(Song and Liu) Becoming A Normative Power? China's Mekong Agenda in The Era of Xi Jinping

Becoming a normative power?
China’s Mekong agenda in the era of
Xi Jinping
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

YAO SONG, GUANGYU QIAO-FRANCO AND
TIANYANG LIU *
The Mekong river, often referred to as south-east Asia’s ‘flow of life’, is a vital
waterway connecting China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.
As such, maintaining strong bilateral and multilateral relationships with riparian
countries within the Mekong region is of high strategic importance to China’s
diplomacy and national security. By broadening economic and political engage-
ment with its southern neighbours, China seeks both to secure its border areas
from western influences and to extend its leadership into the Indo-Pacific region.1
China’s expanded capital investment, trade and aid in the Mekong region are also
perceived to be motivated by domestic considerations—particularly by the goal of
developing its outlying south-western provinces, Yunnan and Guangxi.
China’s strategies for asserting influence in the Mekong region have been a
major focus of theoretical scholarship on China’s peripheral diplomacy.2 However,
existing scholarship remains centred on China’s economic and military might,
while its normative power—the authority to define what behaviour is considered
‘normal’ in international relations—remains under-researched. Serious consid-
eration needs to be given to the normative dimension of China’s power, as its
pre-eminent role within the region will ultimately depend on its cognitive accep-
tance and recognition by regional actors.3
Under the administration of Xi Jinping, normative power has been of partic-
ular importance to China. As some scholars have argued, while material power
remains crucial to China’s foreign policy, normative power has become more
salient in the era of Xi, as China seeks to shape the structure and discourse of
* The three authors have contributed equally to this work and share first authorship, though Tianyang Liu
is the corresponding author. We would like to thank the International Affairs editorial team and anonymous
reviewers for their valuable comments, although space limitations did not permit us to address fully all their
comments. We are also indebted to Annie Wang, Sengaloun Siharath, Ruilei Xing, Cunwan Feng and all the
interviewees for their insights. This work is supported by the National Social Science Fund of China, Youth
Project (grant number: 20CZZ014).
1
Feng Liu, ‘The recalibration of Chinese assertiveness: China’s responses to the Indo-Pacific challenge’, Inter-
national Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 9–28.
2
See e.g. Mingjiang Li, ‘Local liberalism: China’s provincial approaches to relations with Southeast Asia’, Jour-
nal of Contemporary China 23: 86, 2014, pp. 275–93; Tim Summers, ‘The belt and road initiative in Southwest
China: responses from Yunnan province’, Pacific Review 34: 2, 2021, pp. 206–29.
3
Ji-Young Lee, ‘Hegemonic authority and domestic legitimation: Japan and Korea under Chinese hegemonic
order in early modern East Asia’, Security Studies 25: 2, 2016, pp. 320–52.
International Affairs 97: 6 (2021) 1709–1726; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiab168

© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. All rights
reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1709 21/10/2021 11:20

Yao Song, Guangyu Qiao-Franco and Tianyang Liu
the world order.4 The aspiration for greater legitimacy based on Beijing’s own
ideas and norms found expression in Xi’s speech on peripheral diplomacy at the
2013 Work Forum of the Communist Party of China, soon after he took office
in November 2012. The speech emphasized building shared beliefs and norms of
conduct as a necessary approach to expanding regional collaboration.5 Since then,
it has become clear that China has been endeavouring to impose its normative
concept of a ‘community of shared destiny’ (CSD) upon its foreign neighbours.

Central to the establishment of the CSD are two concepts: national rejuvenation
(China’s economic growth) and the new Asian security concept (regional stability).
Beijing’s expanding outreach and increasingly noticeable normative role in
the Mekong region provide a novel context for discussions of China’s normative
power. By investigating China’s normative agenda in the Mekong region under
Xi, we intend to address the following three key questions: What are the new
elements of China’s normative agenda under Xi, in comparison to those of his
predecessors? What means has China employed to establish its normative influ-
ence? And what factors will facilitate or impede Chinese efforts to become a
normative power?
We have found that China’s normative agenda has been pursued by means
different from those identified in the bulk of the literature on ‘normative power
Europe’, where the concept originated.6 As a nascent norm entrepreneur, whose
values and norms are under constant challenge in a world dominated by liberal
western values, China’s normative power relies more heavily on the backing of
material resources than on traditional normative forces.7 This is particularly the
case in respect of China’s exercise of normative power in the Mekong region, where
countries share strong aspirations for economic development.8 Initial adaptations
by the Mekong countries to Chinese interest have often been driven by rational,
cost–benefit calculations, such as the prospect of access to China’s foreign aid,
investment and vast market. Instead of examining these instrumental strategies, as
other research has,9 we look further into whether these adjustments have caused
changes in local cognitive processes, and if so, whether these changes are aligned
with China’s efforts of rhetorical exhortation, socialization and persuasion.
Drawing on empirical observation, we have found two distinct mechanisms
at the source of China’s normative power: organized top-down norm diffusion,
and unorganized bottom-up diffusion. The top-down processes are elite-driven,
involving intergovernmental dialogues, socialization via bilateral and multilateral
cooperation mechanisms, and negotiations with countries co-opted into Chinese-
4
Wu Xinbo, ‘China in search of a liberal partnership international order’, International Affairs 94: 5, 2018, pp.
995–1018.
5
Xi Jinping, On the governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), p. 326.
6
See e.g. Ian Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market
Studies 40: 2, 2002, pp. 235–58.; Thomas Diez, ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering
“normative power Europe”’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33: 3, 2005, pp. 613–36.
7
Selina Ho, ‘Infrastructure and Chinese power’, International Affairs 96: 6, 2020, pp. 1461–85.
8
Evelyn Goh, ‘The modes of China’s influence: cases from southeast Asia’, Asian Survey 54: 5, 2014, pp. 825–48.
9
Selina Ho, ‘River politics: China’s policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in comparative perspec-
tive’, Journal of Contemporary China 23: 85, 2014, pp. 1–20; Christina Lai, ‘Acting one way and talking another:
China’s coercive economic diplomacy in east Asia and beyond’, Pacific Review 31: 2, 2008, pp. 169–87.
1710
International Affairs 97: 6, 2021

China’s Mekong agenda in the era of Xi Jinping
led initiatives in building connectivity and infrastructure, such as its Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). The bottom-up processes, in contrast, comprise the emergence of
ideas from practices (exchange of goods, trade, aid) and the physical presence of
China in the Mekong, exemplified by the massive scale of infrastructure widely
constructed across the region. Both social and elite responses to the Chinese
discourse in the region are complicated by local modes of political legitimacy,
different preferences for development and a range of circumstances of geopolitical

conflict.
We have traced the processes and outcomes of China’s exercise of norma-
tive power primarily in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, at both elite and mass
levels, drawing upon secondary sources and interviews with experts within these
countries. The range of cases examined in our article is not exhaustive, but is
indicative of the complicated processes and the broad spectrum of factors that need
to be taken into account when discussing China’s normative power. Since norma-
tive power is intersubjective, China’s normative influence essentially depends on
the reactions of target actors.10 In a region marked by a complex plurality of ideas,
views and values, China’s efforts at building its normative power have had mixed
results, not only across countries, but also across social levels. In sum, despite the
stark power asymmetry between itself and its smaller neighbours, China has not
been entirely successful in its role as a normative actor, owing to some deeply
incompatible values and conflicting interests: infrastructure development has not
created absolute conformity to the norms espoused by the Chinese elite.
The following analysis starts with a review of the literature on China’s norma-
tive power, then proceeds to examine Xi’s normative agenda in the Mekong region
in comparison to those of his predecessors. It then introduces China’s top-down
and bottom-up processes aimed at building normative power, and the respec-
tive responses at the elite and mass levels across the Mekong countries. The final
section offers lenses derived from our research findings through which to assess the
effectiveness and limitations of China’s peripheral diplomatic strategies.
Normative power as a subject of study

Classical studies of ‘normative power Europe’ conceptualize normative power as
the capacity to ‘shape conceptions of normal in international relations’.11 The influ-
ential work of Manners in 2002, building upon Duchêne’s notion of ‘idée force’
and Galtung’s ‘ideological power’, stimulated a normative turn in theorizing the
EU’s international presence.12 Central to Manners’s concept is the argument that
the EU as a normative power ‘works through ideas, opinions and conscience’,13 in
10
Emilian Kavalski, ‘The struggle for recognition of normative powers: normative power Europe and normative
power China in context’, Cooperation and Conflict 48: 2, 2013, pp. 247–67.
11
Manners, ‘Normative power Europe’, p. 239.
12
François Duchêne, ‘The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence’, in Max Kohn-
stamm and Wolfgang Hager, eds, A nation writ large (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1–21; Johan
Galtung, The European Community: a superpower in the making (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973).
13
Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, ‘Reflecting on normative power Europe’, in Flex Berenskoetter and M. J.
Williams, eds, Power in world politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p. 175.
1711

contrast to traditional approaches that study Europe with reference to ‘military
power’ and ‘civilian power’.14
The notion of normative power has recently gained traction in studies of
non-European contexts. Among them, some Chinese intellectuals have drawn
attention to China’s national identity, world-view and diplomatic philosophy,
usually informed by Chinese historical philosophy and cultures, in an attempt
to construct a ‘Chinese School’ of International Relations (IR). Zhao Tingyang’s

tianxia (‘all under heaven’), Yan Xuetong’s ‘moral realism’, Qin Yaqing’s ‘relation-
ality’ and Pan Wei’s ‘China model’ are prominent examples.15 These theories have
been used to construct China as a specific type of actor that is capable of rising
peacefully, defending it against a realist assumption that sees Beijing as posed to
overturn the liberal order and reshape the international system in its own image.16
In the sizeable body of research on China’s normative power, there has been
a preoccupation with whether China is a specific type of actor that cannot be
understood through conventional IR theories. So far, the means by which China
has pursued its vision of international order, and whether it has been successful in
achieving its normative goals, remain unclear. By closely assessing China’s strategies
for persuading neighbouring countries in the Mekong region to behave in ways
favourable to its goals, our research represents a preliminary attempt to fill this gap.
We argue that China’s expanded normative engagement in the Mekong region is
composed of multiple, oscillating modes of normative production. Unlike Europe
and the United States, China’s rise occurred in a context where liberalism was
already the ‘default setting’ of modern international society.17 Moreover, many
of the ideas that China represents (such as communist/socialist views on political,
economic and social systems) remain controversial. For its visions and ideas to
become accepted as ‘normal’, military and economic means might be essential to
instigating behavioural changes in other actors, which may then be converted into
ideational changes. In this sense, both norms and material resources are sources of
China’s normative power. This approach sets itself apart from the social construc-
tivist approach, which focuses on the independent power of norms to influence
actors’ behaviour. It also departs from the rationalist approach in that it acknowl-
14
For research on military power, see Hedley Bull, ‘Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of
Common Market Studies 21: 2, 1982, pp. 149–64; for research on civilian power, see François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s
role in world peace’, in Richard Mayne, ed., Europe tomorrow: sixteen Europeans look ahead (London: Fontana,
1972), pp. 32–47.
15
Zhao Tingyang, ‘Rethinking empire from a Chinese concept “All-under-Heaven (Tian-Xia)”’, Social Identi-
ties 12: 1, 2006, pp. 29–41; Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese thought, modern Chinese power (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2011); Qin Yaqing, ‘A relational theory of world politics’, International Studies Review 18: 1,
2016, pp. 33–47; Pan Wei, ‘Reflections on the “China model” discussion’, International Critical Thought 1: 1,
2011, pp. 11–17.
16
John Mearsheimer, ‘China’s unpeaceful rise’, Current History 105: 690, 2006, pp. 160–62; Amitav Acharya, ‘Power
shift or paradigm shift? China’s rise and Asia’s emerging security order’, International Studies Quarterly 58: 1,
2014, pp. 158–73. It is worth noting that there is a lively set of debates over whether China will accommodate
itself to existing systems and norms. See e.g. Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a status quo power?’, International
Security 27: 4, 2003, pp. 5–56; Barry Buzan, ‘China in international society: is “peaceful rise” possible?’, Chinese
Journal of International Politics 3: 1, 2010, pp. 5–36; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Status seekers:
Chinese and Russian responses to US primacy’, International Security 34: 4, 2010, pp. 63–95.
17
Zhang Yongjin, ‘China and liberal hierarchies in global international society: power and negotiation for
normative change’, International Affairs 92: 4, 2016, pp. 795–816.
1712

edges the changes in cognitive processes (about what is appropriate and normal)
behind actions driven by instrumental, cost–benefit calculations.
China’s normative power depends heavily upon the interaction between its
rhetorical exhortations and its material means of engagement. We have accordingly
developed an exploratory framework that separates discussions of the exercise of
China’s normative power into top-down and bottom-up processes, each of which
employs different levels of rhetoric-based and material-based interactions between

China and other actors involved in these two types of process.
The top-down norm diffusion processes involve deliberate efforts of socializa-
tion and persuasion, underpinned by economic and military power. Changes in the
interactions of regional elites driven by cost–benefit calculations can potentially be
translated into acceptance of norms and assumptions promoted by China. However,
the degree to which this further translates into acceptance of Chinese norms in
neighbouring countries varies depending on each country’s alignment with China’s
interests and values. Indeed, missteps in infrastructure building, and the inability to
address some fundamental clashes of values and interests, may undermine China’s
capacity to bring about normative change in the Mekong region.
The bottom-up processes, in contrast, occur in unorganized spaces. These
ideational changes are generated from on-the-ground practices and the physical
presence of China, exemplified by its infrastructure-building activities. The
presence of China-built infrastructure, such as railways, roads, bridges and dams,
help formulate ideas about the role China should play within the region. It is
beyond the scope of the present article to examine how the two types of process
interact to shape the normative impact of China within the region. However, our
broad-brush approach will shed light on the wide spectrum of factors shaping the
exercise of China’s normative power.
In sum, understanding China’s normative power requires that we examine: (a)
top-down norm diffusion efforts that occur in formal, intergovernmental organi-
zations; and (b) bottom-up diffusions that occur in unorganized spaces at the mass
level. This article analyses how China has employed these two types of process
to diffuse its norms into the Mekong countries, and closely examines the ambiv-
alence and unevenness of the processes within which material forces are trans-
formed into ideational changes. To provide a context for this review, the next
section introduces China’s normative agenda in the Mekong region and how it has
changed over time, with a focus on the systematic transformation from responsive
to proactive since Xi’s rise to power.
Transformations in China’s normative agenda: before and after Xi’s rise

Since the 1970s, successive Chinese leaders have made great efforts to build China’s
reputation as a good neighbour and remove pervasive feelings of mistrust and
insecurity among the Mekong countries.18 Even so, substantial changes in China’s
18
Shaun Breslin, ‘Understanding China’s regional rise: interpretations, identities and implications’, International
Affairs 85: 4, 2009, pp. 817–35.
1713

normative agenda can be observed since 2012, when Xi Jinping took office. By
contrast with his predecessors, who built regional policies primarily by conforming
with extant international frameworks and norms,19 Xi is attempting to shift the
regional normative order to better reflect Beijing’s understanding of appropriate
modes of political, economic and security cooperation. This section provides a
quick survey of China’s normative agendas in the Mekong region since the later
phase of the Cold War, which in turn provides the context within which to reflect

on the drastic changes in China’s normative strategies in the Xi era.
From the late 1970s, when the situation in respect of territorial disputes and
antagonism in the Mekong region was alleviated, China embarked on a pragmatic
good-neighbour policy as a way out of its diplomatic isolation. The primary task
of Chinese diplomats then was to amend Beijing’s relationships with the Mekong
countries, which were largely paralysed by the long-term political conflicts of
the Cold War.20 There was a deep-seated sense of distrust among lower Mekong
riparian countries towards Beijing, given its involvement in numerous commu-
nist insurgencies in the region. China’s attempt to remove this sense of insecu-
rity and distrust among regional countries was pursued in part through frequent
invocation of good-neighbourliness rhetoric and the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, which entailed ‘mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence’.21 Moreover, China largely
followed Deng’s aphorism of ‘hiding your strength, biding your time’, submitting
to constraints when it came to territorial disputes with neighbouring countries.22
Since the end of the Cold War, with the resolution of regional conflicts, and
fundamental economic reforms in China, Vietnam and Laos, an interest in greater
economic cooperation has emerged. Spurred in part by the collapse of the former
Soviet bloc and the need to find new trading and investment partners, China
became open to more institutionalized regional cooperation with the Mekong
countries.23 In 1992, China and five other Mekong basin countries reached an
agreement to establish the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation
Programme (GMS), with the support of the Asian Development Bank. In 1996,
China also agreed to join the Mekong River Commission (MRC) as a dialogue
partner, and since 2002 has provided hydrological data to the MRC to facilitate
joint water flow management.24
While China maintained a largely defensive posture at earlier meetings of the
GMS and the MRC, it showed a willingness to keep opening up based on the ideas
19
Yunling Zhang and Shiping Tang, ‘China’s regional strategy’, in David Shambaugh, ed., Power shift: China and
Asia’s new dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 48–69.
20
Xiao Ren, ‘Idea change matters: China’s practices and the east Asian peace’, Asian Perspective 40: 2, 2016, pp.
329–55.
21
Donald Hugh McMillen, ‘China in Asia’s international relations’, International Journal 38: 2, 1983, pp. 209–33.
22
Ren, ‘Idea change matters’.
23
Zhang and Tang, ‘China’s regional strategy’.
24
‘Mekong Lancang Cooperation: China welcomes MRC’s call for a closer tie’, Mrcmekong.org, 7 Nov. 2018,
https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-lancang-cooperation-china-welcomes-mrcs-
call-for-a-closer-tie/. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible
on 19 Sept. 2021.)
1714

of mutual benefit and win–win cooperation. China’s diplomacy at both bilateral
and multilateral levels in the post-Cold War period was riddled with good-neigh-
bour narratives, aiming to rehabilitate China’s image as a benign country—as
a force for peace, stability and economic growth. For instance, as one Chinese
diplomat claimed at the sixth ministerial meeting of the GMS in 1998 during the
Asian financial crisis, China was committed to the peripheral diplomacy guideline
of ‘being a good neighbour’ and would ‘cross the river of the financial crisis on

the same boat’ with its neighbours.25
As the twenty-first century began, during the presidency of Hu Jintao, China’s
normative strategy remained generally responsive, despite its rapid rise to Great
Power status.26 While most of the Mekong countries maintained a favourable
balance of trade with China up to 2013, many of them saw China’s supercharged
growth as a threat. Some of them began to worry about China’s military power,
compounded by fears of decreasing strategic stability in the region as US atten-
tion was drawn away from east Asia to a full-out ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan
and Iraq after the attacks of 11 September 2001.27 Meanwhile, China’s influence
in the region had increased significantly, as reflected in its trade volumes with the
Mekong countries and its fast-growing investment in the region.28 In this context,
China’s neighbouring countries were eager to counterbalance Beijing’s increasing
influence by engaging extraregional forces, such as Japan and India, in founding
wider cooperation mechanisms.
Mindful of the growing sense of threat among its Mekong neighbours, China
found it necessary to convince them that its development would produce ‘mutual
benefit and shared prosperity’. One of the narratives promoted by the Chinese
government was the ‘harmonious world’ and the peaceful development of China.
For instance, Premier Wen Jiabao pledged at the third GMS summit in 2008
that China would unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and
contribute to the growth of all countries through its own progress. He called on
the Mekong countries to ‘treat each other with sincerity and enhance consultation
and mutual trust’.29
Whereas the idea of a ‘harmonious world’ arguably contains some Sinocentric
elements—many have argued that China sought to build a regional order based
on the Chinese philosophies of harmony, peace and virtue—most commentators
see Hu as a follower of Deng’s ‘bide and hide’ approach.30 Indeed, the notion of a
harmonious world at the time entailed an emphasis on ‘multilateralism’, ‘mutually
25
Zhengang Ma, ‘30 years of China’s diplomacy (1978–2008)’, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of
China to the UN, 22 Dec. 2008, http://chnun.chinamission.org.cn/eng/gyzg/wjzc/t541518.htm.
26
Zheng Yongnian and Sow Keat Tok, ‘Harmonious society and harmonious world: China’s policy discourse
under Hu Jintao’, Briefing Series 26 (Nottingham: University of Nottingham, 2007), pp. 1–12.
27
Hu Weixing, ‘Xi Jinping’s “major country diplomacy”: the role of leadership in foreign policy transforma-
tion’, Journal of Contemporary China 28: 115, 2019, pp. 1–14.
28
Jeffrey Chwieroth and Andrew Walter, ‘Banking crises and politics: a long-run perspective’, International
Affairs 93: 5, 2017, pp. 1107–30; Stephen Smith, ‘Harmonizing the periphery: China’s neighborhood strategy
under Xi Jinping’, Pacific Review 43: 1, 2021, pp. 56–84.
29
‘Chinese premier calls on GMS nations to enhance competitiveness’, Xinhua News Agency, 31 March 2008,
http://khmernz.blogspot.com/2008/03/chinese-premier-calls-on-gms-nations-to.html.
30
Zheng and Tok, Harmonious society and harmonious world, p. 292.
1715

beneficial cooperation’ and ‘inclusiveness’, with the primary role in leading the
reform of international order accorded to the UN.31 These principles continued
to reflect the basic idea of portraying China as benign and a force for peace and
development for all.
In the Xi era, however, we observe the emergence of a more proactive China,
alongside persistent ideas of fostering cooperation with neighbouring countries
based on the principles of ‘friendship, sincerity, reciprocity and inclusiveness’.32

Peripheral diplomacy has been given greater importance in China’s grand foreign
policy, and its goal has been expanded beyond alleviating the perceived threat posed
by China. Now, it involves bolder moves to shape the identities and preferences of
regional countries to build a Sinocentric CSD underpinned by the concepts of the
‘China dream’ (economic rejuvenation) and the ‘new Asian security’.33
The CSD describes a world defined by mutual cooperation, transcending
ethnicity or culture. While the concept of the CSD first appeared in former
Chinese President Hu’s report at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Xi was the first
to propose transforming China’s neighbourhood into a CSD at the 2013 Work
Forum of the Communist Party of China on peripheral diplomacy. In 2016, the
CSD was specifically invoked by Premier Li Keqiang to frame China’s relations
with the Mekong countries at the first leaders’ meeting of the Lancang–Mekong
Cooperation (LMC), a regional cooperation initiative spearheaded by China. As
Li stated, a CSD for the Mekong region could be achieved through ‘nurturing
a culture of cooperation’ distinctive to Asia.34 Foreign Minister Wang Yi also
added that it is ‘rooted in traditional friendship and built upon mutual interests’,35
differing notably from the extant western hegemonic order guided by zero-sum
thinking.
For Chinese leaders, the construction of the CSD is based on two pillars. The
first is robust, stable economic growth, or economic rejuvenation. In his speeches
at the LMC, Li has repeatedly emphasized development as the primary concern
shared by the initiative’s members. Besides propagating a ‘development first’
mentality, Chinese leaders have also been engaged in convincing the Mekong
countries of the externalized value of the ‘China dream’. China’s involvement
in the region, according to Li, would ‘turn the economic complementarity into
the stimulating force of growth’,36 being ‘both conducive to China’s interests and
their [the other countries’] success in fighting poverty, economic stagnation, and
societal underdevelopment’.37 Inherent to these appeals is the conviction that the
31
‘Hu makes 4-point proposal for building harmonious world’, Xinhua News Agency, 16 Sept. 2005, http://
www.china.org.cn/english/features/UN/142408.htm.
32
Xi, On the governance of China, p. 326.
33
William Callahan, ‘China’s “Asia dream”: the Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order’, Asian Journal
of Comparative Politics 1: 3, 2016, pp. 226–43; Ho, ‘Infrastructure and Chinese power’.
34
Li Keqiang, speech at the first LMC leaders’ meeting, Sanya, 23 March 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1350422.shtml.
35
‘Wang Yi: create a community of shared future among Lancang–Mekong countries’, State Council of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), 23 March 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/state_coun-
cilors/2018/03/23/content_281476087335336.htm.
36
Li Keqiang, speech at the first LMC leaders’ meeting.
37
Li Keqiang, speech at the third LMC leaders’ meeting, Beijing, 24 Aug. 2020, http://english.www.gov.cn/
1716

developmental problems shared by the Mekong countries are caused by poverty,
which may be effectively addressed only through Xi’s effort to bind neighbouring
countries’ development to China’s economic rejuvenation.
The second pillar is building a secure regional environment for China by
promoting the New Asian Security Concept (NASC). In contrast with other
mechanisms in the region, such as the GMS and the MRC, which focus on
economic cooperation or water management, the China-led LMC includes

security as one of its main policy components. This is understandable, as a few
wars have broken out in China’s neighbourhood since the founding of the People’s
Republic, some of them involving Beijing directly. It is for this reason that Li told
the leaders of riparian countries at the 2016 LMC meeting that the relationship
between China and those countries is like that of ‘lips and teeth’. He then shared
his insights on how the LMC could contribute to regional stability: ‘Even though
they may occasionally see things differently, what we need to do is to make good
use of mature communication [under the LMC].’38 Implicit in Li’s statement is
that China has to create an advantageous regional situation for its development by
making collective stability a value shared by the LMC members.39 This outlook
is reflected in the NASC. In Beijing’s discourse, the NASC represents efforts to
build an order where ‘people of Asia run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of
Asia, and uphold the security of Asia’.40 It suggests Beijing’s intention to rescale
Asian security at the localized level, where China as a regional power plays a more
important role than extraregional countries.
Overall, in contrast to the use of normative power in the responsive, constrained
pattern of discourse adopted by previous administrations, China on Xi’s watch
seems more confident about revealing its unilateral claims and framing the
regional order on its own terms. Efforts to build a CSD are not simply an exercise
in showcasing China’s new prominence in global governance reform. Rather, they
comprise a new strategy for the better management of the increasing tensions
among China’s neighbours. For one thing, Xi inherited some enduring challenges,
such as the proximity to several nuclear powers (Russia, India, Pakistan and North
Korea) and various territorial disputes. For another, the impact of the US ‘pivot to
Asia’ in constraining China’s strategic expansion has become increasingly clear.41
Since 2009, under the Obama administration, the United States has been actively
expanding its sphere of influence to encompass China’s neighbourhood, engaging
the Mekong countries, including China’s traditional allies, Cambodia and Laos,
in hedging or balancing strategies against Beijing.42 The advocacy of the Trans-
premier/speeches/202008/25/content_WS5f4448cac6d0f7257693ae42.html.
38
Li Keqiang, speech at the first LMC leaders’ meeting.
39
See also Zhang Yunling, ‘China and its neighbourhood: transformation, challenges and grand strategy’, Inter-
40
Xi Jinping, speech at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia held in
Shanghai, 21 May 2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-05/21/c_1110799227.htm.
41
Mingjiang Li, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: geo-economics and Indo-Pacific security cooperation’, Interna-
tional Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 169–88.
42
See Seng Tan, ‘Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy’,
International Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 131–48.
1717

Pacific Partnership (TPP) during the Obama administration was also perceived by
Beijing as a move to contain the latter’s regional economic strength.
For these reasons, China’s policy circle perceived that the period of strategic
opportunity in the early 2000s might soon draw to a close, requiring China to
act quickly before a new Washington-centred regional structure antithetical
to China’s interests was established.43 To prevent the deterioration of China’s
regional control, Beijing redoubled its efforts to transform its material influence

into normative power, which it conceived as more lasting and sustainable than
‘hard’ power, aiming to render its political influence universally acceptable to its
neighbouring countries.44 China’s attempts to diffuse norms in the Mekong region
and the respective responses at the elite and mass levels will be set out in more
detail in the next two sections.
Top-down norm enforcement and state responses

When it comes to the question of how major powers exert normative power,
IR scholars have identified socialization as one of the main instruments.45 This
section argues that China’s normative power relies more heavily on the provision
of material incentives. To convince the Mekong countries of its normative power,
Beijing proposed cooperation projects according to the strategic demands of each
country, which amount to ‘preference multiplying’.46 These projects built upon
common imperatives for development and created favourable policy conditions
for China to reinforce its normative goals. China expected that its ‘magnanimity’
would bring about loyalty, and endorsement of its diplomatic norms.47 However,
the level of Chinese norm acceptance among the Mekong countries varies,
depending on the alignment of each country’s individual interests with those of
Beijing. To illustrate this point, we compare China’s exercise of normative power
across three cases: the construction of the Sino-Lao Railway in Laos, the building
of the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone in Cambodia and the construction of
the Hanoi Metro in Vietnam. Across all three cases, we observe the same tactics of
combining normative persuasion with infrastructure investment.
Laos’ landlocked position has historically isolated it and served as a major
obstacle to its growth. As such, Vientiane has devoted considerable attention
to infrastructure-building, and particularly to railways. Aware of Laos’s needs,
China helped upgrade its infrastructure connectivity through projects such as the
Sino-Lao Railway. The cost of this $6 billion railway project was shouldered by
43
Jinghan Zeng and Shaun Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power relations”: a G2 with Chinese character-
istics’, International Affairs 92: 4, 2016, pp. 773–94.
44
On how China uses the BRI to enhance its geographical position in the Indo-Pacific region, see Li, ‘The Belt
and Road Initiative’.
45
G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Socialization and hegemonic power’, International Organization
44: 3, 1990, pp. 283–315.
46
Pichamon Yeophantong, ‘China’s hydropower expansion and influence over environmental governance
in mainland southeast Asia’, in Evelyn Goh, ed., Rising China’s influence in developing Asia (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), pp. 174–92.
47
Rosemary Foot, ‘Remembering the past to secure the present: Versailles legacies in a resurgent China’, Inter-
1718

the Export–Import Bank of China (60 per cent) and a joint venture company
established by the two countries (40 per cent). Throughout, Chinese leaders
actively exported Chinese norms associated with infrastructure-building. For
instance, while commenting on the progress of the railway in 2016, Xi stressed
that ‘as two socialist countries under the rule of the Communist parties, China and
Laos share the same values and paths of development ... Therefore, we had better
conflate their respective national strategies, especially the BRI and the land-linked

strategy.’48 Before visiting Laos in November 2017, Xi published an article in
several influential Laotian newspapers, entitled ‘Constructing a strategic Sino-Lao
community of shared destiny hand in hand’. Xi’s article highlighted the alignment
of the two countries’ national strategies, reinforcing Vientiane’s perception that
the Sino-Laos Railway will add critically strategic value by connecting Laos to
neighbouring countries and the wider world.49
China has also invested $5.3 billion in Cambodia’s infrastructure,50 represented
here by the building of the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). Again,
Beijing anticipated Phnom Penh’s needs, developing Sihanoukville in a way that
both framed its projects in Cambodia as crucial to the CSD and highlighted the
alignment of the two countries’ development strategies. In an article Xi penned in
the local Rasmei Kampuchea newspaper in 2016, he emphasized the synergy between
the BRI and Cambodia’s Rectangular Strategy, a national plan proposed in 1998
to address the country’s economic woes and improve its physical infrastructure.
For Xi, the development of the SSEZ represents a mutual interest.51 The Chinese
Ambassador to Cambodia, Xiong Bo, further proposed that the development of
Sihanoukville indicated that China’s special economic zone had successfully taken
root in Cambodia, and that the two countries would take the lead in building the
CSD for the Mekong region.52
The same strategy of doling out infrastructure incentives in exchange for norma-
tive endorsement has also been applied in Vietnam. The Hanoi Metro project, for
example, is Vietnam’s first metro line. It is considered a pioneer project associ-
ated with Vietnam’s Two Corridors and One Belt strategy (TCOB), proposed
by former Vietnamese prime minister Phan Van Khai, and aimed at enhancing
connectivity with China. The Hanoi Metro stretches 13 kilometres from Cat Linh
to Ha Dong in Hanoi, and of the original $552.9 million cost, $419 million was
covered by preferential loans from the Export–Import Bank of China (the Exim
Bank). In 2017, the Exim Bank provided an addition loan of $250 million to cover
a rise in the project’s cost. In September 2015, Li Keqiang, meeting with the then
48
‘Xi Jinping meets Bounnhang Vorachith, the General Secretary of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party and
President of Laos’, Gov.cn, 3 May 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-05/03/content_5070101.htm.
49
The full text of Xi Jinping’s article in the Lao media in 2017 can be accessed at http://world.people.com.cn/
GB/n1/2017/1114/c1002-29644172.html.
50
‘What China’s Belt and Road Initiative means for Cambodia’, University of Southern California US–China
Institute, 21 July 2020, https://china.usc.edu/what-china%E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-initiative-means-
cambodia.
51
‘Xi Jinping published an undersigned article in the Cambodian media’, Xinhua News Agency, 12 Oct. 2016,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-10/12/c_1119704314.htm.
52
‘Xiong Bo: building a strategic community of shared destiny between China and Cambodia’, CPC News, 29
July 2019, http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2018/0720/c64102-30159368.html.
1719

deputy prime minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, called for a connection
of the BRI and the TCOB in order to elevate the two countries’ cooperation in
industry, commerce and investment. Two months later, Xi addressed Vietnam’s
National Assembly, saying that China had devoted great attention to an alignment
between the BRI and the TCOB.53
This strategy of lacing infrastructure investment with a push for normative
power was made possible by the common imperatives of the leaders of the three

countries; namely, to enhance their political legitimacy through improvements
to their respective national economies and infrastructure.54 However, the effec-
tive transformation of infrastructure investment into normative acceptance also
depends on the alignment of fundamental interests. In both Laos and Cambodia,
infrastructure financing has been effective in producing normative power,
reflected in these countries’ leaders’ incorporation of Chinese notions, particu-
larly the CSD, into their rhetoric. For instance, in November 2019, Laos’s then
prime minister Thongloun Sisoulith told Li Keqiang that Laos was willing to push
forward the construction of the Sino-Lao Railway and that ‘the building of the
CSD between the two countries is in full swing’.55 During an audience with Xi
two months later, Thongloun said that his country would complete the railway
as scheduled, and that the strengthening of the Laos–China CSD would chart the
future course for Laos–China relations.56
A pronounced willingness to internalize Beijing’s norms has also been observed
in Cambodia. For example, in an effort to refute criticism of China’s investment
in Sihanoukville, Prime Minister Hun Sen said that the SSEZ housed 161 compa-
nies and generated more than 20,000 jobs for local people, which meant that,
‘based on the spirit of joint efforts, shared benefits and same opportunity, the BRI
will not negatively affect any country’.57 When meeting with Li in April 2019,
after the US and the EU had imposed sanctions against Cambodia in response
to Hun Sen’s decision to dissolve the main opposition party and crack down on
independent media, the prime minister flattered his Chinese counterpart, saying
that ‘Cambodia is ready to further align its Rectangular Strategy with the BRI,
welcomes more infrastructure investment by Chinese businesses, and expects to
collaborate with China in building the CSD’.58
In contrast, China’s infrastructure-to-norm-endorsement approach has been less
successful in Vietnam. There are notably fewer occasions when Vietnamese leaders
53
The full text of Xi Jinping’s speech to Vietnam’s National Assembly in 2015 can be found at http://www.
xinhuanet.com/world/2015-11/06/c_1117067928.htm.
54
David M. Lampton, Selino Ho and Cheng-Chwee Kuik, River of iron: railroads and Chinese power in southeast Asia
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2020).
55
‘China, Laos eye closer cooperation to build community with shared future’, State Council of the PRC,
13 Nov. 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/201911/03/content_WS5dbef34ac6d0bcf8c4c16624.
html.
56
‘Xi Jinping meets with Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith of Laos’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,
6 Jan. 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1730213.shtml.
57
‘PM Hun Sen: Cambodia benefits a lot from “Belt and Road” initiative’, Office of the Council of Ministers,
Phnom Penh, 26 April 2019, https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/51959.
58
‘Li Keqiang meets prime minister Hun Sen of Cambodia’, Second Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation, 29 April 2019, http://beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2019/0430/c22-1408.html.
1720

have connected the TCOB with the BRI. To date, few Vietnamese leaders have
publicly stated that the TCOB or the Hanoi Metro forms part of the construction
of the Chinese-claimed Sino-Vietnamese CSD.59 During a phone call between Xi
and Vietnamese President Nguyen Phu Trong in September 2020, Xi reiterated the
notions of the CSD and strategic alignments; his Vietnamese counterpart did not
mention any of these concepts in response. In another phone call in February 2021,
Nguyen Xuan Phuc likewise avoided this rhetoric, in sharp contrast to the enthusi-

astic embrace of Chinese norms by the Laotian and Cambodian leaders. Moreover,
Vietnamese leaders, including the former transport minister Dinh La Thang, have
been rather vocal in criticizing the safety of the Chinese projects. Strong words—
for example, ‘we cannot trade [Chinese] loans for Vietnamese lives’—have been
used to express this scepticism about China’s infrastructure diplomacy.60
The higher levels of normative Chinese influence in Cambodia and Laos than
in Vietnam may be attributable to the former two countries having limited diplo-
matic leverage (for example, less diversity of foreign investors). In Cambodia
particularly, China is viewed as more pivotal to national survival, probably owing
to western sanctions related to undemocratic election results in 2019, and to the
country’s more isolated political position. Conversely, Vietnam is less reliant on
Chinese investment, and its relationship with China is complicated by intensifying
disputes over territory in the South China Sea, which have led to increased anti-
Chinese sentiments.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that investment in the Mekong
countries’ infrastructure certainly has the capacity to facilitate the legitimation of
China’s norms and values. However, it also shows that these material incentives
cannot override deep-seated differences in values and interests, especially when
territorial concerns are at stake.
Bottom-up norm diffusion and varied social responses

While Chinese normative power has been relatively successful in winning over
some of the political and economic elites in the Mekong region, the question
remains: is it convincing the regions’ wider populations? From interviews and
findings from surveys conducted in south-east Asia in previous research, we have
found that the general public in the Mekong countries remains largely unaware
of or indifferent to the official rhetoric promoted by China (including the CSD,
NASC and economic rejuvenation). Perceptions of China’s normative influ-
ence did not arise from abstract ideas promoted in public policy, but more often
emerged in Mekong people’s daily interactions with on-the-ground practices and
the physical presence of China, exemplified by its infrastructure-building.
The degree to which communities in the Mekong countries have accepted
Chinese norms is varied. Most Laotians and Cambodians spoke positively of
59
See ‘Challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam’, theaseanpost.com, 2 May 2018, https://thease-
anpost.com/article/challenges-belt-and-road-initiative-vietnam.
60
Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Vietnam gives China an earful for worst project’, 9 Jan. 2015, https://thediplomat.
com/2015/01/vietnam-gives-china-an-earful-for-worst-project/.
1721

China’s influence—they have seen economic development brought about by
China as attractive to both government and individuals, and are thus more open
to Chinese normative power. For example, a university student in Laos explained
to us during an interview:
People here accept the Chinese ideas as they see development as vital. As the circumstance
in Laos seems not to have progressed by herself, the cooperation with strong and powerful

neighbours like China would be one of best alternatives for accelerating development
in Laos ... although there were local disruptions. Some people stole the equipment in
railway construction site ... I heard that they built a small bridge in their villages [with
the equipment]. But in this way, they can live with the construction and feel somehow
connected to it.61
For the older generations in Laos and Cambodia, pragmatism relates China’s
influence not only to the notion of development but also to individual survival.
Indeed, while many younger people within the Mekong region are attracted to the
norms of the United States or other western countries, according to one retired
military officer:
The western ideas sound beautiful, like roses, right? But imagine, you are deprived of food
for days. And suddenly you are given either a rose or a piece of bread. Which would you
choose? When I heard of the western or liberal [norms] or whatever, they are like roses
to me!
Some people drive through Chinese-invested highway every day. New shopping malls
were built. We know they were built by China. They are also symbols of a modern Laos.
[When] western leaders came to Laos, they told us about values and other things, and they
left. People forgot about what they said the day after. [But] China is quiet. China has just
been building, but eventually these buildings become a part of the background of our
lives.62
These views have inclined us to think of China’s normative power infrastructur-

ally. Powerful actors do not have to act directly to influence others on a particular
issue. Instead, they can shape the context of interaction.63 Infrastructure takes the
form of semiotic and aesthetic objects that modify material constellations, altering
the shape of spaces and politics, and changing the way in which normative power
is exercised.64 By altering the built environment, infrastructure-as-norms is, on
the one hand, hidden, everyday and ambivalent, and, on the other hand, hyper-
visible and materialized. As such, the infrastructural power of China is not only
broad and material, but also deep and epistemological.
However, there is no denying that voices opposed to Beijing have also long
existed among local communities in Laos and Cambodia. When the railway project
61
Author online interview with a Laotian student, 19 June 2021. This opinion echoes that of other Cambodian
informants.
62
Author telephone interview with a Laotian official, 19 June 2021.
63
Cheng Guan Ang, ‘China’s influence over Vietnam in war and peace’, in Goh, ed., Rising China’s influence in
developing Asia.
64
Andreas Folkers, ‘Existential provision: the technopolitics of public infrastructure’, Environmental and Planning
D: Society and Space 35: 5, 2017, pp. 844–74; Brian Larkin, ‘The politics and poetics of infrastructure’, Annual
Review of Anthropology, vol. 42, pp. 327–43.
1722

in Laos was temporarily halted owing to the lack of an environment report, many
residents hoped that the Lao government would use the opportunity to conduct a
thorough assessment of the sustainability of the project, as Myanmar did with the
Myitsone Dam.65 However, as one Cambodian interviewee reflected:
Laos people are humble. They don’t like to talk too much. So are Cambodians. When
a Chinese infrastructure project was proposed, there was opposition among affected

residents. But once the government made a decision, this opposition came to an end. Of
course, this is also because there are no official channels in Laos and Cambodia to express
dissenting opinions.66
Local perceptions of Chinese normative power in Thailand, Myanmar and

Vietnam are somewhat negative.67 As most of Thai people’s knowledge of China
is obtained at second hand from western media, China’s well-funded state media
network has pursued a growing level of partnership with local Thai news agencies,
delivering pro-Beijing content to Thai audiences. However, the effect of Beijing’s
media activism is doubted:
Khaosod is one of the most popular newspaper in Thailand. It often reproduced contents
from China’s Xinhua News Agency. Our military leaders of course welcomed this, but for
ordinary people, we keep a cool mind. Thai people have a distaste for media politics and
we do not take sides. In Chiang Mai, in contrast to diplomatic propaganda, we find China’s
norm of tangping [lying flat], which comes from the grassroots and means the resistance to
social pressures of overwork, more popular with our laid-back living style.68
Vietnam’s long-term strategic suspicion of China has not even allowed Chinese
state media access to Vietnamese society. In the light of this reluctance, China
organized dialogues for media workers from the two countries, giving itself the
opportunity to explain China’s stance on certain controversies, such as Beijing’s
role in the establishment of three special economic zones across Vietnam that
roused nationwide anti-Chinese protests in 2018. However, these publicity events
were ineffective in alleviating the scepticism of Vietnamese officials and residents,
as one interviewee explained:
China is not favourably [perceived] in Vietnam, especially after the 2014 China–Vietnam
oil rig crisis. Four years later, many demonstrators clashed with police in protest against
the setting up of special economic zones. [During the protest,] some carried anti-China
banners, one of which read ‘No leasing an inch land to China even for one day.’ So, you
can see how large the cleavage is between the two countries. Political elites and citizens
in Vietnam are cautious about Chinese norms ... they doubt all of China’s activities ...
Community of shared destiny is a wishful thinking for idealists.69
65
Author online interviews with Laotians, 24–26 June 2021.
66
Author online interview with Laotian expert, 23 June 2021.
67
Ling Wei, ‘Developmental peace in East Asia and its implications for the Indo-Pacific’, International Affairs 96:
1, 2020, pp. 189–210.
68
Author online interview with Thai expert, 24 June 2021.
69
Author online interview with a Vietnamese employee in the trade ministry of Vietnam, 24 June 2021. This is
consistent with the latest Vietnam Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) data, released 2 March 2021, indicating that
more than half of Vietnamese respondents had a negative view of China, even though they believed China
has the most influence of any country in Asia.
1723

In short, societies in Laos and Cambodia tend to perceive Chinese activities in
the Mekong region in terms of both the material interests they offer and the social/
cultural values with which they are associated, whereas the Thai and Vietnamese
populations hold a more divided view. On the one hand, Thai and Vietnamese
people acknowledge the benefits created by the Chinese projects; on the other,
they are reluctant to accept China’s normative concepts, sometimes to the point of
defiance. These public views are statistically supported by the findings of existing

surveys.70 Notably, a recent opinion poll indicates that there has been a continued
deterioration of public trust in China in the Mekong region in 2021, both because
of the COVID-19 pandemic and prompted by US President Joe Biden’s declared
intention to reverse Donald Trump’s isolationist policies.71
Myanmar’s attitude towards China’s normative power sits at the middle point
of the spectrum. Burmese interviewees thought highly of China’s new invest-
ment in ‘soft power’, such as funding Burmese scholars to spend three months
in the research institutions of Kunming and Chengdu, two south-western
Chinese cities.72 One interviewee particularly reported that he was impressed
by the Myanmar Institute of Yunnan University, which provides a wide range
of Myanmar-related disciplines.73 However, increasingly nationalistic sentiments
among the Burmese have made it difficult for China to transform its economic
investment into normative support from local people.74 This more hostile percep-
tion of China has become more vociferous with the influx of Chinese workers in
recent years, and with Beijing’s perceived role in the military coup of February
2021.75
Building upon these insights, our investigation identifies one of the central
paradoxes encountered by China in its engagement with the Mekong countries:
while China’s normative power and its exercise are characterized by its soft norms
(deliberately ambiguous, broad and relativist) and hard materialization (e.g.
infrastructure investments), western normative power is primarily composed
of hard norms (strong commitment to the values and ideology of liberalization
and democratization) and soft materialization (e.g. service industries, culture
and technology). The hard materialization of China’s normative power renders
its infrastructure projects immobile and potentially vulnerable to ‘superpower
entrapment’, where it is deeply enmeshed and constrained by its own infrastruc-
tural investment in the region.76 Not only do Chinese norms frequently encounter
suspicion and criticism, but its infrastructural investments eventually create a high
politico-economic stake in recipient countries; this shifts the power balance subtly
70
For example, Yusof Ishak Institute, The state of southeast Asia: 2021 survey report (2021).
71
Yusof Ishak Institute, The state of southeast Asia.
72
Author telephone interview with Burmese expert, 13 July 2021.
73
Author telephone interview with scholar from Yangon University, 7 July 2021.
74
Evelyn Goh and David I. Steinberg, ‘Myanmar’s management of China’s influence: from mutual benefit to
mutual dependence’, in Goh, ed., Rising China’s influence in developing Asia, pp. 55–79.
75
Author online interview with Burmese expert, 7 July 2021.
76
For the concept of superpower entrapment, see Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and hierarchical order in southeast
Asia: analyzing regional security strategies’, International Security 32: 3, 2007, p. 129.
1724

towards mutual dependence, as China comes to depend on recipient countries to
protect its heavy investment in their projects.77
Conclusion
Since Xi took office in 2012, China has paid more attention to converting its
economic influence into normative power in the Mekong countries. The notion

of CSD that China has been advocating in the Mekong region is supported by
two connected pillars: economic rejuvenation and regional security. To compel
the Mekong countries to internalize these norms, China has not used its economic
strength simply to coerce, but rather as a preference multiplier. Through this lens,
China’s economic leverage can be seen as enabling the countries of the region to
implement infrastructure projects that were previously beyond their reach. These
projects, which arose from common interests, create or reinforce allegiance to
underlying Chinese norms, although the acceptance of these norms is found to
vary across countries and social levels. This heavy reliance on an infrastructure-
to-norm approach sets China apart from traditional normative powers like the
EU and the US, whose norms were primarily promoted through socialization,
although underpinned by economic and military power.
It should be noted that the Mekong countries had sought to build a norma-
tive order before China came with norms of its own; ideas such as ‘constraint’
and ‘non-interference’ were proposed by the Mekong countries to settle their
disagreements over the use of resources during the Cold War.78 In the post-
Cold War period, the internal order of the Mekong region has arguably entailed
a balance between the optimization of resource use and territorial sovereignty,
prioritizing the notion of intergovernmentalism over that of regional confeder-
alism. At the same time, some western countries, especially Japan and the United
States, have promoted their own values and norms across the Mekong region,
including emphases on private entrepreneurship, economic liberalization, free
markets and legally binding trade arrangements.79
The analysis presented in this article suggests that China has yet to replace
the established model of the Mekong region with its own model. This process
is bound to be bumpy, for several reasons. First, contrary to the conventional
belief that China has skilfully leveraged its growing economic influence to gain
concessions among smaller countries, it has not been completely successful in this
role. As seen from the case-studies presented here describing China’s top-down
and bottom-up norm diffusions, its normative power has been accepted by elites
in Laos and Cambodia but has been contested by their counterparts in Vietnam.
Further, normative promotion through infrastructure investment has been largely
77
Goh and Steinberg, ‘Myanmar’s management of China’s influence’.
78
Abigail Makim, ‘Resources for security and stability? The politics of regional cooperation on the Mekong,
1957–2001’, Journal of Environment and Development 11: 1, 2002, p. 41.
79
Laurids S. Lauridsen, ‘Changing regional order and railway diplomacy in southeast Asia with a case study of
Thailand’, in Li Xing, ed., Mapping China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2019), pp. 219–48.
1725

shunned by the civil societies of the Mekong countries. China’s inability to address
territorial disputes in the South China Sea with other claimant countries has
weakened its claims to the moral high ground, as has missteps in infrastructure-
building, including failure to address environmental issues and corruption. These
acts of omission have not only undermined China’s capacity to bring about norma-
tive acceptance among regional elites, but have also inhibited its normative appeal
among the general public. Xi’s effort to establish a Sinocentric regional network

or CSD will ultimately depend on his ability to enforce coherent policies that are
perceived to be in line with China’s rhetoric.
Second, China’s moves to increase its presence within the Mekong region will
continue to spark rival moves by other powers. Sino-US competition in the Indo-
Pacific region has intensified as the growing footprint of China continuously
challenges traditional US interests there. Beijing’s decision to build a deep-water
port and a special economic zone in Kyaukphyu in Myanmar provoked India into
competing for influence, as New Delhi sees the Indian Ocean as its exclusive sphere
of influence. Similarly motivated, Japan has unveiled a $110 billion plan to build
high-quality and environmentally friendly infrastructure projects in Asia. Sharing
the same anxieties about Beijing’s growing power, since 2018 the US, Japan, India
and Australia have revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) to work
towards a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and counter China’s influence.80 In response
to these shifting power dynamics, most of the Mekong countries have cautiously
maintained their distance from major powers while gaining benefits from all of
them. In this context, norms promoted by China are likely to struggle to take
hold, given that the presence of the United States and its allies is still highly valued
in the region.
80
Kei Koga, ‘Japan’s “Indo-Pacific” question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?’, International
Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 49–74; Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Evasive balancing: India’s unviable Indo-Pacific strategy’,
International Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 75–94; Brendan Taylor, ‘Is Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy an illusion?’,
International Affairs 96: 1, 2020, pp. 95–120.
1726

(Song and Liu) Becoming A Normative Power? China's Mekong Agenda in The Era of Xi Jinping

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

(Song and Liu) Becoming A Normative Power? China's Mekong Agenda in The Era of Xi Jinping

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Becoming a normative power?

China’s Mekong agenda in the era of

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

International Affairs 97: 6 (2021) 1709–1726; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiab168

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1709 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1710 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

Normative power as a subject of study

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1711 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1712 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

Transformations in China’s normative agenda: before and after Xi’s rise

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1713 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1714 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1715 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1716 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1717 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

Top-down norm enforcement and state responses

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1718 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1719 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1720 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

Bottom-up norm diffusion and varied social responses

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1721 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

These views have inclined us to think of China’s normative power infrastructur-

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1722 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

Local perceptions of Chinese normative power in Thailand, Myanmar and

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1723 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1724 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1725 21/10/2021 11:20

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1709/6384367 by University of Glasgow user on 06 December 2021

INTA97_6_FullIssue.indb 1726 21/10/2021 11:20

You might also like