A.C. No.

5987, August 28, 2019

VIDAYLIN YAMON-LEACH, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, RESPONDENT.

Facts

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Vidaylin Yamon-Leach
against herein respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga on grounds of deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral
conduct and gross violation of his Oath of Office and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
During the month of September in 2001, Respondent lured and deceived the complainant to buy a
“beach-front” property of Ms Un n Baybay, Leyte. The property value was 1.4million. After the
necessary procedures had been done, complainant found out that the property was neither owned by
Ms. Un nor a beach front property and that the documents were forged by the respondent.
Respondent lawyer admitted his trickery to the respondent and that he promised to pay the amount
but failed to do so.
Therefore, On April 2, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file his comment to
the above-mentioned complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of the said Resolution. Respondent,
however, failed to do so. Time and time again, Respondent failed to give comment to the compliant.
As of August 13, 2019, the Court has yet to receive respondent’s comment to the complaint. Thus, the
Court deems it proper to consider respondent’s right to file his comment to the complaint as waived
and proceed with the resolution of this case on the basis of the evidence presented by the
complainant.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF DECEIT, MALPRACTICE, GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT

AND GROSS VIOLATION OF HIS OATH OF OFFICE AND THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT is guilty of willful disobedience of the court numerous orders

Ruling

What respondent did to complainant was plain and simple trickery. Through the foregoing acts,
respondent is guilty of violating the provisions of Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that "[e]very
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Respondent also breached his oath as a
lawyer to, among others, "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion." Respondent is, likewise, guilty of violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct
respondent’s willful disobedience of this Court's numerous orders has resulted in the extreme delay of
the instant proceedings. Thus, he is guilty of violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." He also violated Rules 12.03 and 12.04,
Canon 12 of the same Code, which state, respectively, that "[a] lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so" and "[a] lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes."
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga GUILTY of deceit, gross misconduct in
office, violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and willful
disobedience of lawful orders of the Supreme Court. He is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the name of Arturo B. Astorga from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Sereno Case GR No 237428

Facts: On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice
was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31,
2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP
HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon.
Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to
hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of
the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such
as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared
in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the
1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of
the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under
Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether
exclude Sereno therefrom.

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition
against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having
testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question
outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;

Ruling: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its
own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute
autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is
therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or
nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not
automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process
beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be
given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to
ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that
the Court is barred from resolving.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable
conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed
integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was
created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Manuel L. Valin vs. Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz A.C. No. 10564; November 7, 2017

Gesmundo, J.

FACTS: The complainants are the surviving children of Sps. Pedro F. Valin and Cecilia Lagadon. Pedro was
the original registered owner of a parcel of land who died in while he was in Haiwaii. Honorio discovered
that the subject land has been transferred to respondent, the godson of Pedro, by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996, and executed purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of his
spouse, Cecilia. Complainants claimed that the subject deed was obviously falsified and the signatures
therein of Pedro and Cecilia were forgeries because Pedro was already dead and Cecilia was in Hawaii at
that time. They also asserted that Pedro's Community Tax Certificate which was used to identify Pedro in
the deed, was also falsified as it was issued only on January 2, 1996 long after Pedro's death. The
complainants pointed to respondent as the author of the falsifications and forgeries because the latter
caused the registration of the subject land unto his name and he benefited from the same. In his
Answer, respondent denied the allegations against him. He claimed that Rogelio L. Valin, one of the
children of Pedro and Cecilia, sold the subject land to him sometime in 1989 allegedly in representation
of Pedro. Rogelio offered to sell the subject land and claimed that it was his share in their family's
properties. He then asked Rogelio for his authority to sell the subject land but the latter claimed that he
could not locate his authority from his parents in their house. Rogelio, as the vendor, undertook to
process the transfer of the title of the subject land. CASE HISTORY: The IBP-CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD for the suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
ISSUE: Should Atty. Ruiz be held liable? LAW/S APPLICABLE: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

RULING: Yes, Atty. Ruiz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath. The
lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as
be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. Respondent violated the lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01 and
10.01 of the CPR when he participated and benefited from the falsified deed. Even though he acted in
his personal capacity in the improper sale and registration of the subject, he is not excused from liability.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring
reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional
capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. The Court is convinced that respondent was the author or, at the very least, has connived with
the author of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC for his personal benefits. Respondent incessantly closed
his eyes until he became blind to the anomalies surrounding the sale of the subject land. Whether
through deliberate intent or gross negligence, he participated in the successful registration and release
of the title that originated from an absolutely falsified deed of sale. The Court hereby suspended Atty.
Ruiz from the practice of law for two (2) years.

JERRY M. PALENCIA v. ATTY. PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, AC. No. 10557, 2018-07-10

Facts:
Complainant was an overseas Filipino worker seafarer who was seriously injured during work when he
fell into the elevator shaft of the vessel M/T "Panos G" flying a Cyprus flag

While confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital,... paralegals in respondents' law office, approached
complainant

They convinced him to engage the services of respondents' law office... engaged the legal services of
respondents and Gurbani & Co., a law firm based in Singapore, and agreed to pay attorney's fees of 35%
of any recovery or settlement obtained for both... respondents engaged the services of Papadopoulos,
Lycourgos & Co., a law firm based in Cyprus, to draft a written opinion on the issues involving Cyprus
law, among others.

negotiations led to a settlement award in favor of complainant in the amount of US$95,000.00. Gurbani
& Co. remitted to respondents the amount of US$59,608.40.[10] From this amount, respondents
deducted: (l) US$5,000.00 as payment to Justice Gancayco; (2) their attorney's fees equivalent to 35%;
and (3) other expenses, leaving the net amount of US$18,132.43 for complainant.

The Attorney-Client Contract between the parties states: "We/I hereby voluntarily agree and bind
ourselves, our heirs and assigns to pay Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan and his collaborating Singapore counsels,
the sum equivalent to thirty-five [35%] percent of any recovery or settlement obtained."[57] Clearly, the
stipulated rate referred to the combined professional fees of both respondents and their collaborating
Singapore counsel, Gurbani & Co.[58] Nevertheless, respondents proceeded to deduct separate fees on
top of the amount already deducted by Gurbani & Co. Complainant contested this deduction and
refused to accept the amount being tendered by respondents.

Issues:
refusing to remit the amount collected in the Singapore case worth US$95,000.00... depositing
complainant's money into their own account... engaging in "ambulance chasing"

Ruling:

In employing paralegals to encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his employers, respondents
indirectly solicited legal business and encouraged the filing of suit. These constitute malpractice[44]
which calls for the exercise of the court's disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions.[45]

We find that while respondents gave prompt notice to complainant of their receipt of money collected
in the latter's favor, they were amiss in their duties to give accurate accounting of the amounts due to
complainant, and to return the money due to client upon demand.

Principles:

The practice of law is a profession and not a business

A lawyer in making known his legal services must do so in a dignified manner.[37] They are prohibited
from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers

The CPR explicitly states that "[a] lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business."

Corollary to this duty is for lawyers not to encourage any suit or proceeding for any corrupt motive or
interest.[40] Thus, "ambulance chasing," or the solicitation of almost any kind of business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment, is proscribed.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary.[46] This relationship holds a lawyer
to a great degree of fidelity and good faith especially in handling money or property of his clients.[47]
Thus, Canon 16 and its rules remind a lawyer to: (1) hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession;[48] (2) deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand subject to his retaining lien;[49] and (3) account for all money or property collected or received
for or from his client.[50]

Money collected by a lawyer on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitutes trust funds and
must be immediately paid over to the client.[51] As he holds such funds as agent or trustee, his failure
to pay or deliver the same to the client after demand constitutes conversion.[52] Thus, whenever a
lawyer collects money as a result of a favorable judgment, he must promptly report and account the
money collected to his client.[53]

He is under absolute duty to give his client a full, detailed, and accurate account of all money and
property which has been received and handled by him, and must justify all transactions and dealings
concerning them.[55] And while he is in possession of the client's funds, he should not commingle it
with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent.
A.C. No. 10697, March 25, 2019LARRY C. SEVILLA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. MARCELO C. MILLO,
RESPONDENT. Doctrines: Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law of and legal processes. Rule 1.04- A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid,
end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.

Facts: Larry Sevilla a publisher of the Pampango Foorprints issued a statement of account to SPS
Avelino and Melindra Manalo as fee for the publication of the notice of auction sale
related to the foreclosure of the mortgage. It was published 3 consecutive times. Atty.
Marcelo Millo as the counsel of the the Manalo’s refused to settle the account as it found the charge
“exorbitant and. The SPS. Manalo agreed to a 50% discount however counsel intervened on such
negotiation; when the complainant called the Atty.Millo, he shouted at the complainant. Due to
this, Larry had filed an administrative case against Atty. Millo. The administrative case was referred
to the IBP which later on sanctioned him with 1-month suspension.

Issue: W/N Atty. Morillo have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes. Atty Morillo has violated Canons 1 and Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and was sanctioned with One Month Suspension. Further to the decision was a note that
says “A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a
public or private capacity. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole”

LINSANGAN v. TOLENTINO
A.C. No. 6672
September 4, 2009

FACTS:

• There was a complaint for disbarment filed by LINSANGAN against Atty. TOLENTINO for solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional services.
– LINSANGAN alleged that TOLENTINO, with the help of a paralegal, LABIANO, convinced his clients to
transfer legal representation. TOLENTINO promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection
on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text
messages.
• LINSANGAN presented an affidavit attesting that LABIANO tried to prevail upon a client to sever his
lawyer-client relations with LINSANGAN and utilize TOLENTINO's services instead, in exchange for a loan
of ₱50,000.
• LINSANGAN also attached TOLENTINO's calling card.
• TOLENTINO denied knowing LABIANO and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
card.
• The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.
• The CBD recommended that TOLENTINO be reprimanded as it found that he:
– had encroached on the professional practice of LINSANGAN, violating Rule 8.02 and other canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
– contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as
stated in Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court
ISSUE/S:

• W.O.N. Tolentino's actions warrant disbarment

RULING:

• SC adopts the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of TOLENTINO but modifies the
recommended penalty.
• The means employed by TOLENTINO in furtherance of the said misconduct constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.
• • Canon 3, CPR provides:
– A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts.
– The practice of law is a profession and not a business. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill
is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
• • Rule 2.03, CPR provides:
– A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
– Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
• • Rule 1.03, CPR which provides:
– A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause.
– This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.
• TOLENTINO clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• TOLENTINO also committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice, in violation
of
• • Rule 8.02, CPR
– A lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of
better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
• Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, TOLENTINO violated:
• • Rule 16.04, CPR
– A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.
• • The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause.
• Any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers.
• Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
• • Atty. TOLENTINO for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of 1 year .
• Lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: lawyers
name; name of the law firm with which he is connected; address; telephone number and special branch
of law practiced

Atty. Khan vs. Atty. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299

FACTS
An investigation was conducted against Atty. Rizalino Simbillo by Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity
as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office. Atty Khan then filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. Based on their investigation, Mrs. Simbillo, claimed that her husband
was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months,
provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said
that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case
and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered. Further research by the Office of the
Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that various advertisements were
published in a different issue of the newspaper. Atty. Simbilo admitted the acts imputed to him, but
argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent’s act was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING
Yes. Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business. Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.

The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public service, of
which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without
making much money; 2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A
relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.

Such acts of respondents are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority. What
adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist,” he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also
the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who
might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds,
to do so.

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993

Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of
said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to
the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of
by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will
not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have
to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting,
and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

La Flor

The Court had already clarified that failure to indicate the number and date of issue of the counsel's
MCLE compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case, to wit:

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure
to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of
Compliance, this Court issued an En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No.
1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of
the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose
the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action."
Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the
number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the
dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will
subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.

On the other hand, even La Flor recognizes that Section 2, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court does not provide
for any punishment for failure to number the paragraphs in a pleading. In short, the perceived
procedural irregularities in the petition for review on certiorari do not justify its outright dismissal.
Procedural rules are in place to facilitate the adjudication of cases and avoid delay in the resolution of
rival claims.16 In addition, courts must strive to resolve cases on their merits, rather than summarily
dismiss them on technicalities.17 This is especially true when the alleged procedural rules violated do
not provide any sanction at all or when the transgression thereof does not result in a dismissal of the
action.

ROLANDO T. KO v. ATTY. ALMA UY-LAMPASAA.C. No. 11584 (Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3604), March
06, 2019
FACTS: On October 2, 2012, complainant alleged that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers when respondent notarized two purported deeds of sale
between Jerry Uy and the Sultan siblings despite knowing that the two deeds of sale were spurious. The
Deeds of Absolute Sale are similar in the following respects: the vendee, the property covered, and the
consideration. However, the two deeds differ as regards the name of the vendors. In this regard,
complainant claimed that an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale covering the
same property was executed on October 20, 2011 between his son, Jason U. Ko (Jason), and all ten of
the Sultan siblings and that respondent also committed perjury and has filed pleadings in court
without the necessary Mandatory Continuing Legal Education compliance number. In her Answer ,
respondent countered that she has not violated any provision of the CPR. On December 18, 2013,
the Investigating Commissioner of the CBD issued a Report and Recommendation that
respondent shall be suspended as a Notary Public for a period of SIX (6)MONTHS. In a Resolution dated
October 11, 2014, the IBP Board modified the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
imposed on respondent the penalty of immediate revocation of her notarial commission and
disqualification for re-appointment as notary public for two (2)years Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the IBP Board.

ISSUE: Whether respondent violated Rules on Notarial Practice for failure to indicate his MCLE
compliance number in his pleadings and for notarizing a document without the presence of the principal
party

RULING: B.M. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law. Based on the rules, an IBP member shall
only be declared delinquent for failure to comply with the education requirements "after the
sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired." This 60-day period shall commence from the time
such member received a notice of non-compliance. In the instant case, there is no showing that
respondent had ever been issued a Notice of Non-Compliance. On the contrary, the records show that
for the first to third compliance periods, she was exempted for being a member of the judiciary, and
that she was able to complete the requirements for the fourth compliance period. The Court also notes
that when complainant filed the disbarment case on October 12, 2012, respondent still had until April
14, 2013 to comply with the fourth compliance period. She eventually completed the required units on
May 19,2012.

Thus, there is no reason for respondent to be held liable and declared delinquent under B.M.850. The
act of notarization is impressed with public interest. As such, a notary public must observe the highest
degree of care in complying with the basic requirements in the performance of his or her duties in order
to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system. Respondent clearly
violated this provision when she notarized the deeds of absolute sale despite the incomplete signature
and identification details of the vendors. This is also in clear violation of the Rules on Notarial
Practice, Rule IV, Section 2. The Notarial Rules clearly mandate that before notarizing a document,
the notary public should require the presence of the very person who executed the same. When
respondent affixed her signature and notarial seal on the deeds of sale, she led the public to believe that
the parties personally appeared before her and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents
thereof when in fact, they deny doing so. WHEREFORE, Atty. Alma Uy- Lampasa is GUILTY of violating
the Rules on Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6) months; REVOKES
her notarial commission, effective immediately; and PROHIBITS her from being commissioned as a
notary public for two (2) years.

MARILU C. TURLA v. ATTY. JOSE M. CARINGAL, AC. No. 11641, 2019-03-12

Facts:
This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint[1] dated October 8, 2010 filed by Marilu C.
Turla (Turla) against the respondent, Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Caringal), before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In July 2010, Turla discovered that Atty. Caringal[2] had not attended thf required Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) seminars for the Second (MCLE II) and Third (MCLE III) Compliance Periods,
which were from April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007 and April 25, 2007 to April 14, 2010 respectively. Turla
confirmed such information when she received a Certification[3] dated August 2, 2010 issued by the
MCLE Office. Yet, Atty. Caringal signed the pleadings and motions in several cases on which he indicated
the following information after his signature and other personal details: "MCLE Exemption II & III Rec.
No. 000659126 Pasig 8.10.10."
As it turned out, the receipt Atty. Caringal pertained to was not for his MCLE exemption, but for his
payment of the MCLE non-compliance fee.[7]
Consequently, in her Complaint, Turla charged Atty. Caringal with (1) failure to take the MCLE seminars
for the MCLE II and III compliance periods as required under Bar Matter (BM) No. 850; and (2) violation
of his lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[8]
Turla contended that under Section 2, Rule 13[9] of BM No. 850, Atty. Caringal's non-compliance
resulted in his being listed as a delinquent member. She likewise argued that Atty. Caringal violated Rule
139-A[10] of the Rules of Court.
In his Report,[17] the Investigating Commissioner[18] of the CBD held that Turla's motives are
unimportant to a disbarment case since the issue is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to
continue acting as an officer of the court.
noted that Atty. Caringal paid the non-compliance fee of PhP2,000.00, evidenced by Official Receipt No.
0659126, pursuant to Rule 13, Section 1 of BM No. 850, which then served as his penalty for said
infraction.
As to Turla's contention that Atty. Caringal should still be penalized because he had already committed
the infraction, the Investigating Commissioner stated that "[c]omplainant only proved that Respondent
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements within the Second and Third Compliance Periods.
Respondent was already penalized for the same pursuant to B.M. 850, Rule 13, Section 1."[19]
Still, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Caringal breached his oath to do no falsehood by
stating that he was exempted from complying with the MCLE requirements when what he really paid for
was the non-compliance fee and not any exemption fee.
The Investigating Commissioner likewise noted that Atty. Caringal's failure to report his MCLE
information placed the pleadings he signed on behalf of his clients at risk of expunction.
Notwithstanding this, Atty. Caringal's liability is mitigated since he belatedly complied with the MCLE
requirements. Even so, whether or not Atty. Caringal intended to mislead the court, he still had a duty to
faithfully report his MCLE status but he failed to do so.
he IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the foregoing Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Caringal be suspended from the practice of
law for three years due to his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and because of his
misrepresentation that he had an MCLE exemption.
Atty. Caringal asked for a reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution[23]
Discontented, Atty. Caringal filed a Petition for Review by Certiorari[24] before the Court.
n its Resolution[25] dated August 1, 2017, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
In its Resolution[25] dated August 1, 2017, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
Issues:
(1) failure to take the MCLE seminars for the MCLE II and III compliance periods as required under Bar
Matter (BM) No. 850; and (2) violation of his lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[8]
Ruling:
The OBC, in its Report and Recommendation[26] dated October 29, 2018, determined that Atty.
Caringal's Petition for Review was a mere rehash of the matters already passed upon by the
Investigating Commissioner in his Report. It highlighted that Atty. Caringal wrongfully stated that he was
exempt from complying with the MCLE requirements in 11 different pleadings. The significant number of
pleadings which he signed indicating such wrong details completely negated any defense of good faith
since it demonstrated negligence in the performance of his duties towards his client and the courts.
Hence, the OBC agreed with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to impose a three-year
suspension on Atty. Caringal from the practice of law.
Atty. Caringal's Petition for Review is without merit.
It is worthy to note that Atty. Caringal could not be declared a delinquent member as the sixty (60)-day
period for compliance did not commence to run. There was no showing that he was ever issued and that
he had actually received a Non-Compliance Notice as required by the MCLE Implementing Rules. In
addition, by March 11, 2011,[28] he had already complied with the MCLE requirements for MCLE II and
III compliance periods, albeit belatedly.
Nevertheless, Atty. Caringal is being held liable for knowingly and willfully misrepresenting in the
pleadings he had signed and submitted to the courts that he was exempted from MCLE II and III.
BM No. 1922, issued on June 3, 2008, required the practicing members of the IBP to indicate in all
pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately
preceding compliance period. It also explicitly stated that "[f]ailure to disclose the required information
would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records."
Prior to its amendment on January 14, 2014, BM No. 1922 imposed a stiff penalty for a practicing
lawyer's failure to indicate the details of his/her MCLE Compliance/Exemption in the pleadings filed
before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, i.e., the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings
from the records, which, in effect, ultimately penalized said lawyer's clients, too. Atty. Caringal, in this
case, not only failed to indicate the necessary MCLE details in his pleadings and motions, but purposely
stated therein the false information that he was exempted from MCLE II and III. As he had filed the
subject pleadings in 2010, prior to the amendment of BM No. 1922 on January 14, 2014, he risked the
dismissal of the cases and expunction of the pleadings and motions by the courts, to his clients'
detriment.
Considering the foregoing, Atty. Caringal violated his sworn oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood"[30]
When Atty. Caringal indicated that he was MCLE-exempt in the pleadings and motions he filed, although
in fact he was not, he engaged in dishonest conduct which was also disrespectful of the courts. He
undoubtedly placed his clients at risk, given that pleadings with such false information produce no legal
effect[31] and can result in the expunction of the same.
Undeniably, he did not stay true to the cause of his clients and actually violated his duty to serve his
clients with competence and diligence.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years.

Cabiles v Cedo

Facts: Complainant Elibena Cabiles filed an administrative complaint before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro Cedo for neglecting the two cases she referred
to him to handle. Cabiles, engaged the services of respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal
case. Respondent lawyer was paid Php5,500.00 for drafting therein respondents' position paper
and Php2,000.00 per appearance in the NLRC hearings. During the hearing only Danilo Ligbos, the
complainant therein, showed up. According to Cabiles, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that
it was Danilo who was absent during the said hearing. Moreover Cabiles claimed that respondent
lawyer failed to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance in the position
paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Cabiles presented a certification issued on
June 29, 2010 by the MCLE Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied with the first, second,
and third compliance periods of the (MCLE) requirement. Anent the second case, Cabiles claimed
that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to
seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on the ground of
prescription. Respondent lawyer did not refute Cabiles’ claim that he failed to indicate his MCLE
compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal. The IBP’s investigating
commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension for two years. Aside from respondent
lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found him
grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to appear in the NLRC
hearing, and file the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his clients who
had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC rules of procedure, in filing their appeal
and; 3) in failing to file seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before the city prosecutor's
office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by prescription. The IBP Board of Governors reduced
the suspension to one year.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Cedo violated Canon 5 of the CPR when he failed to indicate his
MCLE compliance in the pleadings?

Ruling: The Court found Atty. Cedo guilty of having violated Canon 5 of the CPR and recommended his
one suspension. Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional
requirement to enable them to practice law. This is to ensure that they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law. Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a
delinquent IBP member. In Arnado v. Adaza, the Court administratively sanctioned therein
respondent lawyer for his non-compliance with four MCLE Compliance periods, in accordance
with Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, even if therein respondent attended an
MCLE Program covered by the Fourth Compliance Period, his attendance therein would only cover
his deficiency for the First Compliance Period, and he was still considered delinquent and had to
make up for the other compliance periods. In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in
the pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of
Compliance for the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010,
considering that NLRC case had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the MCLE Office,
Cabiles discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three MCLE compliance
periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5.

Ended here !!!

BAUTISTA v. FERRERFACTS:

Bautista:Alleged that she had recently accused Ferrer,Assistant Regional State Prosecutor, Office of
theProsecutor, Region 1, San Fernando City, La Union,with grave coercion, grave threats, grave
oraldefamation, unlawful arrest, violation of R.A. No.7438, theft, and attempted homicide.As borne by
the records, Bautista suggests that sheonce owed Ferrer P200,000.00, but the latter is nowclaiming that
the amount is already P440,000.00.That in the morning of March 2011, Ferrer, who was veryfurious,
came to her house she was renting from the latter anduttered derogatory remarks such as "punyeta ka!
Ang kapal ngmukha mo!" and threatened her with the words, "kung hindilang ako naawa sa anak mo,
tuluyan kita!"Ferrer then brought out a handgun from a bag beingheld by her driver, forced her to
leave the house shewas renting, illegally searched her bag, and forciblytook her Nokia cellular
phone.That at around 9 a.m. of the same day, Ferrerforcibly brought her to the City Hall of
SanFernando supposedly to identify those people whoshe lent Ferrer's money to.Upon arriving
thereat, however, Ferrer not onlyidentified her debtors, but also placed Bautista inpublic ridicule in
exclaiming that she was a memberof the "Budol-budol" gang.Bautista alleged that at around 2:30 p.m.,
Ferrer nextdetained and delivered her to the custody of thePNP, San Fernando City, La Union, without
anylegal grounds.At the police station, she was subjected to aninvestigation where she was again asked
aboutthose persons who were indebted to Ferrer. Whenshe finally disclosed the names, Ferrer
kicked,punched, and repeatedly slapped her head.Ferrer bragged that the police was under her
controland ordered PO2 Godoy to search her bag whoconsequently searched her wallet and got the list
ofdebtors therein. It was only upon the intercession ofa certain Johnny Go that she was released from
thecustody of the PNP.That Ferrer evicted her and her family from thehouse they were renting from
Ferrer and preventedthem from taking their personal belongings therein,which Ferrer refused to return
until Bautista paidthe alleged sum of money.On May 2011, she went to Ferrer's office with Jose
MariAlmeida, a Supervisor from the DepEd, to beg for the releaseof her personal belongings as well as a
computer belonging toAlmeida.But Ferrer got angry and told her "Putang ina moArlene ayusin mo ako
bago mo muna makuha mgagamit mo!" She then picked a pair of scissors on topof her table and thrust
it towards Bautista but wassubdued by Almeida.She made another attempt to beg for the release ofher
personal belongings amounting to P38,700.00,but was again rejected by Ferrer.Ferrer:Denied the
accusations against her. Ferrer recalls that Bautista,known as "Sudsud" for being the familiar manicurist
of theemployees at the City Hall of San Fernando, rented one of herhouses in December 2010. (Basta gi-
deny ni Ferrer ang aboveallegations ni Bautista. Reasons ra niya, which wala nituoang SC.)Ferrer insists
that the complaint filed against her ismerely an attempt on Bautista's part to pressure herinto
withdrawing her complaint against Bautista forEstafa. She adds that to blame her for her daughter'srape
is completely misguided and is the highestform of unfairness.Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on BarDiscipline (CBD) of the IBP:Recommended that Ferrer be reprimanded andwarned
that a similar show in the future of thetendency to take the law into her own hands and/orcareless use
of her public office or influence toadvance, or even to vindicate a purely privateinterest, and/or the
careless use of abusive,offensive or otherwise improper language will bedealt with more severely.Board
of Governors (BOG) of the IBP:Approved, with modification, the Report andRecommendation of the
InvestigatingCommissioner and suspended Ferrer from thepractice of law for one (1) year. In another
later Resolution, granted thee Motion forReconsideration of Ferrer and resolved to set aside its earlier
resolution and adopt the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Thus, the BOG
reprimanded Ferrer and warned her that a similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

ISSUE:Whether or not Ferrer is guilty of the charges against her.

RULING:In view of the circumstances of the instant case, the Courtfinds that Ferrer must be suspended
from the practice of lawfor a period of one (1) year, as originally found by the BOGin its prior
Resolution.1. It may be true that Bautista was, and may still be, indebtedto Ferrer and that the former
may not have been completelyhonest about where exactly the latter's money went.However, this does
not give Ferrer unbridledauthority to act the way that she did. As stated bythe Investigating
Commissioner, not only is theresomething wrong with the means employed byFerrer in her efforts to
recover what Bautista mayhave owed her, said means violated her dutiesunder the Code of Professional
Responsibility.It was clearly established, and in fact admitted byFerrer, that she uttered the derogatory
remarks inthe confines of her own office.This fact, standing alone, already violates Rule 8.01of Canon 8
of the CPR which prohibits a lawyerfrom using language which is abusive, offensive, orotherwise
improper.These words surely have no place in the mouth of alawyer in a high government office such
as Ferrer,an Assistant Regional State Prosecutor no less.2. It was also clearly proven that Ferrer went to
Bautista earlymorning on March 2011 to inquire about the sum of moneyand that before proceeding to
the government offices to talk tothe alleged debtors, Ferrer took Bautista's cellphone.As the witnesses
Johnny Go and Almeida stated intheir affidavits, Ferrer allowed the removal of theproperties only after
Bautista returns Ferrer'sinvestment. In fact, Ferrer even admitted that shesaid the following words to
Bautista: "putang inamo Arlene, ang kapal ng mukha mo. Ayusin momuna ako bago mo makuha ang
mga gamit mo."3. The Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner'sfinding that Ferrer's taking of
Bautista's cellphone, even if itwas eventually returned later on, and refusal to release thepersonal
effects of Bautista is tantamount to confiscation, ordepriving Bautista of something that is hers without
dueprocess of law.This is in clear breach of the Bill of Rights,particularly the principle that no person
shall bedeprived of life, liberty, or property without dueprocess of law.Under Canon 1 of the CPR,
lawyers, such as Ferrer,are mandated to uphold the Constitution and thelaws.Ferrer's withholding of
Bautista's personal propertynot only runs counter to her duty to uphold the law,it is also equivalent to
putting the law into her ownhands.4. Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
prohibits a lawyer in government from usinghis/her public position or influence to promote or
advancehis/her private interests.Ferrer was the Assistant Regional State Prosecutorof San Fernando
City, La Union, at the time of theincident and that Bautista was well aware of suchfact.Bautista was
questioned at the police station from2:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., or almost 5 hours. But despitethis, Ferrer
did not file any complaint againstBautista, insisting that she merely wanted to talk toBautista in front of
the police authorities.These police authorities searched Bautista'sbelongings looking for any clue as to
thewhereabouts of Ferrer's money as well as thedebtors who borrowed the same. Thus, evenassuming
that Ferrer did not really kick, punch, orrepeatedly slap Bautista's head, the fact thatBautista
surrendered her cellphone and allowedherself to be brought by Ferrer from one place toanother, from
early morning until the evening,shows how Ferrer succeeded in using her high andpowerful position in
the government to intimidateBautista, a mere manicurist and lessee of herproperty.5. In view of the
foregoing, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules ofCourt provides that a member of the bar may be removed
orsuspended from his office as attorney by the Court for anydeceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office,grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of acrime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission
topractice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of asuperior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as anattorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. Inaddition, the failure to live up
to the provisions of the CPR is,likewise, a ground for disciplinary action.6. Moreover, whether the
dispute between the parties is aprivate matter is of no moment.In Gonzalez v. Atty. Alcaraz, the held
that "whether intheir professional or in their private capacity,lawyers may be disbarred or suspended
formisconduct. This penalty is a consequence of actsshowing their unworthiness as officers of the
courts,as well as their lack of moral character, honesty,probity, and good demeanor.When the
misconduct committed outside of theirprofessional dealings is so gross as to show them tobe morally
unfit for the office and the privilegesconferred upon them by their license and the law,they may be
suspended or disbarred."7. In Olazo v. Justice Tinga, "since public office is a public trust,the ethical
conduct demanded upon lawyers in thegovernment service is more exacting than the standards
forthose in private practice. Lawyers in the government serviceare subject to constant public scrutiny
under norms of publicaccountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having toput aside their private
interest in favor of the interest of thepublic; their private activities should not interfere with
thedischarge of their official functions."Ferrer had every right to demand the return of herinvestments,
the appropriate course of actionshould have been to file a collection case againstBautista. But instead,
she chose to put the law intoher own hands by personally questioning Bautista,bringing her to the police
station, and confiscatingher personal belongings.To the Court, Ferrer's acts evinces a
certainvindictiveness, an undesirable trait in anyindividual, and as extensively discussed above,these
actuations violated multiple provisions of theCode of Professional Responsibility.Hence, Ferrer may
have been in the governmentservice for many years, but such fact may notextinguish her administrative
liability.8. The possession of good moral character is both a conditionprecedent, and a continuing
requirement, to warrantadmission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legalprofession.This
proceeds from the lawyer's duty to observe thehighest degree of morality in order to safeguard theBar's
integrity.Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of alawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or
privateactivities, which tends to show deficiency in moralcharacter, honesty, probity or good
demeanour, issufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

IN RE: ATTY. ROMULO P. ATENCIA: REFERRAL BY THE COURT OFAPPEALS OF A LAWYER'S UNETHICAL
CONDUCT AS INDICATED INIT’S DECISION IN PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. AURORA TATAC, ET AL.A.C.
No. 8911. 08 July 2019,
SECOND DIVISION
(PERLAS-BERNABE,
J.
)DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
The rationale for the prohibition under Rule 6.03 is that private lawyers who,during their tenure in
government service, had possessed the power to influence theoutcome of the proceedings, are bound
to enjoy an undue advantage over other privatelawyers because of their substantial access to
confidential information as well as to thegovernment.Here,

Atencia accepted the engagement to be the private counsel of the accused in the same criminal cases in
which he had previously intervened while in thegovernment service. This act falsl within the ambit of
the prohibition under Rule 6.03.
FACTS
Atty. Romulo P. Atencia, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Virac,Catanduanes, Branch 43
(RTC), presided over the arraignment of Aurora Tatac (Tatac),Maria Gaela (Gaela), and Maritess Cunanan
(Cunanan) for transporting dangerousdrugs, and thereafter, ordered a joint trial of the cases.
Subsequently Atencia renderedhis resignation as Presiding Judge of the RTC due to health reasons. Two
years after he resigned, Atencia entered his appearance in the same criminal cases as substitutecounsel
for Tatac, Gaela, and Cunanan. The RTC convicted the accused. On appeal,where Atencia was the
counsel, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered an acquittal butnoted that Atencia committed an ethical
infraction because of his acceptance of thecause of the accused, who had earlier appeared before him
when he was still a judge.The matter had been referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
further investigation. In a memorandum, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)

recommended the docketing of the complaint. Pursuant thereto the Court issued aResolution approving
the formal docketing of the complaint against Atencia.In his Comment, Atencia refuted the charges
against him, claiming that there isno prohibition against a former judge to accept as his client somebody
who was anaccused in his sala when he was still judge. Atencia also argued that his participationwas
limited to the arraignment and to the issuance of the order directing the joint trial.The Court referred
the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.The IBP Board of Governors adopted
the aforesaid report and recommendationhowever, during the pendency of this case, Atencia
unfortunately passed away.
ISSUE:
1.Is Atencia administratively liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the CPR?2.Does the death of Atencia
warrants dismissal of the case?
RULING
:1.
Yes
. Rule 6.03 of the CPR states:Rule 6.03 — A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
acceptengagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he hadintervened while in
said service. According to the PCGG case, the word "intervened was held to only include "anact of a
person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings." Theintervention cannot be
insubstantial and insignificant. The rationale for the prohibitionunder Rule 6.03 is that private lawyers
who, during their tenure in government service,had possessed the power to influence the outcome of
the proceedings, are bound toenjoy an undue advantage over other private lawyers because of their
substantialaccess to confidential information as well as to the government.

In presiding over the arraignment, Atencia performed acts that influenced theoutcome of the
proceedings. The arraignment is an essential stage of criminalprosecution where discretionary matters
may be raised. Atencia had necessarilyexamined the records forwarded by the prosecutor and
consequently, determined theexistence of probable cause. In ordering the joint trial, Atencia had to
examine therecords in order to determine the commonality of evidence.Given the significance of these
acts to the outcome of the proceedings, the acts of Atencia fall within the ambit of the prohibition
under Rule 6.03. Hence, he should nothave accepted the engagement to be the private counsel of the
accused in the samecriminal cases in which he had previously intervened while in the government
service.2.
Yes
. The general rule is that "the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over anadministrative matter by the
mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to holdoffice during the pendency of the case.
Jurisdiction once acquired, continues to existuntil the final resolution of the case." However, the death
of the respondent necessitatesthe dismissal of the administrative case upon a consideration of any of
the followingfactors: first, the observance of respondent's right to due process; second, the presenceof
exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarianreasons ; and third,
it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed.Here, the Court would have merely reprimanded
respondent for his ethical violation.However, since this penalty cannot anymore be implemented
because respondent hadalready passed away, and further taking into account equitable and
humanitarianconsiderations, the Court finds it proper to dismiss the administrative complaint against
him.

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON,
ROMBLON – ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON,
ROMBLON – ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009

BRION, J.:

Facts:

The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended
(or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places a
limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from
government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice
of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

xxx

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and
within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the
private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of
Romblon.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent
public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does
not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who
has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from
engaging in private practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one
(1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe may appear as private counsel before RTC-Branch 81 of
Romblon within the 1 year prohibition.

Held:

NO!

Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials
and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized
by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his
or her official functions.

The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employee's resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of
profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year
prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with
respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.

The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to
remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a
former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors.
The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed
office hours to serve the public.

Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only
prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies.
The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an incumbent court
official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:

Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following
requirements:

(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or
conducts business with the Judiciary;

(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible
with the performance of the court personnel's duties and responsibilities;

(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court
personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or
continuing education centers or similar institutions;

(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential
information acquired while performing officials duties;

(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless
specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment
reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside
employment. [Emphasis supplied]

In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is
covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside
employment requiring the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any
activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under both provisions, a
common objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or
unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with
court personnel still with the previous office.

After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases
to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713
continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffe's situation falls under Section 7.

A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's admission that she immediately
engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713.

As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her
separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court's limitation is that she cannot practice her profession
within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a
resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or
employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the
office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at
all, save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no
conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe's basic premises.

By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt
with more severely.

Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

FACTS:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila.
His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of
the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint
was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay,
summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as
a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.

RATIO:

Respondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1
and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of
the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules.

Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Ramos v. ImbangA.C No. 6788| 23 August 2007| Per CuriamAggy

Facts:Ramos Version(PETITIONER)-Ramos soughtthe assistance of Atty. Imbang because she wanted to

sue spouses Jovellanos. She paid Imbang’s attorney’s fees in the amount ofP8,500 but Imbang issued a
receipt foronly P5,000.She claims Imbang never lether inside the courtroom during hearings and that he
would only inform her after that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened 6
times and she paid Imbang P350.00 each time as appearance fee. She grew suspicious so she went to
RTC to check the status of her case. She found out that Imbang never filed a case and that he was in fact
an PAOlawyer(Public Attorney’s Office). Ramos, then, filed this complaint seeking the disbarment of
Imbang.Atty. Imbang Version(aka what a bullpoo)-He claims that Ramos knew that he was a PAO lawyer.
He refused to assist Ramos in her pursuit against the Jovellanos precisely because he knew he
wasn’t allowed to since he works for the government. He referred Ramos to another lawyer which
never pushed through because Ramos couldn’t pay the lawyer’s attorney’s fee as she only had P5,000.
Imbang says that Ramos asked her to keep the P5,000 as she was afraid she’d spend it. A year later,
Ramos asked him to issue a receipt for P5,000 because Ramos’daughterasked her to account the money.
He agreed because Ramos was a friend. In 1994, Imbang resigned from PAO and Ramos once again
asked his assistance regarding the suit against the Jovellanos. He agreed since by that time he was
already a private practitioner. However, he claims the casewas never finalized sincehe lost contact with
Ramos.Commission on Bar Discipline(CDB) found Imbang guilty and recommended his suspension and
the return of the P5,000. IBP affirmed the recommendation but held that interest should also be given
aside from the P5000.
Issue/s:1.W/N respondent is guilty for violating the lawyer’s oath and should be disbarred? -YES

Holding:Imbang violated the lawyer’s oath. His claim that he only issued the receipt to accommodatehis
friend is untenable. The receipt of the P5,000 confirmed thatthere was indeed an attorney-client relation
between the two of them. The date of the receipt indicated that he accepted the case while he was still
a PAO lawyer(meaning he was prohibited from practicing in private).He is found guilty because for
violating Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Canon 1 Rule 1.01, Canon
18 Rule 18.01 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility:-Practicing in private when he was prohibited to
do so since he’s a government lawyer-Accepting the attorney’s fee of P5,000 when PAO’s main mission
is to provide free legal assistance to indigent litigants-Deceiving Ramos into thinking that he actually
filed the case.Doctrine: Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
Ruling: Imbang is found guilty of violating lawyer’s oath. He is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.He is also ordered to return the 5,000.00 with legal interest.Relevant
Provisions:CANON 1 -A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 18 -A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rules 18.01 -A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows
or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees:Section 7. Prohibited
Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful: xxx xxx xxx(b)
Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not: xxx xxx xxx(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.

HUYSSEN v GUTIERREZMarch 24, 2006 || Per CuriamPROVISION INVOLVED:Canon 6 Rule 6.02 --A
lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

FACTSThis is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against Atty. Fred
Gutierrez.Huyssen and her three sons (American citizens) applied for Philippine Visas, and Atty.
Gutierrez, who was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), told her
that they needed to deposit a certain sum of money, to be returned to them after one year, in order
for their visa to be favorably acted upon. Huyssen deposited $20,000 all in all. Atty. Gutierrez
prepared receipts and vouchers as proof he had received the money, and yet when Huyssen demanded
from him the return of the money, he failed to give the money back. Several demand letters were sent,
and in all of those letters, Atty. Gutierrez would explain the reason for the delay and would deposit
post-dated checks which were all dishonored by the bank. This happened on two occasions,
totalling to 7 dishonored post-dated checks.Atty. Gutierrez admitted having received the $20,000,
but his defense was that the money was indeed used as payment for visa services and that he could
not have appropriated or pocketed the money. Furthermore, he said he delivered it to a certain
Atty. Mendoza who assisted Huyssen in their visa application in BID, but later on Atty. Mendoza diedand
so he was left to answer for the vouchers and pay. The Investigating Commissioner recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Gutierrez. In the investigation, it was found out that his defense was untenable due
to lack of proof of existence of one “Atty. Mendoza”, and due to the strong documentary evidences by
the complainant. Also, the fact that he issued personal checks to cover the return of money to
complainant despite the money being supposedly deposited to BID shows that he received the money
from complainant and actually appropriated it for his personal use. IBP Board of Governors
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s report and stated that Atty. Gutierrez should be disbarred.

ISSUEW/N Atty. Gutierrez should be disbarred? YES

RATIOLawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions than
lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer
who holds a public office.●Atty. Gutierrez’ defense remained unsubstantiated for he failed to
submit evidences. His action of shifting the blame to someone is not only impudent but downright
ignominious. He also failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the
case was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice.●As correctly issued by the
Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Gutierrez would not have issued his personal checks if said amount
were officially deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.Atty. Gutierrez’ act of asking
money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s visa application goes against Rule 1.01 and
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.●For Rule 1.01: prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.●For Rule 6.02: bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interest.○Promoting of private interest includes
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his
office orwhich may be affected by the functions of his office.●He even compounded his case by issuing
several worthless checks in an attempt to camouflage his misdeed.These pronouncement gain
practical significance in the case at bar given that Atty. Gutierrez was a former member of the Board
of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing that government lawyers who are public servants
owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive
to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public eye.Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct, and deserves the ultimate penalty of
expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.HELDDISBARRED.

OMAR P. ALI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, RESPONDENT.

A.C. NO. 4018, March 08, 2005.

TOPIC: Disbarment; Grave Misconduct committed while in the employ of the government

FACTS:

This disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant
against respondent. In said case, respondent, who was then holding the position of Register of Deeds of
Marawi City, was found guilty by the DOJ Secretary of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted
against the Bauduli Datus who are respondent’s relatives.

As a result of this finding, the Secretary recommended respondent’s dismissal from service which
conclusion and recommendation was adopted in toto by the Office of the President, and eventually
affirmed by the Supreme Court.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant instituted the present petition for
the disbarment of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the
employ of the government
HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing
the conduct of lawyers “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.” Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.

In this case, respondent’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by the Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his
office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only
to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent’s conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of
the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

Olazo vs. TingaA.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010

FACTS:
●The complainant in this case filed a sales application covering a parcelof land situated in Barangay
Lower Bicutan in the Municipality ofTaguig.
●Said land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that wassegregated and declared open for
disposition pursuant to ProclamationNo. 2476, and Proclamation No. 172.
●Memorandum No. 119 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 172,that created a Committee on
Awards whose duty was to study,evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to
purchasethe lands declared open for disposition.
●The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands andthe respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his officialcapacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros.
●Complainant filed a disbarment case against respondent for violatingRule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01
of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility for representing conflicting interests.
●Complainant alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) ofthe Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials andEmployees or RA No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of
law,within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyerfor Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee onAwards.

ISSUE: WON the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code ofConduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.

RULING: No, the respondent did not violate Section 7(b)(2) of the Code ofConduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees.Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides that:In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees nowprescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shallconstitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official andemployee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:x x x(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. –
Public officialsand employees during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized bythe Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tendto conflict with their official functions; x x xThese
prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year afterresignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the caseof subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannotpractice his profession in connection with any matter before the office heused to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.As a rule, government lawyers are not
allowed to engage in the privatepractice of their profession during their incumbency.29 By way of
exception,a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her professionunder the following
conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by theConstitution or by the law; and second, the
practice will not conflict or tendto conflict with his or her official functions.In case of lawyers separated
from the government service who are coveredunder subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713,
a one-yearprohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter beforethe office he used
to be with.In the case at bar, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s salesapplication was
ever brought before the Committee on Awards. By thecomplaint’s own account, the complainant filed a
sales application in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s
salesapplication was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR ofthe DENR due to the
conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, ofJoseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that
it was only on August 2,2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered
itsdecision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office andmembership to the
Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997. Thus, noevidence exists showing that the respondent
previously interfered with thesales application covering Manuel’s land when the respondent was still
amember of the Committee on Awards.Therefore, the respondent did not violate Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code ofConduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

A.C. No. 10303 April 22, 2015JOY A. GIMENO vs. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE

FACTS: On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint with the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2)
falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client
trust. In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admissionto the Bar and receipt of
his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on
March 29, 2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial
registers. On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory conference.
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable
for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and
insulting language in his pleadings.He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the
Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. These
provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful
inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given time.Finally, the
investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive language
when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
when he maintained several active notarial registers in different offices and violated Notarial Practice
Rules.

HELD: YES. The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one (1) active
notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The “one active notarial
register” rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to different
offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.Since a notarial commission is
personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the notarial actsthat the law
authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person,
other than the notary public, should perform it. This Court stresses that a notary public should not
trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are impressed with public interest. A Notary public's
office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been
privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.Atty. Zaide
should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant violation of
Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It
amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes."The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's
professional dealings, whether with
the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.Rule 8.01 -
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviorbefore the Courts. As shown in the record, Atty.
Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."
And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate
language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:“Her declaration in Public put a
shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of
Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor
performance as a prosecutor”This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious
mental incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor. This clearly confirms Atty.
Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court.While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. On
many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive
personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a partyor a witness. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be
dignified.

Carmelita Canete vs. Atty. Artemio Puti AC No. 10949 Canon violated: Canons 8 and 11 and Rules 8.01,
11.03, and 11.04 of the CPRCANON 8 —A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.Rule 8.01 —A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which isabusive,
offensive, or otherwise improper.CANON 11 —A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.Rule 11.03 —A lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensiveor menacing language or behavior before the Courts.Rule 11.04
—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

FACTS:●Canete (Complainant) claimed that her husband was a victim in a criminal case for kidnapping
for ransom with double murder filed against Atty. Puti's client. 1.Appearing in the court drunk. The
complainant said that Atty. Puti has been appearing in court occasions, intoxicated and made
discourteous and inappropriate remarksagainst the public and private prosecutors as well as the
judge2.Provoking the opposite counsel.The complainant said that Atty. Puti provoked her lawyer by
calling him “bakla” or gay. This was done in an open court during a hearing last May 9, 2013. 3.Provoking
and insulting the prosecutors. Inappropriate remarks against the Public Prosecutor. Atty. Puti said “No
Answer! Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki siguro bayad sa inyo.|||” Atty. Puti alos uttered the words
"to the handsome public prosecutor" with seething sarcasm. 4.Disrespecting the court. Atty. Puti also
bullied the judge who is handling the case and threatened the same in open court. He claimed that the
court is bias with our evidence. ●DEFENSE: a.Respondent denied ever appearing intoxicated in court.
There was no evidence of it. b.He also claimed that it was Atty. Tan (Canete’s counsel) who provoked
him when the latter made threats against him. c.According to him, it was his duty to call out the judge
for being biased and that he was only discharging his duties to his client by representing him with
zeal.|||●Findings of IBP Atty. Puti liable for misconduct for violating the Lawyer's Oath and theCPR and
recommending his suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law.|||●Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty. Puti failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward
his professional colleagues. Further, his act of imputing bias on the judge was without basis and uncalled
for. Furthermore, his act of appearing at hearings while intoxicated was in utter disrespect to the
court.|||
●IBP Board of Governors -6 months suspension

Issue: WON Atty Puti failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional collegues. Thus, violating Canon 8, Rule 10.01, 10.03, Canon 10 and Canon 11 of CPR.

RULING: Yes, although the penalty is reduced to STERN WARNINGonly.

HELD: While Atty. Puti is guilty of using inappropriate language against the opposing counsels and the
judge, such transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit his suspension since his misconduct is
considered as simple rather than grave.|||It’s also the first administrative case against Atty. Puti in his
more than three decades in the legal profession.|||1.Appearing in court intoxicated & the court agreed
with Atty. Puti There was no sufficient proof presented by Canete even if there wasa witness. Evidence
should be presented. 2.Inappropriate remarks against prosecutors & counsel. He is guilty. the TSN of the
hearings held at the trial court plainly shows that Atty. Puti employed impertinent and discourteous
language towards the opposing counsels. ○The term “bakla” was used in a pejorative and depreciating
manner. Although it’s not a derogatory word. Such offensive language finds no place in the courtroom
or in any other place for that matter. Atty. Puti ought to be aware that using the term "bakla" in a
derogatory way is no longer acceptable||. ○○Against the Public Prosecutors & Judge. TSN showed that
Atty. Puti made several inappropriate remarks unbecoming of a lawyer.

Lim vs Mendoza

Before the Court is a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Rufina Luy Lim (Rufina) against Atty.Manuel V.
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 7,Rule 7.03, Canon 8,
Rule 8.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Canon 11, Rule 11. 03, and Canon 19,Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Section 20, Rule 138 of theRules of Court.Rufina is the surviving
spouse of Pastor Y. Lim (Pastor) who died on June 11, 1994. She claimedthat during his lifetime, Pastor
used conjugal funds to organize several dummy corporations(Skyline International, Inc. (Skyline), Nell
Mart, Inc. (Nell Mart), etc.) using his mistresses andemployees as incorporators and/or stockholders, in
order to defeat her claims to said properties.On March 17, 1995, Rufina filed a Joint Petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofQuezon City for the settlement of Pastor's estate. Miguel Lim (Miguel),
brother of Pastor, onbehalf of his mother Yao Hiong, filed a Petition for Intervention dated
August 17, 1995categorically stating under oath that Skyline, etc., are dummy corporations and that
the personswhose names appear as incorporators, stockholders and officers thereof were mere
dummies. ThePetition also averred that the parcels of lands titled under the names of the corporations
werereally owned by Pastor.The Petition for Intervention was executed before Atty. Mendoza, as
notary public. He alsonotarized the affidavits of Teresa T. Lim, Lani G. Wenceslao, Susan Sarcia-Sabado
and Miguel,who all admitted under oath that: Pastor created dummy corporations; the purported
stockholdersthereof did not pay a single centavo for shares under their names; and, the affiants as
directors,stockholders, or officers did not have any actual participation in the operation of said
companies.Later, however, Atty. Mendoza, as counsel of Skyline, argued that Skyline is the registered
ownerof several real properties and that it has all the right to protect its interest against Rufina.
Rufinaaverred that Atty. Mendoza made such allegation despite his knowledge that Skyline is a
dummycorporation and it has been judicially declared as conjugal property of Rufina and Pastor.Rufina
also claimed that Atty. Mendoza, acting as Vice-President of Nell Mart demanded fromthe tenants of
lots covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 236236 and 236237 tovacate the property,
claiming that Nell Mart owned the same, even while knowing that Nell Martis a dummy corporation.

Rufina finally averred that Atty. Mendoza used intemperate language in his
pleadingsparticularly when he said that Rufina collected "BILLIONS OF PESOS" as rentals which
were"DISSIPATED ON HER GAMBLING VICES."7Atty. Mendoza, in his Answer, countered that Rufina and
Pastor were separated for more than 26years by the time Pastor died. On May 11, 1972, the couple
entered into an Agreement wherethey already partitioned their conjugal properties. As for the issue on
dummy corporations, theRTC of Quezon City, Branch 99 already held in Special Proceeding Case No. Q-
95-23334 that"the bank deposits in the names of [Nell Mart] and Skunac Corporation x x x which were
foundto be properties distinct from the estate, are x x x not properties of the estate of xxx Pastor x x
xand are, therefore, ordered excluded therefrom

Issue: WON Atty. Mendoza should be disbarred?

Ruling:We adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Considering however that this is not
therespondent's first infraction, the penalty of disbarment, instead of mere suspension, is in order.It has
been pronounced, time and again, that the practice of law is a privilege bestowed on thosewho show
that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers areexpected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, includinghonesty, integrity and
fair dealing. They must perform a four-fold duty to society, the legalprofession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legalprofession as embodied in the CPR.16The
Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer, not just to obey the laws of the land, but also to refrainfrom doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, andto conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity tothe courts, as well as to his
clients. All lawyers are servants of the law, and have to observe andmaintain the rule of law, as well as
be exemplars worthy of emulation by others. It is by nomeans a coincidence, therefore, that the CPR
emphatically reiterates the core values of honesty,integrity, and trustworthiness.The flip-flopping
averments of respondent in his pleadings betray a lack of forthrightness andtransparency on his part.
He initially averred, through the Petition for Intervention andsupporting affidavits which he
signed and notarized, that the corporations were dummies ofPastor. He now claims, however, that the
statements in the Petition were mere hearsay and thatthe shares of stocks he now owns in the
corporations were actually payments to him for hisservices and advances.

PHENINAH D.F. WASHINGTON, v. ATTY. DICEN, A.C. No. 12137, July 09, 2018 DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: The instant case aroused when herein ATTY. SAMUEL D. DICEN, respondent, in his pleading
mentioned an oppressive language against the adverse party [Washington], wherein he alleged that “It
is the observation of the respondent that complainant is no longer thinking on her own but has become
fixated on her illicit and immoral, if not adulterous relationship with her ex-husband, Martin Vince,
(while current husband is in the [United States] reportedly recuperating from a surgery), a foreigner who
by the latter's manipulation, caused her to be estranged from the entire Flores-Dicen Clan.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Dicen should be held administratively liable for violating Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for his use of intemperate language in his pleadings?

RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled, "The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the
high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability." Canon 8 of the CPR in particular, instructs that a lawyer's arguments in his
pleadings should be gracious to both the court and his opposing counsel, and must be of such words as
may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. "The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive." Indeed, Atty. Dicen could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to complainant's
allegations against him, explained his participation (or the lack of it) in the latter's arrest and detention,
and refrained from resorting to name-calling and personal

attacks in order to get his point across. After all, "Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The
use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum." FALLO:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Samuel D. Dicen is found GUILTY of violating Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from using language that is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper in his pleadings, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SPOUSES MANOLO & MILINIA NUEZCA v. ATTY. ERNESTO V. VILLAGARCIA, AC. No. 8210, 2016-08-08
Facts:

In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter... copy
furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening but also libelous
utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants to its recipients.

Thus, they maintained that respondent should be held administratively liable therefor.

In a Resolution[5] dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified
complaint. However, for failure... the complainants were then ordered[6] to furnish the Court the
complete and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply... refer the case to the
IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, which set the case for a mandatory
conference/hearing.[8]

Unfortunately, despite notices,[9] complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings.

IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),... recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that
respondent be declared in contempt of court and fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a... warning that
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.[12]

IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the May 29, 2015 Report and
Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending respondent from the practice of law... for a period of
six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.

Issues:

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
based on the allegations of the verified complaint.

Ruling:

partially concurs with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of this
Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

A.C. No. 7972

ANGELITO CABALIDA v. ATTY. SOLOMON A. LOBRIDO, JR. AND ATTY. DANNYL. PONDEVILLA
FACTS:
A certain property located in Vista Homes Subdivision, Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City was
beingcontested by two parties, Cabalida, former partner of Keleher, and Alpiere, the household help
hired byKeleher. Keleher was an Australian who committed suicide, having no family, the court ordered
Alpiere tosell Keleher’s property in order to pay for funeral expenses. Alpiere sold the property but kept
the moneyclaiming that Keleher did not pay her for several months and that the money would be
equivalent to her unpaid services. Cabalida was forced to pay the funeral parlor in order for Keleher to
have a proper funeralservice. When Cabalida returned to Keleher’s property, it was already locked and
he was unable to enter.He enlisted the help of the barangay and police but both did not want to act
absent a court order. After afew months Salili was occupying the property as a tenant. Cabalida asked
Salili to vacate said property tono avail.Cabalida availed the legal services of herein respondent Atty.
Solomon Lobrido for purposes of representing him in a civil action for Ejectment against Alpiere and
Salili. Alpiere and Salili availed the legalservices of herein respondent Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla. During
the continuance of the trial, the courtrecommended amicable settlement between the parties. Cabalida
met with Atty. Pondevilla absent hiscouncel (Atty.Lobrido) and eventually paid the former 250,000 pesos
in a MOA signed only by Alpiere andthe sister of Pondevilla, Cabalida, not being knowledgeable of the
law, signed said contract despite theabsense of the signature of Salili. Lobrido only had knowledge of
the MOA after he saw it in court. Theproperty was eventually sold in auction to pay for Cabalida’s
mortgage (which was the idea of Atty.Pondevilla) which he initiated to pay for the 250,000 settlement
required in the MOA. Cabalida believesthat he eventually lost his property through the connivance of
Lobrido and Pondevilla claming that theunethical acts of respondents clearly violated the Code of Ethics.
Respondents took advantage of their knowledge of the law against him who was not even a high school
graduate.The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference. Commissioner
Reyes found that there was not enough evidence to prove connivance but nonetheless sentenced
bothrespondents to 6 month suspension from the bar for violation of Canon 8 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility. The IBP Board of Governors reversed the decision absent proper form to the
prejudice of the petitioner hence this current appeal
ISSUE:
Whether the Board of Governors of the IBP gravely erred in exonerating respondents despite
thecommission of acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
The Board of Governors of the IBP gravely erred when they cancelled the decision of Commissioner
Reyes suspending both respondents from the practice of law for 6 months each. Rule 139-Bof the Rules
of Court, Section 12(a) provides for an investigator to review a case for reconsideration but inthe case at
bar, the decision to cancel the suspension of the respondents was expedited, not following Rule139-
B .The Court fully adopts the findings of Comm. Reyes but imposes a heavier penalty on Atty. DannyL.
Pondevilla. Pondevilla is found guilty of violation of Canon 8, Rule 8.02 and unauthorized practice of
lawand is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective
immediatelyupon receipt of this decision. Atty. Solomon A. Lobrido, Jr. is also ordered SUSPENDED from
the practiceof law for a period of six (6) months for failure to render proper legal assistance to his client.
Respondentsare further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with
more severely.

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and J. RUSTIA, Complainants, versus ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS
T. JARDER, Respondents. A.C. No. 9604 March 20 20!3 Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.

FACTS: Rodrigo Tapay and Anthony Rustia, both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration
received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit
to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee. The Complaint was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally
chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo
denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia and declared that the
signature in the Complaint was not his. Thus, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying the said
signature. This affidavit was used by Tapay and Rustia in filing a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia
of falsifying the signature of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented as evidence an
affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office
accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. The case was then dismissed. Tapay and Rustia
then later filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty.
Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that not only were respondents engaging
in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to
harass and persecute innocent people. In their Answer, respondents admitted that due to some minor
lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings be signed in his name by the secretary of the law
office. After investigation, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the same Code, and recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the
practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their
law firm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD: YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that
because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were
signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides: CANON 9 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate
to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules
of Court, a counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best
of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed
for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to
certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty.
Bacolo was meted with the penalty the suspension from the practice of law for one year.

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO A.C. No. 6317, August 31, 2006

FACTS: Sometime in January 2001, Luzviminda C. Lijauco engaged the services of Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado
for P 70,000 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank in the amount of
P180,000 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The said
foreclosed house and lot is the subject of a petition for the issuance of writ of possession then pending
before the RTC of Binan Laguna docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
Ms. Lijauco alleged that Atty. Terrado failed to appear in the hearing for the issuance of Writ of
Possession and did not protect her interest in allowing her to participate in a Compromise Agreement in
order to end the LRC Case No. B-2610. She filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Terrado for
gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. In his defense, Atty.
Terrado claims that the P 70,000 legal fees he received is purely and solely for the recovery of the P
180,000 savings account. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner submitted his report
finding Atty. Terrado guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors is proper?

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP. The records show that Atty. Terrado
acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between Ms. Lijauco and
the bank regarding LRC Case No. B-2610. He lured Ms. Lijauco to participate in a compromise agreement
with a false and misleading assurance that the latter can still recover her foreclosed property even after
three years from foreclosure. Atty. Terrado violated Rule 1.01 Canon 1 of the CPR which says that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P 70,000 for legal assistance in the recovery of the
deposit amounting to P 180,000 is unreasonable and is violative of Canon 20 of the CPR. Atty. Terrada
was also found guilty of violating Rule 9.02 of the CPR by openly admitting that he divided the legal fees
with two other people as a referral fee.

QUE VS REVILLA

FACTS: ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR. (REVILLA) was disbarred by the court from the practice of law
on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-
shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts;
maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court. Prior to
said disbarment , the court had penalized him already in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers
in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6)
months. The court in rendering their decision stated that: He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that
the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his
client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate. STATEMENT
OF CASE: On July 8, 2010, Revilla filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion 3 praying that his
license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Banc
resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit. Subsequently, Revilla appealed his case and pleaded the
court’s mercy, but his prayers were denied by the court. Albeit, Revilla continued to file appeals before
the court and continued to receive negative response from the court.

On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating his
apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his
health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney
disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he
had been excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving
with all humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church,
Quezon City. The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but
to be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his
sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed
that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his
petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a
certification 19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his
family are dedicated parishioners.

ISSUE: WON Atty Revilla is qualified for reinstatement in the practice of law.

HELD: NO, Atty Revilla is no longer qualified. Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it,
but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness
inintellectual attainment and in moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a
disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it
that only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to
the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred
attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if
the doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice.22 The basic inquiry in a petition for
reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or
herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. 24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The
Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.25

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient
to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions. We emphasize that
this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross
misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly the same grounds on
which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted
the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent. Considering the
respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as an act of
clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we are not fully
and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is
likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We
believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s reinstatement. Furthermore, we
are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly
stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to
pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings,
contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his
contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of
membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had
completely reformed. As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate
physical condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law,
the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation,
disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such
time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself
and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law
stands.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency
filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.