COMMENTARY
Stooping to Conquer
Jats and Reservations in Haryana
Radhika Kumar
The demand for reservation
by Jats has grown stronger in
the past four months. Does this
demand reflect the changing
political economy of rural
Haryana? A historical analysis.
Radhika Kumar (radhikaku@hotmail.com)
teaches Political Science in Motilal Nehru
College, University of Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 16, 2016
A
ffirmative action policies have
been typical to nations and insti-
tutions aiming to provide greater
representation to marginalised groups and
communities in various spheres of life.
India has had a long tradition of affirma-
tive action or “reservation” policy for the
socially and educationally backward com-
munities, a policy deeply resented and
opposed by the elite/forward communi-
ties. While these policies have only been
marginally successful in ameliorating the
condition of the backwards, it is the
socially “forward” communities which are
now aggressively demanding reservation.
This shift in the elite discourse has
threefold implications. First, it challenges
the logic of reservation policy, which is
now vulnerable to elite capture. Second,
it also flexes its muscle in the electoral
arena revitalising identity politics and
patron–client relations. Third, the elite
demand resurrects the idea of a welfare
state in an economy which is rapidly
liberalising. This article attempts to flesh
out the policy and politics that drives the
contemporary demand for reservation
from the Jat community in Haryana.
Why and When
Affirmative action policies are related
to concerns of social justice while
they also aim at enriching the social
pool with “suppressed talents and
social assets.” The purpose is to create
a set of “resemblances” such that
vol lI no 16
all can acquire skill sets which are
considered “socially valuable” in the
given institutional set-up. However,
resemblances by themselves do not
imply “sameness”. The reference is
instead to a threshold level beyond
which all are capable of exercising their
agency without being burdened with
ascriptive identities that lead to various
forms of discrimination.
The question, “when reservations” is
much more complicated. Reservations for
the educationally and socially backward
classes were envisaged in the Constitu-
tion. However, criteria for determining
them remain disputed. While economic
backwardness may be objectively ascer-
tained, social backwardness is a matter of
interpretation. Caste and traditional occu-
pations have often been used as determi-
nants of social backwardness.1 Exercises
in self-identification of backward castes
based on studies by the National Sample
Survey (NSS) reveal that in 1999–2000,
36% of the respondents considered them-
selves as members of the Other Back-
ward Classes (OBC). However, by 2011–
12 this number had grown to 44% (Desai
2016). Given the decadal increase in
number of self-identified OBCs there is
quite clearly a mismatch between offi-
cial policies of reservation and popular
perceptions of backwardness.
As the politics of reservation takes
over the policy of reservation, identifica-
tion takes precedence over formal/offi-
cial categorisation. Given that identities
are fluid and malleable, self-identifica-
tion is also a dynamic process moving up
and down the varna hierarchy.
Fluidity of Caste Identity
The contested nature of Jat identity
feeds into the fluidity which gained
15
COMMENTARY
specific contours in the early 20th century.
This evolution is also remarkable. Settling
along the banks of the Yamuna, the Jat
communities transformed from being
“plunderers and bandits preying on the
imperial lines of communication” (Bayly
in Datta 1999a: 10) to being “warrior
cultivators and semi-pastoralists” (Datta
1999a: 11). It is instructive to mention
here the practice of bhaichara amongst
the Jats in Punjab. The concept implied
observing certain customary practices
amongst the community linked particu-
larly to the characteristic of hard work
and “industriousness.”
“Jat clan egalitarianism,” which included
an emphasis on Hindu–Muslim unity
and extended to the Gujjars as well was
extremely hierarchical with regard to
women and the agricultural labour
communities.2 However, more interesting
is the oscillating relationship between
the Jat community and various Hindu
identity-based dispensations. It is argued
that the “Shuddhi” movement initiated
by the Arya Samajists included inducting
the Jats into the Varna of the Kshatriyas.
Their flirtation with the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), particularly during
the Ayodhya movement in the late 1980s,
including display of militant Hinduism
was driven by a need to anchor them-
selves in the category of the upper
castes (Jaffrelot 2010: 444).
Under Jat leaders during the first
decade of the 20th century there was an
attempt to assert the “Kisanness” of the
Jat community and in doing this Jat
leader Chhotu Ram positioned himself
in opposition to the Arya Samajists criti-
cising them for being dominated by the
“Banyas” (Jaffrelot 2010: 432–33).3 As
Datta (1999a: 190) argues,
...Jat identity was formed through the crea-
tion of an imagined past; through myths of
kingship, kinship, warrior origin; through
parables of social exclusiveness, through a
recognition of the need for education, eco-
nomic and social improvement...
Jat identity was based on a strong
process of othering, namely, distinguish-
ing them from both the upper castes and
the lower castes. The social identity so
constructed was underscored by the
possession of land as an indicator of
economic prosperity.
16
The concept of the dominant caste as
described by M N Srinivas is one which is
positioned in the middle of the ritualistic
hierarchy, is numerically larger than other
castes and exercises control over local
socio-economic resources (Jeffrey 2001:
221). Traditionally, Jats have been known
to associate social status and honour to
“zamin” and “zamindari” (Mooney 2011:
180). However, the emergence of the
Jats as an economically dominant rural
caste became possible with the Green
Revolution which was particularly suc-
cessful in Haryana.
Economic Foundation
For instance, Jaffrelot (2010: 434) traces
the evolution of Jat identity under the
leadership of Charan Singh in western
Uttar Pradesh. He writes that he tried to
promote the idea of a “kisan.” In doing so,
he was defending a “way of life” (Jaffrelot
2010: 436) quite typically that of the Jats.
As Jaffrelot argues, while both Chhotu
Ram and Charan Singh developed Kisan-
centred narratives, the latter was more
tuned to the political realities and there-
fore adeptly prodded this identity in
the direction of backwardness (Jaffrelot
2010: 436).4
In Haryana, given the predominance
of the peasant–cultivator mode of pro-
duction, around 57% of landholdings in
the state were classified as small or
marginal (less than 2 acres) while the all
India figures for small and marginal
landholdings was 75% of the total. Also,
the average size of an operational land-
holding in Haryana was 2.76 hectares
while the all India average was only 1.69
hectares. Yet, Haryana also saw rapid
decline in the size of average landholding
which fell by 21% between the early 1980s
and the mid-1980s which was the highest
in the country; the national average
decline was only 9% (Sethi 2011: 120).5
While the subdivision of land within
families has contributed to reduced indi-
vidual holdings, land acquisition by the
government in parts of Haryana that are
close to the national capital has also
changed economic equations in the rural
belt. The owner cultivator castes includ-
ing Jats and Gujjars were forced to sell
their lands and the consequent moneti-
sation of assets encouraged consumerist
april 16, 2016
trends, especially amongst the young.
On the other hand, this also resulted in
loss of livelihood options and resulted in
an increase in crime rates.
Closing of Ranks
Tracing the historicity of the Jat demand
for reservation, Datta (1999b: 3172) writes
that the All India Jat Mahasabha, founded
in 1905 “forcefully expressed” the twin
demands for recognition as a Kshatriyas
caste through the Arya Samaj and the
demand for reservation by way of claiming
the status of an agricultural caste. These
demands were however rejected by both
the colonial authorities as well as the up-
per castes. The “Mandalisation” of politics
in the 1990s led to the Jats relegating
the demand for Kshatriyas status to the
“private sphere” (Datta 1999b: 3172) while
they raised the pitch for reservations.
In Haryana, the first Backward Classes
Commission, the Gurnam Singh Com-
mission, was set up in 1990–91. The
commission recommended 26% reserva-
tion for the OBC category in Haryana and
inclusion of Jats, Jat Sikhs, Ahir, Bishnoi,
Meo, Rajput, Gujjar, Rode, Saini and Tyagi
communities within the category of the
OBCs. The then Hukum Singh government
notified the inclusion of Jats within the
OBC category but this was later with-
drawn by the Bhajan Lal government in
May 1991. Two subsequent commissions
in the state did not recommend inclu-
sion of Jats in the OBC category. Refer-
ring to the recommendations of the
Mandal Commission the All India Jat
Aarakshan Samiti noted that the com-
mission viewed Jats as a community
which were politically well represented
as Charan Singh had become a union
minister in 1952. Also that the Jats did
not see themselves as backward and
that demanding reservation would be
below their dignity.
The samiti members claimed that this
view of the commission was incorrect
and did not reflect the ground reality in
the state (Rajalakshmi 2010).6 The Jats
argued that they shared hukkah-pani or
similar status relations with members of
castes which were already included with-
in the category of the OBCs. Also, they had
extended families in neighbouring states
where Jats had been included in the OBC
vol lI no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

category7 and, therefore, the government
should not discriminate against the Jats of
Haryana. However, as has been observed,
status of the same caste is variable across
states. As Rajalakshmi (2010) notes, Kunbi
and Kurmi communities, which are not
listed as backward in Gujarat, are in-
cluded in the OBC category in Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar. This gels in well with Andre
Beteille’s observation that “caste ine-
qualities are not so much cumulative as
they are dispersed.” This could be appli-
cable to regionally dispersed intra-caste
inequalities as much as inter-caste varia-
tions. The Jats are viewed as an “inter-
nally differentiated community” (Datta
1999b: 3172).8
In December 2012, the Bhupinder Singh
Hooda government in Haryana accepted
the recommendation of the State’s Back-
ward Classes Commission granting 10%
reservation to five communities9 includ-
ing the Jats under the category of Special
Backward Classes (SBC). The move by
the government was to forestall the agi-
tation by the Sarvjat Khap Aarakshan
Samiti (representing all Jat Khaps of
Haryana).10 The decision was chal-
lenged in the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana which stayed the quota in July
2015. Subsequently on 27 September, the
state government withdrew the 10% SBC
quota and opened the reserved seats in
educational institutions for students
from the general category. In February
2016, the Jats launched a massive agita-
tion in Haryana demanding reservation.
The state government hoped to reach
a compromise by providing a 20% eco-
nomically backward persons (EBP) quota
with the economic criteria fixed at Rs 6
lakh per annum. However, the offer was
unacceptable to agitators. The quota is
not expected to stand judicial scrutiny
as the 50% quota limit set by the
Supreme Court in the Indira Sawhney
case has already been reached in Hary-
ana. The agitation was withdrawn only
after the central government stepped in
with an assurance that all possible
options for extending reservations to
Jats would be explored. The Jat demand
for reservations has led to a deep caste-
based polarisation in Haryana. From
being a community of 36 biraderis or
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 16, 2016
castes, it is now 35 castes versus the one
caste of the Jats.
In Conclusion
Economic liberalisation as adopted by
India in the early 1990s provided an
alternative to the non-backward classes.
A tacit agreement ensued: market
oppor tunities for the forward classes
and state largesse for the backward
classes. However, in the recent past,
the clamour for recognition as “back-
ward” by the “forward” classes has been
getting louder. Jeffrey (2010: 466), in his
work in Meerut District in north-western
Uttar Pradesh, looks at the socio-economic
challenges faced by the dominant middle-
class Jat farmers in the 1990s. The three
challenges faced by the Jats related to the
rise of the lower castes, impact of liberali-
sation and demographic shifts. The former
instilled fear of what he calls “downward
mobility.” Liberalisation had an impact on
the availability of government employ-
ment as the state was downsized. State
educational facilities stagnated and the
private sector flourished unregulated.
Therefore, while the Jats increasingly
encouraged their children to get educated,
they did not possess enough cultural
capital or an adequate skill set to be
employable. They were looking for
“middle-class” jobs which were few and
far between (Jeffrey 2010: 469). Only few
educated children of the Jats were able to
get salaried employment while others
accepted the gap in education and em-
ployment as an inevitable period of
“waiting.” It is this period of compulsory
“waiting” which becomes pivotal to strate-
gies of mobilisation. While compensatory
discrimination policies need to be revis-
ited and revised, a newer demand by
economically secure groups threatens to
jeopardise the very purpose of compen-
satory discrimination, reversing as it
were the original intent behind the policy.
Second, the inability of the state to
rethink compensatory discrimination
also prevents it from rejecting these
newer demands which come from vocal
and visible forward classes. Finally, the
changing elite discourse captures the
dilemma of the Indian state which is
pushing ever harder in the direction of
economic liberalisation, yet, on the other
vol lI no 16
COMMENTARY
hand, is also faced with demands for
state support couched in the language of
justice and moral imperatives and repeat-
edly bargained for in the electoral arena.
notes
1 The Mandal Commission set up in 1980 identi-
fied 3,743 backward castes on the basis of
social, economic and educational criteria.
2 A strong jajmani–kamin (patron–client) rela-
tionship is said to have existed amongst the
dominant and dynamic castes, including in the
area of the upper-Doab and Haryana. Most of
the castes such as carpenters, blacksmiths,
sweepers, Chamars, water-carriers and others
were dependent on the Jats on account of the
greater agricultural resources that the latter
held. In a study of the Khaps and Sarva-Khaps
(represents all the Jat clans and Khaps of other
castes in the region) in Meerut Division, see
Pradhan (1965: 1822).
3 The colonial government made common cause
with the agriculturalists and passed the Punjab
Alienation of Land Act in 1900. The act placed
a moratorium on all land purchases and mort-
gages for a period of 15 years. The act aimed to
protect the interests of the zamindars and
sharpened the differences between the agricul-
tural and non-agricultural classes including
the traders, moneylenders and shopkeepers.
The act was opposed by the Indian National
Congress in its Lucknow session held in 1899.
4 Charan Singh is credited for having put together
a coalition of various castes including the Ahirs,
Jats, Gujjars and Rajputs (AJGAR). However by
the mid-1970s, as the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD)
became the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), “quota
politics” became central to its political agenda.
A clear rupture is therefore visible between “quota
politics” and “kisan politics” with the Bharatiya
Kisan Union (BKU) under the leadership of Ma-
hendra Singh Tikait seen as the last bastion of
Jat “kisan politics” (Jaffrelot 2010: 440).
5 The state became notorious for massive land
acquisition by the government and private
operators under the Change of Land Use (CLU)
policy during 2004–14 when the Bhupinder
Singh Hooda-led Congress government was in
power in the state.
6 Rajalakshmi (2010) argues that this demand by
the Jats when clubbed with the demand for
amending the Hindu Marriage Act such that same
gotra weddings are prohibited points towards
increasing “caste consolidation” and assertion.
The other aspect of closing of ranks is to be seen
in growing instances of Jat violence against the
Dalit and other backward caste communities
as witnessed in Gohana in Sonepat, Mirchpur
in Hissar and Dulina in Jajjar District.
7 The Delhi government had included Jats within
the OBC list in 1999, while Uttar Pradesh did so
in 2000. Haryana, Punjab and Jammu and
Kashmir were the only three states where Jats
were not given OBC status.
8 It has been argued that Jats of Punjab and
Haryana are known to have large landholdings
and their economic condition is relatively better
compared to Jats in other states. On the other
hand, Jats in Rajasthan are essentially tenant
farmers who have been socially and economi-
cally oppressed by the Rajputs. In a study cover-
ing 2,000 households in five districts of western
UP which included ranking of various castes on
the basis of select socio-economic indicators it
was found that the condition of Jats was similar
or worse than that of other backward castes
such as Gujjars and Yadavs (Singh 2011: 21).
9 These included the Jats, Jat Sikhs, Rors, Tyagis
and Bishnois. The HBCC also recommended
17
COMMENTARY
10% reservation for the economically backward.
The Haryana government already provides 27%
reservation to the OBCs as well as 20% to the
Scheduled Castes. Hence, the total would then
amount to 57% attracting the tag of illegality
as the Supreme Court had capped reservation
at 50%.
10 This move by the Hooda government was much
resented by the non-Jats. In an RTI filed by an
NGO, Janhit Social Welfare Society, it was
found that Jats held 61%, 34% and 29% of all
jobs in the police departments of the districts of
Rohtak, Faridabad and Mahendragarh (Dogra
2012). The K C Gupta Commission which was
set up by the Hooda government in April 2011
to look into the question of reservations for Jats
noted 17.82% representation in classes I and II
government jobs and 40%–50% reservation in
the lower grades. Jat representation in institu-
tions of higher education was 10.35% while
literacy amongst Jat males was 45%, amongst
females it was 30%. It is argued that average
landholding of Jats is 2–3 acres while just about
10% Jats are landless (Bhatia 2016).
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New in EPWRF India Time Series
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