Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Patronage Democracy

    Uploaded by

    Chelsea Nudalo
    127 views24 pages

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    127 views24 pages

    Patronage Democracy

    Uploaded by

    Chelsea Nudalo

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    of 24
    INTRODUCTION DISSECTING PATRONAGE DENIOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES JULIO C. TEEHANKEE he 9 May 2016 general elections in the Philippines saw the me- T teoric rise of Rodrigo R. Duterte to the presidency. His victory marked the first time in the country’s history that a city mayor captured the highest national office of the land. He was also the first president elected from the southern island of Mindanao.' As he bested other candidates who boasted national political credentials, the success of Duterte signified the emergence of “local power as national authority” (Abinales 2016, 1). While Manila’s elite and most Western observers find his behavior unusually coarse, embedded observers of Philippine local politics agree that Duterte simply nationalized the local way of doing politics, which includes the entire repertoire of coercion, vulgarity, and personalized patronage (Abinales 2017). ‘The cultivation and distribution of patronage have been an enduring feature of Philippine local politics. Its durability is built upon intricate networks of political clans, clientelistic ties, and political machines throughout the archipelago. Consequently, the term “patronage democ racy" is now used generally to describe democracies in which “parties and candidates primarily rely on contingent distribution of material benefits, or patronage, when mobilizing voters” (Berenschot and Aspinall 2020, 1). TEEHAMKEE refers to ‘a divisible benefit that politicians distribute to campaign workers, oF contributors in exchange {or hhefier 1994, 283). It is different from corruption since hange public benefits for private monetary gains, cara other hand, patronage involves the exchange of public benefits for political support or party advantage (Shefter 1994). While offen used interchangeably, patronage should also be distin clientelism. Paul Hutchcroft (2014, 176-77) clarifies that patronage refers to a material resource, while clientelism pertains to the Jersinalitic relationship of power. The former is disbursed for particulars tic political purposes and generally (but not always) derived from public sources. At the same time, the latter is the face-to-face and enduring ties of reciprocity between persons of higher social status (patrons) and those of lower social status (clients). He adds, “[n)ot all patronage involves cli tentelism, as some patronage flows are impersonal and others are person al. And not all clientelism involves patronage, as the exchange of goods and services... may or may not involve the ‘exchange of public benefits «Indeed, the classic clientelistic tie, between landlords and tenants, can exist largely outside the state” (177). Mark Thompson (2013, 4), however, sets aside “the linguistic overlap of the two terms (what do patrons do if, not distribute patronage?),” and asserts that “government patronage is the keystone of the clientelist system. Political patrons are exchanging ‘their’ clientelist voting networks for something which can be nothing other than governmental patronage (by an incumbent) or promised patronage (by a candidate).” James Scott (1972, 92) outlined the parameters between patrons and clients as an exchange relationship “in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patrons) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.” Thus, “clientelism is no lon- ger defined as a relationship between patrons and clients but rather as a particular type of exchange. Specifically, most scholars now see political Clientelism as the practice of exchanging a targeted, non-policy based and contingent provision of material benefits (money, jobs, public services, government contracts, etc.) for political support (such as votes, campaign Patronag individual voters. political support” (S corrupt politicians excl guished from DISSECTING PATROWAGE DEMOCRACY IM THE PHILIPPINES funding and other forms of campaign support)” (Berenschot and Aspinall 2020, 3-4). In the past, the personalistic nature of patron-client linkages was tra ditionally forged within rural and peasant-based economies. With the ad. vancement of capitalist forces, urbanization, and state expansion, conse quent transformations have been manifested at the local level. With these socalled “forces of modernization,” it was generally believed that patron- age practices would decline and be replaced by more modern “democrat- ic’ institutions such as political parties (Rocamora 1995). Nevertheless, the opposite has been exact, despite the changes that would have ended patronage politics. The political system is still choked by political oppor tunism and particularistic interests, as evidenced by the proliferation of political dynasties What accounts forthe resilience of patronage politics in the Philippines? The following sections will review the significant explana- tions presented by the literature on local politics in the Philippines and will offer an assessment of the continuing relevance of understanding pa- tronage politics in addressing the challenges of democratic consolidation and development in the country, ENDURANCE OF PATRONAGE Carl H. Landé (1965) was the first to sketch an idealized traditional ver sion of rural patronage politics in the Philippines. In his classic work Lead- rs, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Landé described a network of mutual aid relationships between pairs of individuals that anthropologists called “dyadic ties." The dyadic ties that are reflected in Philippine politics were vertical and unequal, which bound prosperous patrons who dispensed material goods and services and dependent clients who reciprocated with their support and loyalty (see figure 0.1 on page 4). These “patron-client” relationships} formed the basis of local faction- alism that constituted the organizational base of national parties (see ara prenatal law two-party system was anchored on the dom inance of only two factions in local areas, which allowed for only two national parties. Landé (1965, 1-2) noted that the political parties in the 3 TEEHANKEE philippines could not be compared to those found in Wester deme cies. He argued: ihe) Philippine polity, unlike those of most present-day Western democracies, is structured less by organized interest groups or by indi viduals who in politics think of themselves as members of categories, tec work of mutual aid relationships between pairs of individuals... To a large f distinctive social classes or occupations, than by a ne extent the dyadic ties with significance for Philippine politics are ver. tical ones, ie. bonds between prosperous patrons and their poor and dependent clients. Hence, the relationship was primarily anchored on traditional cultural values of reciprocity, or utang na loob. Jean Grossholtz (1964) attributed this to the “bargaining culture” rooted in strong kinship ties. Similarly, Remigio Agpalo (1972) traced this personalistic orientation to the cultural values of organic hierarchy and familism, which predominated Philip- pine provincial politics at that time. Their views, however, tend to reify, if Resources Poiticalloyaity ‘CONSENSUS FIGURE O.1. The patron-cli DISSECTING P RONAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES (ee - | ae s \ ® \ @®eee@ FIGURE 0.2 Patronclient factions Client not valorize, reciprocity, smooth interpersonal relationships, kinship, and fictive kinship bonds. Benedict T. Kerkvliet (1974, 401) raised the most pointed criticism against this conception of patronage: “it minimizes, even dismisses val: ues and ideas, bases for organization and cooperation, and cleavages and frictions except those of a personal, familial, patron-client nature... other values, ideas, organizations, and conflicts are marginalized and deemed unimportant.” Other explanations have since been proffered as alterna tives to the patron-client factional framework originally presented by Landé, RISE OF THE MACHINES ‘The potency of the kinship system as an instrument of patronage was ptt marily believed to have diminished and been replaced by the emergence of the political machine. The onslaught of economic coats and modernity has largely depersonalized patron relations in the raral areas. Thus, the reciprocal relationship between leader and followers has become transactional or contractual (see figure 0.3 on page 6), Political TEEHANKEE Short-term ‘material Votes Benes ‘CONTRACTUAL FIGURE 0.3 The political machine machines are specialized organizations set up to mobilize and influence voter outcomes through the dispensation of social, economic, or material benefits. These benefits are mostly patronage in the form of jobs, services, favors, and money distributed to voters and supporters (Machado 1974; Nowak and Snyder 1974; Wolters 1984). Kit G. Machado (1974) traced the emergence of the political machine in the Philippines to three interrelated changes in the traditional pattern of local leadership recruitment and factional organization beginning in the 1950s. First, “new men’ from small farming, fishing, and business families and other humbler roots slowly replaced the traditional notables from landowning families in positions of leadership. Second was the emergence of professional politicians who treated leadership as a special- ized political activity and career. Third was the transformation of local factions into specialized political machines. Accompanying these chang- 5 was the decline of local considerations in the local factional character and political action and the increase in the importance of provincial and national concerns due to the machine's growing reliance on resources Provided by politicians in higher arenas in exchange for votes. pugsEOTING PATROWAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPiQgg political machines may be organized within or outside political pay ses fartes that adopt a patronage strategy and rely heavily upon the dis. tribution of patronage to mobilize support may or may not be extensively organized and highly centralized (Shefter 1994), Moreover, political ma Shines do not need dyadic personal relationships since they are based on Short-term, materialistic benefits (Kawanaka 1998), For Francisco Magno {1991 the rise of political machines as the primary expression of patron- {ge politics was a result ofthe breakdown ofthe reciprocal and interper sonal system of exchange, which was further facilitated by the rise of new social forces (eg., the working class, the urban poor, and the middle class) that could not be subsumed solely within narrow patron-client loyalties. Masataka Kimura (1997) concluded that elite-dominated factions and their bifurcated inter-familial rivalries had been replaced by local political machines geared toward multifactionalism, characterized by the alliance of factions into temporary blocs. This trend was reinforced by the break- down of the two-party system during the authoritarian period under the Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos (1972-1986) and the emergence ofa ‘multiparty system in the postauthoritarian period. ‘Allen Hicken et al. (2019) in Electoral Dynamics in the Philippines: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots reaffirm the continuing utility of the local political machine by asserting that it is the “founda tional building block” of Philippine patronage that is constructed to support the political ambitions of individual politicians or political clans. Local machines emerge from a combination of clientelist (including familial) ties and short-term instrumentalist arrangements. This durable “clientelist instrumentalist” combination, coupled with the centrality of family and clans, provides organizational stability to local electoral con- tests not found in the weak national political parties that these machines temporarily align with from one presidential administration to another. Moreover, this combination also determines the machine's upward alli- ances at the national level, its downward alliances with lower-level posi tions Ge, city or municipal councilors) and, eventually, its relationship with the voters, The local-national linkage of these political machines ‘underscores the reality that patronage politics cannot be fully understood without taking into account the critical role of the statein the explication of Philippine politics. TEEHANKEE ENTER THE BROKERS — or mtronctient ties emerged from the gradual erosion of forms Orn of traditional landowners inthe Philippine, M eropng societies: While democracy creates space for rep as in mos countability, it also provides incentives for nurturing resentation and ace 2009). The emergence of the berg ds of clientelistic bonds (Seware! sone for example, resulted from the increased linkages between what 7 fonmerly been relatively isolated commu es ruled by one or more pa itonal landowners and the outside world (Archer 1990). The broker timerged a a mediator between patron and client, especially, when the patron has many clients” (Muno 2010, 3). Thus, the personal ties between patron and client have diminished and the dyad is transformed into a error even more complex relations, even though dyadic relationships rae ibe atthe core ofthe clientelistic exchanges that occur between patrons, brokers and clients. In essence, the brokers the client of a patron Ped performs the role of patron to lower tered clients by distributing re Sources from the upper-tiered patron (Muno 2010). Brokers serve as “intermediaries on whom parties rely to target and distribute inducements while monitoring voter participation” (Szware- berg 2009, 2). They are generally tasked with targeting potential voters, mobilizing them for local political rallies, and getting them out to vote or not to vote) through whatever means possible. ‘The crucial role of the broker in the organization and sustenance of clientelistic networks in Philippine local politics remains relatively unex- plored by scholars and academics. Except for some accounts by investiga- tive journalists, not much has been written about the growing influence of political brokers. Unlike in Latin America (eg, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia) and other countries in Southeast Asia (e.g, Indonesia, Malay- sia, and Thailand), not much has been written about political brokers— more popularly known as political operators—in contemporary Philippine politics (see figure 0.4 on opposite page). A political operator is usually tasked with carrying out both legiti- ‘mate and illegitimate “special operations” for political campaigns. In local political parlance, a political operator is “a politically oriented person ca pable of linking up with local leadership” (Tordesillas 1998, 76). In recent New f social and economi pisSECTING PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES en t t t oo secormarsan EMME seaman HRM HAE ot won MERAH HAH FIGURE 0.4 Brokerage structure in the Philippines (Hicken etal. 2019) years, three types of political operators have emerged in the Philippine political scene: 1) the fiscal brokers; 2) the insiders; and 3) former comm nistactivist organizers. However, these categories are not clear-cut and may often overlap with one another. They also operate on different levels or tiers of national and local government. ‘The “fiscal brokers” are upper-tier operators (usually nationally elect: ed politicians or their brokers strategically appointed to key positions in the bureaucracy) who presume a “mandate to speak on behalf of their home province and, toa lesser extent, the region [that] could be leveraged to reinforce their national influence” (De Dios 2007, 174). Often, fiscal brokers are also patrons to smaller groups of cients. They are akin to the traditional regional brokers who were often used to expand the control of the central government and to increase its political integration (Kettering 8 TEENANKEE 1988), In the past, a quintessential example of a successful fiscal broker was Sergio Osmeita ST. ‘of Cebu, who parlayed hi role peices Speaker during American colonial rule and second President of the Common. ‘wealth to earn a reputation for delivering central government funding jnto his province and region in the form of infrastructure projects. Os rena St. was not from the traditional landed class, nor was he involved in Warlord violence predominant in those days. The clan he founded instead + “delivering the goods” to their regional, pro tivated a reputation fo s vind i (Mojares 1994; De Dios 2007).* viincial, and city constituents (Mojare ay insiders” are upper to middle-tier operators who have spent ‘of their professional careers in national and/or local gov ‘ernment agencies. Their stint in government has enabled them to form important networks within and outside the bureaucracy, which enables rare offer their services to prospective clients such as local candidates and aspiring national politicians. The Marcos-era Ministry of Local Gov- Minister Jose Rofio, produced an im- ernments, for example, under then pressive network of master strategists who would make names for them- Prives long after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. They include Ronaldo Puno, key strategist inthe electoral victory of three presidents (Fidel Ra ‘mos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo), and Gabriel Claudio, political affairs adviser to two presidents (Ramos and Arroyo) (Ronquillo 2009). Virgilio Garcillano of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is another perfect example of an insider political operator, Garcillano's wire: tapped conversations with Macapagal-Arroyo on cheating in the 2004 presidential elections triggered a full-blown crisis of legitimacy in 2005 (Coronel 2005) Finally, the “former communist-activist organizers” can be considered low-tier operatives since they conduct their activities exclusively at the local level. They are former members of the underground Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) who have left the revolutionary movement and have become political operators. Given their unique skills in polit ical organizing in communities, they have become a key component in national and local campaign organizations throughout the country. A number of former revolutionaries, for example, formed the grassroots campaign machinery that catapulted former actor Joseph Estrada to the presidency in 1998. Most of these former revolutionaries left or were a large part OISSECTING PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES forced to leave the party during the intense ideological conflict that split the CPP into several factions. Pragmatism has pushed them to offer their services to politicians in order to earn a living, The organizing skills they have honed through years of mobilizing people are put to good use through rallies, motorcades, house-to-house campaigns, and other elec tion campaign activities. In effect, the former leftists “have an edge in the sense that they represent a hybrid of conventional election campaigns and guerilla tactics” (Rimban 2004, 20). In addition, they have established an informal network around the country, which they can easily tap into for their campaign activities PATRONAGE AND THE STATE Looking at European cases, Martin Shefter (1994) avoided a sociocultur- al approach to patronage. He argued that a party's decision to pursue or eschew a patronage-based strategy largely depends on the sequence and timing of two events: the formation of a constituency for bureau- cratic autonomy and the mobilization of a mass electorate. In societies where “internally mobilized” or “insider” parties develop before the establishment of a professional bureaucracy, there are more significant ‘opportunities to raid the public coffers to distribute patronage goods to supporters. Applying Shefter’s “critical experience approach’ to the Philippine case brings back the role of state structures and institutions in shaping political contestation, capital accumulation, and societal relations. The introduction of political parties and elections as institutional mecha- nisms for selecting representatives to the legislature created an avenue for fostering national linkages among local political clans in the country. The establishment of the Philippine Assembly, the precursor of the Philippine Congress, in 1907 paved the way for local politicians to aspire for national power (Anderson 1988). With the use of local bailiwick support, the local political clans were able to entrench themselves in the legislature and ac- cess the much-coveted pork-barrel funds. Pork:barreling was the first sig- nificant method of providing state patronage in the Philippines. Through credit claiming and political machine building, a Filipino politician can translate pork barrel into political advantage leading to reelection (Ka- TEEWANKEE ex this type of patronage can also be dispensed wi resting ptronctientelatonshis (Weer 1984) \ re veakening of personal ties between patron and client hy, ag the resources of competing factions of the elite, This de een the expansion of the role ofthe state a8 a chief source g ee its control of capital resources that can be used fo foal development projects the sate assumes 2 cri role in setting the parameters for factional competition in local pis (Sidel 1989) Under this institutional setup, the Philippine president as been rendered enough constitutional powers to have a formal semblance of a “strong presidency” albeit within a “weak state” (Teehankee 2016) With tremen lous powers over the budget, the president has emerged as a “patron i, chief" but was ironically reduced to a dispenser of patronage goods to clientelistic networks to maintain power (Thompson 2014). State centric accounts of Philippine politics tend to explain why it is institutionally weak rather than portraying it as strong in its capacity “to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate and use resources in determined ways” (Migdal 1988, 158). The weakness of the state is attributed to its lack of “relative autonomy” from dominant sectors of society (see figure 0.5 on opposite page). From this perspective, the Philippine state is characterized as being “captured,” instead of being “autonomously embedded,” in competing and diverse so. cial interests, since it enjoys little autonomy from dominant social clases, Political clans, powerful families, and other entrenched particularisic groups (Rivera 1994), Similar to the “patron-client factional” framework of the 1960s, the “weak state” thesis became “an analytical framework that numerous scholars have—knowingly or otherwise—relied upon andlor reproduced in their study of sub-national politics in many parts of the world” Sidel 2004, 52). fie Paige Mental aplication ofthe “weak state" framework tothe yan From gPeltes was seen inthe groundbreaking volume Alea ncecy lls Satan Family in the Pippnes (199), edited by insets int he notin of wea state provided more indepth problems plaguing eee, Coane soca pole and economic also raised some inerennnnt became a theoretical straw man It has 18 questions: If the Philippine state is weak, suya 2009). Howev' hou e DISSECTING PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES FIGURE O.5 The weakstate what would a strong state look like? What segments of society are repre- sented by the current “weak” state? Ifa state avoids doing the things that are inimical to the elite, is it necessarily weak? If the goal is to protect the interests of the top percentage of Philippine families, then has the state been quite strong? Ifa dominant class is strong enough to keep the state weak,” why is it not strong enough to take over the state entirely, utilize it against other classes, and in the process turn it into a “strong” state? Does a strong state mean a weak civil society (Hawes 1994; Rocamora 1995)? Attempts to address these puzzles have resulted in the emergence of alternative explanations to the durability of patronage politics in the Philippines. The next section will further discuss these explanations. CLANS AND DYNASTIES ‘A combination of weak central bureaucracy and strong local autonomy has contributed to the capture and weakening of state autonomy by com- peting and diverse social interests that include dominant social classes, 8 Es TEEHANKEE werful families, and other entrenched Partial se groups have managed to perpetuate themselves iD Poe, ical dynasties that constantly negotiate pon exchanges with the national political peat through the Presiden ee ne Through credit claiming and political machine building atin pl an can translate pork barrel into an incumbency adyay g toreelection. meee salle asserted that “clans, not parties, have been the building blocks of politics” in the Philippines (Teehankee 2018, 87). ny Fical machines, in turn, are the main organizational expression of cay politics. Kinship networks, for example, serve 10 consolidate wealth ang poise, and provide the base fr the establishment of a political machine, Beyond the utilization of personal wealth, access to state resources seryes san additional means of mobilizing electoral support through political jnachines. When the machine functions properly, there is no need to utilize coercion or violence. A combination of adaptive strategies has enabled political clans to maintain their dominance in congressional and political clans Ps ps. The: groups. T by building local pol local politics It has been observed that most accounts of Filipino politics point to the intense political competition among rival political families, and the transfer of power between members of a family. In the absence of clear socio-economic cleavages and the weakness of the state, the family per sists as a primary unit of political organization in the Philippines. The core group of the kinship system is the angkan (clan), which is composed of a group of related families from which descent is traced. On the other hand, the circle of effective or potentially effective relatives is known col: lectively and popularly as magkakamag-anak. The known and cooperative relatives or personal kindred are known as kamag-anak (see figure 0.6 on opposite page). However, the composition of personal kindred is amor Phous. The membership of the personal kindred is comprised of known and cooperative kin who are in continuous flux. Thus, the group of kins- men or personal kindred is not static (Jocano 1998). a ee : 7 iy as political unit, more than the individ: are ies iat it has a permanent identity as a named unit Sires fom member ae fePttation loyalties, and alliances to other ela ie or retire, Also, being born to a political fami- " DISSECTING PATROWAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES FIGURE 0.8 Filipinoclan structure (Jocano 1998) ly provides an environment for role models and apprenticeship, as well as, identification with a prestigious family name. The family also brings with ita builtin political organization of full-time, unpaid, and loyal staff mo- tivated by family honor. In addition, the variety of talents, background, and network within a family gives rise to division and specialization of political tasks (Fegan 1994), Despite extensive formal experience in a western-style liberal democ- racy since 1946, and re-democratization in 1986, political clans and dynas- ties continue to play an active role in Philippine politics. Hence, political clans that have managed to maintain power through generations have come to be known as “political dynasties" (Gutierrez et al. 1992). Most dy- nasties have survived through three colonial regimes and five republics. The political dynasty is a testimony to the Filipino politicians’ effective transformation of electoral and public office into family assets (McCoy 1994). TEEHANKEE 9 Il, for example, served three terms atthe Benigno era 1998 to 2007, was elected to the Senate ne of Reps von the presidency in 2010. His clan has the distin 2d aay evcin Philippine politics for more than a hundred yey having been ac Aquinos have represented the province of Tage : Bere nationsof the Philippine legislature. The grand pty saree Servillano: Aquino, was a landowner and a general in the revo ae ‘mand was a representative in the country’s first leisy gainst Spail ato falolos Congress of 1898 (Coronel et al, 2004), body—the Mal a SA poli dynasty can be defined as a “family that has successful retained political power through maintaining control over at leas on Three position over successive generations” (Albert et al. 2015, 1) salt perpetation of political dynasties can be attributed to incumbency advantage. Querubin (2016) presented evidence ofa dynastic incumbency vantage: incumbent congressmen and governors are five times more likely to have a relative serve in these offices in the future compared to individuals who barely lose and do not serve. The study also asserted that de jure political power or control of elected office is a key determinant of electoral success of other members of the family. Albert etal. (2015) ob- served pattems in their study of political dynasties in the Philippines: 1) relatives occupying the same elective position over time or an individual succeeding to an elective position previously occupied by a relative; or 2) relatives occupying multiple elective positions simultaneously. They also distinguished between “at” dynasties, which have many family members simultaneously occupying elective positions; and “thin" dynasties, which have only one family member occupying an elective position (see figure 0.7 on opposite page), Just lke social status or economic resources, political offices can be ‘ured into assets that can be passed on to next of kin following the Fil 'pino concept of pamana, Political power can also be bequeathed to the ae on politicians—ipinamanang kapangyarihan. Historically, ue aol have controlled local and national politics mitra 473%) continued to dominate the recently held 2019 ales wo declare eTmerS, 20 (70%) have held local positions for ‘ehankee 2019), Four generations 0 DISSECTING PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES. THIN DYNASTY FAT DYNASTY — os FIGURE 0.7 Thin and fat dynasties ATbert et al. 2015) BOSSISM, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND MORAL POLITICS An opposite view from the notion of reciprocity of the “patron-client factional” framework underscores the concept of conflict, command, co ercion, and even violence. Referred to by various scholars in several ways such as *caciquism,” “bossism,” and “sultanism,” this view of politics is popularly known in the Philippines as “warlordism (Side] 1989). Itis also colorfully labeled by the media as the “3Gs,” referring to guns, gold, and goons. James C. Scott (1972, 96) famously distinguished the “boss” from a “patron”: Patrons ought finally to be differentiated from other partly related terms for leadership such as “boss,” “caudillo,” or “caciques.” “Boss” is a designation at once vague and richly connotative. Although a boss may often function as a patron, the term itself implies a) that he is the most powerful man in the arena and b) that his power rests more on inducements and sanctions at his disposal than on affec tion or status. As distinct from a patron who may or may not be the supreme local leader and whose leadership rests at least partly on rank and affection, the boss isa secular leader par excellence who de- TEEHANKEE pends almost entirely on palpable inducements and threats to more people ent of *bossism® as an analytical framework i john, sidel (2005, 56 who defines “bosses" as “local brokers who eno ng monopotstic postion over coercive and economic sour 2 their respective Bailiwick: long-term mayors Who ran their my nicipalities as their private fiefdoms, congressmen, and governors who Prat up political machines and business empires that spanned ene districts or provinces” (see figure 0.8 below) He further argues, “Imlore than the grip of patron client relationships, the peculiar institutional Ieeaces of colonial rule facilitated the emergence and entrenchment of small-town bosses, provincial ‘warlords, and authoritarian presidents by providing mechanisms for private monopolization ofthe resources and prerogatives of the state” (Sidel 1999, 19). More recently, Patricio N. Abi- nales (2017) asserted that Rodrigo Duterte is the prototypical example of the provincial boss who became the national boss. He described Duterte as a strongman whose foundations remain to be the clan. Duterte con: The primary expon' anenduri conrucr FIGURE 0.8 Bossism DISSECTING PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES solidated his power as mayor and ensured that his children inherited the clan's local monopoly of power (to be mobilized again for future national aspirations). While “bossism” presents a somehow convincing argument for the preponderance of local bosses in far-flung provinces, it empirically fails to take into account the downward trend of warlordism and political violence in other parts of the country since the 1990s. While there are still some warlords firmly secured in their fiefdoms, a lot has also been dislodged both peacefully and violently. Other warlords have replaced some (eg, the Crisologos of locos Sur by the Singsons), while some have opted to become more sophisticated in their approach, making less use of brute force (e.g., Abdullah Dimaporo of Lanao, who succeeded his strongman father, Mohamad Ali Dimaporo). While former Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay adapted Nemesio Yabut's machine politics, he avoided the coercive style of his predecessor. In the 1990s, the defeat of Mayor Macario Assistio in Caloocan by actor Rey Malonzo and the retirement and subse- quent death of Mayor Pablo Cuneta in Pasay after five decades in power effectively ended warlordism in Metropolitan Manila. The Ampatuans’ political downfall after the despicable “Maguindanao massacre” in 2009 (in which the clan was implicated in the cold-blooded murder of 58 jour nalists) demonstrates the growing limits and constraints on local bosses in the age of social media, Further studies should be conducted to account for the decline of warlordism in most parts of the country. ‘Another phenomenon that has been observed since the 1990s (that runs counter to the “bossism” framework) is the rise of local politicians (mostly from urban areas) known for their managerial, reformist, and technocratic approach to local governance. They included local chief ex- ecutives such as Jesse Robredo of Naga City, Edward Hagedom of Puerto Princesa City, Eddie Dorotan of Irosin, Sorsogon province, Rosalita Nunes of General Santos City, Mauricio Domogan of Baguio City, and Franklin Quijano of Iligan City, to name a few. Their rise to power may have uti lized the approaches discussed above, but they have also championed “moral” issues such as anti-corruption and “good governance” (Kawakana 1998). Moreover, a number of young and forward-looking local chief ex- ecutives were elected in the 2019 local elections. This next generation of ‘mayors and governors were a mix of dynastic (eg, Abigail Binay of Maka- " TEEHANKEE ti, Vico Sotto of Pasig, francis Zamora of Sn Juan, and Rolen Pang i, b jans (e.g. Isko Moreno of M and non-dynastic politicians (eg. Isko of Manila ee My Dinagat Islands). But unlike the initial group of moder a a pie executives, this batch mobilized a combination of, ate reformist, and even populist strategies to defeat the old guards | politics, i cin ana (2002) chronicled the sterling career of the late ‘Takeshi Kawa : redo was a nephew of Luis Villafuerte—the politica tinepin of Camarines Sut. After completing mechanical engineering ang jnviutrial management engineering courses at the De La Salle Universi vada brie stint at San Miguel Corporation, Robredo was backed by Vill- fuerte in his frst successful bid for mayor of Naga City in 1988. He would serve two three-year terms as mayor, the first from 1988 to 1998 and the second from 2001 to 2010. Aside from introducing the principles of parti. ipatory governance, accountability, and transparency in Naga, the key to his success was the adept combination of technocratic management with 4 political machine that was wellentrenched with the middle-class and poor voters of the city, He also successfully framed his politics with the ‘moral discourse of good governance. Inspired by the “moral economy” concept formulated by James C. Scott to understand peasant rebellions in twentieth-century Southeast Asia, and by EB Thompson, who wrote about bread riots in eigh teenthcentury Britain, Mark Thompson (2016) proposed the concept of the “moral economy of electoralism” to describe community-based electoral behavior. In his view, the rural poor insist that social relations be structured to promote social relations, not a personal advantage. Given the poor’ socio-economic insecurities, risk reduction is preferred over utility maximization (in the classical capitalist sense). He argues: Jesse Robredo. Rol Electoral behavior is embedded within what in the Philippines are ir pe Patron-client relations and “vote canvassing networks” é = ania Tata ‘The moral economy is a part of the com- Ucternine ake ten tts and politicians that allow the former to Eirantee ee lected officials are acting in a legitimate fashion ee . Poor voters typically put forward claims for lecent standard of living, and being respected, 20 GISSECTING PATROWACE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES which parallels earlier demands (often backed up by a threat of rebel: lion) associated with peasant politics in Southeast Asia. Its suggested that the underprivileged people, as a part of their strategy of coping with their economic marginalization, view elections in the context of the mutual exchange networks of which they are a part. They do not see themselves as selling votes to “corrupt politicians” but believe that they ate voting for leaders who will benefit their local commu nities, which represents what can be called a moral economy of electoralism. (248) Elites in both countries denounce elections as manipulated by “cor rupt politicians” involved in “vote buying” and “money politics.” They deride poor voters and accuse them of stupidly selling their votes for short-term benefits. From the perspective of the poor, however, politicians are actually judged by their ability to fulfill their obligations to the com- munity. This moral economy of electoralism was confined mainly at the local level and was hidden until populist politicians (ie, Joseph Estrada in the Philippines and Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand) made national appeals to poor voters and threatened the dominant elitist narrative of good governance (Thompson 2016). For his part, Wataru Kusaka (2017) adopts the concept of “moral pol- ities,” which he refers to as the creation of groups that are perceived as either “good” or “evil.” He distinguishes moral politics from “interest poli- tics,” which pertains to the distribution of resources, Echoing Thompson, he points to the moralistic discourse of the Filipino urban middle class, which takes pride in their self identification as upright citizens, democrat- ic defenders, and anti-corruption activists. This attitude was evident in the middle-class-led ouster of Joseph Estrada in the so-called “EDSA Dos” or “People Power 2,"7 which was hailed as “a victory for democracy for civil society.” but conveniently overlooked that this extra-constitutional change weakened the electoral process and undermined democratic con: solidation. Furthermore, the poor supporters of Estrada (who attempted to mount their own “EDSA Tres") were dismissed as “criminals dependent on illegal squatting and street vending for their subsistence” (1-3). Kusaka interprets this phenomenon as a primary example of the construction of antagonistic “we/they” relations that may be mobilized a TEEHANKEE obstruct democracy. Moreover, when this “welth the elimination or destruction of the “enemy i moctacy. It has long been assumed by most studies ye middle class i8 a critical agent for prometinn . evelopment and deepening. democracy. He asserts that “even i ee lass cae to power ee ne anaes by the ae alization of politics, it will promote Sra an : itical participation predicated on the belief that groups

    You might also like