Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud

The sources of Russia's fear of NATO

Andrei P. Tsygankov
Department of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The paper analyzes Russia's perception of NATO since the beginning of its eastern
Available online xxx enlargement. Russia's reaction to the enlargement evolved from attempts to diffuse its
potential damage through a limited cooperation to passive and then active policies of
Keywords: containment. The latter have resulted in a risky behavior with respect to the alliance and a
Russia concentration of Russian military on the Western border. Two factors can assist us in
NATO
explaining Russia's evolving perception of NATO from a potential partner to a renewed
Security
military threat e the historical experience of viewing the alliance, and the West in general,
Civilization
Threat
as potentially threatening and the post-Cold war interaction with NATO that served to
strengthen the historically developed perception. As of today, Russia has learned from its
interaction with the alliance that NATO remains a principle threat to Russia's national
security and that through the alliance's expansion the West seeks to exercise its cultural,
economic, and political domination in Eurasia.
© 2018 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

1. Introduction

Since NATO's decision to expand in 1994, Russia's relations with the alliance have gone through several cycles of stability
and crisis. The first two crises were associated with NATO's air strikes against Serbia in 1999 and the Russia-Georgia conflict in
August 2008, respectively. Each crisis was accompanied by a disruption of institutional and political communication between
Russia and the Atlantic alliance. The third crisis developed following the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine and has been the
worst in Russia-NATO relations. Unlike the previous ones, the third crisis resulted in revision of the alliance's military policy
and perception of Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in the eastern Ukraine. The
revision was initiated during the Wales summit in 2014 and was completed at the Warsaw summit in July 2016.1 The Warsaw
summit served to demonstrate the allies' unity in deterring the threat from Russia, agreed to deploy additional forces in
Poland and the Baltic states, and recommended that all NATO members raise defense expenditure to the level of 2% of their
GDP. Although the summit also stressed importance of a dialogue with the Kremlin, the main actions and decisions by the
alliance indicated a qualitative change in perception of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russia was
viewed as the main threat to the West's security.
This paper considers the Russian side in the progressively deteriorating relations with the Atlantic alliance. I argue that
Russia's fear of NATO resulted from a historically enduring perception of the alliance as a key security threat and from the
alliance's actions that played into reviving such perception in Moscow following the end of the Cold War. The alliance's

E-mail address: andrei@sfsu.edu.

1
The Wales summit of the alliance took place on September 4e5, 2014 in Newport, Wales. The summit participants issued a joint statement on Ukraine,
decided to form a joint expeditionary force, and affirmed their commitment to spending 2% of their GDP on defense.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
0967-067X/© 2018 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
2 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11

leaders consistently refused to recognize Russia as a power with important stakes in European security. The Kremlin's
protests over NATO's expansion were ignored, while alliance continued to include new members and build new military
infrastructure on territories bordering Russia. Along with the United States' global regime change strategy and growing
criticism of Russia's human rights record, these developments gradually built the perception of NATO as serving hegemonic
ambitions of the Western civilization in general and the United States in particular. Civilization is defined as a system of
politically and culturally distinct values, or beliefs about appropriate organization of human institutions and foreign policy.
Initially Russia viewed NATO's expansion as a mistake driven by the organization's inertia, but the more recent perception by
the Kremlin betrays fear of the alliance as an offensive military organization employed to meet the larger objective to
dismantle Russia's political regime and system of values (Patrushev, 2015b). Western civilization is centered on competitive
political system and individualism, whereas Russia and other non-Western societies continue to rely on a highly concentrated
authority of the executive (Hale, 2014; Tsygankov, 2015). Today, institutions responsible for defending Russia from external
threats are also charged with the task of political security and prevention of destabilization through a “colored revolution”.2
The constructivist theory of international relations assists us in understanding Russia's perception by pointing to the
significance of “the other” in the process of forming self-identity (Doty, 1996; Neumann, 1999, 2017; Hopf, 2002; Pouliot,
2010). For Russia and the West the Cold War proved too recent to transform their perception of each other as potential
threats. Constructivism views perception as a social, rather than objective phenomenon. Perception is defined by historically
enduring beliefs and repetitive social practices and is rooted in the self-other interactions. Allies for only the brief period of
the Second World War and enemies for almost half a century, the two sides did not overcome some of the old perceptions and
stereotypes. The United States continued to mistrust Russia and insisted on reshaping the world according to the American
image by promoting neo-liberal institutions and NATO-centered security policies in Europe. Russia too displayed mistrust to
the West, acting on the old phobias over the West's intentions and seeking to contain the United States' “global hegemony.” As
early as in 1997 the country's National Security Concept recommended that Russia maintains equal distance in relations to the
“global European and Asian economic and political actors” and presented a program for the integration of CIS efforts in the
security area (Shakleina, 2002, 51e90).
Other theories of international relations are helpful yet insufficient to explain Russia's perception of NATO as the main
threat. Realists may find it puzzling that in the 1990s the Kremlin did not see a serious military threat coming from the
alliance viewing it largely as a political organization with an insufficiently reformed perspective on the post-Cold War
challenges. In addition, even after NATO has officially announced its view of Russia as the main threat and the decision to build
up its military capabilities in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states, the alliance could hardly be qualified as the most
important threat to Russia's security. The four proposed NATO's battalions on rotation basis did not present a serious chal-
lenge, and military analysts recognized that the alliance was not an effective deterrent should the Kremlin choose to attack
the identified East European states.3
Liberals or those stressing Putin's regime insecurities are correct that NATO is a convenient threat to exploit for domestic
stability purposes, yet liberals misunderstand the regime's intentions and the timing of nationalist domestic mobilization.
The contemporary level of Russia's military preparedness and the willingness of the Kremlin to take a high risk, as
demonstrated by dangerous incidents involving Russian and NATO's military planes and sea vessels (Ian Kearns and Raynova,
2016), indicate that Moscow views the alliance as a serious security threat. In addition, the argument about the Kremlin's
diversionary tactics applies only to post-2012 developments as related to Putin's entrenched politics of nationalism, anti-
Americanism, and information war against the West.
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section explains the framework for understanding the formation of
Russia's fear of NATO stressing the role of history and the alliance's activities contributing to the three crises in the bilateral
relations. The following section describes the crises using the proposed framework, and the final substantive part concen-
trates on recent developments following the Euromaidan Ukrainian revolution and leading up to the Warsaw summit of the
alliance in July 2016. The conclusion summarizes the analysis and lessons learned by Russia from its experience with NATO.

1.1. The social construction of the NATO threat

The notion of threat plays a central role in international relations theory; yet different schools approach threat differently.
While liberals tend to stress subjective and political nature of threat and foreign policy formation, depending on preferences
of leaders and regime's internal characteristics (Doyle, 2016), realists define threat “objectively”, in terms of calculations of
military capabilities, offense-defense balance, alliances, and international system's structure.4 Constructivists view threats in

2
Both Russia's Security Council and Ministry of Defense are now involved in fighting such a threat (Nagornykh and Safronov 2015).
3
As Jorge Benitez of the Atlantic Council wrote, "Four battalions (perhaps 4000 men) do not come close to deterring the approximately 250,000 troops
Russia has in its Western Military District (WMD) bordering NATO. In fact, four NATO battalions are not even a proportional response to the 3 new divisions
(roughly 30,000 troops) Russia announced in January that it is creating in the WMD. At best, the deployment of four NATO battalions is an incremental step
to strengthen deterrence that falls short of changing the calculus in Moscow. At worst, they are evidence to Putin that NATO is so weak and divided, the
allies can only muster consensus on tepid action, such as the deployment of battalion-sized speed bumps for his Spetsnaz as they trample over Article 5"
(Cited in Bershidsky, 2016).
4
The modified realist perspective stresses the role of various intervening variables in state interactions, including individual perceptions and domestic
structures (Taliaferro et al., 2016).

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11 3

social terms, stressing historical experience of relations between the “self” and the “other”. Over time, some nations or
cultural communities emerge as more significant, and it is through these significant “others” that “selves” define appropriate
character and types of actions (Neumann, 2017; Oren, 2002). The significant “other” establishes the meaningful context for
the “self's” existence. However, the “self” is not a passive learner and is not likely to accept a vision that undermines its own
historically developed system of perception and cultural meanings.5 The “self's” assessment of the “other” is subject to
variations, depending on the “other's” willingness to accept the “self's” influence. Depending on whether such influence is
read by the “self” as own extension or denying of “self's” recognition, it may generate either hope or resentment and
perception of threat, thereby encouraging or discouraging the “self” to act cooperatively.
At the heart of the Kremlin's current view of NATO is the securitized perception of the alliance as reflecting the eternally
expansionist drive of Western civilization and its desire to undermine Russia as the alternative other with distinct values and
international priorities. The primary factors explaining such view of the alliance are the historically built perception of NATO
and the alliance's policies following the Cold War. Russia has historically sought to be recognized by the Western other but
Russia's cultural lenses are different from those of Western nations, and in the absence of external recognition, the reform-
minded leadership in the Kremlin historically runs into opposition from advocates of more defensive and assertive foreign
policy (Tsygankov, 2012).
The underlying factor that has initially defined Russia's perception of NATO has to do with Russia's experience of security
interactions with Western nations. Before the Cold War, Russia at times cooperated with the West, but the two also fought
multiple wars. The experience of multiple defensive wars resulted in Russia's defense mentality or the entrenched fear of
being attacked from the western direction (Fuller, 1992; Wohlforth, 2006). The Soviet experience exacerbated the problem of
insecurity by adding to it the dimension of ideological confrontation and struggle for existential survival. To Russia, the Cold
War was about sovereignty and independence from foreign pressures. In Russian narrative of independence, the country
successfully withstood external invasions from Napoleon to Hitler. NATO was viewed as yet another threat to Russia's in-
dependence and Soviet statesmen, such as Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev, proposed the mutual disbandment of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact as the way to establishing new security foundations. Russia's post-Soviet leaders too insisted that
NATO had become obsolete and many in Russia viewed the expansion of NATO as a process that would deprive Russia of its
own voice in the new world order.
The second factor has to do with NATO's and the U.S.’ policies following the end of the Cold War. While the history of
security interactions defines the foundation of Russia's perception of the alliance, the more recent policies of the West help to
explain the revival of NATO-threat perception and the dynamics of its escalation. Initially, following the Cold War's end such
perception was weakened by what seemed to be a new era of building constructive relationships between the two sides, but
the threat-perception did not disappear entirely. Moscow sought to integrate with Western economic and political in-
stitutions, but soon stumbled over the West's decision to expand NATO eastward. The decision brushed aside Moscow's hopes
to transform the alliance into a non-military one and strengthened the sense that Russia was not being accepted by the West.
The West's military interventions in Yugoslavia and elsewhere exacerbated Russia's historic fear of the alliance and gave rise
to aggrieved sense of national pride, prompting the Kremlin to mobilize anti-Western sentiments at home.6
That the Russian public was prepared for revival of the image of Western threat was evident from victory of Vladimir
Zhirinovsky in November 1993 parliamentary elections by party lists. Zhirinovsky demanded that the state provided a greater
support for the military and toughen relations with the West. Russia's liberal foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, had to respond
to growing domestic pressures by proposing to rebuild Russia's military presence in Eurasia, supporting the war in Chechnya,
and declining participation in the NATO-devised Partnership for Peace. President Boris Yelstin too sought to improve his
relations with the army and security services and eventually appointed the leading critic of the West, Yevgeny Primakov, as
the Russian second foreign minister. However, NATO was still not taking Russia seriously dismissing the Kremlin's fears as
unfounded and not worthy of attention.
In response to the sense of growing humiliation by the West, the Kremlin changed from cooperative to increasingly
defensive and then assertive policy posture. In the 1990s and early 2000s, due to domestic disorder and poverty, Russia lacked
confidence and could not engage in assertive actions. It was too weak to prevent the policy of enlargement and was working
to engage NATO in security projects of common significance such as counter-terrorism. In the late 2000s, the Kremlin
emerged as more confident and willing to take actions in response to perceived upfront on Russia's values and interests. As
the Atlantic alliance continued to expand and used force, including against Russia's historically and culturally close Serbia the
Kremlin's perception grew more militarized. Following the U.S. strategy of global regime change, Russia's leaders developed
the view that through NATO the West seeks to dismantle Russia's political system and values.

5
Scholars with constructivist sensitivities have advanced a series of arguments suggesting that in cross-cultural interactions the self and the other are
different, but morally equal and, for that reason, both are sources of potential learning (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004).
6
Russia-NATO's relations after the Cold War were examined, for example, by MccGwire (1998); Black 2000; Pouliot 2010; Kanet and Larive  2012;
Tsygankov 2013; Kropatcheva 2014; Forsberg and Herd 2015; Sperling and Webber 2017.

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
4 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11

1.2. The three Russia-NATO crises

Since mid-1990s, Russia's perception of NATO evolved in response to the alliance's policies, resulting in several crises of the
two sides' relations. Table 1 summarizes effects of NATO's policies on Russia's attitude and foreign policy.
Despite the overwhelmingly negative reaction to the alliance's enlargement decision, Russia's leaders were initially
predominantly focused on minimizing potential damage from the enlargement for the relations with the West. Primakov's
reputation of a tough defender of national interests helped him to adapt to the new reality by establishing closer diplomatic
and political ties with the alliance. The result was the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between
Russia and NATO” signed by the two sides in May 1997, which Russia saw as a quasi-institutionalization of its relationships
with the alliance. Russia received an opportunity to join NATO in a specially established body, the Permanent Joint Council, for
consultations anddwhen appropriatedfor participation in decision-making and joint actions. In December 1997, in his
speech to the State Duma, Primakov referred to the Founding Act as a major accomplishment and evidence of Russia's di-
plomacy in reaching its own objectives. Russia now had a mechanism of permanent consultations with the alliance and the
question of its expansion was largely defused in the domestic politics.
Western intervention in Yugoslavia in March 1999 added to Russia-NATO relations the new dimension of use of force
contributing to militarization of Russia's perception. What exacerbated the problem further was that such force was used
against Russia's traditional Slavic/Orthodox ally without consulting with the Kremlin (Headley, 2009, 483). Russia's official
reaction included a statement on NATO's aggression in violation of the United Nations' jurisdiction and Helsinki's act on
preservation of sovereignty, suspension of participation in the Founding Act agreement, withdrawal of military mission from
Brussels, and ordering NATO representatives to leave Russia. Such reaction reflected the negative attitudes toward the
Western alliance within both Russian society and foreign policy community. The overwhelming majority believed that the
Western actions were driven by show of power and hegemonic ambitions, rather than by concerns over Milosevic's actions
against Kosovo Albanians. The Russian parliament fell short of only a few votes in a decision to support the admission of Serbia
into a political and military union with Russia.7 Among the general public, about 90% opposed NATO's bombing of Belgrade
and felt threatened by the alliance's actions (Antonenko, 1999, 143).
The subsequent developments demonstrated that, despite Primakov's efforts to reach a new understanding with NATO
that resulted in negotiating the Founding Act with the alliance, the majority of Russian political class was back to viewing the
alliance predominantly in military terms. The main external threat was now perceived to be from NATO, even though pre-
viously many analysts had seen China as equally threatening. After the war in Yugoslavia, many now viewed Kosovo as a
template of NATO's future strategy. This found its reflection in proposals to increase the defense budget. The newly draft
military doctrine emphasized that the threat of direct aggression against Russia and its allies could only be “deterred by
conducting active foreign policy and maintaining high readiness of conventional and nuclear forces.” (Antonenko, 1999, 134).
The Security Council further proposed extending and updating of the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons (Antonenko,
1999, 134e136). In this context, many argued against ratification of START 2. Russian elites also insisted on strengthening
the U.N. Security Council at the expense of NATO and called for tightening the defense space in the former Soviet Union.
Putin's attempts to improve ties with the West only served to postpone the next crisis in relations with the Western
alliance. The initial effort to build relations with the United States on the basis of fighting terrorism following September 11,
2001 was promising, as President Bush (2003) now saw the two countries as “allies in the war on terror” moving “to a new

Table 1
NATO, Russia, and three crises in their relations.

NATO's actions Russia's perception

1991e93 Discussion of future mission Alliance of Western democracies
1994e99 Enlargement-1; Russia-NATO Council Vestige of Cold War; potential partner
Crisis I 1999 Yugoslavia bombing Military threat
2001e02 Counter-terrorism; new Russia-NATO Council Partner
2002e04 Enlargement-2; MDS Military threat
Crisis II 2005e08 Support for enlargement-3 and colored revolutions Tool of regime change
2009e10 Counter-terrorism; cyber threats Limited partner
Crisis III 2011e14 MDS; military ties with non-Russian states; support for revolution in Ukraine Tool of Western expansionism
2014e16 Deterrence of Russia Military & civilizational threat

Source: composed by the author

7
Communist-minded deputies of Russian Duma Gennadi Seleznev, Nikolai Rizhkov, Sergei Baburin and others went to Belgrade and signed an agree-
ment with Milosevic supporting establishment of a common union. Communists and nationalists advocated providing Serbia with SS-300 defense systems
against NATO bombings and threatened a limited use of nuclear missiles against NATO countries (Tsygankov, 2001).

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11 5

level of partnership.” Putin even expressed an interest in joining NATO, and some members of the alliance indicated their
support (Steinberg and Gordon, 2001).
In late 2001, NATO secretary general Lord Robertson, supported by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, advo-
cated the idea of giving Russia a status equal to the alliance's 19 permanent members, including veto power over certain
decisions (Wines, 2001). An important step in that direction was the establishment at the May 28, 2002 summit in Rome of a
new NATO-Russia Council for consultation on security principles and action against common threats. The US-Russian Joint
Declaration at the summit even stated a “new strategic relationship” between the two nations (White House, 2002).
However, after 2003 the relationship began to visibly deteriorate. In addition to withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile treaty, the United States took steps to advance its military infrastructure closer to Russia's borders, arousing
further suspicions in Moscow. Despite the established Russia-NATO Council, the two sides again treated each other as po-
tential enemies rather than partners, and Washington did little to integrate Russia into Western security institutions or
address its concerns. Not only the US did not stop at two waves of NATO expansion that had already taken place despite
opposition from Russia, but it also worked on extending NATO membership to former Soviet states such as Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Ukraine. During 2003e2004 Georgia and Ukraine also underwent the colored revolutions assisted by the United
States' global democratization strategy and Western NGOs working against the incumbent governments. Although Russian
officials such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that the possible entry of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO would bring
about a tremendous “geopolitical shift” requiring Moscow to “revise its policy” (Interfax, 2006), Washington took these
warnings lightly and continued to work toward the two country's membership despite Russia's opposition.
The Kremlin viewed these developments as a deviation from, rather than a contribution to, the war on terror and a
confirmation that the Atlantic alliance was indeed threatening Russia's security. In response to NATO's activities, which the
Kremlin might see as potentially harmful, President Putin announced his decision to declare a moratorium on imple-
mentation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (Financial Times, Apr 27, 2007). Putin's decision meant that
Russia would be free of the CFE restrictions regarding movement of conventional forces within Russian territory. In addition,
in Russia they started to believe that the Western democracy promotion efforts were a plot to overthrow the legitimately
elected government in Moscow. In the context of the conventional insecurity perception, political changes in Georgia and
Ukraine were viewed by the Kremlin as a Trojan horse for getting these countries into the Atlantic alliance and push Russia in
the direction of regime change.
This securitized perception of political change was at the heart of Russia-Georgia conflict. In addition to grown instability
in the region, the colored revolutions added to the perception within the Kremlin that Washington's chief objective was in fact
to change regime in Russia.8 Although the public support for a revolution was weak, the Kremlin's political technologists took
the threat seriously knowing that influential elites in the United States maintained contacts with some radical organizations
in Russia.9 For instance, in April 2007 the U.S. State Department issued a report highly critical of Russia's political system
pledging various assistance to “democratic organizations” inside the country. In response the Kremlin trained its own youth
organizations to defend what it saw as Russian indigenous democracy, restricted activities of Western NGOs and radical
opposition inside the country, and warned the United States against interference with Russian domestic developments.
Following the summit of the alliance in Bucharest in April 2008 Russia reiterated that it would do everything in its power
to prevent expansion of the alliance and extension of its membership to Georgia and Ukraine (RFE/RL 2008). The West's
geopolitical advances into what Russia has traditionally viewed its sphere of interests and the desire expressed by post-
revolutionary Georgia and Ukraine to join the Western alliance exacerbated Russia's sense of vulnerability and isolation
with respect to the West. As Putin (2008) summarized Russia's perception, “We view the appearance of a powerful military
bloc on our borders … as a direct threat to the security of our country. The claim that this process is not directed against Russia
will not suffice. National security is not based on promises.” The public too reacted overwhelmingly negatively to the alli-
ance's expansion. 74% of Russian polled in March 2008 said that Ukraine's possible accession to NATO posed a threat of the
national security of the Russian Federation, and 77% expressed similar attitude toward Georgia's possible membership in the
organization (Interfax April 1, 2008). While NATO and U.S. officials did not conceal their support for Tbilisi and rarely criticized
Georgia's actions in public, Russia was increasing its economic and military assistance for the secessionist Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2012). Russia also sent signals that it was prepared to work to develop separatist attitudes in
Ukraine.10 The message for Georgia and Ukraine was that their membership in the alliance may come only at the expense of
territorial integrity. Russia's decision to go to war with Georgia over South Ossetia and the Kremlin's subsequent recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence fulfilled Russia's promises and ended the debate on the third wave of NATO
expansion.
Russia's conflict with Georgia in August 2008 was the peak of the second crisis in Russia-NATO relations, yet the United
States' president Barack Obama's attempts to “reset” ties with Moscow presented the Kremlin with a new opportunity to

8
This perception was assisted by fears of Russia displayed within the U.S. establishment. A group of influential politicians including some members of
George W. Bush's administration viewed Russia as a militarized dictatorship and a growing security threat (Tsygankov, 2013).
9
For example, the U.S. politicians such as Senator John McCain and Vice-President Cheney maintained ties with Russia's radical Westernizers associated
with organizations such as the Other Russia that called for sanctioning Russia's officials, boycotting Russia's presidential elections in 2008 and summits
with the Kremlin (Belton, 2007; Tsygankov, 2009, chapter 5).
10
For example, Moscow Mayor and a leader of the pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party Yury Luzhkov claimed Sevastopol was legally a part of Russia, and he
urged Moscow not to extend its treaty of friendship, cooperation, and partnership with Ukraine (Yasmann, 2008).

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
6 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11

address its security perception. Already in June 2008 Russia's president, Dmitri Medvedev (2008a), articulated a broad
perspective on Europe “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” and proposed a new all-European treaty to establish a new security
architecture by moving beyond NATO expansion and the conflict over Kosovo. Following the conflict with Georgia, Medvedev
(2008b) argued for an improved security framework in Europe. In November 2009, Russia published its proposal for a new
security treaty by pledging to legally restrict its unilateral use of force in exchange for European nations and the United States
doing the same. The Kremlin presented the draft as the document that would “finally do away with the legacy of the Cold
War” (Humphries, 2009). The two sides also cooperated on military supplies for Afghanistan and in January 2010 formally
resumed military ties after the interruption stemming from Russia's war with Georgia in August 2008.
However, the new security dialogue with Europe and the United States was not successful. The reset largely exhausted its
agenda by 2011. At the NATO Lisbon summit in November 2010 the Western nations proposed to focus on modern challenges
such as terrorism and cyber-attacks, yet they failed to positively respond to Russia's security proposal. The Western nations
further indicated that they expected more cooperation from Russia globally, while the Kremlin expressed frustration with
what it saw as insufficient cooperation on part of the West. Concerned about Washington's plans to deploy elements of the
missile defense system (MDS) in Europe, Medvedev (2010) issued a warning that a new arms race may take place should
Russia and the Western nations fail to agree on a “full-fledged joint mechanism of cooperation” on MDS. The president also
showed signs of frustration with lack of progress on his initiative on European security. Russia and the West's disagreements
over the Middle East further added to the Kremlin's sense of strategic vulnerability. Many in the Kremlin viewed the Arab
Spring and the subsequent instability in Egypt, Libya, and Syria as a continuation of the colored revolutions in Georgia and
Ukraine and were convinced that the real threat for Russia had to do with the U.S. and NATO attempts to change regimes
across the world.
As far as the Kremlin was concerned, the perception of the U.S. plotting to overthrow Putin was confirmed by subsequent
growing criticisms of Russia's political system by Washington and its role in the Ukrainian crisis in early 2014. Members of
Obama's administration were rarely engaged in criticism of Russia under Medvedev during 2009e2011, as the U.S. worked to
strengthen relations with him at the expense of Putin (Sounders, 2012). Nevertheless, such criticism grew strong since re-
election of Obama as president of the United States. In addition to the shift of power to Putin, Washington found it diffi-
cult to accept the new Kremlin's policies. In particular, Western nations reacted critically to Putin's attempts to re-assert
power in Eurasia and the Middle East. But the West and the U.S. were especially critical of what they viewed as signs of
regime's corruption and intolerance of opposition. The disagreements concerned the Kremlin's handling of protesters such as
the punk band Pussy Riot, the case of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky who exposed corruption among the state officials, but
was arrested and died while in detention, Russia's new law against propaganda of “non-traditional sexual relations among
minors”, and the anti-Western information war launched by the Russian media.
The Kremlin's perception of threat from the West-instigated revolution grew stronger in the context of powerful political
protests over fraudulent parliamentary elections in December 2011. Putin saw many West-leaning protesters as unpatriotic
and following the political and military agenda of Western nations. His first reaction was to accuse them of acting in concert
with the United States (Herszenhorn and Barry, 2011). Putin viewed the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine as one instigated
by the United States and following the series of other revolutions from Serbia in 2000 to the Arab Spring in 2011.11 He was
convinced that the compromise agreement between Ukraine's President Victor Yanukovich and the opposition on February
21, 2014 brokered by the EU collapsed because of the United States' intervention. The Ukrainian revolution and the Western
support for it mobilized support for nationalist and anti-Western thinking in Russia. The coalition behind Putin's Crimea
intervention included security hawks known for their close ties with Putin and tough opposition to NATO expansion. It was in
close consultation with this group that Russia's president made his decision regarding intervention in Crimea.12
NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, two rounds of expansion in Europe, political support for regime changes in Eurasia, and
the United States' decision to deploy elements of MDS in Europe convinced Putin and his entourage that their system was also
under threat. Although Yanukovich scrapped the NATO membership plans and signed a long-term lease on Russia's military
bases in Crimea, the Kremlin remained suspicious that his desire to strengthen relations with the European Union was a path
toward joining the Western military alliance. With the ascent of Arseny Yatsenyuk's coalition in Kiev, Moscow had reason to
believe that Kiev would resume its drive to join NATO and denounce the Black Sea agreement that allowed Russia to keep its
fleet in Crimea until 2042. By intervening in Crimea, Putin de facto acknowledged that his leverage against Kiev-largely based
on natural gas supplies and personal ties with Ukrainian pragmatists-was insufficient to ensure Ukraine's neutral status and
preserve Russian fleet in the Black Sea.
Each of three described crises was never fully resolved in terms of addressing Russia's criticism of NATO's expansion and
use of force without consulting the Kremlin. These sources of tensions in Russia-West relations survived while new politically
explosive issues e Western support for colored revolutions and growing criticisms of Russia's internal political developments
e were added. There were also growing disputes over other international issues including the Middle East, Russia's efforts to
strengthen influence in Eurasia, nuclear arms control, and defection of the former CIA employee Edward Snowden to Russia

11
Such thinking was further confirmed by Putin's statement at the Security Council on July 22, 2014 (Kommersant, July 23, 2014) and the Council's
Secretary Nikola Patrushev's (2014) interview on October 15, 2014.
12
Sergei Ivanov later explained that economic advisors did not participate in discussion on Crimea because of the decision's urgency (Khamrayev, 2014).

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11 7

(Plumer, 2013). The failure to resolve old issues and the emergence of new ones served to accumulate tensions in Russia-West
relations and to make each new crisis more risky and dangerous than the previous one.

1.3. The red lines after Ukraine

Following each crisis with Russia the Atlantic alliance took about two years to resume its military cooperation with the
country's leadership. In late 2001, NATO attempted to engage Moscow in military activities following the Yugoslavia crisis,
and in January 2010 the alliance formally restored military ties with the Kremlin following the Russia-Georgia conflict.
However, the alliance broke with this pattern following the crisis over the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Impressed by
Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for Ukrainian separatists NATO moved in the direction of strengthening its defense
capacity at Russia's expense and deterring its military in case of a potential attack against vulnerable members of the alliance,
most notably the Baltic States.
The dominant discussion within NATO and the U.S. Ministry of Defense concerned motives and tactics of Russia's military
actions using the notion of “hybrid warfare.” The concept assumed Moscow's newly developed capacity to combine tradi-
tional military power with covert efforts to undermine an enemy government, with the latter being on display in Crimea and
Eastern Ukraine.13 As Moscow was preparing for a potential military confrontation with Kiev by concentrating Russian troops
on Ukraine's southern border, NATO was getting ready for Russian military offensive against the West (Kofman, 2016b). The
actions by Russia that caused Western fears included the Kremlin's war in Georgia in 2008 and massive military exercises in
the Black Sea area in 2013 that took place before the EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Following the Ukrainian crisis Russia
conducted a major exercise, “Zapad” in the Baltic area in June 2014, “Vostok” with involvement of Russian Pacific Fleet in
September 2014, and other important military exercises during 2015e2017. Counter-actions proposed by the Atlantic alli-
ance's commanders ranged from building up defense capacity on Western borders to actively arming Kiev and preparing to
confront Russia should it chose to escalate in Ukraine. In particular, then the supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe
General Philip Breedlove advocated the latter approach, lobbying privately to pressure President Barack Obama (Fang and
Jilani, 2016).
The Western defense approach prevailed and was expressed in the alliance's decisions. In addition to consolidating
perception of Russia as a military threat, these decisions concerned movement of troops and military infrastructure, training
exercises, defense spending, and acceptance of new NATO members. During the alliance's summit in Wales held in September
2014, the outgoing Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen named the Islamic State and Russia as the greatest threats to
world peace (Herman, 2014). The summit reassured East European members of the alliance's commitment to collective
defenses and development of a Readiness Action Plan that included a continuous rotation of air, land and maritime forces in
the region. NATO's ability was further strengthened by creating a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force capable of deploying
some 4000 to 6000 troops at two to five days' notice (Kearns, 2014). In December 2015, ministries of defense of NATO
countries approved the proposed plan of actions as a way of responding to Russia's “hybrid war.” They also invited
Montenegro (Chernogoria) to join the alliance. Finally, at July 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO decided to move four battalions to
Poland and the Baltic states to be stationed there indefinitely on a rotation basis. The alliance also conducted massive military
exercises in Eastern Europe involving by May 2016 15,000 troops from 19 countries (Starchak, 2016). In June 2016, the alliance
held an additional simulated defense against Russia known as Anakonda, the largest military exercise since the end of the
Cold War involving some 31,000 troops and thousands of combat vehicles from 24 countries (Klare, 2016). In October 2017,
NATO conducted military exercise in the Black Sea and a nuclear exercise in Germany and Belgium.
In Moscow, these actions by NATO were viewed as confirmation that the alliance was a tool of Western expansion at
Russia's expense. Western support for the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine and sanctions imposed against the Russian
economy, accompanied by preparations of a military response to Russia's “hybrid war” consolidated the perception in the
Kremlin and the foreign policy community that the West is getting ready to attack Russia for standing firm in defending its
national interests. In the words of the Security Council's Secretary Nikolai Patrushev (2015b), “the assurances of some
Western leaders that NATO is a defensive alliance serve only to cover the alliance's aggressive nature.” Elsewhere, Patrushev
(2015a) also stated that NATO and the United States were considering a dismemberment of Russia's territory to achieve their
goals of global domination. According to Russia's NATO representative Alexander Grushko (2016b), the alliance's decision to
station its troops in the Baltics on rotation basis was merely a way to stay there permanently in violation of previous
agreements (Grushko, 2016)14 and such military expansion served the purpose of consolidating the Russia threat in order to
control the European continent (Grushko, 2016a). Such consolidation, Grushko (2014) further argued, would require an
ideological justification and “the competitor's demonization” in mass media.
The Kremlin therefore was convinced that the crisis in Ukraine was only a pretext for the West's open designation of Russia
as the main threat. Both state officials and members of expert community frequently articulated the view that any expec-
tations of normalization of relations with NATO would be unrealistic. While dialogue with the alliance is important to
maintain, the old formats such as the Russia-NATO Council outlived their purpose. For instance, as Russia and NATO were

13
Criticisms of the notion of hybrid war could be found in Kofman (2016a) and Renz and Smith (2016).
14
The 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act prohibits deployment of substantial military forces in Eastern Europe on permanent basis. Russia interprets 3000
to 5000 troops to be “substantial”, while NATO officials disagree (Chernenko, 2014).

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
8 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11

getting ready to meet to discuss their differences following the Warsaw summit, some prominent Russian experts questioned
the idea. Thus, the Honorary Chairman of Russia's Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Sergei Karaganov (2016) argued that
the Russia-NATO Council was “no longer a legitimate body” because it proved to be a “cover for and the legalization of NATO
expansion.” In the expert's view, since its establishment in 1997 NATO has become a “qualitatively different alliance” moving
away from being a “defensive alliance of democratic powers.” In line with this view, experts at the Valdai club, Russia's leading
foreign policy think tank, were now regularly presenting in Europe and worldwide Russia's mistrust of and confrontation with
NATO and the United States as a “new norm” (Suslov, 2014; Sushentsov, 2016; Bordachev, 2016).
This perception by Russia found its expression in official documents. The new military doctrine approved by the Security
Council on December 19, 2014 named among main threats: “strengthening of military potential by NATO; its assumption of
global tasks and attempts to solve them in violation of international law; and expansion of NATO's military infrastructure
toward borders of Russian Federation, including by increasing the alliance's membership” (Gordeev, 2014). In addition, the
document identified as leading threats development and deployment of MDS, global extremism (terrorism), and “estab-
lishment within states bordering Russian Federation of regimes threatening interests of Russian Federation including by
overthrowing legitimate bodies of state power.” The latter point reinforces the view that in the Kremlin's mind, Western
political and military activities were now viewed merely as two sides of the same process of the West's civilization expan-
sion.15 The renewed National Security Strategy (2015) also identified as the main threats NATO's military activities and at-
tempts by the United States and the West to preserve world economic, political, and military dominance. The new Concept of
Foreign Policy (2016), signed by Putin on November 30, 2016, stressed the importance of defending the country's cultural
distinctiveness in the context of new international challenges and attempts by the United States to preserve global domi-
nance. The document posited Russia's “right for a tough response to unfriendly actions including by strengthening national
defense and implementing symmetric and asymmetric measures.”
Russia's military preparations were consistent with the identified perception of threat and sought to contain what was
viewed as the further encroachment by NATO and the West. While the Atlantic alliance worried about protection of the Baltics
from the Kremlin's potential attack, Russia feared for security of its enclave in Kaliningrad. Responding to NATO's military
build-up in Poland and Lithuania, attempts to pull in the neutral states such as Finland and Sweden, and additional MSD
deployment in Europe by the U.S., Russia indicated that it considered deployment of advanced nuclear-capable missiles in
Kaliningrad and Crimea (Osborn, 2016). Rather than challenging NATO in the Baltics, Russia concentrated its troops in its
southern and western regions (Starchak, 2016). In response to what it viewed as highly provocative military exercises and air
patrolling, Russia conducted massive exercises of its own and engaged in bold asymmetrical behavior testing the West's
patience. There were numerous dangerous incidents between Russia and NATO planes since March 2014 including “violations
of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea, simulated attack runs
and other dangerous happenings” (Kearns and Raynova, 2016). In several cases, Russian planes flew unusually close to
Western warships running a high risk of casualties or direct military intervention. In September 2017 Russia conducted a
major military exercise in western part of Russia and Belarus Zapad-2017, involving the largest yet amount of troops and
combat vehicles (Myers, 2017).
On the diplomatic front, Russia sought to prevent future expansion of the Atlantic alliance and relax Western pressures by
issuing conciliatory statements, developing bilateral contacts with European states, and engaging the United States in joint
actions in Syria and elsewhere. In particular, the Kremlin sought to reassure European non-NATO members explaining
Russia's response to the alliance's actions as defensive and calling for development of a collective security system globally and
in Europe (Putin, 2016). In October 2015 Russia intervened in Syria and began to scale down its rhetoric on Ukraine in order to
engage with the United States. During 2016e2017, Putin made multiple statements expressing his desire to work with the
United States despite Western sanctions against Russia and investigations of the Kremlin's hacking activities in the U.S.
Nevertheless, the issues of Crimea and Ukraine remained key obstacles for improvement of the relations.
Acting on the perception of encirclement by the Western civilization Russia sought to defend itself not just on military and
diplomatic grounds, but also in the area of regime consolidation. The Kremlin began to position Russia as a power with its
own special characteristics since the mid-2000 introducing restrictions against Western NGOs, political organizations and
state-critical media. These developments got consolidated following Putin's return to presidency in March 2012 and espe-
cially following the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. The Kremlin now presented Russia as a special civilization, committed
to defending particular values and principles relative to those of the West. In one of his speeches, Putin (2015a) declared “the
desire for independence and sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres” as an “integral part of our na-
tional character.” The incorporation of Crimea too was framed in terms of consolidating Russia's centuries-old “civilizational
and sacred significance” (Putin, 2015b). The Kremlin became especially alarmed by a perceived expansion of Western values
and could no longer be satisfied with defensive steps, but increasingly took the fight to the West's political and media space. In
order to protect Russia's “spiritual sovereignty”, Moscow also began to advocate its own version of information management
and established an infrastructure to influence formation of Russia's image in the world (Forsberg and Smith, 2016). At home,
the Kremlin tightened control over domestic media and information space. Moscow also developed closer ties with those

15
Russia's officials were fearful of democratic protests since the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine, following which Putin indicated his displeasure with
the West's role (Putin, 2005).

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11 9

movements and politicians in the West that were critical of the EU and the U.S. policies across the world (Laruelle, 2015) and
indicated openness to working with Donald Trump, a tough critic of the U.S. establishment and its worldview.
Overall, Russia's efforts to signal its willingness to find a new mode of coexistence with the West do not mean that the
Kremlin's perception of NATO and Western governments improved. The fear of the alliance in Russian political and social
circles remains deeply entrenched and will take a long time to change. Progress in the relationship, if it is to be made, is likely
to be slow and incremental.

1.4. The lessons learned by Russia

Russia's fear of NATO has roots in history of the country's relations with the West and the Western nations' post-Cold War
decisions that served to deepen the historically rooted mistrust and fear of the alliance. In the early 1990s, Russia perceived
NATO as an alliance of Western democracies that it was looking forward to joining. Such view lasted only briefly and
unraveled soon after the alliance began discussing possible inclusion of additional members without considering such
membership for Russia. Several rounds of NATO's enlargement, military intervention in Yugoslavia, deployment of MDS el-
ements in Eastern Europe, as well as the West's political support for regime changes in Eurasia e all worked to turn the
Kremlin to its traditional fear of the alliance. By 2014, Moscow's perception of NATO went full circle: the Kremlin again viewed
it as a military frontier of the West except this time Russia found itself on the opposite side. The Kremlin was no longer eager
to become a part of the Western civilization and instead sought to shield itself against the West's potentially harmful in-
fluences.16 Partly due to the economic sanctions and domestic propaganda campaign, the solid majority of Russians view the
Western nations as enemies seeking to destroy Russia and its leaders. A poll (Levada, 2016) showed that although many
Russians wanted to have closer ties with the West, the share of those stating that they had reasons to fear NATO was 57%. If
need be, the Kremlin will have no serious difficulty mobilizing public support for a military confrontation with the West.
Constructivist theory of international relations that stresses search for the self's recognition by the significant other
provides the basis for explaining the described complexities of Russia's perception and fear of NATO. Additional factors of
military insecurity and Russia's domestic politics, as highlighted by realism and liberalism, played an important yet secondary
role. Both factors mattered in the larger context set by history and politics of Russia-NATO relations. As one analyst (Galeotti,
2016) wrote, “In Russia, NATO is periodically portrayed as a military threat. … Realistically, this is not a military one. … To
many in and close to the Kremlin, Russia faces a real threat, not borne by tanks and missiles but cultural influences, economic
pressure, and political penetration. This is, in their eyes, a civilizational threat aimed at making Russia a homogenized,
neutered, subaltern state.” The perception of a growing military threat on part of the Kremlin would have not developed
without NATO's actions and decisions that marginalized Russia from participating in shaping European security. Domestic
politics too was not the driving factor and would have hardly became as prominent were Russia not feel threatened by the
Western strategy of regime change.
The Russia-NATO story taught the Kremlin two essential lessons. The first one is that force e either when applied directly,
as in Georgia, or demonstrated, as with patrolling Russia's western borders e matters greatly in deterring the Atlantic alliance
from expansion. Russian military planners and policy makers now assume that the only way to stop NATO's encroachment on
Russia's perceived spheres of influence is to clearly signal red lines and act firmly to defend Russia's interests as it was done
with respect to Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow made it clear that it is not afraid of taking risks if such is the requirement for
enforcing its definition of core geopolitical interests. The second lesson learned by the Kremlin is that domestic regime
consolidation is just as important in successful withstanding Western pressures as a powerful army and decisive leadership.
Russia's leaders and the dominant security class are now convinced that it is NATO and the United States, not Moscow that
launched a hybrid war against Russia.
Both lessons learned by Russia indicate that untangling the large and complex set of problems in Russia-NATO relations
will be extremely difficult and will require a persistent effort on both sides. It will be necessary to address both the military
and the political-civilizational dimensions of Russia-West relations. Domestic politics is likely to undermine any such effort
even if the leaders of Russia and the West were committed to transforming their relationships. In the West, critics of Russia
and supporters of the Western domination in the international system constitute the dominant group and will constrain
attempts to cooperate with the Kremlin. In Russia, the mainstream perspective too is skeptical of developing a strong
cooperation with NATO and the United States by viewing them as a serious threat. Mutual effort to recognize each other's
interests and values would be a requirement for resuming Russia-NATO strategic dialogue.

References

Antonenko, O., 1999. Russia, NATO and european security after Kosovo. Survival 41, 4.
Belton, Catherine, 2007. Relations with U.S. Lowest in 20 Years. Moscow Times. May 19.
Bershidsky, L., 2016. NATO can reduce the threat of escalation with Russia. Bloomberg. July 7. http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-07/NATO-
can-reduce-the-threat-of-escalation-with-russia.

16
Initially the EU and the U.S. imposed sanctions on freezing assets and transactions of the individuals and organizations closely associated with Russian
President Vladimir Putin. Then, following Russia's own sanctions against food imports from the EU countries, the West sanctioned several sectors of the
Russian economy (Tolksdorf, 2017).

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
10 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11

Black, J.L., 2000. Russia Faces NATO Expansion Boulder. Rawman & Littlefield.
Bordachev, T., 2016. Russia and the Berlin-Washington order in Europe. Valdaiclub.com, 22 July. http://valdaiclub.com/news/russia-and-the-berlin-
washington-order-in-europe/?sphrase_id¼4369.
Bush, G.W., 2003. Remarks by the president and Russian president Putin, the white House, office of the press-secretary. September 27. http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030927-2.html.
Chernenko, Ye, 2014. Ekspressivnyye Plany NATO. Kommersant. September 6.
Concept, 2016. Concept of foreign policy of the Russian federation. November 30. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/
cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248.
Doty, R., 1996. Imperial Encounters: Patterns of Representation in North/South Relations. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Doyle, M., 2016. Liberalism and foreign policy. In: Smith, Steve, Hadfield, Amelia, Dunne, Tim (Eds.), Foreign Policy: Theory and Cases. Oxford University
Press, New York.
Fang, L., Jilani, Z., 2016. Hacked emails reveal NATO general plotting against Obama on Russia policy. Intercept. July 1. https://theintercept.com/2016/07/01/
NATO-general-emails/.
Forsberg, T., Herd, G., 2015. Russia and NATO: from window of opportunities to closed doors. J. Contemp. Eur. Stud. 23 (1), 41e57.
Forsberg, T., Smith, H., 2016. Russian cultural statecraft in the eurasian space. Probl. Post-Communism 63.
Fuller Jr., W.C., 1992. Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914. Free Press, New York.
Galeotti, M., 2016. NATO Is a Symbol that Russia Is Always an Outsider. Intellinews.Com. July 11.
Gordeev, V., 2014. Osnovnym riskom v novoi voyennoi doctrine nazvano usileniye NATO. RBC. December 26. www.rbc.ru/politics/26/12/2014/
549d5f969a79477e64c36d8d.
Grushko, A., 2014. Rossiya Primet Vse Mery. Kommersant. November 5.
Grushko, A., 2016a. Bez strashilki o Rossiyi NATO ne uderzhat’ kontrol’ za ES. March 25. http://www.vestifinance.ru/videos/26759.
Grushko, A., 2016b. Rossiya Ne Ostavit Bez Otveta Usileniye NATO. Izvestia. June 16.
Hale, H., 2014. Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press.
Headley, J., 2009. Russia and the Balkans. Columbia University Press, NY.
Herman, Y., 2014. NATO Chief Names IS and Russia as Greatest Threats to Peace. Reuters. September 16.
Herszenhorn, D., Barry, E., 2011. Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest over Vote. New York Times. December 8.
Hopf, T., 2002. Social Construction of International Politics. Cornell University Press.
Humphries, C., 2009. Russia drafts ‘post-cold War’ East-west Security Pact. Reuters. November 29.
Inayatullah, N., Blaney, D., 2004. International Relations and the Problem of Difference. Routledge, London.
Interfax, 2006. NATO Expansion a Huge Mistake e Lavrov. Interfax, 12 December.
Interfax, 2008. Poll Shows Russians See NATO Membership for Ukraine, Georgia as Threat. Interfax. April 1.
Kanet, R.E., Larive , M.H.A., 2012. NATO and Russia: a perpetual new beginning. Perceptions 17, 1.
Karaganov, S., 2016. Russian Foreign Policy: 'We Are Smarter, Stronger and More Determined.’. Spiegel. July 16. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
interview-with-putin-foreign-policy-advisor-sergey-karaganov-a-1102629.html.
Kearns, I., 2014. NATO in Wales: summit of missed opportunities, 19 September. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/NATO-in-wales-summit-of-
missed-opportunities-_1913.html.
Kearns, I., Raynova, D., 2016. Managing Dangerous Incidents: the Need for a NATO-Russia Memorandum of Understanding, 7 March. http://www.
europeanleadershipnetwork.org/managing-dangerous-incidents-the-need-for-a-NATO-russia-memorandum-of-understanding_3578.html.
Khamrayev, V., 2014. Dlya Valdaiskogo Kluba Zakryli Krymsky Vopros. Kommersant. October 24.
Klare, M., 2016. The United States and NATO Are Preparing for a Major War with Russia. Nation. July 7.
Kofman, M., 2016b. Lozhnyye Real’nyye Ugrozy. Vedomosti. July 15.
Kofman, M., 2016a. Russian hybrid warfare and other dark arts. War on the Rocks, March 11. http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-
and-other-dark-arts/.
Kropatcheva, E., 2014. NATOeRussia relations and the Chinese factor. Politics 34, 2.
Laruelle, M. (Ed.), 2015. Eurasianism and the European Far Right Reshaping the EuropeeRussia Relationship. Lexington Books, Lanham.
Levada, 2016. Majority of Russians Want Closer Ties with West e Poll. Levada.Ru. November 29.
MccGwire, M., 1998. NATO expansion: ‘a policy error of historical importance’. Rev. Int. Stud. 24, 1.
Medvedev, D., 2008a. Speech in Berlin. Izvestiya. June 6.
Medvedev, D., 2008b. Meeting with the Participants in the International Club Valdai, Moscow, Kremlin.Ru. September 12.
Medvedev, D., 2010. Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, the Kremlin. November 30. www.kremlin.ru.
Mouritzen, H., Wivel, A., 2012. Explaining Foreign Policy: International Diplomacy and the Russo-Georgian War. Lynne Rienner.
Myers, N.J., 2017. Everything you wanted to know. About Zapad. The National Interest. October 8. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/everything-you-
wanted-know-about-zapad-2017-22622.
Nagornykh, I., Safronov, I., 2015. Minoborony Podkluchayetsta K Bor’be S ‘tsventymi Revolyutsiyami’. Kommerstant. June 24.
Neumann, I., 1999. Uses of the Other. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Neumann, I., 2017. Russia and the Idea of Europe, second ed. Routledge, London.
Oren, I., 2002. Our Enemy and US. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Osborn, A., 2016. Russia seen Putting New Nuclear-capable Missiles along NATO Border by 2019. Reuters. June 23.
Patrushev, N., 2014. Vtoraya kholodnaya. Rossiyskaya gazeta. October 15. http://www.rg.ru/2014/10/15/patrushev.html.
Patrushev, N., 2015b. Vyzov Prinyat. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 22 December.
Patrushev, N., 2015a. Mirovoiye Soobshchestvo Dolzhno Skazat’ Nam Spasibo Za Krym”.
Plumer, B., 2013. A short timeline of deteriorating U.S.-Russia relations. The Washington Post. August 8. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2013/08/08/ten-reasons-the-u-s-and-russia-are-at-odds/?utm_term¼.d2be44d6f938.
Pouliot, V., 2010. International Security in Practice: the Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Putin, V., 2005. Poslaniye Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii, March.
Putin, V., 2008. Press statement and answers to journalists' questions following a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council. Bucharest, April 4. www.kremlin.ru.
Putin, V., 2016. Speech at the Victory Parade. May 9.
Putin, V., 2015a. Speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club.
Putin, V., 2015b. Poslaniye prezidenta Federal’nomu sobraniyu rossiyskoy federatsii. December. http://president.kremlin.ru.
Renz, B., Smith, H., 2016. Russia and the hybrid warfare e going beyond the label aleksanteri institute, Helsinki. http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/
publications/presentations/papers/ap_1_2016.pdf.
RFE/RL, 2008. Russia again Vows to Block NATO Enlargement. RFE/RL Newsline. April 9.
Saunders, P., 2012. Another setback for the reset. The national interest. March 6. http://nationalinterest.org.
Shakleina, T. (Ed.), 2002. Vneshnyaya Politika I Bezopasnost’ Sovremennoi Rossiyi Moscow, vol. 4. ROSSPEN.
Sperling, J., Webber, M., 2017. NATO and the Ukraine crisis: collective securitization. Eur. J. Int. Secur. 2, 1.
Starchak, M., 2016. Severoatlanticheski Razlad. Kommersant-vlast’. May 30.
Steinberg, J.B., Gordon, Ph H., 2001. NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward; Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe's Integration. Brookings Institute.
November 15, 2001. https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato-enlargement-moving-forward-expanding-the-alliance-and-completing-europes-
integration/.

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002
 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2018) 1e11 11

Sushentsov, A., 2016. The new normal in US-Russia relations. Presentation at the chatham House, 12 April, 2016. https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/
new-normal-us-russia-relations.
Suslov, D., 2014. Vseryez i nadolgo. Russia in global affairs, 11 November. http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Vserez-i-nadolgo-17102.
Taliaferro, J., Lobell, S.E., Ripsman, N.M. (Eds.), 2016. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. Oxford University Press.
Tolksdorf, D., 2017. U.S. Sanctions law and western coordination on Russia policy. Kennan cable No. 29. December 20. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
publication/kennan-cable-no-29-us-sanctions-law-and-western-coordination-russia-policy.
Tsygankov, A., 2001. The final triumph of the pax Americana? Western intervention in Yugoslavia and Russia's debate on the post-cold war order. Commun.
Post Commun. Stud. 34, 3.
Tsygankov, A., 2009. Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy. Palgrave, London.
Tsygankov, A., 2012. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tsygankov, A., 2013. The Russia-NATO mistrust. Commun. Post Commun. Stud. 46, 1e2.
Tsygankov, A., 2015. The Strong State in Russia. Oxford University Press, New York.
White House, 2002. Text of joint declaration, the white House, office of the press secretary. May 24. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/
20020524-2.html.
Wines, M., 2001. NATO Plan Offers Russia Equal Voice on Some Policies. New York Times, 23 November.
Wohlforth, W., 2006. Heartland dreams: Russian geopolitics and foreign policy. In: Danspeckgruber, Wolfgang (Ed.), Perspectives on the Russian State in
Transition. The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University, Princeton.
Yasmann, V., 2008. Russia Prepares for Lengthy Battle over Ukraine. RFE/RL, April 15.

Please cite this article in press as: Tsygankov, A.P., The sources of Russia's fear of NATO, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.04.002