Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

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Physical Communication
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/phycom

Review article

Physical layer security using beamforming techniques for 5G and

beyond networks: A systematic review
∗
Himanshu Sharma a , Neeraj Kumar a,b,c , , Rajkumar Tekchandani a
a
Computer Science & Engineering Department, Thapar Institute of Engineering and Technology, Patiala, India
b
School of Computer Science, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun, India
c
King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

article info a b s t r a c t

Article history: It has been predicted that by the year 2030, 5G and beyond 5G (B5G) networks are expected to provide
Received 5 January 2022 hundreds of trillions of gigabytes of data for various emerging applications such as augmented, mixed,
Received in revised form 30 May 2022 and virtual reality (AR/MR/VR), wireless computer-brain interfaces (WCBI), connected robotics and
Accepted 16 June 2022
autonomous systems. Most of these applications share data with each other using an open channel, i.e.,
Available online 25 June 2022
the Internet. The open and broadcast nature of wireless channel makes the communication susceptible
Keywords: to various types of attacks (e.g., eavesdropping, jamming). Thus, there is a strong requirement to
Beamforming enhance the secrecy of wireless channel to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of transmitted data.
Physical layer security Physical layer security (PLS) has evolved as a novel concept and robust alternative to cryptography-
5G based techniques, which have a number of drawbacks and practical issues for 5G and beyond networks.
6G Beamforming is an energy-efficient PLS technique, that involves steering of the transmitted signal in
a particular direction, while considering that an intruding user attempts to decode the transmitted
data. Motivated from these points, this article summarizes various beamforming based PLS techniques
for secure data transmission in 5G and B5G networks. We investigate the eight most promising
techniques for beamforming in PLS: Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA), Full-Duplex Networks,
Massive Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO), Cognitive Radio (CR) Network, Relay Network,
Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer (SWIPT), UAV Communication Networks and
Space Information Networks, and Heterogeneous Networks. Moreover, various physical layer threats
and countermeasures associated with 5G and B5G networks are subsequently covered. Lastly, we
provide insights to the readers about constraints and challenges for the usage of beamforming-based
PLS techniques in various upcoming future applications.
© 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Introduction......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1. Physical layer security and beamforming........................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Existing surveys ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.3. Our contributions................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.4. Paper organization ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
2. Research approach ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
2.1. Common research questions ................................................................................................................................................................................ 5
2.2. Statistics trends...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.3. Keywords used and search criteria ..................................................................................................................................................................... 6
3. Challenges in implementing PLS in 5G and beyond networks..................................................................................................................................... 6
4. Security performance metrics ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
4.1. Bit Error Rate.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
4.2. Signal-to-Noise Ratio ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
4.3. Secrecy rate ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 7
4.4. Secrecy Sum Rate................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8

∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: hsharma60_phd18@thapar.edu (H. Sharma), neeraj.kumar@thapar.edu (N. Kumar), rtekchandani@thapar.edu (R. Tekchandani).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.phycom.2022.101791
1874-4907/© 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

4.5. Secrecy Capacity .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8

4.6. Channel State Information .................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
5. Physical layer security-aware beamforming techniques ............................................................................................................................................... 9
5.1. Secure beamforming.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 9
5.2. Artificial noise aided beamforming ..................................................................................................................................................................... 10
5.3. Cooperative jamming aided beamforming ......................................................................................................................................................... 10
5.4. Joint channel coding and beamforming approach ............................................................................................................................................. 11
5.4.1. Low density parity check (LDPC) codes .............................................................................................................................................. 11
5.4.2. Polar codes .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 11
5.4.3. Lattice codes ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 11
6. Key technologies used in 5G and beyond networks...................................................................................................................................................... 12
6.1. Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) ........................................................................................................................................................... 12
6.2. Full duplex network .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 12
6.3. Massive MIMO........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 12
6.4. Cognitive radio network ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
6.5. Relay network ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 13
6.6. Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT).................................................................................................................... 14
6.7. Heterogeneous network (HetNet) ........................................................................................................................................................................ 14
6.8. UAV communication networks and space information networks ................................................................................................................... 15
6.9. Other 5G and beyond scenarios........................................................................................................................................................................... 16
7. Future research trends and challenges ............................................................................................................................................................................ 18
7.1. Artificial intelligence (AI) assisted secure transmission.................................................................................................................................... 18
7.2. Secure transmission of big-data........................................................................................................................................................................... 19
7.3. Secure transmission in line-of-sight (LoS) environment .................................................................................................................................. 21
7.4. Integration of PLS and classical wireless cryptography .................................................................................................................................... 21
7.5. Global optimization considering security and reliability .................................................................................................................................. 21
8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
Declaration of competing interest.................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
References ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21

1. Introduction

A rapid increase in the usage of intelligent devices, base

stations (BS), and the exuberant multimedia content have con-
tributed to an exponential increase in data traffic in the recent
years. According to the report of International Telecommunica-
tion Union Radiocommunication Sector (ITUR) [1], the Global
mobile traffic data will be around 4.394k- Exabytes (M2M traffic
not included) and around 5.016k- Exabytes (M2M traffic in-
cluded) by the year 2030, as shown in Fig. 1. Although the
recently deployed fourth generation (4G), and fifth generation
(5G) network can handle this data traffic boom for the next
few years, but these will not be capable of supporting high Fig. 1. Data traffic analysis [1].
traffic flow demands from various upcoming applications such
as augmented, mixed, and virtual reality (AR/MR/VR), flying au-
tonomous platforms, wireless computer-brain interfaces (WCBI),
connected factories, connected robotics and autonomous systems.
Thus, a variety of technological revolutions are expected in the Hence, the security of users equipments (UEs), components, and
fifth generation (5G) and sixth generation (6G) wireless networks services is one of the top priorities in the design of these wireless
across the globe in the years to come [2]. Over the past decades, networks [5].
the technology of wireless communication within cellphones and Evolved security attacks on 5G and beyond networks can
other user equipments have evolved at a rapid pace globally. The be classified into the following categories [6]. Attacks against
journey of this evolution started from 1G (known as the oldest integrity (cloning attack, message modification attack, message
blocking), attacks against privacy (eavesdropping attack, MITM
kind of voice network) to today’s 5G and in the near future 6G is
attack, Relay attack), attacks against visibility (eavesdropping at-
shown in Fig. 2 (see Table 1).
tack, Denial of Service (DoS) attack), attacks against authentica-
The deployment of ultra-dense base stations in 5G and 6G will
tion (brute-force attack, dictionary attack), attacks against avail-
provide ultra-reliable broadband access to cellular user equip-
ability (physical attack, DoS attack). The traditional security tech-
ment (UEs), Machine-to-Machine communication (M2M), Cyber– niques of previous generations i.e. Third generation (3G) and
Physical Systems (CPSs), and Internet of Things (IoT) [3]. Different Fourth Generation (4G) mainly focus on the protection of data
dimensions of the architecture of 5G is presented in Fig. 3. There and voice. Some of the commonly used security features in these
will be seamless connections between human and machine for are as follows: (U)SIM (Universal-Subscriber Identity Module)
fast data transfer using open channel, i.e., Internet, resulting for identity management, the hop-by-hop secure path between
in various security and privacy concerns in this environment. transmitters and receivers, mutual authentication between user
Moreover, key components of 6G such as realtime intelligent equipment (UEs) and wireless networks. But these techniques
edge computing, intelligent radio equipments, 3D intercoms, and are inefficient for 5G and 6G networks due to the E2E (End-
distributed AI are vulnerable to various types of attacks [4]. to-End) security in the vertical market (Industry 4.0, Intelligent
2
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 1
Summary of main acronyms.
Acronyms Meaning Acronyms Meaning
5G Fifth Generation Network MISO Multiple Input Single Output
6G Sixth Generation Network Eve Eavesdropper
BF Beamforming CSI Channel State Information
AN Artificial Noise D2D Device to Device
CJ Cooperative Jamming 4G Fourth Generation
HetNet Heterogeneous Network OSI Open System Interconnection
BER Bit Error Rate FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio mmWave milli-meter wave
SINR Signal to Interference Noise Ratio CR Cognitive Radio
PLS Physical Layer Security SWIPT Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer
NOMA Non Orthogonal Multiple Access CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output IoT Internet of Things
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access SOP Secrecy Outage Probability
CC Channel Coding LDPC Low Density Parity Check
AI Artificial Intelligence SDN Software Defined Network
HD High Definition LTE Long Term Evolution
QoS Quality-of-service QoE Quality-of-experience
NR New Radio LTE-A Long Term Evolution-Advanced
RAT Random Access Technologies RAN Random Access Network
CWDM Coarse Wavelength Division Multiplexing CPRI Common Public Radio Interface
CRAN Cloud Random Access network AWGN Interface C-RAN Cloud-Random Access Network AWGN

to demonstrate the relevance of various security and privacy

concerns in different generations.
Traditionally, any inconsistencies related to the characteristics
of authenticity, secrecy, and anonymity of data transfer are han-
dled by the upper layers of the Open System Interconnection (OSI)
model. Cryptographic techniques such as distribution of secret-
key, public-key, and symmetric encryption are primarily respon-
sible for maintaining these characteristics. But, these existing
techniques have the following limitations: inefficient centralized
security within public cellular networks, high complexity in the
generation and distribution of public and private keys, need of
individual secret keys for every the wireless communication link,
and so forth. Moreover, when unauthorized users are involved,
wireless networks’ transparent and multiverse behavior poses
concerns about data security and privacy. Therefore, the use of
physical layer security (PLS) has been a viable solution to provide
secure wireless data transmission by intelligently leveraging the
Fig. 2. Evolution of wireless networks from 1G to 6G.
imperfections of the communication channel.

1.1. Physical layer security and beamforming

Transportation System (ITS), healthcare, smart city management)
needs decentralized security and privacy mechanism [7]. The
multi-layer architecture of 6G and interaction between different
layers of 6G architecture for secure networks implementation is
shown in Fig. 4. It consists of various 6G enabled technologies
and communication protocols in three different layers (physical
layer, intelligent control layer, and application layer). Further, the
security improvements in different layers of 6G networks archi-
tecture and their relationship is also presented. The new security
and authentication demands for 6G are 6G-Authentication and
Key Agreement (AKA), PLS, and quantum-safe cryptography.
Standard data encryption methods and 5G-AKA are commonly
used techniques to provide data secrecy and authentication in
various 5G applications [6]. However, it is expected that quantum
computing will be capable of breaching approximately 99% of
the exiting encryption techniques [8]. In addition, with different
goals for security and privacy among the participants, coordi-
nating mismatched rules in 5G and beyond networks would be
a major challenge. Hence, these traditional security techniques
lack the complexity required to safeguard 5G and 6G networks.
Further, for a programmable networking infrastructure, 6G-AKA
must be able to authenticate the stated identity of end-users.
Fig. 5 presents the privacy and security concerns from 1G to
6G. Three parameters, namely Low, Medium, and High, are used
3
PLS is based on the fundamentals of information theory and
focuses on the security of propagation channel [9–18]. Designers
of the 5G and 6G networks can use this technique to efficiently
degrade signal transmission efficiency at unauthorized receivers
and applications to prevent them from obtaining sensitive data
from the received signal. Mainly, there are two-fold benefits
of using PLS techniques for 5G and 6G networks over cryp-
tographic techniques. Firstly, PLS techniques do not have high
computational complexity. As a result, safe and efficient commu-
nications can be done even though eavesdroppers (illegitimate
smart devices) are fitted with powerful computational devices
in these networks. The reliability of computation-based crypto-
graphic algorithms, on the other hand, is adversely affected if
the eavesdroppers have enough computing capacity to solve a
complex mathematical problem. Secondly, 5G and 6G networks
architecture are typically decentralized, implying that devices
can randomly bind to or exit the wireless network at any time.
Thus, cryptographic key delivery and control become extremely
difficult in this situation. Hence, PLS techniques can be used in 5G
and 6G wireless networks to secure the wireless channel used for
signal propagation.
Beamforming (BF) is one of the promising PLS techniques
to solve the issues mentioned above. At the transmitters and
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Fig. 3. Different dimensions of 5G architecture.

Fig. 4. Multi-layer 6G architecture and relationship between different layers for secure networks implementation.

receivers, BF matrices can be used to shape the beam patterns
of antennas to maximize a specific security parameter, such as
signal-to-interference noise ratio (SINR), secrecy rate [19]. Digital
signal processors (DSPs) are used to structure the patterns of the
4
beam generated by the antennas as part of the BF integration for
PLS [20]. In [21], authors discussed space–time computation to
tackle cochannel and intersymbol interference (ISI) in the case
of single-hop mobile communications. Lin et al. [22] proposed
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
Fig. 5. Level of security and privacy concerns in various generations.
rate-splitting multiple access (RMSA) based beamforming scheme
to support IoT in satellite and aerial-integrated networks. Fur-
ther, in [23], a secure beamforming method is investigated for
cognitive satellite terrestrial networks in the presence of un-
known eavesdroppers. According to recent proposals [24–26],
joint beamforming can effectively reduce the transmission en-
ergy. Multiple transmitters are used in joint beamforming to
generate antenna arrays; the radio waves from these arrays may
cause constructive interference at the legitimate receiver by en-
hancing the propagation wavelength. Since the energy demand
is distributed through several transmitters, so each can use less
power and conserve energy. In [27], authors proposed combining
BF with other power management techniques to reduce overall
transmitted power while maintaining the SINR level at the legit-
imate receivers. For 6G wireless networks, beamforming can be
used in the design of PLS techniques for cell-free massive MIMO
and intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) [28].
1.2. Existing surveys
Many outstanding surveys in PLS have been published, pro-
viding detailed overviews and insightful remarks to understand
the underlying ideas, current technology, and future prospects
of this field. For example, in [18], the key technologies, funda-
mentals and future research directions of PLS are summarized in
viewpoint of space information networks. In [29,30], various PLS
techniques, their limitations and future research directions for 5G
wireless networks are discussed. Wang et al. [31] discussed the
fundamentals, key technologies, challenges, and opportunities of
PLS in 5G wireless networks for IoT. Further, Furqan et al. [32] put
an overview regarding cooperative relaying and jamming strate-
gies for PLS of wireless networks. Furthermore, in [33], various
NOMA based PLS schemes are discussed with their limitations,
issues and future recommendations. Additionally, in a recent
study, Furqan et al. [34] discussed the research studies in the
field of visible light communication systems for 5G and beyond
networks.
1.3. Our contributions
Although the above-mentioned PLS survey articles provide
insight into a variety of 5G and beyond perspectives, there is
currently no systematic survey which focus on particular beam-
forming based PLS techniques for 5G and beyond networks. Thus,
providing an overview of recent developments related with the
use of beamforming in PLS design is necessary. In this survey,
a systematic review of PLS using beamforming techniques for
5G and beyond networks is presented. We have discussed the
numerous PLS applications which use beamforming based tech-
niques along with their potential shortcomings and research chal-
lenges in detail. Various PLS issues and research questions related
5
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
to 5G and beyond networks’ security has been addressed using
beamforming based techniques. We have compared the most
related surveys with the proposed survey using the research
questions summarized in Table 2. Table 3 outlines the findings
of previous PLS research surveys in comparison to the proposed
one by highlighting the major differences. We have also discussed
other PLS approaches which can be combined with beamform-
ing to further improve the security of 5G and beyond, such as
Artificial Noise (AN) injection, Cooperative Jamming (CJ), Secure
Channel Coding (CC) techniques.
1.4. Paper organization
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The research
approach is discussed in Section 2. This section covers methods
for selecting the literature along with a brief comparison of the
existing beamforming surveys. Section 3 discusses the challenges
and difficulties of applying beamforming based PLS techniques
to 5G and beyond security. Section 4 discusses the metrics used
in the performance analysis of PLS techniques. Applications of
PLS techniques based on beamforming in 5G and beyond security
are discussed in Section 5. Finally, the paper’s conclusion and
possible future directions are discussed in Section 6. The complete
structure and taxonomy of the manuscript are shown in Figs. 6
and 7 respectively.
2. Research approach
This section discusses the review methodologies adopted to
collect, analyze and present the material collected for review.
2.1. Common research questions
A wide range of relevant research questions and objectives
used to collect the material is as listed in Table 2. The primary
goal of this analysis is to assist young researchers in the design of
PLS using beamforming techniques for 5G and beyond networks
to identify the most relevant research issues in this field.
2.2. Statistics trends
The publication analysis indicates that interest in physical
layer security has increased in recent years. Fig. 8(a) shows the
evolution of PLS publications’ trend in the associated topmost
journals from 2011 to 2021. Fig. 8(b) depicts the percentage of
articles used in this survey from various publishers.
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 2
Common research questions and their objectives.
S.No. Research question Objective
RQ1 What is the current status of the active research in deigning It aims to explore the current status of security techniques
securing data transmission techniques for 5G and beyond designed to ensure secure data transmission in 5G and beyond
Networks? 5G Networks

RQ2 How Physical layer security is different from traditional The purpose is to provide the difference between PLS and
cryptography based security techniques? traditional cryptographic techniques

RQ3 What are the existing physical layer security techniques for It serves the purpose to provide a better understanding of
secure data transmission in 5G? existing PLS techniques in 5G

RQ4 What is beamforming? The purpose is to provide a proper understanding of

beamforming to the readers
RQ5 What is the role of beamforming in physical layer security? It aims to explore the role of beamforming in the design of PLS

RQ6 How beamforming can be used to secure the data transmission in Being a promising PLS technique, how beamforming can be used
5G and beyond networks? to secure the data transmission in 5G and beyond networks

RQ7 How beamforming can be used with other PLS techniques to It aims to explore the joint optimization of beamforming with
enhance the security of the data transmission? other existing PLS techniques to enhance the security of data
transmission
RQ8 What are the different performance evaluation parameters to The purpose is to provide a deep knowledge of different
evaluate the PLS techniques? performance evaluation to the readers

RQ9 What are the challenges and future research directions of The purpose is to provide future directions of using beamforming
beamforming based techniques for securing 5G and beyond 5G based PLS techniques to the readers
networks?

Table 3
Comparison of existing survey articles on PLS.
Survey papers Reviewed till RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 RQ5 RQ6 RQ7 RQ8 RQ9
Ahmad et al. [29] 2018 # # # # # # #
Sanchez et al. [35] 2020 # #
Ahmed et al. [36] 2018 # # # # # # # #
Yadav et al. [37] 2020 # # # #
Yongpeng et al. [30] 2018 # # # # #
Wang et al. [31] 2019 # # #
Yuan et al. [5] 2018 # # # #
Furqan et al. [32] 2020 # # # # #
This survey –

2.3. Keywords used and search criteria
The terms ’’physical layer security’’, ‘‘wireless security’’, and
’’beamforming’’ were discovered in the abstract of every research
paper for almost all searches to collect the relevant data. Based on
the relevance of this study, 500 papers were initially shortlisted.
After this, more in-depth screening is performed to include and
exclude the relevant papers from the shortlisted articles as shown
in Fig. 9. We have included research articles from peer-reviewed
journals, symposiums, conferences, workshops, white papers, and
technical reports.
3. Challenges in implementing PLS in 5G and beyond networks
Each of the individual PLS techniques has its own set of ad-
vantages and disadvantages. The main difficulty is to design an
optimized stable transmit precoding algorithm that maximizes
feasible confidentiality rates while avoiding counter costs. In this
segment, we analyze some of the significant issues in depth in
the design of PLS techniques.
The penetration of transmitted signals into the eavesdropper’s
spatial domain is a common issue in PLS techniques, especially
beamforming. The message signal is guided in the correct direc-
tion to the legitimate receiver using beamforming. The main lobe
beam has a high concentration of transmit power, but some of
it is lost in the antenna’s minor side lobes. The finite number
of transmitting antennas only have a small amount of spatial
6
directivity, so this penetration allows nearby eavesdroppers to
decipher the message signal [38].
Existing PLS approaches in 5G and beyond networks do not
consider the low complexity level of the low-cost Internet of
Things (IoT) devices. Any signal processing specifications for low-
cost devices other than standard connectivity should be marked
as an unnecessary burden upon several low-cost IoT devices due
to minimal hardware, low level of complexity, and extreme en-
ergy restrictions. PLS techniques built on 5G wireless technology’s
latest capabilities are also lacking. High transmission loss and
directivity in mmWave and spatially separated signals in NOMA
are the most recent features of the physical layer in 5G networks.
However, a few experiments have been conducted to take advan-
tage of these new features to develop successful PLS techniques.
The use of AN injection in the transmit signal provides provable
confidentiality in the physical layer. Even so, it comes at the
cost of increased power consumption. The technique is based on
the production of AN signals. The AN signal is produced with
a portion of the power used to propagate information signals.
There have been several reports on the mobility patterns in 5G
and beyond applications. Many wireless IoT technologies, such
as transportation systems and UAV networks, rely heavily on
mobility. The effect of versatility on physical-layer assaults on
both intruder and defender sides can be fascinating to investigate.
In the eavesdropper’s hand, versatility can be used to locate the
best place to initiate the attack or carry out the attack temporarily
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
Fig. 6. Structure of the paper.
to prevent detection. Users on the receiving side may use the mo-
bility to switch away from the attacking field or pairing clusters
to reduce the chances of being targeted.
PLS secure coding technique requires an inference of the ex-
perience or accessibility of the eavesdropper’s CSI. This is the
main drawback to such PLS tactics. Obtaining the CSI of the
eavesdropper can also be problematic for the sender. The ma-
jority of PLS secure coding strategies presume a low-resource
eavesdropper. To be more precise, the eavesdropper is always
thought to have less number of antennas than the intended
receiver. Although [39] suggests that security against an eaves-
dropper having more antennas than the transmitter is feasible,
such a technique generally requires extra power consumption.
As a result, maintaining anonymity in the presence of astute
eavesdroppers remains a challenging task in PLS secure coding
techniques.
4. Security performance metrics
This section analyzes some of the most common security per-
formance metrics that are used in the literature. Understanding
these metrics helps the researchers to get the knowledge of
existing PLS security techniques.
7
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
4.1. Bit Error Rate
The Bit Error Rate (BER) is one of the most common metrics
used to evaluate the performance of Physical Layer Security (PLS)
of the wireless channel. BER is defined as the rate of occurring of
errors during the transmission of data [40]. It can be calculated
by comparing the transmitted bits to the bits received at the
receiver.
4.2. Signal-to-Noise Ratio
The Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) is another measure used to
evaluate the PLS performance, which compares the strength of
the desired wireless signal to the strength of noise present. It
is defined as the ratio of the signal power value to the Noise
power [41]. The SNR higher than 1:1 indicates a high-quality
signal than Noise.
4.3. Secrecy rate
The secrecy rate (RS ) is also known as achievable data trans-
mission rate at which the probability of error at received message
is zero [42]. It is a common performance metric used to eval-
uate the performance of the PLS technique. The secrecy rate of
the wireless channel is calculated as the difference between the
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
Fig. 7. Taxonomy of survey.
achievable secrecy rates of Transmitter-Receiver and Transmitter-
Eavesdropper channel.
4.4. Secrecy Sum Rate
The Secrecy Sum Rate (RSum ) is another metric used to evaluate
the performance of PLS. It is mostly used for Massive Multiple
Input Multiple Output (MIMO) systems. It is the sum of the
achievable secrecy rates of all the antennas [43].
4.5. Secrecy Capacity
The Secrecy Capacity (CS ) is defined as the difference of the ca-
pacities between wiretap wireless channel and the main wireless
channel [44]. More precisely, it defines the maximum value of the
8
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
secrecy rate at which the message can be recovered reliably at the
receiver while remaining unrecoverable at the eavesdropper.
4.6. Channel State Information
Channel State Information (CSI) represents the characteristics
of a wireless channel. It defines the propagation of the signal
concerning the fading and scattering [45]. The importance of the
availability of CSI in evaluating the PLS is presented in [46]. CSI
can be categorized into two types referred as Perfect CSI and
Imperfect CSI [47]. Perfect CSI indicates the user has the complete
information of the wireless channel and Imperfect CSI means
the user does not have the complete information of the wireless
channel.
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Fig. 8. (a) Top Journals Publication count in the area of PLS during the past decade (b) Percentage of articles used in this survey from various publishers.

provide high degree of freedom (spatial) to ensure the secure

data transmission in wireless network. The beamforming based
techniques are designed either to enhance the signal quality
at the receiver or to degrade the wiretap channel used by the
eavesdropper. Beamforming adopted PLS techniques involves the
hybridization of mainly four techniques (1) Secure beamforming,
(2) Artificial noise beamforming, (3) Cooperative jamming aided
beamforming, and (4) Joint channel coding and beamforming
techniques.

5.1. Secure beamforming

Beamforming (BF) is a simple signal processing technique

designed to transmit data in a specific direction. It provides
the optimum signal quality difference between the legitimate
receiver and eavesdropper. Beamforming is considered as one
of the promising techniques in the design of PLS [13,38,48–50].
Consider a simple PLS system model [51] having one transmitter
(T), one receiver (R), and one eavesdropper (E), all of which have
multiple antennas in the quantity of NT , NR and NE respectively.
The legitimate receiver (R) receives the signal vector rR( j) as

rR( j) = HTR ( j)w ( j)s( j) + nR ( j) (1)

where HTR ( j) is the wireless channel parameters matrix between

Fig. 9. Paper inclusion and exclusion criteria. transmitter and receiver of size NT × NR , w ( j) is the weight
coefficient matrix of the channel, s( j) is the transmitted signal and
nR ( j) is the AWGN vector of size NR . Similarly, the eavesdropper
Summary and Insights: We have identified the various se- (E) receives the signal vector rE ( j) as
curity performance metrics used to evaluate the PLS techniques
rE ( j) = HTE ( j)w ( j)s( j) + nE ( j) (2)
in wireless communication in this section. Among these perfor-
mance evaluation metrics, secrecy rate is the most commonly where HT E( j) is the wireless channel parameters matrix between
used to assess the physical layer security in wireless commu- transmitter and eavesdropper of size NT × NE, w ( j) is the weight
nication systems; however, it cannot be considered as a single coefficient matrix of the channel, s( j) is the transmitted signal
criterion for PLS analysis. Hence, the secrecy rate should be used and nE ( j) is the AWGN vector of size NE . The SINR at the receiver
with other metrics to guarantee the security needs in wireless and Eavesdropper can be given as
communication systems. The beamforming based security and
NR ( wH R
privacy-preserving techniques are presented in the next section. ∑ TR,k w)
ψR = PS (3)
5. Physical layer security-aware beamforming techniques
σR 2
k=1
NE ( wH R
Beamforming based techniques have been widely used by
∑ TE ,k w)
ψE = PS (4)
researchers for PLS of wireless communication. These techniques σE 2
k=1

9
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
Fig. 10. Different types of Beamforming.
Fig. 11. Beamforming aided artificial noise.
where RTR,k and RTE ,k are the Channel State Information (CSI) of
the Receiver and Eavesdropper which are available to Transmit-
ter, PS is the power of transmitted signal. The main objective of
applying beamforming is to maximize the signal power and min-
imize the other signal interference in the main wireless channel
such that the legitimate receiver can receive good quality signal.
It can be formulated as SINR at receiver must be greater then a
threshold value Rth , i.e., ψR ≥ Rth . The optimal beamforming de-
sign to maximize the secrecy capacity (Cs ) can be mathematically
formulated as
max Cs (w )
w Cooperative Jamming (CJ) is another technique proposed to
(5)
s.t. ∥w∥2 ≤ P max
where w is the beamforming matrix with the maximum transmit
power constraint P max . Different types of beamforming are illus-
trated in Fig. 10. 3D beamforming can be used if the beam has to
be transmitted in multiple directions.
5.2. Artificial noise aided beamforming
Injection of Artificial Noise (AN) is another technique used
in PLS design. In this technique, the transmitter injects AN in
10
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
the original signal to degrade the quality of the signal at the
wiretap channel used by the eavesdropper. AN injection was first
used in [52] to improve the physical layer security in wireless
communication systems. The generation of AN is carried out
based on the status of CSI of the eavesdropper. If the CSI of the
eavesdropper is not known to the transmitter, then identical AN
is generated. The AN injection is performed in such a manner
that it does not affect the legitimate receiver’s channel since the
AN is generated in its nullspace [53]. Artificial Noise can be used
with beamforming to improve the PLS in wireless communication
systems further. A PLS model using AN and beamforming is as
shown in Fig. 11. The transmitted signal after AN injection can be
mathematically represented as follows
x = msa + nsj (6)
where x is the final transmitted signal after addition of AN, m
and n are the beamforming vectors for data and jamming signal
respectively, sa and sj are the data jamming signals. Also, the
signals received by the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper can
be given as follows
yR = hR msa + gR nsj + nR (7)
yE = hE msa + gE nsj + nE (8)
where hR and hE are the wireless channel responses of the main
and wiretap channel, nR and nE represent the Gaussian Noise for
Receiver and Eavesdropper, respectively.
5.3. Cooperative jamming aided beamforming
enhance the PLS of the wireless communication system. A Co-
operative Jamming assisted wireless network consists of a trans-
mitter that transmits the signal to the legitimate receiver and a
jammer that transmits the jamming signal towards the wiretap
channel used by the eavesdropper to degrade it and improve the
PLS. The cooperative jamming aided beamforming technique is as
shown in Fig. 12.
Cooperative relaying can be used along with cooperative jam-
ming, where a relay node is used to transmit data from the trans-
mitter and legitimate receiver. After applying cooperative jam-
ming, the received signal at the receiver yR [54] and eavesdropper
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
Fig. 12. Cooperative jamming.
yE [55] can be given as follows
√ eavesdropper’s channel is degraded to the intended user’s main
yR = PS hTR s + w hJR z + nR (9)
√ authors demonstrated that this coding scheme can achieve the
yE = PS hTE s + w hJE z + nE (10)
where PS is the transmit power, z denotes the jamming signal
with w as weight vector. hTR , hJR , hTE , hJE are the channel pa-
rameters of Transmitter Receiver channel, Jammer Receiver chan-
nel, Transmitter Eavesdropper channel and Jammer Eavesdropper
channel, respectively.
5.4. Joint channel coding and beamforming approach
The development of realistic codes for PLS has recently got
more recognition. The main objective of the coding is to improve
the security against eavesdropping and jamming attacks. In this
subsection, we analyze the recent developments in the coding-
based PLS. Practical physical layer authentication codes that will
be used in 5G and beyond networks are as follows.
5.4.1. Low density parity check (LDPC) codes
On the wireless channel, 5G uses LDPC codes for channel cod-
ing. The LDPC codes correct the channel errors by keeping parity
bits for a subset of the data bits. LDPC codes are used efficiently
by researchers to design PLS techniques. Thangaraj et al. [56]
shows that absolute confidentiality can be accomplished with any
wiretap channel by using LDPC codes. This conclusion lays out a
framework for developing secure coding schemes for use over the
wiretap channel used by the eavesdroppers.
Later, Rathi et al. [57] designed the two-edge style LDPC codes
to generalize this coding scheme to binary erasure channel (BEC)
of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. Subrama-
nian et al. [58] used the Ramauja graph for a noiseless channel
of the receiver and the BEC of the eavesdropper to create LDPC
codes of broad girth block length, which achieves a high secrecy
rate.
5.4.2. Polar codes
Polar codes are another error correction codes used to design
the PLS techniques for 5G and beyond. Mahdavifar et al. [59]
created a polar coding scheme to obtain the confidentiality for
11
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
the symmetric wiretap channel under the constraint that the
channel for the poor secrecy criteria. Furthermore, in [60,61],
complete rate-equivocation area (defined in [62]). Other polar
coding techniques designed for eavesdropper’s channel include
concatenating two polar codes [63], concatenating polar and LDPC
codes to reduce the security gap [64], and so on.
5.4.3. Lattice codes
Belfiore et al. [65,66], describe a notation of confidential-
ity advantage for wiretap lattice codes, which represents the
eavesdropper’s accurate decoding probability. The confidential-
ity advantage scales exponentially with the lattice dimension,
according to asymptotic theory. In addition, authors in [67] pro-
poses a framework to examine the confidentiality benefits for
arbitrary unimodular lattices. In [68], authors propose lattice
codes for Rayleigh fading wiretap networks that are suitable
depending on the confidentiality gain criteria. In addition, Choo
et al. [69] suggested a superposition lattice code for the Gaussian
Binary Channel with secret message and confidentiality. Nested
lattices code designs for mutual jamming, interference channels,
and relay networks [11,70,71], the protection of the continuous
mod-lattice system with feedback [72] have been used to secure
the physical layer of the 5G wireless network.
Summary and Insights: We have analyzed the state-of-the-art
security and privacy preserving beamforming based techniques.
Due to the benefits of spatial flexibility and diversity gains, beam-
forming is regarded as a practical and dependable technique
of improving system transmission efficiency and security per-
formance. A proper transmit beamforming design is required
to effectively harness the benefits of multiple-antenna based
schemes for ensuring PLS for 5G and beyond networks. The use of
beamforming based techniques in PLS of 5G and beyond networks
can improve the energy efficiency, data privacy and spectral ef-
ficiency of wireless communication. Moreover, the hybridization
of beamforming with artificial noise, cooperative jamming and
channel coding techniques has been proved to be more effective
in enhancing the security of 5G. The different dimensions of
the taxonomy presented in the survey are discussed in the next
section.
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
Fig. 13. (a) Eavesdropping attack on NOMA (b) NOMA Network.
6. Key technologies used in 5G and beyond networks
This section discusses security and privacy preserving beam-
forming techniques used in the key technologies of 5G and be-
yond as follows: NOMA, Full Duplex network, Massive MIMO,
Cognitive Radio, Relay Network, SWIPT, HetNet. The discussion
is based on the thematic taxonomy as shown in Fig. 7.
6.1. Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA)
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) systems have re-
ceived a lot of interest in recent years for 5G cellular networks
[73]. The capacity of NOMA to serve a large number of users by
sharing the same time and frequency resources is the central
motivation behind its adoption in 5G. It delivers high device
performance, high efficiency, increased coverage, low latency, and
huge networking [74]. In contrast to point-to-point transmission
techniques, there are two types of eavesdroppers in NOMA:
external eavesdropper (passive) whose CSI cannot be identified
by the transmitter, and internal user (active) whose CSI can be
recognized at the transmitter. As a physical layer technology,
the security of NOMA networks is a significant issue that needs
more investigation. However, certain issues must be addressed
during the design phase of PLS for NOMA, such as the disparity
in transmit power and the diverse security demands of users. A
comprehensive NOMA network model with multiple users and
eavesdroppers is illustrated in Fig. 13.
NOMA is recently used within the 3GPP long-term evolution
advanced (LTE-A) model because of its spectral performance gain,
demonstrating the role of NOMA in 5G wireless networks. As a
result, one of the top concerns in the design and operation of
5G wireless networks is to provide a peerless level of security
for NOMA [75]. To effectively integrate physical layer protection
with NOMA, a considerable amount of work is needed. Zhang
et al. [76] analyzed the stable NOMA transmission for a single
transmitter, multiple receivers having perfect CSI, and one eaves-
dropper device with no CSI knowledge. Furthermore, in [77], a
joint beamforming and power allocation method for NOMA based
satellite terrestrial integrated network is presented. A summary
of the latest beamforming-based PLS techniques for NOMA is
given in Table 4.
6.2. Full duplex network
Full-duplex PLS is an exciting area that recently received a
lot of attention. This type of transmission includes sending and
12
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
receiving data on the same frequency range at the same time.
It will theoretically double spectral efficiency as compared to
half-duplex ones. Thus, physical layer security for full duplex
systems is a potential research subject that has recently achieved
a lot of attention. The following three categories can be used
to categorize the research on full-duplex physical layer secu-
rity: (i) Full-duplex base station (ii) Full Duplex transmitter and
receiver (iii) Full duplex active eavesdropper. Li et al. [86] stud-
ied a single transmitter, a full-duplex receiver, and a single-
eavesdropper wireless communication model in which the full-
duplex legitimate receiver uses one antenna to obtain the signal
and another antenna to transmit AN to the eavesdropper. Then,
a joint transmitting and receiving beamforming architecture for
a single-antenna receiver, multiple-antenna transmitter, and a
single eavesdropper with incomplete CSI is studied by Zheng
et al. [87]. Meanwhile, Akgun et al. [88] suggested a similar
MISO multiple-antenna eavesdropper wiretap channel, in which
the transmitter uses the zero-force beamforming to prevent in-
terference caused by multiple users. A summary of the latest
beamforming-based PLS techniques for the full-duplex network
is provided in Table 5.
6.3. Massive MIMO
Massive MIMO is one of the ‘‘big three’’ 5G innovations [89],
and it is an exciting solution for the effective transfer of massive
data. One of the advantages of massive MIMO is that it signifi-
cantly increases the capability of physical layer security against
passive eavesdropping assaults. However, the eavesdropper can
take countermeasures. For instance, it might place itself near to
the legitimate user, so that the routes to the legitimate user and
the eavesdropper gets highly connected. Therefore, physical layer
security for massive MIMO system has to be advanced. A recent
study presents PLS for large MIMO networks with passive eaves-
droppers. In this, Zhu et al. [90] investigate stable massive MIMO
communications for multicell-user networks over Rayleigh fading
wireless channel, in which an eavesdropper tries to decipher the
data transmitted to one of the users.
Downlink and Uplink phase of massive MIMO having sin-
gle eavesdropper and multiple users are shown in Fig. 14. Reg-
ularized inversion of the wireless channel along with AN in-
jection is presented in [91] for the massive MIMO to increase
the secrecy rate further. Wang et al. [92] analyze AN-assisted
stable massive MIMO transmission over a fading channel with
Rician fading. Secure communication for massive MIMO systems
with restricted radio frequency and hardware abnormalities [93,
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 4
Beamforming based PLS techniques for NOMA.
Authors BF CJ AN CC Security Provides Description Advantages Limitations
parameter security from
attack
Cao et al.  Secrecy rate, Eavesdrop- Beamforming is used to Improved secrecy Proposed scheme
[78] Transmission ping, Signal preserve the privacy of rate of Private should be tested for
rate interference data transmission in users multiple
MISO NOMA systems eavesdropper
scenario

Hao et al.  Secrecy sum Eavesdrop- Beamforming is used Improved secrecy High computational
[79] rate ping along with SWIPT to sum rate complexity
improve the secrecy sum
rate of the NOMA
network

Zhao et al.   Secrecy rate Signal Beamforming and Improved secrecy Proposed technique
[80] Interference, artificial noise are used rate, reduced should be tested on
Eavesdrop- to secure the eavesdropping rate more security
ping, transmission channel in parameters
Jamming NOMA Network

Deng et al.  Average Eavesdrop- Hybrid artificial jamming Works well for Tested only for
[81] secrecy sum ping, Signal and beamforming is both perfect and single eavesdropper
rate interference used to improve the imperfect CSI case
security of NOMA
network in the presence
of an eavesdropper

Li et al. [82]  Sum Eavesdrop- Beamforming is used to Improved sum Proposed technique
achievable ping secure the downnlink achievable secrecy should be tested on
secrecy rate MISO NOMA network rate more security
parameters

Jiang et al.  Secrecy rate Eavesdrop- Beamforming is used to Better secrecy rate High computational
[83] ping, Signal secure the downlink as compared to complexity
interference MIMO NOMA network zero-force
beamforming
technique

Feng et al.   Secrecy sum Eavesdrop- Beamforming along with Useful in power Proposed technique
[84] rate ping jamming is used to allocation problem should be tested on
secure the physical layer more security
of NOMA network parameters

Yin et al.  SINR, Secrecy Eavesdrop- Beamforming is used to Improved secrecy Proposed scheme
[85] rate ping improve the physical unicasting rate should be tested for
layer security of the UAV multiple
enabled NOMA network eavesdropper
scenario

94] secure tactics in the existence of a massive MIMO eaves-
dropper [95,96], confidentiality outage likelihood study for mas-
sive MIMO systems [97] are the recent developments in the
design of PLS of massive MIMO systems. A summary of the
latest beamforming-based PLS techniques for massive MIMO is
presented in Table 6.
6.4. Cognitive radio network
Cognitive Radio (CR) network is a technology to address the
issue of under-utilized wireless bandwidth by enabling secondary
users to access approved networks without interfering with pri-
mary users’ transmissions [98]. It adjusts its transmission pa-
rameters in response to its interaction with other devices [99].
Although cognitive radio is an effective strategy for alleviating
the pressures of wireless spectrum depletion, its characteris-
tics have also introduced entirely new forms of PLS risks and
challenges [100]. In [101], authors studied robust secure beam-
forming for wirelessly powered cognitive satellite-terrestrial net-
works. Further, Lin et al. [102] presented a secure beamform-
ing technique for Rate-splitting multiple access (RSMA) based
13
cognitive networks having multiple eavesdroppers. Furthermore,
in [103], a cooperative NOMA (co-NOMA) framework is pre-
sented to evaluate the security-reliability tradeoff for primary
user networks. Simulation findings reveal the co-NOMA’s effec-
tiveness compared to non-cooperative NOMA (nco-NOMA) in
terms of total connection outage probability and secrecy outage
probability.
As a result, one of the most critical criteria for deploying
CR networks is its security architecture. A summary of the lat-
est beamforming-based PLS techniques for Cognitive Radio is
provided in Table 7.
6.5. Relay network
Relay Networks are classified into two types: full-duplex and
half-duplex [104,105]. The term full-duplex relay, also known as
a two-way relay, refers to the ability of a relay to send and receive
wireless signals on the same channel at the same time. In compar-
ison, for the half-duplex relay (oneway relay) to send and receive
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 5
Beamforming based PLS techniques for full duplex networks.
Year BF CJ AN CC Security Provides Description Advantages Disadvantages
parameter security
from attack
Fengchao   Average Eavesdrop- Joint beamforming and Improved High computational
et al. [109] secrecy rate ping cooperative jamming is average secrecy complexity
used to improve PLS at rate
both the transmitter and
receiver of the full duplex
base station

Chalise  Secrecy rate Eavesdrop- Beamforming based secure Improved Proposed technique
et al. [110] ping full duplex network having secrecy rate should be tested on
perfect and partial values of more security
CSI parameters

Juhwan   Average Eavesdrop- Joint cooperative jamming Improved Tested only for single
et al. [111] secrecy rate ping, Signal and beamforming is used to average secrecy eavesdropper case
interference secure data transmission in rate
Full duplex systems

Wei et al.   Secrecy rate Eavesdrop- Joint artificial noise and Low power Proposed technique
[112] ping, Signal beamforming is used to consumption should be tested on
interference secure data transmission in more security
Full duplex systems having parameters
self energy recycling
phenomenon

Zhengmin    Secrecy rate Eavesdrop- Secure beamforming based Improved High computational
et al. [113] ping on artificial noise and worst case complexity
cooperative jamming is secrecy rate
used to improve PLS

Qiang et al.   Sum secrecy Eavesdrop- Joint artificial noise and Improved sum High computational
[114] rate ping two rank beamforming for secrecy rate complexity
maximizing the sum
secrecy rate of the full
duplex network

Cepheli   Data rate Eavesdrop- Joint artificial noise and Improved Proposed technique
et al. [115] ping beamforming for throughput should be tested on
maximizing the secrecy rate more security
while maintaining the data parameters
rate and throughput of the
full duplex network

wireless signals, two different channels are required. Recently, re-
laying techniques have also gained substantial interest in the field
of PLS over 5G wireless networks, benefiting from information-
theoretical techniques used in cooperative communications [17].
For example, analogous to cooperative communications, relay
nodes maybe used as trustworthy nodes to resend an improved
version of the wireless signal obtained from the transmitter with
an appropriate power amplification coefficient, namely amplify
and- forward (AF) relay network. A relay network consisting of
the trusted and untrusted relay with a single eavesdropper is as
shown in Fig. 15.
The advantage of using beamforming in multiple antenna de-
vices for two-way AF relaying was explored in [106]. In [107],
authors investigated confidential message transmission over mul-
tihop connectivity using a chain of linked untrusted relays. The
SOP in a three-node AF relay network has an untrusted relay
node was investigated in [108], where authors demonstrates that
confidentiality can be maintained if the transmitter and receiver
are kept apart. A summary of the latest beamforming based PLS
techniques for relay network is illustrated in Table 8.
6.6. Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT)
SWIPT technology is used for simultaneous energy and infor-
mation exchange within a variety of modern wireless networks in
14
the context of 5G connectivity. By allowing simultaneous trans-
mission of both information and power, SWIPT provides signifi-
cant gains in terms of energy consumption, spectral performance,
interruption control, and transmission delay [116].
However, it has been demonstrated that in certain situations,
SWIPT receivers might have a more powerful medium to obtain
information directed at receivers, thus putting the security of
the data transmitted in danger. PLS has been used on SWIPT in
a variety of studies [117–120] in order to resolve these issues.
Authors of [121] proposed a safe beamforming architecture for
SWIPT in a heterogeneous network consisting of a single macro-
cell with multiple users and a single femtocell with multiple
eavesdroppers and a single receiver scenario. A summary of the
latest beamforming based PLS techniques for SWIPT is provided
in Table 9.
6.7. Heterogeneous network (HetNet)
A heterogeneous network, in general, is made up of several
layers of networks that use the same bandwidth. Recent research
on PLS of heterogeneous network focuses on how to build trans-
mission schemes that protect multi-tier communications. The use
of heterogeneous networks in 5G can intelligently and efficiently
merge various nodes into a multi-tier proposed network, which
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
Fig. 14. Massive MIMO.
Fig. 15. Relay network.
includes macro-cells with high-power nodes for broad radio ac-
cess networks, small cells with limited power nodes for small
radio access networks, and so on [155]. Compared to the tradi-
tional single-tier topology, this multi-tier architecture presents
new problems in the analysis of PLS. The positions of high/low
power nodes would directly affect the PLS architecture and must
be carefully modeled and evaluated. Further, heterogeneous net-
works can cause substantial cross-tier interference. This should
be considered when developing reliable and secure data transfer
techniques. Furthermore, in HetNets, users can access an arbitrary
tier, such as open access. As a result, specific user association
policies that coordinate both QoS and secrecy are required.
Lv et al. [156] investigated the PLS in a two-tier heterogeneous
downlink network having multiple users and an eavesdropper in
each cell. By comparing the average received RSSI at the user with
a given threshold, Wu et al. [157] proposed a user association
strategy. Then, for a downlink K-tier HetNet with multiple nodes,
a closed-form expression of secrecy outage probability is derived
by modeling the nodes’ positions as separate Poisson Point Pro-
cesses, assuming that both intra-cell and inter-cell interference
15
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
would not occur. Xu et al. [158] suggested a complex organized
multipoint transmission strategy to expand the stable connectiv-
ity reach in a downlink K-tier HetNet for intra-cell interference.
A summary of the latest beamforming based PLS techniques for
HetNet is given in Table 10.
6.8. UAV communication networks and space information networks
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have gained much pop-
ularity in both commercial and military applications for their
ability to leverage evolving wireless networks and deliver reliable
communication due to their flexible deployment, high mobility,
and inherent line-of-sight (LOS) air-to-ground (A2G) channels.
Despite the remarkable advancements made by UAVs, the open
nature of air-to-ground wireless channels makes secure infor-
mation transfer difficult [159]. Therefore, the security of UAV
based communication network is critical. Li et al. [160] conducted
a comprehensive survey on physical layer security in space in-
formation networks. In the survey, the authors have briefly in-
troduced the satellite Internet of Things (IoT), related research
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 6
Beamforming based PLS techniques for massive MIMO.
Year BF CJ AN CC Security Provides Description Advantages Disadvantages
parameter security from
attack
Qingjiang   Secrecy rate Eavesdropping Inexact block coordinate Maximized Does not solve the
et al. [122] descent (IBCD) algorithm secrecy rate interference issue
based on beamforming and between the users.
artificial noise is proposed
to maximize the secrecy
rate

Mukherjee  Bit error rate, Eavesdropping Zero force beamforming Reduced bit error Tested only for
et al. [123] SNR and optimal power rate, low power single eavesdropper
beamforming techniques consumption case
are analyzed for their
performance in multicase
MIMO network
Jayasinghe  Bit error rate, Eavesdropping Secure beamforming Reduced Eavesdropper can
et al. [124] SNR technique is proposed to computational intercept the
improve the physical layer complexity transmitted data
security of MIMO system

Nabil et al.   Secrecy rate Eavesdropping, Hybrid artificial noise and Scalable to Proposed technique
[125] Signal beamforming is used to multiple should be tested on
interference improve the security of the jammers for more security
physical layer of MIMO improving the parameters
frequency selective channels efficiency further

Kaushik  Data rate Eavesdropping Beamforming is used to Energy efficient Proposed technique
et al. [126] improve the data rate of should be tested on
the MIMO systems more security
parameters
Tian et al.  Secrecy rate, Eavesdropping, Secure beamforming Improved Tested only for
[127] Spectral Interference technique is proposed to secrecy rate single eavesdropper
efficiency between users improve the secrecy rate of case
MIMO system

Zhao et al.  Secrecy sum Eavesdropping, Secure beamforming is used Improved Proposed technique
[128] rate, Interference to maximize the secrecy Secrecy sum rate should be tested on
between users sum rate of the full-duplex more security
MIMO systems parameters

Nabil et al.   Secrecy rate, Eavesdropping Hybrid artificial noise and Low power High computational
[129] SNR beamforming is used to consumption complexity
improve the security of the
physical layer of
MIMO-OFDM systems

issues, security performance metrics, and the state-of-art PLS
approaches related to space information networks. In [161], the
authors have introduced PLS to UAV communication networks
to address the problem of data leakage induced by potential
eavesdropping. The authors have also discussed PLS schemes for
two application scenarios of UAVs, i.e., UAV as a base station and
UAV as an aerial node. Further, in [162], secure transmission for
cognitive satellite-terrestrial networks is investigated to enhance
the security of satellite links. In particular, the authors exam-
ined the challenge of downlink beamforming for secure cognitive
satellite-terrestrial networks by evaluating the realistic scenario
of incomplete CSI for the primary user’s, secondary user’s, and
Eve’s links.
6.9. Other 5G and beyond scenarios
Physical layer security techniques have a wide range of uses
in 5G and beyond. Traditional security key systems rely heavily
on the sharing of secret keys. The key generation in the physical
layer was first studied in [173,174], where coupled measurements
of noisy patterns can be used to produce secret keys over a
dedicated network. Key distribution is one of the few physical
layer security measures that can be used in today’s wireless
16
applications. Many prototypes involving physical layer secret-
key distribution have been published in [175–178]. Further, RIS
is considered as one of the key technologies for B5G wireless
networks. It comprises of a large number of low-cost passive
reflectors, which can reflect the signal independently by adjust-
ing its phase or amplitude to achieve signal enhancement or
passive beamforming. RIS empowered wireless networks have
the capacity to regulate the electromagnetic wave propagation
environment [179]. Lin et al. [180] proposed joint beamforming
design and optimization for RIS based hybrid satellite-terrestrial
relay networks. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the
scheme in enhancing the QoS for satellite communications.
Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of devices equipped
with radio-frequency identification (RFID), actuators, sensors, and
networking to enable them to communicate with operators, sup-
pliers, and other connected devices to achieve shared goals. 5G
would be a crucial component for IoT by allowing many machine-
type communication (MTC) devices to link to the network. In
the literature on PLS, these dimensions have received compara-
tively little consideration. For example, there is still a need for a
technically sound and holistic approach to define uncertainty and
energy constraints in PLS designs specifically. A summary of the
latest beamforming based PLS techniques for other 5G sceneries
is given in Table 11.
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 7
Beamforming based PLS techniques for cognitive radio networks.
Year BF CJ AN CC Security Provides Description Advantages Disadvantages
parameter security from
attack
Fengchao  SINR Eavesdropping Cooperative Low power Requires prior
et al. [130] beamforming is used to consumption information of
improve the security of by secondary eavesdropper
both the primary and users channel
secondary users

Jiang et al.  Secrecy rate Eavesdropping Beamforming is used to Better secrecy Secrecy rate
[131] maximize the data rate rate compared decreases with the
of the secondary system to the energy increase in the
which leads to improved harvesting number of
secrecy rate of the system eavesdroppers
primary system

Tang et al.  Secrecy rate Eavesdropping A cooperative spectrum Better secrecy Throughput of the
[132] sharing technique is rate of the secondary users
designed to improve the primary users decrease with the
secrecy rate of the compared to increase in the
primary users the zero - number of
forcing eavesdroppers
beamforming

Nandan  Secrecy outage Eavesdropping Zero Force Beamforming Improved At high values of
et al. [133] probability and technique is designed to Secrecy rate SNR, secrecy outage
Secrecy rate secure the compared to probability becomes
communication channel the coordinated zero
of MIMO-NOMA based beamforming
cognitive radio network technique

Antony  Bit error rate, Interference Secure beamforming is Provides better Limited to cognitive
et al. [134] Secrecy outage between users used to secure the secrecy rate radio networks only
probability and communication between even in the
Secrecy rate the primary and the presence of
secondary cells large number
of antennas

Wu et al.   Secrecy rate Eavesdropping, Artificial noise with Improved Low secrecy rate if
[135] Interference beamforming is Secrecy rate the number of
between users proposed to enhance the antennas are more
quality of the signal and then six
enhancing the security of
sharing of the spectrum

Pei et al.  Secrecy rate, Eavesdropping Secure beamforming is Improved Proposed scheme
[136] Secrecy used to secure the Secrecy needs to be
Capacity communication channel capacity compared with
of MISO based cognitive different existing
radio schemes to validate
the performance

Cepheli   Transmission Data Beamforming and Improved Proposed technique

et al. [137] power falsification jamming techniques are energy should be tested on
attack used to minimize the efficiency more security
effect of data parameters
falsification attack on
spectrum sensing

Weili et al.   Transmission Eavesdropping Beamforming and Low power Works only for
[138] power, Secrecy artificial noise are used consumption perfect CSI
rate to secure the
communication channel
of cognitive radio
network based on SWIPT

Summary and Insights: We have found that the study of
beamforming based PLS techniques have provided a lot of lit-
erature with themes spanning from security-related theoretical
studies to practical criteria designs. Integration of beamforming
17
based PLS in different promising technologies of 5G is a potential
research path in security paradigms. For example, NOMA with
Beamforming (NOMA-BF) can use both the power and spatial
domains to improve spectral efficiency and secrecy by increasing
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 8
Beamforming based PLS techniques for relay networks.
Year BF CJ AN CC Security Provides Description Advantages Disadvantages
parameter security from
attack
Zhang et al.   Secrecy sum Eavesdrop- Secure beamforming is Improved Proposed scheme
[139] rate, Secrecy ping used along with network secrecy rate is tested only for
rate coding to improve the single antenna
security of two-way relay
network

Junwei et al. Secrecy rate, Eavesdrop- Collaborative beamforming Reduced Works only for
[140] SNR ping is used w.r.t. secrecy computational perfect CSI
conditions to improve the complexity
secrecy rate of the relay
network

Yang et al.  Secrecy rate Eavesdrop- Two cooperative secure Improved data Proposed
[141] ping beamforming techniques rate for technique should
are proposed to improve multiple be tested on more
the secrecy rate with eavesdroppers security
power constraints parameters

Wang et al.   Secrecy sum Eavesdrop- Hybrid jamming and Scalable to Tested only for
[142] rate ping beamforming is used to multiple single
improve the security of the jammers for eavesdropper case
physical layer in the improving the
presence of an efficiency
eavesdropper further

Wang et al.    Secrecy sum Eavesdrop- Improved physical layer Works well for Proposed
[143] rate ping security of bidirectional imperfect CSI technique should
transmission for multiple scenario be tested on more
relays in the presence of security
an eavesdropper parameters

Li et al.   Average secrecy Eavesdrop- Artificial noise with Improved Proposed

[144] sum rate ping, beamforming is proposed average secrecy technique should
Interference to enhance the quality of sum rate be tested on more
between the signal and enhance the security
users security of two-way relay parameters
network

Chengmin   Average Eavesdrop- Cooperative beamforming Low Tested only for

et al. [145] secrecy sum ping along with jamming is computational single
rate, Average used in DF relay networks complexity eavesdropper case
secrecy to secure physical layer
capacity

Tao et al.  Data rate Interference Cooperative beamforming Improved data High
[146] between is used for satellite based rate computational
users relay networks to improve complexity
the data transmission rate

SINR at UEs. In the case of full-duplex wireless communications,
beamforming-based approach can be effectively used to mitigate
the signal interference. Furthermore, using beamforming cancel-
lation, several standard RF, antenna, and baseband cancellation
processes can be eliminated, which reduces the system com-
plexity. In massive MIMO systems, beamforming can be used
to improve the system security, spectral efficiency, and energy
efficiency. In massive MIMO systems, the likelihood of an eaves-
dropper receiving the beamformed signal is lower as compared to
systems with conventional antennas. Further, beamforming can
be effectively used with artificial noise injection to enhance the
secrecy of primary and secondary networks in cognitive radio
networks. Also, beamforming can be used for confidential data
transmission in relay networks by using relay nodes as trustwor-
thy nodes and optimizing the beamforming vectors for cognitive
receivers’ signal. Beamforming is further used in the literature for
designing secure transmission scheme while satisfying the energy
harvesting constraints for SWIPT enabled wireless networks. In
terms of HetNets, beamforming can be used at macro base station,
18
micro base station, femto base station and pico base station to
enhance the security of multi-tier wireless networks. The physical
layer characteristics of the wireless channel, in particular, may be
used to develop novel security and privacy-preserving techniques
in 5G and beyond. In most of the literature, the eavesdropper is
frequently believed to have the same or worse channel character-
istics as the legitimate receiver. However, this may not always be
the case in practice, like Eve can have more antennas than base
stations and user devices, leading to security issues.
7. Future research trends and challenges
7.1. Artificial intelligence (AI) assisted secure transmission
As indicated by AI’s broad use in a variety of PLS application
domains [181–184], it is undoubtedly one of the most impor-
tant factors for improving 5G and beyond PLS. It can be used
to understand both typical and abnormal wireless network be-
haviors based on how UEs and base stations interact with one
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 9
Beamforming based PLS techniques for SWIPT.
Year BF CJ AN CC Security Provides Description Advantages Disadvantages
parameter security from
attack
Bin et al.  SINR Eavesdropping Under SINR constraint, a Reduced Power Proposed
[147] beamforming based consumption technique should
technique is designed to be tested on more
secure the data security
transmission in SWIPT parameters

Schober   SINR, CSI, Eavesdropping Beamforming and Improved Tested only for
et al. [148] Average secrecy Artificial noise based average secrecy passive
Capacity secure communication capacity eavesdroppers
for SWIPT in presence of
passive eavesdroppers

Dong et al.   Secrecy rate Eavesdropping, Joint artificial noise and Improved High
[149] Signal beamforming is used to secrecy rate computational
interference secure data transmission complexity
in Full duplex SWIPT
systems

Zhengyu  SINR, Eavesdropping Secure beamforming is Reduced Proposed

et al. [150] harvesting used in MIMO SWIPT computational technique should
power systems complexity be tested on more
security
parameters

Liang et al.   SINR Eavesdropping Joint beamforming and Reduced Power Tested only for
[151] cooperative jamming is consumption single
used to improve PLS and eavesdropper case
reduce energy
consumption

Zheng et al.    Secrecy rate Eavesdropping, Secure beamforming for Improved High
[152] Interference MISO SWIPT using secrecy rate computational
between users artificial noise and complexity
cooperative jamming

Jiang et al.  Secrecy rate Eavesdropping Secure beamforming is Improved Proposed

[83] used to improve the secrecy rate technique should
secrecy rate of the be tested on more
SWIPT in D2D networks security
parameters

Quanzhong  Average Eavesdropping Relay based secure Low power High

et al. [153] secrecy rate beamforming is used to consumption computational
secure the data complexity
transmission in SWIPT
Relay networks

Zhengyu   Transmit Eavesdropping Joint artificial noise and Improved Tested only for
et al. [154] power, Secrecy beamforming is used to secrecy rate single
rate improve the security of eavesdropper case
the physical layer at
SWIPT systems

another. AI approaches can also be used to predict future at-
tacks, which are typically variants of prior ones. To improve the
PLS of 5G HetNets, Zhihan et al. [181] presented a deep neural
network (DNN) based approach. In this paper, DNN was used
to study simultaneous beamforming and modulation informa-
tion recognition in order to improve secrecy. Xiao et al. [182]
proposed a decaying deep-Q-network (DQN) architecture for in-
corporating reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) in unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) based wireless networks. Yuhan et al. [183]
introduced a DRL-based cooperative communication and relay se-
lection technique. In this method, a DQN is trained using mutual
information and outage probability, and the best relay is selected
from a group of relay nodes without the need of historical data.
Xiaofan et al. [184] presented a physical layer authentication
strategy based on residual networks for industrial cyber–physical
19
systems (CPS). However, the computational cost of reducing AI’s
error rate is very significant. Although use of pruning and smaller
deep neural networks can help to alleviate this problem, the AI
computing crisis for building safe data transfer mechanisms is a
long-term concern for engineers.
7.2. Secure transmission of big-data
Nowadays, there are several big data applications available,
such as large-scale smart city monitoring, Agriculture 4.0, Health-
care 4.0, and so on. Monitoring big-data transmission in a real-
time context is very difficult due to the high traffic density,
making security of big-data transmissions a difficult task. Thus,
the development of beamforming based physical layer security
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791

Table 10
Beamforming based PLS techniques for heterogeneous networks.
Year BF CJ AN CC Security Provides Description Advantages Disadvantages
parameter security from
attack
Lv et al.  Secrecy rate, Eavesdropping Secure beamforming is Low power High
[156] SINR used to improve the PLS consumption computational
of two-tier downlink complexity
hetnet

Jahandideh   Secrecy rate Eavesdropping, Joint beamforming and Improved Proposed

[163] Signal artificial noise is used to secrecy rate technique should
interference secure the data be tested on more
transmission in two security
relay hetnet parameters

Bin et al.   Secrecy rate Eavesdropping Joint beamforming and Low power Tested only for
[164] artificial noise is used to consumption single
secure the data eavesdropper case
transmission SWIPT two
tier hetnet

Chang et al.    Secrecy Eavesdropping, Beamforming is used Improved High

[165] capacity, SNR Signal with artificial noise and secrecy computational
interference cooperative jamming to capacity complexity
improve the PLS of
heterogeneous massive
MIMO system

Zhang et al.   Secrecy rate Eavesdropping Joint beamforming and Improved Proposed
[166] cooperative jamming is secrecy rate technique should
used to secure the data be tested on more
transmission in presence security
of multiple parameters
eavesdroppers in dense
hetnet

Table 11
Beamforming based PLS techniques for other 5G scenarios.
Author BF CJ AN CC Security Provides Description Advantages Disadvantages
parameter security from
attack
Lin et al.  Secrecy rate, Eavesdropping Frequency diverse array Improved High
[167] SOP beamforming technique secrecy rate computational
is used to mitigate the complexity
eavesdropping attack in
millimeter wave
communications

Kim et al.  Secrecy rate, Eavesdropping, Joint relay section and Improved Proposed
[168] SOP Signal beamforming is used to achievable technique should
interference improve the physical secrecy rate be tested on more
layer security security
parameters

Anand et al.  SINR, CSI Eavesdropping Zero force beamforming Low power Tested only for
[169] is used to secure the consumption single
wireless communications eavesdropper case

Lin et al.  Secrecy rate Eavesdropping, Secure beamforming is Improved CSI status not
[170] Signal used to secure the 5G worst case defined
interference enabled satellite secrecy rate
communications

Zhang et al.  Secrecy rate Eavesdropping AF and BF relay based Improved Proposed
[171] beamforming designs are secrecy rate technique should
used to maximize the be tested on more
secrecy rate to enhance security
PLS parameters

Chai Dai   Secrecy rate Eavesdropping Joint beamforming and Low power CSI status not
[172] cooperative jamming is consumption defined
used to improve the
secrecy rate

20
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
techniques capable of providing security for such large amounts
of data transfer could be a future research direction.
7.3. Secure transmission in line-of-sight (LoS) environment
For line-of-sight (LoS) conditions, where the eavesdropper is
in the same direction as the genuine user, the design of secure
transmission techniques is extremely difficult. In such a case, it is
impractical to achieve perfect secrecy using conventional linear
beamforming and artificial noise aided techniques. In general,
more practical PLS techniques are required to maintain their
applicability in scenarios with poor scattering (non-fading) and
static time invariance (non-dynamic).
7.4. Integration of PLS and classical wireless cryptography
Integration of PLS and traditional wireless cryptography is
a potential research direction in security paradigms. The ultra-
reliable and low latency applications of the 5G and beyond net-
works require ultra-strong security. The physical layer charac-
teristics of the wireless channel can be used to develop novel
security algorithms that improve the existing authentication and
key management at higher levels. Integration of beamforming
based PLS approaches and cryptography based methods needs
further investigation in this domain.
7.5. Global optimization considering security and reliability
To achieve optimal network performance and user experience
in a wireless network, PLS designs should take both security and
reliability into account. Providing physical layer security comes
with the risk of jeopardizing other system needs. For instance,
channel coding aided techniques sacrifice spectrum efficiency
of the network, whereas artificial noise aided techniques com-
promise power efficiency, resulting in the transmission of su-
perfluous power. As a result, an optimal design that considers
QoS criteria such as delay, throughput, and bit error rate while
ensuring security is an important component in future research
directions.
8. Conclusion
Future wireless advancements such as massive MIMO, het-
erogeneous network, full-duplex communication, SWIPT, Internet
of Things are posing new security concerns for 5G and beyond
networks. Recently, there has been a lot of interest in developing
effective, secure, and reliable transmission techniques, that take
advantage of the properties of wireless channel in the physical
layer. Focused on PLS, in this paper, we present a systematic
review of beamforming based approaches in wireless networks.
We have discussed various performance evaluation metrics for
beamforming based PLS techniques. We have also discussed var-
ious security concerns in designing PLS techniques for 5G and
beyond networks. Further, we provide an indepth analysis of
various key technologies of 5G, where beamforming based PLS
techniques can be employed. Finally, this article also highlights
future research trends and challenges in designing PLS techniques
for 5G and beyond networks.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
to influence the work reported in this paper.
21
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
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Himanshu Sharma received the M.Tech. degree in
Embedded Systems (Computer Science and Engineer-
ing) from Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, Coimbatore,
India, in 2017. He is currently working toward the
Ph.D. degree from Computer Science and Engineering
Department, Thapar Institute of Engineering and Tech-
nology, Patiala, India. He was a SRF in DST research
project funded by Indian Government. His research in-
terests include Internet-of-Things, Wireless Networks,
Wireless Security, and Artificial Intelligence. Some
of his research findings are published in top-tiered
conferences such as IEEE INFOCOM, IEEE Globecom, IEEE ICC.
H. Sharma, N. Kumar and R. Tekchandani
Prof. Neeraj Kumar (SMIEEE) (2019, 2020, 2021
highly-cited researcher from WoS) is working as a
Full Professor in the Department of Computer Science
and Engineering, Thapar Institute of Engineering and
Technology (Deemed to be University), Patiala (Pb.),
India. He is also adjunct professor at Asia Univer-
sity, Taiwan, King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia and Newcastle University, UK. He has pub-
lished more than 500 technical research papers (DBLP:
https://dblp.org/pers/hd/k/Kumar_0001:Neeraj) in top-
cited journals and conferences which are cited more
than 29700 times from well-known researchers across the globe with current
h-index of 94 (Google scholar: https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=
gL9gR-4AAAAJ. He has guided many research scholars leading to Ph.D. and
M.E./M.Tech. His research is supported by funding from various competitive
agencies across the globe. His broad research areas are Green computing and
Network management, IoT, Big Data Analytics, Deep learning and cyber-security.
He has also edited/authored 10 books with International/National Publishers
like IET, Springer, Elsevier, CRC. Security and Privacy of Electronic Healthcare
Records: Concepts, paradigms and solutions (ISBN-13: 978-1-78561-898-7),
Machine Learning for cognitive IoT, CRC Press, Blockchain, Big Data and Machine
learning, CRC Press, Blockchain Technologies across industrial vertical, Elsevier,
Multimedia Big Data Computing for IoT Applications: Concepts, Paradigms
and Solutions (ISBN: 978-981-13-8759-3), Proceedings of First International
Conference on Computing, Communications, and Cyber-Security (IC4S 2019)
(ISBN 978-981-15-3369-3). Probabilistic Data Structures for Blockchain based
IoT Applications, CRC Press. One of the edited text-book entitled, ‘‘Multimedia
Big Data Computing for IoT Applications: Concepts, Paradigms, and Solutions’’
published in Springer in 2019 is having 3.5 million downloads till 06 June 2020.
It attracts attention of the researchers across the globe. (https://www.springer.
com/in/book/9789811387586).
25
Physical Communication 54 (2022) 101791
He is serving as editors of ACM Computing Survey, IEEE Transactions on
Sustainable Computing, IEEE TNSM, IEEE Network Magazine, Elsevier Jour-
nal of Networks and Computer Applications, Elsevier Computer Communi-
cation, Wiley International Journal of Communication Systems. Also, he has
organized various special issues of journals of repute from IEEE, Elsevier,
Springer. He has been a workshop chair at IEEE Globecom 2018, IEEE Info-
com 2020 (https://infocom2020.ieee-infocom.org/workshop-blockchain-secure-
software-defined-networking-smart-communities) and IEEE ICC 2020 (https://
icc2020.ieee-icc.org/workshop/ws-06-secsdn-secure-and-dependable-software-
defined-networking-sustainable-smart) and track chair of Security and privacy
of IEEE MSN 2020 (https://conference.cs.cityu.edu.hk/msn2020/cf-wkpaper.php).
He is also TPC Chair and member for various International conferences such as
IEEE MASS 2020, IEEE MSN 2020. He has won the best papers award from IEEE
Systems Journal in 2018, in 2020, and IEEE ICC 2018, Kansas-city in 2018. He
has also won best paper award from Elsevier JNCA in 2021 and IEEE Comsoc
IWCMC 2021. He has won the outstanding leadership award from IEEE Trsutcom
in 2021. Moreover, He won the best researcher award from parent organization
every year from last eight consecutive years.
Dr. Raj Kumar Tekchandani is working as Assistant
Professor in the Department of Computer Science and
Engineering, Thapar Institute of Engineering and Tech-
nology (Deemed to be University), Patiala (Pb.), India.
He has thirteen years of academic experience in the
field of computer science and engineering. He has pub-
lished numerous technical research papers in top-cited
journals and conferences with an h-index of 10. He
is supervising many research scholars leading to Ph.D.
and M.E./M.Tech. His broad research areas are Deep
Learning, Cognitive Science, IoT, Software Engineering
and 5G Communication Networks.