FLORESCA V PHILEX MINING

FACTS: It is alleged that prior to the accident, Philex failed to address safety concerns in the mining site.
Much water accumulated in an open pit area which caused pressure in the working shafts below. As a
result, said area collapsed. 21 were left to die due to Philex’s order to stop rescue mission.

Heirs of the 21 filed a civil complaint in CFI. Philex filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the accident
falls under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and thus outside of CFI jurisdiction. WCA provides
that (1) such work-connected deaths are within the jurisdiction of Workmen’s Compensation
Commission (WCC) and (2) if the employer is negligent, employer shall pay the compensation plus 50%
of same compensation. But in essence, the respondents invoke Section 5 of the WCA which states:
“Exclusive right to compensation — The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury.” Because the heirs have already
received compensation, they are no longer entitled to a damage suit.

The heirs of the deceased filed the present petition.

ISSUE: (1) Does CFI has jurisdiction? -Yes

(2) Whether the petitioners can only avail of WCA action or have a choice between WCA action and civil
damage in regular court or can avail of both WCA and civil damage? –Choose either one but not both.

HELD: Generally, petitioners must choose between a WCA action and civil suit. This is what the Section 5
of WCA provides and what has been applied in various court decisions. But the court decided to render
leeway to the petitioners given the peculiarity of the instances. Petitioners have already received
compensation under the WCA. Afterwards, they learned of the true cause of the accident which was
Philex’s negligence. And then they filed a civil suit. The court reasoned that had the petitioners learned
of the cause much sooner, petitioners would have filed for a civil suit instead. Petitioners’ initial resort to
WCA action, the court said, is based on ignorance or mistake of fact. Because petitioners were not
informed of the true cause, they had not the choice between a WCA and a civil suit. This then creates an
exception to Section 5 of WCA. Hence, court remanded the case to lower court for proper judgment. (1)
CFI now has jurisdiction because of the court’s making an exception of the case.

The limitation on the power of courts to construe, can be found within court’s discussion of the second
issue. The two dissenting opinions posit that a careful reading of Section 5 of WCA would demonstrate
that when a complainant has already availed of compensation via WCA, his/her right to sue in civil or
other courts are understood to have been extinguished. After passage of WCA, legislature had plenty of
occasion to modify relevant provision but did not do so. This, according to dissent, is manifest of
legislative’s continuing intent to retain the exclusivity provided therein. In the majority opinion’s
decision to allow petitioners to file case despite having received their WCA compensation, dissent
argues that the court has exercised a power outside of its capacities, i.e. that it has legislated.

To this, the majority opinion enunciates that it has not legislated. What it did was a mere
implementation of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Secs. 6, 7, and 9 of Art. II of 1973 Constitution
guarantees social justice, establishes adequate services in employment, and protects labor. With these
provisions, the present court only gave effect to the rights petitioners are entitled to. No legislation
occurred, because the principles are already present and need only be applied.