself acknowledges that not all the

mentioned desires are present in each of us. 41 They represent only a statistical majority. But

even if they all were the features of every human being without exceptions, they would be

only subjective motivations, explainable with natural mechanisms, which we could study

keeping a certain distance from them, and being able – at least theoretically – to imagine

another possible world without them, and even to try to change or to annihilate them, using

the knowledge about the way they have come into being.

Thus, we have arrived again to the already mentioned famous „Is-Ought” problem.

We shall not resolve it here and now. Instead, we suppose that all our possible interlocutors

agree with us about the fundamental importance of the continuous existence of human nature.

After all, without human beings capable of some variety of specifically human activities and

rational reflection on them, there is no possibility of any further goals, including even the

most bizarre purposes. If somebody wants to put an end to the history of mankind, his idea,

too, is also a by-product of the cultural evolution of the same mankind, so it presupposes the

existence of human nature, at least until now. Of course, if there is somebody with such an

intention, we have no method by which we can necessarily dissuade him from doing so. But
41
Arnhart, op. cit., p. 28.
such extremities have no practical importance. The great majority of theoreticians, with whom

conservatives have to debate, agree with the latter that, as Hart says, when we discuss about

possible forms of society, „our concern is with social arrangements for continued existence,

not with those of a suicide club”.42

In brief: we suppose now the existence of human nature as a common fundamental

value. By this we become substantive conservatives: we have a special content, namely the

continuous existence of human nature, which we want to conserve.

But the functioning of this nature is more than a mere satisfaction of twenty

biologically rooted desires. If it were so, there would be only a quantitative difference

between subhuman animals and humans. As we have seen, there are two other important

factors, too: the rational control and the historical increase of the variety of activities

satisfying our needs (and even of the variety of needs themselves, too, because we have not

only biologically coded desires, but culturally developed needs also, beyond the twenty

biological ones).

The rational control of the whole process is not stressed by Arnhart. He enumerates

among the desires those ones too, which imply teleological activities (art, science etc.), but

they do not seem to be for him especially important by comparison with the other ones: they

are not over the latter but on the same logical level, as simple factors of the individual's

subjective well-being. Regarding the other factor (i. e. the historical differentiation of human

activities) it is recognized by Arnhart, too, but he doesn't mention the base of its possibility,

namely the existence of objectivations. By these we mean the products of human activity

which survive their makers and accumulate from generation to generation. The objectivations

are partly physical (e. g. instruments, buildings, works of art), but the spiritual ones are more

important: these latter can be identified with the tradition in a very large sense, which contains

manners, rules, methods, knowledge, arts, language etc. and without them we cannot produce
42
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) p. 188.
new physical objectivations or use the already existing ones. The two types of objectivations

together constitute the culture. Every newborn human interiorize – in form of habits – the

accumulated spiritual obejctivations of previous generations. Without this tradition there

would be practically no remarkable difference between humans and other animals. Our

personally acquired knowledge and abilities would be on a very modest level, almost all our

time would be used immediately for supply ourselves with food, so we should have no

possibility to develop the rich variety of cultural forms satisfying the twenty natural desires.

Even this low level of life would be exposed continuously to many dangers in nature, because

of the lack of the rational control based on experiences of people living before our time. So

the maintenance and – as far as possible – the development of inherited objectivations

(corresponding, „by the way”, to the general tendency of complexity growth) constitute an

integral part of our nature, together with the physical reproduction of individuals (i. e. the

preservation of our species) and the conservation of subhuman resources (ecological

conditions, sources of row material and energy). Without these the functioning of the twenty

desires either is not possible in a rich, complex and safe way or it is not possible at all. So

they are the ontological preconditions of truly human existence. The maintenance of these

preconditions – a common heritage – is also a function of morals, thus the latter is broader

than a mere promotion of individual well-being and safety.43

Now we have already the answer to the question posed in the beginning of this

section: the further development of the different formations, made by the evolutionary process

– the solution of their eventual conflicts included – must be directed with respect to the

conservation of the afore mentioned ontological preconditions of human nature, i. e. we must

abstain from endangering these latter. But there is a great difference between the twenty

desires (which are biologically innate) and the products of the cultural evolution. The former

43
Cf. Z. Turgonyi, „La legge naturale ed il bene comune”, in Iustum, Aequum, Salutare 4 (2008), 4., pp
83-101.
are given, we can regulate the concrete way of their satisfaction, we can prefer one of these

desires to some other of them etc., but we cannot erase them (the biological evolution which

have made them, is so slow, that practically we can hold these desire to be anthropological

standards). Here we could be truly „conservative” even if we used this term in a procedural

sense, meaning that we must „conserve” all the existing formations. However, since we

accept a substantive value, the existence of human nature, we are substantive conservatives in

the sense used by us in the second section of our text. (Of course we are substantive

conservatives in relation to the Arnhartian desires, too, inasmuch as they have a function in

the maintenance of human nature.) But we have greater freedom in relation to the products of

the cultural evolution: the elements of tradition (i.e. the spiritual objectivations). They are less

fixed than the twenty desires, and their change is much faster than biological evolution. Still,

tradition as such always exists, and, as we have seen, it has an absolutely indispensable role in

the functioning of human nature. Since its content is a result of selection, the preponderant

part of it is verified by the mere fact that mankind still exists. (A successful practice, ensuring

the survival of mankind, would not be possible on the base of traditions containing

predominantly erroneous knowledge, morals contradicting natural desires etc.) That is why

there is a frequent illusion according to which the tradition in its entirety is a value in itself,

independently of its content, and it has to be followed in each case. This is also a kind of

procedural conservatism, and even a “perfect” one, if tradition is the only criterion. But it is

clear that this can easily be dysfunctional, from the point of view of our fundamental value

mentioned above (namely the continuous existence of human nature), when a tradition

contains something endangering the ontological preconditions of human nature in the long

run. This danger can be eliminated when we recognize the objective anthropological role of

tradition (the accumulation and conservation of spiritual objectivations promoting the

mentioned ontological preconditions) and the way it functions (the fortuitous – „trial-and-
error” – character of the process, resulting sometimes in dysfunctional cultural contents).

Knowing this we can be substantive conservatives: we conserve the real ontological

preconditions of our nature (while we eliminate the objectivations which are dangerous to it),

and for this sake we apply the mentioned rational control of evolution, using the most part of

tradition but not idolizing it. (But, we repeat, tradition as such is an eternal necessity for

mankind, so it can be seen as one of the best examples of an evolution-made formation which

is to be conserved.)

The two sets of evolution-based formations (i. e. the twenty desires and the contents of

tradition) are, however, in contact with one another. So those spiritual objectivations which

correspond to the fundamental desires (e. g. the institution of marriage), are more fixed, less

changeable than the others (and – not at all by chance – they are at the same time in a more

direct connection with the mentioned ontological preconditions of human nature). This means

that if we decide to defend the continuous existence of human nature, we have to represent –

as we have already said – a kind of substantive conservatism, the favored „substances” of

which are above all these institutions corresponding to the standard desires. Still we have to

ask the question (posed by Arnhart and his critics, too): „Is it sure that these desires are really

anthropological standards? Is not it possible that biotechnology can radically change them?”

Arnhart says: „biotechnology will be limited both in its technical means and its moral ends”. 44

Concerning the first part of his answer we have some doubts, because when he meets the great

expectations represented by partisans of biotechnological transformation of our nature, he

does not refute them by arguments, instead he says that these expectations are only

possibilities, the future realization of which is not sure. 45 This cannot convince us of the

impossibility of the transformations in question. However, on the second part of his answer

we can agree with him, since by it he means: „the motivation for biotechnological

44
Arnhart, op. cit., p. 131.
45
E. g. Arnhart, op. cit., p. 138.
manipulations will come from the same natural desires that have always characterized human

nature”.46

Here he is perfectly right. Although the twenty desires are historical products of a

spontaneous and fortuitous process, the recognition of this fact does not diminish their

motivational force, does not relativize them as real motives. Now they exist, they really are

our subjective motives, we identify ourselves with them (and even if we refused this

identification, this would be due to another subjective motivation, equally formed by an

historical process), briefly: we like to be motivated by them. So we – or at least the majority

of us – are also motivated to defend the existence of these desires, even by intervening

consciously in the evolutionary process which have made them by chance and perhaps in the

future would cancel them without our intervention. This is a real danger, since today exist

some people whose subjective motivations (which are also historical products in the same

manner as the twenty original desires) induce them to transform our biological properties. If

the twenty desires characterize really the great majority of mankind (and we believe it,

together with Arnhart), then we can reasonably hope that they survive, but this possibility will

be realized just by our conscientious intervention. In this case it is just the rational projecting

(the possibility of which is also a product of evolution) that plays the role of the conserving

factor. This can be a good example of the fact – strange for many conservatives – that

conservatism needs rational control of the evolutionary process.

Conclusions

In this paper we presented arguments for the statement that conservatism has its roots

in the generalized concept of evolution, therefore it has a universal meaning. Throughout the

history of the universe old constructs, like elementary particles, amino acids, cells and organs

remained essentially conserved – even if the world continuously evolved through their
46
Arnhart, op. cit., p. 132.
association. A similar process can be observed in cultural evolution, as basic components of

society and culture survive for long. Accordingly, the conservative approach has and will

always have a role in thinking, just like its opposite, perpetual progress, the belief that the

world can become better in terms of science, technology, modernization, liberty, democracy

and the quality of life, while continuously cancelling what is considered as outmoded.

Furthermore, the two approaches are not independent from one another: even the

“progressists” need the conservation of continued existence of human society, if they want to

do something at all, while rational innovations and projected transformations, too, are made

possible by an evolutionary process producing such human activities (later becoming

hereditary in biological and/or cultural sense) as conscious reflection on the originally

spontaneous cosmic history.