Crime and No Stating that the Uyghur issue is an “internal

matter,” China has consistently denied such al-

Punishment? legations as those above and has not provided
access to representatives of the United Nations
China’s Abuses (UN) to conduct an independent evaluation
of the situation.3 In the absence of official UN
Against the reports, independent media outlets and interna-
tional non-governmental organizations have re-
Uyghurs1 lied on testimonies, satellite images, and leaked
official Chinese government documents to raise
James Waller and Mariana Salazar global awareness of these ongoing crimes. By
Albornoz reviewing these available reports in light of the
applicable international legal standards, this pa-

T
he nominally autonomous region of
Xinjiang, located in northwestern
China, is home to about 11 million
Uyghurs, a mostly Muslim Turkic ethnic group
making up about 45 percent of the region’s
population. In recent years, the Chinese govern-
ment has escalated its repression of Uyghurs,
alleging that these communities hold extremist
and separatist views. Since 2017, numerous re-
ports have emerged, stating that more than one
million Uyghurs, as well as members from other
Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, have been
forcibly transferred to “re-education camps” and
subjected to arbitrary detention, forced birth
control and sterilization, religious restrictions,
sexual abuse, torture, family separation, and
forced labor, among other abuses.2
per argues that, because of their widespread and
systematic nature, at least five counts of crimes
against humanity—persecution, imprisonment,
torture, enslavement, and forced sterilization—
are being committed against the Uyghurs and
other Turkic Muslims. This paper also argues that
the state’s measures to sterilize Uyghur women
and reduce Uyghur birth rates signify an intent
to destroy the group, therefore constituting at
least one count of genocide—measures intended
to prevent births. International accountability
pathways are very limited, and the fear of eco-
nomic and political reprisal from China, due to
its transnational power, is the key deterrent to a
stronger response from the international com-
munity, one that is urgently needed to prevent a
further escalation of these atrocities.

James Waller is the Cohen Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Keene State College and Director of Academic
Programs for the Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities. He is the author of Becom-
ing Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing and Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility
to Prevent Genocide. His next book is titled A Troubled Sleep: Risk and Resilience in Contemporary Northern Ireland.
Waller is the 2017 recipient of the inaugural International Association of Genocide Scholars’ Engaged Scholarship Prize,
recognizing exemplary scholarship and engagement in genocide awareness and prevention.

Mariana Salazar Albornoz is a professor of public international law, international criminal law, and mass atrocity prevention
at Mexico City’s Universidad Iberoamericana. She is the Academic Programs Associate for Latin America and Interna-
tional Law at the Auschwitz Institute and is currently on both the Interamerican Juridical Committee of the Organization
of American States and on the Editorial Board of the International Review of the Red Cross. She has a J.D. from the
Universidad Iberoamericana and a master’s in International Law from Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International Stud-
ies. Salazar previously worked at Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she was Coordinator of Public International
Law and was Mexico’s Focal Point to the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention and to
the Global Network for Responsibility to Protect.

© 2 02 1 Walsh S c h ool of F ore i gn S e rvi c e SPR I N G 2 0 2 1 , VO L UM E 2 2 , N UM B ER 1   1 0 0

 CRIM E A ND NO P U NI SH M E N T ? C H I N A’ S AB USES AG AI N ST T H E UY G H UR S
Crimes against humanity
Developed since its first legal expression in 1945,
the concept of crimes against humanity has been
used in various international instruments and
national laws, and its scope has gradually broad-
ened.4 The most recent definition is contained in
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), adopted in 1998 and in force
since 2002. According to Article 7 of the statute,
eleven acts constitute crimes against humanity,
including persecution; imprisonment; torture;
enslavement; rape, enforced sterilization, and
other forms of sexual violence; and other similar
inhumane acts.5 While China is not a party to
the Rome Statute, the prohibition of crimes
against humanity is a peremptory norm of
general international law.6 This means that it is
binding upon all states.7
The contextual element of this crime, which
must be met in every case irrespective of which
specific act(s) is committed, is that these acts
must be part of a widespread (large-scale) or
systematic (organized) attack. It is disjunctive,
meaning that the acts do not have to be both
widespread and systematic but simply one or the
other. 8 It does not have to be a military attack:
it could be a campaign or an operation, but it
does need to be a “course of conduct” as a series
or overall flow of events, as opposed to a mere
aggregate of unrelated, random or isolated acts.9
The attack must be directed against a civilian
population as its primary target and not just an
incidental victim.10 The Rome Statute adds the
element, not required in the customary law defi-
nition, that the attack be committed “pursuant
to or in furtherance of a state or organizational
policy to commit such an attack,”11 a policy that
does not need to be formally adopted but may
be inferred.12
The repression against the Uyghurs and
other Turkic Muslims is both widespread and
systematic. Its widespread nature can be seen
in the large number of victims and targets in-
volved: over one million Uyghurs detained since
2017 in nearly four hundred “re-education”
or “counter-extremism” camps; an estimated
eighty thousand Uyghurs forcibly transferred to
factories for forced labor; and sixteen thousand
mosques destroyed in Xinjiang.13 The repres-
sion is also systematic due to the high degree
of organization involved, revealed both in the
official policies of and in their implementation
by the Chinese government. For example, the
2017 “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Regulation on De-extremification” orders de-
extremification efforts through a “leadership
responsibility system and an annual target evalu-
ation system” in each autonomous region, with
clearly-distributed responsibilities.14 It is un-
questionable that these efforts constitute an “at-
tack” as they are carried out through a course of
related, continuous conducts, directed primarily
against the civilian populations of Uyghurs and
other Turkic Muslims perceived by the state as
extremist risks. Moreover, the state’s policy to
commit such an attack can be inferred from the
scale of the discriminatory and violent measures
by the state apparatus and from the official
documents where China packages its heavy-
handed response as necessary to curb extremism
and separatist violence.15 In sum, having verified
the existence of each sub-element, it is valid to
conclude that the contextual element for a crime
against humanity is clearly met in this case.16
In sum, having verified the existence of
each sub-element, it is valid to conclude
that the contextual element for a crime
against humanity is clearly met in this
case.
As for the specific acts, accounts from the
region point toward the likelihood that at least
five specific counts of crimes against humanity
are being committed:
Persecution is the intentional deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law
by reason of the identity of the group and, under
customary law, with the intention to discrimi-
nate on political, social or religious grounds.17 It
is clear in the present case that there is a depriva-
tion of fundamental rights—religious, cultural,
and social, among others—which is being
carried out against Uyghurs and other Turkic
SPR I N G 2 0 2 1 , VO L UM E 2 2 , N UM B ER 1   101
James Waller and M ariana S ala zar A lborno z
Muslims as distinct ethnoreligious groups that
the Chinese government automatically and arbi-
trarily equates with suspicions of extremism and
separatism. In the detention camps, for instance,
Chinese officials force members of these groups
to learn Mandarin Chinese and nationalist dis-
courses, as well as to criticize or even renounce
their Muslim faith.18
Involuntary and arbitrary internment (prison-
ers are detained without having committed a
crime), contrary to what China alleges, is the
norm, constituting the act of imprisonment or
arbitrary deprivation of physical liberty without
legal basis and without due process of law, in
violation of international law.19
Accounts of physical and psychological torture
in the camps are common. One former prisoner
recounted: “They wouldn’t let me sleep, they
would hang me up for hours and would beat
me. They had thick wooden and rubber batons,
whips made from twisted wire, needles to pierce
the skin, pliers for pulling out the nails.”20 While
the lack of international access to the camps
makes verification of precise numbers of torture
victims impossible, interviews with former
camp inmates and their family members suggest
the use of physical and psychological torture is
widespread.21
The deployment of approximately eighty
thousand Uyghurs to factories around China
where they are subjected to forced labor and are
tracked by a vast and comprehensive network
of cutting-edge surveillance, including police,
checkpoints, and cameras about every 150 feet
that monitor people’s faces and daily routine
constitutes the crime against humanity of en-
slavement.22
There are numerous accounts of Uyghur
women being subjected to forced sterilization
through injections or intrusive birth preven-
tion surgeries received at the detention camps.23
There are also reports of systematic rape and
other forms of sexual violence committed by
Chinese officials against Uyghur women in such
camps.24
All these acts are being carried out as part of a
widespread and systematic attack. Thus, in light
of the available reports, it can be concluded that
the Chinese government is at least perpetrating
102  EDMUND A . WA L S H S CHO O L O F F O REI G N SE R VI C E AT G EO R G E T O WN UN I VER SI T Y
the crimes against humanity of persecution,
imprisonment, torture, enslavement, and forced
sterilization against Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims.
Genocide
The Genocide Convention, formally adopted by
the UN on December 9, 1948 and in force since
1951, includes nineteen concise articles.25 China
is a State Party to the Convention and therefore
is legally bound by it. The central defining article
of the Convention is Article II:
Genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or reli-
gious group, as such: (a) killing members of
the group, (b) causing serious bodily or men-
tal harm to members of the group, (c) de-
liberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part, (d) imposing
measures intended to prevent births within
the group, or (e) forcibly transferring chil-
dren of the group to another group.26
A genocide determination is supported when
any one of the five acts has been committed—
the material element or actus reus—with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group—the mental
element or mens rea. Both elements must be
proven in order to constitute a genocide. Re-
garding the material element, genocide means
“any” of the five listed acts of destruction—not
“most” and certainly not “all.”
Regarding the mental element, international
jurisprudence has clarified that “where direct
evidence of genocidal intent is absent, the intent
may still be inferred from the factual circum-
stances of the crime.”27 Moreover, the intent
must seek the physical or biological destruction
of all or part of the group.28 This means that an
enterprise attacking only the cultural, religious,
or sociological characteristics and symbols of a
group does not fall under the definition of geno-
cide; nonetheless, cultural or religious attacks
are often simultaneously present when there is
 CRIM E A ND NO P U NI SH M E N T ? C H I N A’ S AB USES AG AI N ST T H E UY G H UR S
a physical destruction of a group and, therefore,
have been recognized by international juris-
prudence as legitimate evidence of an intent of
such physical destruction.29 The group must be
one of the four protected identities—national,
ethnical, racial, or religious—to fall under the
definition of genocide. Lastly, the intent must
be to destroy the group “in whole or in part,”
an expression that has been interpreted to mean
a substantial part in quantitative or qualitative
terms, “even when the exterminatory intent only
extended to a limited geographic zone.”30
As a mostly Muslim Turkic group with its
own language, the Uyghurs clearly meet the
definitional criteria of an ethnic and religious
minority group that falls under the protection
of the Genocide Convention. To determine if
genocide is being committed against them, it is
necessary to evaluate if any of the five specific
material acts are being carried out and if this is
occurring with the intent to physically destroy
the group in whole or in part.
Some reports suggest that each of the five
acts constitutive of genocide may be occurring
in Xinjiang, based on allegations of killings,
bodily harm, overcrowding, and food and sleep
deprivation within the detention camps, and
the forcible separation of Uyghur children from
their parents to place the children in boarding
schools.31 Nonetheless, under the guise of trans-
formation or “re-education,” the requisite estab-
lishment of specific intent to physically destroy
the group is generally less clear at this time for
many of those acts, making the determination
of genocide under international law a difficult
bar to clear.
To date, the most compelling and credible
evidence for an act committed with specific
intent to physically destroy the Uyghurs, in
whole or in part, is the Chinese government’s
efforts to impose measures intended to prevent
births within the group. A July 2020 research
report, based on a systematic analysis of govern-
ment documents and statistics, confirmed the
existence of a “targeted campaign of promoting
‘free’ birth prevention surgeries and services in
southern Xinjiang’s rural minority regions start-
ing in 2019.”32 By that same year, the goal of
Xinjiang’s officials was “to subject at least 80
percent of women of childbearing age in the
rural southern four minority prefectures to
intrusive birth prevention surgeries (IUDs or
sterilizations).”33 In the southern rural part of
the region that makes up the Uyghur heartland,
that aim has been realized as “combined natural
population growth rates fell by 84 percent be-
tween 2015 and 2018,” and it is suspected (the
Chinese government no longer releases the data)
that these population growth rates declined even
further in 2019.34 Such measures are the culmi-
nation of years of concern by Chinese officials
about excessive minority population growth in
Xinjiang. Beijing depicted this growth, particu-
larly among the Uyghur population, as directly
linked to the alleged rise of religious extrem-
ism. Even with government-incentivized Han
Chinese settler colonialism helping to offset the
minority population growth, Beijing viewed
measures intending to prevent births within
minority groups—particularly the Uyghur—as
a necessary demographic corrective to prevent
terrorism and root out Islamic extremism.35
The well-documented campaign of sup-
pressing Uyghur births leaves no doubt that the
material element for the crime of genocide is
present in this case. As for the mental element,
direct evidence of China’s genocidal intent in
the targeted geographic zone of Xinjiang is clear
from its stated de-extremification policies that
aim to “resolutely cut off the black hands that
breed violent terrorists, and resolutely eliminate
the source of harm.”36 Genocidal intent may
also be inferred from the factual circumstances
involved in the forced sterilization and birth
prevention practices and in the plummeting of
birth rates among Uyghurs in that region. More-
over, the large-scale destruction of mosques by
the Chinese government seeks to erase and
alter key elements of Uyghurs’ tangible cultural
heritage. Applying the above-mentioned criteria
The well-documented campaign of
suppressing Uyghur births leaves no
doubt that the material element for the
crime of genocide is present in this case.
SPR I N G 2 0 2 1 , VO L UM E 2 2 , N UM B ER 1   103
James Waller and M ariana S ala zar A lborno z
set forth by international jurisprudence, these
destructions, as part of a forced assimilation that
eventually will lead to the erasure of the group’s
cultural traits, may also legitimately be con-
sidered as evidence of the intent to physically
destroy the Uyghur group.37
The concentration of measures in the spe-
cific geographical zone of the Xinjiang region
complies with the interpretation of the intent to
destroy a group “in whole or in part.” In sum,
both the material and mental elements for a
determination of genocide are in evidence, as
revealed in the intent to destroy the Uyghur
group, in whole or in part, through a well-
documented campaign of suppressing Uyghur
births in Xinjiang.
Legal and political
consequences
The legal and political consequences that arise
from categorizing a situation as a crime against
humanity or a genocide are significant. They
are essential to the responsibility to protect
(R2P), which reaffirms states’ responsibility to
protect their population from these crimes, to
encourage and help each other do so, and to
take timely and decisive collective action in ac-
cordance with the UN Charter when national
authorities manifestly fail to do so.38 The com-
mission of these crimes triggers not only the
international legal responsibility of the state but
also the international criminal responsibility of
the individual perpetrators involved. China and
its agents should be held legally accountable for
the crimes against humanity and genocide the
are committing in Xinjiang; however, the legal
pathways to achieve this objective are blocked.
A) International legal accountability
options
Besides from its obligation under the peremp-
tory norm of international law that prohibits
crimes against humanity, China is a party to
several international human rights treaties
obligating it to guarantee Uyghurs’ freedom of
religion, freedom of opinion and expression,
and their freedom of movement, as well as their
104  EDMUND A . WA L S H S CHO O L O F F O REI G N SE R VI C E AT G EO R G E T O WN UN I VER SI T Y
right to marriage and choice of spouse, to freely
choose employment, and to not be subjected to
bodily harm or torture or other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment.39 As mentioned, it is
also a party to the Genocide Convention and
is therefore obligated to not commit genocide
as well as to prevent and to punish the crime of
genocide in its territory.
Despite its obvious violations under those
instruments, China has not accepted the ju-
risdiction of the ICJ over inter-state disputes
arising under such treaties. This stance obstructs
the only jurisdictional avenue available in the in-
ternational sphere to determine China’s state re-
sponsibility for such acts. In the highly unlikely
scenario that China were to agree to the ICJ’s
jurisdiction, a useful precedent is unfolding with
the ongoing case before the ICJ where Gambia
alleges that Myanmar has violated its obligations
under the Genocide Convention regarding its
treatment of the Rohingya.40
The path to individual criminal accountabil-
ity for crimes against humanity and genocide
against the Uyghurs is similarly hindered. As
mentioned, China is not a party to the Rome
Statute of the ICC, meaning that the only way
to submit crimes committed in Chinese terri-
tory to the ICC would be through referral by the
UN Security Council (UNSC).41 China’s veto
power as a permanent member of the UNSC
makes this scenario improbable.
In an attempt to overcome these obstacles,
on July 6, 2020, a legal team representing two
Uyghur activist groups filed a communication
before the ICC.42 It called for an investigation
of senior Chinese officials, including President
Xi Jinping, for crimes against humanity and
genocide against the Uyghur and other Turkic
peoples on the basis that a number of victims
were unlawfully deported to Xinjiang from Ta-
jikistan and Cambodia, which are, unlike China,
States Parties to the Rome Statute. The claim
relied on the legal precedent set by the ICC de-
cisions in 2018 and 2019 in the Rohingya case,
where it affirmed jurisdiction because part of
the criminal conduct took place in Bangladesh,
a State Party to the Rome Statute, despite the
fact that Myanmar is not a State Party to such
instrument. However, on December 14, 2020
 CRIM E A ND NO P U NI SH M E N T ? C H I N A’ S AB USES AG AI N ST T H E UY G H UR S
the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor reported its
determination that there is no basis to proceed
with the claim, because (i) it appears that most
of the alleged crimes occurred exclusively within
China and (ii) the deportations from Tajikistan
and Cambodia do not appear to fulfil the mate-
rial elements of the crime against humanity of
deportation. The senders have communicated to
the ICC a request for reconsideration based on
new evidence.43
Adding to these efforts, and at the request
of the World Uyghur Congress, a British hu-
man rights lawyer is convening an independent
“tribunal” of experts in London to investigate
whether the Chinese abuses against the Uyghurs
constitute crimes against humanity or geno-
cide.44 While the tribunal is not government-
backed and its findings—expected by the end of
2021—will not be binding, it is likely to increase
awareness of the crisis and to exert pressure on
some governments to take measures to persuade
China to desist from its abuses.
B) International political responses
Faced with these legal limitations, the marshal-
ing of political will is a key piece in international
responses to China’s repression of the Uyghurs
in Xinjiang. States have an international obli-
gation under the R2P principle to respond to
China’s crimes against the Uyghurs, and it is in
every country’s interest to do so. In the absence
of strong international responses to these human
rights abuses, China, as well as other authori-
tarian regimes around the world, will see tacit
permission for such behavior. Silence will speak
volumes to those committing, or considering
committing, these types of crimes. The surveil-
lance technology implemented by China in
Xinjiang will likely be deployed nationally and
even exported to other authoritarian regimes
bent on segmenting and repressing their civilian
population. Under R2P’s second pillar, China’s
veto power in the UNSC does not negate the
international community’s requirement (includ-
ing that of the UN, regional organizations,
governments, and civil society) to assist states in
fulfilling their obligations to protect all popula-
tions within their borders from mass atrocities.
Notwithstanding these compelling interests
and responsibilities, the international response
has been disturbingly muted. Within the UN,
China’s veto power on the UNSC and its alli-
ances have deterred any attempt of adopting a
resolution on the Uyghur matter. Reactions have
been limited to statements within the HRC and
the General Assembly, and even those have come
from a limited number of countries as most have
preferred to stay silent in fear of economic and
political reprisals from China. The most recent
of these, on October 6, 2020, was delivered by
Germany on behalf of a cross-regional group of
39 UN Member States expressing grave concern
about the “increasing number of reports of
gross human rights violations” and demanding
“immediate, meaningful and unfettered access
to Xinjiang for independent observers.” 45 In
counter-response, some 45 countries, including
authoritarian regimes such as Iran, Myanmar,
Pakistan, Syria, Russia, and Venezuela, signed
on to a joint statement that Cuba delivered,
supporting China’s assertion that its activities
in Xinjiang were legitimate counter-terrorism
efforts and praising Beijing for its openness and
transparency.46
As for UN human rights mechanisms, the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination has expressed concern and made
recommendations regarding arbitrary deten-
tions. On June 26, 2020, a group of fifty UN
independent experts urged the Human Rights
Council (HRC) to establish an impartial and
independent UN mechanism to closely moni-
tor, analyze, and report annually on the human
rights situation in China. They also called upon
states and UN agencies to demand China’s ful-
filment of its human rights obligations in their
dialogues and exchanges with China.47
Such expressions of concern, however, were
not enough to prevent China’s election on
October 13, 2020 as a member of the HRC
for the period of 2021–2023. China obtained
vast support via 139 votes, despite the fact that
HRC membership entails upholding “the high-
est standards in the promotion and protection of
human rights.”48
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James Waller and M ariana S ala zar A lborno z
Due to the multilateral shortcomings in
international fora, unilateral actions—belatedly
implemented and slow-moving—have proven
to be the default response. On June 17, 2020,
former US President Donald Trump signed
into law the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act
of 2020. The act is meant to hold accountable
perpetrators intent on eradicating “the ethnic
identity and religious beliefs of Uyghurs and
other minorities in China.”49 The following
month, the United States imposed economic
and visa-based sanctions, under the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
passed by the US Congress in 2016, on four
Chinese officials and one government entity re-
sponsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang.50
In September 2020, addressing the growing use
of forced labor in global supply chains, the US
House of Representatives passed the Uyghur
Forced Labor Disclosure Act and the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act. On January 13,
2021, the Trump administration announced a
ban on imports of cotton and tomatoes from
Xinjiang, as well as all products made with
those materials. The Trump administration’s
final action, issued on January 19, 2021, was a
State Department declaration that the Chinese
government “has committed crimes against
humanity [and] genocide against the predomi-
nantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and
religious minority groups in Xinjiang.”51 While
the State Department’s determination does not
carry any immediate consequences, the Biden
administration – based on an August 2020
campaign statement condemning China’s ac-
tions as “genocide” – will likely push Congress
for tougher legislation against the repression of
the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.52 Though such actions
will escalate the already heightened tensions be-
tween the United States and China, they would
be strong signals of support for international law
and human rights.
Conclusion: need for a stronger
international response
The responses by the international community
to China’s crimes have been disappointingly lim-
106  EDMUND A . WA L S H S CHO O L O F F O REI G N SE R VI C E AT G EO R G E T O WN UN I VER SI T Y
The responses by the international
community to China’s crimes have been
disappointingly limited both in scope
and creativity.
ited both in scope and creativity. There is a wide
range of preventive response tools that can be
used to slow, restrict, or stop the continuation
or escalation of crimes against humanity or
genocide. These include cooperative and coer-
cive legal responses (for instance, continuing
references to applicable international law, calls
for human rights investigations, or the exercise
of universal jurisdiction); political responses
(for instance, diplomatic legitimization and
recognition benefits, the threat of political or
diplomatic sanctions, sporting or cultural boy-
cotts); economic responses (for instance, debt
relief, financial sanctions, or divestment); and
military responses (for instance, confidence and
security-building measures, heightened military
presence in the region, or credible threat of
military force).53 The selection and application
of these preventive response tools—some blunt
and others more precise—work best as part of
a flexible interdependent strategy with underly-
ing principles, rather than as a pick-and-choose
application of isolated tools in a haphazard trial-
and-error approach. That is, the response tools
themselves are not policy, but, rather, they are
instruments of policy.
Standing up to China’s crimes against Xin-
jiang’s Uyghurs will carry considerable costs,
given China’s transnational economic and po-
litical influence. Despite those costs, more states
must embrace their R2P-related duties and exert
pressure over the Chinese government with the
Standing up to China’s crimes
against Xinjiang’s Uyghurs will carry
considerable costs, given China’s
transnational economic and political
influence.
 CRIM E A ND NO P U NI SH M E N T ? C H I N A’ S AB USES AG AI N ST T H E UY G H UR S
wide and diverse range of response tools avail-
able. Protection of civilians and prevention of
mass atrocity crimes need not wait until specific
legal criteria have been proven to be met. Inter-
national organizations, human rights mecha-
nisms, NGOs, and free and independent media
must continue to meticulously track, document,
and expose violations of international law being
committed in Xinjiang. Doing so will pres-
sure the ICC to stop dodging its jurisdictional
responsibility to investigate China’s actions in
Xinjiang. Companies must refuse to collude
with businesses profiting from forced labor in
Xinjiang and states must impose trade restric-
tions on goods derived from that region. The
Biden administration should double down on
the previous administration’s economic sanc-
tions, increasing the costs of China’s continuing
crimes in Xinjiang. Governments must provide
asylum to Uyghurs as well as members from
other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang
seeking to flee persecution. The International
Olympic Committee must move the 2022
Olympic games out of China to a host country
that is more respectful of international human
rights law.
While several of these response tools are
more easily deployed by law and policymakers,
academics and global civil society play a crucial
role as catalysts for the international community
and states to assume their preventive responsi-
bilities in the face of crimes against humanity
and genocide. While many of us may not be in
a position to make decisions about the usage of
these response tools, all of us are able to voice
the necessity of their implementation.
Notes
1. This article made use of information and
source material available up until February 19,
2021. Events after that date are not reflected
in this piece.
2. “The Chinese Communist Party’s Human
Rights Abuses in Xinjiang,” U.S. Depart-
ment of State, accessed November 13, 2020,
https://2017-2021.state.gov/ccpabuses//in-
dex.html.
3. “More Secrets of China’s Xinjiang Camps
Leaked to Foreign Media,” Reuters, Novem-
ber 25, 2019, accessed November 10, 2020,
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