PEOPLE v. RELOVA POLIREV – Art.

III, Sec 21
113
G.R. No. L45129 March 6, 1987 Feliciano, J. Javier
Petitioner/s: Respondent/s:
People of the Philippines The Honorable Nejamin Relova, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, 2nd
Branch, and Manuel Opulencia
Respondents

Recit Ready Summary

Manuel Opulencia was charged for violating Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City for unauthorized
installations of electric wirings and devices to reduce electric power bill. Opulencia pleaded not guilty. He then filed
a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed, which
the City Court granted. 14 days later the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed another information against
Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the
RPC. Opulencia files a Motion to Quash alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in
the second information and that the filing was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Judge
Relova granted the accused’s Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. Petitioners now seek to set aside
the order of Judge Relova.

The issue is whether or not Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy was violated? Yes

The Court upholds Opulencia’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy and denied the prayer of the
petitioners. The first sentence of the provision prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
1. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he
is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include,
the crime charged in the other case. The first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense"
where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense. For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy
to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical
definition of the second offense. In this case, not all elements of the ordinance need be present in the
definition of the second offense, which is theft.
2. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on
one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution
under the other. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. It is shown in this case, that the relevant
acts took place within the same time frame and with the intent to reduce electric bill. This intent was present
from the moment of unauthorized installation.

The dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the
ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under the
Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense. Court denies the petition.

Facts

1. People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of Judge Relova quashing an information for theft filed
against Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
2. Members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped
with a search warrant, searched the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned by
Opulencia.
3. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building.
4. Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order
to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter.
5. An Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed an information against Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No.
1,Series of 1974, Batangas City.

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 6. The accused Opulencia pleaded not guilty. He then filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds
that the crime there charged had already prescribed, which the City Court granted.
7. 14 days later the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed another information against Opulencia, this time for
theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the RPC.
8. Opulencia files a Motion to Quash alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the
second information and that the filing was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
9. Judge Relova granted the accused’s Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed.
10. The petitioner’s position is that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection against a
second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense.
11. The petitioner stresses that the first information filed was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring and devices, acts which are in violation of an ordinance in Batangas which required 2
elements, 1) there was an installation 2) no authority therefor had been obtained from the Superintendent of
the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer
12. In contrast, petitioner says that the offense of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC before the CFI of Batangas has
different essential elements, 1) personal property be taken 2) personal property taken belongs to another 3)
taking be done with intent to gain 4) taking be done without consent of the owner and 5) taking be
accomplished without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
13. Petitioner alleges that theft of electricity can be effected even without illegal or unauthorized of any kind
(turning back dials of electric meter, fixing electric meter that it will not register actual electrical consumption,
under-reading of electrical consumption, tightening the screw of rotary blade).

Issue/s Ruling
1. Whether Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy was violated? 1. Yes
Rationale

The Court upholds Opulencia’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

 Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution: “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution of the same act.”
 First sentence (general rule): the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where
the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts.
 Second sentence (exception): the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the RPC, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.

Yap v. Lutero (1959): Yap was charged violating Art. 14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951 in relation to
Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954 of Iloilo City for driving and operating an automobile recklessly and without
reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street. 3 months later,
he was charged with violation of Revised Motor Vehicle Law by driving and operating an automobile in a
negligent manner and as a result inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian.
 He filed a motion to quash the second information on the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy of
punishment of the same act. SC held that constitutional protection against double jeopardy was available
to Yap.
 SC said that the first sentence of clause 20, section1, Article III, prohibits double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
 Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that
he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not
include, the crime charged in the other case.
 The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based
on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution
under the other.
 The Court in Yap regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the
same acts or sets of acts – that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner.

Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different

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statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged.

Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have
given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the
acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.

Same offense
 The rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness.
 The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity.
 The first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.
 For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting
the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense.
 The purpose is to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets
of technical elements.

Same act
 Acts, in this case, took place within the same time frame
 Opulencia installed eletric wirings without authorization, to reduce electric power bill
 Acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or
design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced to produce as
many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising
prosecutor can find.
 The dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance
upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that
offense. Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense.

Disposition
Petition for certiorari and mandamus Denied.

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