Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire insurance
policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of the
complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The
complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages
sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient
docket fees?

YES. It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes
for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee due not
only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more
liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in
the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Neypes vs CA - 15 day Fresh Period to file MR (civil cases)

ISSUE:

HELD:
Yu vs Tatad - 15 day Fresh Period (crim cases)

FACTS:

An Information for Estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.

Fourteen (14) days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and
material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.

Respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
she had a “fresh period” of 15 days from the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial within which to file a notice
of appeal.

The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to
appeals in criminal cases.

ISSUE:

Whether the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.

RULING:

The “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases.The raison d’être for the
“fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal
should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
De Lima vs Guerrero

Facts:

The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs
syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies.
These legislative inquiries led to the filing of three complaints with the Department of Justice against Senator Leila M. De
Lima, et al.;

On February 17, 2017, three Information were filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City. One of the Information was raffled off to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge. This Information
charging petitioner for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165.

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued an Order finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against De Lima and her co-accused. Accordingly, the Warrant of Arrest which contained no recommendation for bail,
was issued against petitioner.

On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of Arrest on petitioner and the
respondent judge issued an Order committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.

On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to the Supreme Court via the present petition, praying for annulling and
setting aside the Warrant of Arrest of the Regional Trial Court – Branch 204, Muntinlupa City as the said court lacks
jurisdiction over the petitioner;

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in the Criminal Case, the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the Information charges her not with violation of RA
9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former
Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information
is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts
described in the Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some justices of this
Court would even adopt the petitioner’s view, declaring that the Information charged against the petitioner is Direct
Bribery.

Issue:

Whether Sandiganbayan not RTC has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner?

Held:

No, the pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that
jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of
the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions where
it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related cases. Notably, no
other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases. In this case,
RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to “exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA
9165).” This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD
1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and
the latter is to be considered as an exception to the general.
Ampongan vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

That on 3 November 2014, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Iriga City, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused OMAR ERASMO GONOWON AMPONGAN, a high-ranking public officer,
being the City Vice-Mayor of Iriga City, in such capacity, committing the crime in relation to office and while in the
performance of his official functions, acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable
negligence, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to Edsel S. Dimaiwat by appointing the latter to the
vacant position of Secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iriga City without the Iriga City Personnel Selection board
having conducted a screening or deliberation on the qualifications of the candidates to the said vacant position, to the
damage and prejudice of the public interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred its decision and resolution

HELD:

No. Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides, among others, that officials of the
executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and those specifically enumerated positions therein, i.e., without
regard to salary grade, which include the position of, among others, Vice Mayors, are within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan if these public officials commit crimes involving: (a) violations ofR.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) other offenses or felonies
committed in relation to their office. In this case, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3( e) of R.A. No. 3019
and Falsification of Public Document under Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code which he allegedly committed when
he was the Vice Mayor oflriga City. Violation ofR.A. No.3019 is one of those offenses, when committed by the public
official enumerated in the law, to be under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. While the charge of falsification is not
specifically included in the enumeration of crimes over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, however, such crime
falls under the category of other offenses committed in relation to the office of the public official enumerated under the
law.
Laya Jr. vs. PVB

Facts:

Petitioner Alfredo F. Laya, Jr. was hired by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank as its Chief Legal Counsel with a rank of
Vice President. among others, the terms and conditions of his appointment is as follows;

Membership in the Provident Fund Program/Retirement Program.

On 14 June, 2007, petitioner was informed thru letter by the private respondent of his retirement effective on 1 July
2007. On 21 June 2007 petitioner wrote Col. Emmanuel V. De Ocampo, Chairman of respondent bank, requesting for an
extension of his tenure for two (2) more years pursuant to the Bank’s Retirement Plan (Late Retirement).

On 26 June 2008, private respondent issued a memorandum directing the petitioner to continue to discharge his official
duties and functions as chief legal counsel pending his request. However on 18 July 2007, petitioner was informed thru
its president Ricardo A. Balbido Jr. that his request for an extension of tenure was denied.

On December 24, 2008, the petitioner filed his complaint for illegal dismissal against PVB and Balbido, Jr. in the NLRC to
protest his unexpected retirement.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissl

Ruling of the NLRC

NLRC affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint, and deleted the indemnity imposed by the Labor Arbiter.

Ruling of the CA

The CA promulgated the now assailed decision,14 holding that the petitioner’s acceptance of his appointment as Chief
Legal Officer of PVB signified his conformity to the retirement program;

Issue:
Whether or not, Alfredo Laya was validly retired at age 60.

Ruling/Doctrine:

Petitioner Alfredo Laya was not validly retired at age 60

The mere mention of the retirement plan in the letter of appointment did not sufficiently inform the petitioner of the
contents or details of the retirement program

The mere mention of the retirement plan in the letter of appointment did not sufficiently inform the petitioner of the
contents or details of the retirement program. To construe from the petitioner’s acceptance of his appointment that he
had acquiesced to be retired earlier than the compulsory age of 65 years would, therefore, not be warranted. This is
because retirement should be the result of the bilateral act of both the employer and the employee based on their
voluntary agreement that the employee agrees to sever his employment upon reaching a certain age. That the
petitioner might be well aware of the existence of the retirement program at the time of his engagement did not suffice.
His implied knowledge, regardless of duration, did not equate to the voluntary acceptance required by law in granting an
early retirement age option to the employee. The law demanded more than a passive acquiescence on the part of the
employee, considering that his early retirement age option involved conceding the constitutional right to security of
tenure.

The pertinent rule on retirement plans does not presume consent or acquiescence from the high educational attainment
or legal knowledge of the employee

The Court disagrees with the view tendered by Justice Leonen to the effect that the petitioner, because of his legal
expertise and educational attainment, could not now validly claim that he was not informed of the provisions of the
retirement program. The pertinent rule on retirement plans does not presume consent or acquiescence from the high
educational attainment or legal knowledge of the employee. In fact, the rule provides that the acquiescence by the
employee cannot be lightly inferred from his acceptance of employment.

With the petitioner having been thus dismissed pursuant to the retirement provision that he had not knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to, Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) was guilty of illegal dismissal as to him

To stress, company retirement plans must not only comply with the standards set by the prevailing labor laws but must
also be accepted by the employees as commensurate to their faithful services to the employer within the requisite
period. Although the employer could be free to impose a retirement age lower than 65 years for as long its employees
consented, the retirement of the employee whose intent to retire was not clearly established, or whose retirement was
involuntary is to be treated as a discharge. With the petitioner having been thus dismissed pursuant to the retirement
provision that he had not knowingly and voluntarily agreed to, PVB was guilty of illegal dismissal as to him. Being an
illegally dismissed employee, he was entitled to the reliefs provided under Article 279 of the Labor Code, to wit: Article
279. Security of tenure. —In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.