DISSECTING PATROWAGE DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES Landlords used to have monopolistic control over their farmer clients who needed land for their survival. Nowadays, the “game” has become a competition among potential patrons who can provide more forms of as. sistance that are merely supplementary, not about survival. Hence, advan tages derived from the relationship shifts to the clients’ favor such that they can maneuver “the political and policy landscape of their country via their patron—or, when necessary, their patron’s patron, or even their patron's patror’s patron’ (Leonard et al. 2010, 480). In Mexico, elite competition has opened up space for non-patronage politics (Fox 1996, 480), Hence, several external actors (ic. left-wing par- ties, trade unions, church-sponsored social movements, and non-govern- ‘ment organizations) have competed with traditional patrons for the polit- ical loyalty of local communities. Moreover, in today's globalized world, many rural communities are influenced more by international market chains or providers of overseas development assistance (ODA) than the local dominant elites (Leonard et al. 2010). Itcan be argued that while patronage has changed form, it continues to be relevant in understanding the dynamics of local politics. It is not so much that patronage has disappeared, but it has transformed. The tradi- tional forms of patronage politics are hard to come by today. Thus, “even if patron client networks have lost some of their power, they are still the predominant mode of political organization particularly in the rural ar- as, in almost all the developing country systems" (481). In the Philippines, the delineation of these network systems is often amorphous and not as clear-cut to be illustrated in the traditional cli entelistic, pyramidal, and hierarchical organizations. At the local level, patrons can be brokers and clients; and brokers can be clients of higher patrons, while most clients do not know their patron nor each other. The lan also plays a big role in cementing the ties that bind these networks. ‘As De Dios (2007, 175) astutely observes: Neat as the categories of patron, boss and broker are, itis unhelpful to pose a static image for political leaders; categories shade into each other. One and the same local official may be seen to perform differing roles at diferent times, a possibility that may perplex observers wont to prefer neater distinctions. A benevolent “patron” could in the nextTEEHAWKEE instance at asa warlord, oF then again use massive money inj, . Ice. ‘ments to stay in power. Thus, it may be more appropriate to speak of “clientelistic cluster veunks® (CCN) to capture the fluidity of power relations in Pht net oltics Figure 0.9 below isa stylized infographic of the WyPical eon local p : dinfog furation ofthe CCN ina Philippine province, city, or municipal, Scholars have prematurely dismissed the influence of clientelisry in shaping political exchange in developing societies. In the Philippines, cj. entelism (usually expressed in the form of patronage politics) has Proven tobe more resilient and adaptive to the shifting contours of economy ang society. In the heydays of the largely agricultural-based economy, dyadic ties between prosperous patrons and dependent clients at the local level formed the basis for the national two-party system. With rapid urban. ization came the decline of plantation-based patron-client ties based on consensual political exchange, and the emergence of the urban-based ma- chine polities anchored on contractual political transactions. Stato ; Cui socety CEhAmed groupe FMUREO.8 Clientlistic cluster network (Teehankee 2013) %