Journal of Business Ethics (2021) 174:387–402

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-020-04615-0

ORIGINAL PAPER

Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice

Source and Advisor Reassurance Matter?
El’fred Boo1   · Terence Ng2 · Premila Gowri Shankar3

Received: 16 September 2019 / Accepted: 2 September 2020 / Published online: 14 September 2020
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract
We conduct an experiment to investigate the joint effects of advisor reassurance and advice source in enhancing the impact
of advice on auditors’ whistleblowing propensity. Participants from a Big 4 firm assess the likelihood that a questionable act
involving a superior will be reported, both before and after receiving advice. We manipulate, between-participants, the advice
source (the technical department, an authoritative source vs. a colleague, a non-authoritative source) and advisor reassurance
(with vs. without) on the firm’s policy on whistleblower protection, holding constant the advice recommendation. Our study
is underpinned by the premise that moral agents may require an impetus to do the right thing in the form of advice whose
effects may vary by its source and nature. Results are consistent with our hypothesis. Specifically, while auditors’ propensity
to report a questionable act increases after receiving advice, the increase is significantly higher when the advice is received
with reassurance on whistleblower protection than without reassurance, with the effect of reassurance being greater when
the advice is from an authoritative source (the technical department) than from a non-authoritative source (a colleague).
These results underscore the importance of advice in promoting whistleblowing and demonstrate how the impact of advice
is jointly determined by its source and reassurance on whistleblower protection.

Keywords  Advice source · Reassurance · Questionable act reporting · Whistleblowing · Fraud detection

Introduction Plumlee and Yohn 2010), a problem compounded by both

the U.S. GAAP and IFRS allowing considerable reporting
Auditors face challenges assessing the appropriateness of discretion (Notbohm et al. 2019). In instances where the cli-
clients’ accounting treatments as business and accounting ent’s inappropriate accounting treatment is condoned by the
issues are getting more complex (Chychyla et  al. 2019; audit superiors, it would be helpful if the audit staff could
seek advice on the appropriateness of the accounting treat-
ment, even if it were merely to confirm what they initially
Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this suspect is a clear accounting breach, so as to bolster their
article (https​://doi.org/10.1007/s1055​1-020-04615​-0) contains confidence to whistleblow. Although avenues for employ-
supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
ees to seek advice on ethical issues have been discussed in
* Terence Ng prior literature (e.g., Leibowitz and Reinstein 2009; Weaver
abpng@ntu.edu.sg et al. 1999) and suggested in professional codes of conduct
El’fred Boo and ethics (e.g., IFAC 2018), little is known of whether and
ahyboo@ntu.edu.sg the extent to which the propensity to report questionable
Premila Gowri Shankar acts could be influenced by advice and the contexts under
apmaha@ntu.edu.sg which it is provided. We thus aim to contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of the role of advice in whistleblowing
1
Nanyang Technological University, S3, 01b‑47, 50 Nanyang by examining the joint effects of advice source (authorita-
Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore
tive vs. non-authoritative) and advisor reassurance on the
2
Nanyang Technological University, S3, B1c‑99, 50 Nanyang firm’s whistleblower protection policy (with vs. without) on
Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore
increasing whistleblowing propensity.
3
Nanyang Technological University, S3, B2c‑112, 50 Nanyang
Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore

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388
Understanding the above issues is important for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, prior research suggests that whistle-
blowing is a useful mechanism for uncovering agency issues
(Bowen et al. 2010) and it is the most common method by
which frauds are detected (ACFE 2018). A unique feature in
the public accounting context is a professional requirement
for auditors to consult with others within the firm to resolve
contentious issues and ethical dilemmas. However, research
in accounting and psychology suggests that auditors may not
utilize advice optimally due to egocentric or other reasons
(e.g., Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Kadous et al. 2013; Ng and
Shankar 2010; Yaniv 2004). Hence, understanding factors
that could promote or impede the effectiveness of advice in
enhancing auditors’ whistleblowing behavior is important
for timely prevention and detection of questionable acts and
frauds.
Second, while professional codes of conduct and ethics
recommend consultation with appropriate persons within the
firm for advice in resolving an ethical conflict (e.g., IFAC
2018), they are silent about whether the source of advice
matters. Auditors in practice seek advice from a variety of
sources (Danos et al. 1989; Gibbins and Emby 1985), both
authoritative (e.g., the audit firm’s technical department)
and non-authoritative (e.g., colleagues).1 While research
has investigated separately the effects of advice from a spe-
cific source such as a colleague or the technical department
(Kadous et al. 2013; Ng and Shankar 2010) on auditors’
judgements relating to client’s accounting choices, whether
and under what circumstances different advice sources
could affect auditors’ whistleblowing propensity has not
been examined. Danos et al. (1989) find that auditors are
more likely to seek advice from a colleague than the techni-
cal department. Ng and Shankar (2010) similarly document
that their auditor participants report having consulted, on
average over the past 2 years, other colleagues outside the
audit engagement team on client’s accounting issues more
frequently (in 64% of audit engagements) than the techni-
cal department (either formally or informally in 29% and
1
 In our study, an authoritative advice source refers to an official
channel (that is, the technical department) provided by the firm for
employees to consult with, or to seek advice from. Prior literature
also refers to the technical department as ‘Accounting Consultation
Unit’ (Salterio and Denham 1997) or ‘National Office’ (Aghazadeh
et al. 2019). The technical department comprises audit professionals
who are knowledgeable, competent and objective and provide con-
sultations to audit engagement teams seeking advice on complex and/
or sensitive accounting, auditing, risk management, reporting issues,
etc. so as to enhance audit quality (e.g., Deloitte 2019; EY 2019;
KPMG 2018). A non-authoritative advice source comprises any party
consulted with, such as a colleague, who is outside the firm’s official
channel. Advice can be sought on both technical accounting matters
(e.g., appropriateness of accounting treatment) and ethical issues/
dilemmas (e.g., whether and how to report a questionable act).
13
E. Boo et al.
49% of the audit engagements, respectively). More recent
experimental studies have also examined factors affecting
the use or seeking of advice from peers (e.g., Kadous et al.
2013; Schaefer 2013; Shankar and Ng 2008), underscoring
the importance of such an advice source in practice. It is,
however, unclear whether auditors will be more influenced
by advice received from an authoritative source such as the
technical department than a non-authoritative source such as
a colleague, particularly when the advice is obtained infor-
mally, which is the context examined in our study.2 Evi-
dence on whether and under what circumstances the source
of advice matters in enhancing whistleblowing behavior is
important since there could be important implications for
both audit and financial reporting quality as well as firm
policies to the extent that different sources of advice exert
differential impacts on auditors’ judgments.
Third, even when advised to report a questionable act,
auditors might eventually decide not to do so out of fear
of retaliation (Rocha and Kleiner 2005). A survey of 1300
European employees at multi-national companies conducted
by Ernst & Young finds that more than 80 per cent of the
respondents cited fear of retaliation as the reason they would
not whistleblow (Clemmons 2007). Recent finding by Wain-
berg and Perreault (2016) further indicates that providing
explicit whistleblower protections from retaliation may
not necessarily achieve its intended effect of encouraging
whistleblowing as it increases the salience of retaliatory
threats. Advisors can potentially play a useful role in per-
suading the potential whistleblower to do the right thing
by providing reassurance that addresses their concerns.
According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, reassurance is
the “action of restoring or intended to restore confidence:
reducing or eliminating worry or uncertainty.” However,
whether the effect of such reassurance in enhancing whistle-
blowing is contingent on the source has not been systemati-
cally examined.
To investigate the above issues, we conduct an experi-
ment involving auditors from a Big 4 firm in Singapore.
From a socio-cultural perspective, Singapore provides a
suitable environment with a low whistleblowing propensity
2
 Unlike consultations with colleagues which are typically done
informally, consultations with the firm’s technical department can
be either formal or informal. As noted by Kadous et al. (2013, Foot-
note 1, p. 2065), “Relative to informal advice, formal consultation is
more likely to be documented or billed to the engagement and is less
likely to involve auditor discretion in advisor selection and whether to
follow the advice (Perkins 2003)”. Aghazadeh et al. (2019) describe
recent practices in national consultation offices of Big 4 audit firms
where consultations can be done verbally without being documented
in the audit work papers (i.e., informally). We examine the context of
informal consultation given the sensitive nature of the advice sought,
which involves questionable acts of, and potential whistleblowing on,
superiors within the engagement team.
Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance…
baseline (Kaplan 2015; McLaren et al. 2019) to examine
the efficacy of advice source and reassurance in promoting
whistleblowing. We provide participants with a hypothetical
scenario in which an audit senior encountered a question-
able act involving his superiors, and ask them to assess the
likelihood that the act would be reported both pre- and post-
advice. We manipulate advice source (the technical depart-
ment, an authoritative source vs. a colleague, a non-author-
itative source) and advisor reassurance (with vs. without)
on whistleblower protection, holding constant the advisor’s
recommendation and the firm’s policy on whistleblower pro-
tection. Our main dependent variable is the change in audi-
tors’ propensity to report the questionable act after receiving
advice.
Results indicate that auditors are more likely to whistle-
blow after given advice than without advice across all exper-
iment conditions. We further find that the increase in audi-
tors’ whistleblowing propensity is significantly greater when
the advice is received with reassurance on whistleblower
protection than without reassurance, with the effect of reas-
surance being greater when the advice is received from an
authoritative source (the technical department) than from a
non-authoritative source (a colleague). Our results indicate
that the advice source and advisor reassurance play a com-
plementary role in promoting whistleblowing.
Our study extends existing theory on advice taking,
demonstrating that the effect of advice on decision-making
can be jointly enhanced by two factors, namely advice
source and advisor reassurance. Specifically, in the context
of an ethical dilemma involving a whistleblowing deci-
sion with potential negative repercussion or retaliation, the
effect of advice in promoting whistleblowing is enhanced
when it is both from an authoritative source and includes
reassurance on whistleblowing protection. Our study thus
provides evidence on boundary conditions under which
advisor reassurance and advice source could increase the
impact of advice in a risky decision context. Our study
also contributes to both the accounting and ethics litera-
ture by providing evidence on factors that could promote
the reporting of questionable acts in a professional con-
text. One practical implication is that regulators and audit
firms can promote whistleblowing by emphasizing the
importance of seeking advice, which we find to enhance
auditors’ whistleblowing propensity regardless of advice
source or advisor reassurance. Another contribution of
this study is in demonstrating how advisors can further
promote the reporting of questionable acts by reassuring
advice-seekers of the whistleblower protection already in
existence within the firm’s policy statements, as part of
their advice, and that the impact of such reassurance is
contingent on the advice source. We also contribute to the
general advice and psychological literature by providing
389
evidence on factors that can increase the usefulness and
impact of advice, and more specifically on how advice
source and advisor reassurance can jointly influence the
efficacy of advice. Such evidence can be particularly
important for promoting whistleblowing in societies with
a culture that is associated with a lower propensity for
whistleblowing.
In the next section, we discuss related prior studies and
develop our research hypotheses. This is followed by a
discussion of the research method and results. Our paper
concludes with a discussion of the study’s main findings,
limitations, and future research.
Background and Hypothesis Development
Factors Influencing Whistleblowing in Organizations
Given the increasing importance of whistleblowing for
fraud detection in organizations, recent research has
examined mechanisms to improve the reporting of ques-
tionable acts, such as procedural safeguards (e.g., Kaplan
et al. 2009) and incentive systems (e.g., Boo et al. 2016;
Brink et al. 2013; Pope and Lee 2013; Rose et al. 2016;
Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008). Near and Miceli’s (1995) model
on whistleblowing suggests that whistleblowing behavior
is influenced by both individual factors (i.e., character-
istics of the whistleblower, the complaint recipient and
the wrongdoer) and situational factors (i.e., characteris-
tics of the wrongdoing and the organization). Consistent
with their model, prior accounting research indicates that
the attributes of the whistleblower (Arnold and Ponemon
1991; Curtis 2006; Taylor and Curtis 2010; Zhang et al.
2013), the perpetrator (Kaplan 1995; Robertson et  al.
2011), the organization (Granville 1999; Miceli and Near
1985; Zhang et al. 2013), as well as contextual factors such
as wrongdoing seriousness, personal costs, trust that the
firm will investigate the reports, and the type of reporting
channel (Ayers and Kaplan 2005; Curtis and Taylor 2009;
Kaplan et al. 2012; Schultz et al. 1993; Zhang et al. 2013)
influence whistleblowing intention (see Gao and Brink
2017; Lee and Xiao 2018 for recent reviews).
Importantly, prior research indicates that fear of retali-
ation has a negative effect on whistleblowing intention
(Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Near and Miceli 1986).
Fear of retaliation has been identified as one of the main
reasons why employees do not report questionable acts
(Keenan 1990; Near and Miceli 1996; Rocha and Kleiner
2005) and such fear may not be unfounded. Press report of
Lehman Brothers ousting whistleblower Matthew Lee just
13

390
weeks after he had raised concerns with Lehman’s audi-
tor about the firm’s accounting in 2008 (Corkery 2010) is
one example of retaliation against whistleblowers in spite
of existing regulations on whistleblower protection (e.g.,
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002).3 We contribute to this
stream of research by providing evidence on whether the
provision of advice will alleviate such fear of retaliation
and increase auditors’ whistleblowing propensity, and how
the effect of advice could vary depending on its source and
reassurance provided by the advisor.
Whistleblowing Environment in Singapore
As prior literature indicates that cultural environment affects
whistleblowing (Patel 2003; Tavakoli et al. 2003), we will
first discuss the culture and the whistleblowing environment
in Singapore, where we conduct our study.
A White Paper on Shared Values that was debated and
adopted in the Singapore Parliament on January 15, 1991
contains five Shared Values: (1) Nation before community
and society above self, (2) Family as the basic unit of soci-
ety, (3) Community support and respect for the individual,
(4) Consensus, not conflict, and (5) Racial and religious har-
mony (HistorySG 1991; TST 1991). These national values,
which emphasize community above self and social harmony,
are consistent with Confucian’s values, such as respect for
authority, loyalty to good leaders, preference for order, thrift
and emphasis on education (Tan 1989). These fundamental
values have not changed much and are reflective of Hofst-
ede’s recent culture rating for Singapore, scoring high for
Power Distance (score of 74), low for Individualism (score
of 20), low for Uncertainty Avoidance (score of 8), and high
for Long-Term Orientation (score of 72) (refer to Hofstede
Insights 2020). While a high score in Power Distance and a
low score in both Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance
reduce a Singaporean employee’s propensity to whistleblow,
a high score in Long-Term Orientation will increase his/
her propensity to whistleblow (Patel 2003; Tavakoli et al.
2003). On balance, Hofstede’s Culture perspective might
suggest that employees in the Singapore work environment
are generally less inclined to whistleblow, consistent with
expected behavior in Confucian-oriented societies like Sin-
gapore (Kaplan 2015; McLaren et al. 2019). This is also
supported by prior findings indicating that cultural factors
in the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon environments are more
conducive for employee to whistleblow than in an Asian
environment (Patel 2003). Singapore thus provides a suitable
3
 While there is no SOX equivalent or an umbrella Act provid-
ing whistleblower protection in Singapore, whistleblower protection
clauses are specified under various statutes, including the Companies
Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, and Terrorism (Suppression of
Financing) Act (Cheng 2017; McLaren et al. 2019).
13
E. Boo et al.
environment with a low whistleblowing propensity baseline
to examine the efficacy of advice source and reassurance in
promoting whistleblowing.
Whistleblowing in the Audit Context
Auditors who discover a questionable act involving their
superiors and/or clients might find it challenging to resolve
the ethical issue for several reasons. First, accounting issues
are often complex and lacking in clarity (Baudot et al. 2018;
Plumlee and Yohn 2010), making it difficult to assess the
appropriateness of certain accounting treatments. Second,
junior auditors who have yet to prove themselves in the
public accounting environment are less certain of their pro-
fessional judgment (Brown et al. 2016; Pratt and Beaulieu
1992; Westermann et al. 2015). Keenan (1995) and Mil-
liken et al. (2003) suggest that junior employees generally
lack sufficient power or knowledge to whistleblow and effect
change. They might find it difficult and feel powerless to
question or challenge judgments of more experienced supe-
riors and clients, even in situations where the judgment or
decision is obviously questionable. These tendencies may be
exacerbated in a society with higher power distance and low
individualism and uncertainty avoidance such as Singapore.
Third, a perceived conflict between auditors’ whistleblowing
obligation and their responsibility to observe client confiden-
tiality adds to the complexities involved in whistleblowing
decisions (Parisi 2009). Fourth, as only audit team members
assigned to the client engagement are privy to client infor-
mation, it might not be difficult for superiors to deduce and
identify which junior staff whistleblows on them. Thus, an
audit staff might be reluctant to report a questionable act
even if an anonymous reporting channel is available.
Advice and Advice Source
Auditors in practice seek advice from different sources to
address some of their concerns discussed above. Lewis
(2006) suggests that firms’ policies should specifically
encourage employees to seek advice on whistleblowing at
an early stage, that is, upon the discovery of suspicious acts
rather than allow the matter to escalate. Although profes-
sional codes of conduct and ethics similarly recommend
that auditors should consult with other appropriate persons
within the firm to help them resolve ethical conflicts (e.g.,
IFAC 2018), they are silent about whether the source of
advice matters. While prior research suggests that auditors
frequently engage in consultations with their colleagues
(Danos et  al. 1989; Gibbins and Emby 1985), the audit
firm’s technical department or consultation office has also
been identified as an important source of advice for audi-
tors (Aghazadeh et al. 2019; Salterio and Denham 1997).
Yet the questions of whether and the extent to which advice
Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance…
received from these different sources would differentially
affect employees’ whistleblowing propensity have not been
systematically investigated to date.
The theory of source credibility (Birnbaum and Stegner
1979) suggests that, ceteris paribus, auditors are likely to
perceive advice from an authoritative source to be more
reliable than advice from a non-authoritative source. As
an official, authoritative source of advice, the technical
department is likely to be staffed by trained experts who
have the resources to generate high quality advice, as com-
pared to the personal opinion of a non-authoritative advice
source, offered without any accountability or responsibility
attached. Source credibility or reliability has been shown
in prior auditing research to have an effect on judgments
and decisions, including auditors’ utilization of information
(Bamber 1983) and audit committee members’ adjustment
recommendations (DeZoort et al. 2003).4 Thus, auditors
will likely perceive advice received from an authoritative
source (the technical department) to be more reliable than
one received from a non-authoritative source (a colleague).
This difference could be more pronounced in a collectivist
culture with high power distance where authoritative sources
may be viewed as having greater power and capabilities.
However, Bik and Hooghiemstra (2018) report mixed find-
ings that auditors’ compliance with audit firm policy on
fraud risk assessment procedures is positively associated
with the cultural dimension of collectivism but not with
power distance. Ng and Shankar’s (2010) findings indicate
that auditor participants from Singapore discount advice
from the technical department in the absence of an explicit
recommendation and a requirement to discuss the quality
of client’s accounting treatments with the audit committee.
These findings suggest that even in a collectivist culture with
high power distance such as Singapore, auditors may not
necessarily use advice from an authoritative source, due to
contextual, psychological, or other factors.
Advice Discounting and Advisor Reassurance
Despite the expected higher perceived reliability of advice
received from an authoritative source than a non-authorita-
tive source, the advice literature suggests that individuals
tend to discount advice rather than fully utilize it to improve
the quality of their judgments (see Bonaccio and Dalal 2006
for a review), even when the advisor has more expertise than
them (Harvey and Fischer 1997; Yaniv and Kleinberger
4
 Furthermore, auditors may perceive that acting on advice from
an authoritative source could enable them to share with the firm the
responsibility for high-risk decisions (Harvey and Fischer 1997). If
the advice recipient follows advice that turns out to be bad, the audi-
tors could shift the blame on the firm’s technical department or seek
redress from the firm.
391
2000). One explanation for why advice discounting occurs
is that while individuals have access to their own internal
justifications for arriving at a particular decision, they have
limited access to the advisors’ reasoning and justifications
underlying the advisors’ decisions (Yaniv 2004; Yaniv
and Kleinberger 2000). In the context of whistleblowing,
one of the major impediments to whistleblowing relates to
concerns about potential retaliation against whistleblow-
ers (Clemmons 2007). Given the significant risks that the
advice recipients could potentially face should they follow
an advisor’s recommendation to report a wrongdoing, the
absence of reassurance by the advisor may be perceived as
not addressing or acknowledging their fundamental concerns
and hence not having their best interest at heart. The advice
literature suggests that individuals will discount advice to
a greater extent and rate its quality lower if they perceive
that the advisor does not share the same goals as them or
does not provide emotional support that they need (e.g.,
Bonaccio and Dalal 2010; Guntzviller and MacGeorge 2013;
MacGeorge et al. 2017). Thus, the advice recipient may dis-
count the advice that recommends reporting a questionable
act when the advisor does not provide any reassurance that
addresses his or her concerns about potential retaliation by
the wrongdoer. While individuals from a collectivist culture
with a high power distance may potentially discount advice
from an authoritative source less than advice from a non-
authoritative source, the very same culture also implies that
they may also have greater motivation to maintain social har-
mony and not to embarrass their superiors (Kaplan 2015).
Such a culture may promote the tendency to discount advice,
regardless of the advice source.
To increase the perceived usefulness and hence use of
advice by potential whistleblowers, it may be particularly
important for advisors to address the advisees’ concerns by
reassuring them of the firm’s whistleblower protection in
their communication. The act of reassurance to restore con-
fidence and reduce anxiety has been widely examined in the
medical field as a mechanism to reassure patients (e.g., Coia
and Morley 1998; Pincus et al. 2013; Traeger et al. 2015),
and in the criminal justice field as a mechanism to enhance
confidence in the police (e.g., Millie and Herrington 2005).
Reassurance can vary in several dimensions, such as verbal
versus non-verbal, and affective (which aims to reduce worry
or induce a sense of being cared for, respected, and under-
stood without giving specific information) versus cognitive
(which aims to change perceptions or beliefs by providing
specific information) (Coia and Morley 1998; Pincus et al.
2013). In the context of whistleblowing, as the main concern
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392
of the whistleblowers relates to potential retaliation, our
study examines reassurance provided by an advisor on the
firm’s policy on whistleblower protection.5
We argue that reassurance by advisors about the firm’s
whistleblower protection policy can potentially reduce the
discounting of advice by the advisee. Medical and psy-
chology research suggests that providing reassurance can
facilitate attitudinal changes and increase the acceptance
of advice (e.g., Gleicher and Petty 1992; Levy 1954; Rog-
ers and Thistlethwaite 1970; Traeger et al. 2015). In the
judge–advisor paradigm suggested in the advice taking lit-
erature, the judges form a preliminary judgment about an
issue using information that is available to them (i.e., “inter-
nal information”, such as their perceived risk of retaliation,
and the firm’s whistleblower protection policy), and then
receive “external information” in the form of a recommenda-
tion (an advice) from an advisor. The judges then decide on
the extent to which to incorporate the external information
into their final judgment. When the advisor provides reas-
surance about the firm’s whistleblower protection policy,
the judges perceive that the advisor has considered their
fundamental concerns in giving the advice, which increases
the persuasiveness and hence perceived usefulness of the
advice. Consequently, they are more receptive to the advice
and are thus more likely to incorporate the advice into their
final judgment, resulting in less advice discounting. To the
extent the reassurance provides new information about the
firm’s whistleblower protection policy or makes such infor-
mation more salient to the advice recipients, it could reduce
their perceived risk of whistleblowing (including the nega-
tive consequences of potential retaliation by the wrongdoer),
which in turn increases their propensity to whistleblow.
However, as mentioned above, such reassurance could also
increase their use of the advice directly by making them
feel that the advisor has taken into account their concerns
about potential retaliation and need for protection in provid-
ing the advice, without necessarily reducing their perceived
risk of whistleblowing, especially when reassurance does not
provide any new information for their risk perception. The
parallel response model of persuasion, which “separates cog-
nitive representations of a danger from emotional responses
(typically anxiety and fear) to that danger” (Coia and Morley
1998, p. 380), suggests that reassurance can reduce anxiety
or fear associated with retaliation (an emotional response)
without necessarily reducing their perceived risk of retalia-
tion (a cognitive response).
5
 In our study, the advisor provides reassurance by restating the
firm’s whistleblower protection policy. This may make the informa-
tion more salient to the advisee (cognitive reassurance), and at the
same time, show that the advisor has taken into account the advisee’s
concerns about potential retaliation and the need for protection (affec-
tive reassurance).
13
E. Boo et al.
Joint Effect of Advisor Reassurance and Advice
Source
We posit that the effect of the advisor’s reassurance about
whistleblower protection in enhancing the advisee’s use of
the advice is likely to depend on the source. Specifically,
given that the reassurance on whistleblowing protection
relates to the firm’s official policy matters, we posit that
for the reassurance to be effective in influencing the advice
recipient’s decisions, it may be critical for it to be provided
by an authoritative source versus a non-authoritative source.
This is particularly so in the Singapore environment where
there is high Power Distance (Hofstede Insights 2020)
which suggests greater respect for authority. An authorita-
tive source is likely to be viewed by the advisee as a more
reliable source to provide such reassurance since it is likely
to have greater insights into and/or influence over firm poli-
cies than a non-authoritative source. Indeed, the medical
literature on reassurance shows that the authority and cred-
ibility of the source of reassurance is important to persuade
patients to change their beliefs, that is, reassurance provided
by a physician is found to be more reassuring than reassur-
ance provided by a nurse or a physiotherapist (Traeger et al.
2015). Bonaccio and Dalal (2010) show that advice recipi-
ents prefer advisors who are simultaneously experts (have
task-specific knowledge and experience) and have good
intentions of the advisee at heart as there is a synergistic
interaction between these two factors such that advisors are
evaluated more positively when both dimensions are present.
Hence, advice provided by an authoritative source with reas-
surance will likely be viewed significantly more positively
as both advisor dimensions are simultaneously present, as
opposed to reassurance provided by a non-authoritative
source, which is likely to be well-intentioned but a less reli-
able source in relation to the subject matter of the reassur-
ance. Thus, we predict that auditors will increase their pro-
pensity to whistleblow after receiving advice to do so, with
the increase being greater when the advice is received with
reassurance than without reassurance, particularly when it
is received from an authoritative (versus non-authoritative)
source.
Our hypothesis on the joint effect of advice source and
advisor reassurance on whistleblowing behavior is stated
as follows:
Hypothesis  The increase in auditors’ propensity to report a
questionable act after receiving advice is greater when the
advice is received with reassurance than without reassur-
ance, particularly when it is from an authoritative (versus
non-authoritative) source.
Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance…
Method
Design and Procedures
We conducted a controlled experiment by randomly assign-
ing participants to the 4 treatment cells in a 2 × 2 between-
participants design, with Advice Source (authoritative vs.
non-authoritative) and Advisor Reassurance (with vs. with-
out) as between-subjects treatment variables. We manipulate
authoritative Advice Source by describing the source as “a
knowledgeable and experienced staff from the audit firm’s
Technical Department” (henceforth, technical department),
and non-authoritative Advice Source as “a knowledgeable
and experienced colleague outside the engagement team”
(henceforth, colleague).6 We manipulate Advisor Reassur-
ance by varying whether the advisor reassures the auditor
on the firm’s whistleblower protection policy (as described
further below).
We conducted the experiment in three stages. In stage
1, participants were provided with a hypothetical scenario
in which Peter, an audit senior from a Big 4 firm, discov-
ered a material accounting error that overstated the revenue
and earnings of the client, a listed company that is one of
the audit firm’s largest clients. Specifically, the client has
prematurely booked a large sales transaction which was
shipped after the balance sheet date. The client’s account-
ant admitted to the accounting error, and Peter proposed
an audit adjustment accordingly. Peter found out later that
the client’s CEO succeeded in persuading the audit engage-
ment manager and partner not to book the audit adjustment.
The CEO had argued that although the shipment took place
after year-end, the delay arose due to an accident at the port
and hence, in substance, was supposed to be delivered by
the year-end. The CEO also expressed the concern that the
audit adjustment would result in the company contravening
a loan covenant and missing the analyst consensus forecast.7
Despite Peter voicing his concerns to the audit manager and
partner, the audit partner insisted that the client need not
book the audit adjustment. All participants were informed
of the firm’s whistleblower protection policy which stated
that “the audit firm has a reporting hotline for staff mem-
bers to report questionable acts anonymously. The reporting
hotline is manned by an independent and reputable ethics
hotline service provider. Staff members who report ques-
tionable acts in good faith are assured of confidentiality
6
 We describe all advice sources as “knowledgeable and experi-
enced” to hold constant the perceived knowledge and experience of
the advisor, to ensure that there is a valid basis for participants to seek
advice from these sources and potentially use their advice.
7
  For a real case example of an audit partner succumbing to the cli-
ent’s pressure to accept improper accounting treatment, see Account-
ing and Auditing Enforcement Release #455 (SEC 1993).
393
and protection against wrongful dismissal or other forms
of retaliation. All reported cases will be seriously consid-
ered and promptly followed‐up by the firm’s Ethics and Risk
Management Committee”.8
After reading the case scenario, participants were asked
to assess whether a staff member in Peter’s situation would
report the questionable act through the reporting hotline on
a continuous scale ranging from 0% (definitely not report)
to 100% (definitely report).9 Consistent with prior studies
(Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Schultz et al. 1993), we use
an indirect questioning approach to measure participants’
propensity to report the questionable act to reduce social
desirability bias. For the same reason, we ask participants
to complete the research materials anonymously. They were
also asked to briefly explain their reasons for their assess-
ments. In addition, they were asked to assess the likelihood
that a staff member in Peter’s situation would seek advice to
help him decide whether to report the questionable act, and
to list the issues on which advice would likely be sought.
In stage 2, participants were told to assume that Peter
has subsequently consulted and received advice from one
of the advice sources described above. Regardless of the
advice source, all participants were told that the advisor
advised Peter that the audit client “should not recognize
the sales transaction before year-end as it was shipped after
the balance sheet date. Allowing the audit client to do so
would be a questionable act that should be reported”. The
advice is intended to resolve any technical accounting issue
(i.e., appropriateness of the client’s accounting treatment)
or ethical issue (i.e., whether the auditor should report the
questionable act) that auditors may have and therefore need
advice on. Thus, we hold the advice recommendation con-
stant across all participants. Participants assigned to the
Advisor with Reassurance condition (but not those in the
Advisor without Reassurance condition) were further told
that the advisor “further assured Peter that should he report
the questionable act through the firm’s reporting hotline, he
would be protected by the firm against wrongful dismissal
or other forms of retaliation”. The information content of
the reassurance provided is the same as the information con-
tent provided to all the participants about the firm’s whistle-
blowing protection policy, which as mentioned earlier is
8
  The case scenario is similar to that used in Boo et al. (2016). The
description of the whistleblowing policies and procedures are consist-
ent with those of the Big 4 firm where we conducted our experiment.
9
  We also elicited participants’ response to this question on a dichot-
omous scale (i.e., yes or no). We use participants’ likelihood assess-
ments rather than their dichotomous (yes vs. no) decisions in our tests
of hypotheses as the use of continuous measures increases the power
of statistical tests (Donner and Eliasziw 1994). We obtain similar
results for our hypothesis tests when we use participants’ decisions
instead of their likelihood assessments.
13

394
consistent with those of the Big 4 firm where we conducted
our experiment. Thus, the reassurance does not provide any
new information but reiterates or underscores existing infor-
mation. The participants were then asked to assess whether a
staff member in Peter’s situation would report the question-
able act through the firm’s reporting hotline, having sought
and received the given advice, and to briefly explain their
reasons.
In stage 3, participants completed a debriefing question-
naire. The questionnaire includes manipulation check and
demographic questions, as well as additional questions to
elicit participants’ perceptions about the advice and other
aspects of the case. The experimental materials for stages 1
to 3 were provided to participants in three separate envelopes
marked A to C, respectively. Participants were instructed to
complete the materials in sequence, and to open envelope B
only after they have completed and inserted the completed
stage 1 materials back into envelope A, and so on.
Our main dependent variable is the change in auditors’
propensity to report the questionable act between stage 1
and stage 2 (hereafter referred to as “Report_diff”). This
is measured by subtracting participants’ stage 1 pre-advice
assessment of the likelihood of reporting from their stage 2
post-advice assessment, with a positive Report_diff signify-
ing an increase in auditors’ propensity to report the question-
able act.
We also use an alternative dependent variable that meas-
ures the extent to which auditors use the advice received,
which we will discuss in detail in the Additional Analysis
section.
Participants
Participants comprise 69 audit seniors from a Big 4 firm in
Singapore. They participated in the experiment on a vol-
untary basis during the firm’s training session, and were
given two complimentary movie tickets for completing
the research instrument. Their mean audit experience is
3.2 years with a standard deviation of 1.4 years. Seventy-
eight per cent of the participants are female. Neither audit
experience nor gender varies significantly between the
experimental conditions (p > 0.1).10
Results
Manipulation and Other Checks
In the debriefing questionnaire, participants were asked to
indicate from which of the advice sources did Peter seek and
10
 All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise specified.
13
E. Boo et al.
receive advice. The proportion of correct responses is 88%.
They were also asked to indicate whether the advice provider
assured Peter that he would be protected by the firm against
wrongful dismissal or other forms of retaliation should he
report the questionable act. Eighty-three per cent of the par-
ticipants responded correctly. We obtain similar results for
our test of hypothesis when we exclude participants who
failed the manipulation checks in the analyses. Thus, we
report the results based on all participants.
We ask participants to rate “how reliable (i.e., accurate
and trustworthy) the advice sought and received by Peter
was for making a decision whether to report the questionable
act” on a scale ranging from 1 (not reliable at all) to 7 (abso-
lutely reliable).11 Results of ANOVA (untabulated), with
Advice Source (authoritative source, technical department
vs non-authoritative source, colleague) and Advisor Reas-
surance (with vs. without) as independent variables, indi-
cate a statistically significant main effect of advice source
on perceived reliability of advice (F = 8.58, p = 0.005),
with a higher perceived reliability when advice is received
from the technical department staff than from a colleague
(means = 5.4 and 4.5, respectively). Neither the main effect
of advisor reassurance nor its interaction with advice source
is statistically significant (p ≥ 0.367). These results are con-
sistent with the idea that advice is likely to be perceived
as more reliable when it is received from an authoritative
source than a non-authoritative source.12
11
  As prior literature (e.g., Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) suggests that
source credibility or reliability is affected by both expertise and trust-
worthiness, our measure incorporates both expertise/accuracy and
trustworthiness elements.
12
 We asked several questions to measure participants’ perceptions
of the audit client and the questionable act. They rated the strategic
and/or economic importance of the audit client to the firm to be mod-
erately high, with an overall mean rating of 5.7, on a scale ranging
from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (absolutely important). They gener-
ally agree that the audit partner’s decision to allow the audit client
to book the sales before year-end is a questionable act that should
be reported, with an overall mean rating of 69%, on a scale rang-
ing from 0% (totally disagree) to 100% (totally agree). These rat-
ings do not vary significantly by experimental conditions (p ≥ 0.490).
Although their responses to the latter question do not vary by experi-
mental conditions, as reported later, we do find variations in partici-
pants’ propensity to whistleblow between experimental conditions.
This disconnect between what professionals believe they should do
and what they actually do has been shown in prior research as well
(Libby and Tan 1999; Ng and Shankar 2010). We also asked partici-
pants to assess Peter’s responsibility to report the questionable act on
a seven-point scale (1 = no responsibility at all; 7 = full responsibil-
ity). Results of ANOVA indicate a marginally significant main effect
of Advisor Reassurance (p = 0.061), with higher perceived responsi-
bility to report in the advisor with reassurance condition than in the
advisor without reassurance condition (means = 6.1 and 5.5). Nei-
ther the main effect of Advice Source nor its interaction with Advi-
sor Reassurance is statistically significant (p ≥ 0.601). Thus, advisor
reassurance appears to positively influence participants’ perceived
responsibility to whistleblow. Lastly, although participants rated the
Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance…
Participants’ mean rating of likelihood of seeking advice
(on a scale of 0% “definitely not seek advice” to 100%, “defi-
nitely seek advice”) is 67%. Of the 60 participants who listed
issues to seek advice on, 43 (72%) listed accounting issues
(e.g., appropriateness of accounting treatment, materiality
of its impact) and 36 (60%) listed whistleblowing issues
(e.g., consequences of reporting and not reporting, confi-
dentiality issue). Nineteen (32%) of the participants listed
both accounting and whistleblowing issues. These results
suggest that participants generally view advice on technical
accounting and/or ethical issues to be useful in helping them
to decide whether to report the questionable act.13
Tests of Hypothesis
Our hypothesis predicts that the increase in auditors’ pro-
pensity to report a questionable act after receiving advice
is greater when the advice is received with reassurance
than without reassurance, particularly when it is from an
authoritative (versus non-authoritative) source. Table  1,
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics on participants’
propensities to report the questionable act, both before and
after receiving the advice, as well as the difference in these
Footnote 12 (continued)
questionable act to be serious (defined as “the extent to which it is
unethical, illegal or harmful”), with an overall mean rating of 6.0,
on a scale ranging from 1 (not serious at all) to 7 (absolutely seri-
ous), results of ANOVA indicate, unexpectedly, a marginally higher
perceived seriousness of the questionable act when advice is received
from a colleague than the technical department (means = 6.3 and 5.8,
respectively, p = 0.057). Neither the main effect of advisor reassur-
ance nor its interaction with advice source is statistically significant
(p ≥ 0.321). We obtain similar results for our test of hypothesis when
we control for perceived seriousness as a covariate.
13
 To provide some evidence on participants’ preference for differ-
ent advice sources, we also asked participants in the debriefing ques-
tionnaire to rate how likely they would seek advice from five differ-
ent sources to help them resolve highly sensitive issues that could
potentially implicate their direct and/or indirect supervisors in the
audit engagement, on a scale ranging from 0% (definitely not seek
advice) to 100% (definitely seek advice). The means are 65% for col-
leagues inside the audit engagement team, 66% for colleagues outside
the audit engagement, 58% for the audit firm’s technical department,
53% for the audit firm’s advice hotline manned by an independent
and reputable third-party service provider for staff members to seek
advice anonymously (assuming it is available), and 28% for friends
outside the audit firm. Paired-sample t-tests indicate that the means
for the first three advice sources which are internal to the firm are not
significantly different from each other (p ≥ 0.172). However, the mean
for the external advice hotline is lower than both colleagues inside
the engagement team (p = 0.058) and colleagues outside the engage-
ment team (p = 0.037) but not significantly lower than the technical
department (p = 0.144). The mean for friends outside the audit firm
is significantly lower than all other advice sources (p < 0.001). These
results suggest that auditors perceive that they are more likely to seek
advice from sources within the audit firm on ethical issues than from
sources outside the firm.
395
propensities (i.e., Report_diff), for each experimental con-
dition. As mentioned earlier, we test our hypothesis using
Report_diff, measured by the difference between partici-
pant’s stage 1 and stage 2 assessments of the likelihood that
“an audit staff member in Peter’s situation would report the
questionable act through the reporting hotline” (on a scale
ranging from 0%, definitely not report, to 100%, definitely
report), with a positive Report_diff signifying an increase in
auditors’ propensity to whistleblow after receiving advice.
Paired-sample t-tests indicate that Report_diff is signifi-
cantly positive for each experimental condition (p ≤ 0.008),
suggesting that participants assessed a higher propensity to
whistleblow after receiving advice.
Table 1, Panel B presents the results of conventional
ANOVA, with Report_diff as the dependent variable and
Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance as independent
variables. Results indicate a statistically significant main
effect of advisor reassurance (p = 0.022), but neither the
main effect of advice source (p = 0.237) nor its interaction
with advisor reassurance (p = 0.137) is statistically signifi-
cant. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the
observed effects. We run a more powerful specific contrast
to test our hypothesis, with a weight of + 3 assigned to the
authoritative source/reassurance condition, + 1 assigned to
the non-authoritative source/reassurance condition and − 2
to the remaining conditions (see Buckless and Ravenscroft
1990; Guggenmos et al. 2018). Guggenmos et al. (2018)
suggest a three-part approach to contrast testing: namely
the significance of the contrast and the non-significance
of the residual between-cells variance; visual examination
of fit of predicted and observed means; and a quantitative
evaluation of the contrast variance residual ­(q2). Results,
presented in Panel C of Table 1, indicate that the specific
contrast is statistically significant (p = 0.003, one-tailed).14
Moreover, the residual between-cells variance is not signifi-
cant (F = 0.510, p = 0.603, two-tailed); a visual examination
of fit of predicted and observed means shows congruence
(untabulated); and the contrast variance residual (­q2) is
0.111 suggesting that 11.1% of the between-cells variance
is not explained by the specific contrast. Tests of simple
effects indicate that Report_diff is significantly higher in
the advisor with reassurance condition than in the advisor
without reassurance condition when advice is received from
an authoritative source (means = 34.4 and 17.8, respectively;
p = 0.005, one-tailed), but not from a non-authoritative
source (means = 22.8 and 19.2, respectively; p = 0.547).15
14
 The specific contrast based only on participants who passed
both manipulation checks (n = 51) is also statistically significant
(F = 5.169; p = 0.014, one-tailed).
15
  For completeness, we also test the effect of advice source at each
level of advisor reassurance on Report_diff. As indicated in Table 1,
Panel C, in the advisor without reassurance condition, there is no sta-
tistically significant difference in Report_diff between advice sources
13

396 E. Boo et al.

Table 1  Effects of advice source and advisor reassurance on change in auditors’ propensity to report questionable act
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation) on change in auditors’ likelihood to report questionable act (Report_diff)
Treatment Source of advice/Advisor reassurance Pre-advice Post-advice Report_diff
(1) (2) (2–1)

Non-authoritative (Colleague):
1 Without reassurance (n = 18) 38.9 (29.7) 58.1 (27.4) 19.2 (17.0)**
2 With reassurance (n = 18) 47.2 (24.0) 70.0 (19.9) 22.8 (16.2)**
Authoritative (Technical Department):
3 Without reassurance (n = 16) 51.9 (25.8) 69.7 (18.4) 17.8 (23.2)**
4 With reassurance p (n = 17) 44.4 (21.8) 78.8 (17.5) 34.4 (14.5)**
Panel B: ANOVA results on change in auditors’ likelihood to report questionable act
Sum of Square df Mean Square F-value p-value

Between-subjects
Advice source 454.643 1 454.643 1.423 0.237
Advisor reassurance 1757.308 1 1757.308 5.501 0.022
Advisor source x Advisor reas- 725.762 1 725.762 2.272 0.137
surance
Error 20766.166 65 319.479
Panel C: Specific contrast tests on Report_diff (tests of hypothesis)
F-value p-value
a
Overall test of h­ ypothesis 8.023 0.003*
Follow-up simple effect tests
(a) Effect of advisor reassurance from Technical Department (Treatment 4 > Treatment 3) 7.109 0.005*
(b) Effect of advisor reassurance from Colleague (Treatment 2 > Treatment 1) 0.367 0.547
(c) Effect of advice source when advice is received without reassurance (Treatment 3 > Treatment 1) 0.049 0.826
(d) Effect of advice source when advice is received with reassurance (Treatment 4 > Treatment 2) 3.704 0.030*

Advice Source is manipulated at two levels: authoritative, technical department vs. non-authoritative, colleague and Advisor Reassurance is
manipulated at two levels: with vs. without. Report_diff is measured by the difference between participant’s stage 1 and stage 2 assessments of
the likelihood that “an audit staff member in Peter’s situation would report the questionable act through the reporting hotline” (on a scale ranging
from 0%, definitely not report, to 100%, definitely report)
a
 Contrast coding of + 3 assigned to the authoritative source/reassurance condition (Treatment 4), + 1 assigned to the non-authoritative source/
reassurance condition (Treatment 2) and − 2 to the remaining conditions
*Denotes one-tailed p-value based on directional tests
**Denotes p-values ≤ 0.01 based on paired-samples t-tests

(See, however, Guggenmos et al. 2018, pp. 231–232 for a
discussion of the limitations of such follow-up simple effects
tests for testing an interaction hypothesis, relative to specific
contrast testing). Overall, these results provide support for
our hypothesis.16
Footnote 15 (continued)
(p = 0.826). However, in the advisor with reassurance condition,
Report_diff is significantly higher when advice is received from an
authoritative source than when it is received from a non-authoritative
source (means = 34.4 and 22.8, respectively; p = 0.030, one-tailed).
16
 We obtain similar results when we rerun our hypothesis test
with participants’ assessed likelihood of reporting in stage 2 as our
dependent variable, controlling for their assessed likelihood of report-
ing in stage 1 as a covariate. Results of conventional ANOVA (unt-
abulated) indicate a statistically significant main effect of advisor
Footnote 16 (continued)
reassurance (F = 8.261, p = 0.005), and a marginally significant main
effect of advice source (F = 3.969, p = 0.051) but the interaction effect
is not statistically significant (F = 0.859, p = 0.358). However, specific
planned contrasts to test the hypothesis, with a weight of + 3 assigned
to the authoritative source/reassurance condition (mean adjusted
for covariate, that is, stage 1 reporting likelihood = 79.44), and + 1
to the non-authoritative source/ reassurance condition (adjusted
mean = 68.92), and − 2 to the remaining conditions (adjusted means
for authoritative source/no reassurance, and non-authoritative source/
no reassurance = 65.81 and 62.00, respectively), is statistically signifi-
cant (F = 11.458, p = 0.001, one-tailed). These results are consistent
with our primary analysis. Tests of simple effects indicate that likeli-
hood reporting in stage 2 is significantly higher in the advisor with
reassurance condition than in the advisor without reassurance condi-
tion when advice is received from an authoritative source (F = 6.888,
p = 0.006, one-tailed), but not from a non-authoritative source
(F = 1.931, p = 0.169).

13
Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance…
40
Change in auditors' propensity to report quesonable
35
30
25
20
act
15
10
5 alternative dependent variable that is commonly used in the
0
Non-authoritave
(Colleague)
Source of advice
Fig. 1  Observed effects of advice source and advisor reassurance on
change in auditors’ propensity to report questionable act (Report_diff)
We also ask participants to rate “how useful (i.e., rel-
evant, informative and complete) the advice sought and
received by Peter was for making a decision whether
to report the questionable act”, on a scale ranging from
1 (not useful at all) to 7 (absolutely useful). Results of
ANOVA (untabulated), with Advice Source and Advisor
Reassurance as independent variables, indicate a statisti-
cally significant main effect of Advisor Reassurance on
perceived usefulness of advice (F = 7.15 p = 0.009), but
neither the main effect of advice source nor its interac-
tion with advisor reassurance is statistically significant
(p ≥ 0.189). However, the result (untabulated) of the spe-
cific contrast used for our main hypothesis testing with
a weight of + 3 assigned to the authoritative source/reas-
surance condition, + 1 assigned to the non-authoritative
source/reassurance condition, and − 2 to the remaining
conditions is statistically significant ( F = 8.622, p = 0.002,
one-tailed). Moreover, the residual between-cells variance
is not significant (F = 0.154, p = 0.857, two-tailed); a vis-
ual examination of fit of predicted and observed means
shows congruence; and the contrast variance residual
­(q2) is 0.034. Tests of simple effects (untabulated) indi-
cate that perceived usefulness of advice is significantly
higher in the advisor with reassurance condition than in
the advisor without reassurance condition when advice is
received from an authoritative source (means = 5.88 and
4.56, respectively; p = 0.004, one-tailed), but not from a
non-authoritative source (means = 5.28 and 4.83, respec-
tively; p = 0.334). These results suggest that the provision
of reassurance enhances the advice recipients’ perceived
usefulness of the advice and hence the receptiveness
to the advice, particularly when the advice is from an
397
authoritative source, thereby lending further support to
our hypothesis.
Additional Analyses
Without advisor
Our primary dependent variable captures the change in
reassurance
auditor’s propensity to report the questionable act, post-
With advisor
reassurance
advice likelihood minus the pre-advice likelihood, with a
positive change signifying an increased propensity to report
the questionable act. We rerun our hypothesis tests using an
advice taking literature that takes into account the advisor’s
Authoritave (Tech recommendation vis-à-vis the decision maker’s pre- and
Dept)
post-advice judgments and thereby captures the extent to
which auditors use the advice in their final judgment (see
Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Harvey and Fischer 1997). The
advice taking literature suggests a judge–advisor paradigm
that depicts one or more persons as advisors who provide
recommendations or suggestions to the judge, and a judge
(the decision maker) who receives the advice and decides
whether to take the advice into consideration in making
their final judgment (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Sniezek and
Buckley 1995). Hence, the extent to which auditors use the
advice in their final judgment is measured as follows:
Advice taking = (Post-advice likelihood of reporting
−Pre-advice likelihood of reporting)∕
(Advisor recommendation
−Pre-advice likelihood of reporting).
We assign a value of 100 for the advisor recommendation,
the top end of the scale used for measuring the likelihood
of reporting. Three participants were eliminated from fur-
ther analysis as they indicated a pre-advice likelihood of
reporting of 100, which results in an undefined value for
the advice taking measure due to a denominator of zero.
Given that there are no negative values for both the numera-
tor and denominator of this measure for all our participants,
this measure will yield identical results to another similar
“Weight of Advice” measure used in some studies (e.g.,
Kadous et al. 2013; Yaniv 2004) that uses absolute values for
the numerator and denominator of the Harvey and Fischer’s
(1997) advice taking measure.
Panel A of Table  2 presents the descriptive statistics
on this measure (“advice taking”) for each experimental
condition. Across experimental conditions, the measure
ranges from 0 to 100 with a mean of 0.47, suggesting some
discounting of advice. Results of ANOVA, presented in
Panel B of Table 2, indicate a statistically significant main
effect of advice source (p = 0.022) and advisor reassur-
ance (p = 0.012), but the interaction effect is not statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.318). Figure 2 provides a graphical
13

398 E. Boo et al.

Table 2  Effects of advice source and advisor reassurance on auditors’ advice taking

Panel A: Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation) on auditors’ advice taking
Treatment Source of advice/Advisor reassurance Advice taking

Non-authoritative (Colleague):
1 Without reassurance (n = 17) 0.34 (0.21)
2 With reassurance (n = 17) 0.44 (0.29)
Authoritative (Technical Department):
3 Without reassurance (n = 15) 0.42 (0.32)
4 With reassurance (n = 17) 0.66 (0.24)
Panel B: ANOVA results on auditors’ advice taking
Sum of Square df Mean Square F-value p-value

Between-subjects
Advice source 0.375 1 0.375 5.493 0.022
Advisor reassurance 0.458 1 0.458 6.706 0.012
Advisor source x Advisor reas- 0.069 1 0.069 1.013 0.318
surance
Error 4.233 62 0.068
Panel C: Specific contrast tests on Advice Taking (tests of hypothesis)
F-value p-value

Overall test of h­ ypothesisa 10.478 0.001*

Follow-up simple effect tests
(a) Effect of advisor reassurance from Technical Department (Treatment 4 > Treatment 3) 6.264 0.008*
(b) Effect of advisor reassurance from Colleague (Treatment 2 > Treatment 1) 1.295 0.260
(c) Effect of advice source when advice is received without reassurance (Treatment 3 > Treatment 1) 0.866 0.356
(d) Effect of advice source when advice is received with reassurance (Treatment 4 > Treatment 2) 5.799 0.010*

Advice Source is manipulated at two levels: authoritative, technical department vs. non-authoritative, colleague and Advisor Reassurance is
manipulated at two levels: with vs. without. Advice taking is measured as: (Post-advice likelihood of reporting–Pre-advice likelihood of report-
ing)/(100–Pre-advice likelihood of reporting), with likelihood of reporting measured as participants’ assessments of the likelihood that “an audit
staff member in Peter’s situation would report the questionable act through the reporting hotline” (on a scale ranging from 0%, definitely not
report, to 100%, definitely report)
a
 Contrast coding of + 3 assigned to the authoritative source/reassurance condition (Treatment 4), + 1 assigned to the non-authoritative source/
reassurance condition (Treatment 2), and − 2 to the remaining conditions.
*Denotes one-tailed p-value based on directional tests

0.7 representation of the observed effects. Panel C of Table 2

0.6
presents the results of the specific contrast relevant to our
hypothesis, with a weight of + 3 assigned to the authorita-
Auditors' advice taking

0.5
tive source/reassurance condition, + 1 assigned to the non-
0.4 authoritative source/reassurance condition, and − 2 to the
0.3
Without advisor
reassurance
remaining conditions. The contrast is statistically significant
With advisor (p = 0.001, one-tailed).17 Moreover, the residual between-
0.2 reassurance cells variance is not significant (F = 1.563, p = 0.218), vis-
0.1 ual congruence between predicted and observed patterns is
0
observed, and q­ 2 is 0.23 Tests of simple effects indicate that
Non-authoritave Authoritave (Tech advice taking is significantly higher in the advisor with reas-
(Colleague) Dept) surance condition than in the advisor without reassurance
Source of advice

17
 The specific contrast based only on participants who passed
Fig. 2  Observed effects of advice source and advisor reassurance on
both manipulation checks (n = 51) is also statistically significant
auditors’ advice taking
(F = 7.053; p = 0.006, one-tailed).

13
Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance…
condition when advice is received from an authoritative
source (means = 0.66 and 0.42, respectively; p = 0.008, one-
tailed), but not when it is received from a non-authoritative
source (means = 0.44 and 0.34, respectively; p = 0.260).
Consistent with the findings from our primary depend-
ent measure, these results provide further support for our
hypothesis.18
To provide some evidence on whether the greater per-
ceived usefulness and use of advice by auditors when reas-
surance is provided by an authoritative source could be
attributed to the firm’s policy on whistleblower protection
mentioned in the reassurance, we analyze participants’ writ-
ten explanations for their decision in stage 2, after receiving
advice. Not surprisingly, a majority of them (50%) alluded
to the advice in their explanations, such as “Now that there
is further confirmation from an experienced staff, audit staff
member would be more confident of his/her stand”. There
is no significant difference in the proportion of participants
who did so between experimental conditions (p ≥ 0.534).
In contrast, while 20 per cent of the participants, on aver-
age across all conditions, cited the firm’s whistleblowing
policy, the proportion is significantly higher (all ps ≤ 0.025)
when advice is received from an authoritative source with
reassurance (59%) than each of the other three conditions
(proportions = 0%, 22% and 0%, respectively, when advice is
received from an authoritative source without reassurance, a
non-authoritative source with reassurance, and non-authori-
tative source without reassurance). These results underscore
the importance of reassuring auditors of the firm’s policy
on whistleblowing protection, particularly by authoritative
sources, to further promote whistleblowing within the firm.19
18
  For completeness, we also test the effect of advice source at each
level of advisor reassurance on advice taking. As indicated in Panel C
of Table 2, there is no statistically significant difference in advice tak-
ing between advice sources (p = 0.356) in the advisor without reassur-
ance condition. However, in the advisor with reassurance condition,
advice taking is significantly higher when advice is received from an
authoritative source than when it is received from a non-authoritative
source (means = 0.66 and 0.44, respectively; p = 0.010, one-tailed).
19
  We ask participants to assess, on seven-point scales (e.g., 1 = not
likely at all; 7 = absolutely likely), the extent to which (1) the confi-
dentiality of Peter’s identity will be ensured, (2) the reported ques-
tionable act will be seriously investigated, (3) Peter will be protected
against negative consequences (i.e., dismissal, trouble or risk) for
reporting the questionable act, (4) the questionable act could be found
out or detected by others if Peter chooses not to report the question-
able act, and (5) Peter would face negative consequences (i.e., dis-
missal, trouble, or risk) for not reporting the questionable act. The
overall mean ratings are 4.0, 5.2, 4.4, 4.2, and 4.3, respectively. These
ratings do not vary significantly by experiment conditions (p ≥ 0.142).
As discussed in the hypothesis development, given that the reassur-
ance does not provide any new information for the participants’ risk
perceptions, the reassurance provided may not necessarily change
participants’ perceived risk of reporting but could still change their
whistleblowing propensity directly. A caveat of the above analyses
is that we did not measure the changes in these perceptions pre- and
post-advice, which may provide further insights.
399
Conclusion
Our study provides evidence on the impact of advice on
auditors’ propensity to report questionable acts, and how
its impact can be jointly influenced by its source and reas-
surance communicated by the advisor. Specifically, we find
that while auditors’ propensity to report a questionable act
increases when they receive advice to do so from the advisor,
the increase is greater when advice is received with reassur-
ance than otherwise, particularly when the advice is received
from an authoritative source. These results highlight the
important role that advisors can play in complementing the
firm’s whistleblowing policy by providing useful advice and
reassurance that could further enhance auditors’ propensity
to whistleblow. The findings also suggest the important role
of authoritative vis-à-vis other sources of advice and that
it is not just the source of advice that matters but what is
being communicated by the advisors (i.e., reassurance on
the firm’s whistleblower protection policy) is also critical
in determining the extent to which advice will be heeded.
Our findings should be considered in light of several
limitations. First, given the sensitive nature of the issue
investigated, participants’ responses might be affected by
social desirability bias. This concern is alleviated by the
fact that the objective of our study is to examine the effects
of manipulated variables rather than to establish the level
of desirable behavior. Thus, any social desirability bias that
exists would affect all treatment conditions. Furthermore,
we have adopted precautionary measures to minimize social
desirability bias in our experiment, including phrasing the
questions in a third-person perspective and anonymous com-
pletion of the research instruments by participants. Second,
as our participants comprise only audit seniors, our results
may not be generalized to auditors of other ranks such as
audit managers or partners. Pratt and Beaulieu (1992) find
that higher audit staff ranks show lower levels of Hofstede’s
power distance, a measure of staff’s recognition and accept-
ance of unequal power distribution among group members.
Higher-ranked employees may prefer less authoritative
supervision and be more inclined to express disagreement
with their supervisors (Miceli and Near 1984; Pratt and
Beaulieu 1992). On the other hand, due to socialization
within the audit firm and higher incentive not to jeopardize
career advancement, higher-ranked employees may not be
as forthcoming in reporting questionable acts perpetrated by
their superiors. Other than job rank, the participants’ nation-
ality could also have potential Power Distance effects given
that Singapore is rated relatively high on the Power Distance
score (refer to Hofstede Insights 2020). Participants in coun-
tries rated low in Power Distance might not react as strongly
to reassurance provided by an authoritative advice source.
Future research could investigate whether our findings are
13

400
sensitive to differences in auditor rank or other individual
attributes such as nationality, personality traits, and deci-
sion-making styles (see, e.g., Bonaccio and Dalal 2010).
Participants’ advice seeking norms and firm culture, be they
across Big 4, Big 4 vs. non-Big 4, and across geographical
borders, could likewise have different effects on our results,
and they constitute fruitful avenues for future research. Pre-
liminary evidence from Bobek et al. (2017) suggests that
there is greater commonality in ethical environment among
Big 4 firms than between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms. Next,
our study examines only one form/type of reassurance which
focuses on the subject matter of concern to potential whistle-
blowers (Coia and Morley 1998; Pincus et al. 2013). Future
studies could examine other dimensions of reassurance, such
as emotional reassurance showing empathy, which may be
better received by the advisee when it is rendered by a non-
authoritative source rather than an authoritative source.
Finally, as our study examines whistleblowing in an audit
setting, its findings may not be generalized to non-public
accounting environment. Future studies could investigate if
our findings apply to other work settings.
Accounting professional bodies in countries such as the
U.S., the U.K., and Canada provide an avenue for members
to make inquiries about the code of conduct and to seek
advice in situations that challenge their professional ethics.
Future research could compare members’ willingness to
seek advice from, and the extent they would use the advice
provided by, the employer versus a professional body (an
external authoritative source).
Acknowledgements  We thank the participants and their firm for gener-
ous support, Charles Cho (Section Editor), two anonymous reviewers,
and participants of International Symposium on Audit Research and
American Accounting Association Annual Meeting for helpful com-
ments, and Nanyang Technological University for research funding
support.
Compliance with Ethical Standards  Brink, A. G., Lowe, D. J., & Victoravich, L. M. (2013). The effect
Conflict of interest  The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Ethical Approval  Our study was approved by our institution before the
establishment of an IRB at our institution. Participation was on a volun-
tary and anonymous basis. Subject to the above caveat, all procedures
performed in this study were in accordance with the 1964 Declaration
of Helsinki and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.
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