Special Proceeding

Probate proceeding (Rule 75-Rule 77)

Nature of Probate Proceeding
Cases:
G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943, Guevara vs. Guevara
Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]
Maninang vs. CA, G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
Ajero vs. CA, 236 SCRA 488 [1994]).
G.R. No. 176831,  January 15, 2010, ENG vs. LEE

Rule 75
Production of Will Allowance of Will Necessary

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. — No will shall pass

either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject
to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Ernesto Guevara vs. Rosario Guevara (and her husband Pedro Buison)
G.R. No. L-48840
December 29, 1943

Facts:
Ernesto M. Guevara and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter,
respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their
inheritance from the latter.

The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario Guevara to

recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict legitime as an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased—to wit, a portion of 423,492 square
meters of a large parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 51691 of the
province of Pangasinan, issued in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara— and to order the
latter to pay her P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as damages for withholding such legitime
from her.

Ernesto: The defendant answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights
the plaintiff might have had, had been barred by the operation of law.

Contents of the will of Victorino:

Execution: August 26, 1931
To his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain
worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all the furniture,
pictures, statues, and other religious objects found in the residence of the testator in
Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings
worth P120; to his stepson Pio Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second
marriage, Angustia Posadas, various pieces of jewelry worth P1,020.

a residential lot with its improvements situated in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan,
having an area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540; to his wife Angustia
Posadas he confirmed the donation propter nuptias theretofore made by him to her of a
portion of 25 hectares of the large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan
Psu-66618. He also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same parcel of land by
way of complete settlement of her usufructuary right.

He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by him
during his lifetime or by his attorney-in- fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his
pending debts and to defray his expenses and those of his family up to the time of
his death.

Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara executed a deed of sale
(exhibit 2) in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara whereby he conveyed to him the southern
half of the large parcel of land of which he had theretofore disposed by the will above
mentioned, in consideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable considerations, among
which were the payment of all his debts and obligations amounting to not less than
P16,500, his maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and
funeral expenses. As to the northern half of the same parcel of land, he declared: Hago
constar también que reconozco a mi referido hi jo Ernesto M. Guevara como dueño de
la mitad norte de la totalidad y con junto de los referidos terrenos por haberlos
comprado de su propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien había vendido con
anterioridad. (recognized Ernesto as the owner in short, he donated it to Ernesto)

Then Ernesto Guevera applied for the titling of the land and a final decree of registration
was issued under his name over the whole parcel of land.

Victorino died on September 27, 1933. His last will and testament, however, was never
presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been
instituted for the settlement of his estate.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions
made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural
daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of
21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four
years after the testator's demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the
present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore
indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the
court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased
Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter.

Issues:
Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the procedure
adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2) the efficacy of the
deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant
(petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara.
Uriarte vs CFI of Negros, CFI of Manila, Juan Uriarte Zamocona, and Higinio
Uriarte
GR No. L-21938-39
May 29, 1970

Case: Petition for Certiorari

Facts:
Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari against the respondents
Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros
Occidental and of Manila.

Reasons:
 Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344 for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Don Juan Uriarte and failing to declare itself
“the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate” of the deceased
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court;
 Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No.
51396, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the
Negros court.

Petitioner:
Vicente Uriarte filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of
the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter
alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime
of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his
compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son.

Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as
special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for the
hearing of the petition and ordered that-the requisite notices be published in accordance
with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine
National Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.

Respondent:
Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the
above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte
who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy
whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon
receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence
the intestate proceeding.
Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding
No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last. will
of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following
grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no
legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente
Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not
being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate
and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros
Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same pursuant to Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
The Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed
the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it.

ISSUE:
WON the intestate proceeding should be dismissed; and accordingly, where should the
probate proceeding be filed with.

Held:
As to the dismissal of the intestate proceeding, it is proper that it shall be dismissed.
The court held that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person take precedence over intestate proceedings. Thus, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left
a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to
the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding
shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

Now, the question arises whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition
for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court—
particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344—or was entitled to commence the
corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.

The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view
that he should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a
separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the
already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with
public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily
multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the
result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place,
when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been
requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted
to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be
inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the
Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court
for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte
is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special
Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the
Negros Court.

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila
Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had
no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue
therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural
defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches.