The PTI’s biggest achievement was the improvement made in the Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa police under the KP Police Act, 2017. Imran Khan has attributed this
success to former PPO Nasir Khan Durrani, who had his full backing.

According to news reports, Durrani introduced ruthless in-house accountability by

dismissing almost 800 policemen and awarding punishments to over 6,000 staffers.
He established police assistance lines in all districts and setup six specialised training
schools. The model reporting rooms and the female desks helped to introduce public-
friendly policing at the police station level. The PTI-led provincial government seems
to have delivered by focusing on implementation and good governance. However, an
in-depth study is needed to assess the ground reality.

Historically, a personality-driven agenda doesn’t last and needs a strong legal,

political, financial, administrative, technical and accountability framework to be
sustainable. A review of the KP Police Act 2017 shows that it is the same National
Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) system without any major changes. The PTI now plans
to replicate the KP model throughout Pakistan. It is, therefore, an opportune time to
review the KP Police Act and the lessons learnt to resolve the structural and
institutional issues.

After the 18th Amendment KP in 2017 was able to repeal the federal Police Order
2002. The appointment of the PPO was a sensitive issue in 2002 as he was a federal
employee and could be recalled at any time. This issue still remains. The recruitment
of ASP under the KP law is also at the federal level. Such service matters impinge on
provincial autonomy.

The intent of the KP Police Act is to grant operational, financial and administrative
autonomy to the police for improving services and reducing police excesses. To meet
this objective, the police officers in 2002 proposed a separate police department at the
provincial level headed by a police officer. The bureaucracy did not agree. There was
a well-directed campaign against the Police Order 2002, claiming that the police was
‘be lagaam’, (ie, has no control over itself).
Under the KP Rules of Business, the police remains under the home secretary. This
reporting relationship is adversarial and fragile. The NRB side-tracked this issue by
including in the police order that overall superintendence shall vest in the provincial
government and shall be exercised in such a manner to ensure that the police shall
perform its duties efficiently and strictly in accordance with the law. However, a step
forward was that PPO was granted powers of an ex-officio secretary. An option could
be to create a police department headed by a non-police officer.

The NRB separated investigation from prosecution and other police work. It came
under much criticism that inefficiency and corruption had doubled by the separation.
The KP Police Act has continued with the same separation by making a legal affairs
branch at the provincial level with offices at the district level and a specialist cadre.
There is a duality of control over the investigation officer at the district level.

The direct link is with the legal branch. At the same time, the investigation staff is
also answerable to the head of the district police (DPO). It isn’t clear whether there
will be any separate investigation staff at the police station level? The whole concept
of the separation of investigation needs to be made practical and efficient. At present,
it is a bureaucratic tangle.

The NRB did away with the district commissioner (DC) system and made the DPO
answerable to the district nazim. However, this relationship did not work. The KP Act
has delinked the police from local elected representatives and the DPO is now solely
responsible for maintaining law and order.

The reporting relationship among the DPO, nazim and the DC has been left vague as a
coordination function only. Earlier, DCs were responsible and controlled the police.
Should the DC, executive magistrates, or civilians be the interface between the police
and the public? Should there be a role for local elected representatives?

The institutions under the KP Police Act need to be revisited. The number of women
in the public safety commissions should be increased to four as one woman member
cannot be effective. Overall, the KP Police Act has no enabling sections for
encouraging women’s participation in the police force; the formation of women’s
police station; providing women staff in police stations; and adopting anti-harassment
measures.

By law, one member of the PPSC is to sit in as an observer in centralised purchases of

the police. It is a purely procurement matter and has no link with investigating police
excesses. The functions of the Regional Police Complaints Authority should be
merged with PSCs to reduce bureaucracy and costs. The Dispute Resolution Council
needs elaboration. The Police Policy Board, with eight police officers as members,
has been included in the KP act to formulate service delivery strategies. It is toothless
as PPO doesn’t need to consult it.

The concept of public liaison councils hasn’t been well-thought-out. It is not

mandatory for the SHO to hold meetings with the council. The experience in Pakistan
shows that such bodies become a nuisance rather than improve matters.

The section on their powers needs to be deleted as they are not implementable. The
concept of a village police has been mentioned but not elaborated in the legislation.
The institutions will only work if they are adequately resourced.

Regarding human resources, the recruitment of constables is done on the basis of the
district of domicile while they can be transferred to other districts. The KP
government may, on the recommendations of the KP Public Service Commission,
appoint experts to assist the PPO. This is cumbersome. Although the term of police
officers is two years, the same act negates this protection by providing a loophole for
premature transfer.

To safeguard the tenure, the NRB, with great difficulty, was able to get the
bureaucracy to agree to inserting the definition “exigency of service”, which requires
reasons for premature transfers to be recorded in writing. The police law hasn’t been
able to protect the premature transfer of the Pakpattan DPO.
The SHO is a grade-16 officer. This critical post should be upgraded to grade-17 in
senior

ranks if the thana culture is to be changed.

At present, even 16 years after the enactment of the Police Order 2002, the Police
Rules made under the Police Act 1861 are still in force. The NRB only was only able
to enact the Police Order 2002 through a top-down approach as the bureaucracy and
elected representatives were against giving autonomy to the police and establishing
safety commissions. As a result, implementation suffered. KP’s experience shows that
to bring any form of change the key prerequisite is political support at the highest
level. Can this support be garnered in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan, where a colonial
mindset and corruption are deeply entrenched?

The writer is a former member of the NRB and an international development

consultant.