Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal: António Costa Pinto Conceição Pequito Teixeira

EDITED BY
António Costa Pinto

Conceição Pequito Teixeira
POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS
AND DEMOCRACY
IN PORTUGAL
Assessing the Impact
of the Eurocrisis
Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal
António Costa Pinto
Conceição Pequito Teixeira
Editors
Political Institutions
and Democracy
in Portugal
Assessing the Impact of the Eurocrisis
Editors
António Costa Pinto Conceição Pequito Teixeira
University of Lisbon University of Lisbon
Lisbon, Portugal Lisbon, Portugal
ISBN 978-3-319-98151-2 ISBN 978-3-319-98152-9 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9
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Contents
1 Portugal Before and After the “Great Recession”:

A Resilient Democracy? 1
António Costa Pinto and Conceição Pequito Teixeira
2 The Political Economy of Portuguese Crisis Years:

The Road Not Taken 13
Carla Guapo Costa
3 The President of the Republic and the Management

of the Eurocrisis 35
Rui Graça Feijó
4 Electoral Systems and Political Reforms: Portugal

in Comparative Perspective 55
André Freire
5 The Portuguese Party System: Evolution in Continuity? 77

Carlos Jalali
6 The Centrality of the Portuguese Parliament: Reform,

Troika and “Contraption” 101
António José Seguro
v
vi Contents
7 The Portuguese Constitutional Court and Its Austerity

Case Law 121
Teresa Violante
8 New Challenges, Old Parties: Party Change in Portugal

After the European Crisis 145
Marco Lisi
9 Trade Union Representation and Industrial Relations

in Portugal Before, During and Following the
Economic and Financial Crises 167
Alan Stoleroff
10 Portugal and Spain in the International Protest Cycles:

From Global Justice Movement to Anti-austerity
Protests 195
Cristina Nunes
11 Political Discontentment in Portugal Post-Troika:

Risks and Opportunities 215
Conceição Pequito Teixeira, Paulo de Almeida Pereira
and Ana Maria Belchior
Index 247
Notes on Contributors
Ana Maria Belchior is an assistant professor, with aggregation, at the

Department of Political Science and Public Policies at ISCTE-IUL,
Lisbon, and a researcher at CIES/ISCTE-IUL. She is currently the
coordinator of the Master in Political Science at ISCTE-IUL. Her main
research interests are political participation, democratic representation,
political congruence, and electoral pledges and decision-making. She has
published in journals like Comparative Political Studies, International
Political Science Review, Party Politics and The Journal of Legislative
Studies.
Carla Guapo Costa is an Associate Professor at School of Social and
Political Sciences (ISCSP) of Lisbon University and a researcher at the
Centre for Administration and Public Policies (CAPP). She has a Ph.D.
degree in Economics from the Institute of Economics and Management
(ISEG) of the same University. Her main research areas are international
political economy, specifically, European Economy and financial crisis.
She has authored several books and articles in national and international
journals. She is currently working on consultancy missions to African
Portuguese Speaking Countries and East Asian, namely in East Timor.
António Costa Pinto is a Research Professor at the Institute of Social
Sciences, University of Lisbon. He has published extensively on authori-
tarianism, political elites, democratisation and transitional justice in new
democracies and the comparative study of political change in Europe.
vii
viii Notes on Contributors
He has co-edited recently Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership

in European Democracies (2018).
Paulo de Almeida Pereira holds a Ph.D. in Chemistry from the Faculty
of Science and Technology of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa, and a
Master in Business Administration at the ISCTE Business School. He is
currently an assistant professor at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa,
where he is Director of the Department of Economics, Management
and Social Sciences. His research interests include “Quantitative
Methodology and Inferential and Multivariate Statistics” in general, and
Social and Political Sciences in particular. He is the author of two books,
chapters in books and several articles in international journals.
Rui Graça Feijó (D.Phil. Oxford 1984) is affiliated both with the
Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, and the Institute for
Contemporary History, Nova University, Lisbon. His research inter-
ests include history and theory of democracy and semi-presidentialism,
with a focus on Portugal and Timor-Leste. He published Dynamics of
Democracy in Timor-Leste 1999–2012 (2016) and Democracia: linhagens
e configurações de um conceito impuro (2017).
André Freire is a Full Professor at ISCTE-IUL (Lisbon University
Institute) and senior researcher at CIES-IUL (Centre for Sociological
Studies and Research). At ISCTE-IUL, he has been Director of the
undergraduate course in political science (2009–2015), and director
of the doctoral programme in political science (2015–present). He has
been participating in several international research networks and has
directed several research projects in Portugal, namely about “Electoral
Behaviour” and “Political Attitudes”, “Political Reforms” and “Political
Representation”. He has published (in different languages) several books,
book chapters and articles in academic journals about those topics.
Carlos Jalali is Associate Professor and coordinator of the Public Policy
Institutions Innovation group at the Governance, Competitiveness
and Public Policies Research Centre of the University of Aveiro. His
research focuses predominantly on “Portuguese Political Institutions”,
“Party System, Political Communication and Electoral Behaviour”,
and has been published inter alia in South European Society & Politics,
Party Politics, Journal of Political Marketing, Acta Politica and European
Journal of Communication.
Notes on Contributors ix
Marco Lisi is an assistant professor in the Department of Political

Studies, Nova University of Lisbon and researcher at IPRI-NOVA.
His research interests focus on “Political Parties, Electoral Behaviour,
Democratic Theory, Political Representation and Election Campaigns”.
His latest books are Party Change, Recent Democracies and Portugal:
Comparative Perspectives (2015) and Party System Change, the European
Crisis and the State of Democracy (2018).
Cristina Nunes is a Research Fellow at CIES, ISCTE-Lisbon University
Institute. A sociologist with a Ph.D. thesis about anti-austerity protests
in Portuguese society, she has participated in several international pro-
jects on the field of social movements, trade unions and labour relations.
Conceição Pequito Teixeira is Assistant Professor at Higher Institute
of Social and Political Sciences (ISCSP) of the University of Lisbon and
senior researcher at CAPP-ISCSP and CIES-ISCTE. Her research inter-
ests focus on political recruitment, political parties, political behaviour,
democratic theory, political representation and comparative politics. She
published several articles in national and international journals. Her lat-
est books are Portuguese Political System in a Comparative Perspective
(2018) and The Quality of Democracy in Portugal (2018).
António José Seguro is a Guest Assistant Professor at the University
Autónoma of Lisbon (UAL) and Research at OBSERVARE. He has
an M.A. in Political Science the ISCTE-Lisbon University Institute.
His latest publication is The Reform of the Portuguese Parliament. The
Political Control of the Government (2016). He has held various public
offices, including Member of the Portuguese Government (Mr. António
Guterres as Prime Minister); Member of the Portuguese Parliament and
of the European Parliament; Leader of the Portuguese Socialist Party
and Member of the State Council.
Alan Stoleroff is a Professor of Sociology at the Lisbon University
Institute (ISCTE-IUL) who has researched and written extensively on
Portuguese trade unions and industrial relations since the 1980s.
Teresa Violante is a Research Fellow at Goethe-University Frankfurt
and Visiting Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg.
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Portugal GDP growth rate 3

Fig. 5.1 Electoral volatility in Portugal, 1975–2015 88
Fig. 5.2 Effective number of electoral parties 89
Fig. 8.1 Evolution of partisanship in Portugal (2002–2015) 148
Fig. 8.2 Evaluation of members’ influence on decision-making process 154
Fig. 9.1 The evolution of collective bargaining from 1994 to 2015 182
Fig. 11.1 Confirmatory factor analysis (standardized estimates
of model dimensions) 235
Fig. 11.2 Evolution of the different types of democrats
(“democrats with adjectives”) 239
xi
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Electoral systems and governability: aims, solutions

and necessary trade-offs 58
Table 4.2 Types of government in Europe, 1945–2000 60
Table 4.3 Electoral systems and proportionality: aims, solutions
and necessary trade-offs 67
Table 4.4 Electoral systems and quality of representation: aims,
solutions and necessary trade-offs 70
Table 5.1 Patterns of alternation, innovation and openness
in government, 1976–2018 85
Table 5.2 Average combined vote share of PS and PSD in legislative,
local and European elections, 1975–2017 95
Table 9.1 Union density: Portugal, 1978–2015 175
Table 9.2 Collective bargaining agreements, extension decisions
and bargaining coverage 183
Table 11.1 Summary of data collection 232
Table 11.2 Exploratory factor analysis results 234
Table 11.3 Satisfied democrats versus dissatisfied democrats 238
Table 11.4 Critical democrats versus non-critical democrats 238
Table 11.5 Trusting democrats versus sceptical democrats 239
Table 11.6 Relationship between different types of democrats
in Portugal (2016) 241
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Portugal Before and After the

“Great Recession”: A Resilient Democracy?
António Costa Pinto and Conceição Pequito Teixeira
“The (new) Portuguese government … faces a herculean task in the a

pplication
of an economic programme to bring the country out of its alarming decline”.1
The sentence above could have been written in 2011, but it was pub-
lished in 1978, and shows that what Southern European countries experi-
enced in 2011–2012 is not new to Portuguese citizens. Since its inception,
Portuguese democracy has had to deal with economic and financial cri-
ses and austerity measures, with the exception of the decade follow-
ing European accession (Teixeira and Pinto 2012). Although the first
decade after accession was one of slight growth and investment, Portugal’s
economy has been performing poorly since the beginning of this cen-
tury, when the euro entered circulation. This is so much so that the years
between 2000 and 2010 have been named ‘the lost decade’ (Reis 2013).
A. Costa Pinto (*) 
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: acpinto@ics.ul.pt
C. Pequito Teixeira 
Institute of Social and Political Sciences (ISCSP), University of Lisbon,
Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: cteixeira@iscsp.ulisboa.pt
© The Author(s) 2019 1

A. Costa Pinto and C. Pequito Teixeira (eds.),
Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_1
2 A. COSTA PINTO AND C. PEQUITO TEIXEIRA
Then, in May 2011, Portugal signed its third bailout agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) and was
forced to implement severe austerity measures again. For a democracy that
was celebrating its 40th anniversary, the word ‘crisis’ was all too familiar.
Portugal was forced to solve the crisis through “internal devaluation”.
Before and after the bailout, both the centre left (2009–2011) and the
centre right (2011–2015) governments introduced unpopular measures,
including severe wage and pension cuts, higher taxes, and, a sizeable
decrease in social rights. Social and economic situations such as these are
likely to have serious consequences for incumbent parties and therefore
considerable party system changes were to be expected (Kriesi 2012).
Yet, such has not been the case in Portugal, where, apart from some lev-
els of fragmentation, little has changed (Lobo et al. 2011).
This book explores the factors that might explain why some of the
changes occurring in other Southern European democracies as an impact
of the crisis have not been felt in Portugal. The chapter is organised as
follows: in the next section, we introduce the impact of the 2008 finan-
cial crises in Portugal. We then move to the framework of the book and
the main research questions. Finally, the main consequences of the crisis
for Portuguese democracy will be explored, based on the chapters of the
book.
The “Great Recession” and Its Impact in Portugal

The 2008 crisis came on top of an economy that had been stagnat-
ing since the turn of the century. In fact, between 2000 and 2012, the
Portuguese economy grew less than the United States during the Great
Depression or than Japan during its ‘lost decade’ (Reis 2013). Figure 1.1
shows values of GDP growth in Portugal since 2000. It clearly shows
that the Portuguese economy had practically stagnated between 2000
and the beginning of the crisis.
The impact of globalisation and the enlargement of the EU to include
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had a negative impact on
the competitiveness of Portuguese economy, with anaemic productivity
growth, almost no growth, increasing unemployment and public and pri-
vate debt.
To tackle this problem, different governments have come to power
since the beginning of the century with a commitment to fiscal consol-
idation and structural reforms. Barroso’s centre-right wing (PSD/CDS)
1 PORTUGAL BEFORE AND AFTER … 3
Fig. 1.1 Portugal GDP growth rate (Source http://www.tradingeconomics.

com/portugal/gdp-growth)
cabinet in 2002; Sócrate’s majority and minority centre-left government

(PS) in 2005 and in 2009, respectively; and especially Passos Coelho’s
centre-right (PSD/CDS) government all were forced to implement
unpopular austerity measures.
As many observers have noticed, until 2008, Portugal seemed to be
on a path to fiscal consolidation. That year, however, the Portuguese
socialist government engaged in anti-cyclical policies, following other
European countries’ answers to the crisis. This might be the explanation
to why the PS won the elections again in 2009. This time without major-
ity in parliament, the PS decided to form a minority government. ‘Here
again, the Portuguese party system was to display one of its more resil-
ient features: the imbalance between the left and the right in terms of the
potential for coalition-building’ (Magalhães 2012: 311).
When the international rating agencies downgraded the debt of
Greece, the Portuguese Prime Minister tried to avoid the bailout request
as much as he could. Under pressure from the EU, the Socialist gov-
ernment approved a series of austerity packages with the support of the
PSD—in the form of abstention. These packages included a succession of
cuts in salaries, pensions and welfare benefits, increase in taxation and a
number of privatisations. When, in early 2011, interest rates for financing
the state surpassed seven per cent, increasing the likelihood of a future
bailout, the government proposed a fourth package to parliament that
had been previously negotiated with the EU. The PS warned the PSD
that the refusal of this package would make the bailout inevitable. But
this time, after seven years in opposition, in face of favourable opinion
polls, and with a young leader looking for electoral legitimacy, the
PSD refused to give its support. This led the PM to present his resig-
nation leading to early elections in June 2011 (Fernandes 2012). The
bailout agreement with the EU and the IMF was negotiated in May
2011—during the interim period between the resignation of the PM and
the elections. The EU demanded the signature of the three larger parties
(PS, PSD and CDS).
The bailout was a central issue during the 2011 electoral campaign.
The PS argued that the fourth package refusal by the PSD could have
avoided a much more painful bailout. The PSD, on the other hand,
ascribed all the blame to the PS and the previous six years of Socialist
governments. In a nutshell, the PSD won 38.7% of the vote—not
enough to form a single-party majority government. CDS, with 11.7%,
became the coalition partner, just like in 2002. The PS won 28.1% of the
vote and became the major opposition party. The remaining parties in
parliament were the same—the PCP, with 7.4% of the votes (exactly the
same as in 2009), and the BE, the second biggest loser after the incum-
bents, with 5.2% of the votes. As for the other 12 parties running for the
election, they were unable to win a single seat. Abstention can be said to
have been the biggest winner—with an absolute record of 42%. It was
under a fairly stable centre-right coalition government (2011–2015) that
Portugal was governed during the bailout period, when there was a clear
political convergence between the Cabinet and the international lenders,
even in the public speech of the Prime Minister Passos Coelho (Moury
and Standring 2017).
Crises and the Quality of Portuguese Democracy

In a pioneering study of the impact of the crisis on South European
Democracies, Morlino and Raniolo (2017) offer a framework of analysis
that will be partially used in this book. Recalling what quality of democ-
racy is, what its salient dimensions are and which ones can be most
touched by an economic crisis, namely on the two procedural dimensions
that are very relevant for every democracy, that is, participation and com-
petition, this book expands that framework. The central question of this
book is therefore whether the crises contributed to worsening or ironi-
cally deepening and improving the quality of Portuguese democracy, tak-
ing into consideration the quality dimensions of a democracy that can be
endangered and worsened by crisis but the resilience of institutions as well
(Pinto et al. 2013).
In Southern Europe, among the major changes as impact of the cri-

ses, we find: the emergence of important new actors—the protest par-
ties; a change in political participation accelerated by the economic
crisis becoming more radicalised; a partial reshaping of previous cleavages
(left–right) and a fading away or reshaping of others (centre–periphery)
with the emergence and consolidation of a quasi-new cleavage (pro–anti
Europe) and a change in the structure of the party system towards trip-
olarisation despite bipolarising electoral systems (Morlino and Raniolo
2017). In many of these aspects, the phrase “with the exception of
Portugal” is very present. In fact, if the impact of the crisis and subse-
quent austerity policies on citizen dissatisfaction and the drop in the
responsiveness of the political system created a delegitimisation of tradi-
tional leaders, in Portugal, the crisis of loyalty led to exit (i.e. a growth in
electoral abstention and a decline in party membership), but ironically, it
led to the strengthening of traditional parties with the above-mentioned
cleavages playing a very minor role in the Portuguese political arena.
From this point of view, Portugal presents a different picture (Pinto and
Raimundo 2014). There, the incidence of exit (abstention plus aliena-
tion) favoured the traditional parties with low levels of political activa-
tion of Euroscepticism and related cleavages, with a lack of political space
to develop, and communicating populist alternatives (Quintas da Silva
2018).
Evaluating the Impact of the Crises:

Main Actors and Institutions
It is with this perspective that in Chapter 2, Carla Costa analyses how the
Portuguese economy and society have adjusted to the crisis years, within
the context of the political economy approach of the European integra-
tion process. The author argues that the causes of the crisis that stroke
EU, and its more fragile countries in particular, had two sets of origins:
the relapsed behaviour of some of those countries, Portugal included;
the original sins in European and Monetary Union (EMU) design,
and the somewhat biased ways chosen to tackle the crisis, namely the polit-
ical bargaining among its members, especially the most powerful ones.
She concludes that mistakes were serious, the adjustment programmes
were blunt and the lessons are supposed to have been learnt. A funda-
mental lesson from the Portuguese crisis is that sudden disruptive stops
can affect countries that are members of currency unions, even when
those unions involve advanced economies, in the context of a non-fiscal
union, such as is the case of EMU. Tellingly, the ways to deal with the
crisis should consider not only economic and financial issues, but also
encompass some sort of a political and social compromise. Otherwise, it
is the global integration process that might be in jeopardy.
In Chapter 3 of this book, Rui Graça Feijó, immediately moving on
to the effects that the crisis has had on political institutions in Portugal,
focuses on the role of presidents under semi-presidentialism and how it
was affected by the onset of the Eurocrisis. It starts by offering a histor-
ical background to the institutional design that has been in force since
1976, with an important constitutional revision that touched upon pres-
idential powers in 1982. Then, it analyses the relationship between pres-
idents and political parties. Next, it discusses two main junctures in this
long process: the election of the first civilian president (Mário Soares)
after sixty years of praetorian supervision, which contributed to fine-
tune conventions on the status of presidents, followed by the experience
of Cavaco Silva who had to face the Eurocrisis and moved, with little
success, to a different view of the president’s position in the political
arena which hollowed the function. The last section deals with the cur-
rent president Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and his attempt to shift back to
conventions on presidential status and role, and seeking, through what
he called the “presidency of affects”, to turn around the downward and
negative trends of popularity of the presidency role and restore a very
positive score in all polls. As the author well explains, the very fact that
the public perception that “a page had been turned” in the Eurocrisis
(mostly by virtue of the new government’s approach) was strong created
a completely new scenario for the president to play a role that evokes—
even if Marcelo tries to push his powers to the limit—the conventions
established in the wake of Soares’ presidency.
In his chapter, André Freire, departing from the Portuguese case and
using a comparative perspective, reflects on some of the fundamental
problems associated with electoral reform or, more generally, with the
choice of electoral systems. The author tries to show how the different
fundamental objectives the various electoral systems target, as well as the
differentiated solutions they adopt to achieve them, are not easily recon-
cilable, at least fully, and therefore there must always be some form of
trade-off.
Considering the performance of the Portuguese electoral system in
the European context in terms of proportionality, cabinet stability and
quality of representation (i.e. the pattern of relationships between the
voters, parties and candidates/members of parliament), as well as the

necessary trade-off in each and every choice, the chapter reflects on the
aspects of the electoral system that need more or less of reforms and
how to reconcile the maintenance of proportionality, the strengthening
of executive stability and increasing the intensity of links between voters
and deputies. In the latter part of the chapter, the author makes it clear
that the governability problems related to the current electoral system
have an origin that is more political rather than institutional.
To prove this statement, we have the Government solution that was
carved out in the legislative elections immediately following the exit of
the Troika from the country: The understanding reached between the
parties of the left in Portugal at the end of 2015 that led to the forma-
tion and support for the 21st constitutional government (a minority PS
government that for the first time in the history of democratic Portugal
has been kept in power through parliamentary agreements between it
and the parties to its left) is a confirmation of this.
In Chapter 5, Carlos Jalali points out that, despite the absence of mass
parties or of a pre-existing party system that was restored with democ-
ratisation, the Portuguese party system became institutionalised very
quickly after democratisation. Likewise, it has remained remarkably sta-
ble over time, be it in terms of the main parties of the party system, be
it in terms of the main patterns of interaction. What is most surprising is
that this stability has largely endured even with the bailout that Portugal
underwent from 2011 to 2014. Unlike other bailout countries—and,
indeed, many Western European party systems—the Portuguese party
system has not seen major electoral earthquakes and realignments.
However, the post-bailout period has seen a change in interparty interac-
tions, with an unprecedented level of cooperation between the parties of
the left that has been dubbed the “contraption”. The chapter examines
the potential implications of this cooperation for the party system, and
explores some of the systemic factors that helped to bring it about.
In Chapter 6, António José Seguro shows how the reorganisation of
the Portuguese Parliament, in 2007, helped it to take on a new posi-
tion of centrality within the political system regarding its political control
role, expressed by the increased use of the traditional control instru-
ments, thus contradicting the common views based on a functional and
political decline of Parliaments in contemporary democracies. This cen-
tral position held by the Portuguese Parliament—so often queried about
by a system of Government that is a constitutional semipresidentialist
system in its form, but that operates, in practice, much more like a presi-
dential regime with a Prime Minister—has not been questioned. In 2011
crisis and the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding,
the overthrow of the second PSD/CDS–PP government and the PS
government’s entry into office have restored and reinforced the politi-
cal centrality of the Portuguese Parliament, which became the privileged
place for the exercise of the political control function and for the nego-
tiation and approval of the laws indispensable for political action and
the maintenance of the support to the contraption government –hence
the alleged morphing into what can be seen as a kind of “assembly
semipresidentialism”.
In Chapter 7, Teresa Violante looks at the role of the organisation
that, in Portugal, is the main institution responsible for upholding the
Constitution, also being responsible for the inspection of constitutional
validity of different regulations contained in legislation passed either
by Parliament or by the Government. Here, therefore, we are referring
to the Portuguese Constitutional Court (CC) that, on blocking sev-
eral measures that the right-wing majority (PSD–CDS), then in power,
felt were important for compliance with the terms of the Adjustment
Programme—especially in terms of budget consolidation and structural
reform—turned into a kind of “blocking force”, thus taking on a piv-
otal role during the financial crisis that hit Portugal hard after 2008,
especially during an international bailout that prevented the country’s
bankruptcy.
The strict conditionality imposed by the Memorandum of
Understanding commanded national policies aimed at a sharp expendi-
ture reduction and brought under constitutional review by both politi-
cal and legal litigants. The invalidation of some of these policies and the
fiscal gap created by the rulings took by surprise, not only the executive
and the legislature, but also the international institutions involved in the
financial assistance programme.
In this chapter, the author takes things a step further, by analysing
not only the “CC constitutional risk”, but also the Court’s action in a
comparative perspective, showing that the escalation of conflict between
the CC and political elites due to the financial crisis is not part of a
Portuguese singularity.
Similar trends have been reported in other jurisdictions. Institutions
that perform judicial review of legislation may act as “veto players” in
the political process and thus may be under attack by the other branches
of power. As Teresa Violante well explains, the growing rejection of aus-

terity measures by the CC is in line with an identified growing judicial
involvement in fiscal matters across Europe. Although it presents some
comparative specificities, it might be prudent to contextualise it before
embarking on an alleged “Portuguese exceptionalism”.
External shocks, such as the Eurocrisis that has affected Southern
European countries, are expected to foster party organisational change,
especially when long-term trends have challenged the role and functions
performed by political parties. Drawing on the Portuguese case, Marco
Lisi addresses this problem and presents new evidence on the impact of
the crisis on the transformation of party organisations. In this chapter,
the author considers three specific arenas of party change, namely the
party on the ground, the extra-parliamentary party and the party in pub-
lic office. The findings suggest that party change has been rather limited
during the crisis and it has mainly concerned the institutional compo-
nent of party organisation. From this standpoint, and from the author’s
perspective, the Portuguese case challenges conventional wisdom on the
political impact of the Eurocrisis for two main reasons. First, parties have
been resilient and quite immune to economic and political turmoil, while
electoral pressures and the passage to opposition seem to be more pow-
erful factors that account for party change. Second, this organisational
inertia has not led to party system instability or regeneration, which sug-
gests that voters have used more the ‘exit’ option rather than voicing
their dissatisfaction towards parties.
In Chapter 9, Alan Stoleroff starts by stressing the fact that, since
1974, Portuguese trade unions and their confederations have obtained
key roles within the institutional model of Portuguese democracy. This
concerns primarily, but not only, the institutions involved in labour mar-
ket regulation, namely, collective bargaining and tripartite negotiation.
If it is true that neither the long-term evolution of the model nor the
recent crisis has directly challenged either of these roles of the unions at a
formal level, it remains true that they have challenged the substance and
efficacy of labour regulation and industrial democracy. In fact, it is this
potential discrepancy between the formal roles assigned to unions and
labour representation and their substantive effects that is the main object
of this chapter. In order to assess the institutional changes that involve
labour representation and regulation over time, it traces the relation
between neo-liberal influence and policy and economic crisis, exploring
the hypothesis that although the institutions appear to have survived
unscathed from an earlier era, the way in which they actually operate
has often changed beyond recognition. To do so, the author surveys the
transformations of the regulatory institutions throughout democratisa-
tion and European integration and in the context of the recent crises,
focusing on the protracted decline of unionisation and the crisis of col-
lective bargaining.
Even though Portugal was considered an exceptional case in the
southern Europe for the conspicuous absence of a populist anti-austerity
movement along the lines of Podemos in Spain, or popularity of Syriza
in Greece. What is indeed fact is that, also among us, there have been
several popular initiatives making demands, between the years 2010 and
2013. In this period, the Portuguese people suffered the enforcement
of stiff measures for tax contraction which, apart from worsening the
economic situation in itself, also seriously undermined what are, in the
country, known as the “conquests” of the Revolution of 25 April 1974,
which reintroduced democratic government to Portugal—including a
package of social rights in terms of labour law, public health, and access
to education. As was the case in other countries, these austerity measures
were not submissively accepted, and, as a result, there was a stepping up
of protests and social conflicts.
In this regard, Cristina Nunes analyses the Portuguese and Spanish
participation in the more recent waves of international protests, distin-
guishing them by their identity composition, organisation and mobi-
lisation structures. This was done first by analysing what they call the
Global Justice Movement, a cycle of protests motivated by the widen-
ing of social and economic inequalities, responsible for the establishment
of a worldwide network of social movements around the international
summits of political and economic institutions. Later, the author con-
centrates on the analysis of the new cycle of political and social mobili-
sation, related to opposition to the austerity measures, also reinforcing
the contrasts that exist between Spain and Portugal, with regard to their
civil societies and their ability to rally people round, both socially and
politically.
In Chapter 11, the authors also look into the consequences of
the economic and social crisis, with regard to attitudes taken up by
Portuguese citizens with regard to democracy and its main political insti-
tutions and players. While it is indeed true that a massive support for
democracy as a political regime was maintained between 2011 and 2014,
a period in which the country was under external rescue, conversely, it
is also true that both satisfaction with the operation of the democratic
regime and trust in the political institutions that support democracy
reached their lowest ever levels since the start of the new millennium.
This goes to prove that there has been a gradual, yet clear under-
mining of the specific support for democracy in Portugal. On the other
hand, however, if we conduct a more detailed analysis of the indicators
that measure diffuse support of democracy (“democracy as a regime”),
then the authors show that this tends to be more apparent than actu-
ally real, as it coexists with significant support to other autocratic
styles of government, including “government with a strong leader”
or “a government of specialists’; this would explain the high number
of “ambivalent democrats” in Portugal, as also of sceptical democrats
and dissatisfied democrats, which in no way come close to matching
the profile of the “critical citizen” as established by Pippa Norris, a
citizen who, considering the severity of the austerity policies, showed
themselves to be more liable to resort to strategies based on exiting the
system (through electoral abstention), rather than deciding to make
themselves heard through protest actions or other types of less conven-
tional political participation, to pile pressure upon the decision-making
politicians.
This is surely one of the reasons among a host of others that has made
Portugal an exception to the overall development of populism, differ-
ent from what has happened in many other European countries that
have witnessed the rise of populist parties over the last few years, which
have gained significant votes and sometimes threatened the position of
traditional parties. The fact is, and this is where there is exceptional-
ism of the Portuguese case within the overall context of the Eurocrisis,
that is, Portugal has stayed apart from the general rise of populism in
Europe, populism has not found the visibility and influence it has in
other European countries and the traditional parties have kept their
presence practically intact in the Portuguese political spectrum, surely
at the cost of what was the largest abstention rate ever in elections for
the Portuguese National Parliament; out of the 9,682,369 Portuguese
citizens who were entitled to vote, 43.07% did not show up at the poll-
ing stations to cast their vote, proving the upward trend in figures for
abstention.
Note
1. The Times, 2 February 1978. www.cphrc.org/index.php/documents/
democracy/431-1978-02-08-portugal-the-hint-of-an-end-to-the-suffer-
ing (retrieved on 31 May 2013). Parts of this chapter draw from Antonio
Costa Pinto and Filipa Raimundo, “When parties Succeed: Party System
(In)Stability and the 2008 Financial Crisis in Portugal”, Paper prepared
for delivery at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, DC, 28–31 August 2014.
References
Fernandes, J. (2012). The 2011 Portuguese Election: Looking for a Way Out.
West European Politics, 34(6), 1296–1303.
Kriesi, H. (2012). The Political Consequences of the Financial and Economic
Crisis in Europe: Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest. Swiss Political
Science Review, 18(4), 518–522.
Lobo, M. C., Pinto, A. C., & Magalhães, P. (2011). The Political Institutions of
Portuguese Democracy. In Royo (Ed.), Portugal in the Twenty-First Century.
Politics, Society and Economics. Plymouth: Lextington Books.
Magalhães, P. (2012). After the Bailout: Responsibility, Policy, and Valence in
the Portuguese Legislative Election of June 2012. South European Society and
Politics, 17(2), 309–327.
Morlino, L., & Raniolo, F. (2017). The Impact of the Economic Crisis on South
European Democracies. London: Palgrave.
Moury, C., & Standring, A. (2017). ‘Going Beyond the Troika’: Power and
Discourse in Portuguese Austerity Politics. European Journal of Political
Research, 56(3), 660–679.
Pinto A. C., & Raimundo, F. (2014). When parties Succeed: Party System
(In)Stability and the 2008 Financial Crisis in Portugal. Paper prepared
for delivery at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, DC, 28–31 August 2014.
Pinto, A. C., Magalhães, P., & Sousa, L. (Eds.). (2013). A Qualidade da
Democracia em Portugal. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
Quintas da Silva, R. (2018). A Portuguese Exception to Right-Wing Populism.
Palgrave Communications, 4(1), 7–7. Available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3162118 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41599-017-0062-8.
Reis, R. (2013, March 21–23). The Portuguese Slump-Crash and the Euro-
Crisis. Conference Paper Presented at the Spring 2013 Brookings Panel on
Economic Activity.
Teixeira, N. S., & Pinto, A. C. (Eds.). (2012). The Europeanization of Portuguese
Democracy. New York: SSM-Columbia University Press.
CHAPTER 2
The Political Economy of Portuguese

Crisis Years: The Road Not Taken
Carla Guapo Costa
Introduction: “The World Has Been Refashioned

by the Crisis”1
There is quite an abundant academic production on the euro crisis,

its root and superficial causes, the main players, both debtor or credi-
tor countries, and the consequences on the European integration pro-
cess itself. There are also a wide number of studies on specific country
cases, ranging from the most newsworthy Greece, Ireland, Italy or Spain,
on the side of the debtor countries, to the mighty and well-behaved
Germany, on the side of creditors. As Copelovitch et al. (2016) argue,
the euro crisis has developed into the most serious economic and polit-
ical crisis in the history of the European Union (EU), and might even
cast some doubts on the future of the integration process.
However, there is no, to our knowledge, a thorough and exhaustive
approach to the Portuguese case, in the framework of political economy
C. G. Costa (*) 
School of Social and Political Sciences (ISCSP),
Centre for Administration and Public Policies (CAPP),
University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_2
14 C. G. COSTA
analysis. Portugal was plagued by unsustainable financial imbalances

and deteriorating competitiveness, which forced the country to sub-
mit to a harsh austerity programme, under the auspices of the EU and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), during a three-year 78 billion
euros (46% of Portuguese 2011 GDP) bail out. It has come out as a
high achiever survivor, an example to other countries in the Eurozone,
and a reference of success in the international academics and media (see
The Economist, April 2018). However, if there has been a considerable
upgrade in the situation of public finance and export competitiveness,
Portuguese government is already being averted by several international
organisations and reports on the risks of reducing the rate of reforms or
even reversing some of them.
We argue that, although the financial assistance programme was
designed in order to enhance a set of structural reforms to be under-
taken by Portugal, as well as the remaining debtor countries, some of
the fundamental problems remain, since the so-called structural reforms
not only became circumstantial, in order to comply with the creditors’
demands, but they missed some of the structural defects in the EU
design. We argue that the causes of the crisis that stroke EU and its more
fragile countries in particular, had two sets of origins: the relapsed behav-
iour of some of those countries, Portugal included; the original sins in
European and Monetary Union (EMU) design and the somehow biased
ways chosen to tackle the crisis.
Tellingly, Portugal was constrained to sign an agreement, the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), in 2011, with international
institutions (the Troika), which, we believe, reflects a seemingly blind
faith in “disciplinary neoliberalism” (David 2018), noticeably the EU
policy guidelines and the IMF’s one size fits all policy. In this context, we
try to disclose whether the adjustment programme was fit to solve the
imbalances of Portuguese economy, and what were the socio-economic
impacts.
Why We Need a Political Economy Approach?

We propose to apply a political economy approach to the very specific
case of Portuguese economy and society, through the ordeal of the euro
crisis, the subsequent economic and financial adjustment programme,
and the years that followed, from 2015 onwards. The main argument
of this chapter is to demonstrate that the problems that the Portuguese
2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PORTUGUESE … 15
economy and society are facing are not only a consequence of the global
crisis or domestic misbehaviour but also, to a large extent, of competi-
tiveness deficits that have plagued the country’s economy and society, in
the context of an enfeebled institutional and political framework.
We develop our analysis in the context of the political economy
approach of the European Monetary integration process. In the most
part of available literature on the subject, it is easy to find an economic
and a political explanation for the euro crisis. As Copelovitch et al.
(2016) argue, the economic approach emphasises that the Eurozone is
not an optimal currency (in the light of Mundell’s and McKinnon cri-
teria, such as labour mobility or real convergence among regions), and
that the long-term survival of the Eurozone requires the creation of a set
of institutions to act as substitutes, namely a fiscal union or permanent
transfer mechanisms. Accordingly, there seems to be a vacuum on pro-
posals to make the Eurozone viable under existing political constraints.
We also agree with Hall (2014), when he states that the euro crisis has
drawn attention to the international dimensions of varieties of capitalism,
a less studied dimension of the process. And the problem remains the
same from the point of view of political science, as the academics in the
area tend to disregard the importance of economic constraints and trade-
offs (Copelovitch et al. 2016).
Portugal’s Destiny: Not to Take Away

the Punch Bowl as the Party Keeps Going
Portuguese history, along centuries, mediates between brave and dar-

ing achievements and idle vanity. From being the country of fearless
sailors and entrepreneurs who discovered half of the modern world,
Portugal went to a modest position on the ranking of world economy
and well-being. There are several reasons for that, but Portuguese cul-
tural idiosyncrasies constitute a fair explanation for the inevitable decay:
it was written in the stars that highlighted the sky and the sea that led
to Africa and the Americas, in the twenty-fifth and the twenty-seventh
centuries: once the works get done, it is time to enjoy the moveable feast
while it lasts. The history repeats again in the twentieth and the twenty-
first centuries. In what concerns Portugal’s relations with the IMF, it is
worth remembering that the country had already asked for the Fund’s
intervention, in 1978 and 1983, in a different context, but, basically, for
the same reasons and with similar consequences.
16 C. G. COSTA
Blanchard and Portugal (2017) argue that Portugal has gone through
booms, slumps, sudden stops and recovery for the last twenty years, since
the mid-1990s. In fact, after a satisfactory macroeconomic performance
(Portugal was considered one of the most promising pupils, according
to EU criteria) that enabled the country to meet the convergence crite-
ria for joining EMU, Portugal benefited from an extremely favourable
situation, with low interest rates, a strong currency and credibility in the
international arena. From 1995 onwards, there was a general eagerness
from foreign investors for lending to the tiny southern European coun-
try. Euro zone banks, especially German ones, were no exception. The
result was a dramatic decrease in both nominal and real interest rates,
and an increase in private debt, firms and families, since there was a con-
stant and substantial inflow of foreign capital into the Portuguese econ-
omy. Instead of enhancing structural reforms (fiscal, budgetary, labour
market, innovation, education system and institutions), the country was
caught in a spiral of (un)sustainable private, first, and public, afterwards,
indebtedness, often for consumer goods or investment assets with no sig-
nificant return. Along the years, Portugal has been plagued by unsustain-
able imbalances and permanent loss of competitiveness in most tradable,
and non-tradable, sectors, long before the crisis period (Costa 2018),
since decreasing competitiveness due, to a great extent, to the increase
in relative unit labour costs, led to the deterioration of current account
balance. And then, the slump came in the beginning of 2001 (Blanchard
and Portugal 2017). As Portuguese economy struggled to adjust to the
new monetary realm, it was hit by two important asymmetric shocks that
further eroded foreign competitiveness. One was a regional shock, the
EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries, which
implied a reorientation of foreign investment and trade relations, since
most of those countries evidenced a strong comparative advantage in
labour qualification and costs, besides being close to the German market
and central to the rest of Europe. On the international real, the entrance
of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the end of the
Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) aggravated the competitiveness deficit of
Portuguese economy, since over 30% of the country’s exports have tra-
ditionally relied on textiles, apparel and footwear cost-based advantages
(crawling peg exchange rate policy) until the early 1990s (Lopes 1998).
Tellingly, Portuguese economy has been living a decade of stagnat-
ing economic growth practically since entering the Eurozone, in the
beginning of the new century. GDP has constantly been growing below
the EU average, jeopardising real convergence (Pordata 2017), and,

although improving, Portugal has been registering a persistent current
account deficit and serious imbalances in strategic sectors. There has also
been a shortage of investment and productivity performance in other
strategic areas of great potential, namely human capital skills, energy and
food security, labour market and macroeconomic imbalances.
In reaction to the financial crisis, spreads on sovereign debt of
European periphery countries and emerging markets rose, peaking in
the first quarter of 2009. Additionally, the Greek crisis began in October
2009, when the newly elected government raised the fiscal deficit esti-
mate, and this event led to a new rise in Portugal’s interest rate spreads,
inducing the main credit rating to downgrade Portugal’s sovereign rat-
ing. In sequence, capital inflows fell sharply (IOE 2016; Honkapohja
2014). And the tragedy erupted, aggravated by the lack of dissent and
consensus among EU political leaders and institutions, and the clear
evidence that EMU did not dispose of the adequate and proportionate
means to mitigate the ordeal.
Through Seas Already Sailed2

After the Prime Minister had resigned, the President called for general
elections, in March 2011. There was a request for assistance on 8 April,
and in May 2011, Portugal entered a three-year arrangement with the
IMF, under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The EFF-supported
adjustment programme was designed, implemented and funded by the
IMF, in close cooperation with the European Central Bank (ECB) and
the European Commission, with the European portion of the funding
coming from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM). The programme
aimed to strike “a balance between re-gaining credibility and debt stabi-
lisation, and limiting adverse impacts on growth” (IMF 2011) and relied
on three main elements: short-term financial assistance to manage the
current account deficit; fiscal reforms to reduce the government deficit
in the short and medium run; and structural reforms aimed at improving
Portugal’s growth prospects.
As the global financial crisis implied abrupt changes in access to exter-
nal finance, with endemic high fiscal deficits and rising public debt, the
main goals of the external assistance programme were to tackle the most
vicious handicaps of Portuguese economy, namely, a worrisome state of
18 C. G. COSTA
the banking system that has shut down access to affordable financing,
affecting the capacity of local firms to obtain loans, equity or venture
capital for their investment projects.
We should keep in mind that there were several restrictions to han-
dling economic policies: being a member of the euro area, Portugal
could not use the standard currency devaluation to help achieve exter-
nal equilibrium; as member of the WTO, it was harder to recur to beg-
gar thy neighbour policies, such as tax imports or exports subsidisation.
Also, debt restructuring was not an option, since it could trigger moral
hazard issues and fear of contagion. And, finally, the meaning of Troika
itself: being funded by three different entities, the programme had to be
agreed to by the EU and the ECB, and that is not a plain assumption
(Costa 2018; IOE 2016).
In spite of all misfortunes, Portugal has undertaken a very ambitious
structural reform programme since 2011, in order to quickly restore
credibility and to regain access to international capital markets. Reforms
were pursued across a wide range of policy areas, namely product mar-
kets, labour markets, taxes, regulations and the public sector (OECD
2017). It is worth mentioning that the programme was longer than
usual (three years instead of two) because it was driven by the view that
structural reforms should form an important part of the programme and
such reforms require time to implement (IOE 2016).
In the Portuguese case, more specifically, the Economic Adjustment
Programme included:
– structural reforms to boost potential growth, create jobs, and

improve competitiveness;
– a fiscal consolidation strategy, supported by structural fiscal meas-
ures and better fiscal control over public–private partnerships and
state-owned enterprises, aimed at putting the gross public debt-
to-GDP ratio on a firm downward path in the medium term and
reducing the deficit below 3% of GDP by 2014;
– a financial sector strategy based on recapitalisation and deleverag-
ing, with efforts to safeguard the financial sector against disorderly
deleveraging through market-based mechanisms supported by back-
stop facilities.
Labour market deserved an especial attention, since it was considered

too rigid, and the level of local competition too fragile, in result of a
lack of liberalisation in some services. As such, the main labour market

reforms aimed at reducing the level and duration of unemployment ben-
efits for future recipients, and imposing a reduction in severance pay-
ments for new and existing contracts. At the same time, it was also a goal
to increase the flexibility of working time arrangements (reduce the pay
and time off associated with overtime work, vacations and holidays) and
to improve wage-setting mechanisms by limiting automatic extensions of
collective agreements to firms that did not participate in the agreements.
The only measure that tried to reduce the impact on worker’s welfare
was the reduction of the worker’s contribution period necessary to be
eligible for unemployment insurance. There was, clearly, a quite unfair
distribution of the adjustment costs among economic and social agents
(Costa 2018).
Those reforms were combined with other types of measures for
modernising the public administration human capital skills and perfor-
mance, such as the targeting of areas with over-employment, overtime
pay or compensation to better attract qualified human capital, or equity
between public and private sector employment.
In what concerned the pension system reform, having been the main
driver behind the growth in government spending over the last dec-
ade, one of the main issues to be dealt with was the need to re-establish
equity between public and private pension systems: the average pension
in the civil service retirement system (CGA) is nearly three times higher
than an average pension in the general contributory regime (GCR), and
CGA retirees also worked fewer hours per week and fewer years before
retiring. Additionally, the system still provided incentives to costly early
retirement. All those factors provide government arguments for the
merging of CGA and GCR administrations. There was also some dis-
cussion going on about the implementation of sustainability factor to
all pensions, as a means to correct the existing intergenerational and
cross-occupational inequities. The government has also applied a consid-
erable number of changes in social spending programmes, such as fam-
ily benefits, unemployment insurance or minimum income guarantee, in
order to enhance efficiency and equity into to system.
The education and health systems were also considered an impor-
tant source of savings and rationalisation, since the government planned
to reduce the state’s role as a supplier of education and health services,
while strengthening its role as a standard setter and overseer, changing
teacher contracts, and moving to a new student-based funding formula
20 C. G. COSTA
for public schools, provide for a more efficient input mix and economies
of scale, by integrating into the National Health Service (SNS) the health
system of the civil services and the security forces.
The original targets were not achieved in any of the programme years,
and the focus of the programme changed, by shifting the nature of the
fiscal adjustment away from cuts in government spending and towards
tax increases. In practice, roughly 60% of the fiscal adjustment occurred
through tax increases and only 40% was implemented through cuts in
government spending (IOE 2016).
Although requiring a strong political leadership and maximum social
consensus, the programme was implemented under the new government
(liberal biased) surveillance, in a climate of organised protests and strikes
promoted by trade unions and anonymous citizens (Costa 2018).
Naturally, although inherent and in consequence of the reckless
behaviour of Portuguese political and economic leaders through more
than thirty years, the analysis of the crisis and its aftermath in Portugal
cannot be separated from the wider context of the European integration
process itself.
The Long and Winding Road: A Political Economy

Analysis of Seventy Years of the European Project
George Soros, one of the agents who has benefited the most from
Europe’s dissent and hesitations in crucial moments, argues that since
the financial crisis of 2008, the EU seems to have lost its way, by adopt-
ing measures of fiscal austerity that transformed the Eurozone into an
untenable relationship between creditors and debtors. Or, as Magone
(2014: 346) defends, the EU has moved from a community based on
solidarity to one divided into “haves” and “have-nots”, and from an atti-
tude of benevolence to one of conditionality.
EMU, and the European integration itself, was born out of economical
leveraged political factors: there was an imperative need to articulate Europe’s
main players’ interests, Germany and France, in a way that permitted dispa-
rate goals to converge into a common designium. This path would be attrac-
tive enough to lure the remaining, secondary, actors in the European play.
And it is not difficult to understand the reason why: after the experi-
ence of the European Monetary System (EMS), an asymmetric system
based on an anchored currency, France wanted to set up a structured
mechanism that prevented further monetary sovereignty allegiance
towards Germany. In the EMS framework, the German central bank,

the mighty, or do liberal-biased, Bundesbank, was, de facto, the central
player in defining the monetary policy for the German economy, and
through its influence in Europe’s economy and trade, to the remaining
members. For France, and the others, the situation was quite strenuous:
it could choose either to follow the Bundesbank´s lead (option A); or to
endure the costs that would have derived from the instability in mone-
tary markets (option B). France chose option A, and stood by the con-
sequences of Mundell Trilemma, or the Unholy Trinity, letting go of a
pro-domestic monetary policy, but enjoying, at least formally, some say-
ing in the definition of the future EMU monetary policy.
Germany became, thus, Europe’s monetary hegemonic player, fol-
lowing USA footsteps within the Bretton Woods System. EMU was
born, as a complex and fragile compromise between French desire to
curb German hegemony and Chancellor Kohl’s long-standing desire of
sustained peace between former belligerent countries through political
unification.
However, as convergent as political positions were, public opinion did
not share the same feelings: French citizens were relatively indifferent to
the monetary integration process, whereas Germans were openly against
it. They did not share their political leaders’ will to issue a common cur-
rency and monetary policy with the so-called PIIGS, those underproduc-
tive, profligate southern neighbours. Inspired, but not faithful to, by the
orthodoxy of Robert Mundell’s Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) the-
ory, the Maastricht Treaty enumerated the famous Convergence Criteria,
monetary and fiscal biased, an eliminatory stage on the road to EMU.
The participating countries have given up a series of economic policy
instruments (in particular, monetary and exchange policies and, to a lesser
extent, in the budgetary field), and they have not been given fundamen-
tal alternative measures to respond to short-term asymmetric shocks. In
the present context, this has led to very heavy losses of competitiveness.
EMU should not be considered an optimal currency area, which means
that, as a whole, it does not offer the right conditions for introducing
a common currency to all its members in a balanced, equitable way.
Therefore, the turmoil in the Greek sovereign equity market and severe
pressure on Spanish and Portuguese securities were no coincidence, but a
symptom of a fundamental truth, i.e. the euro is not an optimal currency
area. A number of significant academic surveys showed that, since the
introduction of the euro in 1999, the countries on the periphery of EMU
22 C. G. COSTA
have not only failed to achieve real convergence with the core countries,
but have actually deviated further and further from that goal.
The participation of those countries in the Eurozone has provided
them with a false sense of financial security, preventing them from con-
tinuing unpopular but necessary structural reforms. This has caused
substantial losses of competitiveness, leading to unsustainable public
and foreign debts and concerns about the solvency of several Member
States in the Eurozone, such as Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain. The
reasoning seems to be that markets require economic growth to happen
in order to share their blessing. This requires, in turn, fiscal restraint.
And without a fiscal union, squaring the circle is not an easy task to
accomplish.
In a first moment, global markets did not choose Europe as the inno-
cent lamb, since, if EMU were to be a full economic union, the yields
on sovereign debt would be equally trustable, no matter which coun-
try they represented. When they realised that EMU was not, in fact, an
OCA, they started to apply enormous pressure on the Eurozone’s weak-
est members, anticipating a unique response. But that one never came.
Europe’s main political leaders were not consensual on the ECB stance
regarding public debt, there was no concerted solution to tackle the
growing asymmetry among Eurozone economies sustainability.
As Dévoluy and Koenig (2011) claim, one of the key problems with
EMU is its historical context. Most part of experiences dealing with
monetary unions and common currencies were coincident with, or
immediately followed by, political integration. EMU stands as a notable
exception, since its members agreed on disposing of national currencies
and monetary policies, but made a strong point in keeping fiscal policy
domestic headed. We wonder what would be Europe’s Founding Fathers’
feelings on this, apparent, contradiction.
There are no innocent bystanders in this case. As Germany, and oth-
ers, insisted on preventing crisis from erupting through tight adjustment
policies, managing the crisis, when it did surge, was much more incoher-
ent. Besides applying disciplinary neoliberalism (David 2018), Germany,
and France, was the first to violate the Stability and Growth Pact, and
emerged harmless. Leniency towards Greek behaviour was also abnor-
mal: no one felt the need to audit Greek public accounts, even when
Greece did not meet any of the Maastricht Criteria in 1998, but man-
aged to comply with all of them only a year later, in an extraordinary
macroeconomic prowess.
Once again, the success of those measures depends on their govern-

ments’ strategy and firmness in standing up to social contestation and
a likely worsening recessive climate. Deflation processes and wage and
price cuts always have painful consequences. Invariably, countries are
plunged into a prolonged economic slump, high unemployment rates,
a dramatic rise in poverty and social exclusion and higher debt charges.
Gold Standard days are here to stay…
And it is worth remembering that EMU was conceived entirely
on Germany’s terms and that the Germans have been the main ben-
eficiaries of the positive externalities from a currency such as the
euro. The problem is that Ms Merkel’s idea of Germany and its posi-
tion in the European and world order was considerably different from
Mr. Kohl’s. When the Berlin Wall fell, the ideals of a pan-European
Union still meant a great deal in defining the path of European integra-
tion, and Germany was in the front line defending these ideals. Today’s
Germany has a much more pragmatic style. It has lost its post-war com-
plexes; it has cleaned its wounds and paid its bills. Fundamentally, it is
aware of its potential and its role in the European concert of nations.
And yet, Germany has a serious responsibility for what’s been happen-
ing in the Eurozone for the more recent years. Firstly, the emphasis on
crisis prevention via budget policy and European supervision served as
a pretext for not thinking about crisis management. Secondly, Germany
itself contributed to the weakening of the crisis prevention system, when
it joined France and other major EU member states in 2003 to prevent
the Excessive Deficit Procedure from being implemented, in clear vio-
lation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Also, the Greek problem could
have been solved a long time ago if Germany and other major EMU play-
ers had agreed on an audit of Greece’s public accounts. Finally, Germany
has enjoyed its competitiveness vis-à-vis other countries in the Eurozone,
not realising that the corresponding lack of competitiveness of Greece and
other countries was in fact undermining the very sustainability of EMU as
a whole. Besides, European leaders often tend to forget that solidarity is
what makes the difference between a free trade zone and economic union.
The issue of conditionality also made its appearance in these days,
exacerbating the divide between Northern and Southern European
countries. As Magone argues, the crisis of the PIIGS (the infamous acro-
nym that was used to denominate the profligate countries, Portugal,
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) is also a crisis of the European social
capitalism (2014).
24 C. G. COSTA
This leads to evidence another important fact that relates to the

European context: the European EMU was built on the basis of a fun-
damental, and illusory, preposition: that it would be sufficient to define
a set of requirements, primarily regarding financial and monetary pol-
icy targets, to ensure that a group of countries, deeply heterogeneous in
terms of socio-economic development and even economic policy prac-
tices, were in a position to bear the shock caused by the introduction of
a common currency. The idea was that the simple fulfillment of those
nominal convergence criteria would be sufficient to ensure so-called real
convergence and the identity of living standards. However, if differences
between countries have passed unnoticed during times of economic
growth, as was the case in the early years of the euro, even with the con-
stant appreciation of the euro undermining the competitiveness of the
area as a whole, the global crisis has shown the structural difficulties in
defining common economic policies for realities with different needs and
objectives (Costa 2011). The EU, and its political leaders, was unable to
address the market forces and stop the crisis from spreading around. In
the absence of a strong, coherent and strategic leadership, the crisis evi-
denced the dangers of inducing a real convergence from monetary and
financial criteria, when in the presence of such disparate economic, and
political, structures. And, as expected, the most fragile countries paid the
higher price.
The Consequences: Some Say the World Will End

in Fire; Some Say in Ice…3
After years of distress of painful austerity measures that led to the impov-
erishment of a significant part of the population, a widening of social and
economic disparities, unsustainable levels of unemployment and a sus-
tained drain in human capital skills due to migration, it is not easy to
provide for an accurate assessment of the impact of the latest crisis in
Portuguese economy and society.
As we have mentioned earlier, the main justification for recurring
to foreign help was that Portuguese economy was no longer able to
finance itself in international financial markets at affordable rates. And,
from that perspective, we might say that it was the main outcome of
the programme: Portugal did regain access to capital markets, and from
this perspective, the programme was an unambiguous success. Another
criterion is to assess whether Portugal was (is) on a sustainable path in
terms of government debt and net foreign liabilities (Reis 2015). Several
analysts argue that the sustainability of government debt and net foreign
liabilities remains fragile. Portugal failed to meet its deficit targets in all
the years of the programme, but it is a fact that the country’s current
account improved much more rapidly than envisaged in the original
programme: exports grew faster than expected and imports fell by more
than expected. But it is widely discussed to what extent that evolution
was a consequence of the recession and its immediate aftermath itself:
the growth in exports overwhelmingly reflected a return to trend from
the depressed levels associated with the financial crisis. And the unex-
pected fall in imports might simply reflect the unexpected severity of the
recession. In part, this fragility reflects the fact that structural reforms did
produce persistently higher growth rates of productivity or real GDP.
As Frieden (2016: 4) puts it, “debt and balance of payments crises
are politically controversial. In the aftermath of such crises, conflict typ-
ically breaks out over how the burden of adjustment will be distributed.
There is an international conflict, between debtor nations and credi-
tor nations, over how outstanding debts will be resolved. And there is
a conflict within nations, over who will make the sacrifices necessary to
get economies back on track”. In the case of EU, as Rodrigues and Reis
(2012) argue, the Euro came to consolidate a division between the core
“Northern” countries, led by Germany and the Netherlands, which reg-
istered important surpluses in their current accounts and therefore capi-
tal outflows, and the peripheral “Southern” countries, registering deficits
in their current accounts and inflows of financial capital. It is also a divi-
sion between growth and economic development models, the difficult
coexistence of credit-led and export-led models of growth in Europe,
which makes the financial surpluses of the European periphery respon-
sible for its current account deficits (Rodrigues and Reis 2012). This led
to the imposition of deflationary policies that increase unemployment,
recession and the probability of defaults, in the absence of an alternative
narrative to neoliberal orthodoxy (Costa 2011).
The IMF assessment also enlightens what it considers to be the major
achievements of the adjustment programme: the increased flexibility of
labour market dynamics, due to the reduced duration and level of unem-
ployment benefits, while increasing eligibility for those benefits; reduced
severance pay for regular employment contracts; and simplified individ-
ual and collective dismissal procedures. In what concerns public sector
reforms, there’s a well-accomplished reorganisation of local and central
26 C. G. COSTA
governments, improvement of the efficiency and governance of state-

owned enterprises, reform of procurement procedures, and efficiency
measures in the health sector. In the field of product market reforms,
they detach the process of privatisation, the strengthening of the power
of the competition authority, the simplifying licensing procedures or the
phasing out regulated tariffs on electricity and gas. The pension reform
measures prescribed the increase of pension contributions of pub-
lic sector workers and raised the retirement age, by indexing it to life
expectancy. Also, financial reforms were able to apply measures to help
deleverage the banking system, by progressively setting higher capital
requirements, and tax reforms included broadening the base of the per-
sonal income tax and the value added tax (VAT), as well as an increas-
ing property and car registration taxes. To sum up, according to IOE
(2016), a true fiscal devaluation was not implemented, structural reforms
were incomplete and the original fiscal targets were not met.
On the positive side, it is acknowledged that Portugal achieved real,
though limited, success in making the labour market more flexible and
increasing the ease of doing business, according to the evaluation of
organisations such as the World Competitiveness Forum, on the features
countries display in order to attract foreign investment.
However, as for Greece and Spain, cuts in research and innovation
expenses, along with the migration of thousands of highly qualified
young professionals due to unemployment levels, did affect the capacity
of firms to innovate, preventing the country from changing its special-
isation into higher value-added activities. According to the Portuguese
Institute of Statistics (INE 2015), there were nearly 350,000 people
leaving the country between 2011 and 2015, over 100,000 each year.
And the most worrisome part being the rising share of younger people,
with higher qualifications: in 2011, those people represented 47% of
total migrants, and in 2014, over 60% of people leaving the country were
aged between 20 and 39 years. Although it is possible to depict a slight
deceleration in 2015, it still remains that this represents a relevant loss in
human capital stock, in a growing ageing and skill-less society.
In what concerns expenses in research and development activities,
the diagnostic is also bleak: after a constant growth since 2009, when it
reached 1.6% of GDP, there has been a regular decrease between 2011
and 2014, to 1.3% of GDP. In the same period, there was also a sig-
nificant reduction in the number of scholarships for Masters and Ph.D.
students and grants to research centres, from the main funding agency,
Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) (Pordata 2017).
In what concerns social issues, the consequences are, unfortunately,
easier to assess. Portugal has traditionally been a country swept by signif-
icant inequalities and poverty, among wide parts of its population. The
onset of the financial and the sovereign debt crisis, as well as the austerity
measures in the adjustment programme, marked a turning point. In spite
of the progress registered in the first decade of the new century, there is
an increase in the level of inequalities within Portuguese society. These
two plagues have been particularly devastating on children and youths
(OECD 2017).
In line with the structurally low levels of human capital qualification,
Portugal has some of the lowest wages in the European context, and
wide wage asymmetries induced by higher wages. In 2015, the average
income of Portuguese workers (employed) was 25.887 euros in par-
ity power purchase (PPP), against 35.741 euros PPC for the EU. And
Portuguese minimum wage was 756 euros PPP, behind Greece, Poland
or Malta, when the Luxembourger worker received 1597 euros PPP, also
in 2015. Additionally, the poverty rate rose between the years of 2009
and 2014, from 17.9 to 19.5%, well above the EU average, especially in
younger parts of the population (children and under 25) which convenes
Portugal to early century statistics, revealing a notorious deterioration of
Portuguese families’ living conditions.
Rodrigues (2016) also disentangles two famous and widespread
myths: the austerity policies did not exempt from ordeal poorer fami-
lies, on the contrary. In spite of being spared from wages and pension’s
cuts, the removal, the brutal reduction and elimination of social transfers
(such as Social Income, Family Allowances or the Elderly Supplement)
plunged thousands of families into acute poverty. The second misconcep-
tion relates to those most affected by the crisis and the austerity meas-
ures that followed: although official statements and even some social
media placed the burden of adjustment in the wealthier tier of the pop-
ulation and a part of the middle class, it is now clear that the income
of the bottom 10% was slashed by 25%, the main reason being job loss,
while the top and intermediate tier incomes decreased 10%. According
to Rodrigues (2016), the result of all these restrictive policies was the
impoverishment of Portuguese society and a greater risk of disintegration
and social cohesion.
28 C. G. COSTA
Happy Days Are Here to Stay?

In 2015, a general election was held, and the centre-right party, Social
Democrat Party (PSD), led by the incumbent prime minister, Passos
Coelho, was the most voted party, but it did not reach votes to form
a stable government. The Socialist Party (PS), led by Antonio Costa,
the second most voted party, managed to build a coalition with the two
hard-left parties, the Communists (traditional orthodox) and Bloco de
Esquerda (progressive radical left), which compromised to support a
minority socialist government in exchange for some mild policy conces-
sions. This solution was seen, national and European wide, as a very risky
adventure, since there were significant differences between PS and its
left-wing supporters: the latter wanted to leave Eurozone and NATO, to
write off public debt and bring a large array of industrial sectors back to
government property and control. Portugal’s European partners voiced
its doubts on the sustainability of the agreement and creditors feared
that the new government would start a reckless spending spree and scare
away investors and rating agencies.
Indeed, some of the former reforms were reversed, the most debata-
ble ones being the public servant wages and pension’s cuts, and halting
public transport privatisation. However, in spite of the leftist wing, the
main tenets of the former government were kept: the main focus of the
powerful Finance Minister, Mário Centeno, continued to rely on public
finances equilibrium and providing for the stability of the financial sec-
tor, rather than expanding investment or public services. These measures
were aimed at constantly reassuring international creditors that the coun-
try would keep all its compromises and follow the orthodox discipline
that endures EU most relevant players, namely Germany and other north
European countries. Mr. Centeno’s stance has been so convincing that
he has been elected President of the Eurogroup, the council of finance
ministers for the Eurozone.
And, yet, against all odds, or at least some of them, the economy
strived, with the help of Portuguese trade partners’ recovery (it is worth
noticing that over 70% of Portuguese exports are headed to EU coun-
tries), the ECB’s bond-buying initiatives, the boom in tourism and, nat-
urally, the previous government reform programme.
As expected, one of the main consequences of the adjustment pro-
gramme was the coming down of the economy’s growth poten-
tial, due to the lack of investment and a diminishing labour force
(OECD 2017). In order to address those challenges, the Portuguese

government launched, in April 2016, the National Reforms Programme,
a medium-term development strategy (25 billion euros) in the fields of
qualifications, innovation, territorial enhancement, modernisation of the
State, capitalisation of firms and social cohesion and equity, to tackle the
structural constraints in three main areas: productivity and competitive-
ness; indebtedness and social cohesion and reducing inequality. The pro-
gramme provides specific measures, such as Capitalizar, a set of policies
to strengthen and diversify the diversification of the financing sources for
companies, through tax reliefs for investment in start-ups and SME. The
qualification axis of the NRP contains measures to reduce the number
of school dropouts and of NEETs (those not in education, employment
or training). In particular, the Qualifica Programme focuses on adult
education and training, complementing a process of certification with
training.
Human capital is, probably, the most structural constraint of
Portuguese economy and society, since the average skills of Portuguese
citizens are quite low (both in the OECD and EU context): only 2/5
of the working-age population and 2/3 of young adults have attained
upper secondary education, and 1/3 of young adults have reached a ter-
tiary education, placing the country nearly at the bottom of the ranking
(OECD 2017). As expected, this relates directly to widening income ine-
quality and lower productivity, jeopardising real convergence.
And past structural reforms seem to have definitely contributed to
improving the country’s recovery through exports: in 2005, exports
counted for less than 30% of GDP, while, in 2017, they represent over
40%. Although imports have recently begun to surge again, the growth
in exports has made external liabilities to narrow, and the current
account deficit to turn into a surplus. Still, mixed signs loom large: the
fragility of the financial system (high share of non-performing loans),
high indebtedness of the private and public sectors, significant structural
reforms that have not been undertaken. Remarkably, unemployment
accounts, seemingly, for the best performance, since it remains under 9%,
after having reached over 16% in 2013. However, youth unemployment
of 24% reflects significant remaining challenges in the labour market, as
well as long-term unemployment, which affects over 60% of unemployed
population.
The latest data for Portuguese labour market show a considerable
decrease in unemployment numbers, conveying a sense of recovering
30 C. G. COSTA
from the ordeal. However, it should be kept in mind that the employ-
ment that has been created is of very short duration, one might even
call it precarious, affecting younger and more qualified active population.
This is quite worrying, since having been behind the increases in income
inequality in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is a clear evidence
of the dual labour market and the low level of qualification of active
population.
Also, according to the Euro Plus Barometer (2017), labour costs are
an imperfect gauge of competitiveness: they have asserted that, since
2009, wage pressures have converged within the Eurozone: the five res-
cued countries are the ones that have cut their labour costs more deeply
(Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, in this order). It is interest-
ing to notice that, in its latest report, they consider the crisis to be the
“handmaidens of change”, since it was ultimately due to the pressure of
crisis (and the IMF and the EU) that governments at the euro periphery
undertook some of the structural reforms to enhance respective econo-
mies into sustainable growth.
Finally, OECD data reveal that the Eurozone has entered a new stage,
with a special focus on Portugal: since 2015, the new government main-
tained fiscal discipline, but rolled back some structural reforms, raising
the pro-austerity defenders’ alert.
Conclusions: Nothing Gold Can Stay?

The world economy faced its most troublesome event since the end of
the Second World War: the financial and economic crisis in 2008, and
the spreading of the consequences to other regions. Europe was not
immune to the plague. And the original sins in the integration process
came wide open.
In fact, EMU resembles a contemporaneous Gold Standard: a coun-
try’s surplus can only be sustained by another country’s deficit. And
in a context of advanced globalisation, technological challenges and a
growing popular divorce from European issues, the EMU countries are
plagued by disturbing heterogeneity: in economic and sociodevelop-
ment, policy preferences and even institutional preferences. And that has
made all the difference. As Goodman (2018) argues, from its inception,
austerity carried a whiff of moral righteousness, as if those who delivered
it were sober-minded grown-ups.
In what concerns the most affected countries, mistakes were serious,

the adjustment programmes were blunt, and the lessons are supposed
to have been learnt. A fundamental lesson from the Portuguese crisis
is that disruptive sudden stops can affect countries that are members of
currency unions, even when those unions involve advanced economies.
The problem is that EMU is not a fiscal union, and this might lead some
prominent economists and academics to underestimate the dangers of
persistent current account deficits in that specific context (Costa 2011;
De Grauwe 2013).
But it should also be in the mindsets of other European leaders,
namely the ones who are ahead of the most powerful economies in the
EU, that, within an economic and monetary union, no one benefits from
poor, distressed and excluded countries and regions. And that rules, once
defined, are to be respected by all members of the EU, not differentiated
according to economic power or political influence.
As Hall (2014) argues, if European countries want to succeed, they
will have to learn the lesson from the inter-war years, that a single pat-
tern of policy is the solution to all the problems, instead of fighting for
multiple social and economic models.
The project of building a strong economic and political bond among
European countries began before the signing of the first treaties, and,
from the first years, the process acquired a life of its own. After having
been based almost exclusively on the opening and liberalisation of mar-
kets, in the early 1990s, it launched itself into more ambitious projects
involving a considerable political commitment. What we often tend to
forget is that, in almost every determinant moment of the European
integration saga, the fundamentals were mainly of a political kind.
Economics worked as an operational tool. If that was not the case, the
project would not have probably survived so far. In a time when almost
all European political leaders complain about Eurosceptic feelings,
detachment and active or passive indifference from population to the
European integration process, discriminating among countries is not
a bright or sustainable strategy. We should not forget that Europe was
founded on solidarity and on the need to maintain peace, but all this
happened more than sixty years ago. Times have definitely changed. “I
have always believed that Europe would be built through crises, and that
it would be the sum of their solutions” (Jean Monnet 1978).
32 C. G. COSTA
Notes
1. New York Times; 29 May 2018. In Britain, Austerity Is Changing
Everything. Peter Goodman.
2. Expression taken from The Lusiadas, written masterpiece of one of the
greatest Portuguese poets of all times, Luís de Camões.
3. “Fire and Ice”, in You Come Too, 1916; Poems by Robert Frost.
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Recovery, and Policy Options: Portugal and the Euro. GEE Papers, nº72.
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Imbalances on a Fragmented European Union. Global Business & Economics
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Costa, C. (2018). Portuguese Economy: How (Not) to Get Away with Financial
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37(6), 1223–1243. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.929352.
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of Macroeconomics, 39, 260–271.
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June. https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_destaques&
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188–205.
CHAPTER 3
The President of the Republic and the

Management of the Eurocrisis
Rui Graça Feijó
Introduction: History, Politics and Institutions

Portugal is often portrayed as a backward country whose fate is to follow
more advanced nations. In the political history of the twentieth century,
this view does not hold: Portugal was a pioneering country in several
domains at different junctures.
Portugal is a Republic since October 5, 1910—the third country in
twentieth-century Europe to live under such a regime after Switzerland
(1648) and France (1870). The installment of the First Republic in
Lisbon was the first of the century, preceding the wave that swept
Europe in the wake of World War I. For over a century, this regime
has coexisted with the three government systems compatible with a
Republic—parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism.
This places Portugal as one of the European countries with more experi-
ence in institutional arrangements regarding presidential powers.
R. G. Feijó (*) 
Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal
R. G. Feijó 
Institute for Contemporary History, Nova University, Lisbon, Portugal

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_3
36 R. G. FEIJÓ
The First Republic (1910–1926) was installed after a century of con-

stitutional monarchy. The Parliamentary Republic was conducive to
a great deal of political instability: Portugal had 8 presidents, 7 elected
parliaments, 45 governments with 40 different heads of government
and 2 provisional juntas. During World War I, there was a brief inter-
regnum when Sidónio Pais (1872–1918) led a military coup, introduced
República Nova, amended the constitution that installed a presidential-
ist (authoritarian) system, and organised a direct presidential election
with the widest suffrage the country had experienced (Feijó 2012)—
only to collapse with the murder of the President-King (as the poet
Fernando Pessoa would call him) a year after he had seized power. The
Constitution of 1911 was reinstalled, and Sidónio’s legacy would resur-
face years later after the fall of the First Republic.
Notwithstanding the many achievements of the First Republic and the
irreversible nature of many of those—including the republican regime—
an enduring correlation was established between a parliamentary system,
social unrest and political instability (Martins 2018).
The fall of the First Republic at the hands of military rebels on May
28, 1926, was followed by a brief period of instability in which the
military assumed prominent roles, including the control of the presi-
dency that would last for sixty years, leading to the stable Estado Novo
(1933–1974). Portugal ranks among the first countries to embark in the
right-wing authoritarianism that characterise the inter-war period. The
Constitution of 1933 instituted a presidentialist system. However, this
was a fake regime, as the true holder of power was the head of govern-
ment, António de Oliveira Salazar (1889–1970). The “President of the
Council of Ministers” was actually the centre of power in Portugal, and
no president ever attempted to remove him from office. A classification
of this system as “presidentialism of the prime minister” which will resur-
face in the late 1980s in the words of a conservative politician—Adriano
Moreira (1987)—was then adequately coined.
As the “Carnations Revolution” broke out on 25 April 1974, most
people associated a parliamentary regime with instability and turmoil,
and presidentialism with authoritarianism and repression. Without a clear
and tested alternative model to inspire its leaders, the search was on for
a new system that would supersede the negative features of the two pre-
vious experiences. Eventually, Portugal adopted a semi-presidential form
of government, when this model was only marginally adopted in Europe,
with the exception of France’s Fifth Republic—a model that was far
3 THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC … 37
from academic considerations before Maurice Duverger introduced the

theme in a seminal book in 1978 and in a much-acclaimed article for the
English-speaking world in 1980.
The model adopted by the Constituição da República Portuguesa
(CRP) emerged in response to a vast array of questions which go beyond
the conjuncture of the revolutionary years and contribute to the longev-
ity of the solution that was adopted. John M. Carey (2000) argued that
the implications of choices resulting from negotiations taking place at the
time of the creation of institutions are felt on the long term, assuming a
quasi-structural role in shaping political expectations. In a broader theo-
retical framework, this approach fits what the social sciences literature, in
the wake of the economist and Nobel Prize laureate Douglass North, has
termed path dependence or “a way to narrow conceptually the choice set
and to link decision making through time” (1990).
This sort of arguments, in turn, suggest that consideration should be
paid to historical causes that converge on the choice of a model for the
powers vested in the head of state (Freire and Costa Pinto 2010; Braga
da Cruz 2017).
The decision to move with a direct election by universal suffrage
responded to the need of institutionalising a model which would allow
the military leadership to obtain a solid democratic legitimacy and
favour the evolution of the regime in the sense of subordinating mili-
tary power to civilian rule—even if paradoxically the adopted formula did
restrict partisan power and assured the survival of the military Council
of the Revolution (Gaspar 1990: 15). In this sense, those parties that
seconded the military who were in power should support the election
of one of them for president, who would in turn assume to behave as
an “independent” figure, not associated with any particular party, situ-
ating the realm of his action “above the party fray”. The main political
parties respected the idea of a military candidate, but it is important to
note that the “implicit clause” seems to have had another consequence
resisting the passing of time: the idea that presidents should be “inde-
pendent” and facilitate compromises in a system characterised by party
fragmentation as expected in the wake of the adoption of proportional
representation.
Other important factors played their part in the emergence of the
government system adopted in 1976. First, the Processo Revolucionário
em Curso (PREC—the “ongoing revolutionary process”) had estab-
lished the desire of very large sectors of the population to be part of
38 R. G. FEIJÓ
the political process. Even after the defeat of the radical elements who
praised direct democracy, this desire for participation would be man-
ifested in massive electoral turnout in 1975 and 1976. It would have
been unwise to devise a model for the choice of the highly symbolically
charged function that would not mobilise the entire political body of the
nation. As Jean Blondel argued, the role of presidents in processes of
nation-building or regime change is often critical, as “the president may
contribute markedly to the legitimation of the regime, since he or she
controls the one ‘institution’ which has ‘universal visibility’” (Blondel
2015).
Secondly, the memory of important presidential campaigns under
Estado Novo, namely those of Norton de Matos (1949) and above all
that of Humberto Delgado (1958), called for the reinstatement of the
historical tradition of direct elections, if for no other reason, the symbol-
ism it enshrined.
Thirdly, Portugal possesses a political culture that accentuates the
personalisation of authority, calling for the emergence of a democratic
model tributary to a strong symbol legitimised by popular elections
(Salgado de Matos 1983). In this sense, the legacy of Sidonio Pais’
República Nova has endured more than the brief period of his tenure.
In another context, the personalisation of politics would take new turns
under CRP, as Marina Costa Lobo (2007) has discussed regarding the
emergence of powerful prime ministers. Direct presidential elections
were thus a natural consequence.
In fact, the direct election of the president, mainly if he was a per-
sonality characterised by his independence vis-à-vis political parties,
emerged as a solution capable of rationalising institutional life and mit-
igate weaknesses of a young party system. The presidential prerogative
to choose a prime minister, combined with the fact that prime minis-
ters are not required to submit their programme to a vote in the House,
represents an element of flexibility for political solutions, allowing for
minority governments to be installed and rule, and facilitating a rotation
of majorities. Under these terms, one might conclude that the institu-
tional model adopted in CRP represented a short-term response that
rose above its time, as it proved well adapted to systemic needs of the
nascent Portuguese democracy. Even some elements that might appear
time-bound, like the “independent” nature of presidents, turned out to
be enshrined in the matrix of the political system. The president is thus a
first rate actor.
Presidents and Political Parties

The duality of powers inscribed at the core of the semi-presidentialist sys-
tem implies that
parties face distinct dilemmas of candidate selection and campaign strat-

egy […] because the characteristics that facilitate winning a direct presi-
dential election differ from the characteristics of a good legislative leader
[given that] the best potential agent from the party’s point of view maybe
incapable of winning a direct presidential election, while the candidate
most likely to win a national direct election may be less likely to serve as a
faithful party agent. (Samuels and Shugart 2010)
Maurice Duverger (1996) noted that the high profile of the president
in Fifth Republic created a situation in which “the party system […] has
been organized around the election of a President by universal suffrage”
and the coincidence of party leadership with the candidate to the presi-
dency is the rule. Once elected, the French president becomes either the
leader of the parliamentary majority or that of the minority—and does
not shy away from assuming he is a party agent.
In the case of Portugal, Carlos Jalali expressed the view that “the
position of the prime minister has been the central locus of political
leadership throughout the democratic period and remains the key
political prize for parties” (2011). The rule is that party leaders dispute
the legislative elections, and leave the presidential ones for politicians
with a different profile. This sort of strategy opens doors to a multiplic-
ity of options: to endorse a “senatorial” figure from within the party
ranks, to support an individual without party affiliation whose political
views are located in the same ideological spectrum, refrain from pre-
senting their own candidate and transfer the support to the incumbent,
or even not to interfere officially in the presidential campaign. As a sen-
ior member of the current socialist cabinet confided to me a propos
presidential elections in which the party chose not to endorse any can-
didate in spite of being in government, “presidential elections are not
our battleground”.
In the Portuguese political arena, the status of the president is often
described as being “independent”. In which sense can we take this asser-
tion for valid?
40 R. G. FEIJÓ
Dawn Brancati (2008) sustains that “[t]he one characteristic of all

independent candidates is that they are not affiliated with any politi-
cal party”. In many pieces of political literature, this term is virtually
interchangeable with “non-party membership”. In this specific sense,
Portugal’s first elected president after the 1974 Carnations Revolution
was “independent”: General Ramalho Eanes had no party affiliation at
the time of his election in 1976.
However, there are more complex cases both in literature and in prac-
tical ways of referring to the “independence” of presidents. This objec-
tive statement is but one of “multiple, occasionally conflicting usages”
with which the term has been associated, as “independent candidates
constitute a highly diverse category of politicians” (Ehin et al. 2013).
Following the suggestion of Piret Ehin and her colleagues, one can
devise a more complex notion of “independence”, using it
to denote electoral candidates whose nomination is not subject to appoint-

ment or endorsement by a political party (or functional equivalent).
Independent candidates are not included in the electoral list of any politi-
cal party, and the information provided in the ballot does not link them to
any party in any manner. (Ehin et al. 2013)
We have now a broader definition of “independent” candidate. Party

affiliation is no longer the litmus test, and can happen in empirical cases
that are so referred. One may thus consider as “independent” candidates
in presidential elections those who have an affiliation with a political
party but do not present themselves as flag-bearers of their party, rather
insisting that they represent a wider platform, and are not, in general,
leaders of the party.
Portugal is a good example of this broader definition of
“independent” candidates. In parallel to some instances of individuals
who conform to the narrower definition, the broader understanding is
useful to account for the civilians who have been presidents in Portugal
as from 1986. This view has been clearly expressed by President Mário
Soares who claimed that
The President of the Republic should have as far as possible a consen-

sual role, to place himself above the natural party’s controversies, and
his action feature an accentuated independence. He should not claim
to be part of any majority – even the one that elected him – against
any other eventual partisan majorities, especially those that are formed
in the legislative process in parliament, nor should he seek to bring ben-
efice, in the course of his actions, to any single party of whatever kind,
and least of all should he seek to form his own party. (quoted in Braga
da Cruz 1994)
Arguably, the politicians aspiring to be perceived as “independent” fall

in the third category devised by to Maurice Duverger’s for the analysis
of the relationships between presidents and governments in semi-
presidential regimes: presidents who are leaders of the governmental
majority, presidents who are leaders of the opposition to the parliamen-
tary majority (in situations that have been labelled as “cohabitation”),
and “presidents without majority” (1996). In this sense, one may recall
the premonitory words of Luis Salgado de Matos (1986) who stated
that “Portugal normally has a majority without president and a president
without majority”.
However, there is no way of denying what Jorge Fernandes and
Carlos Jalali (2017) have termed “congruency” between the president
and government majority—a circumstance that in itself does not chal-
lenge the supra-partisan nature of the president’s mandate nor guar-
antees a leading role for the head of state. On the contrary, when such
“congruency” takes place, it may also happen that the fulcrum of power
resides in the hands of the prime minister rather than in those of the
president whose room for manoeuvre may thus be more limited than
extended. Evidence suggests that sustaining independence vis-à-vis the
government has contributed—with a relevant exception—to “maintain
the president as the most popular and best-regarded figure in Portuguese
politics” (Jalali 2011).
Institutional and Political Junctures

in the Definition of the President’s Role
When the first president was re-elected in 1980, Portugal had seen six
constitutional governments, five different PMs and a special mid-term
election alongside a normal one. The spectre of instability was haunting
the Second Republic. As the agreed transitional period was approaching
its end, serious consideration was devoted to revising CRP in what per-
tains to the political system.
42 R. G. FEIJÓ
The main novelty brought by the 1982 revision was the abolishment of
the Council of the Revolution (CR). Powers entrusted to CR were redis-
tributed among some bodies that were created anew (Council of State—
an advisory board to the president—and Constitutional Court), others
to already existing ones. The president saw his powers being altered: his
capacity to act independently was enlarged, namely in the case of the dis-
solution of parliament that became a discretionary competence; conversely,
they seem to have been reduced when conditions were set for his capacity
to dismiss a prime minister. The dual responsibility of the prime minister
before the president and the parliament remained in force. For Marcelo
Rebelo de Sousa, acting as a constitutionalist back in 1984,
[t]he current government system is semi-presidential, with a tendency

for the equilibrium between its two main components, and it may evolve
either in the direction of more significant presidential intervention or in
that of a more important parliamentary component
His suggestion is that the regime would evolve mostly due to political
factors (such as the first single party majority in 1987) without requiring
a substantial alteration of the terms of the Constitution.
Even if political circumstances may dictate that for a while the visibil-
ity or the actual power of presidents is clouded, one has to bear in mind
the useful assertion of two leading constitutionalists for whom
the powers and the constitutional competences of the organs of sov-

ereignty do not lapse by disuse, and the fact that for a larger or smaller
period of time a restrictive understanding or a position of contention has
been adopted does not prevent the full recovery of all the constitutional
capacities. (Canotilho and Moreira 1991)
The novelties introduced by the revision, however, called for changes in

the way elected presidents discharge their functions. Mário Soares, the
first civilian president in sixty years, inaugurated the new monk’s robe.
It combined the continuation of structural features dating back from
1976, namely the “independent” nature of the presidency in the political
arena, with some novelties that would persist beyond his term in office.
Mário Soares position was made clear in the evening of his elec-
tion. Addressing a crowd of supporters, he claimed: “There is no
such thing as a presidential majority”. He also said he would suspend
his formal affiliation with the socialist party, symbolically returning his
card as militant number one of the socialist party. And finally, he pro-
nounced the words that are the motto of subsequent presidents: “I shall
be the president of every Portuguese”. President Soares inherited from
President Eanes the idea of the president as an independent actor. In
this light, he coined an expression that has endured beyond his term:
“The president discharges a magistracy of influence”. During President
Soares’ terms, the parliament was dissolved only once; two consecutive
legislatures lasted for the normal four years; the country had only two
prime ministers and four governments, the last of which would endure
for three and a half years after the presidential term. The contrast with
the time of his predecessor could not be more telling, given that political
circumstances and institutional provisions had changed. But also because
the president had a different vision of the best way to discharge his func-
tions which gained traction in the country, translated in high approval
rates and a record 70.35% of the vote at re-election.
The theoretical origins of the status of the president in the political
system can be traced a very long way back to the early modern Polish
leader Jan Zamoyski’s (1542–1605) utterance that rex regnat sed non
gubernat (the king reigns but does not govern) which was made popu-
lar by the French politician Louis Adolphe Thiers (1797–1877). Also in
the nineteenth-century, Benjamin Constant (1767–1830) formulated a
critique of Montesquieu and sustained that a better equilibrium would
be generated by the introduction of a fourth, “neutral” or “moderating”
power alongside executive, legislative and judiciary. Maurice Duverger
sustained that this contribution might be useful to explain the status of
“presidents without majority”. In fact, Portugal had expressly adopted
Constant formula in its Constitutional Chart of 1826 (Sardica 2012),
the longest surviving constitution of the country, which was an impor-
tant source for the 1976 CRP (Miranda 1978).
The CRP seems to espouse such a concept when it defines as “organs
of sovereignty” the President of the Republic, the Assembly of the
Republic, the Government (i.e. the cabinet) and the Courts (article
110.1). Each of those organs is vested with specific competences, and
thus the president and the executive are not deemed to discharge over-
lapping functions. The president is not the chief executive. However,
he is entrusted with four major areas of intervention in public life, apart
from his symbolic role as guarantor of national unity and sovereignty as
44 R. G. FEIJÓ
an independent state: the powers of the word, of the sword, legislative

supervision, and appointment and dismissal of public officers.
However, the letter of CRP does not exhaust presidential powers, as
“there are spaces in which the constitution refrains from establishing an
exhaustive regulation, leaving a more or less generous margin of indeter-
minacy, which only the course of time will translate into constitutional
customs, conventions and doxa” (Canotilho and Moreira 1991). This
is what Giovani Sartori (1997) called “material constitution”, and its
importance has to be underlined as António de Araújo (2003) remarked
that
it is not possible to understand the weight of the President of the Republic

in the Portuguese government system without paying due attention to the
important informal mechanisms at his disposal, mainly when those mech-
anisms are articulated and interact with the so-called “de facto powers”
(media, groups of interest, unions) […] The Palace of Belém can become
an important center for political struggle even when the President does not
exercise any of the powers that the Constitution bestows upon him.
This is the framework for the analysis of presidential activity that

emerged after the 1982 constitutional revision, and that the two terms of
President Soares contributed to clarify and, to an extent, solidify.
The Eurocrisis and Presidential Responses
The Presidency of Aníbal Cavaco Silva (2006–2016)

Professor Aníbal Cavaco Silva (born 1939) is a university lecturer in
public finance, member of the first partisan centre-right government
after the revolution, and leader of PSD and prime minister for ten years
(1985–1995), who was elected president in 2006, serving for two
terms (2006–2016). He is the longest serving politician in democratic
Portugal, and the only to have won four absolute majorities (two as
party leader, two as presidential candidate). Yet, in 1996, just after step-
ping down from party leader and prime minister, he ran his only unsuc-
cessful campaign, and was beaten by Jorge Sampaio (46% vs. 54%). At
that juncture, he was clearly hampered for being perceived as a direct
party agent and could not create a broader coalition required to cap-
ture votes outside his political area. Claiming not to be a “professional
politician”, he retired into the university, and slowly built a new persona:
the senior statesman who distanced himself from the realm of party pol-
itics to the point that he wrote an article applying Gresham law to the
prime minister and government of his own party. When he restated his
bid for the presidency, although formally endorsed by centre-right par-
ties, he had carved a public profile of a wise man above partisan subor-
dination, and ran his campaign without the presence of the leaders of
supporting parties. As he wrote, he aspired “to serve Portugal and the
Portuguese and not any group in special, to be President of the Republic
and not of right or left, to be a last resort reserve in case of a serious cri-
sis” (Cavaco Silva 2017).
The self-presentation of Cavaco Silva in 2006 was of a man with
long political experience as well as technical expertise in critical matters
of public finance and economics in general. They would be an electoral
asset, but a liability in terms of his mandate when the Eurocrisis struck
Portugal.
From his long experience as prime minister, a soundbite he once
pronounced was repeated time and again: “Let us work” (Cavaco Silva
2004). This dictum, together with his generalised use of the expression
“blockage forces” in which the presidency was included, and referred to
all horizontal accountability instances, found their roots in his interpreta-
tion of the constitution that stressed the importance of the parliament as
the true centre of powers and consequently reduced those of the presi-
dent (Cavaco Silva 2002). Cavaco Silva long experience as prime minister
made him prisoner of his own past words, associated with a minimalist
interpretation of his new functions. The economic expertise in matters of
public finance might have made an impact should the president assume a
higher profile. As it happened, the 2008 crisis hit Portugal quite severely
in 2010, and this had a negative impact on the perception of the pres-
ident’s performance as the country plunged into a deep recession, his
expertise being unable to mitigate the brutal effects of austerity (Freire
and Santana-Pereira 2017).
His first option after being elected in 2006 was to offer the socialist
majority government “strategic cooperation” (Cavaco Silva 2017): “A
president serves better his country if he adopts a constructive approach
and searches for his own space in the implicit powers of influence”—he
wrote—“rather than using the negative powers conferred by the consti-
tution, such as veto power and the competence to dissolve parliament”.
46 R. G. FEIJÓ
In line with this understanding, and because Socrates’ cabinet pursued

the most centrist policy of any socialist government in Portugal, Cavaco
Silva used soft power. As an example, he mentioned that during his first
term, his office and the government worked together to modify 22% of
all legislation that had been presented for promulgation. This did not
prevent him from effectively vetoing 15 diplomas on political grounds
(Rapaz 2017). The president also used selectively his appointment pow-
ers. In a recent interview, he revealed that he had opposed two propos-
als for the position of Prosecutor General (Cavaco Silva 2018). By and
large, his first years in power were tailored on the model of his predeces-
sors, including his attempts to “voice good examples” as he visited them
in the company of members of government, or the organisation of what
he called Roteiros (roadmaps) for youth, dynamic economy or innovative
local communities, where experts were called to contribute to the debate
of the strategic lines of development.
His memoirs of his years of dealings with Prime Minister José Socrates
reveal the extent to which their relation deteriorated, mainly around
the 2009 legislative elections, which returned a minority socialist gov-
ernment. Socrates had responded to the Eurocrisis in line with the first
set of orientations emanating from Brussels, and applied counter-cyclical
measures that sky-rocketed public deficit (which was in 2007 under the
3% magical figure at a 30-year lowest) and the debt. Cavaco Silva, who
had espoused very expansionist policies while prime minister, benefit-
ting from the first wave of EU funds, was slow to distance himself from
such an approach, which was U-turned when Brussels espoused Schauble
and Dijsselbloem ordoliberalism. As his opinion evolved, a reflex would
appear in Cavaco Silva’s platform for re-election in 2011, where he
promised to raise the profile of his intervention and increase his activism
(Fernandes and Jalali 2017).
Although Cavaco Silva presented again his candidature as an “inde-
pendent”, soon he changed the tone of his discourse. On the election
night, he bitterly criticised all his adversaries and expressed the idea that
the government had been defeated. His inauguration speech was an
unprecedented violent libel against the socialist government, which indi-
rectly moved the prime minister to tender his resignation two weeks later.
Then, he pressed the outgoing prime minister to solicit the support of
PSD to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding with the so-called
troika (EU, ECB and IMF), which set stringent conditions for a loan
of €78,000 million, and chose the first-ever “honeymoon election” in
which the parties that supported him obtained the majority and formed a
ruling coalition under Pedro Passos Coelho, leader of PSD. The road was
paved for a greater integration between the president and the govern-
ment—an indicator being the number of vetoes issued by the president
who, contrary to what had happened with Presidents Soares or Sampaio,
decreased in the second term (Rapaz 2017).
However, the pattern of relations between the president and the
prime minister, who claimed his programme to “go beyond the troika”
and develop an highly ideological right-wing agenda, created a pecu-
liar situation that I have referred to as “Sá Carneiro’s dream turned into
Cavaco Silva’s nightmare”. Sá Carneiro had idealised in 1980 a consti-
tutional revision to reinforce presidential powers, and proposed a slo-
gan to encapsulate its nature: “a majority, a government, a president”,
installing the president in the driving seat. Now, Portugal had a con-
gruent majority in line with a government and a president that assumed
his political engagement with it—but the driving seat was reserved for
the prime minister, as Cavaco Silva himself had defended for so long.
Contrary to what Carlos Jalali (2011) had expressed when referring to
past experiences, the president was now mostly a passenger in a moving
car. Whereas the independence of previous presidents had allowed them
to keep high popularity even when governments disposed of low esteem
because they were viewed in separate, Cavaco Silva failed to distance
himself from the unpopular measures of the executive that translated in
severe cuts in salaries and pensions, rising unemployment, downgrading
of public utilities and extensive privatisation measures. For instance, he
accepted to promulgate important laws that were subsequently sent for
constitutional revision by the special court and failed to secure its con-
sent. On the other hand, his initiatives representing an attempt to reas-
sert an autonomous position (such as his aspiration to bring the socialist
party into the ruling coalition in 2013, which was not well received by
his own party leader) failed to get traction and led to nowhere. In one of
the New Year presidential addresses, he hinted that the path being pur-
sued was leading to a “negative spiral” and recession—but did not take
any action to counter the prime minister. In the dilemma represented
by the alternative to respond to public sentiments or to abide by inter-
national pressures, the president followed the lead of his prime minister
(Freire and Santana-Pereira 2017).
The room for manoeuvre of Cavaco Silva was further diminished by a
succession of political gaffes (i.e. he claimed his pension, which was more
48 R. G. FEIJÓ
than twenty times the minimum wage, was not enough for him to live
a comfortable life without having to mobilise his savings—and this was
said at a time when salaries and pensions were being severely cut). These
impacted his popularity and thus his capacity to engage public opinion
on his side.
Political activism surfaced from unusual sources, like the
Constitutional Court who was called to review numerous pieces of legis-
lation—often not by the president who was the first responsible to guar-
antee that the constitution was upheld. As a result of the projection of a
president under the influence of the prime minister despite the official
hierarchy, combined with a series of unfortunate public statements that
created an image of a cold man, distant from his people’s concerns, the
confidence of the Portuguese in the presidency plummeted from 73.4 in
2008 to 36.3 in 2014—and probably further down until 2016 (Freire
and Santana-Pereira 2017). The public rate of satisfaction with Cavaco
Silva, at the end of his term, was −12.9 in Expresso’s monthly polls—the
only president ever to record a negative score (Teixeira 2016).
The abandonment of the traditional presidential posture as an inde-
pendent referee above the party fray to a close involvement in the major-
ity with a secondary role eroded the president’s capacity to influence
the course of events. In a sense, Cavaco Silva hollowed the presidency
because he had a minimalist understanding of presidential powers.
At the end of the day, a senior advisor to the president on c onstitutional
matters, Carlos Blanco de Morais (2016), expressed the view that
Portuguese semi-presidentialism had paradoxically taken a parliamentary
turn (“semi-presidentialism of assembly”, he called it) right when the
president had abandoned his neutral, independent position as an insti-
tutional referee and made a last attempt to circumvent the rise of a novel
majority in the House.
The 2015 parliamentary elections took place within the last six
months of Cavaco Silva term in office, a circumstance that prevents pres-
idents from dissolving parliament. In the wake of these elections, which
returned a right-wing coalition as the largest bloc (and PSD as the largest
party), but the left as the parliamentary majority, Cavaco Silva followed
established conventions and appointed the leader of his party to form a
government. However, the convergence of the left parties defeated that
government in parliament, preventing its investiture. Reluctantly, Cavaco
Silva appointed the leader of PS to form a minority executive with confi-
dence and supply agreements with its left partners. In the inauguration
of this government, he tried to impose limits to the action of the new

government—but these were either in line with the socialist manifesto
or mostly disregarded by the new prime minister when he submitted his
programme to the assembly. He abandoned the presidency as a defeated
man in open opposition to the new government formula.
The Presidency of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (Elected 2016)

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (born 1948), aka Professor Marcelo or sim-
ply Marcelo is a former government minister, member of parliament,
and leader of PSD (1996–1999). He is known as professor of consti-
tutional law, and among the public as a TV pundit who entered every
home on Sunday evenings for about fifteen years. In spite of his long
party career, he created the persona of the neutral, politically moderate,
often ambiguous, common-sense commentator who did not shy away
from openly criticising his party when in power, to the extent that a
government of his party pressed a private broadcaster to terminate his
contract. In October 2015, he launched his bid to the presidency from
the small town of his grandparents, symbolically distant from the capi-
tal, dispensing the active collaboration of his party. It was no secret that
the leadership of the governing coalition had made stringent efforts to
find an alternative candidate to stand for the centre-right, and the rela-
tions between the sides were not easy. His campaign was original. Taking
advantage of his popularity, he ran a very cheap campaign which fur-
ther distanced him from the parties that eventually endorsed him, as
he claimed that not a single cent he spent came from party apparatuses
(Fernandes and Jalai 2017). The distinguishing factor that benefitted
him was his notoriety and easy communication skills that made him a
good entertainer (Santana-Pereira 2016; Serrano 2017).
In the January 2016 elections, he won on the first ballot scoring 15
percentage points more than the right-wing coalition had done three
months before. These figures reveal that he was not perceived as a party
agent, but rather someone above the fray and able to attract moderate
electorate from the centre-left. Immediately he set the tone to his pres-
idency in sharp contrast to the image created by his predecessor. On
inauguration day, he took a walk with a small escort, shaking hands with
passers by, to reach the parliament where the ceremony took place. That
was the beginning of what he labelled “a presidency of affections” mir-
rored in the nascent fashion of having a selfie taken with whoever hap-
pens to ask for in his many wanderings through the country (Pacheco
50 R. G. FEIJÓ
Pereira 2018). A “presidency of proximity”, as he also refers, through

which he contacts directly the population almost every day and offers
comments on every questions he may be asked, prompting a commen-
tator to question whether he would become a “president-pundit” (Sousa
Tavares 2018), allowed him to invert the downward and negative trends
of popularity of the presidency and restore a very positive score in all
polls. The rationale for this approach is simple: as Jorge Fernandes and
Carlos Jalali stated (2017), “the political capacity of the president of the
Republic to influence public policies depends on his popularity”. To sus-
tain the surge in popularity, he made a point of distancing himself from
the right wing that claimed for the dismissal of government and disso-
lution of parliament, and did not antagonise the minority socialist gov-
ernment. For instance, two of his five appointees to the Council of State
were socialist members, establishing further than any of his predecessors
a bridge with those who had opposed him. Rather, as a new wind was
blowing after the government’s strategic option to reverse the most neg-
ative effects of austerity angrily opposed by the former prime minister,
the president took every opportunity to sail it. But he did not forego his
interpretation of the vast array of presidential powers which, as we have
seen earlier, do not lapse by disuse.
The most revealing episode of President Marcelo’s understanding
of his role took place on 17 October 2017, after a second major fire in
the centre of Portugal within a few months claimed several dozen lives.
He addressed the country in a broadcasted speech from the heart of
the ravaged areas in which he stated his powers. In a short sentence, he
asked for a “new cycle of policies” forcing the government to consider
“what, by whom, how and when” these new policies are to be devised
and implemented. He mentioned that budgetary priorities required
new consideration—three days after the budget had been formally pre-
sented in the House, prompting the government to amend it. And he
made it clear that the government needed to refresh its parliamentary
legitimacy. Unless his plea was heard, he would make use of “all its con-
stitutional powers” to see that the Portuguese would not be let down
yet another time (implying that he might choose to dismiss the PM or
dissolve the parliament). His popularity soared to the point that a com-
mentator wrote: this is the example we can tell our children and grand-
children when they ask us why do we elect a PR by universal, direct vote.
Only minority voices rose to consider that the PR had overstepped his
competences.
The president had previously used his “power of word” to send clear
messages to the government on matters of executive competence. He
announced he regarded positively the continuation of Public–Private
partnerships in the health sector, when the issue was being discussed
between the socialist party and those to its left, who were against them.
He raised objections to legislation introducing electoral procedures in
the metropolitan governing institutions in Lisboa and Porto—a theme
deriving from the socialist party electoral manifesto. All these pro-
nouncements were made in anticipation of any formal proposal the
government might have produced. He went as far as to attend the last
performance of a theatre company that was at loggerheads with the
ministry of culture, prompting the minister to follow him, and before
a public audience and TV cameras tried to impose a solution that the
government could not accept—and the president did not further press
his point. On the issue of a new policy to tackle homelessness, the pres-
idency went as far as to organise several working sessions with the pres-
ence of a junior minister and diverse NGOs and other stakeholders. All
these presidential remarks were made not in a confrontational spirit, but
rather as a form of insinuating the virtues of a sort of co-governance.
This spirit was captured by a political commentator-cum-humourist who
invented the figure of “Costelo” (a fusion of Prime Minister Costa and
President Marcelo), and may be referred to as a “magistracy of interfer-
ence”. The very fact that the public perception that “a page had been
turned” in the Eurocrisis (mostly by virtue of the new government’s
approach) was strong created a completely new scenario for the president
to play a role that evokes—even if Marcelo tries to push his powers to
the limit—the conventions established in the wake of Soares’ presidency.
Conclusions
The Eurocrisis lambasted the conventions on the status and political
attitude of the president of the Republic, hollowing its content, and
making the pendulum that oscillates between the presidential and the
prime-ministerial poles of the dual system of government tilt towards the
head of government. Cavaco Silva was castigated for abandoning the tra-
ditionally neutral position of presidents by plummeting popularity, and
the presidency lost more than half the level of confidence the Portuguese
bestowed upon it. His expertise as professor of public finance was chal-
lenged by the depth of the crisis, and his counterfactual (“Things would
52 R. G. FEIJÓ
have been much worse were I not in my position”) failed to attract pub-
lic support.
Portugal initiated with the novel government formula—minority
socialist cabinet supported by confidence and supply of the parties to
its left—an unprecedented political experience, and one that flies in the
face of recent trends to the right in European politics. However, the new
formula seems to have attracted popular support, as mirrored in several
opinion polls that guarantee a wide margin of victory for the left par-
ties, or the resounding success of the socialist party in the mid-term local
elections. On the European front, the election of the Portuguese finance
minister, Mário Centeno, to lead the Eurogroup symbolises the recogni-
tion that different policies could be successfully developed to tackle the
effects of the crisis—placing Portugal as a beacon for alternative politi-
cal developments, namely in the social-democratic family which has been
consistently losing ground as it moves to the right. This is a sign that
Portugal is not necessarily a follower, but sometimes a forerunner.
With the departure of the right-wing coalition and the end of the
term for Cavaco Silva, and the arrival of new winds brought about by
the substantial change in public policies pursued by the novel govern-
ment, even with the very same parliamentary composition that created
so many difficulties to Cavaco Silva, the pendulum started moving clearly
in the presidential direction again, as the president regained the capacity
to manage his relations with the government by supporting its legitimacy
and gaining room for criticism. A new equilibrium is presently being
sought in which the president of the Republic reassumes a central role in
the political arena.
References
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CHAPTER 4
Electoral Systems and Political Reforms:

Portugal in Comparative Perspective
André Freire
Introduction
This chapter adopts a comparative approach to reflect on some of the
basic problems associated with electoral reform.1 Different electoral sys-
tems generally have a different underlying objective that, according to
some authors (Nohlen 1984, 1995, 2007), define the associated system
of representation. Each electoral system adopts different instrumental
solutions to achieve these central underlying objectives (formulas for con-
verting votes into seats, the size of constituencies, type of suffrage—indi-
vidual or list, etc.). Each of these solutions, and their combination, will
have probable determined effects that could involve the immediate conver-
sion of votes into seats,2 or which could have a more long-term effect on
the behaviour and attitudes of the electorate and the parties/candidates—
which could result in actor strategies being adjusted in respect of electoral
rules.3 In this chapter we speak of ‘probable effects’, because in different
A. Freire (*) 
ISCTE-IUL, CIES-IUL (Centre for Sociological Studies and Research),
Lisbon University Institute, Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: andre.freire@iscte-iul.pt

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_4
56 A. FREIRE
historical, social and political contexts, and especially with different

regional distributions of votes/electoral support for parties, the same elec-
toral rules can have significantly different effects (Nohlen 2007).
The different goals pursued by the various electoral systems and the
solutions adopted to achieve them are not easily wholly reconciled,
meaning there must always be some trade-off. However, some of the
available solutions (mixed systems of proportional representation with
multiple segments or tiers [PRMS / PRMT], for example) are designed
precisely to reconcile objectives that are to some extent contradictory.
Nevertheless, we must recognise that even when reconciliation is possi-
ble, it will always be imperfect and mitigating.
Governability
According to Dieter Nohlen (1984, 2007), there are two main principles
of representation that are largely irreconcilable: proportional representa-
tion, which seeks to ensure the parliamentary (and to a certain extent
governmental) representation of the many important social and political
tendencies within each country; and majority representation, which seeks
to ensure the formation of (absolute) parliamentary majorities (even if
artificial) and, consequently, the formation of single-party governments.
The French two-round absolute majority system achieves this same result
by reconciling it with the existence of coalition governments.
An important theorist on this subject, Arend Lijphart (1999, 2006,
2007), Powell (2000), speaks of ‘majority democracy’ in which majority
electoral systems play a central role, and of ‘consensual/consociational
democracy’ in which proportional electoral systems are a crucial insti-
tutional axis. Beginning from the assumption modern democracies are
fundamentally representative, Lijphart claims each model of democracy
offers a different response to the question ‘who should govern (to rep-
resent the people)?’ In the case of majority democracy, the answer is the
majority should govern, and to ensure this goal is achieved the electoral
system gives a generous bonus to the winning party by converting votes
into seats to ensure a generally artificial absolute single-party majority
in parliament (that is, an absolute majority of seats based on a relative
majority of votes). Proportional systems clearly also product this type of
majority (for example, in Portugal in 2005, the PS received around 45%
of the votes but gained an absolute parliamentary majority), however,
there are important differences in terms of the winner’s bonus (which
4 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL REFORMS: PORTUGAL … 57
is much less generous than in majority systems) and the frequency with
which this happens (it is a much more unusual outcome than in propor-
tional systems).
Consequently, in majority democracies politics is a ‘zero sum game’
in which the winner takes all in terms of central government-level deci-
sion-making mechanisms. However, while these systems are generally
associated with more durable governments and greater governmental
stability, this is largely achieved through the creation of artificial major-
ities and by strongly distorting the conversion of votes into seats in such
a way as usually penalises minority parties. So while it may be possible
to better identify alternative governments and ensure accountability
(Anderson 2000; Freire and Lobo 2005), it is also true that this model
of democracy also tends to result in lower levels of citizen satisfaction
with the performance of the democratic regime (Lijphart 1999) and
to a greater distance between the level of satisfaction of the most sat-
isfied winners (who voted for the party in power) and the most dissat-
isfied losers (who voted for opposition parties) (Anderson and Guillory
1997). Moreover, the artificial strengthening of the majority and the
under-representation of minorities could result in the authoritarianism of
the majority and to higher levels of social conflict and violence (Lijphart
1999). Table 4.1 provides a summary of these matters.
On the other hand, consensual/consociational democracies respond
to the question who should govern with ‘the more the merrier’. That
is, these systems seek both to faithfully represent all main political ten-
dencies in parliament and incorporate, as far as possible, minorities
in the decision-making process at governmental level. This is achieved
through the use of proportionality rules for converting votes into par-
liamentary seats in such a way as to reduce the distortions in these pro-
cesses (that is to say, by offering less generous bonuses to the biggest
party; and by penalising minority forces less), and in the later formation
of coalition governments (which will incorporate large—majority—and
small—minority—parties in the parliamentary and governmental deci-
sion-making processes). This naturally stimulates and demands a signif-
icant propensity for cooperation between the various political forces/
parties to ensure it is possible to have coalition governments or parlia-
mentary agreements (bringing together several parties). In consen-
sual or consociational democracies politics is seen as a ‘positive sum
game’ in which majorities and minorities normally have a role in cen-
tral government-level decision-making mechanisms, or at least in the
58 A. FREIRE
Table 4.1 Electoral systems and governability: aims, solutions and necessary

trade-offs
Proportional Majority Mixed systems

representation representation
PRMT (PR with Parallel systems
multiple tiers) or MMP
Average/Weak Strong Identical to PR Mitigated MR

“Positive sum game” “Zero sum game”
policies policies
Power sharing— Winner takes all
cooperation
Greater involvement Weak involvement
of minorities in the of minorities
political system
Quicker
decision-making
Clear identification
of alternatives
Accountability
Trade-off
Minority “veto” Artificial majorities
Slower decision-making
Reduced identification/ Authoritarian;
Accountability Greater conflict
Remedies Trade-off
Enhances stability of -Greater complexity in system’s opera-
minority governments tion: less transparency
Incentives for coop- -Increased result uncertainty (double
eration (for example voting, etc.)
“related lists”/appar-
entment or two rounds
in the uninominal
component of mixed
systems)
Source Author’s assessment taking benefits of electoral systems into account
decision-making processes at the parliamentary level. This greater incor-

poration of minorities in the decision-making process and more inclusive
democracy is generally associated with higher average levels of citizen
satisfaction with the performance of the democratic regime (Lijphart
1999) and of much closer relationship between the level of satisfaction
of the most satisfied winners (who voted for the party in power) and the
most dissatisfied losers (who voted for opposition parties) (Anderson and
Guillory 1997). Moreover, as there is greater representation of minor-
ities and, therefore, a lower risk of the authoritarianism of the majority
in exercising power, there is also generally a lower level of social conflict
and greater control of violence (Lijphart 1999). See Table 4.1.
There are naturally some trade-offs/disadvantages that are often
associated with proportional representation and consensual democracy.
First, the governments tend to be shorter lived with a resulting reduc-
tion in executive stability. As Lijphart (1999–2000) notes, it is important
to distinguish between government stability and regime stability and to
remember that in some of the most successful democracies in northern
and central Europe (Scandinavia, Benelux, central Europe, etc.) govern-
ments have lasted a very long time.
Nevertheless, there are some ‘solutions’ that increase government
stability without compromising proportionality, two of which were sug-
gested in a recent study of electoral reform (Freire et al. 2008). The first
is the constructive censure motion that makes the opposition responsi-
ble for the fall of governments (they can only defeat them if they have
an alternative government in waiting), while the second is to improve
the incentives for inter-party cooperation, something that is very weak
among the parties on the left of the Portuguese ideological spec-
trum (see, for example, Freire and Santana-Pereira 2016; Freire 2017).
However, as Jorge Reis Novais suggested (Freire et al. 2008) during a
discussion in the parliament building on that took place in parliament
(on 4 December 2008), the power of minority governments can be
enhanced by giving them the ability to convert certain important issues,
such as the state budget and some other limited items of basic legisla-
tion, into motions of no confidence (that can only be proposed when
the opposition has an alternative government in waiting, in the same way
as a constructive censure motion). In the case of mixed systems, where
the level of proportionality is maintained (or enhanced) in comparison
to the average for proportional systems, the use of two rounds (as in
France) for the single person constituency is also a powerful incentive for
cooperation between parties and a ‘powerful weapon against anti-system
parties’.4
In the case of coalition government, which are the most common in
Europe (see Table 4.2), which are usually a result of inter-party nego-
tiations, the electorate’s ability to identify an alternative government is
60 A. FREIRE
Table 4.2 Types of government in Europe, 1945–2000
Countries Majority Minority Minimum Minority Majority No. of gov-

single-party single-party winning coalition coalition ernments
coalition
Germany 0 1 17 0 5 23
Austria 4 1 17 0 1 23
Belgium 3 1 24 2 7 37
Denmark 0 14 4 13 0 31
Slovakia 0 1 4 1 1 7
Slovenia 0 0 2 2 3 7
Spain 4 4 0 0 0 8
Estonia 0 2 6 1 0 9
Finland 0 4 6 7 23 40
France 0 4 7 5 41 57
Greece 8 0 0 0 1 9
Netherlands 0 0 10 0 9 18
Hungary 0 0 1 0 4 5
United 20 1 0 0 0 21
Kingdom
Ireland 7 4 8 3 0 22
Italy 0 11 2 9 31 53
Latvia 0 0 4 4 3 11
Lithuania 2 0 1 1 3 7
Luxembourg 0 0 17 0 1 18
Malta 9 0 0 0 0 9
Poland 0 2 5 2 0 9
Portugal 3 4 6 (4) 0 1 14 (12)
Portugal I 0 2 4 (3) 0 1 7 (6)
Portugal II 3 2 2 (1) 0 0 7 (6)
Czech 0 1 2 1 0 4
Republic
Sweden 3 16 5 2 0 26
Total 63 77 152 (150) 53 135 482 (480)
Total (%) 13 15.9 31.5 10.9 28.0 100
Sources Calculated from Grossman and Sauger (2007: 136–137)

Notes (1) Portugal I—until 1987; Portugal II—from 1987 to 2009; (2) Portuguese governments
exclude the three that were appointed by the president. This includes two counts: the first and more
conservative counts all formal governments; the second (in parenthesis) only counts a government as
new when there is new party backing for the cabinet or when a new government is formed follow-
ing elections, even if there is no change in its composition; and (3) Total (%)—line total (480 days of
government)
much less clear, just as it is more difficult to hold the parties accounta-
ble when there are several involved in the government (Anderson 2000;
Freire and Lobo 2005). Additionally, the influence of minorities can
become excessive and can even represent an obstacle within the deci-
sion-making process both at the governmental (where the smaller parties
usually have more power than their electoral support warrants) and the
parliamentary level, and particularly on issues requiring broad support.
The slow pace of the decision-making process is often the price paid for
including minorities, although this can bring advantages: with measures
being more fully discussed and upon which a consensus is achieved that
can be more durable and obtain more social support.
Mixed and PRMT (PR with multiple tiers) do not add much in this
respect, and at times often resemble proportional regimes (German-style
mixed systems; PRMT), while at others resemble majority systems (par-
allel mixed systems) that allow greater minority representation than pure
majority systems (Massicotte and Blais 1999; Shugart and Wattenberg
2000; Lopes and Freire 2002; Freire et al. 2008). In any case, these sys-
tems always make the electoral systems more complicated and less trans-
parent (in terms of their operation) to the electorate.
Note that in Portugal, problems of governability existed up until
the end of 2015 on the left, while they practically never existed on the
right. However, these problems were of a political rather than an insti-
tutional nature. That is to say, they were the result of the left’s inability
to reach an understanding rather than the consequence of an excessively
proportional electoral system,5 or of an excessively fragmented party sys-
tem.6 The right in Portugal has amply demonstrated its ability to reach
understandings: the last Social Democratic Party (PSD—Partido Social
Democrático) and Popular Party (CDS-PP—Partido Popular) coali-
tion, which governed from 2011 to 2015, was extremely cohesive dur-
ing a particularly difficult time (economic crisis, need to quickly correct
the deficit, investigations in the Moderno Case that could implicate the
leader of the CDS-PP, etc.), which only collapsed as a result of presiden-
tial actions.
The problem was that, unlike its socialist and social democratic peers
elsewhere in southern Europe (especially in Spain, France, Italy and
Cyprus), Scandinavia and other European countries, the Socialist Party
(PS—Partido Socialista) was not able to reach an understanding with
the parties to its left (Arter 2006; March 2008; Freire 2009).7 However,
while it is true the radical left shared some responsibility for this lack
62 A. FREIRE
of understanding, either because of the orthodoxy of the Portuguese

Communist Party (PCP—Partido Comunista Português) or because of
the unwillingness of the PCP and Left Bloc (BE—Bloco de Esquerda) to
compromise and assume governmental responsibility, the PS must also
accept a share of the blame. In 2004 several of the party’s senior leaders
(who at the time supported Manuel Alegre’s bid for the party leadership)
argued that in the event of the PS winning a relative majority in parlia-
ment, then the party should seek an understanding with the parties to its
left. Moreover, a number of studies have shown that the PS is one of the
least left-wing parties of the European socialist/social democratic family
(Freire 2006, 2009), although there have been signs of some change on
this score since the crises at the PS has moved towards the left (although
the PS remains one of the least left-wing of Europe’s socialist parties)
(Freire 2017: Parts II and IV). However, to move closer to the left, the
PS must first recognise that its ideology is strongly centrist and that it
must be prepared to make significant concessions from this centrism
to make an understanding possible with the radical left. The ‘consocia-
tional democracies’ and coalitions with which it is normally associated,
and which the Portuguese seem to prefer to absolute majorities, demand
such understandings from all involved, and at least in this respect, every-
one is responsible. In truth, however, such concessions must be both
mutual and, naturally, greater on the part of the smaller parties (BE and/
or PCP) for one simple reason: the larger party has more popular sup-
port, which is a crucial element in any democracy and implies that the
larger parties are more important than the smaller ones in any discussions
for parliamentary agreement or coalition.
A recent comparison of the ideological positioning and public policy
preferences of the electorate and deputies, based on two surveys carried
out in 2008, reveals that among the parties to the left of the PS there
is much greater divergence between those who voted for the parties
and their elected representatives, with the latter standing much farther
to the ideological left than the former (comparing each parliamentary
group with the voters/sympathisers of each party) (Freire and Belchior
2013). It is important to note two things. First, the need to resolve the
imbalance within the Portuguese political system (between a right that
has been able to reach understandings and a left which has not), not
only because this is one way to make it easier to perceive alternatives and
thus the quality of democracy, but also to preserve the proportional sys-
tem and consociational constitutional model: party-political agreements
are fundamental to the ability of these systems to operate well. Second,

because the inability of the left to reach understandings is a problem cre-
ated by the party elites and not by the voters (March and Freire 2012;
Freire 2013, 2014, 2017).
As Freire (2017, 2018) clearly demonstrates, ‘leftist government’
or, as some prefer to call it ‘plural leftist government’ solutions have
become commonplace across Western Europe since the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In
Portugal, however, this solution (at least at the national level) was only
realised following the general election of October 2015—more pre-
cisely, on 26 November 2015 (the day on which the 21st constitutional
government took office)—a full 26 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall
(Freire 2017). As an aside, it should be noted that the Portuguese ‘left-
ist government’ solution consists of a minority PS government that has
secured parliamentary support from the parties to its left: the BE, PCP
and Greens (PEV—Partido Ecologista-‘Os Verdes’), which is only one
of the possible solutions for this type of government. The other solution
is a proper coalition government in which all, or almost all, of the coali-
tion partners have a seat around the cabinet table. There is also another
type of government—the ‘rainbow coalition’ (a coalition or minority
government with fixed parliamentary support on matters that are key
to the government’s survival) and which involves parties of the left and
right. The Syriza government in Greece is just such a rainbow coalition,
involving as it does an alliance of radical left-wing parties—including the
Eurocommunist KKE-Interior—in a coalition of parties under the name
Synapismos, and which since January 2015 has included the Independent
Greeks (ANEL—Anexartitoi Ellines), a right-wing conservative party
opposed to austerity.
We end this aside over the concept of ‘leftist governments’ with some
questions for Portugal. Why is it that in Portugal, unlike in many other
Western European countries, this solution only became possible so long
after the fall of the Berlin Wall? What were the reasons for this delay?
What factors explain the appearance of this governmental solution at the
end of 2015? And, finally, what will be the consequences of the inclusion
of the radical left within government for the democratic political systems
in Portugal and Europe? These are the four main questions addressed in
Freire (2017). Here we can provide only an outline of the main conclu-
sions as to the reasons for it happening at the end of 2015 and the possi-
ble consequences for the democratic political systems.8
64 A. FREIRE
First, the asymmetrical austerity policies introduced during the third

external intervention in Portugal (2011–2014) that had a greater impact
on labour than it did on capital, which also went much farther than
either the political mandate received by the right in 2011 or the Troika’s
initial programme. Second, the PSD’s sharp move to the right, with it
often adopting positions that were farther to the right than its coali-
tion partner, the CDS-PP, made an understanding involving it and the
PS much more difficult. Third, the popular demand by left-wing voters,
who had been calling for the parties of the left to come to some form of
understanding for several years, and which became even more vocifer-
ous during the crisis. Fourth, the perception by many senior socialists,
and especially of the party’s leader, of the risk of the ‘Pasokisation’ of the
PS should it choose to enter alliances with the right. Fifth, the PS’s new
leadership under António Costa, who while mayor of Lisbon (2007–
2015) had led an administration that consisted of an alliance of a galaxy
of radical left-wing forces and whose leadership also impressed the BE,
whose leader Catarina Martins announced during a televised debate with
António Costa on 14 September 2015 a series of moderate, pragmatic
and realistic programmes that made it possible to reach an understand-
ing with the PS and which created a dynamic that encouraged under-
standings with the PCP and PEV after the elections. Sixth, the political
and institutional situation in which the PS fell short of winning a relative
majority in parliament (in an election in which the pre-election Portugal
Ahead [PàF—Portugal à Frente] coalition of the PSD and CDS-PP won
a relative majority) but which gave the left in parliament an absolute left-
wing majority that would divert power from the right into the arms of
the PS (and the radical left). Seventh, the survival of the PS leader (and
his party leadership) was on the line: either there was a ‘leftist govern-
ment’ in which Costa became prime minister, or he would have to resign
his position and let another take his place (someone who would be pre-
pared to accept a ‘centre bloc’ solution involving an alliance with the
PSD), in the event of the PS rejecting an understanding with the radical
left in favour of one with the right or centre-right.
Eighth, approaching the end of his mandate, the president was pre-
vented from dissolving parliament and calling fresh elections. Ninth, the
generational change in the PS leadership embodied in the emergence of
new leaders who had not been affected by the trauma of the democratic
transition and the PS’s relations with radical left and who wished to take
the opportunity to overcome, both in word and deed, this historical
division within the Portuguese left. To these we could also add a tenth
reason: the new type of political competition introduced by the new
party, LIVRE, and the LIVRE/Tempo de Avançar list (in 2015).
Namely, because of prioritising the need for the parties of the left to
reach an understanding for government, the LIVRE/Tempo de Avançar
list put some pressure on the radical left, especially the BE, to compro-
mise with the PS for governmental solutions.
What will be the consequences of this inclusion of the radical left in
spheres of government for the democratic systems in Portugal and
Europe? Freire (2017: Introduction and Parts II and IV) outlines eight
possible consequences. First, the current political system is more inclu-
sive and integrationist, and more democratic, with the 10–18% of
the electorate that had until the end of 2015 been excluded from gov-
ernment sphere while present in parliament now included in the gov-
ernment sphere. Second, there has been a significant move towards
political innovation with a solution that had never been attempted dur-
ing 40 years of Portuguese democracy. Third, this solution brought the
leaders of left-wing parties closer with their electorate in terms of gov-
ernmental preferences, and this is an element that if it persists could be
very positive in terms of political representation that tends to depend
on the greater adjustment of the preferences of representatives to
bring them into line with those of the represented. Should this solu-
tion persist, and should it prove stable and relatively successful, the fol-
lowing will probably be the result. Fourth, this governmental solution
can reduce the PS’s ideological centrism, which can in turn clarify the
divide between the centre-left (PS) and the centre-right (PSD), thereby
improving the quality of a political representation (in Portugal) that
depends on clear political (and governmental) alternatives being pre-
sented to voters. Fifth, this solution could help overcome the carteli-
sation of the political, media and economic systems that favour big
parties and which is reflected in their close relationship with big business
that has led to a significant section of the PSD, PS and CDS-PP politi-
cal elites moving into lucrative positions in major companies, and of
senior managers from big business accepting political appointments.
Sixth, this could increase the pressure for a more social and democratic
Europe that will better protect territorial minorities (the smaller states)
and which could be taken up in other countries, which is why there is
so much pressure from the right in Europe to ensure this doesn’t hap-
pen. However, seventh, should this solution not prove durable, stable
or successful, and is not an example that is followed across Europe, it
66 A. FREIRE
could lead to the return of the Portuguese right and be a signal to Europe
to restrict the space for minimally effective alternative policies within the
European Union. While this may benefit the right in the short- to medi-
um-term, it will certainly not benefit European democracy in the medium-
to long-term. Eighth, should this solution be successful (on the terms
referred to above) the radical left may become more moderate (quickly
blurring some of its protest movement identity), although by losing some
of its marginality it may result in the BE, PCP and PEV in particular, and
the left in general, gaining more social, media and political influence as a
consequence of their joining forces. This form of incursion into the gov-
ernment sphere must be considered because it will make the radical left
parties more vulnerable to electoral highs and lows (Freire 2017: Part II).
Proportionality
One of the main advantages of proportional systems is that they offer
fairer representation of the various political tendencies (although there
will also be some distortion in the conversion of votes into seats). Not
only does this enable greater incorporation of minorities into the political
system and decision-making process, giving it more legitimacy while also
delaying decision-making and reducing conflicts and making the system
more permeable to new political forces (which are usually small when
they first emerge) (Rule and Zimmerman 1994). This enhances the par-
liamentary systems’ ability to incorporate social and political innovation.
Moreover, since the various important political forces are treated rela-
tively fairly, the votes of those who sympathise with and vote for smaller
parties are not wasted, and nor are they ‘tempted’ to cast a ‘useful’ vote,
with the result that fewer votes are wasted. See Table 4.3 for a summary
of proportionality issues.
This is all behind the differences of electoral participation, which is
favourable to proportional systems and unfavourable to majority systems.
There is sufficient empirical evidence showing that people tend to par-
ticipate more in the former than in the latter (Jackman 1987; Jackman
and Miller 1998; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Lijphart 1999; Franklin
2002; Meirinho 2004; Wessels and Schmitt 2008). But the extent of
proportionality in the electoral system is also linked to clearer political
alternatives offered by the parties to the voters (that is, more ideolog-
ical polarisation) since in proportional systems space exists for the rep-
resentation of a number of parties (and not just the two largest ones)
Table 4.3 Electoral systems and proportionality: aims, solutions and necessary

trade-offs

PRMT (PR with Parallel systems
multiple tiers) or
MMP
Various tenden- Favours the winner; Identical to PR Mitigated MR

cies more faithfully Strongly penalises
represented; the smaller parties
Opportunities for new
forces
Trade-off
Greater participation Less participation Ideal mix, but Mix, with the final
depends on various result depending
elements more on the various
elements
Greater incorporation Less incorporation
the competition for ideological majorities and minorities does not focus
exclusively on the ‘average voter’. That is, political competition does not
focus exclusively on voters in the ideological centre, and that this pat-
tern of competition encourages ideological differentiation between par-
ties. Indirectly, by making the alternatives clearer, it can also be said
that proportional representation enhances the quality of democracy by
encouraging electoral participation (Wessels and Schmitt 2008), increas-
ing voter identification with political parties (Schmitt 2009; Eneyedi
and Todosijevic 2009) and increasing the degree to which voters are
anchored in their preferences regarding public policies / topics / value
orientations (Freire 2015).
Majority systems, however, are usually associated with representa-
tion that is less fair (providing larger party bonuses and penalties), offers
fewer opportunities to new political forces and which has less capacity
for the incorporation of social and political innovation. Majority sys-
tems are generally associated with more wasted votes (with votes cast for
the smaller parties not counting) and the artificial concentration of the
vote in the two largest parties, which, apart from geographically con-
centrated smaller parties, are the only ones likely to gain parliamentary
68 A. FREIRE
representation. The increase in the proportion of wasted votes and the

reduced involvement of minorities in the political system generally leads
to lower levels of citizen participation. And, because of the artificially
induced bipartisanship, these systems encourage competition that is
almost exclusively focused on the average voter, thereby increasing the
possibility that the two main parties will become ideologically indistinct
and, consequently, more chance of lower levels of political participation,
lower aggregate levels of identification with the parties and votes that are
less anchored in public policy preferences. In short, the efficiency and
decision-making speed that is usually associated with single-party govern-
ments could very well result in a reduction in the quality of democracy.
Of course, excessive levels of proportionality can also lead to ungov-
ernability, the capture of government by minor parties, loss of govern-
ment efficiency and effectiveness, etc. However, Portugal has neither
a system that is excessively proportional nor does it has a fragmented
party system. Rather, since 1987 to at least 2005, the proportionality of
the Portuguese system was below the average for European proportional
systems (EU27 + 3) and has a party system that concentrates on the two
main (and ideologically similar) parties (Freire 2018: Tables 6 and 7). The
Portuguese party system has more similarities with those found in major-
ity democracies than it has with that of consensual democracies (Freire
et al. 2008). Moreover, while between 1975 and 1987 there was a great
deal of governmental instability in Portugal, the extent of government
stability since 1987 has been consistent with most European standards.
Nevertheless, as noted above, right-wing parties have already shown they
can reach understandings and govern in coalition while left-wing parties
have not. However, the problem of left-wing governance is not institu-
tional and is not a consequence of an excessively proportional electoral sys-
tem or fragmented party system. The problem of left-wing governability in
Portugal is essentially a political problem caused by the parties of the left
and is not something that can be resolved by reducing proportionality—
because of the negative impact this would have on participation, clarity of
political alternatives and degree of identification with parties, etc.
Quality of Representation
Portugal has a closed party list electoral system in which voters can
vote for a party and not for any individual candidate on the list. By
placing their cross next to the party of their choice on the ballot paper
they must accept the candidates in the order decided by the parties
(see Freire and Meirinho 2012). When a party can elect three people
in any given constituency, then the deputies elected are the first three
names on the list. This system has a number of advantages, which may
have been particularly important for a new democracy such as Portugal
in 1975, First, it strengthens the political parties at the expense of
the candidates; second, it encourages voting discipline because depu-
ties know their election depends entirely on the position their name
appears on the list approved by party managers rather than on the
result of the popular vote. However, there are also significant disad-
vantages: first, deputies will be less concerned with trying to please the
voters than they will be with trying to please the party leadership. This
can lead to an increase in the distance between the electorate and their
representatives; second, the importance of voting discipline may lead
to the complete annulment of the role of deputies as individuals in the
parliamentary arena.
There are several equally effective ways to create institutional
conditions that will bring the electorate and their representatives
closer together (Curtice and Shively 2003; Ortega 2004; Gallagher
and Mitchell 2008; Pilet et al. 2012; Freire and Papp 2014) (see
Table 4.4). One of these is the creation of single-member constituen-
cies like those found in majority systems (two cases in the EU27 + 3:
France and the United Kingdom) and in mixed systems (five cases in
the EU27 + 3 between 1970 and 2007) (Freire et al. 2008). Another
solution is the so-called preferential vote in which the electorate votes
for a list but can choose their preferred candidate or candidates from
this list (or can even choose from several lists in ‘open/mixed list’
systems), with these being the preferences determining which candi-
dates are elected rather than their position on a list prepared by the
party. With these solutions, from 1970 to 2007 across Europe there
were ten examples of preferential vote, one single-segment propor-
tional representation system, and two single transferable vote systems
that can be considered a form of preferential vote associated to a sin-
gle-segment proportional representation system (Malta and Ireland);
and three cases of preferential vote and one PRMT. The closed list
system, like that used in Portugal, is in a minority in Europe (there
were only seven examples between 1970 and 2007) (Freire et al.
2008: 40–41).
70
A. FREIRE
Table 4.4 Electoral systems and quality of representation: aims, solutions and necessary trade-offs

MMP (PRMS) Parallels
Less incentive for local Greater incentive for local Greater incentive for local rep- Greater incentive for local
representation representation resentation (with eventual local representation (without local
(without local pluralism) pluralism: PRMT) pluralism)
Trade-off
Greater voting discipline Less voting discipline Less voting discipline Less voting discipline
Centralism Localism Localism Localism
Clientelism Clientelism Clientelism
More cohesive parties Less cohesive parties Less cohesive parties Less cohesive parties
Remedies
Non-blocked closed (or open) Demand voting discipline on the manifesto and on matters of governability; allow more voting
lists freedom on other matters

Conclusions
We must remember that no electoral system is perfect and that the dif-
ferent systems that do exist pursue different goals that cannot always
be reconciled. This means there is always some form of trade-off. This
author continues to believe the Portuguese electoral system does not in
itself generate problems of governability. This is because, in comparative
terms, the level of proportionality in the Portuguese system is not high,
and indeed is lower than the EU27 + 3 average for proportional systems.
The party system is also not fragmented: the degree of vote concentra-
tion in the two main parties is like that found in the bipartisan regimes
associated with majority democracies. However, this does not mean there
are no problems of governability, what it does mean is that problems
of governance are political in origin (lack of understanding on the left
until the end of 2015) rather than institutional (that is, they are not the
result of excessive proportionality in the conversion of votes into seats
and/or of the excessive fragmentation of the party system). The under-
standing reached between the parties of the left in Portugal at the end
of 2015 that led to the formation and support for the 21st constitu-
tional government (a minority PS government that for the first time in
the history of democratic Portugal has been kept in power through par-
liamentary agreements between it and the parties to its left) is proof of
this. The root of the reasons for this understanding between the left—or
the prior lack of such understandings—are political rather than institu-
tional, although the institutions could be open to such understandings.
There are also political-institutional reforms that could be introduced to
improve the status quo in this area.
This also means these problems could be minimised without compro-
mising proportionality. For example, using specific constructive censure
motions, namely those that allow some items of legislation to be con-
verted into motions that can only vote down a cabinet when there is an
alternative government able to replace the existing one (within the current
parliamentary framework). Additionally, through incentives to encourage
cooperation among parties.9 This is because the reduction in proportion-
ality (and the subsequent increase in bipartisanship) could still result in an
even greater reduction in the clarity of the alternatives, a decline in party
identification and, either directly or indirectly, a fall in both political par-
ticipation and in the level of satisfaction with the democratic regime.
72 A. FREIRE
The closed list system, which tends to involve very large constitu-
encies, may have made complete sense during the transition to democ-
racy, but it is now anachronistic in the European context and ought to
be replaced. First, because without exaggerating the role of electoral
reform in this area (we must remain realistic!) (Freire 2014) by opening
the electoral system in this way it will be possible to increase political
participation and identification with parties and encourage deputies to
pay more attention to their constituents and, consequently, act in such a
way as to make voters feel better represented. Also, because critics high-
lighting the subversion of the constitutional model (with representations
focused on the candidates rather than the parties) and the significant
decline in voting discipline (Moreira 2008a, b; Lobo 2008) are in every
way exaggerated—as the experience in other countries demonstrates
(Arter 2006; Ortega 2004).
It is naturally necessary to assume there will always be trade-offs in
this matter and to accept, first, the greater relative prominence of depu-
ties in political representation (compared to the status quo) and, second,
to accept a weakening of the voting discipline (which could even lead to
more flexibility in the system of government).
In short, these reforms could serve to improve the quality of democracy,
especially if they are not accompanied by any reduction in proportionality—
although a certain element of trade-off will always be necessary. Beyond
this, the data are in the open and there is no shortage of studies, so while we
must move forward cautiously and moderately, we must also be daring (par-
ticularly in relation to the suffrage and voting procedures). The directions
for reform should include the following: without calling into question the
essence of the Portuguese PR system, that has operated very well during the
past 40 years of Portuguese democracy, but taking away the voting system
(closed list) and the lack of incentives for inter-party cooperation. Thus, by
moving in these directions we will be able to preserve the essence of the PR
system and reform the electoral regime in order to improve the quality of
the Portuguese democracy.
Notes
1.
This chapter was originally published as Freire, A. (2015), ‘Electoral
systems and political reforms: Portugal in comparative perspective’,
E-Pública: Revista Electrónica de Direito Público, FD-UL (ICJP, CIDP), 4,
pp. 1–27. http://e-publica.pt/destaque.html. The author of this chapter
and editors of this book would like to thank E-Pública: Revista Electrónica
de Direito Público, and especially Professor Alexandra Ludomila Ribeiro
Fernandes Leitão, for their permission to republish the article here. This
version has been updated to take into account the events associated with
the result of the general election on 4 October 2015 and the resulting
minority PS government kept in power through parliamentary agreements
with parties of the radical left (BE, PCP and PEV), which represented a
fundamental turning point for Portuguese politics that the author has ana-
lysed in depth (Freire 2017; see also Freire and Santana-Pereira 2016), and
which is investigated again here. This version was published in Portuguese
in Freire (2018).
2. ‘Mechanical effects’ (Duverger 1951); ‘proximal effects’ (Rae 1969).
3. ‘Psychological effects’ (Duverger 1951); ‘distal effects’ (Rae 1969).
4. See Freire (2011) for an explanation of ‘related lists’ / apparentment and
‘two-round’ mechanisms and how they encourage inter-party cooperation.
5. The level of disproportionality in Portugal is above the average for propor-
tional regimes in Europe and the EU27 + 3.
6. The concentration of the vote in the two main parties makes the
Portuguese party system resemble Westminster-style democracies.
7. See Tables 3 and 4 in Freire (2018).
8. The empirical evidence sustaining our thesis and expectations can be found
in Freire (2017), especially Parts II and IV.
9. For example, the ‘related lists’ / apparentment in a system of proportional
representation by multiple segments / multiple tiers, as proposed by Freire
et al. (2008), or over two rounds with the requirement of an absolute
majority in a single-member constituency, should the option for a mixed
system be chosen. See Freire (2011).
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CHAPTER 5
The Portuguese Party System:

Evolution in Continuity?
Carlos Jalali
It has become something of a cliché to note Portugal’s pioneering role

in the ‘third wave of democratization’ coined by Huntington (1993).
However, when we examine the country’s party system in a comparative
perspective, its position as a precursor of the third wave gains added rel-
evance. The expansion in the number of Democratic Party systems since
1974 generated a renewed interest in party systems and how they are
conceptualised. As Mainwaring (1999: 3) put it, “most third wave party
systems have distinctive features that require us to reformulate theories
about party systems”. Portugal thus presents an interesting case. As the
longest third wave democracy, it can help shed light on the nature and
development of party systems in recent democracies.
This chapter examines the Portuguese party system, concentrating
on four aspects. First, we outline the main characteristics of the party
system. Second, we assess its evolution over time. Third, we examine
the process of consolidation of the Portuguese party system. Finally,
we examine the party system in the aftermath of the 2015 legislative
C. Jalali (*) 
DCSPT & GOVCOPP, University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal
e-mail: cjalali@ua.pt

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_5
78 C. JALALI
elections, which have been accompanied by an unprecedented degree of

cooperation between the parties on the left. Before examining these four
aspects, the chapter provides a brief overview of the relevant models con-
cerning party systems.
Party Systems: Models and Theories

We begin by defining the concept of a party system. The classic defini-
tion of Sartori characterises party systems as the interactions between
political parties. While Sartori (1976: 43–44), posits these interactions
as deriving from “inter-party competition”, they can also be the result of
inter-party cooperation, with parties cooperating with each other—be it
formally, informally or even implicitly (Ware 1996: 7).
In the study of party systems, three dimensions have been very sali-
ent. First, the classification of party systems. Second, and related, the
notion of party system change. And, finally, the process of structural con-
solidation (or institutionalisation) of party systems. We will examine the
Portuguese case in all three of these dimensions.
Regarding the classification of party systems, we can identify var-
ious typologies that have been developed (e.g. Duverger 1954;
Sartori 1976; von Beyme 1985), each focusing on different aspects
and dynamics of party systems. In this chapter, we use the model of
Mair (1997), for three reasons: first, because it meets the criteria of
parsimony; second, because it aggregates and integrates some of the
most common aspects in the analysis of party systems (in particu-
lar of the commonly used typology developed by Sartori 1976); and
third, because—unlike older typologies drawn with certain realities in
mind1—this typology is more adaptable to different configurations of
interparty interaction.
This model centres on the notion of the structures of party compe-
tition, and in particular the interaction regarding government. With
regard to this latter aspect, Mair (1997: 222–223) notes that voters
are not just “expressing preferences for individual parties” in elections;
“rather, albeit not always to the same degree in different party systems,
(…) they are also expressing preferences for potential governments”.
Party systems thus “become ‘about’ something” (Mair 1997: 14). This
“something” is essentially the competition for government, which gen-
erally defines the principal dimension of competition of the party system
(Mair 1997).
5 THE PORTUGUESE PARTY SYSTEM: EVOLUTION IN CONTINUITY? 79
For Mair, party systems are characterised by the constraints they

generate, both on voters in their voting choice, and on political actors.
These have different degrees of intensity and constriction, reflected in
structures of competition that can be more open (and thus less con-
straining) or more closed (and thus more restrictive).
Mair (1997: 206–211) derives these structures of competition from
three interrelated factors:
1. Pattern of alternation in government: whether it is wholesale (i.e.

all parties in government at period t are replaced in the govern-
ment of period t + 1 by parties previously in opposition), partial (a
newly incumbent government includes at least one party which was
also in the last government); or non-existent (complete absence of
alternation);
2. Innovation in government: to what extent innovative formulae are
used in government formation, i.e. “whether or not the party or
combination of parties has governed before in that particular for-
mat” (Mair 1997: 208);
3. Openness to new parties: whether all relevant parties are able
to gain access to government, or whether that opportunity is
restricted to a subset of the relevant parties.
Structures of competition can thus lie between two poles, being rela-
tively closed or relatively open. The former are characterised by patterns
of wholesale or non-alternation in office, with governments that present
familiar formulae in their format and access restricted to a well-defined
subset of the relevant parties; the latter present a greater prevalence of
partial alternation in office, as well as a greater frequency of innovative
governing formulae and access to government open to virtually all the
relevant parties (Mair 1997: 211–214).
A second dimension that has received attention in the study of party
systems, which we will also consider with regard to the Portuguese
party system, pertains to party system change. Change occurs when
“a party system is transformed from one class or type of party sys-
tem to another.” (Mair 1997: 51–52). It should be noted that elec-
toral change does not necessarily generate party system change. As
Mair notes (1997: 215), electoral patterns may shift without affect-
ing the party system; and, conversely, the structure of party interac-
tion may be altered without significant electoral realignment. In this
80 C. JALALI
chapter we assess to what to what extent the Portuguese party system

has changed over time, especially in the aftermath of the 2015 legisla-
tive elections.
Finally, we are interested in examining the consolidation (or institu-
tionalisation) of party systems. Mainwaring defines the structural con-
solidation of a party system (or, as he puts it, its institutionalisation) as
follows:
An institutionalized party system, then, is one in which actors develop sta-

ble expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental
contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the
foreseeable future. In such a system, there is stability in who the main par-
ties are and how they behave. Institutionalization does not completely pre-
clude change, but limits it.
Mainwaring (1999: 25)
Thus, a consolidated (or institutionalised) party system implies that

it has reached an “equilibrium”, with stability and predictability in
its interparty interactions (Mair 1997: 7). This notion of stability is
reflected in the analysis of Morlino (1998), which characterises the
structural consolidation of a party system as the stabilisation2 of inter-
party interactions.
This is perhaps the dimension that has garnered the most interest in
the context of third wave party systems, and where the Portuguese case
may have greater comparative relevance. This interest stems from the
perception of the importance of the consolidation of party systems for
the consolidation and functioning of democracy, both in the literature
on party systems that predates the third wave (see, for instance, Sartori
1976), and in the more recent literature. The statement by Mainwaring
and Scully (1995: 1–2)—that “it is difficult to sustain modern mass
democracy without an institutionalized party system”—neatly summa-
rises the relationship that is posited between the consolidation of party
systems and the consolidation of democracy itself.
In this regard, the literature tends to characterise third wave democ-
racies as having lower levels of party system consolidation than their
older counterparts (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). This weaker consol-
idation is largely ascribed to the weaker social roots of political parties
in third wave democracies; and an electoral support that is based more
on personalistic appeals of individual party leaders and, conversely, less
on stable programmatic and ideological bonds with voters (Mainwaring

and Torcal 2006). Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) deepen this analysis,
and argue that the emergence of television prior to the creation of parties
in third wave democracies explains this trend for shallower social roots
and weaker programmatic appeals. For these authors, this pattern—and
the resulting weaker consolidation of the party system—persists even if
democracy subsequently consolidates and endures.
This analysis focused on third wave democracies echoes the older lit-
erature on consolidation of party systems. For Sartori (1968: 292), the
advent of the mass party—the archetype of a party with strong social
roots and programmatic appeal—was the “critical factor in altering the
nature of a party system and in bringing about its structural consolida-
tion”. Mair also echoes this perspective:
Through the encapsulation of sections of the mass electorate, and through

the inculcation of political identities which proved both solid and endur-
ing, the mass party became the agency by which partisan stability was
ensured. Political choice developed into political identity as a result of
political organization; in this fashion, the party systems themselves were
consolidated.
Mair (1990: 3)
While the era of mass parties has ended some time ago, the existence of
these parties is seen as having structured electorates in the older democ-
racies, consolidating their party systems. The newer democracies, in
turn, did not benefit from this effect, generating less consolidated party
systems. This is of particular importance in the study of the Portuguese
party system, where mass parties did not emerge with democratisation
(Bruneau 1997: 5) and partisan identities were formed ab novo with the
transition to democracy, without any remnants of a previous party sys-
tem that could be at least partially resuscitated with democratisation.
The Portuguese case contrasts starkly with that of neighbouring Spain,
where the relevant post-1977 parties on the left (PSOE and PCE) had
also been relevant parties during the ill-fated Republican experience of
the 1930s. In this context, the Portuguese case is potentially a typical
case (to use the typology of Gerring 2006: 89–93) in terms of third wave
democracies that did not have prior party systems that re-emerged with
democratisation.
82 C. JALALI
The Portuguese Party System, 1974–2015:

Characterisation
The Portuguese party system has shown considerable stability in terms
of its macrostructure and main interactions since democratisation, at
least until 2015. This is very evident in terms of the relevant parties.
Four parties have dominated since 1974, almost invariably monopolising
parliamentary representation: the right-wing Democratic Social Centre
(Centro Democrático Social, CDS); the center-right Social Democratic
Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD); the center-left Socialist Party
(Partido Socialista, PS); and, to the Socialists’ left, the Communist Party
(Partido Comunista Português, PCP). Since 1999, this number has
increased to five, with the emergence of the Bloco de Esquerda (BE,
Left Bloc), a party that emerged from an alliance of small Maoist and
Trotskyite parties with Communist dissidents. However, it is also appar-
ent in the main interactions of the party system, notably the principal
dimension of competition and the lines of cooperation and competition
in the party system.
We can thus identify three main patterns in the Portuguese party sys-
tem until 2015:
1. A principal dimension of competition between PS and PSD;

2. The absence of cooperation for government on the left;
3. Conflicts between dimensions of competition.
Regarding the first, we can identify the competition for government

between PS and PSD as the central pattern of the Portuguese party sys-
tem (Goldey 1992: 171). These two parties have led all constitutional gov-
ernments since democratisation (bar the brief and unsuccessful experiment
with presidential governments in 1978–1980). The Portuguese party sys-
tem has thus been ‘about’ the competition between PS and PSD for gov-
ernment; and this competition has tended to constrain voter choice.
The second main pattern relates to the absence of cooperation for
government on the left, reflected in the continued exclusion of the PCP
(and, since 1999, also of the BE) from national government. This exclu-
sion has had a major impact on interparty interactions and governance in
Portugal. First, it limited the formation of government to the other three
relevant parties, thus preventing the establishment of a bipolar coalitional
competition as in France for much of the Fifth Republic.
Second, it generated an asymmetry in the formation of governments

with majoritarian parliamentary support in Portugal, a pattern that Freire
(2009: 224) describes as a “party system bias to the right.” Of the 12
legislatures in Portugal between 1976 and 2015, 7 had a parliamentary
majority of parties to the left.3 However, only one of these resulted in
a left-wing government with the support of a parliamentary majority—
the tenth legislature, which gave rise to the first government led by José
Sócrates, whose majority support in parliament derived from the overall
majority obtained by the Socialist Party in the 2005 legislative elections.
By contrast, all five legislatures with right-wing majorities led to gov-
ernments with majority support in parliament.4 In all these legislatures,
the PSD coalesced with the CDS when it did not have a single-party
majority, either through a pre-electoral alliance (as in 1979 and 1980),
or via post-election coalitions (2002–2005 and 2011–2015).
Third, and related, this pattern creates a higher propensity for the PS
to form minority governments. As we saw earlier, only one of the seven
constitutional governments led by PS until 2015 had a single-party
majority in parliament. Of the other six Socialist administrations, four
were minority governments5 and the remaining two resulted from coa-
litions with the parties on the right (with the CDS, in the second consti-
tutional government from 1976 to 1978; and with the PSD in the ninth
constitutional government, 1983–1985).
In the case of the PSD, in nine constitutional governments it has led,
only one was a minority administration (the tenth constitutional gov-
ernment, 1985–1987). Of the remaining eight, two were single party
majorities6; and six resulted from pre- or post-electoral coalitions with
the CDS.7 Even the exception of the tenth constitutional government,
led by Cavaco Silva (1985–1987), is less exceptional when we take into
account that a PSD-CDS would not represent a parliamentary majority,
making such a coalition immaterial.
Finally, the third pattern concerns the conflict between dimensions
of competition. For Mair (1997: 14), a central part of any party sys-
tem is the competition between the parties that are part of the principal
dimension of competition—in the case of Portugal, PS and PSD—and
those that “are trying to establish a wholly different dimension”. In the
Portuguese case, this dynamic has consisted in attempts by other rele-
vant parties to replace the PS and the PSD in the principal dimension of
competition. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail all the efforts
84 C. JALALI
of CDS, PCP, and BE.8 However, it is important in this context to high-

light the PRD (Partido Renovador Democrático, Party of Democratic
Renewal).
Although it had an ephemeral presence in the Portuguese polit-
ical scene, the PRD represented the greatest challenge to the principal
dimension of competition thus far. A flash party, the PRD was close to
becoming the largest party of the center-left—and also the main opposi-
tion party—in the first legislative election it contested in 1985, winning
17.9% of the vote, less than 3 percentage points below the PS, which
polled 20.8%. The challenge of the PRD was reinforced by the fact that
its speech focused precisely on the need to change the political elite and
greater integrity in politics: the PRD positioned itself as the “party of
honest men, the moral party, the party of good men” (Soares in Avillez
1996: 261).
The PRD’s challenge turned out to be as brief as it was intense. In
March 1987, the PRD put forward a motion of censure against the
minority government of Cavaco Silva, with the tactical aim of forc-
ing the PS to abstain, thus making the PRD, with the support of the
PCP, appear as the leader of the left (Aguiar 1996; Frain 1998: 178).
However, the PS did not take this bait, and its support for the motion
resulted in the fall of the government of Cavaco Silva and the dissolu-
tion of parliament. Weakened by an unpopular motion of censure and
internal divisions, and with an unconsolidated electoral base, the ensuing
elections signaled a collapse of the PRD, losing over three-quarters of
its vote in 1987 before crashing out of parliament in 1991, with only
0.61% of the vote. Ultimately, as will be discussed in the next section,
the failure of the PRD’s challenge would further strengthen the principal
dimension of competition around PS and PSD.
Having outlined the main patterns of interaction, we present the
Portuguese party system based on the three dimensions defined by Mair:
the patterns of alternation, innovation and openness to new parties. This
analysis is summarized in Table 5.1.
Overall, Table 5.1 reflects a party system with a largely closed struc-
ture of competition. Excluding the first constitutional government,
of the 13 cases of government analysed in Table 5.1, 9 are of non-
existent or wholesale alternation; 9 do not present any innovation in the
governing formulae; and 11 show no openness to new parties previously
excluded from government. In this context, the Portuguese party sys-
tem is very close to Mair’s (1997: 212) description of a closed structure
Table 5.1 Patterns of alternation, innovation and openness in government,

1976–2018
Legislature Period Government Alternation Innovation Openness

composition and to new
Prime-Minister parties
I 1976–1977 PS minority (Soares) – – –

1978 PS-CDS majority Partial Yes Yes
(Soares) (CDS)
I (after 1979 1980–1981 PSD-CDS majority Partial Yes Yes
elections) (Sá Carneiro) (PSD)
II 1981–1983 PSD-CDS majority Non- No No
(Pinto Balsemão) existent
III 1983–1985 PS-PSD majority Partial Yes No
(Soares)
IV 1985–1987 PSD minority Partial Yes No
(Cavaco Silva)
V 1987–1991 PSD majority Non- No No
(Cavaco Silva) existent
VI 1991–1995 PSD majority Non- No No
(Cavaco Silva) existent
VII 1995–1999 PS minority Wholesale No No
(Guterres)
VIII 1999–2002 PS minority Non- No No
(Guterres) existent
IX 2002–2004 PSD-CDS majority Wholesale No No
(Barroso)
2004–2005 PSD-CDS majority Non- No No
(Santana Lopes) existent
X 2005–2009 PS majority Wholesale No No
(Sócrates)
XI 2009–2011 PS minority Non- No No
(Sócrates) existent
XII 2011–2015 PSD-CDS majority Wholesale No No
(Passos Coelho)
XIII October– PSD-CDS minority Non- No No
November (Passos Coelho) existent
2015
November PS minority (Costa) Wholesale No No
2015–
Notes
1. This analysis excludes the brief period of supra-partisan presidential governments (1978–1979)
2. The PSD-CDS government of 1980 entered office after the 1979 legislative elections. However, the
period until 1981 is formally considered part of the first legislature
86 C. JALALI
of competition, with patterns of wholesale or non-alternation in power;

familiar formulae in government formation; and access to government
restricted to a few well-identified parties.
This closure of the party system occurs quickly after the transition to
democracy. By 1980, the set of three parties that have monopolised gov-
ernment in democracy—PS, PSD and CDS—had already been defined.
With regard to innovation, the first decade would produce governments
with five different combinations of PS, PSD and CDS. No other com-
bination would emerge subsequently, and there are only two forms of
government with this range of parties that have not yet been tried—a
coalition of the three parties; and an (unlikely, given its position in the
party system) single-party government of the CDS. In terms of alterna-
tion, the prevailing pattern is one of wholesale and non-alternation, espe-
cially from 1987 onwards.
Portuguese Party System, 1974–2015: Evolution

In this section, we assess how the Portuguese party system evolved until
the parliamentary elections of October 2015. We argue that the notion
of a change in the Portuguese party system in the mid-1980s, as put for-
ward e.g. by Morlino (1995: 322–323, 1998: 86) is overstated. Rather,
the key interactions of the party system were established early on, and
remained throughout the democratic period, at least until 2015. Indeed,
the principal dimension of competition between PS and PSD emerged
in very first democratic elections of 1975 and 1976, placing these as the
two main parties.
Similarly, the absence of cooperation on the left also emerged early
on. The process of democratisation in 1974–1975 would confirm one
of the key patterns of the party system between 1974 and 2015—
the separation between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party,
and the consequent exclusion of the latter from national government.
During complex and uneasy revolutionary context of 1974–1975, the
PS emerged as a prominent advocate for the establishment of a liberal
democracy in post-1974 Portugal. This placed it in direct opposition to
the PCP, perceived as having a hegemonic project that looked to popular
democracies as its model. This conflict would generate a wedge in the
left that would subsequently endure.
At the same time, it is important to recognise that the period of
1985–1987, with the sudden emergence and decline of the PRD,
marks—as Lobo notes (2000: 154)—a “turning point in Portuguese

electoral history.” While the PRD did not alter the main patterns of
interaction between the parties, its demise coincides with a considerable
strengthening of the principal dimension of competition between PS and
PSD.
These two parties saw their combined vote share be strengthened in
the two decades after the PRD, obtaining, on average, 77.1% of the vote
in the legislative elections between 1987 and 2005, 15 percentage points
above the average between 1976 and 1983 (62.2%). This strengthening
is reflected in the form and duration of the governments in the two dec-
ades after the 1987 legislative elections. Portugal had 7 constitutional
governments in the 22 years between the elections of 1987 and those
of 2009. In the previous 11 years, Portugal had had 10 constitutional
governments. Of the seven constitutional governments between 1987
and 2009, only two were not single-party governments (in the previous
period, only two had been single-party executives); and only three did
not last a full term, whereas previously none had achieved this feat.
Finally, government became more concentrated in the two main
parties. In the 11 years between the legislative elections of 1976 and
1987, the CDS was in office for 1493 days (4.1 years), only 154 days
less than the PS (1647 days in the government), although considerably
below the PSD (2782 days in government). In the subsequent 22 years,
from the elections of 1987 to those of 2009, the CDS was in govern-
ment for 1070 days. In terms of the proportion of time in which the
CDS was in government, this fell from 37% from 1976 to 1987, to less
than half that (18%) from 1987 to 2009.
This strengthening of the two main parties is also reflected in a
decline in the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) from 1987
onwards, after the peak generated by the PRD in 1985, as Fig. 5.1
illustrates.
However, if the party system underwent a centrist inflection in the
mid-1980s, the legislative elections of 2009, 2011 and 2015 suggest a
potential reversal of this pattern. As Fig. 5.1 also illustrates, there was a
substantial increase in the ENEP in these elections, bringing it to lev-
els close to the average of the 1975–1985 period: the average ENEP for
the 2009–2015 period is 4.2, almost identical to the 1975–1985 average
(4.3).In this context, it is also important to note that this increase in the
ENEP is not entirely explained by the emergence and consolidation of
the Left Bloc as a relevant party in the Portuguese party system. Indeed,
88 C. JALALI
Fig. 5.1 Electoral volatility in Portugal, 1975–2015
this increase in the effective number of electoral parties comes a decade

after the emergence of the BE.
Consistent with the increase in the ENEP from 2009 onwards, the
average combined vote share of PS and PSD in these three elections
(2009, 2011 and 2015) is 65.2%, closer to the mean for the pre-PRD
period than the 1987–2009 one. This decline in the vote share of the
two major parties from the legislative elections of 2009 onwards is also
reflected in recent elections at other levels, as Fig. 5.2 illustrates.
Finally, this period is marked by a greater presence of the CDS in
government. As noted above, the CDS was in government for 2.9 years
(1070 days) of the approximately 22 years that separate the 1987 and
2009 legislative elections. This total would be amply surpassed post-
2009, with the CDS being in office for 1542 days (4.4 years) in the six
years that separate the inauguration of the 18th constitutional govern-
ment, on 27 September 2009, and the 20th constitutional government’s
taking office, on 4 October 2015.
At the same time, it should be noted that the number of legislative
elections in the post-2009 period is small—three legislative elections—
and as such insufficient to state that there is an enduring decline of the
Fig. 5.2 Effective number of electoral parties
two major parties. Additionally, it is important to note that this decline

occurs in a context of increasing pressure on party systems in Europe.
We discuss this aspect in greater detail in section “The Post-2015
‘Contraption’: The Moment of Change?”.
The Structural Consolidation

of the Portuguese Party System, 1974–2015
In this section, we examine the consolidation of the Portuguese party
system in the period up to the legislative October 2015. In particular, we
argue against Mair’s assertion that only in the mid-1990s was the process
of party system consolidation “coming to its fruition” in Portugal and
Spain (Mair 1997: 214).
Rather, and as previously developed, the main interactions of the
Portuguese party system formed rapidly and then remained in place. In
terms of the principal dimension of competition, its structuration around
PS and PSD emerges early on. Indeed, these have been the two largest
parties at national level in every election since democratisation, be these
legislative, local or European elections. Similarly, the exclusion of parties
90 C. JALALI
to the left of the PS from government also emerged early on, reflected in
the Socialists’ decision to form a minority government in 1976, not to
mention the dividing line between PS and the parties on its left during
the revolutionary period.
Likewise, it is important to note that this structuration occurred
despite the absence of mass parties in Portugal. The Portuguese expe-
rience thus suggests that party systems can consolidate quickly after
democratisation; and that this can be achieved without the development
of mass parties.9
The Portuguese case also illustrates the need to look beyond electoral
volatility when examining the consolidation of a party system. As Fig. 5.2
illustrates, Portugal had some elections with fairly high levels of volatil-
ity, such as in 1985; 1987; or 1995. However, with the exception of the
1985 elections—marked by the emergence of the PRD—this volatility
was generally consistent with party system stability in Portugal. In these
cases, the volatility tends to be more a reflection of the electoral swing
between the two main parties, within a framework of a consolidated
party system.
The Post-2015 ‘Contraption’:

The Moment of Change?
In this section, we analyse the Portuguese party system after the par-
liamentary elections of October 2015. This is a necessarily preliminary
analysis: only with time will the full effects of this period become clear.
To paraphrase the famous (though probably apocryphal) answer of
Zhou Enlai to Nixon and Kissinger’s query regarding his opinion on the
impact of the French Revolution, it is too early to tell if the post-2015
‘contraption’ marks a significant reshaping of the Portuguese party sys-
tem, or is a brief outlier period in its form of operation. Nevertheless,
while it is too early to fully assess the impact of this period, we can iden-
tify some initial patterns and dimensions.
Following the October 2015 elections, the President appointed,
on 30 October 2015, a minority coalition between the PSD and CDS
as the 20th constitutional government. This government would see
its programme be rejected by 123 MPs in Portugal’s 230-strong
Assembly of the Republic, namely those of the PS, BE, PCP, as well
as PEV (Ecologist Party ‘The Greens’, an ally of the PCP that has
always run together with the Communists in elections) and PAN
(People-Animal-Nature party, which elected one MP in 2015). With

these MPs constituting a majority of parliament, this rejection led to the
government’s resignation, as stipulated in the Constitution. Following
this outcome, the President appointed, on 26 November, a new consti-
tutional government led by the secretary-general of the Socialist Party,
António Costa, which survived the parliamentary vote on its programme
with the backing of the BE, PCP and the PEV. Prior to this outcome,
the PS entered into agreements (termed as ‘joint positions’) with the
PCP, BE and PEV, with the parties agreeing on a set of common policies
and the support of the latter for the formation of a Socialist government.
How should we interpret this post-2015 period? Let us begin by ana-
lysing it using Mair’s model of the structures of competition. It is easy
to identify that the 21st constitutional government of António Costa
entails wholesale alternation from the previous period. With regard to
the degree of openness and innovation, formally the executive headed
by António Costa is a minority government of the PS. The agreements
between the PS and the parties to its left are not coalition agreements
nor did they result in the latter entering office. Similarly, both the PCP
and the BE stressed during the negotiations that what was at stake was
enabling a minority PS government to take office (and preventing a
right-wing coalition government of PSD-CDS), not a coalition between
the parties. Examining it from this perspective, as a minority Socialist
government, the Costa executive does not represent any innovation or
openness in the structures of competition. Indeed, as we saw earlier,
minority governments were the most common form of PS executives
throughout the democratic period.
A similar conclusion is reached if we interpret this government based
on the literature that seeks to empirically measure Mair’s structures of
competition, which typically operationalises the degree of alternation,
innovation and openness to new parties based on the proportion of min-
isters each party has in government (see, for example, Bértoa and Enyedi
2014). In the Costa government, the absence of ministers selected by
the Left Bloc and PCP would lead to the assessment that the govern-
ment does not represent any innovation or openness in the structures of
competition.
However, the reality is not as straightforward. Although no other
party is represented in the government, the Costa executive has been
accompanied by a degree of cooperation within the left that is unprec-
edented in Portuguese democracy. The most noteworthy example is in
92 C. JALALI
terms of the approval of the State Budget, the central policy plank for
Portuguese governments. The 2016, 2017 and 2018 budgets were all
approved with the support of BE, PCP and PEV (and the opposition of
PSD and CDS).
This marks a sea change in the interactions of the Portuguese left.
Previously, BE and PCP systematically voted against all Socialist budgets,
with the former voting against every single budget since it was first elected
to parliament in 1999; and the Communist doing the same since 1977.10
This support of PCP and BE for the budgets of the Costa government
contrasts sharply with the experience of previous minority PS govern-
ments, which have invariably had their budgets approved in parliament
with the support of the parties to the right, usually through an absten-
tion that enabled parliamentary approval. This is evident in the budg-
ets for 1996 and 2000, approved with the abstention of the CDS; 1997,
1998 and 1999, approved with the abstention of the PSD; or more
recently, the budget for 2010 (approved with the abstention of the PSD
and CDS) and 2011 (with the abstention of the PSD). When it was una-
ble to obtain the support of either PSD or CDS for the 2001 and 2002
budgets, the budget was approved thanks to an individual CDS MP—
again, highlighting the lack of cooperation between the PS and the par-
ties to its left.
The notion that the 21st government is different from previous
Socialist governments, implying a change in the party system, is also
evident in political discourse since 2015. Speaking on October 2015,
António Costa described the prospective entente with the PCP and BE as
“if we were overthrowing the remainder of the Berlin wall” (Khan 2015).
Similarly, the description of this government as the ‘contraption’
reflects this perception of a change in the party system. This epithet—
at first applied to the Costa executive in a disparaging manner by the
PSD and CDS,11 before swiftly becoming the near-ubiquitous term to
describe this government in the media and popular discourse—is con-
sistent with the idea that this period is different. A contraption is not
only something that is unstable: it is also a novelty, and it is with the lat-
ter sense that the left (and especially the Socialist Party) appropriated the
term to describe this government.
So is the ‘contraption’ the moment of transformation of the
Portuguese party system? To borrow Zhou Enlai’s answer, it is too early
to say. The current legislature has certainly seen an unprecedented level
of cooperation on the left. However, it remains to be seen if, and how,
this cooperation will last beyond this legislature. It is worth recalling that
such apparent changes do not always yield a permanent change in party
systems, as the ‘historic compromise’ in 1970s Italy illustrates.
That said, there are two interrelated aspects that can help assess why
the contraption occurred, and provide pointers with regard to the future
of the party system. The first is the decline in the vote of the two major
parties. The second is the unprecedented parliamentary configuration
that resulted from the 2015 elections.
With regard to the first dimensions, the combined vote of PS and
PSD in the 2015 elections is estimated at 63.3%. Excluding the 1985
elections, where the PRD had a substantial impact, this is the lowest
combined vote share for these two parties in practically 35 years. This
decline in the vote share of the two main parties helps explain why the
largest list, the PàF, fell short of a parliamentary majority. This is the
first time that PSD and CDS coalesce—be it pre-electorally or post-
electorally—and do not obtain a parliamentary majority. Indeed, the
very creation of the PàF alliance can be interpreted as a preemptive reac-
tion to this decline, seeking to take advantage of the seat bonus that the
Portuguese electoral system historically generates for the list that wins
more votes. The most voted party or list in legislative elections from
1976 to 2015 has on average gained a share of the seats that is 6.5 per-
centage points higher than its share of the votes.12 This bonus helped the
PSD gain the largest parliamentary group in the 2015 elections, with 89
MPs, 3 more than the PS.
This weakening of the combined PS-PSD vote also contributed to a
second key factor: an unprecedented parliamentary configuration, where
the most voted list (PàF) was in one political bloc (in this case, on the
right), while the parliamentary majority was of the opposite political bloc.
This configuration is only partially mirrored in the fourth legislature that
emerged from the 1985 legislative elections. In that legislature, the PSD
was the largest single party; but the left held a parliamentary majority,
if we include the PRD within this bloc. However, the PRD had poorly
defined ideological position, reflected in the fact that its manifesto is clas-
sified as being slight right of center by the Comparative Manifest Project
(Lehmann et al. 2015), which made it less adversarial vis-à-vis the PSD
than the PCP and BE were with regard to the PàF parties in 2015.
The combination of these two patterns generated a parliament where
both of the main parties were far from a parliamentary majority. This can
be seen using the Shapley-Shubik power index to measure the power of
94 C. JALALI
the largest parliamentary party in the various legislatures since 1976. The
results mirror the analysis of sections “The Portuguese Party System,
1974–2015: Characterisation” and “Portuguese Party System, 1974–
2015: Evolution”. The power index of the largest parliamentary group is
substantially greater in the period of 1987–2009 than in the legislatures
preceding and following this period. The average power of the largest
party is 0.8 between 1987 and 2009, which contrasts with an average
of 0.44 until the 1987 legislative elections; and of also 0.44 in the three
legislatures since the 2009 elections.
More relevant to our analysis of the period after the 2015 elections is
that the largest party in the post-2015 legislature (PSD) has the lowest
Shapley-Shubik power index of the democratic period, of 0.3. Similarly,
it is worth noting that in this legislature, and for the first time in our
democracy, the two major parties have the same Shapley-Shubik power
index. This result helps explain the new parliamentary balance after the
2015 elections, leading to new potential coalitional configurations.
The Shapley-Shubik power index does not take into account the ide-
ological positioning of the parties. If we take these into account, we can
see that the range of majoritarian options in the post-2015 legislature
was very limited. A coalition with the CDS was not enough for either
PSD or PS to reach a parliamentary majority. That left only two politi-
cally viable minimum winning majorities in this parliament: an entente
between PS and PSD, or one between the parties on the left (PS, PCP
and BE).
At the same time, the decline in the combined vote share of the two
main parties in the 2015 legislative must also take into account the very
particular context of these elections: the immediate aftermath of a bail-
out programme that had adverse consequences for both parties. In the
case of the PS, the negative effects derived from the fact it was a Socialist
government that had requested the bailout; in the case of the PSD,
because it had led the government that implemented the austerity meas-
ures of the bailout programme.
That being said, the immediate effect of the bailout on the two main
parties’ vote appears to be slight. The combined vote share of PS and
PSD declined only 2.4 percentage points from the pre-bailout 2009 elec-
tions to the post-bailout 2015 elections. In this regard, Portugal is a nota-
ble exception in the context of Eurozone bailout countries (and indeed,
of several non-bailout party systems in Western Europe). The two main
parties in Ireland, Spain and Greece saw their combined vote decline by
Table 5.2 Average combined vote share of PS and PSD in legislative, local and
European elections, 1975–2017 (in percentage)
Average 1975–1986 Average 1987–2008 Average 2009–2017

(number of elections (number of elections (number of elections
between brackets) between brackets) between brackets)
Legislative 60.2 (6) 77.1 (6) 65.2 (3)

Local 62.2 (4) 73.5 (5) 67.6 (3)
European – 67.2 (5) 55.6 (2)
Average 61.0 (10) 72.9 (16) 63.7 (8)
(all elections)
Notes
1. This table includes the Constituent Assembly elections of 1975
2. In elections in which PSD and CDS ran together in a single list alliance, the votes of the alliance are
split in a 4:1 ratio, following the practice adopted in the literature (see, for instance, Jalali and Lobo
2006)
19.1, 22.7 and 43 percentage points respectively after their bailouts; and
similar electoral realignments have occurred in recent years in countries
such as France and Italy. In the case of Portugal, the largest single decline
in the combined vote share of PS and PSD predates the 2011 bailout,
occurring in the 2009 legislative elections, when the two parties together
polled 65% of the vote—a decline of some 12 percentage points in com-
parison with the average for the 1987–2005 elections, and of over 8 per-
centage points vis-à-vis the immediately preceding 2005 elections.
The nature of the party system beyond the 2015 legislature will
depend to a large extent on the future trend of the PS-PSD combined
vote share. Is the post-2009 decline highlighted in Table 5.2 an excep-
tion, with subsequent elections leading to a return to the 1987–2009
‘norm’; or is this a ‘new normal’ in the Portuguese electoral behavior? In
the latter scenario, an entrenchment of the patterns inaugurated in 2015
is more likely, as is the possibility of actual innovation and openness in
government composition.
Conclusions
A party system consists of the patterns of interaction between the parties.
In the Portuguese case, we identified three main patterns of interaction
until 2015. First, PS vs. PSD as the principal dimension of competition,
structuring the party system in terms of competition for government.
96 C. JALALI
Second, the exclusion of the Communist Party and BE from government

at the national level. As explored in this chapter, this exclusion gener-
ated a bias to the right in terms of government formation, especially evi-
dent when the PS governed with a plurality in parliament. Finally, we
addressed the conflict between dimensions of competition, underscoring
the challenge generated by the PRD in the mid-1980s. As we noted, the
failure of this challenge ultimately reinforced the principal dimension of
competition around PS and PSD.
Overall, these patterns help explain the relatively closed structure of
competition until the 2015 legislative elections, with no innovation in
governing formulae since the mid-1980s and with access to government
restricted to a subset of the relevant parties. Similarly, and as was also
discussed in this chapter, the Portuguese party system structured quickly
after democratisation, contrary to the theoretical expectations that fore-
saw a slow consolidation of party systems in third wave democracies,
especially in the absence of mass parties.
At the same time, the chapter highlighted the new dynamics that
emerged in the aftermath of the 2015 legislative elections, with an
unprecedented pattern of cooperation between the PS and the parties to
its left that gave rise to the so-called ‘contraption’.
This cooperation was largely fostered by an unprecedented parliamen-
tary configuration in the aftermath of the 2015 elections—itself a reflec-
tion of an erosion in the support for the two main parties since 2009.
That said, the critical junctures that reshape institutions—including party
systems—often derive from exceptional conditions. The next legislatures
will allow us to see if the ‘contraption’ is an exception arising from this
unique parliamentary balance—or a turning point for the Portuguese
party system.
Acknowledgements This research was funded by the Portuguese Science and

Technology Foundation FCT), by the Programa Operacional Competitividade
e Internacionalização (COMPETE 2020) and by the Programa Operacional
Regional de Lisboa (PO Lisboa), in its European Community Fund FEDER
component, as part of the ‘Changing European Elections’ project (POCI-01-
0145-FEDER-016887; PTDC/IVC-CPO/3481/2014).
I am grateful to João Moniz for assistance in collecting data for this chapter.
Notes
1. See, for example, the typology of Sartori (1976). This captures well party
systems that are either prior or contemporary to its elaboration (e.g. post-
war Italy or the French Fourth Republic in the case of polarised plural-
ism; or the French Republic Fifth Republic and post-war Germany in the
moderate pluralism category). However, it is less capable of dealing fully
with more recent party systems (such as Portugal and Spain) or changes
in older party systems, such as Italy after 1994.
2. Morlino avoids the term institutionalisation on the grounds that the party
system is not an institution, at least in the full sense of the term (Morlino
1998: 206).
3. These were the first (from 1976 to the mid-term elections of December
1979); third (1983–1985); fourth (1985–1987); seventh (1995–1999);
eighth (1999–2002); tenth (2005–2009); and eleventh (2009–2011)
legislatures.
4. These were the second (1980–1983); fifth (1987–1991); sixth (1991–
1995); ninth (2002–2005); and twelfth (2011–2015) legislatures.
5. The sixth constitutional government led by Mário Soares; the thirteenth
and fourteenth constitutional governments, both headed by António
Guterres; and the eighteenth constitutional government of José Socrates
(2009–2011).
6. The tenth (1987–1991) and eleventh (1991–1995) constitutional govern-
ments, both led by Cavaco Silva.
7. The sixth constitutional government (1980–1981, led by Francisco Sá
Carneiro); the seventh (1981) and eighth (1981–1983) constitutional
governments (led by Francisco Pinto Balsemão); the fifteenth constitu-
tional government (2002–2004, led by José Manuel Barroso); the six-
teenth constitutional government (2004–2005, led by Pedro Santana
Lopes); and the nineteenth constitutional government (2011–2015, led
by Pedro Passos Coelho).
8. For an analysis of the strategies of CDS and PCP, see Jalali (2007:
202–208).
9. For an analysis of the consolidation process of the Portuguese party sys-
tem, see Jalali (2007).
10. The one exception was in 1976, when the PCP abstained on the first
Socialist budget for 1977, although this abstention was irrelevant for its
approval, given the other parties’ votes in parliament.
11. The epithet, initially coined in a newspaper column, entered popular
lore when it was used by the then leader of the CDS, Paulo Portas, in
98 C. JALALI
November 2015, describing the Costa executive as “not quite a govern-

ment, but rather a contraption” (TVI24 2015).
12. For the second most voted party or list, the bonus is smaller: average of
3.4 percentage points. For the remaining three relevant parties, on aver-
age these obtain a share of seats that is 1.4 percentage points below their
share of the votes.
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CHAPTER 6
The Centrality of the Portuguese

Parliament: Reform, Troika
and “Contraption”
António José Seguro
Since the entry into force of the 20071 Reform on 15 September 2007
(see the Reform process in the References), the Portuguese Parliament—
Assembly of the Republic—has challenged the theory of the functional
decline of the legislatures defended in 1921 by Lord Bryce (Cotta 1996:
287; Teixeira and Freire 2009: 57), following previous works where
the book of Walter Bagehot stands out (Norton 1990: 20).
It is undeniable that the legislatures lost power in legislative produc-
tion in favour of the governments. This applies particularly in parliamen-
tary systems, as a consequence of: (a) the complexity of the modern state
(Leston-Bandeira 1995: 122; Freire et al. 2002: 23; Porta 2003: 210);
(b) the globalisation process (Merkel 2014; Streeck 2015; Freire 2015);
and (c) in the case of the Member States of the European Union, the
co-legislative function that the national governments are having in
increasingly more areas at European level (Miranda 2014: 195).
A. J. Seguro (*) 
University Autónoma of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_6
102 A. J. SEGURO
However, asserting its “decline” presents some weaknesses. We share

the views that the analysis of legislatures should be integral. It should
involve all their functions and roles in the political system they are
inserted in. The analysis should not be partial or look at one function
only, however relevant it may be (Leston-Bandeira 1996: 122). Moreover,
it should not be carried out at a single occasion, when a certain function
may be central and cease to be so later on (Meirinho Martins 2008: 103).
Therefore, the legislative function, however important it may be, is not
the only function of legislatures. Moreover, in the wake of Cotta, a legis-
lature that limits its intervention to legislating “would relinquish a very
important part of the political process” (1983: 886).
It is precisely in a part of this political process—the political action
of the government—that the Portuguese Parliament has undergone pro-
found normative transformations, which some have identified as a true
revolution in the work of Parliament (Filipe 2009), with the aim of rein-
forcing its executive control function and, consequently, its centrality in
the Portuguese political system.
The Consequences of the 2007 Reform

on Executive Control
In the only known study2 of the consequences of the Reform, the focus
was precisely on the analysis of the executive control function. The
results showed “a positive change in the executive control function
expressed by the increased use of the traditional control instruments that
led to the rise in the number of government members – both in the ple-
nary and in the committees – and increase in the average number, rate
and time to answer written questions and requests” in the period 2007–
2014 compared to the period 2000–2007 (Seguro 2016).
The significant increase in the number of government members both
in the plenary (+19%) and in committees (+74%) resulted from several
factors: the increase in the opposition rights that the Reform granted to
the parliamentary groups, particularly the opposition, for the first time
since the establishment of democracy in 1974, which do not entail the
consent of the parliamentary majority to require the presence of a gov-
ernment member in the parliament; the obligation and scheduling of ses-
sions for questions to the Government members in the committees; and
the mandatory presence of the Prime Minister in the plenary for debate
with the deputies every fortnight.
6 THE CENTRALITY OF THE PORTUGUESE … 103
The study concludes that the reinforcement of the executive control

function of the Portuguese Parliament over the government’s actions has
resulted in the strengthening of its primacy in its relationship with the
government (as opposed to what happens in the legislative function) and
in the solidification of the parliament’s centrality in the Portuguese polit-
ical system (Seguro 2016).
This strengthening of the executive control function seems to follow
the tendency identified by Kreppel that indicates that fused powers par-
liaments tend to be strong with regard to the control function of gov-
ernments and weak in the legislative function, contrary to what seems to
happen in separation powers congresses, which tend to have more legisla-
tive power and less political control over the executive3 (2009: 183).
The statistics on legislative activity in Portugal also reinforce the
trends identified by Kreppel. Indeed, in the period 2000–2016, and
using a quantitative criterion, the total number of Decrees-Law was
4356 while the total number of Laws was 1415 (Observatory of
Portuguese Law 2017: 17–20), that is, the government approved about
three times more legislative acts than the Assembly of the Republic.
The Troika Years

During the period of the Financial Assistance Programme to Portugal
(17 May 2011–17 May 2014), the results of the analysis of data on the
legislative activity and the exercise of the executive’s control function
point to the maintenance of the government’s supremacy vis-à-vis the
Parliament in the law making activity and of the Parliament vis-à-vis the
government in terms of executive control, with an increase in the exer-
cise of some specific political initiatives by the MPs and the Parliamentary
Groups.
Indeed, in 2011–2014,4 the number of Decrees-Law was 867 and the
number of laws was 326. During these 4 calendar years, the executive
approved approximately 2.6 times more legislative acts than the parlia-
ment. It is true that there was a decrease compared to the proportion
observed in the period 2000–2016 but the primacy of the executive over
the parliament remains. The government was responsible for 75.48% of
legislative acts (in the period from 2000 to 2016) and for 72.67% in the
four years (2011–2014) of the bailout period.
The number and nature of many of the measures contained in
the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy
104 A. J. SEGURO
Conditionality (MoU), which are part of the absolute reserve (Article

164 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic—CRP) and of the
relative reserve (Article 165 of the CRP), which are the remit of the
Assembly of the Republic, certainly contributed to this slight decrease.
The measures included the creation, extinction and modification of local
authorities, respectively; and the creation of taxes, the tax system and
privatisations.
Furthermore, regardless of the universes of legislative responsibilities,
the sensitivity and unpopularity of many of the measures contained in the
MoU led the Social Democratic Party/Social Democratic Centre (PSD
CDS-PP) to seek national Parliament to approve legislation, considering
its social and electoral impact. With the submission of laws for approval
in national Parliament, the PSD/CDS-PP government thus fulfilled two
objectives of its political strategy: on the one hand, to remind voters that
it had been a Socialist Party (PS) government that had been responsible
for the request for financial aid and, on the other hand, to confront the
PS with the approval of measures resulting from the MoU that the party
itself had signed and committed to in the previous government.
Legitimation
In addition to its legislative function, national Parliament simultaneously
had a legitimation function in one of the most difficult economic, social
and political periods after 25 April 1974. This legitimation function was
identified by Robert Packenham (1970) as a consequence for the polit-
ical system when he studied the role of the Brazilian Congress during
the authoritarian and nationalist military regime (1964–1985), especially
regarding its regular functioning (see also Kreppel 2014: 173). As noted
by Cristina Leston Bandeira, Packenham’s study shows that “parliaments
play a variety of functions beyond traditional legislative production, and
a parliament does not necessarily play a decisive role in the policy-making
process, understood as the process of drafting legislation and public poli-
cies” (2002: 31).
This legitimisation function is not new in the Portuguese parliament.
In a comprehensive analysis of the Assembly of the Republic (1983–1995),
Leston-Bandeira identifies the existence of this function and concluded
that in two decades of democracy, the Portuguese parliament has devel-
oped from being a law-oriented institution to becoming an institution
oriented towards legitimation (2002: 209–219).
According to this study’s conclusions, the transformation of the

Portuguese parliament’s positioning appears in the V and VI Legislatures,
which had an absolute parliamentary majority supporting the government.
This is a common feature of the Troika’s5 stay in Portugal: an absolute
majority supporting the government, whether formed by a single party
(1987–1995) or a coalition (2001–2015). The party majority is present
in both parliament and the government, so the decision on where the
approval of the legislation lies, respecting the constitutional requirements
of the universes of own legislative powers, rests in the political leadership
of this majority, given that approval will always be guaranteed.
As Packenham noted, and by no means attempting to compare the
Brazilian autocracy of the military dictatorship with the Portuguese
democracy of the Troika period, but noting its unique socio-political
context, “the debates in the Brazilian Congress Plenary, the commit-
tees’ meetings and the meetings of the various sections of the party, the
MPs’ statements (…) constituted a vehicle through which tensions were
released not only among MPs (who debated, met and talked) but also
among the various layers of an attentive audience” (quoted by Leston-
Bandeira 2002: 30). This is another aspect that is also present in the
Portuguese parliament during the bailout period, enriched by the fact
that the Assembly of the Republic brought together more representa-
tives from political parties (PSD, PS, CDS-PP, Portuguese Communist
Party—PCP, Left Bloc—BE and the Green Party “Os Verdes”—PEV)
than those who signed the MoU (PS, PSD and CDS-PP).
It is true that no one expects, as has been confirmed, that the PCP,
the BE and the PEV would approve the measures contained in the
MoU, but their participation in legislative processes and parliamentary
debates has accentuated Parliament’s role in legitimising the Portuguese
political system. It should also be noted that political parties not signa-
tories to the MoU (PCP, BE and PEV), which refused to attend meet-
ings with the Troika, in the preparation of that document (March and
April 2011) two voted in favour (BE and PEV) (PCP abstained) of the
creation of the Ad hoc Committee that the national Parliament set up
to Follow-up the Measures of the Financial Assistance Programme to
Portugal (CEAMPAFP) and the three parties integrated it.6 One of the
PCP MPs was also one of the heads of the two Vice-Presidencies of that
Parliamentary Committee.
This Parliamentary Committee was set up on 2 July 2011 and,
according to its final report,7 adopted a unanimously approved action
106 A. J. SEGURO
plan with three priority areas: the financial system, balance of public
accounts and measures to support economic recovery. The Committee
met 70 times, with 47 regular meetings and 23 meetings of the Board
and Coordinators of the parliamentary groups. The fact that there were
23 meetings between the political leadership of the committee illustrates
the high degree of political importance the political parties attached to
the monitoring of the implementation of the Bailout Programme. The
14 hearings held with government members with high political respon-
sibilities (Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of State and Finance, Deputy
Secretary of State of the Prime Minister8 and Deputy Secretary of State
of the Deputy Prime Minister) as well as the nine meetings with the
Troika9 over the mandate also attest this importance.
During the bailout period, the Portuguese Parliament took its role of
politically controlling the government very seriously and created a spe-
cific mechanism—the Follow-up Committee—to gather information and
clarifications from both the government and the Troika; to convey to
them the plural political positions of the parties that comprise it (see the
final declarations of each parliamentary group in the Committee’s Final
Activity Report) and to listen to the positions of other relevant politi-
cal and social players (Trade Unions and Confederation of Employers),
as well as the Governor of the Bank of Portugal and the Portuguese
Association of Banks.
Admittedly, according to reports of those who were present, these
meetings with the Troika served to reaffirm the political positions of each
of the parties rather than to achieve any other objective for the occa-
sional or structural correction of measures of the MoU. That objective
was for the government only. Still, this was not the purpose that had led
to the creation of the parliamentary follow-up committee.
As made clear from media reports during the bailout period, most of
the parliamentary debates dealt with austerity policies, Troika measures,
the implementation of these measures and others that the PSD/CDS-PP
government considered indispensable for the economic recovery of the
country and to which the opposition parties objected. These topics over-
whelmingly pervaded all debates, interpellations, questioning sessions
(with emphasis on the fortnightly debate with the Prime Minister) and
parliamentary committees’ hearings of government members. Thus,
the role played by the Follow-up Committee through its specific action
was also used as a means to fuel the intervention of MPs in the Plenary
and in the permanent committees of the Assembly of the Republic, which
constantly reminded the government that it was the latter and not the
troika who was accountable to the Portuguese, while simultaneously
publicising their plural positions to the country.
During this period, the parties did not fundamentally change their
main political positions: “The socialist government has left us a coun-
try on the brink of bankruptcy, the troika has helped us raise and now,
finally, the PSD/CDS-PP government can make the country walk on
its own foot” (PSD); “There was another way, with less social suffer-
ing, to healthily fulfil the commitments made with the signing of the
Memorandum of Understanding. The PSD/CDS-PP government went
beyond the troika, impoverishing the Portuguese (PS); after this phase,
we are convinced that Portugal will no longer find itself in the undoubt-
edly vexatious situation of being forced to seek international aid. After
very difficult years, we now live a different moment, in which the eco-
nomic cycle shows progressive signs of change” (CDS-PP); “The Pact of
Aggression signed by the domestic (PS, PSD and CDS-PP) and foreign
troikas (IMF, ECB and the EU) subjected Portugal to a political pro-
gramme of impoverishment (…) imposing a historical cycle of civiliza-
tional regression. With the implementation of this pact, the government
reconfigured the State itself against the Constitution of the Portuguese
Republic” (PCP); “With the signing of the MoU, the PS, PSD and
CDS-PP pawned the sovereignty of Portugal, leaving the country hos-
tage of supranational institutions. (…) The Portuguese people became
the victim of an intense austerity programme that resulted in the deval-
uation of work, in the increase of unemployment, in the reduction of
the Welfare State, in the rise of taxes and in the increase of poverty and
inequalities” (BE).10
The existence and confrontation in national Parliament of this plu-
rality of positions constituted an invaluable political asset, particularly in
moments of crisis, echoing and responding to different socio-political
currents in Portuguese society, avoiding exposed fractures of the inevita-
ble social and ideological cleavages that emerged with the crisis resulting
from the consequences of austerity policies.
This political plurality is a unique feature of legislatures as a structure
of political representation. We do not ignore the argument that the direct
election of the legislature only serves to legitimise the appointment of
the executive, but even if it were like this, the executive does not guar-
antee the plural nature of political representation. The oppositions are
present in the legislatures but do not integrate the executives. Hence, the
108 A. J. SEGURO
legislature is indispensable to ensure the pluralistic principle of political

representation (Cotta 1996: 288; Teixeira and Freire 2009: 58), which
places it in a prominent place in democratic political systems.
The Parliament’s control of the political activity of the government
and the political debate were two of the classic functions most exercised
by the Portuguese Parliament, which reinforces its protection shield
against the opposed views of the functional decline theory and maintains
its real centrality, not only normative, in the political system.
With regard to its executive control function, if we analyse the num-
ber of government plenary attendance, parliamentary committees and of
answers, within the deadline, to the written questions and requests to the
Government and Central Administration during the three legislative ses-
sions of the bailout period (June 2011–September 2014) and compare,
using the average per legislative session, with the four previous legislative
sessions (all of which in the 2007 post-reform period), we find that there
are no significant deviations in overall terms, i.e. likely to affect the inten-
sity of the executive control function. It should be noted that there is a
greater number of ministers in committee attendance and a lower number
in the plenary in the period 2007–2014 than in the period 2000–2007,
which we attribute to the identified trend for “a parliamentary prac-
tice that privileges parliamentary committees, and not the Plenary, for
the periodic scrutiny of ministers” (Seguro 2016). There is also a slight
decrease in the number of interpellations (1.9 per legislative session),
which may be associated with an increase in the number of debates arising
from the presentation of several Censure Motions.
Censure Motions
Censure Motions figured prominently in the process of executive con-
trol during the bailout period. In fact, the PSD/CDS-PP government
of Passos/Portas faced the largest number of censure motions since the
first legislative assembly (1976). Six censure motions were submitted by
all opposition parties (PS-1, PCP-3, BE-1 and PEV-1), i.e. over a fifth of
the 28 censure motions submitted in the 42 years of legislative assembly.
Political parties were aware that censure motions would be doomed to
rejection by the vote of the government majority, but nevertheless they
took the initiative. The objective, of course, was not to overthrow the
government but to politically criticise to make clear the distance from the
PSD/CDS-PP government’s austerity policies, in the name of another
path against the impoverishment strategy (motion of the PS submitted

on 28-03-2313); rejection of the pact of aggression on behalf of a patri-
otic left-wing policy (PCP motions submitted on 01-06-2012, 01-10-
2012 and 27-05-2014); in defence of the Constitution and the right to
salaries and pensions (motion of the BE submitted on 01-10-2012); for
the dignity and the improvement of the life of the Portuguese people
(motion of the PEV submitted on 15-07-2013).
We are aware that in the classical view, according to which control is
equivalent to the government’s political accountability to the Parliament,
including evaluation and sanction (Santaiolalla 2013), we would not
be in the presence of the executive control function because, according
to this view, executive control only exists when it causes the overthrow
of the government. We disagree with this view because if it was to be
considered, it would mean that executive control in the Portuguese
political regime would only have worked four times during the last 42
years.11 Executive control does not lead to the requirement for politi-
cal responsibility (Morilo 1985: 72–87; Mény 1996), so it is natural
for a democratic regime to function for years without requiring politi-
cal responsibility/resignation of the government, but it is inconceivable
that the same regime works without the exercise of executive control.
According to Crick, “control means influence, not direct power; advice,
not command; criticism, not obstruction; scrutiny, not initiation; and
publicity, not secrecy” (1990: 276).
As Morilo points out, not all the consequences of exercising execu-
tive control are limited to the parliament (1985: 196). We highlight two
of these consequences: the first, from the judicial view point, through
assessing the conclusions of the parliamentary inquiry committees when
sent to the Public Prosecution and the second, arising from the public-
ity resulting from the exercise of the executive control function, publicly
exposing acts of the government that otherwise would be unknown, in
order to provide a third subject—the sovereign people—with informa-
tion so that it can form an opinion on the government and the majority,
with the aim of weakening or providing social support (for the rest of
the term of office), censure or renewal of the mandate (in the next elec-
tions), in accordance with the objectives of the opposition or the major-
ity, respectively (Morillo 1985: 196).
In practice, the debate in the parliament becomes a debate before
and among voters. In addition to aiming to weaken and exert elec-
toral censure, minority oppositions may gain influence over the public
110 A. J. SEGURO
policies that they failed to achieve in the legislatures through the polit-
ical processes. As an example, there is the “TSU case”12 in September
2012, when the publicity resulting from the political control exercised
by the opposition in the national Parliament influenced the voters, who
took to the streets throughout the country in one of the most expressive
demonstrations in the post 25 April 1974, which made a decisive con-
tribution to the government’s relinquishment of its proposal. This is a
consequence of the exercise of the executive control that must be taken
into account.
Requests for Review of the Constitutionality of Budgets

The submission of the largest number of censure motions was one of the
specific initiatives undertaken by opposition parliamentary groups in the
Portuguese Parliament to express their disagreement with the austerity
policies carried out by the government. Other initiatives that marked the
Legislature conducted by the parliamentary groups and the MPs were
the requests for review of the constitutionality of the State Budget laws
(article 281 of the CRP). The PSD/CDS-PP government submitted
four proposals for State Budgets (2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015), which
were approved by the parliamentary majority, and all of them were the
subject of requests for verification of the constitutionality of some of its
norms, almost all of them related to the so-called “cuts” in the salaries of
civil servants and in the pensions of the Portuguese. It was the first legis-
lature when all the Budget Laws were sent to the Constitutional Court,
pointing to the conclusion that “in Portugal, political and party con-
texts predictably affect the use of constitutional litigation as a counter-
majority weapon” (Araújo and Magalhães 2000: 211). Moreover,
according to the same authors, citing Habermas, “it is precisely in the
domain of abstract control that the competition between the consti-
tutional court and the democratically legitimized legislator is intensi-
fied” (2000: 214). On several occasions the minority oppositions have
won by judicial means what they lost in the parliamentary political way.
Regardless of the ongoing debate in the academy on the “judicialisation
of the legislative processes”, “the exploitation of courts by political actors
for political-partisan purposes”, “the actions of governments on the mar-
gins of constitutionality”, and the “political parties’ incentives and elec-
toral punishments through the courts” (Araújo and Magalhães 2000),
what is relevant is to stress the centrality of the Portuguese Parliament,
in this case through initiatives without which the Constitutional Court

could not have acted. At the time, several analysts pointed to the visibil-
ity and popularity of the Constitutional Court by preventing (the cut-
back in the incomes of the Portuguese) what that the Parliament had
failed to achieve. Most of the Portuguese then discovered the existence
of a Constitutional Court that until then had been largely unknown.
However, we insist, the Constitutional Court deliberated only because
the parliamentarians took the initiative, which in our analysis constitutes
an element in favour of the centrality of Parliament and its supervisory
role.13
Portugal was under financial assistance from June 2011 to May
2014. The austerity policies lasted longer, but the Portuguese managed
to “overcome the economic crisis without rejecting the foundations
of democracy”, as pointed out by Bruno Stagno, Legal Officer of the
Human Rights Watch (Visão, 19 April 2018). The sovereignty bodies,
political parties and social partners have acted in respect of the rule of
law in an extremely difficult political and social context, with people and
families experiencing tragic situations in the face of strong social and
political cleavages.
It is too soon to draw all the consequences of what has happened, but
a reality is clear: the understanding reached by the political parties of the
parliamentary left as a formula for governance.
The Surprising Contraption (“Geringonça”)

It was precisely this understanding that surprised the Portuguese and was
responsible for the introduction of three breaks in the Portuguese polit-
ical system: (a) the principle that who win elections should govern dis-
appeared; (b) the constructive rejection of the government’s programme
appeared; and (c) the arch of governance encompasses all parliamentary
parties, not just three (the PS, PSD and CDS-PP).
Let us examine each of these ruptures individually.
Winning Elections No Longer Means Governing

In the previous 13 general elections, the understanding that whoever
wins the elections must govern prevailed. According to this under-
standing, the electoral system produced single-party minority govern-
ment14 (PS in 1976, 1995, 1999 and 2009, PSD in 1997) and generated
112 A. J. SEGURO
single-party majority governments (PSD in 1977 and 1991, PS in 2005)

and pre-electoral coalition governments (Aliança Democrática15—
Democratic Alliance—in 1979 and 1980) and post-election ones
(PSD + CDS-PP in 2002 and 2011).
On 22 October 2015, President of the Republic Cavaco Silva
appointed the leader of the largest party of the political force winning
the legislative elections, even though he knew that he did not have a
parliamentary majority in support of the future government. Thus, the
fate of the 20th Constitutional Government, the second led by Passos
Coelho, was pronounced. The four parties of the parliamentary left
reached an understanding by signing “joint positions” and announced
their willingness to support a minority government of the Socialist Party
(the second most voted political force in the elections).
The next step was the overthrow of the 20th Government through
the approval of a motion to reject the government’s programme by the
sum of the votes of the four left-wing parties. And so it happened.
Thirty-seven years later, the Portuguese Parliament rejected a gov-
ernment’s programme for the second time in its history.16 However,
this time there were two differences: (a) the party coalition that formed
the PSD/CDS-PP government had won the elections (it was not, as in
1978, a government of presidential initiative in the midst of the legis-
lature as a solution for the political parties’ lack of understanding) and
(b) the political forces that voted for the rejection of the government’s
programme offered an alternative and stable government solution within
the parliamentary framework.
The Preponderance of Parliament vis-à-vis

the President of the Republic
The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic does not require the pres-
entation of an alternative government as a condition for the Assembly
of the Republic to approve a motion of mistrust that necessarily implies
the fall of the executive. The solution to the crisis goes directly into the
hands of the President of the Republic, who can dissolve the Parliament
and call elections (points e and b of no. 1 of Article 133 of the CRP).
It turns out that the “Assembly of the Republic can not be dissolved
in the six months after its election, nor in the last semester of the man-
date of the President of the Republic” (article 172 of the CRP). The leg-
islative elections were held in October and the President of the Republic
was four months away from the end of his term of office, which pre-
sented a double constitutional limitation to the dissolution of the
Parliament. President Cavaco Silva appointed the PS leader, accompa-
nied by a statement at the inauguration of the PS government, where he
recalled that “the President of the Republic does not have the power to
dissolve Parliament and to call new elections” (Speech at the inaugura-
tion of the 21st Government on 26 November 2015) and expressed its
disagreement as to the solution.
We do not know what the decision of President Cavaco Silva would
have been if there had been no double constitutional impediment to the
dissolution of Parliament (see Freire and Santana-Pereira in Pinto and
Rapaz 2018: 242–243; Feijó 2016), and indeed that is not our focus.
In this context, what must be pointed out here is the preponderance of
the parliament vis-a-vis the president in resolving the crisis, revisiting the
weak role in the process of government formation that is attributed to him
by Cheibub, Martin and Rasch (see Fernandes and Jalali in Pinto and
Rapaz 2018).
It should be noted that this has not always been the case, since, even
in the face of the existence of parliamentary majorities in support of new
government solutions, in 1982 President Eanes refused to appoint Vitor
Crespo after Balsemão resigned; in 1987, President Soares refused to
nominate Vitor Constâncio after the fall (approval of a censure motion)
of Cavaco Silva’s minority government(1987); and in 2004, President
Sampaio17 dissolved the parliament invoking the Government’s lack of
credibility and the inability to face the crisis (Address to the Country, 10
December 2004). These facts show that having the support of the par-
liamentary majority is not enough for a Prime Minister to be nominated
(Feijó 2016) or to remain in office. A contribution, undoubtedly, to
deepen the research on the significant variation of the role of the presi-
dent in the Portuguese semi-presidential system (see Freire and Santana-
Pereira in Pinto and Rapaz 2018: 218).
Nobody Is Out of Governance Anymore

Until the 2015 elections, Portugal had been governed by executives led
by the PS and the PSD with various combinations: PS only, PSD only,
PS + PSD, PS + CD18 and PSD + CDS-PP. Neither the PCP (party with
parliamentary representation since the beginning of the democratic
regime) nor the BE (with parliamentary representation since 1999), nor
114 A. J. SEGURO
the PEV (party that forms an electoral coalition with the PCP) have been
part of, or supported constitutional governments. The expression “arch
of governance” has entered the Portuguese political lexicon to create a
separation between available parties and unavailable parties to exercise
or support governance. On 3 December 2015, this arch of governance
began to include all parliamentary political forces, making Portuguese
democracy even more consensual, as Lijphart typified in his seminal
study where he analysed 36 models of democracies (1999). Whether due
to ideological choice (see Secretary of State for Parliamentary Affairs,
Público, 15 February 2018), mere parliamentary arithmetic (see article
by Mariana Mortágua, Público, 17 February 2018), or to the political
survival of the PS leadership (see Ana Sá Lopes, Sol, 28 April 2018),
the truth is that the four political parties had two points in common: to
remove Passos Coelho from government and to restore the incomes of
the Portuguese.
Regardless of other analyses of the real motivations that led to this
solution, it is clear that the consequences of the crisis played a part in the
integration of the PCP, the BE and the PEV in the area of governance.
For the first time, the parties of the left reached an understanding and,
through the bilateral agreements parties made with the PS, called “politi-
cal positions”, it was possible to form a PS government with the majority
parliamentary support from the left.
It should be noted that from 1976 to 2015, agreements between
political parties translated into pre-election or post-election government
coalitions. In this context, the government was, in practice, the place
for majority decisions, since party leaders were the government leaders
(examples of this century: Durão Barroso-Paulo Portas; Passos Coelho-
Paulo Portas). In this legislature, the place where decisions are made
is the Parliament and no longer the government, the Secretary of State
of the Parliamentary Affairs (diverse public declarations) acting as a axis
of the executive in the relation with the parliamentary parties of the con-
traption (“Geringonça”).19
The Portuguese Parliament has always gained political importance
when there is no government (single-party or coalition) with an abso-
lute majority. What is new in the Portuguese (semi-presidential) system
of government is that the place for negotiations is Parliament itself.
It is too early to extract all the consequences of this political option,
known as contraption (“Geringonça”), in the Portuguese political sys-
tem, electoral system and party system. The 2019 legislative elections,
the alliances’ politics of each political party, the parliamentary composi-

tion and the formation of the next government will be important occa-
sions to confirm or deny whether the contraption (“Geringonça”) has
served a specific conjuncture or will go beyond it.
Still, it is not premature to say that the implementation of the 2007
Reform (in what concerns the political control function), the 2011 cri-
sis and the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding, the
overthrow of the second PSD/CDS-PP government and the PS govern-
ment’s entry into office have restored and reinforced the political cen-
trality of the Portuguese Parliament, which became the privileged place
for the exercise of the political control function (Seguro 2016) and for
the negotiation and approval of the laws indispensable for political action
and the maintenance of the support to the contraption (“Geringonça”)
government.
Notes
1. In 2007, the Portuguese Parliament drew up, approved and started imple-
menting the reform of its functions, organisation and functioning.
2. This study aimed to analyse the effects of the 2007 Reform on the politi-
cal control function in the period 2007–2014. For comparison purposes,
an earlier period with the same number of legislative sessions (2000–
2007) was considered.
3. Although the Portuguese government system is semi-presidential, the
President of the Republic (Head of State) has no executive power, so the
Government-Assembly relationship is closer to fused powers parliaments
than to separation powers congresses.
4. The available data of the Decrees-Law are organised by calendar year.
5. Designation of the three institutions that signed the MoU with Portugal
(PS Government, PSD and CDS-PP): European Commission (EC),
European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
6. The PEV was not part of the Committee because its Parliamentary Group
had only two MPs.
7. Report adopted unanimously on 25 September.
8. Member of the Government responsible for coordinating the
Memorandum Follow-up Structure (ESAME).
9. The Troika travelled to Portugal every three months to evaluate the
implementation of the measures contained in the Memorandum of
Understanding. In each of these evaluations, they met with Parliament,
the Government and the PS (the main opposition party that included the
government that signed the request for financial assistance), maintaining
116 A. J. SEGURO
contacts with the Presidency of the Republic and with other major players
in national political life, namely the Confederations of Employers and the
Trade Unions.
10. Excerpts from the political positions expressed by the Parliamentary
Groups and contained in the Final Activity Report of the Committee
for the Follow-up of the Enforcement of Measures of the Financial
Assistance Programme to Portugal.
11. In Portugal, since 1976 there have been four motions that led to the resig-
nation of the government: rejection of a motion of confidence (1976);
rejection of the government’s programme (1978); approval of a censure
motion (1987); and rejection of the government’s programme (2015).
12. Taxa Social Única—Single Social Tax—Contribution for Social Security
for Workers (11%) and companies (23.75%) on the workers’ salary. In
September 2012, the PSD/CDS-PP government announced that it
would increase the workers’ contribution to 18% and lower the compa-
nies’ contribution to 18%.
13. Since 1983, the year of its first judgement, the Constitutional Court has
examined 15 requests for successive abstract scrutiny of State Budget
laws, on the MPs’ initiative. Nine of these requests occurred during the
PSD/CDS-PP government mandate (June 2011–November 2015).
14. With the exception of single-party governments with an absolute majority,
there was only one minority single-party government (1995–1999) and
one coalition government with an absolute majority (2011–2015) whose
terms of office lasted until the end.
15. Pre-electoral coalition composed of the PSD, CDS and the People’s
Monarchist Party (PPM).
16. In this case, the exercise of political control produced political responsi-
bility, which in the two conceptions of the exercise of executive control
mentioned earlier, there is a consensus that we are in the presence of the
exercise of political control, not just activism without consequence.
17. In July 2004, President Sampaio agreed to appoint Santana Lopes (indi-
cated by the PSD/CDS-PP parliamentary majority) to replace Durão
Barroso, who resigned to take up the post of President of the European
Commission. In this case, what weighed the most to inform the
President’s decision was the condition that Barroso had imposed on him:
to accept the position in Brussels (considered to be of national interest)
if the parliament was not dissolved. Five months later, President Sampaio
dissolved the parliament, invoking the need for the regular functioning
of the institutions, a basis for the resignation of the government (Article
133 (g) of the CRP), but not for the dissolution of the Assembly of the
Republic. This provoked a controversy over the constitutionality of his
act. The situation was only remedied with the victory of the PS by an
absolute majority, which politically legitimised the President’s decision.
18. In 1978 the CDS still did not use the designation CDS-PP. The alteration
of the party’s name took place in the 11th (Extraordinary) Congress in
January 1993, on occasion of its doctrinal renewal.
19. “Contraption” means “improvised or poorly built thing or construc-
tion” and “device or mechanism of complex construction”. In political
and communicational terms, it designates the new governance formula in
Portugal: PS government (86 MPs) with parliamentary support from the
BE (19 MPs), the PCP (15 MPs) and the PEV (2 MPs). The Portuguese
Parliament is composed of 230 Members.
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CHAPTER 7
The Portuguese Constitutional Court

and Its Austerity Case Law
Teresa Violante
Introduction
The Portuguese Constitutional Court (PCC or CC) was established in
1983, following a constitutional transitional period which experienced
the first working system of judicial constitutional review. It has been an
episodically contested institution not so much because of its counter-
majoritarianism but due to other factors related, on one hand, to legal
history and, on the other, to the adjudicative role of the Court on the
separation of powers between the Republic and the autonomous regions.
According to the literature, the Court’s countermajoritarianism has been
low or rather insignificant from a comparative perspective. This means
that the judicial potential to influence the political action—by invali-
dating the legislature’s options—has not been a systematic feature of
The research leading to this chapter has been funded by the German Research
Foundation/Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) in the framework of
the Emmy-Noether-Project on “Transnational Solidarity Conflicts” at Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt.
T. Violante (*) 
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_7
122 T. VIOLANTE
the Court’s action. Furthermore, the Court has developed tools aimed
at reducing said influence (namely by deferring to later moments the
unconstitutionality rulings, when a different political majority is in
power). This traditional equilibrium was shaken during the financial cri-
sis period when the Court delivered severe drawbacks to austerity poli-
tics over a short period of time (particularly, between 2012 and 2014).
From an episodically contested institution, the Court became the centre
of political controversy, with several politicians and scholars pointing to
its “unauthorized activism” and claiming measures to restrict the court’s
review powers, particularly regarding budgetary or economic policies.
This chapter addresses this fundamental change in the legal and polit-
ical discourse and its potential consequences for the Court’s jurisdic-
tion and independence. Such change can be framed as an empowerment
of the PCC during the financial crisis as an effect of a rearticulation of
traditional Portuguese countermajoritarianism against the backdrop
of the crisis. As some authors have put it, the Court’s “activism” dur-
ing the austerity period can be regarded as an exercise of national sov-
ereignty against the demands of international creditors at a time when
the remaining political institutions have their bargaining power con-
strained by strong financial needs. Such empowerment, although reason-
ably foreseen when we look at examples provided by other jurisdictions,
was neglected by the legislature on the first moment. In fact, although
the “constitutional debate” (as the need to update the constitutional
text in light of challenges posed by globalisation and the new demo-
graphic trends) was vividly waved by the political opposition in 2009 and
2010, it was dropped as soon as the financial crisis took over the political
debate and the possibility of an international bailout materialised.
My analysis is not normative, and I do not join the prolific debate on the
Court’s legitimacy (or lack of it) to curb austerity policies and legislation.
The debate regarding the legitimacy of the Court’s case law is only relevant
inasmuch as it provides an extension of the conflict between the two
branches of power—the legal epistemic community was divided into two
opposing factions, between the critics of the Court and the supporters or
allies of the bold case law. I refer to countermajoritarianism as a descriptive
concept that encompasses the power that constitutional courts hold to influ-
ence the due course of politics by invalidating the normative production of
the legislature. If a system entails a constitutional court, then there is always a
“constitutional risk”, that alludes to the theoretical possibility of a represent-
ative government having its legislation struck down by the judicial rulings.
7 THE PORTUGUESE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND ITS … 123
In the first part, I provide a brief description of the CC, its institu-
tional design and traditional role in the political system. The second part
deals with the constitutional impact of austerity politics, including the
CC’s assessment, and the negative and intense reactions it sparked both
on national and international political institutions. It also addresses the
political negligence, on a first moment, of the potential obstacles pre-
sented by constitutional justice to the financial adjustment demands.
The third part explores lessons provided by other countries where con-
stitutional courts have raised obstacles to public policies aimed at deal-
ing with economic and financial crises. These lessons, together with the
institutional role of the CC, point to the fact that political negligence of
the “constitutional risk” was unjustified. Finally, I conclude that the crisis
provided the opportunity for a realignment of the equilibrium between
constitutional adjudication and the legislature. This realignment may
not only spark the risk of future political attempts to restrict the Court’s
power but also the protecting shield that comes from an enhanced social
support of the judicial protection of fundamental rights.
1. The Portuguese Constitutional Court

Portugal was the first European country to implement judicial review
of legislation. It was introduced in the Republican Constitution of
1911 and followed by the Political Constitution of 1933. The con-
stitutional text expressly allowed ordinary courts to disapply legal pro-
visions that breached the fundamental law. However, judicial review
of laws was largely irrelevant between 1911 and 1976.1 Following the
revolution, and the enactment of the democratic Constitution of 1976
(the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, hereafter CPR) a mixed
transitory model was adopted whereby a political organ (the Council
of Revolution), advised by an independent Constitutional Commission,
held competence to perform abstract control of legislation, as well as to
review legislative unconstitutional omissions.
In the first constitutional revision (1982), instead of opting for a
typical centralised model similar to the European system followed in
Germany, Austria, Italy or Spain, Portugal kept its mixed tradition: a
system of diffuse control whereby every ordinary court has the power
to disapply unconstitutional laws, subject to appeal to the newly cre-
ated CC, combined with a centralised model of judicial review con-
cerning abstract (ex post) control of legislation as well as review of
124 T. VIOLANTE
unconstitutionality by legislative omission. The CC is exclusively com-

petent to perform this control and delivers decisions with erga omnes
effects, thus imposing on the legislature the burden of striking down its
normative production in case of constitutional breach. Rulings delivered
on review of unconstitutionality by legislative omission2 have the mere
force of a pronouncement or persuasive judgment that the legislature is
free to accept or not whereas positive rulings delivered on a priori (ex
ante) review prevent the President of the Republic from promulgating
the bill unless a reinforced parliamentary majority confirms it (something
that has never occurred in the case of national legislation). Finally, rul-
ings delivered on concrete review only have inter partes effect.
The CC comprises thirteen judges. Ten of them are elected in parlia-
ment by a two-thirds majority that requires an agreement from the two
main parties, PS (Socialist Party) and PSD (Social Democratic Party).
The remaining three judges are co-opted by their peers.3
Constitutional review may be requested by legal and political liti-
gants.4 Legal actors include the Ombudsman and the General Public
Prosecutor. Both can initiate ex post abstract control proceedings and the
former can also request the review of unconstitutionality by legislative
omission. Political litigants include the President of the Republic, the
President of Parliament, the Prime-Minister, one-tenth of Members of
Parliament (hereafter MPs), as well as representatives from the regional
parliaments (in cases concerning regional autonomy). Regarding national
statutory legislation not included in organic laws, the power to request
preventive reviews belongs exclusively to the President of the Republic.5
On comparative terms, the Portuguese system for constitutional
review is quite generous: the power to initiate proceedings is assigned to
a wide array of both legal and political institutions, on one hand and, on
the other, there are no time-limits to request the review. Abstract consti-
tutional review in Portugal thus pose considerable theoretical constrain-
ing conditions upon the legislature.6
This is not new. Constitutional courts endorsed with the power to
review the constitutionality of statutes present a “mighty problem”
(Cappelletti 1980) for the separation of powers. They are non-elected
institutions that will occasionally strike down decisions adopted by
the elected legislature. According to one apt metaphor, this is some-
thing that comes with the job. Constitutional courts are like “junkyard
dogs” and occasionally they will bite the legislature. “The demos or
the majority is free to buy or not buy the dog, but it cannot escape
institutional realities. Once bought, the dog will bite”.7 One institu-
tional consequence of entrenching a constitutional court is the possi-
bility that it will take seriously its role as guardian of the constitution
and will occasionally deliver decisions that will reflect at the political
level. Constitutional courts in well-functioning democracies—even
where models of weak-judicial review are in place—influence the course
of politics. How often, when and why they do so depends on multiple
factors, including the institutional and procedural framework in which
courts operate.
Through an empirical analysis of the CC’s decisions delivered on
abstract control requested by political actors between 1983 and 1998,
Araújo and Magalhães (2000) concluded that constitutional justice in
Portugal did not present a significant countermajoritarian issue. Even
though the Court might occasionally act as a countermajoritarian institu-
tion, it did not entail the risks of judicialisation of politics.8 Among other
aspects, the authors observed that political litigants tend to challenge
more legislation enacted by “contemporary majorities” and that in these
cases the Court has allegedly been tempted to delay the adjudication to
later political cycles to prevent an open confrontation with the political
branches.9 Another empirical study on abstract review rulings delivered
between 1983 and 2008 concluded that in 59% of the challenges the
Court ruled for the partial or total unconstitutionality.10
Despite the different studies and methodologies adopted, there was
no significant political contestation of constitutional case law until the
crisis’ period. This does not mean, of course, that the Court has not peri-
odically exercised its powers and interfered with the political action.
Social awareness of the CC has been traditionally low (Araújo and
Magalhães, 2000: 207). Furthermore, the existence of a constitutional
court has been episodically questioned in Portugal, although not in rela-
tion to its alleged activism towards the national legislature: first, because
some regional politicians tend to view the Court as an obstacle to their
political aspirations; second, due to the singularity of the Portuguese
model of judicial review of legislation. The constitutional revision of
1971 specifically introduced the possibility of centralising the power of
judicial review in the Supreme Court of Justice (an organ entailed in
the judicial hierarchy whose members are not appointed by the politi-
cal branches). It is possible that the traditional option of awarding the
power of judicial review to ordinary courts, with the possibility of cen-
tralising abstract control in the Supreme Court of Justice, has blurred
126 T. VIOLANTE
the theoretical divide underlying the option for a dedicated (and auton-
omous) constitutional court. Legal history, on one hand, and regionali-
sation issues, on the other, explain the episodic debates concerning the
possible extinction of the CC and concentration of judicial review in a
special chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. The last episode of
such debates was held in 2012, during the appointment process of new
members to the Court (and before the first judicial striking of austerity
legislation).
2. Austerity Policies in Portugal

and Their Constitutional Impact
After the democratic revolution (1976), Portugal requested financial

aid three times (in 1978, 1983 and 2011). The second bailout met the
existence of the CC which was called to review fiscal consolidation poli-
cies following an international loan of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The Court was thus faced with an economic crisis at the very
beginning of its existence. It was not difficult for the judges to reject the
alleged constitutional breaches because of the “extraordinary” and “tran-
sitory” nature of the tax increases and the public interests underlying the
need to finance the State.11,12
The financial collapse following the Lehman Brothers crash, and,
on a second moment, the Eurozone crisis, were particularly harsh on
Portugal particularly due to its already fragile situation: a significant dete-
rioration of the fiscal position since 2008, due mainly to reductions in
tax revenues, combined with spread off-budget spending practices and
a large increase in the state-owned enterprise sector, which was by then
off the limits of the general government perimeter, and the adoption
of an expansionary program of public policies with significant invest-
ment expenses, particularly in public-private partnership programmes.
Within the framework of an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP),13 the
Government adopted several austerity packages between March 2010
and the beginning of 2011, including pay cuts between 5% and 10% for
all public workers with monthly gross salaries above 1500 euros. These
austerity measures, passed by a minority PS Government, enjoyed the
support of the main opposition party, PSD. When a further fourth pack-
age of austerity was put forward in March 2011, the entire opposition
backed off leading to the Government’s resignation.
On 7 April 2011, the incumbent Government asked for financial assis-

tance from the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the IMF. The agreement on the Financial and Economic
Assistance Program (FEAP) was formally adopted on 17 May 2011.
It took the form of a 78 billion euros loan that would be delivered in
tranches between 2011 until mid-2014. The successful delivery of fur-
ther disbursements depended on positive interim quarterly evaluations of
the conditions in the bailout agreements conducted by the Troika (IMF,
EC and ECB). One of those documents, the Memorandum of Economic
and Financial Policies, signed between the Portuguese State and the
EC, detailed the general economic policy conditions. The adjustment
program envisaged a sharp fiscal consolidation to achieve the fiscal defi-
cit of 3% of GDP by 2013. At the same time, an ambitious programme
of structural reforms was designed focused primarily on expenditure
consolidation.
Several of these policies were brought to the CC. The judicial scrutiny
of austerity began early in 2010,14 when the President of the Republic
questioned the constitutionality of tax increases in the middle of the fis-
cal year. At this point in time, the CC did not raise obstacles to austerity
policy. By adopting a deferential stance towards the legislature, the con-
stitutional judges claimed that because of the international economic and
financial crisis the increase in income taxation in the middle of the fiscal
year did not breach the principle of protection of legitimate expectations
nor the prohibition of retroactive taxation.15 Similar reasoning followed
later when the Court first reviewed pay cuts on public workers.16
In July 2012, the CC delivered its ruling on the first budgetary law
adopted after the bailout. It specifically analysed further pay cuts on
public workers (the total or partial suspension of holiday and Christmas
allowances).17 The decision followed a request filed by a group of MPs,
including some PS parliamentarians. The official party line of PS did
not subscribe the request and was actually against it. The Court found
that there was a breach of the principle of equality in accordance with a
proportionality review. A hypothetical state of financial emergency was
rejected by the judicial reasoning. The Court affirmed that, despite the
crisis context, the normative autonomy of the Constitution prevented
an alleged superiority of economic and financial goals over fundamental
constitutional provisions. The Court suspended the effects of the ruling
so that the concerned cuts were effectively implemented during the fiscal
year (2012). However, the declaration of unconstitutionality signaled a
128 T. VIOLANTE
red line that the legislature should not cross if further veto rulings were
to be prevented.
A few months later, the Court analysed several provisions of the
Budget Law for 2013 at the request of the President of the Republic, the
Ombudsman and some MPs. Decision 187/2013 ruled further pay cuts
on public workers unconstitutional as well as a contribution imposed on
sickness and unemployment benefits for breach of the principle of equal-
ity. However, several other austerity policies were allowed such as the
renewal of the 2011 pay cuts threshold, the reduction of overtime pay
for public workers, cuts on pensions and a varied increase in income tax-
ation. The decision on the Budget Law for 2013 was at the basis of the
Finance Minister Vítor Gaspar’s resignation which created a political cri-
sis inside the ruling coalition. It was reported that the then Head of the
IMF Mission said that if a second bailout was ever at risk the country
would seriously need to consider a constitutional amendment.18
Legal safeguards were formally included in the MoU from the sev-
enth to the eighth and ninth updates19 with the aim of mitigating “legal
risks from future potential Constitutional Court rulings”. Accordingly,
the Government committed to the following: (i) designing expenditure
reforms with the principle of public/private sector and intergenerational
equity in mind; (ii) addressing the sustainability of social security sys-
tems: (iii) justifying austerity measures on compliance with the fiscal sus-
tainability rules enshrined in the European Fiscal Compact; (iv) relying
on general laws instead of one-year budget laws in order to allow the
possibility of prior constitutional review thus permitting early reaction in
case of unconstitutionality rulings.20 This means that the concern with
the constitutional risk finally materialised when the assistance programme
suffered its first financial impact caused by a CC’s ruling. From that day
onwards, legislation would be grounded in accordance with the new
MoU guidelines and the Government joined all the litigation near the
Court with documentation aimed at upholding the constitutional validity
of austerity legislation.21
Later that same year, following a request from the President of the
Republic, the Court rejected a bill that would have introduced a new
framework for dismissing public workers for violations of the principle of
proportionality and legitimate expectations.22 It also struck down several
amendments to the Labor Code regarding withdrawal of previous collec-
tive agreements on compensatory rest for overtime work and causes for
dismissal of private workers (for respectively breaching the fundamental
right to collective bargaining and the prohibition of dismissal without

fair cause), following a request filed by MPs. On the other hand, several
legal provisions that implemented slashing of labour costs, flexible work-
ing time arrangements and restriction of collective labour agreements on
severance and overtime payments were not sanctioned by the judges.23
Increase in the working time of public workers was also allowed by the
Court.24
But 2013 would not end before another serious drawback was
imposed on the legislature’s efforts to execute the bailout conditions. In
December 2013, following a preventive request from the President of
the Republic, the Court unanimously struck down a bill implementing
the Social Protection Convergence Mechanism for violating the principle of
legitimate expectations.25 This bill would have introduced a 10% cut on
present and future pensions of former public workers.
The year of 2014 witnessed the peak of the conflict between the CC,
the Government and the legislature. Judicial deference towards the polit-
ical choices reached its minimum and all but two of the challenges filed
by the Ombudsman and two groups of parliamentarians on the Budget
Law for 2014 were successful: a new pay cut mechanism which added
further cuts to the ones implemented in 2011 (considered in violation of
the principle of equality), the renewed contribution on unemployment
and sickness benefits (which breached the principle of proportionality
and the right to a dignified existence) and cuts on survivors’ pensions
(also for equality reasons).26 The only challenges that were not upheld
by the Court were a suspension of payment of supplements at state-
owned business sector enterprises that had sustained net losses in the
previous three financial years (in some cases, these cuts implied a reduc-
tion of 60% of the income of those pensioners), as well as pay cuts in
state-owned enterprises.
The legal technique employed in the new pay cuts design embedded
the 2011 cuts threshold in the further cuts that were struck down by
the Court. The unconstitutionality ruling struck down the entire scheme
leaving public workers temporarily free from any cuts at the cost of pub-
lic expenditure aggravation if no suspension of effects was ordered. Even
so, the Court did not suspend the effects as it had done previously in
2012. It only limited the effects to safeguard the cuts that had already
been implemented (the ruling was delivered at the end of May, two
weeks after the successful exit from the bailout programme).
130 T. VIOLANTE
The completion of the FEAP brought the international bailout frame-

work to a closure. However, Portugal found itself again under the frame-
work of the EDP (that had been suspended in 2011). This means that
strict conditionality still applied, now within a renewed European frame-
work.27 In the summer of 2014 the CC was requested to review a frame-
work for new pay cuts for public workers as well as a revised reform of
public pensions (following the judicial sanctioning delivered six months
earlier). The Court kept showing its teeth: it allowed for the revised pay
cuts (that were basically a repetition of the 2011 threshold) for 2014 and
2015 but rejected the further provisions for 2016/2018. Furthermore,
it blocked another legislative attempt to reform the pensions’ scheme
paid by social protection systems leading the Prime Minister to pub-
licly state that the Government would not present any other proposal to
reform the Social Security pensions’ system.28,29 Following a request by
the Ombudsman, the Court rejected, in 2015, the unconstitutionality of
pay cuts in state-owned enterprises,30 and, finally, in 2016, upon referral
by a group of MPs, the judges ruled the unconstitutionality of previous
cuts on lifelong allowances of former political officeholders.31
The austerity case law, particularly the one delivered on policies
adopted after the formal rescue, raised growing charges of judicial activ-
ism on the Court. It attracted unprecedented attention and criticism,
both from the national and international media as well as an intense aca-
demic debate that was awkwardly expanded to the public arena.32
The criticisms became more aggressive in time but so did the majority
opinions of the Court. The division between the majority and the minor-
ity factions inside the Court was also evident. Some dissenting opinions
fiercely criticised the majority for interfering with the political options,
not providing clear interpretive guidelines and possible alternatives to
help the legislature coping with budget-balance commands, an epistemic
insufficiency that should force it to apply a weak scrutiny as well as failure
to interpret the Constitution in light of the constitutional commitment
to European integration (Article 7(5) CPR).33 Despite the internal divi-
sion, it is important to stress that even the “critics” ruled for the uncon-
stitutionality of some of the reviewed legislation and that one of the
most symbolic decisions—the one that envisaged the Social Protection
Convergence Mechanism—was adopted by a unanimous vote.
Criticism of the Courts’ rulings began when it rejected the suspension
of public workers’ Christmas and holiday allowances (in July 2012). The
IMF reported its “surprise” with the ruling.34 From the Government’s
side, the Minister of Economy affirmed that Portugal was “unadvisable

for those who want to work” and that the Constitution would condemn
the country to bankruptcy.35
However, only with the ruling on the Budget Law for 2013 were the
legal efforts to implement the rescue programme effectively encroached.
The Government was forced to find swift alternatives, in the middle of
the fiscal year, to compensate the reduction in expenditure that had been
struck down. Eloquently, the Finantial Times wrote that the CC was
threatening the country’s bailout.36 After the rejection of the requalifica-
tion framework for public workers in the summer of 2013, the President
of the EC, José Manuel Barroso, called upon the responsibility of all the
sovereign organs to avoid a second bailout37 and a leaked memo of that
institution dramatically posed the question: “Will the Constitutional
Court put at risk the MOU implementation?”.38
In the scholarly debate, some options were presented to restrict the
Court’s jurisdiction in financial matters in times of economic emergency
ranging from doctrinal arguments to concrete proposals regarding the
entrenchment of a financial emergency institute in the constitutional
text. It was difficult to avoid confrontation between the Government and
its parliamentarian supporting majority and the Court. First, the judges
were faithful to the time-constraint demands due to the periodic assess-
ments that preceded the disbursement of following aid-tranches. The
decision process was very fast: between 2012 and 2014 it never exceeded
five months except in the case concerning the 2012 Labor Code revi-
sion.39 Furthermore, there was a high number of review requests. For
instance, the austerity period led to the highest number of requests made
by a President of the Republic on policies that had been adopted by a
legislature of his political area (Blanco de Morais 2014: 777). The suc-
cess rate of requests on austerity by the President is impressive: in two
cases, the Court ruled for the unconstitutionality, in three for the partial
constitutionality and in only one case did the Court rule in favour of the
legislature. This means that the success rate of the President’s requests
(considering both unconstitutionality and partial unconstitutionality rul-
ings) is around 83% against 62.5% and 33% respectively for the requests
filed by MPs and the Ombudsman. We must not forget, however, that
the two last requests were agreed with the Government in accordance
with the MoU’s “legal safeguards”. The Court’s allegedly increased
judicial activism has been subject to an empirical analysis aimed at con-
firming its exceptionality. The authors have confirmed, however, that in
132 T. VIOLANTE
light of a comparative and benchmarking approach (which also includes

consideration of past adjudicatory practices under times of normality),
the “behavior of Portuguese judges during this period looks much less
exceptional than everyday political commentary would lead us to think”
(Coroado, Garoupa and Magalhães 2017: 309). The singularity of the
Portuguese case, considering the unprecedented media and academic
attention it catalysed, should then be justified by other reasons as we will
see later. Despite the empirical data, it is undeniable that the crisis case
law brought about a moment of empowerment of the Portuguese CC.
By becoming the final forum of decision on matters that were at the cen-
tre of the national (and even European) political life, the Court inadvert-
ently became one of the prime political actors. The role of constitutional
justice in the Portuguese democratic system was brought to the spotlight
like never before and, between 2012 and 2014, some of the fundamental
political choices of the Republic, pressed by the urgent need to reach a
budgetary balance, had to be significantly altered or even abandoned in
order to meet the constitutional demands.
3. The “Constitutional Risk” to the Assistance Program

The Court’s deferential posture towards the legislature in the early days
of austerity certainly contributed to the fact that the bailout agreements
and their prospective catalysing effects at the political and legal levels
did not raise a significant constitutional debate on a first moment. The
“constitutional problem” had been an important political issue during
2010, after Passos Coelho, then newly elected leader of PSD, introduced
a project to revise the Constitution.40 This proposal triggered a formal
revision procedure which was extinguished when a new legislature took
charge, following the anticipated elections of 2011. The draft proposal
emphasised the need to curb the growing public debt and to imple-
ment sustainable public finances. The intergenerational solidarity princi-
ple would be formally introduced as one of the main public goals and
the constitutional principle of prohibition of dismissal without fair cause
would be erased from the fundamental text.
With the aggravation of the crisis, the constitutional debate became a
secondary political topic. The PSD’s electoral manifesto41 only alluded to
possible constitutional amendments regarding the powers of the auton-
omous regions and the implementation of regionalisation on the conti-
nental territory.
At first sight, it is difficult to understand why one of the hot subjects

for the new party leadership became such a neglected topic in the elec-
tions just a few months later. The revision proposal presented one year
earlier shows that PSD was aware of the possible constitutional con-
straining effects to the implementation of sound economic and finan-
cial policies and the reforms it wished to promote at the labour market.
The proposal expressly stated that “(…) the Constitution creates several
obstacles to the implementation of the reforms the country so much
needs”.
Two factors can explain this apparent loss of interest, in just a few
months, in a substantial constitutional amendment: first, the fact that
PSD was likely to win the elections and thus hold the majority of seats in
Parliament. Constitutional revision processes entail complex bargaining
procedures between the two main political parties (PS and PSD) and that
is not appealing for a newly elected majority in charge of applying a strict
programme of public policies. Second, because PSD did not see the con-
stitutional constraining effects as a liability to the implementation of that
programme. To be constraining upon the political branches, a constitu-
tion must be normative: it must aspire to regulate the political process,
on one hand, and effectively regulate it, on the other. The constitution’s
normative primacy doctrine requires working enforcement mechanisms,
be they political or legal (including judicial mechanisms where they are
available).
Due to the generosity of the Portuguese model for abstract review,
although PS might not present a strong opposition force in the begin-
ning of the new legislative term (and of the implementation of the bail-
out programme), there were other possibilities of bringing austerity to
the Court as history shows. This means that the lack of interest in the
possible “constitutional risks” to the successful fulfilment of the loan
conditions that threatened national sovereignty can only be explained by
the fact that it was the Court itself that was not regarded as a poten-
tial obstacle. The CC (and, therefore, the “constitutional risk”) were
not considered a possible liability at this stage. A strong sign that that
was the case were the parliamentary hearings conducted in June 2012
(before the first negative ruling was delivered) on three candidates
appointed to the CC. Two of them were appointed by the center-right
wing ruling coalition and the third one was appointed by PS. Only one
MP raised a question on the interpretation of the Constitution in times
of crises (as a matter of fact, one of the parliamentarians that had signed
134 T. VIOLANTE
the request review that was at the basis of the first unconstitutionality
ruling). The three candidates were not shy to say that, even under such
circumstances, the constitutional rules and principles should be fully
enforced and rejected any restriction of the Court’s enforcing powers
due to the crisis context. The two candidates appointed by the center-
right coalition voted later for the unconstitutionality of some austerity
measures.42 As Coroado, Garoupa and Magalhães wrote, “parties, in
their role of judicial appointers, should not select appointees at random,
but rather according to their policy preferences” (2017: 23).
The nature of the crisis and the challenges raised on the constitutional
system might have also contributed to the belief that the Constitution
would not jeopardise the implementation of fiscal retrenchment pol-
icies. The economic and financial crisis was part of a systemic crisis
that affected not only the remaining Eurozone countries but also the
European Union as a whole. The problems therein were not limited to
Portugal. Under such circumstances, domestic legal orders and, particu-
larly, constitutional courts “are under tremendous pressure to give green
light to the (…) unusual, and sometimes extraconstitutional, measures
that are necessary to remedy the apparent dangers”.43
However, information on how constitutional courts can act in times
of economic crises, on one hand, and knowledge of previous counterma-
joritarianism of the CC, should have advised the newly elected majority
to pay more attention to the “constitutional risk” presented to the bail-
out programme.
4. Constitutional Courts and Economic and Financial

Crises in Comparative Perspective
The escalation of conflict between the CC and political elites due to the
financial crisis is not part of a Portuguese singularity. Similar trends have
been reported in other jurisdictions.44 Institutions that perform judicial
review of legislation may act as veto players45 in the political process and
thus may be under attack by the other branches of power.
The adjudication of constitutional problems in periods of economic
and financial crises present difficult problems to courts.46 In the absence
of formal mechanisms of financial emergency or a conceptualisation of
a financial emergency that might provide clearer rules, courts are left
in the difficult position to assess public policies that pose severe restric-
tions upon constitutional provisions such as the separation of powers
and fundamental rights in periods of acute uncertainty. The difficulties

worsen if we recall that the time-constraints differ to those that qual-
ify constitutional adjudication in times of normality: first, the urgency
claimed by crisis’ periods means that the legislation is normally pro-
duced under stricter time-frames (particularly in case of international
loans) which may account for a decrease in its technical and constitu-
tional quality; second, judicial actors are also pressed by the contingency
of time since most of their decisions bear immediate financial and budg-
etary consequences that may jeopardise international bailouts or even,
at the EU level, common economic policy obligations that imply the
transfer of national competences from national states to the EU institu-
tions.47 The mechanisms devised to deal with these periods include for-
mal amendments to the constitution in order to, for example, entrench a
balanced-budget rule48 or even restrict the courts’ jurisdiction regarding
economic and budgetary issues or the grounds under which the consti-
tutional review can take place.49 In the Portuguese case, none of these
possibilities was viable: a possible court-packing attempt, the restriction
of the Court’s jurisdiction or the introduction of a golden rule required
a constitutional revision and, therefore, the acquiescence of PS, who had
lost the elections following the approval of the bailout.
The growing rejection of austerity measures by the CC is in line with
an identified growing judicial involvement in fiscal matters across Europe
(Fabbrini 2014). Although it presents some comparative specificities,
it might be prudent to contextualise it before embarking on an alleged
“Portuguese exceptionalism”.
History shows us that the CC it is not alone in its courage to bite
austerity policies imposed by international conditionalities. In 1995,
the Hungarian Constitutional Court delivered a series of decisions
that declared the unconstitutionality of several parts of the Economic
Stabilization Act following a rescue package provided by the IMF.
Although the rulings were received with criticism and outrage by a part
of the legal and intellectual Hungarian community, they were followed
by the government and forced modifications of the austerity programme.
However, neither the economic adjustment nor the protection of the
welfare state were jeopardised. Some years later, both the Romanian
Constitutional Court and the Latvian Constitutional Court blocked
national legislation that implemented bailout conditions agreed with the
IMF. The Romanian high court, although allowing the application of
temporary pay cuts on public workers’ wages, rejected cuts to pensions
136 T. VIOLANTE
already in payment.50 Pension cuts were also found unconstitutional by

the Latvian Constitutional Court.51
Greek case law on the financial crisis has been framed, on a first
moment, as an example of a submissive constitutional reaction towards
the financial crisis.52 Judicial rejections of austerity-induced legisla-
tion have increased in time and they are still unfolding.53 In 2012, the
Council of State—a centralised body that is the apex instance of a dif-
fuse system of judicial review—ruled the unconstitutionality of legal pro-
visions that imposed a cut in power supply to those who did not pay the
“Special Property Contribution” for breach of the right to property.54
Legislation on the suspension of civil servants was found in breach of
the principle of equality and, in a landmark case in 2014, the Council
rejected the privatisation of water in Athens for breach of the constitu-
tional right to health.55 Cuts in wages and pensions have also seen a red
light from that judicial body.56
The Hungarian example from the 1990s shows that the Constitutional
Court acted as a democratic enhancer because it allowed “democrat-
ically elected politicians to support the needs of their constituents at
the most difficult times”, without jeopardising the political process and
the Hungarian welfare state itself.57 Similar analysis have been provided
regarding the Portuguese case on the constitutional case law on austerity.
Instead of the judicial activism framework, the Portuguese constitutional
case law on financial retrenchment can be framed as shielding the national
legislator from the growing demands of the creditors (Cisotta and Gallo
2014). Other scholars have argued that the CC acted as the last defender
of national sovereignty in a country subject to international assistance
(Novais 2014; Blanco de Morais 2014: 774). All these claims converge
in the assumption that courts can be viewed as the best placed institutions
to resist demands of international creditors since the legislature and the
executive are handcuffed, facing an impossible choice: they either chose
to surrender to the lenders’ requests or to face bankruptcy.
Despite these comparative examples, a certain Portuguese singularity
remains because of the high political and media profile of the Portuguese
rulings on austerity policies. This singularity has been explained by their
large number, the size of the bailout and the fact that they were deliv-
ered by a constitutional court from the Eurozone (Kilpatrick 2017:
288). The institutional framework of the Portuguese system has also
played a role: first, the fact that in Portugal there is a centralised system
for abstract constitutional review charged to the Constitutional Court,

unlike Greece, for example, where constitutional review of bailout-
induced legislation has been conducted by several different courts; sec-
ond, the generosity of the Portuguese system, that awards the power to
request the review of legislation to a broad range of legal and political
actors while, at the same time, does not impose time-limits to initiate the
proceedings; and finally, the fact that the reviewed measures were com-
prised in parliamentary legislation enacted under the regular procedural
framework thus embodying the idea that a full-fledged constitutional
review would not be questioned by the crisis nature of the legislation.
We can thus conclude that despite the CC’s traditional restrained
behaviour, the Government had good reasons to take the “constitutional
risk” to the bailout program seriously. This does not mean, of course,
that things might have turned out differently. However, a stronger com-
mitment to the constitutional framing of the restrictive legislation, as
well as a more oriented selection of constitutional judges in the 2012
election might have proved decisive, at least in some of the cases. As
Coroado, Garoupa and Magalhães point in their study (2017: 398), it
is possible that “a few judges appointed by the center-right parties were
ideologically closer to judges appointed by the left, when it comes to
austerity measures, to the point of reversing the logic of voting with
‘their’ government”.
Conclusions
With the austerity case law, the Portuguese CC affirmed its counterma-
joritarian power, not shying away when national and international polit-
ical pressures were voiced. The austerity case law brought the Court
under a (strengthened) public light. Although there is no updated data
concerning the social support of the Court, there are good reasons to
assume that if research was conducted today, results would be substan-
tially different. In several of the large social demonstrations held during
the crisis period, there were signs of appraisal of the Court and its rul-
ings. The role of the judges, as the ultimate guardians of fundamental
rights, was certainly strengthened. In fact, “in more or less democratic
states [courts] are unlikely to be able to govern without popular support
even as much as other parts of government could” (Shapiro 1998: 8). If
this holds true, then the austerity case law is grounded on strong pub-
lic support—proportional to the size of the conflict it sparked between
138 T. VIOLANTE
the legislature and the Court. It is difficult to envisage, under such cir-
cumstances, the theoretical possibility of abolishing an institution that
is socially taken as the guarantor of the people’s fundamental rights.
However, this does not mean that there are no institutional lessons to
be taken. The CC has brought upon itself the fame of biting whenever,
according to the judges’ interpretation, upholding the Constitution so
requires even in cases where international and EU commitments might
recommend otherwise. The more recent Hungarian example shows us
that constitutional courts that bite can be politically muzzled and that
economic crisis combined with political supermajorities pose serious risks
to the rule of law and the independence of courts (Szente 2013).
In times of economic crisis, courts committed to the protection of
fundamental rights and constitutional principles may endure the task suc-
cessfully. However, judicial independence can come at a price providing
that the institutional and contextual factors meet accordingly. By having
successfully proven its countermajoritarian courage, both nationally and
internationally, the Portuguese CC has cast upon itself the virtue but also
the shadow of independence. It has signalled that it can be a liability to
economic and financial adjustments that the country may require in the
future. At the same time, the Court strengthened its social support as it
stood out as the prime guardian of fundamental rights and the protector
of some of the most vulnerable individuals such as pensioners and social
beneficiaries. That may be its main shield of protection should the future
bring it again to the centre of the political arena.
Notes
1. Galvão Teles (1971).
2. Control of unconstitutionality by legislative omission has become irrele-
vant due to the lack of requests.
3. See Araújo and Magalhães (2000: 216).
4. These expressions are used by Araújo and Magalhães (2000).
5. See Articles 278(1)(2)(4), 281(2) and 283 CPR.
6. The CC only reviews statutes and other legal and normative provisions. It
does not hold the power to review the constitutionality of any other acts
of public power.
7. Shapiro (1998: 26–27).
8. Stone Sweet (1999).
9. Although officials from the Court have expressly rejected any possibility
of judicial manipulation on this matter, claiming that the slowness of the
Court, where it is found, is due to the growth of its activity. See Santos
(2011: 91). The enlargement of the CC’s competences and the dangers
that is presents to the constitutional review of legislation has been repeat-
edly voiced by subsequent officials. On this topic, see Amaral (2012).
10. These figures do not distinguish between challenges made by political and
legal litigants. See Santos (2011: 128–129).
11. See Decisions 11/83, 66/84 and 141/85. The CC’s decisions are avail-
able online at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/. The
English version of the website provides extended summaries of the case
law on austerity legislation enacted after the Great Recession. In this
chapter, I only consider case law enacted on abstract review, both a priori
(preventive) or ex-post (successive) cases because decisions delivered by
the CC on concrete control lack a direct impact upon the legislature and
the political process.
12. These decisions were met with intense criticism by the media and several
political actors, as Araújo and Magalhães (2000: 226–227) report.
13. Initiated by Council Decision No. 2010/288/EU of 19 January 2010.
14. I follow the case selection adopted by Canotilho et al. (2015) and
included two rulings delivered after that article was published (Decisions
576/2015 and 3/2016).
15. Decision 399/2010.
16. Decision 396/2011, requested by a group of parliamentarians.
17. Decision 353/2012.
18. h ttps://www.publico.pt/2015/03/05/politica/noticia/chefe-de-
missao-do-fmi-pediu-revisao-constitucional-para-renovar-memo-
rando-1688164.
19. Respectively, June and November 2013.
20. See paragraphs 9 and 7 of the seventh and eighth and ninth revised ver-
sions of the MoU.
21. In Portugal, legislative power is shared between the Government and the
Parliament in accordance with the Constitution. The reviewed austerity
legislation was formally enacted by the latter although based on propos-
als of the former. However, in the judicial proceedings, only the formal
author is expressly invited to provide arguments favouring the validity of
the contested legislation. Although the Portuguese procedural constitu-
tional law does not allow amicus curiae briefings, the Government was
able to join the austerity litigation with “technical notes”. The first time it
did so was on the review of Budget Law for 2013.
22. Decision 474/2013.
140 T. VIOLANTE
23. Decision 602/2013.
24. Decision 794/2013 also following a request of a group of MPs.
25. Decision 862/2013.
26. Decision 413/2014.
27. Due to the new design of the European Monetary Union adopted after
the outburst of the crisis. It comprises tighter budgetary constraints, new
instruments of financial stabilisation and a clear mandate for economic
adjustment at the domestic level. For an overview of what these three
components imply in terms of furthering obligations for Member States
and reinforced powers of the EU institutions, see Fabbrini (2014) and
Hinarejos (2015).
28. Respectively, Decisions 574/2014 and 575/2014 that followed preven-
tive requests from the President of the Republic. Following the “Legal
Safeguards” that were included in the MoU, the Government specif-
ically requested the President to initiate a priori reviews on the two
bills in order to reach a swift clarification regarding their constitutional
admissibility.
29. h ttps://obser vador.pt/2014/08/15/passos-desafia-ps-negociar-
nova-reforma-da-seguranca-social/.
30. Decision 576/2015.
31. Decision 3/2016.
32. On the critics’ side see Nogueira de Brito (2014), Almeida Ribeiro and
Pereira Coutinho (2014) and Maduro et al. (2017). For a counter-
critique see Novais (2014), Blanco de Morais (2014), and Canotilho
(2018).
33. See the dissenting votes of Maria Lúcia Amaral on Decisions 353/2012,
413/2014, 574 and 575/2014. See also the dissenting vote of Pedro
Machete on Decision 187/2013 and the joint dissenting vote to that
same ruling signed by Vítor Gomes, Maria Lúcia Amaral, Pedro Machete,
José Cunha Barbosa and Maria João Antunes.
34. h ttps://www.tsf.pt/economia/interior/fmi-inconstitucionali-
dade-do-corte-nos-subsidios-foi-uma-surpresa-2670699.html.
35. h ttps://www.tsf.pt/portugal/politica/interior/pires-de-lima-portu-
gal-comeca-a-ser-um-pais-altamente-desaconselhavel-2652307.html.
36. https://www.ft.com/content/884f61d2-3bfb-11e3-b85f-00144feab7de.
37. http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/politica/detalhe/barroso-te-
mos-o-caldo-entornado-se-houver-instabilidade-e-falta-de-responsabili-
dade.
38. http://www.tsf.pt/storage/ng2823480.pdf.
39. In the case of preventive requests, the Constitution specifically pro-
vides for a maximum time frame of 25 days for the Court to deliver its
decision. No deadline is provided for abstract successive reviews although

the Law on the Constitutional Court entails a specific procedure and
deadline for the drafting process of the decision.
40. Available at http://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=
6148523063446f764c3246795a5868774d546f334e7a
67774c336470626d6c7561574e7059585270646d467a4c31684a4c-
33526c6548527663793977636d4d784c56684a4c6d527659773d3d&-
fich=prc1-XI.doc&Inline=true.
41. Available at http://www.psd.pt/ficheiros/programas_eleitorais/progra-
ma-eleitoral-2011.pdf.
42. The hearings are available at https://www.parlamento.pt/Actividade
Parlamentar/Paginas/DetalheAudicao.aspx?BID=93104.
43. Szente and Gárdos-Orosz (2018: 6).
44. Scheppele (2004), Contiades (2013), Fabbrini (2014), and Szente and
Gárdos-Orosz (2018).
45. Tsebelis (2002).
46. Among many, see Scheppele (2004), Contiades and Tassopoulos (2013),
Fabbrini (2014), and Faraguna (2016).
47. See Tuori and Tuori (2014).
48. The 2012 EU Fiscal Compact introduced the balanced-budget rule and
explicitly suggested that Member States entrenched this provision in
their national constitutions. In Portugal, the rule was introduced in the
Budgetary Framework Law which enjoys a special reinforced rank with
infra-constitutional value (Law 37/2013, 14 June). Eurozone countries
that introduced a constitutional balanced-budget provision include Spain,
Slovenia and Italy (Germany had already done so in 2009).
49. See the case of Hungary where the combination of a supermajority with
the economic and financial crisis proved highly detrimental to the rule of
law (Kilpatrick 2017; Szente 2013).
50. Decision 872/2010. For an extensive review of the Romanian financial
crisis case law, see Kilpatrick (2017).
51. Case no. 2009-43-01. For further details, see Balodis and Pleps (2013).
52. Contiades and Tassopoulos (2013).
53. For an overview, see Vlachogiannis (2018) and Contiades and Fotiadou
(2016).
54. Decision 1972/2012.
55. Respectively, Decisions 3354/2013 and 1906/2014 of the Council of
State.
56. Respectively Decisions 2192/2014 and 2287 and 2290/2015.
57. Scheppele (2004: 1961).
142 T. VIOLANTE
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CHAPTER 8
New Challenges, Old Parties: Party Change

in Portugal After the European Crisis
Marco Lisi
Introduction
The thesis of the decline of parties in contemporary societies is well-
known: parties are unable to perform their functions of legitimation
and participation due to being increasingly more distant from civil
society. For this reason, there is growing tension between parties as
actors responsible for governance and as agents of representation
(Mair 2009). According to Ignazi (2017), parties responded to the
crisis of legitimacy in particular through organisational transforma-
tions in terms of their increased opening of decision-making processes
and the stronger accountability of the leadership. A number of authors
have identified a trend towards greater democratisation, in particular
through greater inclusivity in selection of party candidates and leaders,
as well as in the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy and
the stronger intervention of members in the definition of political lines
(Scarrow et al. 2000; Krouwel 2012; Cross and Katz 2013).
M. Lisi (*) 
Department of Political Studies, Nova University of Lisbon,
Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: mlisi@fcsh.unl.pt

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_8
146 M. LISI
Despite these long-term trends, the transformation of parties can be

triggered by short-term factors, such as a sudden environmental change.
Economic crises are exogenous shocks that create deep changes in both
the electoral arena and the mobilisation of civil society outside the
electoral moment (Kriesi 2012). In particular, the ‘Great Recession’ is
expected to deepen the crisis of parties in two ways. On the one hand,
the eurocrisis has unveiled the incapacity (or unwillingness) of political
elites to deal with social demands, thus aggravating the legitimacy crisis
of democratic regimes and increasing popular discontent (Torcal 2014;
Hobolt and Tilley 2016). On the other, the crisis has strengthened elec-
toral pressures, especially for mainstream parties, due to the emergence
of new parties and growing levels of volatility (e.g. Chiaramonte and
Emanuele 2017; Bosco and Verney 2017). In sum, the crisis has unveiled
a functional crisis of parties, revealing increasing difficulties to perform
(and combine) their traditional functions as agents of participation and
institutional coordination (see Mair 1997; Schmitter 2001).
Overall, there is clear evidence that the economic and political context
that Portugal experienced since 2010 provided fertile grounds for party
renewal or change. Citizens’ discontent led to the adoption of new and
intense forms of mobilisation and the emergence of new parties, such
as the ‘populist’ PDR (Partido Democrático Republicano, Republican
Democratic Party) and the left-libertarian LIVRE. Given the growing
electoral dealignment and increasing electoral pressures, it is plausible to
expect that in times of crisis parties will increasingly adopt democratising
reforms and will try to adapt to external challenges.
Based on these reflections, this chapter examines the organisational
transformations of Portuguese parties over the last decade. We focus on
the three faces of political parties identified by Katz and Mair (1993).
The first is related to the party on the ground, that is, the membership
organisation and the party voters; the second is based on the extra-
parliamentary party (or ‘armature’ in Duverger’s terms, see Duverger
1981), while the third is related to the party in public office. Although,
as stressed by Sartori (1976), democracy as a regime can flourish with
rather undemocratic parties, it is also true that the way decisions are
taken and how candidates and leaders are chosen significantly influence
the alternatives proposed to the electorate and the overall system of
political representation. Therefore, the characteristics and functioning
of party organisations are an essential aspect to understand the quality
of contemporary democracies.
8 NEW CHALLENGES, OLD PARTIES: PARTY CHANGE IN PORTUGAL … 147
The analysis of the Portuguese case considers the main parties that
have gained parliamentary representation over the last two decades.
Therefore, our focus is on the two bigger parties, the Socialist Party
(PS, Partido Socialista) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD, Partido
Social Democrata), the conservative Popular Party-Social and Democratic
Center (CDS-PP, Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular), and
the two far left parties, namely the Portuguese Communist Party
(PCP, Partido Comunista Português) and the Left Bloc (BE, Bloco de
Esquerda).1
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
evolution of the party on the ground. Section three examines the main
changes experienced by the party in central office, while section four
analyses how the crisis has influenced the party in public office. In the
final section, we summarise the main results and discuss their implica-
tions for party change.
The Party on the Ground and the Legitimacy Crisis

The first expectation about the impact of the crisis on party organisations
is the erosion of partisan identities. The Great recession has weakened
the ties between parties and voters, strengthening the dynamics of disin-
tegration and electoral realignment, as emerged in Greece, Italy or Spain.
Indeed, partisanship is an important anchor for voters’ choice and a cru-
cial heuristic device that helps voters to locate themselves in the political
space. In short, party actors build identity bonds with citizens based on
the strength of the party identification, which contributes to maintaining
a solid and lasting support. This is of the utmost importance especially
in new democracies, characterised by a lack of social anchors and greater
instability of the electorate.
According to European Social Survey (ESS) data, the countries hit by
the economic crisis have registered the highest decrease in party iden-
tification. Partisanship in Ireland, for example, declined from 47.4%
to 23.7% between 2002 and 2010, while in Greece partisan identi-
ties decreased more than 26 percentage points in the same period. The
Portuguese case is no exception to this trend. During the 2000s the pro-
portion of citizens without partisan attachments was, on average, 35%
(Fig. 8.1). This proportion increased significantly in 2011 (57%) and has
remained rather stable in 2015 (52%). In addition, Portugal is a clear
148 M. LISI
60 57
52
50
50
44
40
40
35
32 31
30 26
23
20 17 18 18
15
13
10
10 6 6 5
3
0
2002 2005 2009 2011 2015
Very close Rather close Sympathizer No partisan identity
Fig. 8.1 Evolution of partisanship in Portugal (2002–2015) (Source Post-

electoral surveys (Institute of Social Sciences), 2002–2015)
example of the decreasing intensity of partisan feelings: in 2002, almost

32% of the electorate felt very close to a political party, while this per-
centage dropped to 3% after the 2011 elections (Lobo 2013).
One of the main problems of Portuguese democracy is the low lev-
els of political participation and mobilisation. This can be seen not only
in terms of electoral turnout, but also with regard to the weak level of
social integration of parties measured by membership figures (van Biezen
et al. 2012). It has already become commonplace, following the expres-
sion coined by Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), to speak of ‘parties with-
out partisans’ (see also Scarrow 2000). Although during its first decade
of democracy Portugal showed a higher average of the ratio between
members and voters compared with other Southern European countries
(Bosco and Morlino 2006), more recently this country is one of the new
Southern European democracies where the crisis of party membership
appears to be more consistent (van Biezen et al. 2012; Correia 2017).
The number of members in Portugal stands slightly above 300,000
individuals (as of 2016), corresponding to approximately 3% of the elec-
torate, a value below the majority of more advanced democracies, but
above the average recorded by the countries of Eastern Europe, which
show an even lower associative capacity. In general, these indicators

reveal the weak capacity of Portuguese parties to anchor civil society
when compared with other European democracies (van Biezen 2003:
202–203; Lisi 2015: 70–73). However, there are also notable differ-
ences between parties. In particular, the PCP shows a far superior level
of organisational integration than the other parties, traditionally evincing
a greater capability to convert voters into members. Nonetheless, also
in this party there is a strong evidence of the crisis of internal militancy,
similarly to what is happening in European democracies where it is pre-
cisely the parties that are closest to the mass-based party model that are
incurring the highest loss in terms of members (van Biezen et al. 2012).
To this respect, the relevant aspect here is the widespread tendency—
albeit with exceptions, as is the case of Germany—towards a loss of rele-
vance of parties to perform citizens’ social and political integration.
Despite this long-term trend, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of
the crisis on parties’ capacity to mobilise their own members. Short-term
fluctuations in the levels of party membership are not very meaningful
because the parties traditionally inflate the figures of registered members
and do not regularly update membership files. Therefore, membership
figures tend to increase steadily due to the recruitment of new members,
until a new process of ‘cleaning up’ membership files drastically reduces
the number of members. However, according to the data made available
by party headquarters, the overall picture indicates that the crisis did not
affect significantly the associative strength of Portuguese parties. While
the PS seems to have increased its membership after the return to oppo-
sition (2011–2015), the PCP and CDS-PP have remained rather stable,
while the PSD has shown a significant decrease (Correia 2017). As the
total number of party members in Portugal was already low before the
crisis, the economic turmoil did not significantly alter parties’ capacity to
encapsulate citizens.
The importance of this long-term trend is twofold. First, it rein-
forces the elitist features of parties and the asymmetries in terms of
representation. This is evident, for example, with respect to the rep-
resentation of women, young people or some socio-professional cate-
gories.2 Second, it boosts the apathy and demobilisation of groups with
lower economic and cognitive resources, thus decreasing participation
and widening political inequalities. As a consequence, the role of par-
ties ends up by further widening the distance between citizens and the
political power.
150 M. LISI
Another important indicator of the party on the ground refers to the

type of party affiliation. It has been noted that party organisations have
increasingly reacted to the legitimacy and mobilisation crisis by creating
a new type of adherent: the sympathisers. These are individuals who join
the party with the same rights as fee-paying members, but with fewer
duties, such as the payment of party fees (Scarrow 2015). This normally
implies to be eligible to cast a vote in intra-party elections but with no
obligations in terms of the payment of party fees. This transformation is
part of a broader process of diversification of party membership and the
creation of new types of mobilisation, especially through the use of new
communication technologies (Scarrow 2015).
In general, Portuguese parties have diverged from this trajectory, with
the exception of the PS. The socialists introduced this new category with
the statutory revision in 2003, similar to what happened in other main-
stream left-wing parties in Southern Europe (Bosco and Morlino 2006;
Lisi 2010). The PSD discussed the proposal to adopt similar changes in
2010 after the election of Pedro Passos Coelho as party leader but the
majority of party delegates in the 2012 congress rejected it. The pro-
posal re-emerged in the 2018 party congress, as one motion advocated
the introduction of this new category of party members. However, the
party leadership preferred to postpone this debate and to give priority
to the party strategy, relegating the debate on organisational matters to
an ad hoc congress to be held after the forthcoming legislative elections
(scheduled for 2019). As for the remaining parties, the statutes only
establish the existence of ‘regular’—i.e. dues-paying, card-carrying—
members. In sum, the crisis has not substantially altered the way par-
ties differentiate their links with citizens, with the aim to mobilise new
groups of civil society.
Finally, another important indicator of the party on the ground is
related to the type and functions developed by party branches. Following
the general process of individualisation that affects Western societies, ter-
ritorial units—typical of the mass party model—have been gradually com-
plemented or substituted by thematic sections or circles, with the aim of
aggregating groups and individuals on the basis of their political inter-
ests. In the Portuguese case, the PS statutes have adopted thematic sec-
tions since 2003, but their mobilisation capacity has been extremely low,
affecting only a small proportion of party members (Coelho 2014). The
PSD has also granted its local structures autonomy to create new ‘the-
matic groups’, which combine party members and independent citizens
on the basis of their technical and professional competencies (art. 78).

‘Councils of opinion’ (at the national level), which have a consultative
character, may also be formed as well as ‘virtual communities’ for the
discussion of specific issues of national relevance. Within the BE, ‘work-
ing groups’ can be set up which are open to non-party members. These
changes took place before the onset of the crisis and Portuguese parties
have been reluctant to adapt the functioning of their party branches to
the changes associated to digital societies. Indeed, the main parties rank
very low compared to other countries in their capacity to provide multi-
ple channels of mobilisation and representation (Scarrow 2015).
The Party in Central Office: ‘Lighter and More

Individualised’ Parties?
The main Portuguese parties that emerged with the establishment of the
democratic regime had a predominantly institutional origin—with the
exception of the PCP—and formally adopted the typical model of mass-
based parties in a hierarchical organisation where the congress, expres-
sion of the internal representative principle, is the highest body of the
party and is responsible for the election of all the other bodies (Lopes
2004; Jalali 2007; Lisi 2015). Despite this genetic model, the party cen-
tral office has emerged as the most important party face, especially when
party leadership positions overlap with public office (in parliament or
government, see van Biezen 2003; Lisi 2015).
The functional practice of party organisations confirms a mismatch
between the mass party model, based on the ‘participative myth’, and the
more closed and oligarchic practice followed by Portuguese parties. This
incongruence is evident if we observe three distinct dynamics. First, the
leaders and restricted executive bodies control the decision-making pro-
cess, very often through informal structures or procedures (Lisi 2015).
Party rules and structures are frequently used in an instrumental man-
ner in internal struggles for power. Second, party leaders strengthen their
power through the (growing) partidarisation of parliamentary groups
and the governmentalisation of the main party bodies (see below),
which undermine their representative nature. In this sense, the party
elite becomes an increasingly more closed and insulated social ‘cast’ in
relation to members or voters (Lisi 2015). The internal mechanisms to
assure the accountability of the leading positions are very weak, as is
the transparency of the decision-making processes. Last but not least,
152 M. LISI
problems arise in the ethics of the party elites, above all regarding the
shift from party positions to top jobs in public (or public–private) enter-
prises and in public administration appointments in general (Jalali et al.
2012; Coelho 2014).
Two key dimensions of the party central office that have recently
experienced important reforms are the elaboration of electoral manifestos
and the selection of party leadership (Gauja 2016; Pilet and Cross 2014).
We briefly examine how Portuguese parties develop these functions and
the changes experienced since the onset of the European crisis.
Political parties play a crucial role in articulating interests from civil
society. Over the last decades party has tried to open to the contribution
of citizens in order to innovate policy platforms. The clearest example
of this phenomenon took place with the PS’ General Estates organ-
ised during Guterres leadership (1992–2001) and systematically rea-
dopted—although under new labels and modalities—by subsequent
leaders. Right-wing parties also decided to implement similar events in
the attempt to strengthen their social legitimacy. This is a practice that
is more related to the move of the party to opposition or the election of
a new leader than to a regular trend towards greater intraparty democ-
racy or openness to civil society. The analysis of the crisis period con-
firms these findings. António José Seguro, the socialist leader elected in
2011, inaugurated the LIPP (Laboratory of Political Ideas for Portugal),
which was organised in dozens of thematic panels with the aim to mobi-
lise experts and independents through bottom-up mechanisms in order
to elaborate innovative policies. The same happened to the PSD in 2018
after the election of a new party leader. Rui Rio decided to create the
National Strategic Council, a new consultative body that aims to draft
the main policies to be included in the election manifesto. This structure
includes party members or sympathisers, mostly experts or professionals
working in specific areas.
This ‘outsourcing’ exercise in order to define programmatic orienta-
tions has rarely brought relevant policy innovations, with limited effects
also in terms of the mobilisation of new sectors of Portuguese society. If
these events had some effects, this took place mostly in terms of visibil-
ity and leaders’ popularity, as well as for co-opting ‘notables’ from civil
society, whose expertise and networking are crucial assets when achiev-
ing government positions. Despite the attempt to open these procedures,
party organisations have replicated close and oligarchic modes of deci-
sion-making over the last decades.
A survey conducted in 2014 to a sample of party members of the

main parties3 confirms the high proportion of affiliates unsatisfied with
intra-party democracy, especially with regard to lack of inclusiveness
and the marginalisation of members in day-to-day politics (Sanches and
Razzuoli 2017). Approximately 40% of party members are satisfied or
very satisfied with their influence within the party. Nonetheless, there
are also interesting differences between parties, as PS members are less
satisfied than the new-born Livre (32 and 70%, respectively), while BE
activists stand in the middle (46%). In addition, there is a general percep-
tion that IPD (intra-party democracy) should increase (only 19% claim
the opposite). Finally, the overwhelming majority of members agree that
formal rules are important for the functioning of the party.
The perception of party members regarding intra-party democracy
shows also that their role seems to have decreased over time. According
to survey data (Lisi and Espírito Santo 2017), approximately 40% of
members believe to have less influence on party decisions during their
experience as activists. Again, there are some differences between parties,
namely between mainstream parties, which present higher values of neg-
ative attitudes, and the CDS-PP (see Fig. 8.2).
The second aspect is related to the selection of party leadership.
In this dimension there is an important divide between bigger par-
ties and smaller ones. Both the PS and the PSD have introduced since
quite a long time (1998 and 2006, respectively) one-member-one-vote
(OMOV) method for the selection of the party leader. On the other
hand, party leaders in smaller parties have been selected mostly from
members of party executive bodies. The partial exception here is the
CDS-PP, which adopted the direct selection method for a very short
period (2006–2011) and then shifted again to an election through
the selected party body. Despite the differences in leadership selection
methods, there have been limits to the openness of this position to mem-
bers outside the parties’ inner core. Party leaders are usually experienced
politicians with a strong partisan background and always belong to the
main party organs. This confirms the prevalence of the party central
office vis-à-vis the parliamentary party and the highly centralised struc-
ture of Portuguese parties. In the case of OMOV method, some criticism
has emerged from time to time regarding the low competitiveness of the
race and the lack of internal debate (Lisi and Freire 2014). However, the
hypothesis to change the way party leaders are chosen is not a salient
issue for the bigger parties, although some figures defend the need to
154 M. LISI
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
BE CDS-PP PS PSD
Fig. 8.2 Evaluation of members’ influence on decision-making process (Source

Lisi and Espírito Santo [2017]. Notes (1) Question: ‘During your experience as
party member, do you believe that your influence has decreased, increased, or has
remained the same over time? (2) Values indicates the proportion of respondents
that show negative answers. (3) Data collection in 2014)
modify the timing, i.e. holding party leadership elections during or after
the congress in order to revitalise intra-party discussion.4
It is worth mentioning here the case of the BE, whose statutes do
not recognise the figure of party leader. As other left-libertarian par-
ties, it is the absence of the figure of leader and the adoption of collegial
and informal type of leadership, with particular emphasis on horizontal
bonds, that most distinguishes the BE from the remaining parties. Yet,
Francisco Louçã played de facto such a role as coordinator between
1999 and 2012 (Lisi 2015). Following Louçã’s voluntary resignation
in 2012, the main party bodies selected two speakers, one man and one
woman, both members of the secretariat. Yet, the failure of this solution
led the party to concentrate more visibility and powers in the spokesper-
son (Catarina Martins), with the role of de facto leader, even if formally
the leadership is still collegial and it is based on a permanent commission
composed of six members representatives of the distinct internal factions.
Overall, also in this case electoral pressures have been the main source
of change, and the crisis had only an indirect effect, mostly through the
growing internal factionalism associated to divergences about the elec-
toral strategy and policy positions.
The change in party leadership selection has been limited to main-
stream parties. However, it has reinforced the tendencies of personali-
sation within parties and the growing mediatisation, attempting to fill
the vacant space of territorial loyalties and political sub-cultures. Even in
this dimension, the crisis has not spurred significant changes. Despite the
emergence of new forms of mobilisation and the ‘disintermediation’ of
society, parties have not innovated in the way they coordinate the dif-
ferent functions and faces of party organisations, nor in the way their
bureaucracy works.
The Party in Public Office: Between Democratisation

and Cartelisation
Although parties have attempted to reclaim and restore their role as

agents of mobilisation and as a channel of participation through reforms
of the party branches and measures of internal democratisation, the
change in the recruitment process has been limited. In fact, the selec-
tion of candidates and leaders through restricted bodies (deliberative or
executive) continues to be the rule followed by the majority of western
democracies (Scarrow et al. 2000; Kittilson and Scarrow 2003). In gen-
eral, it is the party elites that control the processes of selection of pro-
spective MPs, relegating the members to a marginal role.
Overall, parliamentary recruitment in Portugal presents the follow-
ing characteristics and trends. First, Portuguese parties show centralised
forms of recruitment which are rather non-inclusive (Freire and Teixeira
2011). Second, the most significant change is related to the law of quo-
tas (or ‘parity’) approved by the Socialist government in 2007, which
came to partially re-balance the asymmetry of representation in terms
of gender (Baum and Espírito-Santo 2012).5 Finally, the most signif-
icant innovation was implemented by LIVRE on the occasion of the
European elections of 2014, based on the adoption of open primaries.
After these elections, and following the conflict for the party leadership
between António José Seguro and António Costa, the PS also decided to
endorse, for the first time, primaries open to sympathisers for the choice
156 M. LISI
of candidate to prime minister. These two ‘experiments’ represent a sig-

nificant shift from the highly centralised and hierarchical recruitment of
MP candidates traditionally adopted by party elites.
The main innovation in terms of candidate selection methods was
implemented by the newly created party LIVRE by introducing open
party primaries. It is worth noting that the main rationale for the adop-
tion of more inclusive methods of candidate selection was based on the
imprint of the party’s genetic model, which was centred on a strong
emphasis on participation and more horizontal ties among members,
emphasising the use of instruments of direct democracy for adopting
key decisions (alliance strategy, leadership, policy orientations, etc.).
This contrasts the main rationale behind the introduction of primary
elections, which lies on a party’s reaction to a (internal or external) cri-
sis (Sandri et al. 2015: 190). The requirements to acquire eligibility
implied to sign L/TdA’s6 statement of principles and obtaining at least
12 endorsements among the proponents registered in the internal elec-
toral census. A recent study has shown that endorsements were crucial
in determining the candidates selected through primaries (Cancela et al.
2017). This means that open methods of candidate selection had only
limited consequences on the profile of prospective representatives; at the
end, LIVRE’s candidates were those displaying more political (and parti-
san) experience, more visibility in mass media and belonging to the main
party bodies.
The second important innovation in candidate selection in Portugal
took place within the PS. The debate on the introduction of democratis-
ing reforms emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections and
the subsequent withdrawal of the socialist Prime Minister (and PS leader)
José Sócrates. Competition for the party leadership raised the issue of
democratising candidate selection as advocated by one of the competi-
tors. Francisco Assis defended the need to introduce open primaries for
selecting prime ministerial and mayoral candidates. This was mainly a
strategic move aimed at increasing support by deepening party democ-
ratisation. Yet this issue was a divisive one, as revealed during the 2013
congress. After an intense debate, the new socialist leader (António José
Seguro) decided to accept open primaries for local offices, in the attempt
to neutralise internal opposition. In addition, the new statutes approved
in 2012 also established the possibility of adopting primaries for candi-
dates to MPs.
The proposal to adopt open primaries was unexpectedly taken up

again by the secretary general after the poor performance at the 2014
European elections. António Costa, the mayor of Lisbon, decided to
challenge the incumbent leader by demanding a new election for party
leadership. Instead of organising a closed primary (the method normally
used to select the party leader), Seguro decided to open the competition
but only for prime ministerial candidates. This was considered a strategic
move, a ‘rush forward’ against the challenger’s greater popularity and the
growing difficulties in controlling the party apparatus. In the end, Costa
won a landslide victory and Seguro was forced to resign.
Costa decided to institutionalise party primaries by including this
method of candidate selection in the new party statutes approved in
2015. The problem is that the party organisation has not defined yet the
rules that should manage the selection of candidates through primaries
(art. 59º-6). In fact, one of the most dividing issues between Costa and
the challenger that run in the leadership contest in June 2016 was the
call for primaries for local and national public offices. After the congress
a working group was created within the PS in order to analyse the pos-
sibility of conducting party primaries before the 2017 local elections.
However, the party secretariat has delayed the decision sine die and has
been critical towards primaries because of the problems of ‘instant mem-
bership’ that these may bring and the excessive control of local bosses on
grassroots mobilisation.7
Both primaries represent an important shift in traditional practices
adopted for the selection of politicians, introducing innovative meth-
ods of candidate selection. These experiences constitute a radical change
vis-à-vis previous patterns of recruitment in Portugal, in terms of both
inclusiveness and decentralisation. By adopting party primaries, new
dynamics has been introduced in the Portuguese political system, with
unpredictable outcomes in the foreseeable future.
The debate regarding candidate selection has also emerged, from
time to time, in the two right-wing parties. In the congress held in
February 2018, the previous leader of the party youth organisation,
Pedro Rodrigues, proposed the introduction of closed primaries (party
members and sympathisers) for candidates to local office holders and for
half of the prospective MPs included in party lists.8 However, the motion
was rejected by the majority of party delegates. In addition, innovation
in terms of party organisation is clearly not one of the core concerns for
158 M. LISI
the new party leader elected in 2018, whose strategy focuses primarily in
the elaboration of policy proposals and the efficacy in communicating its
message to the electorate.
Several authors have argued that party organisations in third wave
democracies place more emphasis on the winning of office, the exploita-
tion of state resources and the cartelisation of government than on the
mobilisation of members and greater inclusiveness in decision-making
processes (Mair 1997; van Biezen 2003). Research on Portuguese parties
also shows some aspects of cartelisation of mainstream parties, especially
with regard to party funding, media access and party competition (Lopes
2004; Martins 2004; Jalali 2007). Has this pattern become more evident
during the crisis period?
One important indicator of the power of the party in public office is
the control over the parliamentary arena, not only through the recruit-
ment of the parliamentary elite but also by monitoring the activity of
MPs. With the establishment of democratic regime, parties have become
central actors for the functioning of parliamentary institutions and
for the professionalisation of public office holders (Garcês 2009). The
degree of ‘partidarisation’ can be measured as the proportion of MPs
belonging to party cadres, i.e. as party bureaucrats or professional poli-
ticians. Therefore, this is an indicator of the extent to which parties are
specialised agencies for parliamentary recruitment, undermining inclu-
siveness and the autonomous participation of civil society. The percent-
age of members who did not belong to party bodies was between 75 and
80% in the first elections, but went down to around 60% between the
4th and 6th legislature (Freire 2001: 107–108). This process has con-
tinued in the most recent period with the partidarisation of MPs around
40% or less.
Cartelisation is also linked to another phenomenon that took place
in the institutional arena, namely the governmentalisation of the extra-
parliamentary party. This process emerges when the government enjoys
greater freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the party, in particular through the
control of nominations to national party bodies and the subordination of
the party to ministers. The governmentalisation of the main party bodies
may take place through the appointment of independents to ministerial
positions, or through the ascension of ministers to key positions within
the extra-parliamentary party. In both cases, the party figures selected for
government positions maintain ties of allegiance and personal loyalties to

the party leader. Consequently, while the inner circle’s powers increased,
the powers and functions of national bodies decreased. This phenome-
non has emerged especially during single-party majoritarian government,
but there is not a clear trend in terms of increasing levels of governmen-
talisation. On the one hand, the number of independents appointed to
government positions shows ups and downs (Costa Pinto and Tavares de
Almeida 2018). Although on average the proportion of independents is
slightly higher after the crisis than in the period before the crisis, Passos
Coelho’s cabinet display a relatively small proportion of independents
(38.9%), while in both Costa and Sócrates’ governments the percent-
age of independents is always above 50%. On the other, there has been
efforts to separate the management of the party from the government.
For instance, Costa delegated most powers in terms of party leadership
to Ana Catarina Mendes, which was appointed as the new deputy secre-
tary-general, dealing especially with the intra-party life of the PS. A simi-
lar process happened in the PSD under Passos Coelho, when in the 2012
congress a new party direction was nominated in order to separate gov-
ernment functions from everyday party life.
The last aspect that needs to be addressed as an important change
undertaken during the crisis is the reform of party funding law. There
have been two changes worthy of examination. The first occurred with
the approval a new law (Organic Law 5/2015, 10 April 2015) that
allowed the party central office to use subsidies to parliamentary groups
to finance internal party activities. The second change took place after
the Constitutional Court asked parties to change the law with regard to
the supervision of party accounts and the introduction of court appeal.
Most parties (PCP, PS and PSD) decided to elaborate and implement
a new law in December 2017, which generated criticism and protests
in both the public media and the institutional arena. Indeed, with the
new law the party in public office seemed to benefit to the detriment
of the two other faces. First, the limits to receive external funding were
removed, which allowed to raise money through the organisation of
‘big events’. Second, the new law removed the payment of VAT for par-
ties. Despite the President’s veto, the same parties (PCP, PS and PSD)
approved the law—with minor revisions though—thus overcoming the
President’s opposition.
160 M. LISI
Conclusions
Portuguese parties have performed a fundamental role in the institution-
alisation of the party system and consolidation of the democratic regime.
However, party organisations revealed many weaknesses at the time of
their formation, which were to become increasingly more evident with
the process of modernisation experienced by Portuguese society. This
was clearly reflected in the inability of parties to perform the functions
of representation and participation. However, parties have also remained
the main and even only suppliers of representatives and have performed
important institutional functions.
The analysis carried out in this chapter indicates that party organisa-
tions in Portugal have remained rather immune to the impact of the Great
recession and that party change has been very limited. In some dimen-
sions, namely the party on the ground and leadership selection, the trans-
formation of Portuguese parties has deepened previous trends. On the
other hand, some innovations have taken place with regard to the party
in public office, but these were marginal or very short-lived. Moreover,
the changes of the parties were always reactive, partial and very often
instrumental to the logic of power (see also Lisi 2015). This means that,
in many cases, the transformations were merely ‘cosmetic operations’ or
instruments used by the party leadership to strengthen its own internal
power, without any significant changes in terms of intra-party functioning.
As noted in this chapter, there are also differences in the way dis-
tinct parties have adapted during the crisis. Catch-all mainstream parties
have been more sensitive to external pressures, trying to respond to the
electoral or societal challenges and to be responsive to environmental
changes. The opposite happens with the PCP, which has displayed no
change at all. This means that the ‘original model’ (Panebianco 1988) is
an important intervening variable between external shocks and the trans-
formation of political parties.
The implications of these findings are twofold. First, party organi-
sations have displayed a high degree of inertia and the party leadership
has made it difficult to implement reforms from within (Lisi 2015). As
a consequence, party change takes place mainly in presence of an elec-
toral shock, and this is even more likely when this shock is combined
with the passage from government to opposition. In other words, the
Portuguese case shows that the crisis alone is not a sufficient condition
to foster party organisational changes, but it may favour democratising
reforms indirectly when associated to a deep electoral change.
Second, the Portuguese case also contributes to highlighting the

importance of the institutional arena. This is a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, parties may be able to extract higher benefits from
the state and to strengthen the cartelisation of politics (Ignazi 2017). We
believe that their capacity to perform (and keep control on) institutional
functions is an important element that helps to explain the resilience of
Portuguese party system, which has proved to be better able to resist
to the European crisis than Southern European counterparts. On the
other, these—more often than not obscure and informal—practices may
contribute to eroding institutional trust and to boosting political cyni-
cism or anti-political attitudes. From this standpoint, the stability of the
Portuguese party system may be considered as a ‘giant with feet of clay’.
While the extraction of institutional resources may strengthen in the
short-term the role of political parties, in the long run this process may
provide the seeds for party system change.
It is obviously impossible to summarise in a few pages the character-
istics and evolution of a complex and multifaceted reality, such as that
of political parties. For an overall appraisal of the contribution of the
role of parties to the quality of democracy it would be necessary to con-
sider other dimensions, which cannot be considered in this short chapter.
However, the analysis of the organisational transformations has demon-
strated that the external shock of the European crisis did not significantly
alter party structures and functions. This also means that there is a long
way to go concerning the strengthening of some of the fundamental
components of the quality of democracy such as the inclusiveness, repre-
sentativeness, receptivity and greater participation of citizens. These are
some of the key challenges that parties should overcome in the future in
order to maintain the protagonism performed up to the present.
Notes
1. The BE was founded in 1999 as a left-libertarian party based on a coali-
tion between two parties and one political movement (see Lisi 2009). All
remaining parties were founded with the establishment of the democratic
regime in 1974 or before (in the case of PCP and PS).
2. According to data provided by the parties, the proportion of women in
the PS and PSD is around 36%, while in the PCP and CDS-PP it does not
exceed 30%. The BE is the party with the highest proportion (over 40%
according to data collected in 2009).
162 M. LISI
3. For more methodological and substantial details on the surveys, see Lisi
and Espírito Santo (2017).
4. In the 2018 congress, the PSD discussed the direct election through elec-
tronic voting of the party leader and the main executive party body dur-
ing the congress, but the proposal was rejected by the majority of congress
delegates.
5. For the analysis on the Portuguese case in a comparative perspective,
see the data available on the website of the Inter-Parliamentary Union
(http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm).
6. LIVRE decided to form a coalition with the political movement Tempo de
Avançar (TdA, Time to Move Forward) in the 2015 elections.
7. See Expresso, 14 January 2017 (http://expresso.sapo.pt/politica/2017-
01-14-Socialistas-adiam-decisao-sobre-primarias).
8. See Público, 1 February 2018, p. 13.
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Políticos: Portugal em Perspetiva Comparada. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências
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(Ed.), Portugal e a Europa: Novas Cidadanias (pp. 51–84). Lisboa: Fundação
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(1975–2000). Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas.
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Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies. London: Routledge.
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uma análise comparada das perceções dos militantes do BE, CDS-PP, LIVRE,
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Partidos Políticos: Portugal em Perspectiva Comparada (pp. 187–212). Lisbon:
Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
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51(1), 24–56.
CHAPTER 9
Trade Union Representation and Industrial

Relations in Portugal Before, During
and Following the Economic
and Financial Crises
Alan Stoleroff
Portuguese trade unions and their confederations have earned key roles
within the institutional model of Portuguese democracy. These concern
primarily, but not only, the institutions involved in labour market regula-
tion, namely, collective bargaining and tripartite negotiation. Indeed, to
a certain extent, their participation in numerous procedures is imperative
and prescribed in various aspects of law.
Collective bargaining is where trade unions exercise their core func-
tion of representing workers in negotiations with employers over condi-
tions of employment, most crucially wages. Though outside the political
sphere per se, it is the basic institution of whatever “industrial democ-
racy” exists in Portugal (Stoleroff 2016). It is a necessary complement
to modern representative political democracy, grounded in—although
A. Stoleroff (*) 
Lisbon University Institute (ISCTE-IUL), Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: alan.stoleroff@iscte-iul.pt

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_9
168 A. STOLEROFF
intermediated by—autonomous trade union organisation, and is under-

stood as such by the labour movement. In fact, in the late 1960s, the
attainment of free collective bargaining was a foundational goal of the
incipient Intersindical confederation, the precursor of the modern labour
movement in Portugal, and was central to its participation within the
overall political struggle for democracy (Barreto 1990). Its crisis during
the recent period of “adjustment” under the tutelage of the Troika truly
shook up the trade union movement.
Tripartite “social concertation”, on the other hand, directly involves
the government in its triangular relationship and emanates from the polit-
ical project, following the turbulence of the revolution in 1974–1975 and
the inflationary burst and economic crisis in the beginning of the 1980s,
to incorporate organised interest representation within the institutional
regime of Portuguese democracy, having been established as the Conselho
Permanente de Concertação Social in 1984. Its institutionalisation—
and the negotiation of “social pacts”—is the clearest manifestation of
enduring corporatist tendencies in the operation of the Portuguese
state (Campos Lima and Naumann 2011). Moreover, through social
concertation, the officially recognised trade union confederations, the
Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (CGTP) and the União
Geral dos Trabalhadores (UGT), have been attributed a quasi-corporatist,
public status as representatives of the interests of a class, i.e. the workers.1
Tellingly, neither the long-term evolution of the model nor the recent
sovereign debt crisis directly challenged either of these roles of the unions—
at least at a formal level.2 But they did challenge the substance and effi-
cacy of labour regulation (Campos Lima 2015) and, therefore, of industrial
democracy. The question then is to determine to what extent and how the
institutional roles of labour have been transformed throughout the crisis
and since the end of the “conditionality” regime and the shift of parliamen-
tary alliances following the 2015 elections and to evaluate their efficacy.
It is this potential discrepancy between the formal roles assigned to
unions and the substantive effects of labour representation that is the
principal object of this chapter. We will look at the links between neo-
liberal policy and the state and economic crises in order to assess the
institutional changes that involve labour representation and regula-
tion, exploring the hypothesis that although the institutions “appear
to have survived unscathed from an earlier era, the way in which they
actually operate has often changed beyond recognition” (Howell 2009:
252–253). To do so, we will look at the transformations in Portugal of
the regulatory institutions throughout democratisation and integration
9 TRADE UNION REPRESENTATION AND INDUSTRIAL … 169
and in the context of the recent crises, focusing on the transformation of

collective bargaining from before, during and after the recent economic
crisis.
Neo-liberalism, the State, the Economic Crisis

and Institutional Change
To one degree or another, labour market deregulation, induced by

the breakdown of the “Fordist regime of accumulation” (Boyer 1986;
Regini 2000, 2003) and neo-liberal political change (Harvey 2005),
became a shared threat to organised industrial relations systems. This
context was eventually contagious to Portugal as well.
As Howell stated in a relevant article on France towards the end of
the first decade of the new century: “despite institutional stickiness and
pressures towards path dependence that flow from comparative insti-
tutional advantage, a process of deep-seated and wide-ranging insti-
tutional change is under way in the political economies of advanced
capitalism and particularly in the sphere of class relations” (Howell 2009:
252). Other authors, such as Harvey (2005, 2006), have affirmed that
the neo-liberal project, with its milestone in the anti-union actions of
Reagan and Thatcher, has depended upon involved States as the pro-
tagonists of reforms with the aim of reconfiguring relations between
capital and labour. For Streeck (2011), neo-liberal deregulation, in this
context, is a component of the gradual extraction of the social from the
social–democratic arrangements that still prevailed under organised capi-
talism and an undermining of democracy.
The role of politics and the state is therefore a key to any analysis of
institutional change in industrial relations. Taking off from an analysis of
the decline of British unions and “voluntarist” industrial relations, Howell
had argued “that the state has been constitutive of the industrial relations
system itself…” (Howell 1995: 150). His later analysis of French industrial
relations again emphasised the leading role of the state in the invention of
arrangements, in the context of trade union decline, for labour representa-
tion within firms as a means to deregulation and labour flexibility. His con-
clusions are particularly important here even if the case of Portugal is quite
different in numerous characteristics from the French:
…France is not alone in seeing an extensive, even enhanced role for the
state. While some traditional roles associated with states have been reduced
(particularly those related to economic management), it is now clear that
170 A. STOLEROFF
states have unique and privileged capacities when it comes to institutional

reconstruction and embedding. Perhaps paradoxically, states are often
more nimble and less subject to attachment to established institutions than
class actors. Thus, the ability to solve collective action problems for those
actors, to confer legitimacy on new actors, to extend the scope of iso-
lated institutional experiments, and to shape behavior through incentives
are crucial elements in a period in which established institutions are being
challenged and new institutions are waiting to be born. (Howell 2009:
252)
With regards to the role of politics and the state, the particular histor-
ical trajectory of Portugal, with its take off from the post-revolutionary,
semi-socialist political economy, resulted in divergent timings with
respect to the development of deregulation. Still, the question is not
principally of timing, but rather of the institutional paths towards con-
vergence and away from the various, established European patterns of
industrial relations towards a new European model or the liberal market
model. In general, trends, such as trade union decline, have not been
at all synchronous (Waddington and Hoffmann 2000) and have made
themselves felt in accordance with the institutional starting points in each
country (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1998; Checchi and Visser 2005), their
institutional “stickiness”—resilience or vulnerability—in the face of glo-
balised competitivity, as well as the particular contents and timings of
their internal political struggle. In this sense, as will be demonstrated,
by the time of the economic crisis of 2007–2008, the resilience of
Portugal’s industrial relations model had already been seriously compro-
mised, particularly given the previous weakening of the trade unions and
the revisions of labour legislation. But this is where the problem of the
discrepancy between form and substance comes in: while the recent crisis
did not overtly challenge the form of trade union representation within
collective bargaining, the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU), signed with the Troika, did, however, demand a major overhaul-
ing of its operation and therefore its substance.
In addition to the corrosive effects that internationalisation has had
on the governance capacity of national-level institutions (Marginson
2016), authors, such as Baccaro and Howell (2011), have more recently
argued that neo-liberalism has, over the long term, produced institu-
tional transformations in industrial relations that have countered the
“surface resilience” of national institutions and “hollowed out” or, at
least, mitigated the formal roles earned by labour and their effectiveness,
leading to convergence in the “practice and content of institutions”. This

makes it necessary to assess “the internal functioning and outcomes of
institutions”. Apparently coordinated industrial relations, established
in the previous phases of evolution, may, over time, and subject to the
piecemeal weakening of roles in practice, produce their opposite, leav-
ing intact the shell but not the body of institutions (Streeck and Thelen
2005). As Howell and Givan (2011: 232) referred:
Change in a common direction, towards decentralization, individualization

and assorted types of flexibility, has to some degree required the destruc-
tion of old institutions and the creation of new ones, but other kinds of
institutional change have also been important: existing institutions have
taken on new functions, and parallel institutions have grown up alongside
the formal ones, supplanting them in importance.
Or as Howell added in the conclusions to his analysis of France,
The result is that even where industrial relations institutions appear to

have survived unscathed from an earlier era, the way in which they actually
operate has often changed beyond recognition. (Howell 2009: 252–253)
On the one hand, there is an institutional change in both form and sub-
stance, such as with the decentralisation of collective bargaining, signi-
fying the decline in coverage of branch-wide, multi-employer collective
bargaining and the increase in specific company-level bargaining. There
may also be radical institutional disintegration, as in the extreme situa-
tion of a rise of employer unilateralism. On the other hand, existing insti-
tutions may lose efficacy, relegating the assigned, formal roles to routine
and limited effectiveness.
In the Portuguese case, European integration initiated an incremen-
tal, neo-liberal whittling away at labour regulation with the state as
the protagonist of fundamental changes in the structure of the econ-
omy. Structural reform, from 1986 on, went pretty far in transforming
the Portuguese political economy but did not succeed in satisfying the
employers goals in terms of maximising their flexibility, i.e. their discre-
tion to manage labour in accordance with their competitive strategies. It
also largely left intact the branch-level framework agreements established
in the earlier phase of industrial relations, when unions wielded greater
bargaining power and mobilising capacity. At the turn of the century,
172 A. STOLEROFF
political opportunity made it possible to revise labour legislation. The

introduction into the Labour Code in 2003 of processes for the expi-
ration of collective agreements had an effect upon collective bargaining,
but it left a lot to be desired on the part of employers and many estab-
lishment economists. It was in such a context that the post-2011 crisis
provided an unprecedented opportunity to resolve a relative stalemate
through state intervention. This is what various researchers on the crisis,
such as Moury and Standring (2017), have attempted to demonstrate:
that state actors found it useful and took advantage of a crisis situation
to bring about desired changes, that is, those desired by the employers,
in labour regulation through radical state intervention under the guise of
external intervention.
Thus, a useful assessment of the impact of the economic and finan-
cial crises following 2007 upon the sphere of labour institutions should
not abstract the recent developments from the long-term evolution of
the industrial relations system. In Portugal, the impacts of the most
recent crises have made themselves felt as both continuity and change
with respect to the protracted evolution of previous deregulatory trends.
The following will attempt to do so in summary fashion before proceed-
ing to analyse institutional change through the evolution of collective
bargaining.
The Portuguese Case: A Gradual Evolution

from Neo-liberalism to Economic Crisis
As in other countries, Portugal’s trade unions eventually suffered

a decline in their efficacy that may be traced back to economic and
political transformations following the 1970s (Wallerstein and Western
2000). However, as one of the later democracies, emerging in 1974
(O’Donnell et al. 1986), the timings of institutional development in
Portugal have been somewhat out of sync with those of the advanced
capitalist democracies.
Portugal suffered the impact of such global macro-economic phe-
nomena as the oil crisis in the midst of a fundamentally progressive, deep
change of political regime that, after a revolutionary phase from 1974 to
1975, brought its industrial relations more or less into the mould based
upon democratic union rights to organise, bargain and strike (Barreto and
Naumann 1996). It was only at this “late” point, that is, the late 1970s,
that Portugal was brought into the general European development pattern
with the emergence of a Welfare State, complementary to institutionalised

industrial relations, thereby constructing the various pillars of an institu-
tional array approximating the European Social Model (Visser 2006) and
which, by 1984, included the tripartite social and negotiation, that had
fallen into disuse in many of the other countries.
The political economic institutions built during the first decade of
Portuguese democratisation established strong formal roles for labour
representation, primarily of trade unions, in the industrial relations sys-
tem.3 Fortified by the revolutionary process of 1974–1975, these were
significantly influential organisations of the Portuguese working class,
having reached a high point of 60% unionisation by 1978 (Cerdeira and
Padilha 1988), just prior to the ideological and political division of the
labour movement. Thus, in its first decade of democratisation, Portugal
seemed to be developing—though not without difficulties—along lines
somewhat out of sync with much of the rest of Europe, consolidating
new union power and an industrial relations system based upon col-
lective bargaining and the achievement of the first major branch-wide
framework agreements as well as enterprise agreements in the large firms.
However, this institutional expansion of social democracy hit the rocks
due to the imbalance of payments, serious inflation and the increasing
difficulties of the large industrial enterprises—as well as labour con-
flict.4 As a result, the country suffered a serious recession and crisis from
1983 to 1985, during which it experienced a second encounter with the
International Monetary Fund.
Following 1983, serious economic problems set in and an intense
struggle was opened over the status of the public enterprise sector that
had been established after 11 March 1975 with the revolutionary nation-
alisations of the commanding heights of the economy (banks, insur-
ance, big industry). The economic crisis and the “liberal” challenge to
the nationalised enterprises led to significant defensive politicisation of
labour conflict and a further displacement of the locus of trade union
strategy and action from the deadlocked enterprise level to the State. It
was in this context that formal tripartite concertation was institution-
alised in 1984 with the creation of the Permanent Council for Social
Concertation (CPCS) under the auspices of the central block, coalition
government of the Socialist (PS) and Social-Democratic (PSD) parties.
The creation of the CPCS was, on the one hand, a pivotal moment in
a party “cartelization” process: a government formed by two catch—all
parties invited the employers’ and trade unions’ confederations to, above
174 A. STOLEROFF
all, harness out of control inflation and “modernize” the country.5 On

the other hand, it also turned out to be a moment in the creation of a
durable neo-corporatist institution.
The economic recovery following 1985 and the integration of
Portugal within the EEC in 1986 brought about favourable conditions
for the political changes that brought Portugal into the European liberal
fold. Thus began a piecemeal dismantling of the state-centred economic
model. The PSD governments under Cavaco Silva (1985–1987, 1987–
1991, 1991–1995), which had come to power at this decisive juncture,
proceeded to implement a programme of structural reforms to liberal-
ise the economy and privatise the main components of the state enter-
prise sector. Recovery also initiated a protracted process of flexibilisation
of labour market regulation (Pinto 1992) that would gather steam up
until the turn of the century. Integration within the Single Market made
Portugal’s labour market and industrial relations particularly susceptible
to pressures of institutional convergence.
During this period, the agreements around incomes’ policy, obtained
between government, employers and the UGT in the CPCS, were, in
crucial ways, a sort of concession bargaining at macro-level on the part of
labour. In spite of the CGTP’s rejection of such pacts, the participation
of labour was crucial to the institutionalisation of this neo-corporatism
à la portugaise. This was largely a legitimation process, which permit-
ted the PSD governments of Cavaco Silva to carry out their “structural
reforms” of the economy (reversing the nationalisations and flexibilising
labour protections against dismissals), while securing the integration of
one of the two representative union confederations.6
Moreover, economic recovery and European integration tended to
weaken the appeal of previous incentives for unionisation. In this period,
capital flowed “freely” into Portugal, especially in the form of the transfer
of European structural funds. The facility of money and credit provided
economic stimulus and contributed to shifting the balance of power in
and altering the operation of the labour market, though its advantageous
impact was felt mostly on an individual level. The rise of human resource
management also promoted individualisation in employment relations.
Beyond this, it led to a growing sense of economic insecurity (“precar-
ity”), in spite of job growth, as employers more and more recruited on
the basis of fixed-term “atypical” contracts. This undermined the impetus
towards collective organisation and action, which had significant conse-
quences for trade union membership as shown in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1 Union
Members Employees Density
density: Portugal,
1978–2015 1978 1486.8 2447 60.8
1980 1460.0 2663 54.8
1985 1225.0 2746 44.6
1990 920.0 3289 28.0
1995 800.0 3154 25.4
2000 783.0 3646 21.5
2005 804.2 3742 21.5
2010 738.7 3762 19.6
2011 694 3715 18.7
2012 665 3539 18.8
2013 – 3453 –
2014 615 3608 17
2015 600 3707 16.2
Source 1978–1995: Jelle Visser, ICTWSS @ http://www.uva-aias.

net/208; 2000–2015: OECD.stat @ https://stats.oecd.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=TUD#
From the mid-1980s to the 1990s, union membership quickly

declined. Union density was cut pretty much in half. This trend took its
toll on the organically divided trade union movement. Moreover, already
in the mid-1990s, survey research at company level had revealed a sig-
nificant presence of employer unilateralism and prevalent ineffectiveness
of sector and branch collective bargaining (Stoleroff 1995, 2009). This
research also revealed the existence of a vast area of activity where union
presence was, at best, marginal. At the time, this did not necessarily sig-
nify a worsening of conditions but rather that collective bargaining was
mainly being used to establish a floor for the labour market while leaving
the real terms of employment to the discretion of human resource man-
agement in the companies (based upon their need to attract labour and
their capacity to pay). But it was a signal that unions could potentially
become superfluous for a large sector of the labour force. It was also a
signal that employer unilateralism was rampant in sectors where workers
did not have independent bargaining power and were being weakened by
globalisation (textiles).
The post-Maastricht lead-up to the EMU provided a protracted, long-
term context for institutional change. It was thus a period of attrition,
which is quite visible in the continuing decline of union membership,
already referred to. Moreover, the previous structural reforms had their
intended impact and stimulated organisational restructuring (downsizing
176 A. STOLEROFF
and outsourcing in particular) that transformed the economic panorama

in a relatively short time. It was also a period of deep social, cultural
and political changes that many referred to as “modernisation”.7 Then,
following the breakdown of the Soviet world of “really existing social-
ism”, political discourse, if not attitudes, swung against the established
institutions of modernity, namely the trade unions and the collective rep-
resentation of interests, as well as against the ideologies of the traditional
class-based “mass” parties, which had been the allies of the unions.8
Meanwhile, as liberalisation and privatisation progressed steadily under
both the PSD and PS governments (1995–1999, 1999–2002), social
concertation served out its intended function towards “nominal conver-
gence”, with the signing of multiple “social pacts”, legitimating wage
moderation and decreasing inflation (Stoleroff 1992; Campos Lima and
Naumann 2011).
The turn of the century and the creation of the Euro were followed
by two pivotal developments initiated in the political realm. These were,
firstly, the revision of labour legislation in the new Labour Code (2003),
which among other measures, most notably introduced procedures for
expiration and cessation of collective agreements that could be initiated
by unilateral action. The introduction of these clauses in the Labour
Code in 2003 (revised in 2006 and 2009) was—and continues to be—
vehemently opposed by the labour movement for the understandable
reason that the possibility of cessation through unilateral decision could
potentially take pressure off of employers in bargaining processes, allow
them to prevaricate and renounce existing contracts unilaterally and
thereby lead to a collapse of collective bargaining. The second develop-
ment was the start of a Reform of the Public Administration inspired by
the New Public Management.
The Reform of Public Administration was initially launched during
the PSD government in 2003 but it really took off with the mandate of
the Socialist majority government of José Socrates in 2005. Its relevance
for this discussion derives from its main objectives: beyond organisational
rationalisation to eliminate redundant services and achieve employment
mobility, it aimed at the alteration of the public employees’ employment
status and new human resource management, namely through individ-
ualisation and new meritocratic assessment schemes. It also sought to
contain salaries and promotions and reduce overall employment. It even
included new procedures and matters for collective bargaining in the
public sector. Its implementation required negotiation on all its major
reforms with the public-sector unions and the measures led to signifi-
cant confrontation with the labour movement and, specifically, the very
important unions of the public employees (Stoleroff 2007).
Thus, by the time the major economic crisis broke out in 2007–
2008, Portugal’s labour regulation institutions, as inherited from the
phase of democratisation, had been under long-drawn-out attack and,
to some extent, already qualitatively transformed, largely as a conse-
quence of “reformist” government initiative. But the purported rigidity
of the Portuguese labour market remained a major point of struggle.
This became the subject of policy debate producing a Green Book and
a White Book on labour relations but, even more so, it became a bone
of contention of ideological struggle.9 As far back as the first Cavaco
Silva governments, with the launch of Portugal’s neo-liberal project, the
flexibilisation of restrictions on dismissal and firing had been a key com-
ponent of the programme of structural reforms of the PSD.10 In effect,
the employers’ associations and their political supporters had never been
satisfied with the outcome this struggle and the issue remained a fester-
ing wound in labour relations. Beyond this, Portugal, in the first decade
of the new century, had already come under the constraints of the fiscal
regime of the Euro and been subject to the restrictions of its excessive
deficit. The restraint on wages and promotions in the public sector was
a harbinger of the challenges that would soon be felt following the out-
break of crisis. It was in this context that the Socialist government put
the Reform of Public Administration into full swing, succeeding in sev-
eral years, in the midst of a first rehearsal of austerity, and against signif-
icant union opposition, in significantly altering employment relations in
the public sector (Stoleroff 2013).
In the context of financial crisis, by 2009 the Portuguese state began
to progressively lose control of the public deficit and national debt.
In the following year, it elaborated four versions of a Programme for
Stability and Growth (PEC) seeking to ward off external intervention.
Eventually, under tremendous pressure, Portugal submitted to exter-
nal intervention by the troika of institutions under the conditions of a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in May, 2011.
Between 2008 and 2012, the respective governments, the employ-
ers’ confederations and the UGT signed three social pacts. Each facili-
tated and legitimated structural adjustments in employment regulations
and were translated into effective measures. The first, previous to the
MoU, Tripartite agreement for a new system of regulation of industrial
178 A. STOLEROFF
relations, employment policy and social protection of 25 June 2008 set the
basis for 2009’s revision of the Labour Code. The following two tripar-
tite agreements were instrumental in preparing the way for the drafting
and implementation of the MoU. The first, a Tripartite Agreement for
Competitiveness and Employment preceded the signing of MoU. It was
signed on 23 March 2011 by the Socialist government, the employ-
ers’ confederations and the UGT and comprised various commitments,
namely promoting competitiveness, improving active employment poli-
cies and various changes in the regulatory framework of industrial rela-
tions. This included decentralisation of collective bargaining and the
reduction of severance pay and the creation of a fund to finance it. A sec-
ond agreement, a social pact, the Compromise on Growth, Competitiveness
and Employment, was signed following the MoU by the government
(now a PSD–CDS coalition with a parliamentary majority), the employ-
ers’ confederations and the UGT on 18 January 2012. Its commitments
were mostly integrated into the revised Labour Code of 2012. The
union confederations’ participation in social concertation, weakened
by their ideological and strategic division, achieved very questionable
results. The social pacts that were agreed upon actually facilitated the
cutback of workers’ rights and, more than anything else, contributed to
the legitimation of the Troika’s and the PSD–CDS government’s offen-
sive against labour.
There is no need to repeat here the details of the already much ana-
lysed debt crisis and MoU11; suffice it to say that the institution of
collective bargaining was an important target of the authors of the
Memorandum.
The MoU fixed four main goals in the areas of the labour market,
employment law and industrial relations:
1. reduction of the costs associated with employment contracts;

2. introduction or reinforcement of flexibility into the legal system;
3. relaunching collective bargaining and collective agreements under
a new framework; and
4. implementing active labour policies to promote the employment of
specific groups such as the youth and the long-term unemployed.
For each of these objectives, the MoU-stipulated specific measures,

including major changes to the Portuguese industrial relations system
aimed at fostering “coordinated decentralized bargaining”:
1. the redefinition of criteria for the extension of collective agree-

ments, including the representativeness of the negotiating organ-
isations and consideration of how the extension may affect the
competitive position of non-affiliated firms;
2. further reduction of the duration of expired collective agreements
that have not been renewed;
3. further decentralisation of bargaining in favour of company-level
bargaining;
4. derogation of negotiation of conditions for functional and geo-
graphical mobility and arrangements for working-time to Workers
Commissions;
5. reduction of the company’s size threshold, so that Workers
Commissions may be able to negotiate agreements in companies
with less than 250 employees; and
6. the inclusion in sectoral collective agreements of the conditions
under which Workers Commissions would be able to conclude
company-level agreements without the involvement of trade unions.
The PSD–CDS government that came to power 2011, following

the signing of the MoU, went to work to put it into effect. As a result,
this phase of “adjustment” had a tremendous impact upon labour and
industrial relations. The implementation of the MoU in the field of col-
lective bargaining led to what is fairly consensually referred to as a cri-
sis of the institution.12 Most importantly, the backbone of industrial
democracy, sectoral collective bargaining, suffered a severe breakdown
and threatened the disenfranchisement of large strata of the working
class (Ramalho 2013; Rocha and Stoleroff 2014; Távora and González
2015; Campos Lima 2015). The unions’ ability to secure or even main-
tain collective agreements virtually plummeted, thereby jeopardising
their intermediation in labour market regulation in numerous economic
branches. This collapse of collective bargaining led to a painful deterio-
ration of purchasing power, work conditions and job security, but it also
meant that unions, themselves, would, in the future, have to re-establish
their bargaining positions and relations with employers in the context of
a new, “adjusted” legal and industrial relations framework. Moreover,
with respect to their organisational resources, union density stagnated;
membership did not show signs of substantial recovery, leading to signif-
icant organisational fragility, particularly in the private sector (Portugal
and Vilares 2013). On the political front, the mobilisation capacity of
180 A. STOLEROFF
the union confederations, outside of collective bargaining and in defence

of acquired rights in labour legislation, likewise suffered. A further shift
in the balance of power of class forces took place, making possible a
massive transfer of value from labour to capital (Leite et al. 2014). As
a consequence, the very possibility of industrial democracy in Portugal
(Stoleroff 2016) was jeopardised.
Nevertheless, by the end of 2014, the mandate of the Troika was over.
In spite of constant campaigns, the labour confederations’ ability to
rally effective working-class protest during the mandate of the austerity
government, particularly of the CGTP, followed a downward curve and
it was only thanks to the loss of that government’s electoral majority and
clever political manoeuvring by the left-wing parties to support a minor-
ity Socialist government that the austerity policy has been attenuated
since 2015. The formation of the so-called “contraption government”
consolidated a new shift in political forces. This new political situation
has provided the union confederations with potentially reinforced polit-
ical resources, but, given their own programmatic and political division,
has required very astute tactical management by their leadership and
allies in order to extract advantage from this relatively favourable polit-
ical conjuncture. For one thing, although austerity has been halted, it
did not end and, furthermore, nor has adjustment. In spite of its reliance
on the left-wing parties, the Socialist government has steadfastly accom-
modated the employers’ confederations and thwarted the union confed-
erations’ hopes with respect to inverting the changes in labour law that
were imposed during the Troika’s mandate. With regards to collective
bargaining, although the government has ended the blockade on the
publication of extension decisions, allowing the coverage of collective
bargaining to begin a recovery, it has refused to revert the clauses of the
Labour Code permitting the expiration and cessation of agreements.
The Decline and Partial Recovery

of Collective Bargaining
In what follows, we will look at various aspects of the evolution of col-

lective bargaining, seeking to analyse how and to what extent this fun-
damental institution of industrial democracy has been transformed. It
will look at the frequency of agreements and the coverage of collective
bargaining over time as indicated by the number of annually renewed
and updated agreements officially published.13 In accordance with the
theoretical perspective proposed, the analysis covers a period ranging

from the years leading up to the crisis, the crisis and “adjustment” period
and the most recent post-crisis period.
For the analysis we use the data published officially by the General
Directorate for Labour Relations (DGERT) on bargaining activity that
is universally accessible from its website.14 The same data have been
used for similar analyses by Campos Lima (2015, 2016) and Naumann
(2018), though here it is updated to 2017.
The frequency—or number of agreements published annually by the
Ministry of Labour—will be considered indicative of ongoing collective
bargaining activity and is therefore a gauge of what is here referred to
as the form of the institution. We will be interested in tracing aggregate
annual number of agreements as well as the number according to the
level at which they are negotiated and signed. The greater the activity,
the more vigorous is the institutional form at aggregate and the par-
ticular level and vice versa. In the Portuguese system, there are three
levels at which contracts may be established: the more centralised, sec-
tor, branch or multi-employer level (CCT), the decentralised single-
employer level (AE) and an intermediate level that combines a limited
group of companies (ACT), generally within similar activity. We will
look primarily at the evolution of CCTs and AEs. Collective bargaining
coverage refers to the extent to which agreements apply. It is here meas-
ured as the number of workers whose employment is regulated by col-
lective bargaining agreements at a given level. This latter measure will
be used here as a convenient, partial measure of the substance of insti-
tutional activity. It will be looked at both the aggregate and the specific
levels.
As shown in Fig. 9.1, there was in fact a significant fall in the num-
ber of agreements signed between 2003 and 2004, as a likely effect of
the introduction of the expiration clause. Yet by 2005, the numbers
had begun to recover slightly (perhaps signifying that the decline was a
temporary adjustment to the new rules), although to the detriment of
multi-employer bargaining, and reached a much lower level than in the
period before the adoption of the Labour Code. Thus, there were sig-
nals that the trend would level off, though at this lower level. But that
did not occur, the stabilisation was short lived and, in 2008, there was
a decrease coincident with the crisis. Now, this was a serious crash and,
after 2010, with the deepening of economic crisis, the fall became more
significant and continued until 2012. From 2008 to 2012, the number
182 A. STOLEROFF
Fig. 9.1 The evolution of collective bargaining from 1994 to 2015

(Source DGERT [A evolução da contratação coletiva e da extensão administra-
tiva (1994–2015) http://www.dgert.gov.pt/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
EvolucaoContratacaoColetiva_1994_2015.pdf])
of agreements fell from 296 to 85. Adding to this, the obstacles placed
by the PSD–CDS government, in conformity with the MoU, upon the
extension of collective contracts, there was a genuine near collapse of
the institution as coverage also fell to record lows (Naumann 2018).
Campos Lima (2016: 30) calculates that coverage of new and renewed
agreements fell from 65.5% in 2008 to 17.0% in 2012 (continuing to
fall to 10% in the following two years) and refers to the results of the
government’s policy as the “dismantling of the collective bargaining
regime”.
Table 9.2 contains the figures for the numbers of new and renewed
collective bargaining agreements, extension decisions and bargaining
coverage from 2007 to 2017.
The total number of workers covered by new and renewed collec-
tive bargaining agreements declined meaningfully after the high point
of 1,894,846 in 2008, following the outbreak of economic crisis, to
1,236,919 in 2011. But in the next years it crashed, reaching a drastic
low point of 241,539 in 2013, coincidently, as unemployment soared
to almost 18%. It increased only marginally to 246,643 in 2014. This is
clearly an effect of the politically determined brake upon the publication
of extension decisions, which declined from 116 in 2010 to 17 in 2011,
reaching a low point of only 9 in 2013.
Table 9.2 Collective bargaining agreements, extension decisions and bargaining coverage
Number 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
CCT 160 172 142 141 93 36 27 49 65 69 91

Coverage 1,430,660 1,778,216 1,299,371 1,309,267 1,160,080 291,068 197,017 214,603 446,025 648,974 766,862
ACT 27 27 22 25 22 9 18 23 20 19 21
Coverage 58,233 47,232 59,902 64,455 52,737 26,645 27,104 19,596 21,728 65,844 16,209
AE 64 97 87 64 55 40 49 80 53 58 96
Coverage 32,384 69,398 37,952 33,344 24,102 9909 17,418 12,444 22,624 34,530 37,812
Total 251 296 251 230 170 85 94 152 138 146 208
collective
agree-
ments
Published 75 137 102 116 17 12 9 14 36 35 84
extension
decisions
Total 1,521,277 1,894,846 1,397,225 1,407,066 1,236,919 327,622 241,539 246,643 490,377 749,348 820,883
employ-
ees cov-
ered by
collective
bargaining
Source DGERT (Instrumentos de regulamentação coletiva de trabalho publicados em Portugal Continental)

9 TRADE UNION REPRESENTATION AND INDUSTRIAL …
UGT (Relatório Anual da Negociação Colectiva 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017)
183
184 A. STOLEROFF
Furthermore, while collective bargaining had been far and away pre-
dominantly branch and multi-employer, there had been a tendency
towards increasing numbers of single-employer agreements since the
middle-late 1990s. Although these also decreased in number from 2008
until 2012, in 2012 company-based agreements for the first time ever
outnumbered sectoral agreements, a real sign of the tremendous fall in
branch-wide agreements that continued until 2015, when branch agree-
ments began making a comeback. Nevertheless, the comeback was to be
slight and, even with this recovery, multi-employer agreements no longer
predominate in numbers in the system. Presuming that this trend lasts,
Portugal’s collective bargaining system seems to have made significant
progress towards convergence with a decentralised model of industrial
relations.
As important as the number of agreements is the number of work-
ers covered by the different types of bargaining agreements. The biggest
drop in coverage took place between 2011 and 2012 from 1,236,919
to 327,622. It continued to decline to 241,539 in 2013. The largest
drop in sectoral agreements also occurred between 2011 and 2012 from
1,160,080 to 291,068. It also continued to fall until 2013, reaching the
low point of 197,017. Coverage of renewed single-employer contracts
decreased, but began to decline earlier, from a high point of 69,398 in
2008, it progressively declined to a low of 9909 by 2012.
In 2014, the direction of variation changes, indicating some recovery
in collective bargaining. The coverage of renewed sectoral agreements
rose from its 2013 low to 49 agreements covering 214,603 workers in
2014 and then more than doubled to 446,025 based on 65 agreements
in 2015, continuing its rise. It reached a new high in 2017 with 91
agreements and coverage at 766,862. The recovery of coverage in sec-
toral bargaining was accompanied by a corresponding rise in the publi-
cation of extension agreements following 2014. This recent high in the
coverage of renewed sectoral contracts, however, is only somewhat more
than half the coverage of renewed sector-wide bargaining in 2010. The
coverage of single-employer agreements also began a recovery follow-
ing the low of 2012. As it is mathematically obvious, the increase in the
number of single-employer agreements does not signify a corresponding
increase in the number of workers covered by collective bargaining. In
2017 96 single-employer agreements produced coverage of only 37,812.
Not only does coverage as a whole remain far below the pre-crisis lev-
els but the significant increase in the numbers of single-employer
agreements has not come close to making up for the number of covered
workers lost to multi-employer agreements.
Presuming that the trends referred to here last, and the number of
single-employer agreements continues to balance out the number of
multi-employer agreements, it is clear that Portugal’s collective bargain-
ing system has made significant progress towards convergence with a
decentralised model of industrial relations. While the collapse of bargain-
ing during the mandate of the Troika and the PSD–CDS government
has been surely attenuated and there has been a recovery of bargaining
activity producing new and renewed agreements, there has also been a
qualitative shift in the loci of the system.
Addison et al. (2017) criticise the use of these particular data as the
basis of an interpretation regarding the collapse of collective bargaining
in Portugal. They object to a supposed dramatism associated with the
analysis of these data. Whereas Campos Lima, the labour movement and
we emphasise the significant transformations of collective bargaining
structure and coverage based upon the flow of bargaining activity, these
authors insisted that data on the stock of existing contracts demon-
strate, in effect, that Portugal’s fairly high rate of coverage suffered
only a very “modest” decline during the crisis period—from 90.5% in
2008 to 89.2% in 2013 (according to their calculations). Their analysis
is relevant, but rather than contradicting a so-called “narrative” regard-
ing a “disappearance” of collective bargaining, these data, in our view,
reveal major transformations in its structure, including a relative col-
lapse in bargaining during the period of adjustment. In fact, by demon-
strating the general persistence of an aspect of the institutional form,
i.e. the continuing effects of existing contracts, their analysis reinforces
our conclusion that the substance of institutional activity has under-
gone qualitative change. On the one hand, as Campos Lima (2016: 29)
argued,
In Portugal what collapsed was the number of renewed contracts and their
corresponding coverage. From the viewpoint of those authors (Addison,
Portugal & Vilares 2015), the decline in contract renewal and their cover-
age reflected the problem of “rigidity towards decreasing wages” in times
of deflation, and not a crisis of collective bargaining. However, what is cer-
tain is that it was precisely the strategy of “downward wage flexibility” – in
order to correct the supposed rigidity – which was behind the blocking of
contract extension, that had dramatic effects upon collective bargaining…
186 A. STOLEROFF
On the other hand, the fundamental issue involved here is the decline
of multi-employer, branch-level bargaining and its coverage in favour of
decentralised bargaining with its relatively low coverage. Although we
have not analysed the content of the decentralised bargaining agreements
that have emerged, we would consider it more than likely that the result
has been the differentiation of contractual conditions and a resulting
growing inequality as well as greater flexibility in general in workplace
labour relations. This would in fact confirm our point.
Conclusions
The first conclusion regards the state and politics. Throughout this expo-
sition, the role of the Portuguese State as a constituent actor in the shap-
ing and structuring of industrial relations has been particularly salient.
This visible role of the state is a prominent feature of Portuguese his-
tory; democratisation did not attenuate, but rather reinforced it. Politics
is the process and means by which the state acts or that class actors seek
to use the state to accomplish their projects with respect to the polit-
ical economy and the regulation of the labour market in particular.
The neo-liberal project in the Portuguese context expresses itself in the
application of structural reforms to achieve reprivatisation, deregula-
tion and flexibilisation in such a way as to reconfigure the state-centred,
quasi-socialist economy that had emerged from the revolutionary period
and was considered to be a brake upon economic growth and mod-
ernisation. The Portuguese neo-liberalism aimed especially at a politi-
cal reconfiguration of class influences upon the state and a shift in the
balance of forces within the labour market. The neo-liberal project also
comes through in the long-term practice of the “cartel parties” of cen-
tre right and centre left, each contributing to the processes of recon-
figuration. Both political forces promoted neo-corporatism, where the
state plays a leading role in influencing the formulation of the social
pacts, achieving agreements as a legitimating process for its action in the
sphere of the labour market and class relations. Most notable as well is
the politically initiated revision of labour law. Clearly, the introduction of
the contract expiration and cessation process was a major factor in trans-
formation of collective bargaining since 2003. However, its results were
slow. The crisis exacerbated and exaggerated the role of the state under
the tutelage of the supra-state actors, a.k.a. the Troika. But it did so in
the sense analysed by Moury and Standring (2017): taking advantage
of the opportunity posed by a destabilising crisis in order to breakdown

obstacles to changes that otherwise would have been difficult, by substi-
tuting actors and obtaining strength and legitimation for transformative
measures through external intervention as a form of imposition of dereg-
ulatory measures aimed at flexibilisation.
The second conclusion regards the transformation of the Portuguese
industrial relations model. There has been a reconfiguration of the roles
of multi-employer and single-employer bargaining. There has been con-
vergence with a decentralised model, although sectoral bargaining has
made an uneven comeback in its activity and coverage and it is not about
to disappear. In fact, it continues to predominate in terms of coverage.
This reconfiguration of the system will require a great deal of study, but it
would seem precipitous to conclude that Portuguese collective bargaining
has, in form, reached a point of “disorganized decentralization”. On the
other hand, we must deepen our understanding of the efficacy of multi-
employer bargaining in Portugal. The increase in the national minimum
wage in 2016 through a parliamentary political decision-making process
and its effects upon minimum negotiated wages in pay scales and effective
minimum wages raise deep questions regarding the efficacy of sectoral col-
lective bargaining in the post-crisis conjuncture. Further increases in the
national minimum wage, as demanded by the union confederations and
opposed by the employers’ confederations, will produce significant ten-
sions that will be expressed in this relationship between parliamentary pro-
cesses, concertation and collective bargaining. This is an open story.
The third conclusion regards the problem of form and substance
and refers particularly to the relationship of union strength, reflected
in unionisation and union density, on the one hand, and the efficacy of
collective bargaining, reflected in coverage, on the other. Unions have
been significantly weakened through a long-term decrease in member-
ship, but they continue to play their role in collective bargaining.15 The
relative stability of collective bargaining processes ensured the unions’
performance roles in spite of membership loss. However, this capacity
gradually diminished following the revisions of labour law. Then, the
period of economic crisis and external intervention succeeded in trans-
forming the established order of Portuguese industrial relations. The
most visible aspect of this turning point was the temporary collapse of
collective bargaining, the decline in coverage and substantial decen-
tralisation. Nonetheless, while the crisis undermined the capacity of
Portuguese trade unions to assert themselves in joint regulation, the
188 A. STOLEROFF
institutionalization of social concertation consolidated the public rep-

resentative status of the two ideologically opposed confederations. The
result has been the production of various agreements and pacts where
the UGT’s compromise and consent have had the function of legitimat-
ing much of the change that has impacted upon collective bargaining.
Thus although Portuguese trade unions and their confederations
continue to play the formal roles attributed to them, they have been sub-
ject to substantial institutional transformation.
Greatly weakened on various fronts from the years of economic and
financial crisis, unions and their respective confederations face strategic
dilemmas in the context of current political change and economic devel-
opment. On the one hand, over time, unions have increasingly resorted
to judicial action in order to compensate for their own defensive mobi-
lization deficits. On the other hand, in accordance with their respec-
tive, opposing ideological tendencies, the confederations have opted
for the contrasting solutions of concertation or mass political mobiliza-
tion in protest. The elections of 2015, which resulted in the unprece-
dented arrangement of a minority Socialist government, supported by an
anti-austerity agreement on the left, changed the context. At peak asso-
ciation level, trade union strategy has played a variation on the same old
dilemma: the choice between investment in the institutionalized concer-
tation for social pacts as opposed to investment in the explicitly politi-
cal resource of union-party alliances in parliamentary action. Meanwhile,
their capacities for effectively participating in collective bargaining and
the joint regulation of industrial relations have been significantly condi-
tioned by the institutional changes discussed in this chapter.
Notes
1. Crucially, in contrast with the French system, which establishes a minimum
percentage of electoral support as a criterion for representativeness, or the
Spanish and Italian systems, which provide for voting for union representa-
tion at company level, in the Portuguese system, the achievement of rep-
resentative status, either in collective bargaining or social concertation, is
not determined by any form of verification of the degree of representa-
tiveness of relevant unions or the two confederations. Independent unions
therefore have no voice in social concertation. Thus, this form of labour
representation gives rise to an odd characteristic of the underlying neo-cor-
poratism existent within the institutional model of Portuguese democracy.
2. Even the possibility of derogation of bargaining roles to non-union com-

mittees of workers that was inserted into the Labour Code in 2012 does
not entirely bypass unions.
3. The system also provides for a second channel of employee representa-
tion in the enterprise-based Workers Commissions (Comissões de
Trabalhadores).
4. Strike frequency and participation reached their height at this point.
5. While the employers unanimously accepted the invitation, on the labour
side only the UGT—the confederation led by trade unionists of the gov-
ernment parties—was at first interested in participating. The CGTP—
whose leadership was Communist Party—refused to enter the CPCS on
anti-corporatist grounds. It stayed out until 1987.
6. The CGTP entered the CPCS in 1987, but the agreements left it in the
cold. It could justify participating—up to a point in negotiation pro-
cesses, as long as this did not compromise its demands and action out-
side of concertation—but it could not justify signing the agreements on
incomes policy (1987 and 1988) that the UGT signed, nor the social
pact of 1990, that the UGT also signed. The UGT, on the other hand,
entered the game and at key moments made fundamental concessions in
return for political advantage in relation to the CGTP—thereby compen-
sating for its weaker position with respect to representativeness. Campos
Lima and Naumann (2011: 153) give support to this view when, on
the basis of an interview conceded by the UGT General Secretary of
the time, Torres Couto, they claim that, in spite of some internal resist-
ance, “… by signing the agreement, the UGT was able to assume a more
prominent role in social concertation…”
7. We refer to change in the family, particularly with the accelerated entrance
of women in the labour force, decline in the rural, agricultural labour
force, technological change and organisational restructuring. See Freire
(2008) for analysis articulating these trends around the issues of work.
8. Even the orthodox Portuguese Communist Party was shaken by a loss of
ideological self-confidence and required a strenuous effort from its lead-
ership to hold the line (Patrício and Stoleroff 1994).
9. Although it had had the greatest decline in legal employment protection
since 2003, the OECD still ranked Portugal as having the most strict and
rigid labour regulations within the European Union (Venn 2009). The
main “rigidities” of Portuguese labour law were generally identified as
(a) excessive employment protection for permanent contracts; (b) overly
generous unemployment benefits; (c) rigid working-time arrangements;
and (d) a wage bargaining system incapable of aligning wage growth with
productivity and external competitiveness.
190 A. STOLEROFF
10. This had led the two labour confederations to unite in a general strike in
1988 against the government’s attempt to liberalise labour legislation in
this sphere.
11. See for example Rocha and Stoleroff (2014).
12. As we will see below Addison et al. (2017) challenge this consensus.
13. Agreements take effect upon publication in the Labour Ministry’s bulletin.
14. The UGT confederation’s thorough annual reports on collective bargain-
ing activity as well as those of the Center for Labour Relations (CRL) are
based upon this data.
15. As a measure of union strength, union membership and density are only
relative indicators due to the fallibility of statistics. More than ever before,
we do not know how many union members there really are. Due to the
impossibility of maintaining independent accounting and the inexistent
public efforts to determine union representativeness, we are dependent
upon membership claims by the unions. On this problem, see Stoleroff
and Naumann (1993). Consequently, we cite statistics published by the
OECD and the ICTWSS data base, associated with Professor Jelle Visser.
The attempt by Portugal and Vilares (2013) to make calculations on the
basis of the Relatório Único are useful but limited to the private sector
and by the characteristics of the source.
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5–29.
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Transformationen des Kapitalismus (pp. 315–316). Frankfurt am Main:
Campus Verlag.
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Facing Challenges and Searching for Solution. Brussels: ETUI.
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and Why. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 355–377.
CHAPTER 10
Portugal and Spain in the International

Protest Cycles: From Global Justice
Movement to Anti-austerity Protests
Cristina Nunes
Introduction
The year of 2011 was recognised by the emergence of a new cycle
of protests around the world such as the Arab Spring, the Occupy
Movement and the Indignados in Southern Europe.
Although these mobilisations are deeply rooted in the national con-
texts, they also share common features and goals. Their claims are related
to the lack of confidence on the political and economic elites and an
appeal for more equality and social justice.
Portugal and Spain merge into this cycle of mobilisations in a context
of economic and social crises marked by the adoption of austerity meas-
ures such as cuts in education and health systems, salaries, pensions and
loss of social and labour rights. The anti-austerity protests started within
a very short time between the two countries: the demonstrations of the
12th of March (Portugal) and the 15th of May (Spain) during 2011.
C. Nunes (*) 
CIES, ISCTE-Lisbon University Institute, Lisbon, Portugal

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_10
196 C. NUNES
Both societies have been characterised as carrying low levels of politi-

cal and civic engagement in public sphere issues. Nevertheless, there are
also some features that set them apart, namely a wider support of the
Spanish society towards associations that embody post-materialist values
and unconventional forms of civic action.
Our reflection also takes into account some trends of the ‘new new’ social
movements (Feixa et al. 2009) on identity themes and the effects of new
communication technologies in the evolution of contemporary movements.
In this comparative analysis, we start from the notion that, in
Portugal, global justice dynamics were not very strong, while in Spain
emerged new collective action groups that organised large-scale demon-
strations. Using these points as the basis of discussion, our focus is on
the evolution and spread of the protests in the two countries.1
From “Movement of Movements” to “Citizens

Movements”: The Identity Issue
During the last years, the social justice movements have given place to
anti-austerity protests emerged mostly in Southern Europe.
Are we facing a new cycle of protests? Can we make a comparative
analysis with the social justice movements on the identity level?
It is possible to point out two types of analytical insights towards this
new cycle of protests: one that is looking for a break with the social jus-
tice movement and highlights its new character (Tejerina et al. 2013)
and another that compares the two moments, regarding their continui-
ties and discontinuities (Juris 2012; Calhoun 2013; Romanos 2013).
Tejerina et al. (2013) analyses anti-austerity protests as a cycle of
worldwide demonstrations divided into two waves: the first arose from
the uprisings of the Arab Spring and the second, inspired by the first,
includes the Southern Europe protests and the Occupy Movements in
the U.S.A. The protests are all motivated by the increase of social and
economic inequalities, especially in countries with large-scale demonstra-
tions, but Arab Spring uprisings have emerged in countries where people
claim for an openness to a democratic political system. The second wave
shapes itself mainly by the opposition to austerity measures imposed by
the political and economic agreements with the Troika (International
Monetary Fund, European Union and European Central Bank).
The main “identity discontinuities” are underlined through a shift
from the so-called “movement of movements” to the “people movements”
(Tejerina et al. 2013). This means that, in the social justice movements,
10 PORTUGAL AND SPAIN IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEST CYCLES … 197
the research focus was on the identity composition of the different

groups, but in the anti-austerity protests it is related to the social fea-
tures that define its participants at individual level. In the “movement of
movements”, the analysis looks to the actors according with their group
identity (movements such as environmentalist, feminist, trade unions,
direct action groups, etc.), organisational levels, collective action struc-
tures (institutional versus non-institutional, verticality versus horizon-
tality) and their political and ideological orientations (reformists versus
revolutionaries). In anti-austerity wave, the social actors are analysed
through their social conditions and these protests bring together citi-
zens who start, for the first time, their political and civic participation. In
general terms, the networks of social justice could be distinguished by a
greater professionalisation and institutionalisation of the activist groups
(Romanos 2013; Juris 2012).
We could observe a higher fluidity and spontaneity in the anti-aus-
terity street protests due to the social media influence. The spread of
mass self-communication (Castells 2009, 2013), such as YouTube or
Facebook, allowed an acceleration of the huge protests (frames and
organisational patterns). The collective actions that emerged around the
world are similar on their expression, but not in their content. If we take
into account a detailed analysis on the wave of protests that emerged
from 2011 onwards, including the Arab Spring, the Occupy Movement
and the anti-austerity protests in Southern Europe, we will find differ-
ent meanings in the contentious politics. It is necessary to go beyond
empirical evidence that seeks to emphasise all the protests as similar due
to the occupation of the public squares or the use of social media. These
mechanisms take different meanings, if we analyse countries with granted
freedom of speech, if the use of public spaces is legally allowed or the
nations where these rights are denied. Therefore, the occupation of
Tahrir Square (Egypt) and its wide-spreading to Plaza del Sol (Madrid,
Spain), Rossio (Lisbon, Portugal) or to Zucotti Park (New York, USA)
does not mean that the protests are homogeneous.
From the Logic of Networking to the Logic

of Aggregation
In the occupy and ‘indignados’ (outraged) movements, the organisational

model given by the new communication networks is a fundamental differ-
ence towards social justice movements. The first are managed by a logic
of aggregation and are guided by a logic of networking (Juris 2012).
198 C. NUNES
In the social justice movements, the websites and email lists are the
main forms of virtual communication among activists and supported the
claiming of a transnational movement that wants to become global. In
the occupy or ‘indignados’ (outraged) protests, the information started to
spread via Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other channels. We want to
understand if the rising of social media is changing the social movements
or contentious politics.
The mass self-communication creates a logic of aggregation that allows
a multitude of citizens in open and public spaces, as it happened in 2011
when protesters with different profiles occupied a lot of public squares
around the world. The information carried out through websites and
emailing lists produces a logic of closed organisation with smaller groups
and networks. While in social justice movements this logic of network
was helpful to the formally established actors (associations, trade unions,
NGOs, etc.), in demonstrations that emerged from 2011, the logic of
instant sharing, mainly through social media, allowed each individual to
be, in real time, both an information producer and a receptor, even in
cases with no previous affiliation to the communication networks of the
activists (Castells 2009). Nevertheless, this logic of aggregation has differ-
ences in relation to the social justice movements. These are distinguished
by the formation of a network built mostly from established collective
actors, where the Internet was a tool to promote contact between phys-
ically distant actors and a global organisation. In the anti-austerity pro-
tests, or in the Occupy Wall Street, social networks could work as a tool
to enhance citizen mobilisation or the occupation of public squares, but it
may difficult a more organised practices of collective action (Juris 2012).
However, this format of self-organised networks could be seen as
useful for the social movements regarding their relations with the oppo-
nents (Castells 2013): an horizontal and decentralised organisation,
with no formal leaders, could help the movement in its interactions with
the opponents that, in this context, may have problems to identify the
groups that are behind the organisation. If self-organised protests could
be seen, in a certain way, as positive for the social movements actions, it
could also be seen as carrying some less favourable features. On the one
hand, the opponents difficulties in identifying the movement members
are an advantage, in the other hand, it could also mean that the move-
ment is not well organised to draw up alternative proposals against the
political and economic powers. A weak organisation may result in an
interaction against their adversaries only at the street level. If the ties
between the members of the movement are too weak, it could be also a
problem to construct the opposition on another level—a transition to a
political movement with a policy guide.
This is one of the less positive features comparing to the social jus-
tice movements. However, only new cycles of protests will show us if the
self-organised actions may become the main model of contentious pol-
itics. If it is true that the logic of aggregation is increasingly important
to the social movements models, it is also true that the logic of classic
action is still important to trade unions.
Social media might be changing the protestors profiles (Castells 2013;
Anduíza et al. 2012): in anti-austerity demonstrations, despite the partic-
ipation of activists from other cycles of protest, we could see the mobili-
sation of new actors such as less politicised citizens with little experience
in activism networks. This difference may be related to the increasing
role of the social media in the mobilisation processes. These are provid-
ing an openness in the activism networks.
Are social media changing the recruitment networks? Are face to face
recruitment losing importance?
If we try to answer this question, we need to accept that the social
media are changing the nature of social movements. However, only the
emergence of new cycles of protest and the research of their empirical
trends will tell us what is the importance of the social media on the con-
struction of contemporary collective action.
Civic Participation in Portugal and Spain

The research on civic participation issues about Portugal and Spain tends
to emphasise the high levels of political involvement during and after
the transition to democracy, which declined in later decades (Santos and
Nunes 2004; Morales 2005). However, it has been pointed out differ-
ences about civil society since the beginning of the democratic regime.
Fernandes (2012) notes that, in both countries, the civil society was
influenced by political processes that led to transition for democracy. In
the Portuguese case, the political revolution of 25 April 1974, allowed a
high civic engagement, namely the emergence of grassroots movements
and to close relations between political parties, trade unions and asso-
ciations. In the Spanish case, a process of democratic transition man-
aged within the political elites, despite the popular mobilisation, had less
impact on the relations between the political and institutional actors and
200 C. NUNES
associations from civil society. These differences can allow us to explain

why, after the transition for democracy, Portuguese society had high lev-
els of membership in trade unions, while in Spain the trend has been a
greater institutional opening to citizen participation in issues related to
“new” social movements, as environmental and human rights organisa-
tions (Fernandes 2012: 7).
In a quantitative research (Viegas et al. 2010), which compares
Portugal and Spain from the point of view of civic engagement data,
46.6 and 51.6% of Portuguese and Spanish respondents said that they
did not belong to any association. If these data link both societies, a deep
analysis to the organisations and their memberships show us differences:
Portuguese citizens are more engaged in charitable, religious and sports
associations; Spanish citizens reveal a higher participation in associations
related to the defence of citizenship rights and values2 (Viegas et al. 2010:
165–166).
These trends show us a closer relation between Spanish citizens and
the new social movement’s organisations. Data from European Social
Survey (2002–2012)3 also underline these trends (Amador 2013; Lima
and Artiles 2014). In the Portuguese society, between 2002 and 2010,
individual participation in legally authorised demonstrations was around
3.6%, while in Spanish society was around 17%.4 If we take into account
the data for 2010 and 2012, we can see an increase in both countries,
but higher in Spain. The Portuguese participation in demonstrations
was 3% in 2010 and 7.4% in 2012; in Spain was around 18.2 and 25.9%.
We could explain this increase through the participation in anti-austerity
protests.
The confidence levels of the Portuguese and Spanish societies in
national governments, political elites and parties has been an impor-
tant issue of debate in national studies (Morales 2005; Torcal and
Magalhães 2009; Teixeira and Pereira 2012), but the Spanish citizens
show their discontent through a higher participation in demonstra-
tions. In the last decade, in Portugal, a lower membership in associa-
tions related to post-materialist values resulted in a lower participation
in the transnational cycle of the global justice movements and, com-
paring to Spain, some contrasts in the contentious politics against the
austerity agreements between the Spanish and Portuguese governments
with European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and
European Union.
The Global Justice Movement in Portuguese

and Spanish Societies
In the last decades, a new cycle of protest created a worldwide net-

work of different social movements around the international summits
of political and economic institutions.5 These actions were followed
by the organisation of world, regional and national social fora, as the
Portuguese Social Forum: meetings where actors were trying to find out
alternative political goals against the neo-liberal globalisation model.
The cycle of global justice was held by several social movements and
international summits with less organised and vertical demonstrations,
comparing with the mobilisations of last decades (Della Porta e Kriesi
2009 [1999]; Della Porta e Tarrow 2005); or a transition to a “network
of transnational activism held by NGOs” to a “network of social justice
direct action” (Bennett 2005: 213). If complex internationalism (Della
Porta and Tarrow 2005), or an increasingly multilevel political opportu-
nity structure, could help to explain the changes on organisation of polit-
ical contentious from twentyfirst century, several studies highlight that
global justice dynamics were very influenced by national conditions of
political opportunity structure and local activism traditions (Della 2005;
Fominaya 2010).
How can we analyse the Portuguese and Spanish participation in the
social justice movements before the global financial crisis (2008) and the
agreement of austerity measures?
In the Portuguese case, the global justice events began with the partici-
pation of intellectuals, members of the trade unions and left-wing political
parties in the first World Social Forum (Nunes 2004). From this participa-
tion, they started the process of the Portuguese Social Forum and the local
actions for global justice, including the global demonstration against the
Iraq War attending by 85,000 participants (15 February 2003).6
The Portuguese Social Forum (June 2003) adopted the charter of
principles from World Social Forum. This underlined the construction of
a plural network of social movements organised horizontally and with-
out formal leaders, excluding the political parties and encouraging a large
participation of civil society associations. The diversity of identities was
one of the dimensions seen as most positive by the members of civil soci-
ety associations (Nunes 2011). However, the Portuguese Social Forum
was influenced by conflicts about the participation of left-wing political
202 C. NUNES
parties in its organisational process, including the Partido Comunista

Português (Portuguese Communist Party) and Bloco de Esquerda
(Left Bloc). This situation triggered out tensions between members
who wanted an active participation of political parties and those who
defended their presence only as observers. This conflict became central
and the attempt to build a dynamic of global justice against neo-liberalism
in the Portuguese civil society has failed.
This conflict was not only a problem of Portuguese Social Forum,
a research conducted by Della Porta (2005), in Italy, about European
Social Forum (Florence 2001) concluded that the participants show
a lack of confidence towards political parties and other institutional
political actors. In Spain, the networks of global justice also triggered
out a conflict between the institutional actors, closer to the political
parties, and the less institutional sectors, who opposed to their partici-
pation (Fominaya 2010). In Spain, new protest groups associated with
the grassroots and direct action and the alternative cultural centres have
emerged (Pastor 2002). These are inspired in the Zapatista movement, a
main symbol for the grassroots groups.
The increase of the less institutionalised protest groups, who adopt
the grassroots model, has been seen as important in the emergence of
the Spanish anti-austerity protests, particularly in the 15 M formation’s
(Romanos 2013). On the one hand, they have an important role on the
material resources to the organisation of the big protests, which generally
were supported only through political parties; on the other hand, 15 M
structures are also perceived as influenced by grassroots movements: the
popular assemblies provides a large-scale participation not only for the
individuals previously integrated in the activist networks, but also for
those who start, for the first time, their political activity; the claiming for
non-centralised and consensus model without leaders.
The experiences from the cycle of global justice were very important
to a “new organisational culture based on respect for the principles of
diversity, subjectivity, transparency and of deliberative democracy in
decision-making processes” (Romanos 2013: 211). The global justice
movements began the “Europeanization of social movements in Spain”
(Romanos 2013: 204) and, even with different demands and claims, the
anti-austerity dynamics also benefited from this internationalisation pro-
cess (Tejerina et al. 2013).
In the Portuguese society, it is difficult to find links between the
global justice movement and the anti-austerity protests. Despite an
attempt to build a dynamic for global justice, it failed through conflicts

and tensions around the participation of political parties. But even in
this context, it provided interactions between very different collective
actors such as trade and farmer unions, feminist, LGBT, environmental-
ist, human rights and immigrants NGOs (Nunes 2011). From the point
of view of new contentious politics and large-scale demonstrations, the
anti-austerity protest is a process of social and political mobilisation hard
to find, in Portugal, in the last decades.
The Austerity Context and a New Cycle

of Political and Social Mobilisation
The demonstrations of 12 March (12 M—Portugal) and 15 May 2011

(15 M—Spain) started a new period against the austerity measures
organised besides political parties and trade union structures.
Both demonstrations have the same claims: the job insecurity and
the rising of unemployment, particularly the youth unemployment, the
worsening of the economic and social life conditions and a disaffection
to the national governments and to the political representation. The call
for 12 M came from a group of four young people whose life conditions
reflected the reality of a generation under unemployment or with pre-
carious contracts. The organisation of 15 M came from a network of
associations and groups that gathered around the platform “Democracia
Real Ya” (Real Democracy Now).7 Comparing both demonstra-
tions, data pointed to a larger number of participants in 12 M protest
(around 200,000–380,000; in the case of 15 M, 130,000).8 However,
15 M mobilisations gave rise to the acampadas and the popular assem-
blies in several Spanish and European cities, including Lisbon where a
group of activists occupied Rossio Square during three weeks. The aca-
mpadas, in Portugal, have not reached the dynamics of Spain, but the
in-depth interviews with activists show us the importance of that space
to the emergence of new protest groups9 such as Platform 15.O.10 This
group organised the demonstration of 15 October 2011 (150,000
participants).
Besides the 12 M and 15.O protests, organised outside the activity of
political institutional actors, we highlight the demonstrations “Queremos
as nossas vidas de volta” (“We Want Our Lives Back”, September 2012)
and “O povo é quem mais ordena” (“It Is the People Who Lead”,
204 C. NUNES
March 2013).11 These protests were organised by Que se Lixe a Troika

(Screw the Troika), a group of activists who emerged not only from
the Rossio Square acampada but also from some not very good work
experiences within the Platform 15.O. This was featured by the conflicts
related to the positions towards political parties and trade unions, ideo-
logical orientations to the collective action and to the financial debt issue.
In the beginning, Que se Lixe a Troika (Screw the Troika) was com-
posed by twenty-nine activists with political and social experiences in dif-
ferent areas, including political parties: “the goal was to join activists from
different professional sectors that could increase the network mobilization
and not to be associated with some activists groups” (Screw the Troika—
member). As reported by another member, “in the beginning the group
was formally closed due to the experience of 15.O Platform”. On the other
hand, its heterogeneous composition, with members and supporters
from the Partido Socialista (Socialist party) to Bloco de Esquerda (Left
Bloc), created a large political and ideological commitment: “we had a
common goal: fight against Troika and the austerity measures and claim
against the government’s resignation within a democratic electoral frame”.
Another activist said: “we never wanted to be a movement, but suddenly
we had a large-scale demonstration (September 2012) and we think that
we could play an important role in mobilizing people who do not often
mobilize”.
Several members of the group share the idea that these demonstra-
tions “…organized by political parties or trade unions would not be so
huge. We received many emails from people saying that will come because it
was called by citizens outside of these political actors”.
A lack of a strong civic engagement in protest actions leads to the con-
clusion of some activists that it is very difficult to mobilise people beyond
the street demonstrations. Unlike other countries, they recognise that
there was not a large participation in acampadas or in popular assemblies.
This is one of the main differences pointed out to the Spanish society
where the anti-austerity dynamics gave rise to a strong movement like the
occupation of public squares (acampadas) or to the popular assemblies’12
organisation model, which expanded across borders and influenced, for
example, movements as Occupy Wall Street in USA.
After a high period of political and social mobilisation, 15 M began to
experience some internal conflicts regarding to its organisational model
(Calvo 2013): there were conflicts among the members who refused to
follow an institutional model and those who desired a transition to a
political party. The formation of political parties, inspired by the 15 M,

started first with the creation of Red Ciudadana Partido X (January
2013) and then by the formation of Podemos (March 2014).13 Podemos
obtained good results in the last European elections (25 May 2014)14
and this political situation become an important debate among the activ-
ists communities of 15 M. A group of activists says, against the changes
of 15 M into a political party, that the 15 M’ purpose has always been
the direct and participatory democracy and never the creation of a
political party structure. This group says that some activists are taking
an advantage from the 15 M’ success to co-opt its political dynamics.
Activists from Podemos argue that it is not true and stress that 15 M has
been changing and one of the goals was the construction of a grassroots
party such as Podemos or Partido X. This sector claims that there is no
contradiction between the street protests and the existence of institu-
tional parties to support them (Fominaya 2014).
It is clear that since May 2011, the movement has been changing in
its organisational and political model. The street demonstrations gave
rise to more organised action groups and collective actors such as las
mareas (“the waves”).15 However, the main legacy of 15 M was a new
culture of civic action and political participation in the Spanish society
(Calvo 2013).
Portugal and Spain: Different Trends

in the Anti-austerity Collective Action
The anti-austerity protests cycle have been analysed as the “peoples” or

the “we are the 99%” movements—an expression symbolising that cit-
izens affected by the global financial crisis are the 99% of the world’s
population against 1% of the ruling elites benefiting from the current
economic context (Perugoria and Tejerina 2013)—which stresses the
demands of the “old” social movements. While the labour movement
demanded new social and economic rights, the anti-austerity protests
arose against the worsening of economic life conditions and a throwback
of rights conquered in the past. However, it is not a return to the tra-
ditional working class portrayal but we could observe a set of different
citizens affected by the austerity measures, particularly young adults with
high education resources, but excluded from the labour market, and
state employees.
206 C. NUNES
At the organisational level, this cycle has been analysed as an inter-

national wave of protest that spread so quickly due to the social media
role. These allowed a fast diffusion of the organisational protest frames,
including the occupation of public squares and spaces and the con-
struction of popular assemblies. This model of diffusion gave rise to a
movement against the political system (Castells 2013), without clear oppo-
nents, proposals and goals.
In the Portuguese society, like in other countries, the emergence
of protest groups is related to the opposition to austerity measures,
job insecurity and unemployment increase. Even so, the lack of statis
tical data does not allow to analyse either the profiles of activists or
the socio-demographic features of the participants in the main street
mobilisations. But the most consensual thesis is that we have individuals
belonging to different ages and social groups.
In the case of Spanish society, a research comparing the protesters
profiles from 15 M with previous demonstrations, taking place between
2010 and 2011, concludes that the first had a higher participation
of young people and women (52%), individuals with high education
resources (on a scale of 1–8 are located at 6.4), as well the number of
unemployed people (14%) is higher than other protests (8%).
It is also stressed that the 15 M participants distinguish themselves by
a lower membership to formal political organisations. According to the
authors, traditional mobilisation channels, conducted by social and polit-
ical organisations, were not in the protests origins, but smaller groups
supported by new communication technologies, specifically by social
media. The researchers argue that this situation may have triggered some
changes in the profile of participants that joined the demonstrations: less
politicised and with a lower participation in street actions. The social
media may allow a wider participation of citizens who are not already
mobilised through social movements’ organisations and political par-
ties. This is also stressed by Castells (2013): despite the participation of
activists from social justice movements and from other cycles of protest,
the 15 M demonstrations were distinguished by a massive participation
of young people who define themselves as non-partisans or with a low
empathy to the political parties.
Through the analysis of the profile participants in popular assemblies
of Madrid and Salamanca (Calvo 2013), it was underlined that protest-
ers are between 25 and 35 years old, have high educational qualifications
and left-wing political orientations. Several surveys highlighted that the
Spanish public opinion had a lot of interest in the 15 M evolutions. In a

survey carried out by the Sociological Research Center16 (June of 2012),
50.2% of the respondents said that have followed the movement evolu-
tion with a lot of interest, as well as 70.3% said to have a positive image
of it. On May 2014, after three years of the 15 M beginning, the polls’
results still follow this trend: 72% of respondents said that the movement
is right about their claims.17
Regarding to its organisational structure, the 15 M is seen as a “viral”
movement (Castells 2013; Toret and Monterde 2014) that spread into
the national and international levels due to the mass self-communication
(Castells 2013), such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.
Portuguese activists argue that internet makes easier the commu-
nication between protest groups, the diffusion of their frames and the
mobilisation processes. In the protests planned by Que se Lixe a Troika
(Screw the Troika!),18 it allowed a big network of organised events. The
call for protest events spread across the country and to the Portuguese
communities in other countries. Despite this international diffusion,
the anti-austerity demonstrations were deeply rooted in national protest
frames. The Carnation Revolution of 1974 is a very important reference
in all the anti-austerity protests (Baumgarten 2013; Fernandes 2017).
The slogans and songs alluding to 25 April 1974 were used as a moti-
vation to mobilisation. The song “Grândola Vila Morena” (Grândola,
Swarthy Town) inspired the March 2013 protest, giving rise even to a
new word: “grandolar”.
In Spain, activists usually organise protests based in international
frames protests or inspired in a broad diffusion around the world. This
link to the international collective action was important in the demon-
strations that led to 15 M and also in the protests celebrating its con-
tinuity (October 2011 and May 2012). There were protests referring
the solidarity between Portugal and Spain. An example of this infor-
mal cooperation was the moment when the Spanish sang “Grândola
Vila Morena”19 in a marea branca (white wave) protest or when the
Portuguese activists organised the mareas (waves)20 in March 2013
protest. Therefore, some solidarity collective actions were organised by
social movements from different European countries, including Portugal
and Spain, such as “Povos Unidos contra a Troika” (“United People
Against Troika”, June 2013). This action was an attempt to create an
international network cooperation between social movements from dif-
ferent countries.
208 C. NUNES
Conclusions
In the first points of this chapter, we analysed the trends and features of
the social and political protest movements of the last decades.
The social justice and the anti-austerity cycles distinguished themselves
by their identity composition, organisation and mobilisation structures.
It was highlighted in this conceptual debate the changes produced by the
new communication technologies and social media in contentious poli-
tics of the last years. If in social justice movements, its impact was already
important by increasing the ability to construct global political protests, in
the anti-austerity cycle this has become even higher. Thus, the social media
development begins to raise new theoretical questions: is the internet more
than a mean of communication between individuals and is becoming a
new model of organisation for social movements? Does the construction
of contentious politics and activism from twenty first century increasingly
works according to connective action and to networks of self-organised pro-
tests? Are these mechanisms changing the recruitment networks of activists
and the participants in demonstrations? Are they changing the social pro-
file of activists and expanding the mobilisation processes to less politicised
and not socialised individuals through trade unions and political parties?
We also analysed the participation of Portugal and Spain in the main
international protest cycles of the last decades. In this comparative anal-
ysis, we put forward the hypothesis that both countries have followed
different trends in the global justice framework and in anti-austerity
protests context. In Spanish society, a higher participation in demon-
strations and in civic engagement within the “new” social movements’
organisations, closer to the action repertoires of both protests cycles,
could explain these differences. A higher integration of the Spanish
social movements into the cycle of global justice led to an active civic
participation and to the formation of collective action structures towards
the international arena, as well as a cooperative network with collective
actors from other countries. 15 M began a new cycle of protest, but
organisational experiences and the transnational interactions from social
justice movements may have been useful in their diffusion processes.
Acampadas and popular assemblies in public spaces give rise to a new
culture of civic participation, particularly within the young people. 15 M
has undergone a political transformation, such as the institutional model
followed by some branches, namely the creation of political parties influ-
enced by organisational nature of the movement.
In Portuguese society, the attempt to build a global justice dynamic

was determined by the conflicts around the role of political parties. It
is difficult to understand if a higher integration in this cycle of protests
would have any influence on the recent wave of protests. The social and
political demonstrations against Troika were the biggest in the last dec-
ades. But, differently from the Spanish society, the new protest groups
did not gave rise to the creation of political parties, and they had some
problems in attracting new members and mobilising citizens for their
causes. We have not analysed the possible links between “new” and
“old” collective dynamics, but trade unions and political left-wing parties
played an important role in the mobilisation against austerity (Accornero
and Pinto 2014). It remains to be understood the role of “old” political
actors in the cycle of the “new” protest groups.
Finally, our analysis highlighted that, even in a globalised world
shaped by the new communication technologies, national and local con-
texts continue to play a key role in the social movements development,
influencing their life course and moments of unity and rupture.
Notes
1. Our approach focuses on mobilisation organised by protest groups besides
political parties and trade unions. We conducted fifteen in-depth inter-
views with activists engaged in the following demonstrations: “Geração à
Rasca” (Desperate Generation)—12 March 2011; “Unidos pela Mudança
Global” (United for Global Change)—15 October 2011; “Que se Lixe
a Troika!” (Screw the Troika)—15 September 2012; “O Povo é Quem
Mais Ordena!” (It Is the People Who Leads!)—2 March 2013. We also
analyse websites from Portuguese and Spanish groups.
2. 9.4% of Spanish respondents are engaged in this kind of civic associations,
but only 4.1% of Portuguese respondents said the same.
3. The data for 2002–2010 are from Amador (2013) and for 2012 is from
Lima and Artiles (2014).
4. The data for 2004 are higher than for other years (33.5%). This increase
can be seen as a result of the strong participation in demonstrations
against the Iraq War (2003) and against the position of right-wing gov-
ernment to the attacks of 11 March 2004.
5. The Zapatista uprising in Mexico (1996) and the Seattle demonstra-
tion against the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be seen as very
important to the social justice movements. It is stressed that their collective
dynamics began to fail after the demonstrations against the Iraq War (2003).
210 C. NUNES
6. In Spain, there were about three million of protesters: http://inter-

nacional.elpais.com/internacional/2003/02/15/actualidad/10452
63602_850215.html, accessed 15 June 2014.
7. Platform organised by ATTAC Spain,Juventud Sin Futuro, Estado del
Malestar, Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Castells 2013).
8. For the Portuguese case: http://www.jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Nacional/
Interior.aspx?content_id=1804830&page=1; http://expresso.sapo.pt/
manifestacao-geracao-a-rasca-chega-ao-rossio-com-mais-de-200-mil-pes-
soas-fotos-e-video=f637298.
For the Spanish case: Toret and Monterde (2014).
9. From the protest of Geração à Rasca (Desperate Generation) and the
occupation of Rossio Square were emerged new activists groups such
as Indignados Lisboa, Movimento Gerações, M12 M, Movimento dos Sem
Emprego, Democracia Real Já.
10. The Platform 15.O was formed by citizens, groups and associations like
Indignados Lisboa, UMAR, M12 M, Precários inflexíveis, Democracia
Verdadeira, Já – 15 M: http://www.15outubro.info/p/manifesto.html.
11. In the protest of 15 September 2012, the organisers claimed that one mil-
lion people took part in the demonstration and in the second protest (2
March 2013) one million and a half: http://expresso.sapo.pt/os-numer-
os-totais-disponiveis-de-norte-a-sul=f753598. A few days before the first
demonstration, the Prime-Minister Passos Coelho announced new meas-
ures of austerity like the increase of the contribution of the employed to
the social tax. This measure created divisions along the political and eco-
nomic elites and a strong opposition from civil society.
12. Since the 15 M demonstrations, there were in Spain 222 acampadas and
586 popular assemblies (data collated by activists in 15Mpedia project:
http://wiki.15m.cc/wiki/Portada, accessed 1 June 2014).
13. http://partidox.org/; http://podemos.info.
14. Podemos was the fourth largest party voted in Spain, obtained 7.97% of
votes and elected five members to the European Parliament: http://
politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/05/25/actualidad/1401009854_
060215.html, accessed 15 June 2014.
15. Protesters were divided into different waves of protest: the white wave in
defence of public health; the green wave in defense of public education; the
red wave representing the unemployed citizen. Its goal was to bring together
citizens, collectives and social movements around common areas and actions.
16. http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?estu-
dio=11424, accessed 1 June 2014.
17. http://blogs.elpais.com/metroscopia/2014/05/el-apoyo-ciudadano-al-
15m-tres-años-despues.html, accessed 1 June 2014.
18. On 2 March 2013, there was a call to thirty-nine demonstrations all over
the country, as well as in cities of other countries, including London,
Paris, Madrid and Barcelona (Camargo 2013).
19.
In a protest against the privatisation of the health system 23 February
2013: http://www.tvi24.iol.pt/economia---economia/espanha-zeca-afon-
so-pib-grandola-vila-morena-manifestacoes-economia/1420796-6377.html,
accessed 15 June 2014.
20.
The education wave, the white wave of health, the gray wave of the
retired and pensioners people, the LGBT wave and the lilac wave formed
by feminist groups (Camargo 2013).
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CHAPTER 11
Political Discontentment in Portugal

Post-Troika: Risks and Opportunities
Conceição Pequito Teixeira, Paulo de Almeida Pereira

and Ana Maria Belchior
Introduction
In the last decades, the expression democratic paradox has been used by
several political scientists to refer to the coexistence of two distinct phe-
nomena. On the one hand, the global expansion and apparent triumph
of the Western-type democratic model; and, at the same time, the reali-
sation that many of the countries that have now come to democracy have
C. Pequito Teixeira (*) 
Institute of Social and Political Sciences (ISCSP), University of Lisbon,
Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: cteixeira@iscsp.ulisboa.pt
P. de Almeida Pereira 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: ppereira@crb.ucp.pt
A. M. Belchior 
Department of Political Science and Public Policies, ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon,
Portugal
e-mail: ana.belchior@iscte-iul.pt

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9_11
216 C. PEQUITO TEIXEIRA ET AL.
regimes with formally democratic institutions—such as the elections—

but actually they only “make up” an effective authoritarian domina-
tion to the extent that they lack competition truly open, free and fair
elections, and hence the recent and extensive scholarly investigation of
so-called “hybrid regimes” (Diamond 2002; Morlino 2009).
This type of regime that alloys democratic rules with authoritarian
governance is the most widespread political systems in the world at the
beginning of the twenty-first century (Puddington and Roylance 2017).
Conventional accounts describe them as defective democracies or com-
petitive authoritarian regimes. Alternative views point to the genuine fea-
tures and functions of these regimes that cannot be reduced to those of
half-democracies or half-autocracies. In fact, “hybrid regimes” are puz-
zling in several ways (Diamond 2002; Morlino 2009) but that is not the
point in this chapter.
The other paradox that intrigues us, and which we shall deal with
in this chapter, is related to the widespread malaise that has been
expressed by the national electorates in the old and new democracies,
who are increasingly dissatisfied, sceptical and critical of the functioning
of democracy and its main institutions and political actors (Hofferbert
and Klingemann 2001; Stefan et al. 2014), but without compromising
their support for the values and fundamental principles of the democratic
regime, a situation that apparently is contradictory and also paradoxical,
at least at first sight (Klingemann1999; Lagos 2003).
Theoretical Framework of Analysis: The Dimensions

of Support for Democracy and the Different Types
of Democrats
In order to address and confirm this apparent democratic paradox, which

is transversal to the electorates of contemporary democracies, it is impor-
tant to begin by recovering the systemic approach to political life of
David Easton (1965, 1975), the first author to propose a qualitative dis-
tinction between different types of support for the political system, albeit
with a high level of generality and abstraction.
Easton distinguishes, therefore, between the support to certain
objects of the political system and the nature of this popular support.
On the one hand, the support of the citizens can be directed to: (1)
the political community (feeling of patriotism and national pride, for
11 POLITICAL DISCONTENTMENT IN PORTUGAL POST-TROIKA … 217
example); (2) the political regime, that is, the set of values, norms and
rules inherent in its organisation and functioning, related to basic and
fundamental values; (3) political institutions, that is, the traditional, for-
mal and specific institutions of the regime and lastly; and (4) the political
authorities (evaluation of elected officials and political appointees).
On the other hand, as regards the nature of the support, Easton dis-
tinguishes between “diffuse support” and “specific support.” If “diffuse
support” is related to the fundamental aspects of the political system,
such as constitutional order, as well as the values and normative prin-
ciples that underlie it, “specific support” is targeted at the particular
institutions and their respective holders (political authorities), and is
closely related to the performance and results of both. Thus, “diffuse
support” tends to be more durable and stable, as it results from deeply
rooted political values and links typically cultivated during early politi-
cal socialisation. On the other hand, “specific support” depends on
the perceptions and evaluations that citizens make of the performance
of democracy and its main political institutions, and the results of the
sectorial policies pursued by the governments in office at the moment,
which are more prone to short-term fluctuations. Public support for spe-
cific parties (in government or opposition), as well as attitudes towards
governing elites, is therefore expected to fluctuate in response to short-
term contextual factors such as the performance of particular govern-
ments, policy changes, replacement of leaders, or simply a conjunctural
economic crisis.
It can be asserted that the argument proposed by David Easton
(1965, 1975), and later explored by many other political scientists, is
that popular support for democracy consists of two essential dimensions:
a dimension that concerns the normative and institutional assessment of
democracy (“diffuse support”), and one that refers to the political per-
formance and functional evaluation of democracy, i.e. the functioning of
its key political institutions, in the light of the original aims and goals
expected (“specific support”). These authors, and many others, have
demonstrated empirically that ordinary citizens tend to make this distinc-
tion too. Thus, citizens who support democracy as a form of government
or principle can be either satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of
that regime’s individual or collective actors.
On the other hand, the multidimensional nature of political support
for democracy presupposes that we are dealing with a concept that is not
in itself “cumulative”, although the so-called “contagion hypothesis”
cannot be excluded: there will be a “contagion effect” when the con-

tinuous and steady lack of support to political institutions and authori-
ties tends to extend itself to other higher levels of the political system, in
particular to its fundamental values and principles, which can undermine
democratic legitimacy (Rothstein 2009; Gjefsen 2012).
It is because this “contagion hypothesis” is considered a real scenario
in relation to which more recently authors such as Roberto Stefan Foa
and Yascha Mounk (2017) are asking whether under certain current cir-
cumstances the consolidated liberal democracies can fail, contradicting
the political scientists that have long considered that democratic consoli-
dation cannot be a one-way process: once democracy is consolidated in a
given country, it may not be the “only game in town”. Let us not antici-
pate for now, as we shall return to this question a little further on.
Continuing on the theme of political support, it must also be pointed
out that Russell Dalton (2004, 2014) and Pippa Norris (1999, 2011)
have updated David Eastons’ approach by reasserting the multidimen-
sional nature of support for democratic systems and by distinguishing
in their respective works the concepts of “diffuse support” and “specific
support”. Thus, along a continuum, support for democracy is analysed
by Norris from a more abstract to a more specific dimension, namely:
(a) the most generic and fundamental feelings of citizens about the sense of
belonging to the national community, exemplified by feelings of pride
and national identity;
(b) support for the general principles of the regime, including the adoption
of democratic and autocratic attitudes and values;
(c) evaluations on the overall performance of the regime, exemplified by
satisfaction with the functioning of democracy;
(d) confidence in state institutions, including government, parliament, par-
ties, civil service, courts and security forces; and
(e) confidence in elected and appointed officials, including politicians and
leaders. (Norris 2011: 7–8)
The results of the work carried out by both Norris (1999, 2011) and
Dalton (2004) confirm that the distinction between “diffuse support”
and “specific support” is valid not only conceptually, but also e mpirically,
since it is present in the minds of citizens. Although, in the vast major-
ity of countries, normative support for democracy as a political regime
is overwhelming, the fact is that satisfaction with its functioning in
practice is much weaker and volatile. Pippa Norris (2011) even argues
that the growing political criticism is not only a phenomenon transversal
to advanced industrial democracies, but also not necessarily a negative
process, arguing that the current and manifest dissatisfaction with the
functioning of democracy is nothing more than the result of the growing
aspirations of citizens towards the performance of institutions and the
outputs of the democratic process, which leads them to press the author-
ities to introduce reforms that enable their improvement and efficiency
(Norris 2011).
In this sense, it is clear that growing dissatisfaction with democracy
does not necessarily mean that citizens are becoming less democratic,
but that they are simply “more sophisticated and demanding citizens”
(Dalton 2013), “critical citizens” (Norris 1999: 2011), or even “asser-
tive citizens” (Klingemann 2013). It is therefore this conflict between
growing public aspirations for democratic government and critical, scep-
tical and negative evaluation of its concrete performance that is at the
origin of a new type of contemporary citizenship, resulting from the
combination of short-, medium- and long-term factors.
On the one hand, the growing democratic aspirations are the result
of the social forces of modernisation with long-term effects, responsible
for a long-term cultural change. The argument here is similar to that put
forward by Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) on the rise of “post-materialist
values”. On the other hand, there is also the generalised perception of
the poor performance of democratic institutions and its outputs: per-
vasive corruption, cronyism, clientelism and abuse of power (De Sousa
2008). There is, moreover, an important economic component to the
performance of democracy. There is a plenty of evidence that once
democracy is established in a country, the richer the country becomes,
the lower is the probability that democracy will fail. The rationale for
that is simple: if democracies consistently do not deliver prosperity to
their citizens, they again fail to engender public trust and confidence.
Lastly, the citizens’ perception of the performance of democratic institu-
tions is now largely mediated by the coverage and framing of the media,
which makes comparisons between the countries easier, but at the same
time makes more difficult the existence of clear lines of accountability
(Norris 2011: 4).
By following closely this theoretical framework, we intend in this
chapter to confirm the idea of the existence of different dimensions of
support for the Portuguese political system, starting from the premise
that the concept of political support has a multidimensional nature. It

should also be emphasised that this concept should be seen here as a
“psychological orientation of citizens towards democratic government”
(Norris 2011: 20). A methodological orientation that leads us to another
important premise, namely what citizens think, feel and assess about
democracy is an indispensable dimension of the study of the stability and
quality of democracy—according to a long tradition in political research
and thinking which argues that the stability of democratic regimes, as
well as the functioning of their main institutions, should be essentially
understood as reflecting the values, perceptions and attitudes of citi-
zens. It is, therefore, an analysis that focuses mostly on the subjective
dimension of democracy and the individual assessment of the values and
formal and informal mechanisms that underlie it. If we can admit that
citizens may not have a very clear vision of the political imaginary—that
is, of the democracy that they aspire to—they know how to evaluate very
well what is missing. Or, as Carolyn Logan and Robert Mattes conclude:
“democratic quality is only knowable from the eye of the beholder”
(2012: 471).
This theoretical framework also highlights another issue that we are
interested in addressing, which is related to the idea of who is the type of
citizen that best serves democracy and its values and principles, in other
words an idea that has long been discussed in the context of political cul-
ture studies.
Who does not remember the defence of the “submissive citizen”
described in the seminal work of Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture
(1963), characterised by the support, loyalty and moderation against the
democratic political regime, with no room for dissatisfaction, mistrust or
criticism, and still less for an autonomous and direct bottom-up partic-
ipation, challenging the decisions and actions of the traditional political
authorities through a simple idea: the ideal citizen should be participa-
tory, but not excessively; influential but also deferential to the political
authorities; active but also passive.
An accumulating body of survey evidence, however, suggests that
in recent decades citizens in many established democracies have grown
more distrustful of politicians, doubtful about public sector institutions,
and disillusioned with government leaders, although simultaneously
endorsing democratic promising virtually everywhere. This phenomenon
represents the rise of “critical citizens”, which is conceptualised here,
most simply, as those who simultaneously aspire to democratic values or
principles as the ideal form of government yet who are sceptical in their
evaluations of the way political institutions work in. Or, said another way,
“critical citizens”, are those that, by virtue of the processes of social, cul-
tural and technological modernisation, became increasingly educated,
informed, politicised and cognitively mobilised citizens—i.e. a public
much more “demanding and sophisticated” in view of the functioning
of the democratic system and its main institutions and political actors
(Norris 1999, 2011).
However, with the transition from industrial societies to post-
industrial societies, several factors—economic, social, human and
technological—determined a significant shift in the value orientation of
contemporary citizens, operating what Inglehart called a “silent revolu-
tion” (Inglehart 1977), or the affirmation of a new model of political
culture. Materialistic values based on security, order and tradition have
succeeded post-materialistic values, which emphasise self-expression,
autonomy, creativity and the defence of minorities, but which also result
in the contestation of the sources of traditional authority and new par-
ticipatory claims of the bottom-up type, as well as the challenges to
the action of elites. In this new model, which Klingemann (2013) calls
“assertive culture” in contrast to “allegiant culture”, the ideal citizen
corresponds to the one whose political attitudes and behaviours are char-
acterised by their assertiveness and pressure to the political system and
no longer by the conformity and passivity proper to the Almond and
Verba “culture of submission”.
Throughout this period, political culture research argued that in order
to persist, democracies required a supportive and allegiant public, at the
same time criticism of democracy or the performance of the democratic
regimes was often regarded as synonymous with anti-democratic ideol-
ogies of the extreme left or right. Especially during the Cold War era,
the hallmarks of a good democrat were the unquestioning loyalty and
allegiance to anything called democratic. However, results of other stud-
ies sign that the nature of democratic political culture has been changing
from the model offered in The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba 1963)
and the research of this era.
It is thus none of Dalton (2004), Norris (1999, 2011), and
Klingemann (1999, 2013) see in this growing dissatisfaction of contem-
porary electorates towards the concrete performing of democracy—when
compared to its ideal and normative referential—any “threat” or “risk”
to the stability and improvement of established democracies. In front
of citizens politically more sophisticated and cognitively more mobi-

lised, what is anticipated is precisely that they have higher expectations
regarding the performance of democracy and the actuation of its main
institutions and political actors. Feeling more frustrated (and even dis-
appointed) with the distance that (always) exists (and will exist) between
democracy as an ideal and democracy in practice (Fails and Pierce 2010).
But more important than anything else, the critical, dissatisfied or
assertive citizens constitute a real opportunity to improve the quality of
democracy, due to their increasing activism and to the reformist pres-
sures that they direct to the traditional political authorities. Therefore,
with the emergence of this kind of citizens, it would make perfect sense
to speak of “more democracy” and not “less democracy” (Abdelzadeh
et al. 2015). However, both the question of the gap between “diffuse
support” and “specific support” for democracy, and the positive impact
of critical or “dissatisfied citizens” on improving the democratic process
is much more puzzling than we might think at the beginning. In the
first place, evaluating the causal claims about the relevance of citizens’
attitudes for the consolidation and quality of democratic governance also
implies addressing a logically prior problem: the problem of measuring
mass support for democracy.
As stated above, a large number of political culture studies have
demonstrated that most citizens in old and new democracies are in a
position to orient themselves towards political community, political
regimes, institutions and authorities as the most important objects of any
political system (Easton 1965; Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999, 2011;
Dalton 2004; Linde and Ekman 2003). Taking up these distinctions,
it is usual to start by measuring generalised support for democracy as a
form of government or regime type. In the majority of these studies, the
authors assume that support for a democratic regime exists when citizens
prefer democracy to autocracy as a form of government. In both inter-
national and national opinion surveys, these preferences are measured by
the following two questions:
1. I am going to read off some things that people sometimes say
about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if
you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly after I read
each of them?
“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other
form of government.”
2. I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask

what you think about each as a way of governing this country.
For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly
bad or very bad way of governing this country: “Having a dem-
ocratic system?”; and in contrast to democratic orientations, an
autocratic orientation is inferred from responses to the following
two items:
– “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with par-
liament and elections.”
– “Having the army rule the country.”
This way of measuring support for democracy subjectively is not uncon-

troversial. It is assumed that most ordinary citizens who express a prefer-
ence for democracy on questions like these do not really understand the
meaning of democracy as a concept (e.g. Inglehart 2003; Schedler and
Sarsfield 2007; Dalton and Welzel 2014) or they have different under-
standings of what democracy is, which suggests that it may be appropri-
ate to consider including more open questions in the questionnaires of
public mass surveys.
Even though the evidence generated by open interviewing shows
that citizens from across the world associate meaningful attributes with
the concept of democracy such as freedom, rights, liberties, free elec-
tions and social benefits, we should, however, not forget that “democ-
racy” is a concept “essentially contested” or “radically confused”, and
incompatible definitions could all be equally legitimate in the eyes of the
citizens.
This means that we cannot assume that the liberal-democratic consen-
sus within the discipline over the past three decades, according to which
democracy is defined by quite narrow political institutions (such as mul-
tiparty competition and regular, competitive, free and fair elections) and
the rule of law (political and civil liberties as well as constitutional limits
on the exercise of power), is extensible to the real world of politics. As
Norris put it (2011), individuals may support fundamental principles of
liberal-democratic politics at the same time as they reject some of its con-
stitutive values.
One of the main problems affecting the measurement of diffuse sup-
port for democracy as a political regime lies precisely in the fact that it
is common to describe “democrats” broadly as the citizens that prefer
democracy to any form of autocracy. This is a methodological decision

that implies that all the rest of the respondents end up as “non-
democrats”, which greatly increases the levels of support for democracy
and consequently leads to a quick and equivocal thinking: there are no
indications that we confront a general crisis of legitimacy of the demo-
cratic regime, which, does not preclude citizens from wanting to alter
or change particular democratic institutions because they come to the
conclusion that in other democratic countries, the same functions are
performed better by institutions of a different design. However, such
changes would probably not endanger a democratic regime’s legitimacy
as much as they would strengthen it.
The high levels of support for democracy, although substantially
higher among West European (about 80%) than among East European
countries (around 60%), seem to validate the dictum ascribed to Winston
Churchill, according to whom “democracy may have problems but it’s
better than any other form of government”.
This is the reason why these standard survey questions that ask in a
direct and abstract manner whether respondents prefer democracy to
non-democratic regimes have led some authors to conclude that “it is
not useful or meaningful to ask if people support democracy in general
terms, because this approach tends to generate more puzzles than they
resolve.”
If we recognise the validity of all these criticisms and significant gaps,
we are still convinced that by linking direct to indirect measures of dem-
ocratic support, we can find a more faithful and realistic picture of citi-
zens’ attitudes towards the Portuguese democratic system and its main
institutions. We will in this chapter conjugate and interpret the direct
and abstract measures of democratic support, matching them with each
other and also with other questionnaire items that we consider impor-
tant to take into account. One of these items is one that is usually used
to measure “specific support” for the democratic system. This is usually
measured by the following standard question.
“On the whole, are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satis-
fied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our
country?” This question reflects how a democratic system functions in
practice (Linde and Ekman 2003).
If, during the Cold War period, research showed that there was a high
association between the evaluation of the performance of democracy in
each country and the support for democracy as an ideal, the fact is that
after 1990 this association weakened considerably, and in some cases, has
even become irrelevant (Hofferbert and Klingemann 2001). What is seen
now is the strong association between this measure and citizens assess-
ment of the overall political performance of governments and the assess-
ment of the country’s economic situation (Feng 2003).
Performance evaluations of democracy in practice turn negative
when citizen demands and the capacity of the democratic regime to
satisfy these demands are out of balance. If democratic regimes—despite
changing governments—do not deliver acceptable policy outcomes over
longer periods of time—including economic growth and social security—
citizens that support democracy in principle may well become dissatisfied
and contemplate alternatives, namely autocratic ones.
To that end, it will analyse not only the levels of support for
Portuguese democracy, but also the distribution of different types of
democrats, going from a discussion of “democracies with adjectives” to a
discussion of “democrats with adjectives”.
The Support for the Portuguese Political System

in the Context of Crisis and Post-crisis
On 7 April 2011, Portugal became the third Member State of the

Eurozone to apply for international financial aid from the European
Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This situation
was triggered about a year after the EU approved the first package of
financial aid to Greece, and five months after Ireland applied for finan-
cial bailout under the temporary arrangements that had in the meantime
been set up by the EU (European Financial Stabilization Mechanism
or EFSM) and the Eurozone (European Financial Stability Facility or
EFSF).
The financial crisis that began in mid-2007, with the US mort-
gage-backed securities markets’ crisis culminating on 15 September 2008
with the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers, had finally
reached the Eurozone in the form of a sovereign debt crisis and quickly
became a crisis with political, economic and social consequences in sev-
eral Member States.
After Greece and Ireland, Portugal found itself in a situation of rapid
escalation of borrowing costs and inability to repay its external debt,
which in turn forced Portugal to negotiate a bailout agreement with
the European Union and the IMF in 2011 (Pereira and Wemans 2012).
The condition attached by the EU and the IMF to the massive loans
made available to the Portuguese government included severe budget
cuts, which immediately created a recessive spiral, rising unemploy-
ment, declining state revenues, persistent budget deficits, new austerity
measures and an even deeper recession (Caldas 2012; Moury and Freire
2013; Gurnani 2016).
Unsurprisingly, this development signalled the beginning of a period
when positive assessments and feelings towards the government and other
political institutions followed a steep and abrupt downward trajectory
not only in Portugal but also in other peripheral European countries—
where the same spiral was reproduced with variable intensity.
On 17 May 2014, Portugal was to formally exit the economic and
financial adjustment program initiated in 2011 with the support of
the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, and with-
out recourse to any precautionary program, thus being a “clean exit”.
First, the end of this program meant that Portugal was again able to
refinance itself in international markets at reasonable rates, and formal
“sovereignty” was regained. Second, the economic adjustment that took
place over the past three years, while with extremely severe and painful
effects for the vast majority of the population, has fulfilled some of the
main goals set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (or Austerity
Package), namely the growth of strengthening competitiveness and a
more controlled budgetary situation.
Having been signed by the Socialist Party (PS), then in the direction
of the Portuguese government and directly responsible for the third
international request to Portugal—and after losing all the political sup-
port in the Parliament with PEC IV—the fact is that the MoU was also
negotiated and signed by the parties to the right of the Socialist Party,
namely the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Social Democratic
Center-Popular Party (CDS-PP).
With the “expected” victory in the 2011 legislative elections, it would be
up to the right-wing government (a coalition between PSD and CDS-PP)
led by Pedro Passos Coelho to implement on the ground the commit-
ments established with international creditors (Magalhães 2014a, b).
If the Prime Minister then undertook to “respect” the foreign aid memo-
randum, he also said that his government’s program would “go far beyond
the troika memorandum”, which for many scholars, analysts and politi-
cians could only signify that under the pretext of “respecting” the troika
program, the choice of the right-wing government was to drastically reduce

expenditures and to advance as far as possible in the “squeezing” of the
Portuguese Welfare State.
In the early months of 2015, there was the idea that this would be the
transition year. It was estimated that the European Union (EU) would
finally emerge from what had been the biggest economic and institu-
tional crises since its foundation and its single currency on the way to
the long-awaited stabilisation. At first, optimism was the dominant
trend in Brussels: “The European economy is experiencing its bright-
est spring in several years”, announced in March by Pierre Moscovici,
European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, while the
European Commission underlined that “favorable winds support the
recovery” (European Commission 2015). In this context, Portugal was
no exception.
The year 2015 became the first full year in which Portugal would live
without the troika’s “chains”, ending what, in the controversial words
of the Vice Prime Minister of the right Government Paulo Portas, was a
kind of “European protectorate”—not to mention the “vexation” that
the co-government with the international creditors caused the nation
with more than 900 centuries of history. However, the year 2015 would
look quite different.
On the one hand, and as far as the European Union is concerned, the
year 2015 was not, as expected, a transition year for the crisis, but rather
a year of addition to the crisis. Behind the economic and financial crises
that seemed to slow down were the refugee crisis and the announcement
of the referendum in the UK on its continuity in the EU. European lead-
ers now faced, not one, but several simultaneous challenges and all of
their unpredictable consequences. Solidarity between the Member States,
which had already been severely eroded and put under extreme pressure
during the euro crisis, was no longer only tested in the context of the
North–South differentiation, in order to affirm now a number of frac-
tured and worrying divisions: East versus West, Euro versus No Euro
and EU versus EU’s neighbourhood. On the other hand, these two
key events of 2015 added yet another threat, a global threat: interna-
tional terrorism, which would once again hit Paris in November, in sev-
eral simultaneous attacks on a city that is one of the major symbols of
Europe and the European identity, and then in Brussels, where the main
European institutions are located.
In this adversely affected environment, the Portuguese had sched-

uled their legislative elections for October 2015 with the clear choice
not only of a new Government, but also of the policies that one wanted
post-bailout, which could be embodied in a simple idea: “turning the
page of austerity”. After three years of international financial rescue,
which launched the country into a deep economic and social crises, with
investments going two decades back, unemployment reaching historic
levels, especially among the best-qualified generation ever, and the coun-
try experiencing a widespread increase in inequality among its citizens.
In October 2015, the Portuguese went to the polls and the unexpected
happened: while in the “Europe of austerity” the voters expelled their
crisis’s rulers, the Portuguese re-elected them (De Giorgi and Santana-
Pereira 2016).
Winning the elections in 2015 was indeed a remarkable achievement
for the PSD–CDS coalition (PáF). The Portuguese people, who had
experienced a crisis there previously was no memory of—with brutal
increases in taxes, drastic cuts in public spending, rising numbers of the
unemployed and a return to mass emigration, did not radically change
their vote. It is true that the right-wing coalition lost more than 800,000
votes from 2011 to 2015. The absolute majority stayed away with 102
MPs elected by the PSD and CDS–PP, corresponding to 37% of the
votes. All in all, the winning coalition (PáF) was able to elect 104 and all
parties a total of 122 (Magalhães 2017).
Unlike the Greeks, the Portuguese did not vote mostly in a radical
left-wing party—as was the case of SYRIZA—as a result of the imposed
austerity measures. Unlike the Spaniards, they did not choose new parties—
like the Ciudadanos or Podemos. In Portugal, the electoral sanction of the
coalition was much less dramatic and translated mainly into more absten-
tion, which again hit record highs (44.1%) and confirmed that voters at
the centre, when dissatisfied with the party or the parties that integrate
the governments, not only revalidate the vote in these parties but also not
transfer it to the next party in ideological terms, opting instead for the exit
of the political system.
However, despite the second most voted party, the PS did not go
beyond 32%, and in the absence of a parliamentary majority on the right,
would end up leading an unprecedented change, namely the realignment
of the political system on the left, which was not directly imposed by
the will expressed by the citizens at the polls, but rather by the will of
the leftist parties, PS, BE and PCP and their respective leaders: António
Costa, Catarina Martins and Jerónimo de Sousa. Thus, under the

cover of an apparent electoral continuity, the fact is that everything has
changed in Portuguese politics since that election night.
Following the victory of the PáF in the legislative elections, Pedro
Passos Coelho was again confirmed as Prime Minister of the 20th
Constitutional Government on October 30, giving place to the one
that was to be the shortest government of Portuguese democracy,
which would last only 12 days—a motion to reject the Government’s
programme was approved by the majority of MP’s in the Parliament,
with the votes of the PS, BE, PCP and PAN, due to the fall of the
government.
The Socialist Party (PS) was able to secure, for the first time in
democracy, an agreement to the left that made António Costa Prime
Minister and brought the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the
Left Bloc (BE) to the so-called “arc of government”, ending, at least
temporarily, the traditional bipartisanship without alternation between
PSD (alone or in coalition with the CDS–PP) and PS that had been
in place since 1987. And it did so not through a formal parliamentary
agreement as one would expect or the formal participation of its radical
leftist partners in a coalition of government, but rather through partial
arrangements whose central objectives had been to reverse the main aus-
terity measures implemented during the troika’s period, negotiated and
renewed with each annual vote on the national budget.
The reality is that austerity measures have destroyed the centre. One
side is on the right: the other on the left. In the middle, there is noth-
ing. On the one hand, there is the neo-liberal creed, on the other an
apparent lack of ideas, first not going beyond the slogan that demanded
the “end of austerity”, then reiterating the time of “turning the page of
austerity”, embodied in what some authors have called the “Portuguese
Government Solution: The Fourth Way to Social-Democratic Politics”
(Ferreira et al. 2017).
The current government solution, based on a minority government
supported by the leftist’s front, was known for the formula that has made
its way in Portugal and throughout Europe: the “contraption”—in more
or less literal terms, it means a fragile structure and a precarious func-
tioning, which reflects the contradictory situation of joining the forces
of the left that are far from homogenous in almost everything from their
genesis and history to their political ideology and European Union posi-
tions (Estanque and Costa 2017).
To be more precise, this left includes the old Portuguese Communist

Party (PCP) and the Left Bloc (BE), an extreme and libertarian left
party that shares certain similarities with party movements such as the
Podemos or SYRIZA in southern Europe (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis
2014; Rodríguez-Teruel et al. 2016). The PCP is a Stalinist party, col-
lectivist by nature and surpassed by history. The BE is a far-left party that
has openly said it wants to abandon the Euro and restructure the internal
debt. Both are far removed from what the Socialist Party defends, which
repeatedly says it wants to remain in the Euro and in NATO and does
not even want to hear anything that resembles a restructuring of internal
debt.
As a result, Portugal was plunged into a profound contradiction, thus,
not by chance, the name of “contraption” given to this new formula
of governance: it wanted to remain in the European Union, but at the
same time, it wanted to end austerity at any price. In order to resolve
this incongruity, the minority socialist government would need a kind of
flexibility that the Portuguese Communists and, possibly, the members
of Left Bloc could not offer.
In this sense, if the recent victory of Mário Centeno—current
Minister of Finance of the new government solution—as president of
the Eurogroup can be seen as a defeat of the right-wing political dis-
course PSD and CDS-PP, based essentially on the irresponsibility of the
“contraption” in the management of public accounts and in its anti-
Europeanism, the fact is that having its Minister of Finance in this
position, implies a strong and reinforced commitment by the current
government with European budgetary rules, which means that it cannot
fail to increase mistrust and raise the pressure of PCP and BE in terms of
national financial and economic policies.
As we have longitudinal data that allow us to analyse the Portuguese
attitudes towards democracy, both in terms of “diffuse support” and
“specific support”, as well as possible transformations in our political
culture in three different periods—namely before, during and after the
bailout—it seems extremely interesting and academically valuable to
develop a case study on Portugal, not only in substantive terms, but also
at the methodological level, namely at a time when the role of the case
studies is increasingly being discussed for the production of causal infer-
ences in the context of contemporary political science: intensely marked,
as we know, by the intensive use of formal models and quantitative
methods in the production of scientific knowledge (Mahoney 2007).
Like many other authors, we also consider it possible to generate

causal inferences, test research hypotheses, and generate new theories
from small-n research designs for the specific case of political science, as
we also believe that case studies, when well formulated and used, are use-
ful for the generation of medium-range theories with a deliberately com-
parative dimension (Rohlfing 2012).
Therefore, it is a matter of knowing what changes have occurred in
popular support for Portuguese democracy, such as the level of political
culture, i.e. the changes in the distribution of different types of demo-
crats and their respective impact in the period immediately before and
after the crisis of 2007–2008—also known as the Great Depression and,
in the specific case of Europe, the sovereign debt crisis.
In the face of these financial and economic crises, and the rapid resur-
gence of the narratives of Southern European “exceptionalism”, how was
the Portuguese democracy able, or not able to weather the legitimacy
crisis? To what extent do the diffuse and specific types of support for the
political system remain independent of each other in these hard times?
What changes have occurred in the evolution of these two types of polit-
ical support during this period? Are there signs that the economic crisis
created transitory (pendulum effects) or lasting and stronger effects in the
legitimacy of the political system (catalyst effects)?
To what extent have the observed changes in public support for
democracy translated into a redistribution of the different types of “dem-
ocrats with adjectives”? No less important, how has this redistribution
of the different types of democrats, which has existed, brought signifi-
cant consequences? These are some of the many questions that this study
would like to answer.
Data, Research Hypotheses and Methodology

The empirical analysis for Portugal is fundamentally based on three mass
surveys administered to Portuguese voters in 2008, 2012, 2015 and
2016, carried out within the framework of research projects coordinated
by CIES-IUL researchers and financed by FCT. Let us briefly summarise
the details of the data collection (Table 11.1).
We must now proceed to the formulation of the research hypotheses
that must be tested within the scope of this chapter.
As discussed above, the theoretical distinction between diffuse
and specific support is important in assessing the resilience of political
Table 11.1 Summary of data collection

• 1st (N = 1350), fielded in the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis (March–July
2008)
• 2nd (N = 1209), after the effects of the crisis were deeply felt (September–October
2012)
• 3rd (N = 1204), the fieldwork took place after the 2014 European Parliament elec-
tions (30 June–14 October 2014)
• 4th (N = 2897/sample used here weighted by gender, age and education), in the
aftermath of the economic crisis (May–July 2016)
Sources Project 1—“Portuguese Deputies in Comparative Perspective: Elections, Leadership and Political
Representation” (2007–2010) (FCT: PTDC/CPO/64469/2006). CIES-IUL leader André Freire
Project 2—“Elections, Leadership and Accountability: Political Representation in Portugal—
Longitudinal and Comparative Perspective” (2012–2015) (FCT: PTDC/CPJ-CPO/119307/2010).
CIES-IUL leader André Freire
Project 3—“Agenda Setting in Portugal from a Comparative Perspective: The Legislation, Party
Promises, Public Opinion and the Media”. CIES-IUL leader Ana Maria Belchior
Project 4—“Crisis, Political Representation and Democratic Renewal: The Portuguese Case in the
Southern European Context” (FCT: PTDC/IVC-CPO/3098/2014). CIES-IUL leader André Freire
regimes (Easton 1965; Dalton 2004; Norris 2011). Thus, if political

support is largely specific, then an event such as an economic crisis can
threaten the very stability of the regime. As the economic crisis brings
privations, citizens express negative evaluations of the regime’s perfor-
mance and these, in turn, decrease specific political support. Yet, on the
other hand, if the regime enjoys massive diffuse support, it can use this
valuable reservoir of support to weather the crisis.
H1: The conceptual and empirical distinction between diffuse support

and specific support for the political system remains valid in the three
periods considered here, i.e. before and during the economic and finan-
cial crisis that severely affected Portugal.
In most mass international and national opinion surveys, the way diffuse
support for democracy is measured and understood as an ideal polit-
ical regime—namely through the question that combines answers to
questions about support for democracy as a more appropriate form of
government to conduct a country with answers to questions about the
rejection of different types of autocratic government—beyond all its vul-
nerabilities, which we have already mentioned previously, will be used
here to test the following hypotheses:
H2: If what is characterized by diffuse support is its persistence even in

times when citizens become dissatisfied with the regime’s policies, then
it is expected that, between 2008 and 2016, this type of support has not
only maintained the high levels (which generally characterize it) but has
also known great stability or, then, only small oscillations.
H3: If we jointly address all autocratic forms of government considered in

the standard question on diffuse support, combining them together, it is
expected that, between 2008 and 2016, support for autocratic forms of gov-
ernment will have grown, that is to say, increased the number of “ambivalent
democrats” compared to the number of “unconditional democrats”.
H4: If specific support is a ‘running-tally’ type of attitude that fluctuates

according to the political regime’s performance, then it is expected that,
between 2008 and 2016, there has been a deep erosion of specific support
for democracy, in regard to the satisfaction with both the practical func-
tioning of democracy and its main institutions and political authorities.
On the other hand, and being faithful to the combined use of the stand-
ard questions that measure the specific support for democracy and other
items of the questionnaires, it is expected that between 2008 and 2016,
there would have grown dissatisfied, sceptical and critical citizens. It
results from the following hypothesis:
H5: Between 2008 and 2016, the increase in political discontent among
the Portuguese citizens resulted in a significant growth of dissatisfied,
sceptical or critical democrats.
Analysis of Data Regarding Political Support

in Portugal (2008–2016)
To test H1, we present an exploratory factor analysis (with four factors)

which, as shown in Table 11.2, shows the multidimensional nature of the
concept of support for the political system, one of our main theoretical
assumptions. It presents a total explained variance of almost 61%.
However, in order to confirm the validity of our theoretical model, a
confirmatory factor analysis was also performed (Fig. 11.1), and the adjust-
ment measures of the model for the construct in question allow us to con-
clude that the items: (i) are significant; (ii) are consistent and (iii) have a
Table 11.2 Exploratory factor analysis results (with 4 factors)
Factor
1 2 3 4
1. Democratic political system 0.787

2.1. Strong leader 0.770
2.2. Experts 0.737
2.3. Armed Forces 0.577
3. Satisfaction with Democracy 0.583
4.1. Trust: Parliament 0.810
4.2. Trust: Political Parties 0.773
4.3. Trust: Constitutional Court 0.482
4.4. Trust: Presidency of the Republic 0.636
4.5. Trust: Government of Portugal 0.758
5. Overall performance of the government 0.916
% variance explained 26.0 13.6 10.7 10.5
Total variance explained 60.8
Note Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations
N = 6660. KMO = 0.782. Saturations below 0.4 are suppressed
convergent validity. There is also a good overall adjustment of the pro-

posed model to the data collected in the four mass surveys. For this pur-
pose, the values of the respective indexes are: RMSEA = 0.072 < 0.08;
CFI = 0.884 > 0.80 and NFI = 0.882 > 0.80.
The confirmation of our first hypothesis empirically demonstrates that
ordinary citizens tend to make the distinction between the different dimen-
sions of support for the political system too. Thus, citizens who support
democracy as a form of government or principle can be either satisfied or dis-
satisfied with the performance of that regime’s individual or collective actors.
In view of the fundamentally structural nature, which is associated
with deeply rooted political values and links typically cultivated during
the period of primary socialisation, it is stated in the second hypothesis
that this type of support will have remained stable or, at most, suffered
only small oscillations during the period, which runs from 2008 to 2016.
If we look at the data from the mass opinion surveys mentioned, we
can verify that this hypothesis is only partially confirmed. While it is true
that levels of support for the political system remain fairly high (90% on
average), this does not mean that these levels did not decline between
2008 (around 96%) and 2016 (88%), i.e. minus eight percentage points,
which is a statistically significant decrease, taking into account the results
of the ANOVA Test or the Variance Test, in which the null hypothesis is
Fig. 11.1 Confirmatory factor analysis (standardized estimates of model

dimensions)
rejected. Or put another way, the sample differences are real and caused
by differences in observed populations.
On the other hand, it is also verified that in Portugal, in the three
periods considered, the citizens’ preference for the democratic system
coexists with other non-democratic forms of government. If we take
into account the fact that, between 2008 and 2016, the adhesion of the
Portuguese to autocratic forms of government, namely a “strong leader
government” and a “government of specialists”, is on average 48.4 and

67.2%, respectively, the claim that democracy constitutes “the only game
in town” becomes a statement that deserves some caution.
As for the third hypothesis, it is argued that between 2008 and 2016
there will be a significant increase in the so-called “ambivalent demo-
crats” (that is, respondents, at the same time as they prefer to not only
have a democratic system in the country, but also show preferences for
other autocratic forms of government) to the detriment of “uncondi-
tional democrats” (that is, respondents who show only preference for the
democratic option, rejecting all other autocratic forms of government):
there is indeed a positive and statistically significant increase of a further
6 percentage points, with “ambivalent democrats” decrease from 72.5 to
66.5%, while “unconditional democrats” also recorded a similarly signifi-
cant reduction from about 29% (2002) to about 18% (2016).
Between 2008 and 2016, such disproportion between the “uncon-
ditional democrats” (23.0%) and the “ambivalent democrats” (67.8%)
would lead us to a broader reflection, which is unfeasible, however, given
the page limit to which this chapter is subject. But perhaps, the words
of Andreas Schedler (2007: 28) may give the motto for this discussion:
“Democracies may survive despite low levels of popular support. Still,
there is little doubt that high reserves of mass support provide a valua-
ble cushion that helps democracies to prevent the emergence of crises, as
well as to overcome critical moments as they arise.”
Let us now analyse the data that confirm or invalidate H4, which sup-
ports the existence of a significant erosion of specific support in Portugal
between 2008 and 2016. If we consider the degree of satisfaction with
the functioning of democracy, which is one of the questions by which
specific support to the political system is measured, it is verified that it
was 28.8% immediately before the crisis (2008), reached its minimum
record during the crisis of not exceeding 13% (2012 and 2014), only to
rise again in the post-crisis period (18.3%).
The lowest figures correspond precisely to the international request
and to the intervention of the troika in Portugal, with the years 2012
and 2014 characterised by the implementation of deep structural
reforms and the application of severe austerity measures with enor-
mous recessive effects for the whole population, namely cuts in wages
and social benefits as well as tax increases. In other words, these years
corresponded to a deep deterioration of the socio-economic context in
Portugal, marked by heavy sacrifices for the Portuguese people, great

social unrest and governmental unpopularity.
Given the data mentioned above, there is no way of recognising the
enormous gap between the support given by the citizens to the ideal
dimension of democracy (“diffuse support”) and the approval for the
practical dimension of democracy (“specific support”): this gap was
67.1% in 2002; 78.6% in 2012; 69.1% in 2014 and 69.8% in 2016.
Faced with these values, the enormous dissatisfaction of the
Portuguese with the functioning of our democracy is undeniable, as well
as the possibility that this dissatisfaction may become increasingly corro-
sive of the diffuse support for democracy as an ideal, failing to contribute
as a “reservoir” for the legitimacy of the regime. There is no doubt that
a democracy where the constant decline of specific support is a reality
(on average, more than 70% of the Portuguese are said to be very little
or not satisfied with democracy) is therefore a political regime less and
less resilient to crises than a democracy that depends on diffuse support.
In order to have a clear understanding of the enormous distance sepa-
rating the citizens’ support for the principles, values and norms inherent
in a democratic regime from its support for the way the political system
functions in practice, we should take into account the indicators relating
to public confidence in key political institutions, including government,
parliament and political parties, between 2008 and 2016.
With the exception of the President of the Republic (with confidence
levels above 70% before and after the crisis), both the Parliament and the
Government have relatively low levels of support before and after the
crisis (Teixeira et al. 2014), but they in fact reached their minimum lev-
els during the period of the troika’s presence in Portugal, i.e. between
2012 and 2014, during which, on average, public support for the
Parliament was 28% while it was only 26% for the national government.
However, among all the institutions mentioned, the most unloved by the
Portuguese are undeniably the political parties: 15% confidence before
the crisis and 11% during the crisis, to return to 15% reliability according
to the Portuguese in the period immediately after the crisis (2015).
The growing distrust of the main democratic institutions not only is
a phenomenon that began in Portugal with the arrival of the interna-
tional crisis of 2008—and then with the near bankruptcy of the country
in 2011 and the international bailout request in 2011—but apparently
also has a “pendular effect” since the beginning of the new millennium,
to use economic terminology. Indeed, indicators for specific support rise
Table 11.3 Satisfied democrats versus dissatisfied democrats
Normative dimension Factual dimension
“Having a democratic political Satisfaction with the concrete functioning of

system is the best option for the democracy
country” Yes Satisfied democrats Dissatisfied democrats No
No Antidemocrats No
Table 11.4 Critical democrats versus non-critical democrats
“Having a democratic political Cognitive mobilization

system is the best option for the Yes Critical democrats Non-critical democrats No
country” No Antidemocrats No
in cycles of growth (recovery) and fall into cycles of relative stagnation or

decline (contraction or recession) (e.g. Teixeira 2018).
If H4 is thus fully confirmed, it should be related to H5, which states
that, between 2008 and 2016, political discontent in Portugal will have
increased significantly, and is reflected in the growth in the number of
dissatisfied citizens, distrustful or sceptical citizens, and critical citizens.
In order to test this hypothesis, we have created 3 typologies of dem-
ocrat citizens. In terms of “negative political support”, the so-called “dis-
satisfied democrats” correspond to all respondents who prefer to “have a
democratic system” in the country—rejecting all other autocratic govern-
ment possibilities—and also to all those who say they are very dissatisfied
with the functioning of Portuguese democracy in practice (Table 11.3).
In Typology 2, we have the “sceptical democrats”, that is, all the
respondents who prefer to “have a democratic system in the country”,
rejecting all other autocratic possibilities of government, as well as all
those who say they trust very little the main democratic institutions
(president, government, parliament and parties) (Table 11.4).
It was on the basis of Russell Dalton’s concept of “cognitive mobili-
sation” and its respective operationalisation that we established the dif-
ference between “critical citizens” and “non-critical citizens” according
to the following variables: (i) the education of the respondents; (ii) their
level of interest in politics and finally, (iii) their degree of exposure to
political information through the media.
Table 11.5 Trusting democrats versus sceptical democrats
“Having a democratic polit- Level of trust in political institutions

ical system is the best option Yes Trusting Untrusting or sceptical No
for the country” democrats democrats
No Antidemocrats No
Fig. 11.2 Evolution of the different types of democrats (“democrats with

adjectives”)
In order to arrive at the final variable of “cognitive mobilisation”, the

three variables were standardised and summed in order to obtain a scale
ranging from 6 to 8 points, adopting the same cut-off criterion estab-
lished by Dalton (2013). That is, individuals between 2 and 5 points
were considered to have “low cognitive mobilisation”, and individuals
between 6 and 8 points were classified as having “high cognitive mobili-
sation” (cf. Typology 3) (Table 11.5).
From Fig. 11.2, we can easily see that between 2008 and 2016, of
the Portuguese who said they were democrats (about 91%), 72% of them
can be classified as “dissatisfied democrats”, 61% as “sceptical demo-

crats” and only 35% can be considered “critical democrats”, according to
the typologies described above. It is also noted that at the most intense
moment of the crisis (2012), the most pronounced growth was in the
“dissatisfied democrats” (rising from 67 to 81%), followed by the “scep-
tical democrats” (from 49 to 76%), with “critical democrats” rising from
about 14 to 24%. In addition, according to the Chi-square test, all these
increases are statistically significant (p = ***0.000).
In the period immediately following the international rescue and the
presence of the troika among us, which also corresponded to the period
when austerity measures proved to be socially and economically more
severe, although the percentage of “dissatisfied democrats” in relation
to the functioning of democracy in practice and the percentage of the
democrats who said they were very little or not at all confident about the
performance of the main political institutions, the fact is that there was a
decrease in both (in the first case, there was a decrease from 81 to 71%,
while in the second there was a decline from 76 to 61% (which is also
statistically significant).
It is curious to note that, in addition to this decrease, there was also a
very significant growth in the “critical democrats”, that is, citizens who
have a preference for democracy as a form of government, as well as a
high level of cognitive mobilisation, increasing from 24 to 44%. This
change is far from important in explanatory terms. And why is that so?
It is precisely because we are faced with types of democrats who can-
not be regarded as conceptually equivalent or interchangeable, as in the
case of “dissatisfied democrats” and “sceptical democrats” versus “critical
democrats” which is repeatedly assumed by the literature on this question,
even when there is little evidence that empirically demonstrates their simi-
larity at the individual level (Doorenspleet 2012). To prove this is the fact
that there is no statistically significant relationship between the “dissatis-
fied democrats”, nor between the “sceptical democrats” and the so-called
“critical democrats”, as shown in Table 11.6. This means that while it is
entirely legitimate to take the “dissatisfied democrats” and the “sceptical
democrats” as equivalent or similar categories, this is not the case with the
“critical democrats”, which are a category unrelated to the previous ones
and should therefore be considered conceptually distinct.
The positive and statistically significant association that we can assume
between “sceptical democrats” and “non-critical democrats” is, in fact,
Table 11.6 Relationship between different types of democrats in Portugal

(2016)
(2016)
Satisfied Dissatisfied χ2 p
democrats democrats
Trusting democrats % in group 43.4% 56.6% 264.722

Sceptical democrats % in group 14.5% 85.5% ***0.000
Total N (634) (1984)
Non-critical democrats % in group 17.4% 82.6% 8.492
Critical democrats % in group 48.2% 51.8% 0.085
Total N (634) (1984)
Source 2016 Mass Opinion Survey
very visible if we consider that the overwhelming majority of “sceptical

democrats” and “non-critical democrats” are among the “dissatisfied
democrats”. H5 suggests that if the socio-demographic and attitudinal
profile as well as the behavioural correlates of the “critical democrats”
meets Norris’s description of the new type of citizen—who is more edu-
cated, more cognitively mobilised and political autonomous, but also
more critical of the traditional political institutions, not only adopt-
ing less conventional forms of participation (mainly of protest) but also
pressing the political authorities to introduce political reforms capable
of increasing the quality of democracy, especially in a more participatory
and deliberative sense—then the fact that their number falls far short of
the two other types of democrats tells us that the progressive erosion of
specific support for democracy in Portugal should be viewed with great
concern by our political leaders and citizens.
The good news, however, is that the post-troika still represents a sig-
nificant increase in “critical democrats”, nearly doubling their share by
20%. It remains to be seen whether this will be a lasting or merely tran-
sitory change and signal a transformation in the type of political culture
in Portugal, that is, from an “allegiant culture” to a more “assertive cul-
ture”. This would mean that the crisis—and this third international res-
cue to Portugal, as well as the enormous difficulties experienced by the
majority of the citizens in recent years—is also synonymous with greater
political responsiveness of the citizens and accountability regarding the
functioning of democracy and its main institutions and political actors.

It remains to be seen, as many authors ask, whether “critical democrats”
are a risk or an opportunity for democracy.
Conclusions
We start this chapter by considering what is now a transversal phenome-
non, characteristic of European democracies, which has been an element
of the origin of several scientific papers: the apparently paradoxical coex-
istence of a strong degree of citizens’ support of democracy as a political
regime, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a strong and growing
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in practice, aware of the
deep suspicion that citizens have shown with regard to the most impor-
tant political institutions and to the activities of the respective political
post holders.
Basing our analysis on the pioneer contributions made by David
Easton (1965, 1975) with regard to support for the political system—
updated in line with the more recent specialised literature—in this chap-
ter, we address the wide gap that exists between “diffuse support” and
“specific support”, whether before, during or after the crisis.
In this chapter, we can conclude that this gap reaches its maximum at
the time when Portugal was the subject of international rescue, between
2011 and 2014, represented by the presence of the Troika among us and
also by the application of harsh austerity measures by the Government,
measures which have had a dire economic and social effect on many
segments of the population. In such a context, the question of democ-
racy and legitimacy became increasingly problematic, putting it back on
centre stage within public and academic debate and political struggles.
Some authors have even warned of the dangers of what would be consid-
ered a “democracy without choices”, or “a bloodless coup d’état” in the
Eurozone. Among us, and in terms of attitudes in support of the politi-
cal system, the crisis of the Eurozone and the resulting help provided to
Portugal have intensified the growth of a phenomenon which has already
been around for a long time: the signs of a deep and worsening deterio-
ration of the specific support for the political system, with the singularity
of massive support for democracy as a political regime (“the only game
in town”) being much more apparent than real.
It shall suffice to pay attention to the fact that many citizens who pre-
fer democracy as a system of government for the country do not exclude
other possibilities of styles of government considered autocratic. This
reality is clearly seen in the number of citizens who are here known as
“ambivalent democrats” (about 72.5% in 2016). In terms of “specific
support”, this comes together with the fact that, in 2016, Portugal had
some 68.5% of “dissatisfied democrats” and about 60% of “suspicious
democrats”, with regard to the country’s main democratic institutions.
The issue that remains unanswered, and that warrants being addressed
in future studies, is that of knowing the related behavioural expres-
sions shown by these “democrats with adjectives”. However, one thing
is already quite clear: the group of “critical democrats” in Portugal is
not just a group of people which is much less important than the oth-
ers (only about 35%, on average), as also these people are conceptually
and empirically distinct. Therefore, we would not expect the attitude and
behaviour profile assigned to the group by the most recent literature—
and which includes greater pressure and demands to improve the quality
of democracy—to extend to the other democrats. This is a line of investi-
gation that definitely deserves to be followed.
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Index
0–9 assertive culture, 221, 241

1826 constitution, 43 austerity, 50, 63, 64, 111, 122, 123,
1911 constitution, 36, 123 126–8, 130
1933 constitution, 36, 123 “turning the page on…”, 229
1976 constitution, 38, 40, 42, 43,
108, 116, 123, 126, 146
1982 revision, 42, 44 B
2001 downturn, 16 Bagehot, Walter, 101
2007 reform, 102 bailout, 7, 105, 106, 108, 228
effect on parliament, 104
effect on parties, 105
A role of parliament, 108
Acampadas, 208, 210 banking system, 18
adjustment programme, 14, 25, 27, bipartisanship, 71
28, 31 Bretton Woods, 21
Alegre, Manuel, 62 Brexit, 232
allegiant culture, 221, 241 Bundesbank, 21
Anexartitoi Ellines (ANEL), 63
Animals and Nature Party (PAN), 91.
See also People-Animal-Nature C
Party Capitalizar, 49
anti-austerity protest, 197–200, Carnation Revolution (25 April 1974),
202–5, 207, 208 36, 40, 207
and Carnation Revolution, 215 CDS-PP, 8, 61, 64, 65, 82–8, 90–5, 97,
Arab Spring, 195–7 104–8, 110–3, 115–7, 147, 149,
armature, 146 153, 154, 161, 182, 185, 230
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 247

A. Costa Pinto and C. Pequito Teixeira (eds.), Political Institutions and
Democracy in Portugal, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98152-9
248 Index
October 2015, 92 rejection of austerity, 56, 135

opposes state budget, 92 role in political system, 123
Censure motions, 108, 110, 113 Romania, 135
Centeno, Mário, 28, 52, 230 social awareness, 125
president of Eurogroup, 28 Social Protection Convergence
Churchill, Winston, 224 Mechanism, 129
Ciudadanos, 228 social security pension system, 130
civil service retirement system (CGA), 19 state budget, 110, 116
cognitive mobilisation, 238–40 constitutional reform, 133
collective bargaining, 167–73, 175, constitutional review, 121
176, 178–80 contagion effect, 217–18
Comissão Eventual para Costa, António, 28, 98, 229
Acompanhamento das Medidas 2014 leadership election, 157
do Programa de Assistência Geringonça, 111
Financeira a Portugal, 107–8 cabinet, 159
Comparative Manifest Project, 93 Mayor of Lisbon, 64, 157
Compromise on Growth, prime minister, 85
Competitiveness and Employment, Council of State, 50
178 Council of the Revolution, 37, 42
Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Crespo, Vitor, 113
Portugueses (CGTP), 168, 174,
180
Conselho Permanente de Concertação D
Social, 168 Delgado, Humberto, 38
Constâncio, Vitor, 113 deliberative democracy, 202
Constitutional Court (CC), 18, 42, Democracia Real Ya, 203
48, 110, 116, 124–8, 134–41 Democratic Alliance, 112
1983 fiscal consolidation, 126 democratic government
appointments, 152 critical citizens, 219–21, 242–7
assistance programme ruling, 128 critical democrats, 240–43
austerity, 5, 131–6 diffuse support, 11, 217, 218, 237,
constitutional review, 139 242
established, 121 dissatisfied citizens, 222, 238
guardian of constitution, 125 dissatisfied democrats, 11, 240, 241,
Hungary, 141 243
judicial review, 123 legitimacy, 146
judicialization of politics, 125 silent revolution, 221
jurisdiction, 122, 135 specific support, 11, 217, 218,
Latvia, 135, 136 222, 224, 233, 234, 236, 237,
make up, 108 241–43
national sovereignty, 138 submissive citizen, 220
party funding, 158 Durão Barroso, José Manuel, 3, 114,
political actor, 132 131
Index 249
E convergence criteria, 21
Eanes, António Ramalho, 40, 43, 113 political union, 21
Economic Adjustment Programme, European Social Forum, 202
14, 18 European Social Model, 173
Exit from, 228 Euroscepticism, 5
Economic Stabilization Act, 135 Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP),
education system, 16 23, 126
elections Extended Fund Facility (EFF), 17
abstention, 11
1975, 38; 1976, 38; 1987, 90
European 2014, 205 F
realignment, 7 Financial Adjustment Programme, 14
presidential election 1980, 36; Financial and Economic Assistance
1996, 39; 2006, 44, 45; 2011, Programme (FEAP), 127, 130
46; 2016, 49 Financial Assistance Programme to
June 2011, 4 Portugal (CEAMPAFP), 103–7
October 2015, 49, 50, 63, 92, 112, ad hoc committee, 107
228 First Republic (1910–26), 36
electoral reform, 55 fragmented party system, 68
electoral systems France
consociational democracy, 56 monetary union, 22
majority representation, 56 functional decline theory, 108
proportional representation, 56
Estado Novo, 36
presidential campaigns, 39 G
EU enlargement, 16 Gaspar, Vitor, 128
eurozone, 15, 28, 126, 136 general contributory regime, 19
political party organisation, 14 General Directorate for Labour
Portuguese exceptionalism, 9 Relations, 181
resilience of Portuguese parties, 4 Geringonça, 111, 114, 115
European Central Bank (ECB), 17, Germany
18, 22, 28, 46, 107, 115, 127, European integration, 23
196, 200 monetary union, 22
European Financial Stability Facility Global Justice Movement, 10
(EFSF), 17, 225 governability, 7, 56, 61, 68, 70, 71
European Financial Stabilization Grândola Vila Morena, 207
Mechanism (EFSM), 17, 225 Greece
European Fiscal Compact, 128 2009 crisis, 17
European Monetary System (EMS), bailout, 225
20, 21 Maastricht criteria, 22
European Monetary Union (EMU), 5, sovereign debt, 27
14, 15, 140 Special Property Contribution, 136
250 Index
Green Book on labour relations, 177 Lehman Brothers, 126, 225

Greens (PEV), 63, 64, 66, 73, 90–2, LIVRE, 65, 146, 153, 155, 156, 162
114, 115, 157 lost decade, 1–2
support for state budget, 92 Louçã, Francisco, 154
Guterres, António, 152
M
H Martins, Catarina, 64, 154, 229
Huntington, Samuel, 77 Matos, José Norton de, 38
Memorandum of Understanding, 14,
46, 103–10, 115, 170, 177, 226
I court rulings, 128
ideal citizen, 220, 221 industrial relations, 185
indignados, 197–8 Merkel, Angela, 23
internal devaluation, 2 Military coup (28 May 1926), 36
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Moderno Case, 61
2, 4, 14, 15, 17, 25, 30, 46, 107, monetary union, 22, 31
115, 126–8, 130, 135, 173, 196, Morais, Carlos Blanco de, 48
200, 225, 226 Moreira, Adriano, 36
1978 intervention, 15 Moscovici, Pierre, 227
1983 intervention, 15, 126 Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), 16
Intersindical, 168 Mundell Trilemma, 21
intra-party democracy, 153
Ireland
bailout, 225 N
National Health Service (SNS), 20
National Reforms Programme, 29
K National Strategic Council, 152
KKE-Interior, 63
Kohl, Helmut, 21, 23
O
Occupy Movement, 195–8
L Ombudsman, 124, 128–31
Laboratory of Political Ideas for O povo é quem mais ordena, 209
Portugal, 152 Optimum Currency Area, 21, 22
Labour Code 2003, 172, 176
2009 revision, 176
2012 revision, 131 P
labour regulations, 9, 168 Pais, Sidonio, 36, 38
Left Bloc (BE), 4, 62–5, 82, 87, 88, Parliament
90–4, 147, 202, 204, 229, 230 and the president, 112
support for state budget, 92 assembly semi-presidentialism, 8
Index 251
control of executive, 108 populism, 11

control of government, 102 Portas, Paulo, 114, 227
reorganisation 2007, 7 Portugal
party decline, 145 debt, 27
party identification, 147 deficit, 25, 31
party leadership, 150 education level, 29
Party of Democratic Renewal (PRD), electoral system, 71
84, 86–8, 90, 93, 96 electoral volatility, 88
party system, 78–9 emigration, 228
constraints, 79 exports, 28
institutionalisation, 78, 80 government stability, 68
Portugal, 82 inequality, 29
power index, 94 labour costs, 30
Passos Coelho, Pedro, 3, 4, 28, 47, parliamentary legitimation, 104
112, 132, 150, 159, 210, 226, party monopolisation, 82
229 party system, 77–96, 94
October 2015 election, 112 president, 38
cabinet, 159 presidentialism, 35, 36, 48
pension reform, 26 separation of powers, 121
Permanent Council for Social transition to democracy, 72
Concertation, 173 unemployment, 29
Pessoa, Fernando, 36 welfare reform, 29
PIIGS, 21, 23 Portugal Ahead (PàF), 64, 93, 105,
Platform 15.O, 203, 204, 210 228, 229
Plaza del Sol, 197 Portuguese Communist Party (PCP),
Podemos, 10, 205, 228, 230 4, 62–4, 66, 82, 84, 86, 90–4,
and 15M, 203 105, 107, 113, 147, 149, 151,
political discontent, 238 159, 160, 161, 228–30
political participation, 148 opposition to PS, 84
political parties support for state budget, 92
agents of mobilisation, 155 Portuguese Social Forum, 201, 202
organisation, 155 Povos Unidos contra a Troika, 207
organisational transformations, 145 presidential powers, 48
party funding, 158 Programme for Stability and Growth,
recruitment, 155–7 17
political system Public–Private Initiatives, 51
cartelisation, 158
partidarisation, 158
Popular Party (CDS-PP), 61, 64, 65, Q
104–108, 110–113, 115–117, Qualifica, 29
147, 149, 153, 154, 161, 226, Que se Lixe a Troika, 204, 209
228–230 Queremos as nossas vidas de volta, 203
252 Index
R social movements, 10, 196–206, 209

Red Ciudadana Partido X, 205 12M, 203
Reform of Public Administration, 176, 15M, 203–9; legacy, 205; political
177 party, 205; young people, 206
refugee crisis, 227 connective action, 208
Republican Democratic Party (PDR), global network, 205
146 movement of movements, 197
República Nova, 36, 38 “new new”, 196
Revolutionary Period in Progress old, 205
(PREC), 37 participation, 203
11 March 1975, 173 protester profiles, 206
Rio, Rui, 152 social media, 197–8
role of trade unions, 9, 20 solidarity actions, 207
trade unions, 203
Social Protection Convergence
S Mechanism, 129–30
Sá Carneiro, Francisco, 47 Social Security Contributions (TSU),
Salazar, António de Oliveira, 36 110
Sampaio, Jorge, 47 Socialist Party (PS), 3–4, 7–8, 28,
Science and Technology Foundation, 27 56–7, 61–5, 82–96, 104–9,
Seguro, António José, 152, 155–7 111–5, 124, 126–7, 152–9, 173,
semi-presidentialism, 6, 35, 39–42, 48 176, 226, 228–9
Silva, Aníbal Cavaco, 6, 44–52, 61–2, 1976 government, 90
83–6, 112–3, 174 1985 election, 83
appoints António Costa, 92 2011 resignation, 126
censure motion 1987, 108 censure motion 1987, 108
cohabitation, 41 electoral dominance, 95
popularity, 47 Memorandum of Understanding,
strategic cooperation, 45 170
single currency, 24, 31, 227 move to the left, 63
Soares, Mário, 6, 40–7 opposition to PCP, 92
social concertation, 168 party agreement 2015, 114
Social Democratic Party (PSD), 2–4, “Pasokisation”, 64
8, 28, 44, 46–9, 64–5, 82–93, Stability and Growth Programme,
104–116, 124, 126, 132–3, 177
149–50, 152–3, 174–9, 182–5, Sócrates, José, 46, 83, 156, 159, 176
226, 228–30 Prime Minister, 4
electoral dominance, 95 resignation, 4
move to the right, 64 Soros, George, 20
October 2015, 92 Sousa, Jerónimo de, 229
opposition to state budget, 92 Sousa, Marcelo Rebelo de, 6, 49–50
structural reforms, 177 sovereign debt crisis, 225, 231
Index 253
Spain civilisational regression, 107

Communist Party (PCE), 81 impact of, 104
Socialist Party (PSOE), 81 Memorandum of Understanding, 8
Stability and Growth Programme IV
(PEC
IV), 226 U
Stability and Growth Pact, 22–23 União Geral dos Trabalhadores, 168
structural reform programme, 18
Supreme Court of Justice, 125–6
Synapismos, 63 V
Syriza, 10, 63, 228–30 voter satisfaction, 57
T W
Tahrir Square, 197 White Book on labour relations, 177
terrorist attack World Competitiveness Forum, 26
Brussels March 2016, 227 World Social Forum, 201
Paris November 2015, 227 World Trade Organisation (WTO),
third wave democracies, 77, 80–1 16, 18
trade union membership, 174
troika, 7, 14, 18, 46, 47, 64, 103–7, 127,
168, 170, 177, 178, 180, 185, 186, Z
196, 204, 206, 226–7, 229, 242 Zucotti Park, 197

Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal: António Costa Pinto Conceição Pequito Teixeira

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Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal: António Costa Pinto Conceição Pequito Teixeira

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EDITED BY

António Costa Pinto

ISBN 978-3-319-98151-2 ISBN 978-3-319-98152-9 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950517

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

Cover credit: Vasilii Kosarev/EyeEm

1 Portugal Before and After the “Great Recession”:

2 The Political Economy of Portuguese Crisis Years:

3 The President of the Republic and the Management

4 Electoral Systems and Political Reforms: Portugal

5 The Portuguese Party System: Evolution in Continuity? 77

6 The Centrality of the Portuguese Parliament: Reform,

7 The Portuguese Constitutional Court and Its Austerity

8 New Challenges, Old Parties: Party Change in Portugal

9 Trade Union Representation and Industrial Relations

10 Portugal and Spain in the International Protest Cycles:

11 Political Discontentment in Portugal Post-Troika:

Ana Maria Belchior is an assistant professor, with aggregation, at the

He has co-edited recently Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership

Marco Lisi is an assistant professor in the Department of Political

Fig. 1.1 Portugal GDP growth rate 3

Table 4.1 Electoral systems and governability: aims, solutions

Portugal Before and After the

António Costa Pinto and Conceição Pequito Teixeira

“The (new) Portuguese government … faces a herculean task in the a

© The Author(s) 2019 1

The “Great Recession” and Its Impact in Portugal

Fig. 1.1 Portugal GDP growth rate (Source http://www.tradingeconomics.

cabinet in 2002; Sócrate’s majority and minority centre-left government

Crises and the Quality of Portuguese Democracy

In Southern Europe, among the major changes as impact of the cri-

Evaluating the Impact of the Crises:

voters, parties and candidates/members of parliament), as well as the

of power. As Teresa Violante well explains, the growing rejection of aus-

The Political Economy of Portuguese

Carla Guapo Costa

Introduction: “The World Has Been Refashioned

There is quite an abundant academic production on the euro crisis,

© The Author(s) 2019 13

analysis. Portugal was plagued by unsustainable financial imbalances

Why We Need a Political Economy Approach?

Portugal’s Destiny: Not to Take Away

Portuguese history, along centuries, mediates between brave and dar-

the EU average, jeopardising real convergence (Pordata 2017), and,

Through Seas Already Sailed2

– structural reforms to boost potential growth, create jobs, and

Labour market deserved an especial attention, since it was considered

lack of liberalisation in some services. As such, the main labour market

The Long and Winding Road: A Political Economy

towards Germany. In the EMS framework, the German central bank,

Once again, the success of those measures depends on their govern-

This leads to evidence another important fact that relates to the

The Consequences: Some Say the World Will End

governments, improvement of the efficiency and governance of state-

Happy Days Are Here to Stay?

(OECD 2017). In order to address those challenges, the Portuguese

Conclusions: Nothing Gold Can Stay?

In what concerns the most affected countries, mistakes were serious,

INE. (2015). Provisional Estimates of Resident Population—2014. Last Modified 16

The President of the Republic and the

Rui Graça Feijó

Introduction: History, Politics and Institutions

© The Author(s) 2019 35

Fig. 1.1 Portugal GDP growth rate 3

Table 4.1 Electoral systems and governability: aims, solutions

Portugal Before and After the

The “Great Recession” and Its Impact in Portugal

Fig. 1.1 Portugal GDP growth rate (Source http://www.tradingeconomics.

Crises and the Quality of Portuguese Democracy

Evaluating the Impact of the Crises:

The Political Economy of Portuguese

Portugal’s Destiny: Not to Take Away

The Long and Winding Road: A Political Economy

Happy Days Are Here to Stay?

The President of the Republic and the

Introduction: History, Politics and Institutions

Presidents and Political Parties

Institutional and Political Junctures

The Eurocrisis and Presidential Responses

The Presidency of Aníbal Cavaco Silva (2006–2016)

The Presidency of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (Elected 2016)

Electoral Systems and Political Reforms:

Table 4.1 Electoral systems and governability: aims, solutions and necessary

Table 4.2 Types of government in Europe, 1945–2000

Table 4.3 Electoral systems and proportionality: aims, solutions and necessary

Party Systems: Models and Theories

1. Pattern of alternation in government: whether it is wholesale (i.e.

1. A principal dimension of competition between PS and PSD;

Table 5.1 Patterns of alternation, innovation and openness in government,

Fig. 5.1 Electoral volatility in Portugal, 1975–2015