[ G.R.No.

240662, September 16, 2020 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. RAYMUNDO RAPIZ Y

CORREA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT,

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This appeal assails the Decision dated February 7, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 08109 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Raymundo Rapiz y Correa" which affirmed
appellant's conviction for simple rape.

Prosecution's Version

On April 2, 2015, AAA (complainant) and appellant were left all alone in the latter's house. When she
heard appellant call for her, she immediately approached but he suddenly pointed a deadly weapon at her.
She got shocked and was unable to react when he undressed her and himself too. He asked her to lie down
on the bed, after which, he got on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. He threatened to kill
her and her mother if she would tell her mother about the incident. Before her mother arrived, appellant
tightly held her hands, went outside, and sharply stared at her. She could not do anything but cry.

On April 3, 2015, appellant brought her near a balete tree. There, he hugged her, kissed her on the lips,
fondled her breasts, and touched her vagina. He lay near her and slept. They went back to appellant's
house by 11 o'clock in the evening.

On April 4, 2015, around 11 o'clock in the evening, appellant told her to go to the Canon Vulcanizing
Shop where he was working. When she got there, appellant locked the door of the shop. He proposed to
court her, but she refused because she thought he is her uncle, that is, she believed that he and her mother
are cousins. Appellant got mad and no longer talked to her. They were able to go home by 1 o'clock in the
morning.

On April 6, 2015, around midnight, appellant promised to buy her a pair of slippers and dress in Baclaran.
They later went there, but he did not make good his promise. He just made another promise to buy for her
another time. He then took her to a zoo and kissed her there. They went home afterwards.

On April 7, 2015, her mother, BBB, filed a complaint before the barangay against appellant's live-in
partner. The reason for the complaint was that complainant and appellant's live-in partner had apparently
gotten into a fight. Appellant's live-in partner was jealous whenever complainant conversed with
appellant. Complainant attended the hearing before the barangay where she disclosed that appellant had
inserted his penis into her vagina three (3) to four (4) times already and it all happened in appellant's
house.

Medico-legal officer Police Senior Inspector Reah Mangroba Cornelio, M.D. (Dr. Cornelio) examined
complainant and made the following findings:

xxx

HYMEN: Presence of deep healed lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions and deep healing
laceration at 6 o'clock position.

xxx

Conclusion

Medico-legal evaluation shows clear evidence of recent blunt penetrating trauma to the hymen.
 Defense's Version

Appellant Raymundo Rapiz testified that complainant's mother BBB had falsely accused him of raping
her daughter because he refused to lend her P1,500.00. BBB needed the money so she and complainant
could go back to Mindoro.

He worked at a vulcanizing shop owned by a certain Jonivie Canon and her husband, Antonio Canon
(Spouses Canon). He used to reside in Montanes Compound at No. 358, Barrio Talon, Angela Road, Las
Pinas City. The compound was owned by Antonio Jesus Montanes. On March 20, 2015, he chose to move
and live in the vulcanizing shop because he was ashamed of the behavior of complainant and her mother.
Both allegedly arrived at the compound on March 3, 2015, fighting and cursing each other - "Narinig ko
pa yung sigaw nya doon na ''Tang ina ka. Kahit hubaran kita sa kalsada pagpilahan kita sa mga lalaki
wala kang magagawa'."

Complainant and her mother were supposed to help him wash his clothes, but it never happened. Instead,
BBB made complainant work as a canteen helper near the vulcanizing shop. BBB even told every man in
the canteen to treat complainant as if she were his wife.

The spouses Canon testified on appellant's character. They knew him to be industrious, very helpful, and
accommodating to his relatives. They believed that appellant could not have raped complainant because
he had a live-in partner, a certain Ana. In the later part of March 2015, appellant approached Antonio
Canon and told him the latter stories on how BBB would do everything to put him in jail. Eventually,
BBB's wish happened.

The Trial Court's Ruling

The RTC found the Accused guilty with moral certainty of rape under Article 266-A paragraph l(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, without the possibility of parole.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in the main, with modification increasing the awards of civil indemnity
and moral damages to P75,000.00 each and awarding exemplary damages of P75,000.00.

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in convicting appellant of rape?

Ruling

We acquit.

The general rule is that the lone testimony of the victim in a prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient
to sustain a verdict of conviction. The rationale is that, owing to the nature of the offense, the only
evidence that can be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is usually only the offended party's
testimony.

Yet, the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused demands no less than a moral certainty of
his guilt free of reasonable doubt. More, the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, her own credibility must also be
put on trial.

The crime of Rape is defined and penalized under Article 266-A of The Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz.:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1)   By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d)  When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxxx
The elements of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender is a man who
had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation upon
her; or she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or she is under 12 years of age or is demented.
The RTC and the CA both found that complainant's testimony clearly established appellant's carnal
knowledge of her against her will by employing threat and intimidation.

There being only one witness to her harrowing experience, the Court must go over complainant's
testimony with close scrutiny. Complainant testified on what happened to her on April 2, 2015:

Fiscal Castillo

Q: You said that you got frightened. What did you do when you got frightened after your Tito Raymundo
threatened you to kill you if you don't go near him?

Witness:

A: I did not do anything. I just remained silent.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: After you go near your Tito Raymundo, what did he do next?

Witness:

A: He removed all my clothes

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What were you then wearing?

Witness:

A: I was wearing a short and a t-shirt.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: How did your Tito Raymundo remove your clothes?

Witness:

A: He held both of my hands and then he cover[ed] my mouth.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What [did] he [use] in covering your mouth?

Witness:

A: His hands, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which hand?

Witness:

A: Flis right hand, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which hand [did] he [use] in holding your hand?

Witness:

A: Left hand, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Now, how did your Tito Raymundo remove your clothes?

Witness:

A: HINAWAKAN NIYA NGA PO.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Will you please demonstrate it to the Honorable Court?

Witness:

A: He used both of his hands in removing my clothes.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which [was] [removed] first, your t-shirt o[f] your shorts?

Witness:

A: My T-shirt, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And after your T-shirt was remove[d] by your Tito Raymundo, what did he do next?

Witness:

A: Then he remove[d] also my bra, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And what else did he do after removing your bra?

Witness:

A: Then he remove[d] my shorts, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: While your Tito Raymundo [was] removing your clothes, referring to your t-shirt, bra and your shorts,
what were you doing?

Witness:

A: Nothing, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Why [did] [you] not shout?

Witness:

A: Because I was frightened at that time, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Why [did] [you] not run away?

Witness:
A: NATAKOT NA NGA PO AKO KAMI LANG PONG DALAWA NUON.

xxx

Q: What did your Tito Raymundo do after removing your t-shirt, bra and your shorts?

Witness:

A: BINABOY NIYA PO AKO.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your answer "BINABOY"? What exactly did he do to you?

Witness:

A: PINASOK NIYA PO YONG ARI NIYA SA ANO KO PO.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your statement "ANO"?

Witness:

A: PINASOK NIYO PO YONG TETE NIYA SA HARAPAN KO PO.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your statement "HARAPAN"?

Witness:

A: BINABOY NIYA PO AKO DAHIL MAY GUSTO PO SIYA SA AKIN.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Will you please point to the Interpreter what part of your body were you referring when you said
"HARAPAN KO PO"?

Witness:

A: Here. (And the witness is referring to her vagina).

Court:

So there was this insertion of the penis to the vagina of the witness.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What did you feel Madam Witness when your Tito Raymundo inserted his penis in your vagina?

Witness:

A: It was painful. There was pain.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And for how long the male organ of your Tito Raymundo remained inside your vagina?
Witness:

A: NANGHIHINA NA PO AKO NUON NOONG SINUOT NIYA PO.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Why [did] [you] not shout to call the attention of the people outside while your Tito Raymundo [was]
inserting his penis into your vagina?

Witness:

A: Because he was threatening me, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: In what manner was he threatening you then?

Witness:

A: He tightly [held] my hands and I could not go outside the house. KASI PO PAG LUMABAS PO AKO
PAP ATA YIN NIYA PO AKO.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What was your position Madam Witness when your Tito Raymundo [was] inserting his penis into your
vagina?

Witness:

A: I was lying, Prosecutor.

xxx

Q: Why were you then lying when your Tito Raymundo was removing your t-shirt, bra and shorts?

Witness:

A: NAGHIHINA NA NGA PO AKO.

In reviewing the foregoing testimony, we adhere to the guidelines laid down in People v. XXX,28 viz.:

Specifically, for the review of rape cases, the Court has consistently adhered to the following established
principles: a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Following these principles, the Court has also refined how rape is proved. The credibility of the
complainant is the single most important issue in the prosecution of rape cases. The categorical and
candid testimony of the complainant suffices, and a culprit may be convicted solely on the basis of her
testimony, provided that it hurdles the test of credibility. It should not just come from the mouth of a
credible witness, it should likewise be credible and reasonable in itself, candid, straightforward and in
accord with human experience. Where the discrepancies and contradictory statements on important details
in the testimony seriously impair its probative value, cast serious doubt on its credibility, and erode the
integrity of the testimony, the Court should acquit the accused.

It is true that the Court accords great respect to the trial court's findings on witnesses' credibility. This is
because trial provides judges with the opportunity to detect cues and expressions that could suggest
sincerity or betray lies and ill will, not reflected in the documentary or object evidence. The exception, of
course, is when the trial court and/or the CA overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts that could have
affected the outcome of the case.
Stated differently, where the credibility and reliability of witnesses and their respective testimonies are
key, then:

First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.

Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you
must acquit.

Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on
the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that
evidence of the guilt of the accused.29

While we believe complainant's claim of sexual intercourse with appellant, the prosecution evidence does
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the result of or was accomplished through force or
intimidation or moral ascendancy.

It is the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the crime of rape, which
includes as above stated that an accused  had   carnal   knowledge  of a  complainant  through   force  or
intimidation. Lack of consent through any of the modes mentioned in the RPC or case law as where moral
ascendancy is involved is not to be presumed.

However, where an accused alleges consent to the sexual act as a defense, it is his burden of evidence to
prove this allegation by substantial evidence. Thus:

Consensual sexual congress as an affirmative defense needs convincing proof such as love notes,
mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the consensual romantic relationship between the offender
and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden shifts to
the appellant to prove his defense by substantial evidence.... Furthermore, even assuming arguendo, that
there was some form of amorous relationship, such averment will not necessarily rule out the use of force
or intimidation by appellant to have sex against her will.30

Here, appellant did not raise the affirmative defense of consensual sex. He in fact denied having carnal
knowledge of complainant. Hence, it behooves the prosecution to prove each of the elements of rape
beyond a reasonable doubt, especially that the sex between complainant and accused occurred through
force, intimidation or moral ascendancy. This the prosecution evidence distinctly failed.

First. Complainant mentioned that appellant threatened her with a weapon. Interestingly, the type of
weapon was never identified by complainant. She never described how it was used to threaten her.
Instead, she proceeded to describe how she felt weak and felt that she had no other choice but to comply
with appellant's directives. As her testimony progressed, there was no longer any mention of the
purported weapon. Did appellant continue to threaten her with it? Did appellant bring it with him when
they went to the bedroom? What did appellant do with the weapon while he was raping her? We will
never know.

Surely, a person who has been threatened with a weapon will definitely remember what was used on him
on her, especially in cases where a person is threatened to do something against his or her will, more so in
the heinous crime of rape. Testimonial evidence, to be believed, must come not only from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience. A credible
witness must, therefore, be able to narrate a convincing and logical story.31 In this case, the weapon
disappeared from the narrative without any logical explanation. Such omission leads us to conclude that
the "weapon" was contrived by complainant to give color to her claim that she was threatened by
appellant.

Second. Intimidation is peculiarly addressed to the mind of the person against whom it may be employed,
and its presence is basically incapable of being tested by any hard and fast rule. Intimidation is normally
best viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time and occasion of the
crime.

Complainant's claim that she was intimidated into submitting herself to appellant's lewd designs is
likewise incredible. True, appellant is her mother's cousin and exercises moral ascendancy over her. But,
complainant was already 20 years old at the time and she was of sound body since she was able to work
as a helper at a nearby canteen. She may be illiterate, but the same cannot be considered as equivalent to
mental retardation. She is of sufficient mental aptitude and is perfectly capable of at least resisting
appellant's advances, if indeed his advances were unwanted.
The rule is that in making a diagnosis of mental retardation, a thorough evaluation based on history,
physical, and laboratory examination made by a clinician is necessary. The reason for this requirement is
well-explained in both medical and psychology literature: mental retardation is a recognized clinical
syndrome usually traceable to an organic cause, which determinants are complex and multifactorial. As
the boundaries between normality and retardation are difficult to delineate, proper identification requires
competent clinical evaluation of psychosomatic parameters in conjunction with medical and laboratory
tests.

Here, the record is bereft of any evidence that a comprehensive medical evaluation was had to properly
determine complainant's mental status. There is as well no allegation about deficiencies in her mental
state.

In the absence of a weapon, appellant's threat of killing her would have been an idle threat, or at least
considerably less threatening. Complainant never once mentioned that appellant forcibly held her or
pushed her to a lying position. Appellant only laid his hands on her when he covered her mouth and
seemingly took his time in taking off her clothes. Also, nowhere is it indicated in her testimony that
appellant continually threatened to kill her if she did not comply with his wishes. Not once did she resist
appellant's advances. We note that appellant threatened complainant only once and before he made his
move on her. We simply find it implausible that a single threat, a weak one at that, would immediately
deprive a woman of her free will and immediately subject her to the whims and caprices of a man without
even giving the slightest resistance.

Admittedly, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be
shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong
resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Resistance is not an element
of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or
intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or
less irresistible is beside the point. But in this case, complainant's total passivity is baffling. Her narration
of the events simply does not make sense and makes her testimony incredible.

Nor can moral ascendancy be considered to have supplanted force and intimidation in this case. For moral
ascendancy can only be considered if rape of minor was committed by a close kin or a relative within the
third civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. People v. Gacusan explains:

Recent cases reiterating that moral ascendancy replaces violence or intimidation in rape committed by a
close-kin cited People v. Corpuz.

In Corpuz, the accused was the live-in partner of the victim's mother. The victim, AAA, was 13 years old
when accused Corpuz started raping her. The repeated rape incidents made AAA pregnant.

Accused Corpuz admitted his sexual encounters with AAA. He insisted, however, that he never forced
himself to AAA since he even courted her. Similarly, he admitted that he was the father of AAA's child.

Nonetheless, this Court affirmed his conviction and held that:

In rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse
of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.

In People v. Fraga, accused Fraga raped the daughters of his common-law partner. Fraga tried evading his
conviction by shifting from his defense of alibi to lack of force or intimidation. While this Court affirmed
Fraga's conviction since force and intimidation was sufficiently proven, it also emphasized that:

Accused-appellant started cohabiting with complainants' mother in 1987. As the common-law husband of
their mother, he gained such moral ascendancy over complainants that any more resistance than had been
shown by complainants cannot reasonably be expected.

In People v. Robles, accused Robles raped his common-law wife's daughter. This Court affirmed his
conviction and likened Robles' moral ascendancy over the victim to that of a biological father; thus:

Moral ascendancy and influence by the accused, stepfather of the 12 year—old complainant, and threat of
bodily harm rendered complainant subservient to appellant's lustful desires... Actual force or intimidation
need not even be employed for rape to be committed where the over powering influence of a father over
his daughter suffices.
Complainant is a full grown 20-year old woman at the time of her alleged sexual ravishment. More,
appellant is not even considered a close kin under the law, being her mother's cousin. Verily, moral
ascendancy cannot be taken into account and considered as substitute for threat or intimidation.

Indeed, rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the
female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged
and shown to be without her consent. Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape,
provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent. The female
must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to penetration, however reluctantly
given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from being rape,
provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.38 Here, there is no doubt that complainant had
impliedly given her consent for appellant to have carnal knowledge of her. Her actions, or lack thereof for
that matter, speaks for itself.

Third. The reasonable doubt on the nature of complainant and appellant's sexual congress is reinforced by
their subsequent actuations. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that a woman's conduct
immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value in gauging the truth of her accusations. It must
coincide with logic and experience. Here, complainant's actuations whenever she was with appellant are
not those of a woman whose virtue had been outraged.

Complainant admitted that the following day, on April 3, 2015, she had gone to rendezvous with
appellant to a balete tree. There, he hugged her, kissed her on the lips, fondled her breasts, and touched
her vagina. He lay near her and slept. She never mentioned that she was threatened or forced to go with
him. There is reasonable doubt that she voluntarily submitted to appellant's ministrations while shielded
by the balete tree from prying eyes.

Again, on April 4, 2015, around 11 o'clock in the evening, she voluntarily went to the vulcanizing shop.
She did not state that appellant threatened or compelled her to go to there in the middle of the night.
When she got there, appellant locked the door of the shop and proposed to court her - which can be
construed as an attempt to formalize, or at least put a label on, their relationship. She refused mainly
because he is her alleged uncle, which caused appellant to get mad and stop talking to her. Again, the
Court observes that the actuations of both parties are those of lovers trying to determine if they should
move forward and have a deeper connection after their physical communion with each other.

Thereafter, on April 6, 2015, appellant promised to buy her a pair of slippers and dress in Baclaran. When
they went there, he did not make good his promise, but made another promise to buy for her another time.
He then took her to a place with many animals and kissed her there. This time, there is no doubt that
complainant went with appellant willingly - this little excursion could even be considered a date.
Complainant was apparently comfortable and at ease in appellant's company that she would allow herself
to be seen in public with him and even be kissed by him.

Taking into account all the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that there is reasonable doubt
on the element of force, threat or intimidation in this case. There is no moral certainty as to the crime of
rape to speak of.

Reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence, and it should
pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. While no test definitively determines what is
reasonable doubt under the law, the view is that it must involve genuine and irreconcilable contradictions
based, not on suppositional thinking, but on the hard facts constituting the elements of the crime.40

It has been repeatedly ruled that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests
on the prosecution. Thus, its failure to discharge its burden in this case entitles appellant to an
acquitta41 as a matter of right. Surely, where the evidence of the prosecution is concededly weak, even if
the evidence for defense itself is equally weak, an accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt
in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys.42

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 7,2018 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08109 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant RAYMUNDO
RAPIZ y CORREA is ACQUITTED of rape on ground of REASONABLE DOUBT.

The Director of the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila is ordered to
immediately RELEASE RAYMUNDO RAPIZ y CORREA from detention unless he is being held in
custody for some other lawful cause; and to REPORT to this Court his compliance within five (5) days
from notice.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 207763               June 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO RONDINA, Accused-Appellant.

REYES, J.:

Factual Antecedents

On December 15, 1998, an information was filed against Rondina charging him of rape, as follows:

The undersigned Public Prosecutor, based upon the sworn complaint of victim [AAA] hereby, accuses
ROLANDO RONDINA, alias "Lando", of the crime of Rape,

Rondina was arraigned on February 8, 1999, and he pleaded "not guilty." Trial ensued, with the
prosecution presenting three witnesses, namely, AAA, the victim, BBB, AAA’s grandmother, and
Teodulo Gultian (Captain Gultian), Barangay Captain of XXX, town of YYY in Samar, and a first cousin
of AAA’s grandfather. The testimony of Dr. Francis Gerald Mijares (Dr. Mijares), the attending physician
who examined AAA, was dispensed with upon the parties’ stipulation that AAA submitted herself to
medical examination a week after the incident. Rondina testified alone for his defense.

According to the prosecution, the rape happened in this manner: Sometime around noon of August 30,
1998, AAA, allegedly only 14 years old, lay awake beside a wall of their house while her 1-year-old sister
was sleeping next to her. She heard a noise coming from the kitchen, and suddenly Rondina was on top of
her. Poking a knife at her chest, he warned her not to tell her parents, stuffed her mouth with a face towel,
and quickly removed her shorts and underwear. He then inserted his penis into her vagina and made a
push and pull movement, keeping at this for a "long time." AAA felt pain in her organ, and just before he
finished, she felt him discharge something inside her. He pulled out his penis, and she noticed blood
oozing from her vagina. He sat beside her while she remained supine and crying. 6 At that exact moment,
BBB entered the house and overheard Rondina and AAA talking in a low voice. In the kitchen, she was
surprised to see AAA and Rondina on the floor still naked from the waist down. She angrily demanded to
know what they were doing, but AAA said nothing and just cried, still in terror of Rondina, as the latter
quickly put on his clothes and ran out through the kitchen. At first, BBB told no one what she saw that
day, having been kept busy in the farm. But the next day, she told CCC, AAA’s mother, and two days
later, after AAA had left for Tacloban where she worked as a laundrywoman, 7 CCC and BBB sought the
help of Captain Gultian, who advised them to get a medical report on AAA. 8

On September 7, 1998, CCC brought AAA to the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center in Tacloban
City, where she was attended by Dr. Mijares. His medical certificate 9 showed the following results:

P.E. Findings:

= Negative pertinent P.E. Findings

Ob-Gyne findings:

= Pelvic exam

external genitalia - grossly normal

introitus - nulliparous

hymen - intact, elastic, open

vagina - admits one (1) examining finger with ease

Speculum exam:

cervix - small, pinkish

(+) scanty whitish discharge

 = Internal exam:

cervix - close, non-tender on wriggling

uterus - small

adnexae - (-) masses, tenderness

Laboratory results:

UCG – negative

Grams stain result: Grams (+) rods = +++

e. cells = ++

REMARKS:

CONCLUSIONS: 1. The above[-]described physical injuries are found in the body of the subject
the age of which is compatible to the alleged date of infliction.

xxxx

On September 9, 1998, AAA, accompanied by CCC and Captain Gultian, executed a complaint affidavit
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging Rondina with rape. On September 17, 1998,
Rondina was arrested on a warrant.

The version of the defense paints a lovers’ tryst. According to Rondina, 24 years old, a laborer in a rice
mill, he met AAA on August 10, 1998 at a benefit dance held during their town fiesta. They danced three
times to slow music, and in the course of the evening she agreed to be his sweetheart. He visited her
several times at home, and each time her parents were around. On August 29, 1998, a Saturday, at around
7:00 p.m., Rondina again saw AAA, and it was then that he broached an "intimate" proposal to her. She
agreed, but told him to come back at noon the next day since her parents would be away in the farm.
Rondina returned as agreed, and AAA herself opened the door. AAA led him to the kitchen, and there the
lovers lost no time kissing and caressing each other. AAA took off her bra and shorts, and Rondina also
took off his shorts. Rondina insisted that he and AAA still had their underwear on when BBB arrived just
when they were about to commence the sexual act. He denied that he used a towel and a knife to facilitate
the rape.10

BBB caught them half-naked, and she angrily demanded, "birat ano hin pagbuhat niyo hito?" ("why did
you do it?").11 But AAA just cried, while Rondina quickly arose and feebly tried to explain that he and
AAA already had an understanding. BBB refused to be pacified and Rondina had to leave. He put on his
shorts and exited through the kitchen. Believing that he committed no crime, Rondina was surprised when
the police came to his rented house and arrested him on September 16, 1998. 12 He also claimed that
Captain Gultian tried to extort money from him.13

On September 13, 2004, after three changes in the presiding judge, the last judge, Honorable Jovito C.
Abarquez, having personally observed only the demeanor and testimonies of Captain Gultian and of
Rondina but not those of the complainant and her grandmother, the RTC rendered judgment against
Rondina.

The CA affirmed the conviction of Rondina.

The case is again with this Court on automatic final review, and meanwhile, Rondina has been in
detention since 1998.

Ruling of the Court

This Court votes to acquit the accused.

 Discussion

The crime of rape is now found in

Article 266-A of the RPC

R.A. No. 8353, known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997," was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on September 30, 1997 and took effect on October 22, 1997, becoming Article 266-A to 266-D of Title
VIII of the RPC under Crimes Against Persons. Providing for a broader definition of rape, it reclassified
rape from a Crime Against Chastity to a Crime Against Persons. Article 266-A of the RPC now reads:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed-

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Throughout our recorded history, rape has been invariably regarded with unmitigated odium, and meted
the highest penalties allowed in our statute books. By its very nature, a charge of rape must be resolved by
giving primordial consideration to the credibility of the victim’s testimony, 18 since conviction may be
solely based thereon, provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things.19 For when a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. So if her testimony meets the test of credibility, conviction
may issue on the basis thereof.20

The constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused demands no less than a moral certainty of his
guilt free of reasonable doubt. Moreover, the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The testimony of the victim
must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, her own credibility must also be put on trial. 21

The Supreme Court as the court of last resort is obligated to conduct a comprehensive and extensive
assessment of a conviction for rape,22 and in the Court’s review of the decisions of the RTC and the CA,
the Court has followed the oft-cited guiding principles, to wit:

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences both for the accused and the complainant,
so that utmost care must be taken in the review of a decision involving conviction of rape. Thus, the Court
has consistently adhered to the following guiding principles, to wit: (1) an accusation for rape can be
made with facility, while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused,
albeit innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme care;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must succeed or fail on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to
derive strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Corollary to the above principle is the
rule that the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in the prosecution of a rape
case.23 (Citations omitted)

The elements of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender is a man who
had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation upon
her; or she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or she is under 12 years of age or is demented.
The RTC and the CA both found that AAA’s testimony clearly established that Rondina had sexual
intercourse with her without her consent and against her will; that to satisfy his lust, he employed force
and threats. There being only one witness to her harrowing experience, it behooves this Court to go over
AAA’s testimony anew in detail:
[PROSECUTOR AGERICO A. AVILA:]

Q Do you recall where were you around 12:00 o’clock noon of August 30, 1998?

A I was in the house.

Q And where is your house located?

A Along the side of the road.

Q What barangay, municipality and province?

A Brgy. [XXX], [YYY], Samar.

Q Who were with you in the house at that time?

A My one[-]year[-]old sister.

Q Who else were there in the house aside from you and your younger sister?

A Only the two (2) of us.

Q Why, where were your father and your mother then?

A They were in the mountain.

xxxx

Q While you.... where were you particularly situated while you were lying down?

A I was near the wall of the house.

Q So, while you were near the wall of your house lying down, do you recall of any incident that transpired? What
happened if any?

A I heard a noise which noise came from a bamboo.

Q From what bamboo did the noise come from?

A Near the kitchen.

xxxx

Q So, after hearing the sound of the bamboo, what did you observe next if any?

A He placed himself on top of me.

Q You said he. A person? Did you understand the question?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And did you know the person who went on top of you?

A No.

Q But, would you be able to recognize this person if you will see him again?

A Yes.

xxxx

Q After the person whom you pointed in Court went on top of you, what did he do to you?

A He poked a knife at me and placed a face towel inside my mouth.

xxxx
Q To what part of the body was the knife pointed to?

A On my chest.

xxxx

Q So, after this person you pointed to in Court pointed a knife and placed a hand towel in your mouth, did he say
anything?

A He said, "Don’t tell your father and mother because if you will tell them, I will kill you."

Q After he uttered those words, what did he do next if any?

A After uttering those words, he took off my shorts and underwear.

Q After taking off your shorts and your underwear, what did he do next if any?

A He inserted his penis into my organ.

Q So, when he inserted his penis to your organ, what did you feel if any?

A I felt pain.

Q So, while his penis was inside your organ, what did he do?

A He was making push and pull actions.

Q For how long in your estimate did he do his push and pull action?

A A long time.

xxxx

Q What did you notice in your organ when he made the push and pull movement?

A I was feeling pain.

Q Did you notice if he discharged anything in your organ?

A Yes.

Q And what did you notice?

A There was a blood.

Q When did you notice this blood coming from you?

A After he finished.

Q When he finished, what did he do?

A He sat in my side.

Q How about you, what did you do?

A I was crying.

Q So, while he was sitting by your side, what happened if any?

A My grandmother arrived.

xxxx

Q Where was Rolando Rondina when your grandmother arrived?

A He was on my side.
Q Left or right side?

A Right side.

Q Did he already put his pants on when your grandmother arrived?

ATTY. MARIO NICOLASORA

Leading, Your Honor.

xxxx

A Yes.

PROS. AVILA

Q What was he wearing at that time?

A He was wearing short pants.

Q Was he with an underwear?

A Yes.

ATTY. NICOLASORA

The question is leading. COURT

GO AHEAD. DID HE TAKEOFF HIS UNDERWEAR?

A Yes.

PROS. AVILA

Q While this accused was sitting beside you, was he still naked at that time?

ATTY. NICOLASORA

We object, leading. COURT

LET THE WITNESS ANSWER. PROS. AVILA

A Yes.

Q So, when your grandmother arrived, what did the accused do?

A He ran towards the kitchen.

Q What did your grandmother do when she arrived in your house?

A My grandmother asked me, "[AAA], who was that?"

Q What did you answer?

A I did not answer because I was afraid that he might kill me.

Q Going back when he removed his underwear. After removing his underwear, what did he do next if any?

A He placed his penis inside my organ.

Q Before that, did he … what did he do to your legs if any?

ATTY. NICOLASORA

Leading, Your Honor.

COURT
SUSTAINED.

PROS. AVILA

Q Before he inserted his organ to your organ, what did he do to you?

ATTY. NICOLASORA

Assuming that the accused [did] something.

COURT

LET THE WITNESS ANSWER.

PROS. AVILA

A Immediately after taking off his short pants and underwear, he placed himself on top of me and placed his organ
inside my organ.

Q What was your position?

A I was prostrate.

Q How about the person whom you pointed to, what was his position when he inserted his penis inside your organ?

A He was on top of me.

Q All the time while he was making the push and pull movement, where was the knife all the while?

A On my chest.

Q It was on your chest all the while until he finished?

A No.

Q So sometimes, where would he placed his knife?

A It was no longer on my chest.

Q Do you know the accused personally?

A I don’t know him.

Q So, how were you able to identify him?

A I could hear his name from other persons.

Q Why, where is he a resident of?

A He is living with Tiying.

Q Do you know the surname of this Tiying?

A I don’t know the surname.

Q In what barangay is the accused living?

A I don’t know where he is a resident of.

Q How about this Tiying, where does he resides?

A In Brgy. [XXX]

Q Since you did not inform your grandmother about the incident, who was the first person whom you informed?

A I did not tell anybody.

Q So, how come that you were able to file a Complaint?

A Because I told my mother about the incident just before I left for Tacloban.

Q How long was that after the incident?

A I cannot remember.

Q How many days after the incident before you went to Tacloban?

A About two (2) days.

Q What was your purpose in going to Tacloban?

A Because when the incident happened, I was working in Tacloban.

xxxx

Q Did you go to the house of the Brgy. Chairman?

A Only my mother went there.

Q With respect to this case, did you submit yourself for medical check-up?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where?

A In Tacloban.

xxxx

[CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. NICOLASORA]

Q At that time of incident at 12:00 noon of August 30, 1998, the windows and door of your house were opened?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You mean, all the windows were opened?

A Yes.

Q There is a house located on the right side of your house?

A Yes.

Q Will you please try to tell us whose house is that?

A Ging-Ging.

Q If you are in your house, you could see it directly?

COURT:

YOU HAVE NOT SPECIFIED THE DISTANCE.

ATTY. NICOLASORA

Q How far is the distance of the house located on the right side of your house?

A From where I am sitting, up to that wall of the Chamber, which is about two (2) meters.

COURT:

DO YOU KNOW ARMS LENGTH? HOW MANY ARMS LENGTH?

A Two (2) arms length.

ATTY. NICOLASORA

Q Immediately before the incident, you noticed that the windows near your house were opened?

COURT:

WHETHER THERE WAS A WINDOW ON THE RIGHT SIDE.

ATTY. NICOLASORA

Q On the right side of your house, does the house nearest you [have] a window?

A No, Sir.

Q To the left side, is there a window?

A Yes.

Q How far is your house to that house?

A About two (2) arms length.

Q Who lives in this house?

A I don’t know who owns the house.

Q Did you notice if there were persons before the incident happened?

A I did not notice.

Q Is there a house at the back of your house?

A None, Sir.

Q How about on the front portion of your house, is there a house?

A None.

Q Would you agree with me that there are number of houses located in your house aside from the left and right
houses?

PROS. AVILA

Vague, Your Honor.

ATTY. NICOLASORA

Q Aside from these two (2) houses located on the left and right side of your house, are there other houses in the
immediate vicinity?

A There are other houses.

xxxx

Q There are a number of people living within the vicinity?

A Yes.

xxxx

Q Alright, at 12:00 o’clock noon of August 30, 1998?

A There was none.

xxxx
Q At 12:00 o’clock noon, am I correct that you heard a sound of bamboo in your kitchen?

A Yes.

xxxx

Q When for the first time did you notice a person in your house on August 30, 1998?

COURT:

SHE NOTICED A PERSON WHEN HE WAS ALREADY LYING DOWN ON HER AND POKING A KNIFE
ON HER.

ATTY. NICOLASORA

Q Before the incident, you have not seen that person who laid on top of you?

COURT:

IMMEDIATELY BEFORE?

ATTY. NICOLASORA

Prior to the incident. A No, Sir.

Q So, you were lying prostrate on the flooring of your house allegedly when the incident transpired?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You were looking directly upward when the incident transpired?

A Yes, Sir.

xxxx

Q You did not see what was actually placed inside your organ?

A No.

Q You did not sustain any injury during the incident?

A No.

Q You said during your direct examination that after he laid on top of you, he seated on your right side?

A Yes.

Q He stayed there for a long period of time?

A Yes.

Q While he was sitting on your right side, he did not do anything to you?

A He did nothing.

Q Am I correct to say, to hear from you during the direct examination, you did not tell your grandmother anything
about the incident?

A Yes.

Q And when she arrived at your house, she did not do anything?

A Yes.

ATTY. NICOLASORA

That will be all, Your Honor. COURT:

RE-DIRECT?

PROS. AVILA

xxxx

Q You said you did not sustain any injury during the incident. Where did the blood come from?

A From my organ.

Q After the incident while he was sitting along side with you, did he try to converse with you?

A No.

xxxx

COURT:

ALRIGHT, CLARIFICATORY.

Q After he took out his organ from your organ, what did you do with your panty and short pants?

A I put my underwear and short pants on.

Q You said that while he was sitting beside you, he was still naked?

A Yes.

Q Was he still naked when your grandmother arrived?

A Yes.

Q So, when he ran to your kitchen, he was still naked?

A Yes.

Q What did he do with his pants and brief?

A He took it with him.

Q When you said you told your mother what happened to you, whom did you mention? You said you told your
mother what happened, what did you tell?

A I said, "Nay, I was raped by Lando."

Q So, before Lando raped you, you knew his name already?

A Yes, I was familiar with his name because I could hear his name from other persons.

Q And this Lando you are referring to is the person you pointed to before?

A Yes.

Q And he is the person you referred to, whom your mother understood?

A Yes.

Q Your mother knew this Lando already?

A No.

Q When you told your mother about this Lando, did your mother already know this Lando?

A Yes, because she could hear his name from other persons.
Q When you told your mother, you proceeded to Tacloban, while your mother went to the Brgy. Chairman?

A My mother told the Brgy. Chairman the next day.

Q But you proceeded to Tacloban?

A Yes.

Q But your mother went to Tacloban for your medical check-up?

A Yes.

x x x x.

According to the appellate court, AAA’s testimony says it all and bears the hallmarks of truth, that her
positive identification of Rondina was made with moral certainty and thus sufficient to convict him, and
that considering AAA’s age, it was hard to believe that she could have concocted such an ignominious
tale, told in a guileless and straightforward manner, unless it was the truth.

The Court disagrees.

The victim’s narration is

inconsistent with the physical
evidence of the supposed rape by a
stranger

It has been held that when the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge; that laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.25 The Court, however, finds no physical evidence of sexual penetration and no corroboration
of other vital details in AAA’s narration of the rape.

At the outset, it must be stated that Dr. Mijares’ medical report was not testified to, and therefore it is at
best a hearsay evidence. At the hearing scheduled on October 17, 2001, Dr. Mijares appeared, after
several subpoenas and warnings from the court, but instead of presenting him to be examined on his
medical report on the alleged rape of AAA, Prosecutor Filotea Estorninos manifested that she was
dispensing with his testimony provided the defense agreed to the prosecution’s offer of stipulation that
AAA submitted herself to medical examination one week after the alleged rape, to which the defense
acceded.26 Nonetheless, even granting it to be admissible, the report clearly shows that AAA suffered no
lacerations in her hymen, whether recent or healed and whether deep or superficial, nor other similar
injuries consistent with violent sexual assault. AAA’s hymen is described as "intact, elastic, open," and
the report nowhere indicates that she is in a non-virgin state. The report carries a pre-typed conclusion
that "[t]he above[-]described physical injuries are found in the body of the subject the age of which is
compatible to the alleged date of infliction," but being a mere pro-forma printed statement, the
"conclusion" serves only to further render the report of mere hearsay value.

It is true that the absence of lacerated wounds in AAA’s vagina does not negate sexual
intercourse.27 Laceration of the hymen, considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of
sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context
used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not
necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. 28 But when the victim
says that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina and pushed and pulled inside her "for a long time,"
and she felt pain and blood oozed from her organ, the stark absence of any vaginal tear or laceration will
have to be medically explained, or else, the Court is left with no inference other than that the charge of
rape may have been a mere fabrication.

The scenario created by the prosecution is that of a barrio maiden whose purity was being forcibly
assailed in a sudden attack, and the attacker is a stranger, one who naturally has no demands upon the
victim’s affections nor exercises moral ascendancy over her. It thus beggars belief that without putting up
a resistance, AAA just lay still on her back and mutely suffered the shame and pain of her repeated
violation by Rondina. She did not even raise a shout or a whimper, yet it was noonday, the windows and
doors of her house were open, there were people within a few arms’ length in the vicinity, and her
grandmother BBB lived just a house away. After her attacker had fled, still she raised no outcry.
In People v. Dizon, the accused had a gun and he threatened to kill the victim, but she vigorously resisted
and tried to stop the sexual assault; she kicked and pushed the accused away to prevent him from
consummating his lustful desire; she screamed for help, although no one came. In this appeal, the medico
legal report30 found no external injuries whatsoever sustained by AAA, indicating that she did not resist.
Yet from her testimony, her hands were unrestrained, and although Rondina poked a knife at her in the
beginning, he later laid it beside her.

Unbelievably, too, despite the threat of injury or death, and with her mouth stuffed with a towel as her
attacker forcibly entered her repeatedly, AAA could still take notice that Rondina ejaculated inside her.
With such mental sangfroid, one wonders how AAA could have failed to devise any resistance.

Significantly, too, the Court finds it curious that AAA completely overlooked making any further mention
of the knife and towel used by Rondina. She was absolutely sure he used a knife to threaten her, and then
both she and BBB testified that he stuffed AAA’s mouth with a face towel to gag her. Yet they told
nothing of the whereabouts of these objects, and neither AAA nor BBB saw Rondina leave the house with
the knife and towel. If then Rondina left them behind in the house, where are these vital evidence?
Towards the end of her testimony, BBB made an unbidden mention of the towel stuffed into AAA’s
mouth when she saw her,31 but this was an obvious concoction, since she did say that in the sala, she first
overheard them talking softly in the kitchen. Also, upon seeing them half naked in the kitchen, she
immediately demanded from AAA what they had done. Why would she ask her if she already saw AAA
gagged with a towel? Incidentally, the RTC noted that AAA’s minority has not been established by any
documentary or other evidence, nor even alleged in the information. 32

AAA made contradictory claims

that rendered her chief testimony
doubtful.

In addition to the inconsistencies this Court has already noted, AAA lied during her testimony on June 7,
1999, 10 months after the alleged incident, when she was asked if she knew the man who suddenly
sprung and laid on top of her. She answered with an emphatic "No," and when pressed further she said
she would recognize him if she saw him again. But in her complaint-affidavit which she executed on
September 9, 1998 at the NBI, she admitted that in fact she knew him.

Q Do you know LANDO personally?

A Yes.

Q How did you know him?

A He is residing in our Barangay.

AAA also admitted as much when she said she told her mother, "Nay, I was raped by Lando." 34 The
medicolegal report itself states that she was being examined for alleged rape "by a known person." For
"Lando" was not a stranger, being a resident in the same barriofor one year already, whose rented house
was a mere 20 meters away from AAA’s.35 AAA admitted that she had heard his name from the
neighbors,and that she knew that he lived in the house of Tiying, another barangay resident.

Also, AAA testified that when BBB arrived and Rondina ran away (although BBB twice mentioned that
he walked out), BBB asked her, "[AAA], who was that?" But having first overheard them talking in a low
voice, and later seeing AAA and Rondina half-naked, BBB’s natural reaction would logically have been
to exclaim, as the accused claimed in his testimony, "birat ano hin pagbuhat niyo hito?" or "why did you
do it!"36

Then, AAA said that as soon as Rondina was through raping her, she put her shorts back on, and when
BBB arrived, Rondina fled;37 but BBB said she saw AAA on her back half-naked and talking softly to
Rondina. BBB likewise executed an affidavit stating that upon seeing her, Rondina took to flight; but in
her testimony, BBB corrected the defense lawyer who tried to get her to repeat what she said. The counsel
said, "He went out of the kitchen door and went outside the house of [CCC]," but BBB clarified that "he
walked".38 A little later, she repeated that he walked. 39
The testimony of BBB only bolstered the story of Rondina. The RTC and the CA relied heavily on BBB’s
testimony, and this Court is reproducing pertinent portions thereof:

[PROS. FILOTEA M. ESTORNINOS]

Q You said you are residing in [XXX] and [CCC] is also residing in [XXX], how far or how close is the house of
[CCC] to your house?

A One house away from my house.

Q On August 30, 1998 at about 12:00 noon, can you still recall where were you then?

A At that time[,] I was about to visit my daughter [CCC].

Q Were you in fact visit the house of [CCC]?

A Yes, I went upstairs.

Q When you went upstairs[,] were you able to get inside the house?

A Yes.

Q Why, is there no [shutter] of the door?

A It was open when I arrived.

Q When you arrived what did you see if ever?

A I saw Lando.

Q Who is this Lando you are referring to?

A That one. ([W]itness pointing to a person when asked his name answers to the name Lando).

Q What was Lando doing when you saw him?

A When I arrived[,] I saw him by the side of [AAA].

Q How did you observe him?

A He was naked from the waist down.

Q How about your granddaughter [AAA], have you seen [her]?

A Yes, I saw [her].

Q Where was she?

A She was lying beside him.

Q You said Lando was beside [AAA,] what was the position of Lando when you saw him?

A He was sitting down.

Q What happened when you went inside the house and you saw Lando?

A When I arrived at the house hewas already beside [AAA].

Q When you went inside the house you saw Lando, what did he do?

A When I saw him he went down.

Q Where did he pass through?

A By the door of the kitchen.

Q How about you where did you enter when you went inside the house?
A At the front door.

Q When Lando left through the kitchen door and you said he was naked[,] what did he do with respect to his
clothings?

A He was holding his short pants when he went out.

Q When you said naked what do you mean by naked?

A He was naked from the waist down without any clothing, he was holding his brief and short pants.

Q What did you do when you saw Lando in that particular situation?

A I asked [AAA] what was that all about and she said nothing.

Q What was the demeanor of [AAA] when you asked her?

A She was crying.

Q For how long did you stay in that house of [CCC]?

A Not very long.

Q Why?

A Because I already asked her what had happened.

Q How about you[,] what did you feel as a grandmother when you saw Lando and [AAA] in that particular
situation?

A I got mad because he did something bad to my granddaughter.

Q Who is this person as you claim when you saw?

A Lando.

Q Do you know his family name?

A I forgot his family name.

Q Is he a native of Brgy. [XXX]?

A He lives there but he isnot [from] that place.

Q With whom is he living in Brgy. [XXX]?

A He lives in the house of Remedios.

Q Do you know a person by the name of Teying?

A He is the son of Remedios.

Q How about [AAA] at the time you saw her, what was the condition of the body of [AAA] when you first saw her?

A She was naked from the waist down.

Q When you went up[,] what did [AAA] do?

A She was crying.

Q How about her clothing[,] what did she do?

A It was on her waist.

Q And when you asked her[,] was she still naked when you asked her what is that?

A Yes.
Q Was she able to put on something on the lower portion of her body after you asked her?

A Yes she was able to put on her underwear.

Q As you said you got mad at Lando as he did something bad to your granddaughter what did you do if any?

A I asked [AAA] what was that all about and she said nothing and she was crying.

Q How about [CCC,] did you talk with [CCC] with respect to what you have seen?

A Yes in the morning.

Q You mean to say the following day?

A Yes.

Q Why did it take you to tell [CCC] on the following morning what you have seen?

A Because I have so many obligation to do considering that we are only farmer.

Q When you told [CCC] about what happened to your granddaughter, what did you and [CCC] do?

A We went to the Brgy. Captain.

xxxx

ATTY. NICOLASORA [On cross-examination]

Q When you arrived in the house of [AAA] you saw [AAA] lying naked is that correct?

A Yes.

Q What was her position[,] was she face up or was she lying on her side?

A Lying face up.

Q For the first time that you saw [AAA], you did not see her crying?

A She was already crying because she was already half-naked.

Q Before you enter[ed] the house of your daughter [CCC] on August 30, 1998 at 12:00 o’clock, you did not heard
[sic] any sound emanating from the house?

A I did not hear any sound only two of them inside.

Q When you first saw Lando[,] he was just sitting beside AAA?

A Yes.

Q They were talking small voice?

xxxx

A Yes, they were talking to each other.

Q But you were not able to hear the voice[,] what they were talking?

A No, because they were talking secretly[sic].

Q At the time you saw Lando[,] you were surprised why he was naked below? [sic]

A Yes.

Q You could hardly speak at that time when you first saw Lando naked below?

A I was not able to say anything because I was surprised.

Q It was only at that time when Lando saw you and bringing along with him his brief and pants?

A Yes.

Q He went out of the kitchen door and went outside the house of [CCC].

A He walked.

xxxx

PROS. ESTORNINOS [on re-direct]

Q Please tell the Court whether you have seen them talking?

A Yes[,] they were talking.

Q Why do you say that they were talking?

A Because I could hear them talking.

Q And when Lando pick[ed] up his pants and brief, he ran or walk slowly?

A He walked in going the door.

PROS. ESTORNINOS

That is all your honor.

COURT

Q You said Lando and [AAA] were talking, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Did you hear what Lando was talking?

A No, because he is talking in a low voice.

Q When Lando saw [you, he] immediately went out by the door of the kitchen?

A Yes.

Q Why did you say now that Lando was [stuffing] something in the mouth of [AAA] and poking [bladed] weapon
on her?

A Because [AAA] could not shout because the face towel was on her mouth.

Q Are you sure of that?

A Yes[,] I am sure about that.

The RTC summarized BBB’s testimony as follows:

During the cross-examination, said witness [BBB] averred that when she arrived in the house[,]
[AAA]was lying half[-]naked and with face up crying. That she did not hear any sound when she entered
the house and Lando was sitting beside [AAA] and they were talking to each other, but she was unable to
hear what they were talking [about] because they were talking secretly and she was surprised and could
not say anything when she first saw Lando.

In the re-direct examination, [BBB] claimed that she saw Lando and [AAA] talking to each other because
she could hear them talking and further averred that accused just walked in going to the door after picking
[up] his pants and brief. And in the court’s clarificatory questions, [BBB] contended that Lando and
[AAA] were talking to each other but she could not hear what Lando was talking about because he was
talking in a low voice x x x."41 (Emphasis ours)

While the natural reaction of a rape victim would have been to make an outcry after the danger to her had
passed,42 the truth is BBB saw no towel stuffed in AAA’s mouth, and in fact there was no need to gag
AAA because, as she herself admitted, throughout her ordeal, she chose to just cry quietly. BBB admitted
that she initially overheard her granddaughter talking with Lando in a low voice, or "secretly," which
could only have meant that they both desired to avoid discovery. It is also important to mention that BBB
saw no knife either beside AAA or in the hand of Rondina as he walked out.

The victim’s and her family’s

actuations after the alleged rape
defy logic and ordinary experience

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that a woman’s conduct immediately after the alleged assault
is of critical value in gauging the truth of her accusations. 43 One important test is that it must coincide
with logic and experience.44 If indeed she was raped, AAA’s utter failure not only to resist Rondina’s
advances but also to shout for help before, during or after the rape are truly baffling, and defy the ordinary
standards of human behavior. A stranger suddenly materialized who obviously had unholy intentions, he
quickly placed himself on top of her and raped her, yet AAA did not shout for help, knowing that the
neighbors were just nearby. Incomprehensibly, too, after the dastardly rape, which went on for a "long
time," AAA stayed half naked and supine, and with her face looking up she carried on a hushed
conversation with her supposed attacker, who just sat still beside her, also half-naked like her. While a
rape victim is not expected to resist until death, it is contrary to human experience that AAA did not even
make an outcry or put up a resistance,45 particularly since throughout her ordeal, her hands were free of
restraint, and Rondina’s knife lay by her side most of the time, if indeed he had a knife. The neighbors
were just a few arms’ length nearby, and her granduncle was the barangay captain, so after Rondina fled,
AAA had no more reason to still be afraid. Yet AAA did not even tell her mother the first night, or the
next night, choosing instead to return to her employer in

Tacloban two days later rather than report the incident. It has been held that "the victim's instant
willingness, as well as courage, to face interrogation and medical examination could be a mute but
eloquent proof of the truth of her claim."46 But as the R TC noted, it was BBB, not AAA, who told CCC
the next day.47 The second morning, she and CCC went to the barangay hall. BBB' s delay in telling CCC
defies logic, she merely saying she was busy farming. 48 The barangay chief was a first cousin of her
husband, and CCC' s uncle, yet she and CCC waited two days to report the rape incident.

Conclusion

A most regrettable outrage was committed upon the family's name and honor. This is clear from BBB' s
fury when she exclaimed, "Birat ano hin pagbuhat niyo hito?" Unfortunately, there is less evidence than
the modicum demanded by law to build a case for rape. The Court has a duty, and it is to set the accused
free.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Rolando Rondina is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of simple rape.
His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ordered, unless he is being held for another lawful
cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken
within five (5) days from his receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 92988. September 9, 1992.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRENEO TIWAKEN, Accused-

Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Domogan, Lockey, Orate, Daoas & Dao-Ayan Law Office for Accused-Appellant.

David A. Daoas collaborating counsel for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRINCIPLE TO GUIDE THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE

CASES. — The basic principle in criminal prosecutions is that accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If
the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no
defense at all. The accused faces the full panoply of state authority with "The people of the
Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, the odds are heavily against him. It is
important, therefore, to balance the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the
innocence of the accused until the state is able to overcome the presumption by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court has stressed time and again that in view of the severity of the
penalties for the offense of rape, justified by the" ‘traumatic consequences for the unfortunate
victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the community,’ there is need ‘for
extreme care on the part of the judiciary to avoid an injustice done to an accused. For it is equally
true that this is an offense to which, as is often the case, only two people can testify, thus
requiring the most conscientious effort on the part of the arbiter to weigh and appraise the
conflicting testimony. If a reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of acquittal.’ It must
be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but harder to be
defended by the accused, though innocent. The evidence for conviction must be clear and
convincing to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence."

2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; TESTIMONY OF RAPE VICTIM; REQUIRES

CORROBORATING STATEMENT FROM OTHER WITNESSES IN CASE AT BAR. — In the
case at bar, numerous circumstances detract from the credibility of the testimony and version of
the alleged rape victim, resulting in the failure of her case to meet the test of moral certainty and
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. To begin with, there were no witnesses presented
to corroborrate the story of the complainant, despite the fact that her brother and sister were
inside the house at the time of the alleged rape therein. Likewise, while complainant had
neighbors all around her house — scene of the alleged rape — including an uncle who lived very
near her house (who would have noticed any struggle or commotion inside the house of the
complainant if there really was any), yet, none of such neighbors was presented as witness for the
complainant. Indeed, it is hard to believe why the complainant did not shout or raise any outcry
which she could have easily done at the time she was supposed to have been sexually assaulted.
Why did she not shout for help when, according to her testimony, Accused Ireneo Tiwaken
suddenly opened the window of her house and was trying to climb in order to enter the house?
Why did she not do the same thing even after Tiwaken had supposedly entered the house,
considering that she had the needed time to do so? When one considers that complainant had a
brother and sister who were staying with her in the house where the rape allegedly took place and
that she had neighbors within the immediate vicinity of her house, including an uncle, who were
well within hearing distance, 7 her testimony as to the alleged sexual assault on her becomes a bit
difficult to really appreciate. It is even harder to fathom how the complainant merely went to
sleep in her room after having been allegedly sexually assaulted and ravished by the accused
three (3) times. It is unnatural and contrary to human experience for a woman not to immediately
seek the help of a brother and sister, an uncle and other neighbors who were within the vicinity of
her house at the time of the alleged assault or immediately thereafter.

3. ID.; ID.; INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE ACCUSED CAN NOT BE TAKEN EVIDENCE
OF GUILT. — The sustained scratches and bruises on the face of the accused and on the dorsal
side of his hands as well as the human bite marks on his shoulders at the time he was picked up
for questioning can not by any means and by themselves be taken against the accused as evidence
of guilt. The prosecution has not, in short, demonstrated the link between the injuries of the
accused and the offense charged. It is plain conjecture to say that the accused must have been
guilty of rape because he had such scratches and bruises on his body.
 4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CONVICTION; REQUIREMENT OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT; NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCES IN CASE
AT BAR. — The constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused in this case has not been
overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is doubt because the complainant had
no contusions in her stomach caused by a blow of such severity as to have rendered her
unconscious. And it is almost impossible for the complainant to have been unconscious for so
long a time as not to have been fully aware that accused had sexual intercourse with her two times
(2) before she allegedly regained consciousness. It takes time to consummate an act of coitus and
an even longer time to consummate the next. Furthermore, doubt is also raised by complainant’s
own act of bringing her supposed underwear and dress as well as the bolo that was supposed to
have been held by Tiwaken, as exhibits, fifteen (15) days after the alleged rape. While ,the assault
was allegedly committed on 25 August 1984, the exhibits were submitted to the police only on 10
September 1984. The intervening period, no doubt, could have given the complainant sufficient
time to "manufacture" her own evidence.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED DURING CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION; VIOLATION THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — Paul Pespes requested his
daughter to personally accompany the complainant to the hospital. He admitted that he knew the
complainant even before the incident and that his wife and the mother of the complainant are
related to each other. Pespes proceeded right away to arrest the accused and elicited admissions
from the latter, in clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused to remain silent and to
be assisted by counsel. It can be gathered from the circumstances narrated by Pespes that he
directly asked of the accused what he committed. The question, in effect, asked for an admission
on the part of the accused and did not partake of a general investigation, as the accused had
already been charged by complainant of the offense. The accused was a suspect and he should
have been apprised of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent first before any
investigation could proceed against him.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 35, Bontoc,
Mt. Province in Criminal Case No. 645 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Ireneo D. Tiwaken," finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P25,000.00.

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution’s version, of how the offense was committed, as adopted by the trial court in its decision,
is as follows:

"That on the afternoon of August 25, 1984, Floresita Albing, a Cathecist of the Roman Catholic religion
of Tue, Tadian, Mountain Province, escorted Sister Grace Leano to visit the barrios leaving her sister of
12 years old, a brother of 5 years old and a niece of 3 years old in the house after cooking food for them
and instructed them not to wait for her as she might be invited for supper. That the last house they visited
that day was the house of Mr. and Mrs. Romeo Kidikchan who let Mrs. Albing and Sister Grace stay for
supper. After supper Floresita Albing escorted Sister Grace Leano to her auntie’s house which was
converted and used as convent. After bringing Sister Grace to the convent and preparing her bed Mrs.
Albing begged permission and left for home. That on her way home she remembered she was earlier
invited to a birthday party and the persons who invited her saw her and called so she went to attend the
party given by Mr. and Mrs. Mariano Bolay for their grand child. That Mrs. Floresita Albing led the
prayers for supper and thereafter left for home with the excuse that she had visitors. That Mrs. Albing
reached her house past 9:00 o’clock in the evening and as she was about to sleep, her teeth ached so she
went down to the kitchen to brush her teeth. That at the kitchen Mrs. Albing took her brush and opened a
little the window and as she was brushing at the window she was suddenly frightened by the appearance
of accused Ireneo Tiwaken below the window and the window seal being only 3 feet above the
ground, Accused Ireneo Tiwaken climbed inside and held the mouth of Mrs. Floresita Albing stopping her
from shouting. Both victim and accused then struggled until they reached the fireplace where Floresita
took hold of a bolo; however accused grabbed the bolo and stuck it on the fireplace and thereafter accused
pushed Mrs. Albing against the fireplace. At this instance Mrs. Albing clawed the hands and face of
accused. She also bit his shoulders and Ireneo Tiwaken boxed the abdomen of Mrs. Albing rendering her
unconscious.
"That when Mrs. Floresita Albing regained consciousness she was lying on her back near the fireplace
and she felt dizzy and weak and thirsty and she asked for water and somebody gave her water. After
drinking Mrs. Albing felt better and when she opened her eyes she saw Ireneo Tiwaken standing naked
near her feet. Mrs. Albing got frightened and she touched her body and found her dress unzippered and
her bra lifted and her panty removed, and felt her private part bloody and wet. At this point Mrs. Albing
asked accused Ireneo Tiwaken, ‘What did you do with me?’ and Tiwaken told her, ‘I had sexual
intercourse with you twice.’ Thereafter accused Ireneo Tiwaken got the bolo and said: ‘We will have
sexual intercourse again and if you don’t want, I will kill you.’ And while saying these words he was
brandishing the bolo. Thereafter, Accused again raped Mrs. Albing. Then after raping Mrs. Albing for the
third time, Accused put on his dress (sic) and said to Mrs. Albing: ‘You are already finished. Even if I will
be jailed for this.’ After saying that accused left through the kitchen door. After accused left, Mrs, Albing
managed to wake up even though she was weak and went upstairs where her kid brother and sister were
sleeping and there she lied down and cried.

". . . that the following morning after the incident Mrs. Floresita Albing went early to Tadian, Mt.
Province and saw Cpl. Paul Pespes in his house at past 7:00 o’clock in the morning and reported the
incident to Cpl. Pespes in the presence of Mrs. Pespes and his daughter Rosalyn Pespes, and told Cpl.
Pespes that Ireneo Tiwaken was the one who raped her. That after Mrs. Albing made the report to Cpl.
Pespes, Cpl. Pespes instructed Mrs. Albing to go to the hospital for check-up and seeing her to be pale
and weak, Cpl. Pespes asked his daughter Rosalyn to accompany Mrs. Albing to the hospital while he,
Cpl. Pespes went to the police station to enter into the Police Blotter the reported incident. That Mrs.
Albing and Rosalyn Pespes hiked to the Abatan Mt. Province General Hospital and reached there at 11:00
o’clock, and Dr. Philip Guinid treated and examined Mrs. Floresita Albing.

". . . that on August 26, 1984. Cpl. Pespes after entering into the Police Blotter the incident narrated by
Mrs. Albing. . . ., Cpl. Pespes called for Pat. Bonifacio San Jose and both of them went to Tue, Tadian.
Mt. Province, to investigate the reported rape case. That upon arriving at Tue and with the help of Donato
Alibet a Barangay CHDF, Cpl. Pespes and Pat. San Jose located the place of accused Ireneo Tiwaken
who was sleeping and after waking Tiwaken up, Cpl. Pespes asked him if he, Accused, committed an
unusual incident and accused answered; ‘linokok ni Mrs. Albing’, meaning, ‘I did something bad to Mrs.
Albing’, or ‘I wronged Mrs. Albing’. After that Cpl. Pespes invited accused Ireneo Tiwaken to the Police
Station at Tadian and upon arrival recorded their mission in the Police Blotter . . . After recording in the
Police Blotter their mission. accused Ireneo Tiwaken was brought for medical examination as he appeared
to have sustained some injuries during the raping incident. That as a result of the medical examination a
medico legal certificate was issued."

The version of the defense, on the other hand, is as follows:

"That accused Ireneo Tiwaken knows Mrs. Floresita Albing because they are barriomates and former
friends. That accused courted Mrs. Floresita Albing in 1981 and (she) became his girl friend for 4 months.
That during that (sic) four months in 1981 accused and Floresita Albing who was then single, lived-in
together. Thereafter. accused went to Baguio to work with the plan of returning home on (sic) December,
1981, but because Floresita got married to Mr. Pedro Albing his plan did not materialize. Accused then
worked off and on until he was taken in Philex Mines where after working for one year he was removed
and accused loafed around until finally he went home to Tue, Tadian in 1984 to attend the wedding of his
sister Gema. That after the wedding accused Ireneo Tiwaken helped his parents in the harvest of their
fields at Segseg and Abit. That in the harvest at Abit in the year 1984. Mrs. Floresita Albing was one of
those who helped in the harvest. That on the first day of the harvest at Abit, Accused and Floresita walked
together to the ricefield and on the way they hugged and kissed each other. That on the second day they
again went together to harvest at Abit and on the river bank accused and Floresita made love before
working. That on the third day accused and complainant again went together to the ricefield at Abit
kissing each other and holding hands; and on the fourth day accused and Floresita again went together to
Abit and made love on the wayside. After the harvest at Abit was over, Accused Ireneo Tiwaken went for
a whole week, to the mountains to fetch fuel.

". . . that in the evening of August 25, 1984, Accused Ireneo Tiwaken went with one Peter Tanan to the
house of Felipa Bonay and there they had conversations and singing with Mrs. Floresita Albing and some
children. After staying in the house of Felipa Bonay (sic) for two hours accused was called by Mrs.
Albing to accompany her home located at a distance of about 300 to 400 meters away from the house of
Mrs. Bonay (sic). That upon reaching the house of Mrs. Albing, the kitchen door was opened by Floresita
and both of them with Ireneo Tiwaken entered and after exchanging some words their love got arose (sic)
and they started kissing and embracing and made love. Thereafter, Floresita went to get a mat and they
slept on the kitchen floor and again made love before sleeping. Late that night Ireneo was awaken (sic) by
Floresita telling him to leave as she will go preaching doctrine at Balaoa that morning so they again made
love for the third time that night and after that accused left the house and went to sleep, in the incomplete
house of Floresita located above. In the following morning, August 26, 1984, Accused woke up and went
home and ate and after eating, he attended a meeting at the Atato and after the meeting he went to sleep
again in his usual sleeping place. Later that day he was awaken (sic) by two policemen named Pespes and
San Jose and was informed that Floresita sued him for rape so accused was brought to Tadian and placed
in jail. The following day, August 27, 1984, Accused was brought to the Abatan hospital for medical
examination and the doctor asked accused if he quarreled with anybody and the policeman who
accompanied accused informed the doctor that accused was sued for rape."

The court a quo gave full credence to the prosecution’s version and rendered the aforestated judgment of
conviction. Hence, the present appeal. Appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the
court a quo:

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THIS (HIS) GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;

II

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF RAPE
ARE LACKING IN THE INSTANT CASE;

III

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND
UNSUBSTANTIATED TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE UNPREJUDICED AND
HIGHLY CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE ACCUSED.

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS, PAUL PESPES AS TO WHAT ACCUSED IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE STATED WHEN
BEING INVESTIGATED FOR THE RAPE CHARGE MADE BY THE COMPLAINANT.

The foregoing assignments of error, being interrelated, will be discussed jointly.

The basic principle in criminal prosecutions is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused
is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails
utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The accused faces the full
panoply of state authority with "The people of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of
speaking, the odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to balance the positions of the
prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to overcome
the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The Court has stressed time and again that in view of the severity of the penalties for the offense of rape,
justified by the" ‘traumatic consequences for the unfortunate victim and grievous injury to the peace and
good order of the community,’ there is need ‘for extreme care on the part of the judiciary to avoid an
injustice done to an accused. For it is equally true that this is an offense to which, as is often the case,
only two people can testify, thus requiring the most conscientious effort on the part of the arbiter to weigh
and appraise the conflicting testimony. If a reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of acquittal.’
It must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but harder to be
defended by the accused, though innocent. The evidence for conviction must be clear and convincing to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence."

In the case at bar, numerous circumstances detract from the credibility of the testimony and version of the
alleged rape victim, resulting in the failure of her case to meet the test of moral certainty and guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

To begin with, there were no witnesses presented to corroborrate the story of the complainant, despite the
fact that her brother and sister were inside the house at the time of the alleged rape therein. Likewise,
while complainant had neighbors all around her house — scene of the alleged rape — including an uncle
who lived very near her house (who would have noticed any struggle or commotion inside the house of
the complainant if there really was any), yet, none of such neighbors was presented as witness for the
complainant.

Indeed, it is hard to believe why the complainant did not shout or raise any outcry which she could have
easily done at the time she was supposed to have been sexually assaulted. 5 Why did she not shout for
help when, according to her testimony, Accused Ireneo Tiwaken suddenly opened the window of her
house and was trying to climb in order to enter the house? Why did she not do the same thing even after
Tiwaken had supposedly entered the house, considering that she had the needed time to do so? 6

When one considers that complainant had a brother and sister who were staying with her in the house
where the rape allegedly took place and that she had neighbors within the immediate vicinity of her
house, including an uncle, who were well within hearing distance, 7 her testimony as to the alleged sexual
assault on her becomes a bit difficult to really appreciate.

It is even harder to fathom how the complainant merely went to sleep in her room after having been
allegedly sexually assaulted and ravished by the accused three (3) times. It is unnatural and contrary to
human experience for a woman not to immediately seek the help of a brother and sister, an uncle and
other neighbors who were within the vicinity of her house at the time of the alleged assault or
immediately thereafter.

In People v. Hayag, this Court ruled:

"In all such cases, the conduct of the woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost
importance as tending to establish the truth or fidelity of the charge."cralaw virtua1aw library

and in People v. Monsalud, this Court said:

"Subjecting the evidence on record to the crucible of scrutiny, we find that the most significant fact
decisive of this appeal, is the very conduct of the complainant immediately after the alleged rape. The
actuations do not show any sign of fatigation, disturbance or predicament to her brothers, to her parents
nor to the policeman who came after the alleged rape. (People of the Philippines v. Acogido, C.A. GR
No. 21513-R, April 30, 1969). Her silent acquiescence which she maintained until the following morning
seriously casts doubt on the prosecution’s theory of rape."cralaw virtua1aw library

Besides, there is no evidence to show that the complainant was really forced to have sexual intercourse
with the accused. In fact, when the complainant went for medical examination, what was found on her
body were minor abrasions on the external genitalia which could have been caused by fingernails as
reported in the testimony of Dr. Camilo Rivera 10 and affirmed by Dr. Philip Guinid, who actually
examined Florecita Albing’s condition during the earlier inquiry and who stated that the abrasions in the
genitalia of the woman could have been caused by anything such as "fingering (of) her own."

Court: In your findings, what caused the wounds?

Answer: It could have been caused by anything such as fingering her own . . .

Court: From August 26, 1984 at 10:30 a.m. a few number of hours before examination, could a wound
have been inflicted?

Answer: That is possible. (TSN, Nov. 29, 1984)

These answers give some credence to the theory that the abrasions on the genitalia of Florecita Albing
(which were minor and did not even require treatment) could have been self-inflicted by the complainant
for reasons of her own.

The testimony of the complainant in this case must be considered with caution. In People v. Reyes 11 and
in People v. de Guia, this Court held:

"In the appreciation of the evidence in a prosecution for the crime of rape, we have been invariably guided by three
well-known principles:

1. That an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the complainant to prove it, even more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it.

2. That in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two (2) persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution: and

3. That the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and can not draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense."
In its totality, the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused in this case has not been
overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is doubt because the complainant had no
contusions in her stomach caused by a blow of such severity as to have rendered her unconscious. 13 And
it is almost impossible for the complainant to have been unconscious for so long a time as not to have
been fully aware that accused had sexual intercourse with her two times (2) before she allegedly regained
consciousness. It takes time to consummate an act of coitus and an even longer time to consummate the
next.

In People v. Monsalud, this Court held:

"Complainant claimed that in a period of 30 minutes appellant had sexual intercourse with her three (3)
times. If there was any resistance, no matter how token, put up by complainant, appellant could not have
had carnal knowledge three (3) times in 30 minutes. The assault was repeated thrice, she said, but she did
not explain or even as much as intimate, how the second and third sexual assaults happened. It has been
held that ‘the fact that the accused had succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the complainant for
the 2nd and 3rd time is a very strong circumstance against complainant’s claim that her previous
intercourse was perpetrated by the force or with imminent threat of her life.’ (People of the Philippines v.
Lacson, 53 O.G. 1823)"

Furthermore, doubt is also raised by complainant’s own act of bringing her supposed underwear and dress
as well as the bolo that was supposed to have been held by Tiwaken, as exhibits, fifteen (15) days after
the alleged rape. While ,the assault was allegedly committed on 25 August 1984, the exhibits were
submitted to the police only on 10 September 1984. The intervening period, no doubt, could have given
the complainant sufficient time to "manufacture" her own evidence. It is in this connection that the ruling
in People v. Dramayo, 15 acquires significance:

"Accusation is not, according to fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer
evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is a need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had
been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for
the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty."

So also in People v. Tempongko, 16 where this Court held:

"The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of
this Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and so cannot be
affirmed in this appeal. . . . The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our condemning the
appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of doubt that he is guilty."

and in People v. Alcaraz, where we said:

"However, the Constitution and the law are clear that in case of reasonable doubt, the accused must be
acquitted. Our jurisprudence is built around the concept that it is preferable for the guilty to remain
unpunished than an innocent person to suffer a long prison term unjustly."

Felipa Bonay Tanan testified that the complainant was in her house in the evening of 25 August 1984 to
attend the birthday party that she and her husband hosted. This was admitted by the complainant. Felipa
also testified that the accused accompanied the complainant home after the birthday party and that she
provided the complainant with some light which the latter in turn handed over to the accused.

Victor Gonan and Simeon Benbenen testified to the effect that it was of common knowledge in Tue,
Tadian, Mt. Province that the complainant and the accused were lovers. According to them, many
residents of their place expected that they would soon get married because it was widely known that they
were already sleeping together, just like husband and wife. However, when the accused went to Baguio
sometime in 1981 to look for work, the complainant suddenly got married to a certain Pedro Albing,
probably thinking that the accused had left her for another girl. Due in turn to some marital
misunderstanding, Pedro Albing left the complainant sometime in 1983 and did not return home for a
significant period of time. The same witnesses further testified that sometime in the evening of 25 August
1984, they met the complainant and the accused headed towards the former’s house.
The testimony of Capt. Rafael Delson, the station commander of the Integrated National Police of Tadian,
is also of importance in evaluating the accused’s innocence or guilt of the crime charged. Substantially,
he testified that the complainant herself went to visit the accused on 27 August 1984 or a day after she
filed the complaint against him to tell him about her predicament. Delon testified that when the accused
asked the complainant why she filed a case against him, she replied that she was confused because she
just learned that her husband had arrived on 25 August 1984 and that he went directly to his uncle’s
residence in Kayan.

According to the complainant herself, she went directly to the residence of Paul Pespes on 26 August
1984, to report the rape instead of reporting directly to the police Station.

Paul Pespes requested his daughter to personally accompany the complainant to the hospital. He admitted
that he knew the complainant even before the incident and that his wife and the mother of the
complainant are related to each other. 22 Pespes proceeded right away to arrest the accused and elicited
admissions from the latter, in clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused to remain silent and
to be assisted by counsel. It can be gathered from the circumstances narrated by Pespes that he directly
asked of the accused what he committed. The question, in effect, asked for an admission on the part of the
accused and did not partake of a general investigation, as the accused had already been charged by
complainant of the offense. The accused was a suspect and he should have been apprised of his
constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent first before any investigation could proceed against
him.

The sustained scratches and bruises on the face of the accused and on the dorsal side of his hands as well
as the human bite marks on his shoulders at the time he was picked up for questioning can not by any
means and by themselves be taken against the accused as evidence of guilt. 23

The prosecution has not, in short, demonstrated the link between the injuries of the accused and the
offense charged. It is plain conjecture to say that the accused must have been guilty of rape because he
had such scratches and bruises on his body.

Finally, from the totality of the circumstances, the reasonable idea cannot be ruled out that the ulterior
motive of the complainant in filing the rape charge against the appellant was to avoid retribution from her
husband who night have found out her sexual union with the accused during his absence from the
conjugal abode.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Ireneo Tiwaken is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt for the crime of rape has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 232455, December 02, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TEODORO ANSANO Y

CALLEJA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before this Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by the accused-appellant Teodoro Ansano y Calleja
(Ansano) assailing the Decision2 dated February 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 08223, which affirmed the Decision3 dated November 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of
YYY, ZZZ4, Branch 26 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. SC-12326, finding Ansano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape.

The Facts

An Information was filed against Ansano for the rape of minor AAA, Upon arraignment, Ansano entered
a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial and trial on the merits then ensued.

The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, is as follows:

The complaining witness is AAA, 15 years old, student and a resident of XXX. She testified that she filed
this case of rape against accused Teodoro Ansano, whom she pointed to and identified in open court. She
stated that she did not know him at first, but when she went to the Municipal Building, she came to know
him because of his niece who is her friend. On April 6, 2005, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she
was going to fetch her father at Narra, where he was then selling goods at the river. This was at GGG near
the river. Accused Ansano was then carrying a bolo, wearing a long-sleeved shirt and long pants used in
the farm; while she was wearing red t-shirt and school uniform skirt. Ansano poked his bolo at her and
told her to go with him to the falls near the Narra tree. Because she was afraid and he threatened to kill
her if she does not go with him, she went along. When they were nearing the falls, he turned the other
way. He held her tightly by the shoulder, dragged her to a secluded area with bamboo trees and coconuts
and told her to sit down and not to shout, still poking the bolo at her. He then removed his clothes,
undressed her, laid her down, kissed her neck and placed his penis into her mouth. She cried very hard
and vomited at that time. Thereafter, accused inserted his penis into her vagina. It was painful. Accused
rested for a while, and then did it again. Thereafter, accused put on his clothes and directed her to remain
lying down until he left the place. He also told her not to tell anyone about the incident because he knew
her and her parents, he knew what time she went to church, what time she went to bed and that she was
always with her cousin. He then left and proceeded to the direction going to Narra. After he left, she put
on her clothes and went home. She proceeded to bed and cried. Her mother asked her why she was crying
and she told her that she was raped. She could hardly speak because she was still crying. Her father went
to the place of the incident but the person who abused her was no longer there, so her father reported the
incident to the police station.

She came to know the name and identity of the accused on March 19, 2006 at 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
when she saw him in their house having a drinking spree with her father. She was able to recognize him
("namumukhaan"); he has a scar and "butil-butil" on his face; he has a moustache and "medyo singkit".
She came to know his name for the first time when she went to the XXX Municipal Hall, where accused
was detained because of the case filed by BBB. She was shown a picture of the accused, which she
examined clearly, and she was sure that he was the one who raped her.

Because she was raped, she went to [ZZZ] Provincial Hospital for a medical examination. At the time of
the incident on April 6, 2005, she was [just] thirteen (13) years old. She presented her Certificate of
Baptism issued by Santo Cristo of Bulacan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, showing that she was born on
September 14, 1991 and baptized on September 25, 1991. She does not have a Certificate of Live Birth,
as her birth was not registered because the midwife who attended to the delivery of her mother went
abroad.

Upon cross-examination, she stated that she had been residing in XXX, since the year 2005, and that she
had not known the accused, even by face, before April 6, 2005. She came to know him through BBB who
was then living in their house, when accused had a drinking spree with her father on March 19, 2006.

xxxx
The next prosecution witness was Dr. Maria Cheryl Obcemea x x x [and] [h]er qualification as an expert
witness was admitted by the defense. She testified that according to their records, she examined the
patient AAA on April 7, 2005 at [ZZZ] Provincial Hospital. She was the one who physically examined
AAA and her findings was reduced into writing in a Medico-Legal Report. Said findings indicate
"Perineum: hymen-multiple fresh laceration 7 and 5 o'clock position; minimal bleeding."8

On the other hand, the accused relied on denial and alibi to establish his innocence. The version of the
defense was summarized by the RTC, again as affirmed by the CA, as follows:

The defense presented accused himself, Teodoro Calleja Ansano, 45 years old, single, slipper maker and
residing at XXX. He stated that he does not personally know AAA. On April 6, 2005, at around 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, he was at Villa Pokan with his friends Rudy Monfero, Albert Concordia and
Nick Esmejarda. They arrived at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Villa Pokan to go swimming there and
left at around 5:00 o'clock. They went home going their separate ways: Rudy and Albert to Ilayang
Taykin, Nick to Poblacion and he (Ansano) to XXX. Upon reaching his house, he immediately went to
sleep and woke up the next morning, April 7 at around 6:00 o'clock. On his way home to XXX, he did not
meet AAA, nor did he poke a bolo on her neck and rape her.

The Court noted the manifestation of defense counsel that Ansano has no scar on his face at the time he
testified in court.

When cross-examined, he stated that he does not know AAA and her father CCC; that he came to know
in court that their house is more or less one kilometer away from his house; that on April 6, 2005, he and
his friends Rudy, Albert and Nick left at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that [Villa Pokan] is more
or less one kilometer away from his house; that upon reaching his house, he immediately went to sleep
and woke up the following day.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision10 dated November 16, 2015, the RTC convicted Ansano of the
crime charged.

The RTC was convinced by the testimony of AAA identifying Ansano as the one who sexually abused
her. It found such testimony to be clear, consistent, spontaneous, and unrelenting, thus establishing that it
was Ansano who sexually abused her on April 6, 2005. The RTC likewise found her testimony to be
corroborated through the testimony of the medico-legal who conducted a medical examination on AAA.
Thus, as between her credible testimony and Ansano's bare denial, the RTC ruled that the evidence at
hand established Ansano's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Aggrieved, Ansano appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision13 dated February 20, 2017, the CA affirmed Ansano's conviction, and held
that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the elements of the crime charged.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

Proceeding from the foregoing, for resolution of this Court is the issue of whether the RTC and the CA
erred in convicting the accused-appellant.
 The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits Ansano on the ground of reasonable doubt.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that "the Court, in the course of its review of criminal cases elevated to it,
still commences its analysis from the fundamental principle that the accused before it is presumed
innocent."17 This presumption continues although the accused had been convicted in the trial court, as
long as such conviction is still pending appeal. As the Court explained in Polangcos v. People:

Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that every accused is presumed innocent
unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is "a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by
procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the
offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength
of the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of the defense."

This presumption in favor of the accused remains until the judgment of conviction becomes final and
executory. Borrowing the words of the Court in Mangubat, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al, "[u]ntil a
promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails." Hence, even if a judgment
of conviction exists, as long as the same remains pending appeal, the accused is still presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in People v. Mingming, the Court
outlined what the prosecution must do to hurdle the presumption and secure a conviction:

First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until final conviction; conviction
requires no less than evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral certainty of guilt, not only with respect to the
existence of a crime, but, more importantly, of the identity of the accused as the author of the crime.

Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot draw its strength from the
weakness of the defense.19 (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to such principle, the Court has also laid down the following guidelines in its review of rape
cases:

(a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove,
it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge;

(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of
rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and

(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

From these principles, and based on its own careful review of the records of the case, the Court rules that
a reasonable doubt exists as to Ansano's culpability. While the Court does not doubt AAA's claim that she
had been raped, the Court does not, however, have moral certainty that it was Ansano who committed the
dastardly act.

Verily, a successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the
identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a
crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offender's
identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an
identification that is full of uncertainties.

The Court has always been mindful that "the greatest care should be taken in considering the
identification of the accused, especially when this identification is made by a sole witness and the
judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification."24 This stems from the
recognition that testimonial evidence, unlike other forensic evidence such as fingerprint and DNA testing
which are real or object evidence, are subject to human errors which may be intentional or unintentional.
In People v. Nuñez25 (Nuñez), the Court elucidated:

The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of inordinate reliance on human memory in
criminal proceedings, where conviction results in the possible deprivation of liberty, property, and even
life, is equally established.

Human memory does not record events like a video recorder. In the first place, human memory is more
selective than a video camera. The sensory environment contains a vast amount of information, but the
memory process perceives and accurately records only a very small percentage of that information.
Second, because the act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting puzzle pieces together, human
memory can change in dramatic and unexpected ways  because of the  passage  of time  or subsequent
events, such as exposure to "postevent" information like conversations with other witnesses or media
reports. Third, memory can also be altered through the reconstruction process. Questioning a witness
about what he or she perceived and requiring the witness to reconstruct the experience can cause the
witness' memory to change by unconsciously blending the actual fragments of memory of the event with
information provided during the memory retrieval process.

Eyewitness identification, or what our jurisprudence commendably refers to as "positive identification," is

the bedrock of many pronouncements of guilt. — However, eyewitness identification is but a product of
flawed human memory. In an expansive examination of 250 cases of wrongful convictions where
convicts were subsequently exonerated by DNA testing, Professor Brandon Garett (Professor Garett)
noted that as much as 190 or 76% of these wrongful convictions were occasioned by flawed eyewitness
identifications. Another observer has more starkly characterized eyewitness identifications as "the leading
cause of wrongful convictions."

xxxx

The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on eyewitness identification is borne not only by the
intrinsic limitations of human memory as the basic apparatus on which the entire exercise of identification
operates. It is as much the result of and is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as environmental factors,
flawed procedures, or the mere passage of time.

In another case, the Court acknowledged that:

Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a
bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details
of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of
unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to
acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and
suggestive influences.

Thus, American jurisprudence has followed — and local jurisprudence later on adopted — a "totality of
circumstances test" in determining the reliability, or at times even the admissibility, of a witness' out-of-
court identification of the accused.

The jurisprudential test of "totality of circumstances"

The totality of circumstances test was first applied by the Court in People v. Teehankee (Teehankee),

wherein it applied the test as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in Neil v.
Biggers (Biggers) and Manson v. Brathwaite30 (Brathwaite):

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Essentially, the problem with eyewitness testimony is that the human mind is not just limited in terms of
perception, but that human memory is also highly susceptible to suggestion. Hence, the jurisprudence on
the matter, like Biggers and Brathwaite, dealt with the propriety of police procedures employed to arrive
at the identification of the accused. The rule that was thereafter adopted was that "convictions based on
eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that
ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise
to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." It was explained that "suggestive
confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification, and
unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of
misidentification is gratuitous."
In the case of Foster v. California, the accused was initially put in a line-up of three men, with the accused
being almost six feet in height while the other two men in the line-up were just 5'5" and 5'6." The
eyewitness was unable to identify the accused as the perpetrator, but asked for a one-on-one confrontation
with the accused. Even with this, the eyewitness was still uncertain that it was indeed the accused who
committed the crime. A week or more later, the same eyewitness was shown another line-up of five men.
Only the accused was present in both the first and second line-ups. After having been shown the second
line-up, the eyewitness became "sure" that the accused was the perpetrator. Applying the totality of
circumstances test and the standard of "likelihood of irreparable misidentification," the SCOTUS set aside
the out-of-court identification of the accused for having violated the latter's right to due process. The
SCOTUS explained:

Judged by that standard, this case presents a compelling example of unfair lineup procedures. In the first
lineup arranged by the police, petitioner stood out from the other two men by the contrast of his height
and by the fact that he was wearing a leather jacket similar to that worn by the robber. See United States
v. Wade, supra, at 388 U. S. 233. When this did not lead to positive identification, the police permitted a
one-to-one confrontation between petitioner and the witness. This Court pointed out in Stovall that

"the practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a
lineup, has been widely condemned."

Even after this, the witness' identification of petitioner was tentative. So, some days later, another lineup
was arranged. Petitioner was the only person in this lineup who had also participated in the first lineup.
See Wall, supra, at 64. This finally produced a definite identification.

The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made it all but inevitable that David would
identify petitioner whether or not he was, in fact, "the man." In effect, the police repeatedly said to the
witness, "This is the man." See Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U. S. 404, 407 (dissenting opinion). This
procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due
process.35 (Emphasis supplied)

The SCOTUS clarified, however, that the presence of suggestive elements in the identification process
adopted by the police officers, on its own, would not automatically result in the inadmissibility of the out-
of-court identification. In Brathwaite, the SCOTUS emphasized that "reliability is the linchpin in
determining the admissibility of identification testimony"36 and that the "factors to be considered x x x
include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of
attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be
weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself."

This was the context of the totality of circumstances test adopted by the Court in Teehankee. Years
after Teehankee, the Court would adopt additional guidelines for police officers, and safeguards for the
accused, in the conduct of out-of-court identification. In People v. Villena, the Court said that "to avoid
charges of impermissible suggestion, there should be nothing in the photograph that would focus attention
on a single person." Subsequently, in People v. Pineda, the Court added that:

[t]he first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of photographs must be
shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group
of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to
the suspect.

The Court in Pineda applied the totality of circumstances test, but also added that the following factors
may be considered in determining the reliability of the out-of-court identification:

A well-known authority in eyewitness identification made a list of 12 danger signals that exist
independently of the identification procedures investigators use. These signals give warning that the
identification may be erroneous even though the method used is proper. The list is not exhaustive. The
facts of a particular case may contain a warning not in the list. The list is as follows:

(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;

(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no accusation against
him when questioned by the police;

(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness' original description and the
actual description of the accused;
 (4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified some other
person;

(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;

(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;

(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to see the accused;

(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;

(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness was unaware that a
crime was involved;

(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness' view of the criminal and his identification
of the accused;

(11) several persons committed the crime; and

(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.

From the foregoing jurisprudential tests and guidelines, the Court finds in this case that the out-of-court
identification by AAA failed to pass the test of reliability to establish the identity of the accused as the
perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt.

Application of the totality of circumstances test in the present case

To reiterate, the totality of circumstances test requires the Court to look at the following factors in
weighing the reliability of the out-of-court identification: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the length of time between the crime and the identification; (5) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.   

(a) The first two factors: opportunity to view, and degree of attention.

Discussions relating to these factors include, for example, the duration of the commission of the
crime, the lighting conditions, and whether the eyewitness was put on alert that he or she must
remember the identity of the particular person, among others.

In the present case, the Court recognizes that the witness had a good opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, given that they spent considerable time together during the
commission of the crime. The witness also said that the crime happened around 5:00 in the
afternoon, thus the lighting conditions were well enough for her to see the face of her assailant.
As well, it could be said that AAA had a high degree of attention, especially on the identity of her
assailant, during this time as they were the only people in the crime scene.

Despite these, however, AAA's identification of Ansano as the assailant fails the rest of the other
factors to be considered.   

(b) Accuracy of any prior description.

AAA's description of her attacker was general and related mostly to, not her assailant's physical
features, but what he was wearing at the time of the crime. In her direct testimony, the only
descriptions that she gave were that: "[h]e is taller than I am; he was carrying a bolo; he was
wearing a long-sleeved shirt; he was wearing long pants he used in the farm, sir."43 These were
her only descriptions of her assailant as she was narrating the rape incident. The description that
her assailant had a scar on his face and that it had "butil-butil" came after, when she saw Ansano
on March 19, 2006.

More importantly, however, the records show that the additional description did not match
Ansano. She testified as follows:

Q Can you please tell to the Honorable Court, how were you able to come to know the name and
identity of the accused?
A I was able to recognized (sic) his face at the time of the incident on March 19, 2006 at 8 o'clock
in the evening. I saw him in our house having a drinking spree with my father, sir.

Q And while the accused was having a drinking spree with your father at that night, where were
you at that time?

A I was in our house, playing with my cousins, sir.

Q How far were you to the place of your father and the accused were there (sic) having a drinking
spree?

A Our house is near the road and my father and the accused having a drinking spree beside the
road, sir.

Q What happened next after their having a drinking spree?

A I felt nervous, Sir.

Q Why?

A Because I was able to recognized (sic) his face, sir.

ATTY. ANONUEVO I would like to quote in vernacular "namumukhaan"

COURT Put it on the record.

WITNESS Because "namumukhaan ko po siya"

Q And when you say "namumukhaan", what do you mean by that?

A Because in my mind, I was able to recall his face that he is the one who abuse[d] me, sir.

Q Now, you said that you were able to recall that the accused was the one who abuse[d] you
because of his face, what are those identifying [marks] to his face?

A He has a scar in [his] face, sir.

INTERPRETER Witness pointing on her left cheek with her finger.

FISCAL What else, if any?

WITNESS And he has "butil-butil sa mukha", sir.

Q Aside from those, what else, if any?

A He has a moustache, he has an eye which is "medyo singkit", sir.44

However, on another hearing date, before the prosecution cross-examined Ansano, the defense
made the following manifestation which was duly noted by the trial court:

ATTY. ANONUEVO Before the public prosecutor conduct[s] his cross-examination, I am

requesting the witness, the accused, to please face the Honorable Presiding Judge. I just want to
make it of record that the face of the witness has no scar whatsoever which will be verified by the
Honorable Court.

COURT Verified.

ATTY. ANONUEVO I would like to make it of record that the Honorable Presiding Judge has
confirmed that the accused has no scar whatsoever on his face.45

The prosecution made a counter-manifestation that the scar may have been gone since it had been
four years between AAA's identification and the time the accused took the witness
stand.46 However,
 [t]he Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more interpretations, one of which being consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the
constitutional presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus
insufficient to support a conviction.47

In other words, doubts — no matter how slight, as long as they are reasonable — created in the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime, should be resolved in favor of the accused.48   

(c)   The length of lime between the crime and the identification

The Court also held in Nuñez that:

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the length of time between the
crime and the identification made by the witness. 'It is by now a well-established fact that people
are less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval than
after a short one.' Ideally then, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after
the incident.49

In the present case, AAA was raped in April 2005. She supposedly saw her assailant again in
March 2006, and was finally able to definitively point to Ansano as her assailant in May 2006.
There was thus, more or less, one year between the time the crime was committed to the time of
the identification.

In People v. Rodrigo (Rodrigo) a time lapse of 5 1/2 months between the commission of the
crime and the out-of-court identification was one of the factors that led the Court to hold that the
identification of the accused was unreliable. The present case, in comparison, even involves a
longer passage of time. While a longer passage of time per se will not automatically make an
eyewitness recollection unreliable, it certainly impacts its overall reliability when considered
along with the other factors in the totality of circumstances test.

(d) The last two factors: the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification, and the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

The Court notes that AAA did not show a high level of certainty in her initial identification of
Ansano.ℒαwρhi ৷ For instance, in her testimony quoted above, she used the word "namumukhaan"
instead of "nakilala" when she saw Ansano on March 19, 2006. More glaring, however, was that
she needed a second look for her to be able to ascertain that Ansano was her assailant — this
time, through a photograph while Ansano was detained for another charge. AAA testified as
follows:

Q Now, Madam Witness, you stated that, that was the time on March 19, 2006 were able to
identify the face of the accused, the one who raped you that afternoon of April 6, 2005, when for
the first time did you come to know his name?

A When I went to the Municipal Hall, sir.

Q Where specifically in Municipal Hall?

A In Municipal Hall of [ZZZ], sir.

Q What office?

A In the office of the police, sir.

Q Were you able to know his name at the Police Station?

A I was then asking if the accused was still at the Municipal Jail because he was then detained
because of the case filed by [BBB], sir.

Q And the policemen told you the name of the accused?

A Yes and he shown (sic) the picture of the accused, sir.

Q And after that what did you do?

 A I examine the picture clearly and I am sure that he is the one who raped me, sir.52 (Emphasis
supplied)

The foregoing testimony, apart from being an indication of AAA's level of uncertainty as to her
identification of Ansano, is more importantly an indication that the identification was marred by
improper suggestion.

To recall, the Court has already said in Pineda that:

[t]he first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of photographs must
be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is
shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of
the pictures pertains to the suspect.53

This is so because:

[w]here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party, any subsequent corporeal
identification of that person may be based not upon the witness's recollection of the features of
the guilty party, but upon his recollection of the photograph. Thus, although a witness who is
asked to attempt a corporeal identification of a person whose photograph he previously identified
may say, "That's the man that did it," what he may actually mean is, "That's the man whose
photograph I identified."

xxxx

A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the conclusion that where a witness
has made a photographic identification of a person, his subsequent corporeal identification of that same
person is somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must be evaluated in light of the fact that he first
saw a photograph.

Pineda itself involved an acquittal of the accused on the ground that, among others, the eyewitness was
shown only two photographs of suspected highway robbers while there were a total of six perpetrators to
be identified, thereby effectively suggesting to the eyewitness that the men in both photos belonged to the
group of the perpetrators. Similarly, in Rodrigo, the eyewitness was shown only one photo before making
the identification. In finding this out-of-court identification unreliable, the Court explained:

The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious constitutional law implications in terms
of the possible violation of the due process rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights to a fair
trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible
suggestions in the earlier photographic identification. In the context of this case, the investigators might
not have been fair to Rodrigo if they themselves, purposely or unwittingly, fixed in the mind of Rosita, or
at least actively prepared her mind to, the thought that Rodrigo was one of the robbers. Effectively, this
act is no different from coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying only with respect to the
means used. Either way, the police investigators are the real actors in the identification of the accused;
evidence of identification is effectively created when none really exists.

The same thing can be said about AAA's identification of Ansano in this case. ℒαwρhi ৷ That she was
shown only one photograph, when considered with the other factual circumstances of this case, only leads
to the logical conclusion that the identification might have been marred by improper suggestions.

Again, the circumstances of AAA's identification of Ansano were that almost a year after the rape
incident, she supposedly recognized him as her assailant as he was having a drinking spree with her
father. She, however, only knew of his name two months after, or on March 19, 2006, when she went to
the municipal hall to inquire if Ansano was still detained for the case filed by her best friend, BBB, who
was also Ansano's niece. Incidentally, BBB was also present when AAA first "recognized" Ansano in the
drinking spree with her father. She narrated:

Q How did you come to know that he is indeed a resident of [GGG, XXX, ZZZ]?

A Because of my best friend [BBB] and she is his niece, sir.

Q You mean to say that, through [BBB], you came to know that the accused is from [GGG, XXX, ZZZ]?

A Yes, sir.

xxxx
Q And you were able to see him face to face through [BBB]?

A No, sir, he had a drinking spree with my father.

Q You were with [BBB] when that incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q That was March 19, 2006?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time more or less was that, when you were able to meet face to face the accused?

A More or less 8 o'clock in the evening, sir.

Q March 19, 2006?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you were with [BBB]?

A Yes, sir.

Q In what particular place, you were (sic) then with [BBB] on that date?

A In our house, sir.

Q Your house is near the house of [BBB]?

A No, sir. [BBB] once live[d] in our house.

Q You want you (sic) tell the court that, on that day, March 19, 2006 that was the very first time that you
came face to face [with] the accused?

A Yes, sir.

It is important to note that the records reflect that the present charge was once consolidated with a case
filed by BBB against Ansano, but BBB eventually decided to not pursue the case and this case thus
proceeded on its own. While the records do not reflect the exact nature of the case filed by BBB, it could
reasonably be inferred that it was likewise a rape or sexual assault charge for it to have been initially
consolidated with this case.

To the mind of the Court, there is a reasonable possibility that the confluence of these circumstances may
have, albeit inadvertently, improperly suggested to the mind of AAA that Ansano was her assailant. It is
true that the latter finding — on the possible effect of BBB on the identification — did not arise from
State action; thus, this finding would not amount to a violation of Ansano's right to due process that
would render the identification inadmissible. This does not, however, preclude the courts from taking the
said finding into consideration as evidentiary inquiries do not end on questions of admissibility.
"Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence." Hearsay evidence, for
instance, cannot be given credence whether objected to or not for it has no probative value. Eyewitness
testimony, like all other evidence, must not only be admissible — it must be able to convince.

Ultimately, the Court's independent assessment of the reliability of the out-of-court identification when
the totality of circumstances test is applied resulted in reasonable doubt on the said identification. All
told, the foregoing findings ultimately impressed upon the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt — to
reiterate, not on the fact that the crime happened, but rather — on the identity of the accused. Acquittal
must perforce follow.
 The Court's reminders

The Court laments that neither the RTC nor the CA was able to discuss the doubt on Ansano's identity as
the perpetrator of the crime even though the issue was glaring in the records of the case. Both the RTC
and the CA focused on whether the crime indeed happened and examined AAA's testimony only through
that lens. The RTC simply said that "[t]he clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of [AAA]
unrelentingly established how Ansano sexually [assaulted] her on April 6, 2005 with the use of force,
threat and intimidation."59 The CA was unfortunately as terse, as it held that: "AAA positively identified
accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA established
that accused-appellant committed rape against the victim,"60 adding that Ansano's defense of alibi and
denial simply failed to stand in light of AAA's positive identification.

The Court thus takes this opportunity to remind courts that "[a] conviction for a crime rests on two bases:
(1) credible and convincing testimony establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime; and (2) the prosecution proving beyond reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime are
attributable to the accused." "Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's
primary responsibility. Thus, in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is
not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime
can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable
doubt."

Also, while the defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak, they are only so in the face of an
effective identification64 which, as discussed, was not present in this case.

Lastly, while it was true, as the CA noted, that "no young woman, especially one of tender age, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter testify about her
ordeal in a public trial if she had not been impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her," this does
not mean that the said testimony should be accepted wholesale. It bears stressing that:

the testimonies from aggrieved parties should not simplistically be equated to or treated as testimonies
from detached parties. Their testimonies should be handled with the realistic thought that they come from
parties with material and emotional ties to the subject of the litigation so that they cannot be accepted and
held as credible simply because the defense has not adduced evidence of ill-motivation.

Like all other evidence, they must be independently assessed.

As a final note, the Court ends with the following discussion in People v. Fernandez:

Given the foregoing findings, we are not concluding that complainant has not been a victim of rape, or
that appellant's defense of alibi and denial can be given full faith and credence. We only stress that her
testimony was unable to pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands and the rules
require to satisfy the prosecution's burden of overcoming appellant's presumption of innocence.

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt — moral certainty
that the accused is guilty. The defense may be weak, but the prosecution is even weaker. As a result of
this finding, it will be unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised.

The Court has aptly said: It is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose
guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Court's support of
ardent crusaders waging all-out war against felons on the loose, when the People's evidence fails to prove
indubitably the accused's authorship of the crime of which they stand accused, it is the Court's duty —
and the accused's right — to proclaim their innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order.68

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08223 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Teodoro Ansano y Calleja
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an
entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of New Bilibid Prisons for immediate
implementation. The said Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days
from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.