Emerging Geo-strategic Environment in the Middle East

1. Introduction
For about 20 years since the end of the Cold War, the regional power
dynamics of the Middle East were relatively stable, and the United States
was the uncontested and dominant external power. Today, a
combination of the upheavals, revolutions, and civil wars in the region,
U.S. war fatigue, the shale energy revolution, and the return of great
power competition have dramatically transformed the geopolitics of the
Middle East.
2. The Middle East in a Multipolar Era
 Waning hegemony of the US
 Rise of other global powers: most significantly Russia and China
 Flirting of America’s allies with Russia and China

In a remarkably prescient 2004 interview, then-Saudi Foreign

Minister Saud al Faisal told former Washington Post journalist
David Ottaway that the U.S.-Saudi relationship wasn’t a “Catholic
marriage,” where only one wife was allowed; it was a “Muslim
marriage,” where four wives were permitted. “Saudi Arabia was
not seeking divorce from the United States; it was just seeking
marriage with other countries,” Ottaway wrote.
3. Factors responsible for waning the influence of the USA in the
Middle East
 Litany of evidence starts from Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia
 His decision not to enforce his own red line regarding Bashar-al Assad’s use of
chemical weapons against the Syrian people.
 September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco facilities, declined to come to Riyadh’s
defense militarily and stated that the United States “no longer needs” Middle Eastern
oil.
 Lack of support from US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., after multiple Houthi
missile attacks on the United Arab Emirates; Another low point
 Unilateral withdrawal of Trump from JCPOA in 2018
 Hasty and humiliating withdrawal of the USA from Afghanistan

4. US and Saudi Arabia: a breach in the oil-for-security relationship

 Joe Biden’s visit to the Middle East for the sake of energy-oriented geopolitical
aspirations in the wake of the Ukraine invasion.
  US-Saudi row over OPEC+ decision
o To cut the oil production by 2 million bpd
 USA important defense partner of KSA

5. USA and Iran: A sanction-ridden relationship

 The unilateral withdrawal of Trump from JCPOA in 2018 and the imposition of
crippling sanctions
 Futile efforts to revive JCPOA by P5+1 and the EU in 2022
 Role of Israel in debilitating the deal.
 Iran’s unwavering resolute enrichment of uranium
o Iran’s stock of uranium enriched up to 60pc close to weapon-grade
o It was allowed to enrich uranium at 3.67%
 US sanctions on Iranian oil markets to curb its influence.

6. Emerging Role of China in the Middle East and great powers

competition:
 “Saudi Arabia is partnering with China to accelerate the kingdom’s digitalization of the
energy sector and the digital transformation of the economy more broadly,” observed
Calabrese, director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute
China’s interests in the region”
 The energy imperative:
o China’s demand for energy increased significantly between 2000 and 2020, a
period in which its economy quintupled in size.
o the largest proportion from Saudi Arabia (15.5%), followed by Oman (7%), the
UAE (5.5%) and Kuwait (5%).
o China’s Silk Road Fund has acquired a 49% stake in the Saudi renewable-
energy company ACWA Power.
 The diplomatic imperative:
 The Economic Imperative
o China had displaced the European Union as the GCC’s leading trade partner
o China Railway Construction Corporation led the consortium that built the metro
system in Mecca, the China Ocean Shipping Company built a new terminal at
the UAE’s Khalifa Port, and Chinese investments have funded the expansion of
the port of Duqm in Oman
o The Gulf states have been willing to install 5G equipment provided by Huawei
and other Chinese telecommunications companies
o Iraq’s energy reserves and strategic location have become critical for China,
while the U.S. sanctions on Syria have pushed Damascus to expand its
cooperation with Beijing defying the U.S. Caesar Act.
 Political relations:
o Gulf states are eager to court China
o Authoritarian growth model of China
o Geopolitical uncertainty is pitching Gulf states closer to China:
o China is challenging established global norms established after world war 2
 o US is showing ambivalence
o Gulf states know that China will not impose political decisions on them
o China has no interest to pursue larger strategic ambitions or engage in power
projections in the Gulf
o GCC endorsed China’s imposition of a new legal and security regime in Hong
Kong in 2020 as China welcomed M. Bin Salman to Beijing in 2019 after the
killing of Jamal Khashoggi.
 Defense relations:
o Saudi Arabia and the UAE have acquired Wing Loong uninhabited aerial
vehicles
o Saudi Arabia is reportedly seeking to acquire Chinese ballistic missiles
o Anwar Gargash, a senior Emirati official, said ‘we’re all worried, very much,
by a looming Cold War. That is bad news for all of us because the idea of
choosing is problematic in the international system, and I think this is not going
to be an easy ride.’
o US is worried that greater IT infrastructure may expose US military equipment
to Chinese spying.
o For Beijing, the large US diplomatic and military footprint in the Middle East
is useful to both secure the sea lanes for trade and because it means that there
are fewer US resources available to send to the South China Sea.
 Convergence of China US relations:
• US factor

o China:
o Oil resources of Iran
o Steel and Gold resources
o Manifestation of China’s soft power
o Threatens establish world order dominated by US as hegemon
o Two Oceans power
• Iran:

o China a major source of finance

o Investment from China (25 year strategic partnership
o Requires China’s technology

 China Iran relations: A threat to US power

Two main security implications on US
o First, Chinese investment will provide economic stimulus and revenue for Iran
o If past is prologue, Tehran will use a significant portion of that additional
revenue to build its missile and drone arsenal, advance its nuclear program,
export terrorism, and attack its neighbors
o Second, significantly improve Iranian military capability
o Iran, Russia and China will hold joint naval exercises in the northern Indian
Ocean “this autumn,” Iran’s semi-official Mehr news agency reported
•
 China and KSA
 China’s energy-focused visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022
 Agreements worth $30bn were signed.
 Signing of energy agreements on hydrogen as well as plan to harmonize Saudi’s
ambitious economic reform agenda VISION 2030, with China’s trillion-dollar BRI
 Deals also cover a petrochemical project, housing development and the teaching of the
Chinese language
 Trade in Yuan (Future prospects)
 Summit with six members of GCC and wider China-Arab Summit
 Kingdom accounted for more than 20pc of Chinese investment in the Arab world
between 2005-2020, the largest share if any nation.
 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016 between China and KSA

China and Iran

 25 years cooperation agreement
o 450 billion investments in Iran’s infrastructure in return for discounted oil
supplies
 Export of Iranian oil by China amid US stringent sanctions
 China’s support for membership of Iran in SCO

Egypt
 the construction of Egypt’s new administrative capital, where China’s state-owned
enterprises are building the Central Business District.
 Penetrating the Egyptian market extensively after the Suez Canal economic zone was
opened.
 China remains the largest investor in the Suez Canal Area Development Project,
which is Beijing’s most important shipping route to Europe.
 Egypt and Saudi Arabia have expressed interest in joining BRICS.

Some scholars as the University of Chicago’s Paul Poast have suggested that
the expansion of BRICS and the SCO represents the emergence of an
“alternative international order.”

Syria and Iraq

 Importance of Iraq due to its energy reserves and strategic location
 The U.S. sanctions on Syria have pushed Damascus to expand its cooperation with
Beijing defying the U.S. Caesar Act.
 Other Initiatives
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Oman’s Vision 2040, Qatar’s Vision
2030, Kuwait’s Vision 2035, and Egypt’s Vision 2030.

Defense
 Exhibition of China’s advanced weapons and equipment, including tanks, artillery, air
defense missiles, drones and electronic warfare systems, at the largest international
defense expo Egypt Defense Expo (EDEX 2021).

7. Role of Russia in shaping Geo-strategic environment in ME:

Russia and Iran cooperation on defense

 Use of Iranian made drones in Ukraine war
 Main benefactor of ongoing stand-off between Iran and the West over nuclear program
 Involvement in Syria war
 MoU on economic projects and Russian investments in energy and infrastructure
projects ($2.7 bn)
 International North-South Transport Corridor, set to link Iran to Russia
via Azerbaijan

Saudi-Russian partnership
 Saudi Arabia’s Kingdom Holding Co invested at least $500m in Gazprom, Rosneft and
Lukoil
 Tilting of KSA towards Russia
 Role of KSA and Turkey in facilitating a prisoner swap between Kyiv and Moscow

8. Turkey: A major claimant for the Middle East hegemony seat

Turkey is the oldest claimant to the seat of Middle Eastern hegemony. Its claim
is driven from the Islamic Ottoman heritage, rich Muslim history and a
geography and physicality of the state that positions it suitably to lay claim of
being such a power.
 Turkey support for Muslim Brotherhood
 Reinforcement of split due to blockade of Turkish ally Qatar by Gulf neighbors in 2017
  The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the kingdom’s Istanbul consulate
in October 2018.

 A Thaw in Icy Relationships

 Lifting of embargo by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain early last
year paved the way for Ankara’s reconciliation with its erstwhile adversaries.
 The end of an unofficial Saudi boycott of Turkish goods, which cut Ankara’s exports
by 90 percent, saw trade to Saudi Arabia reach $58m last month, March 2022

Turkey and UAE

 Before the visit, Turkey secured a $4.9bn currency swap deal with Abu Dhabi,
following similar agreements with Qatar, China and South Korea given Turkey’s
economic crisis.
o Official inflation stands at 61 percent while the lira has plummeted by 64pc in
2022.
 Visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to UAE in Feb 2022
 Signing of 13 agreements including on defence, trade, climate change, industry and the
economy.
 The UAE also announced a $10bn fund to support investments in Turkey.
 Turkey as a meditator between Russia and Ukraine to facilitate food security in various
Ukraine-depended middle eastern countries.

9. US-led alliances in the Middle East countries

 To counter the influence of China and Russia
 I2U2 (US, United Arab Emirates (UAE), India and Israel) security arrangement. This
alliance aims to counter growing Chinese influence in the Middle East and
prioritises the agenda of cooperation on 5G technologies, space, nuclear power
and technologically advanced military hardware such as drone

10. The Dark side of Abraham Accords

 A death blow to already half-pulse-beating Palestine cause
 Responsible for the arms race in ME
 Israel-UAE military cooperation
o Selling of advanced weapons to UAE owing to increased Iran’s attacks and its
nuclear program.
 Isolation of Iran

11. Russia’s war forces Europe and MENA closer together

 Qatar-Europe energy deal
 Though these developing ties were not able to fully prevent a global energy crisis in
2022, the coming years will likely see a long-lasting European reorientation toward
greater reliance on MENA energy supplies.
  MENA states like Egypt and the UAE also took the initiative to attempt to secure new
agricultural deals with countries on the European continent

12. Contemporary changing dynamics among the regional

players
Saudi-Iran cold war
 Yemen war
 crowd stormed the Sunni-
Setback in diplomatic ties in 2016 after a
majority kingdom’s embassy in Tehran following the execution
of a prominent Shia leader.
 Ongoing rapprochement talks between Saudi and Iran
 Since April 2021, Iraq has hosted five rounds of direct talks
between the two. However, there are some roadblocks.
o Intensified rhetoric against Saudi Arabia accusing of
backing media outlets for fomenting unrest in recent
nation-wide protests.
o Iran backed Houthis’ attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019
& 2021.
 A real breakthrough in rapprochement talks can be
beneficially opportunistic for Pakistan.
Israel and Iran: Nuclear arch-rivals
 Cyberattacks on Iranian infrastructure and air attacks on Iranian bases in Iraq and Syria
by Israel
 Assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh In 2020 and alleged involvement of
Israel
 Role of Israel in opposing the revival of JCPOA
13. Strategy of middle eastern countries amid great powers
competition
 “All of the above”; omni-alignment approach to their international relationships
 Most countries view the rivalry between great powers, rather than the threat posed by
any single power, as the greatest challenge to their interest.
 The Saudis count China as their top economic partner and destination of its one-fifth of
their exports.
 At the same time the US as their top security partner so they would like to maintain
both.
 14. Pragmatic approaches by the US to revive its position
Less strategic narcissism, More cooperation
 Instead on focusing on broad, multi-issue forums, the US should seek or build smaller
partnerships of states with more focused agendas.
 These coalition can advance high priority mutual interests including security and
infrastructure investments.
 Working with existing allies to entrench shared norms and regulations such as data
privacy and technology exports.
 Increasing incentives for non-allied partners to conform to Washington’s preferences.
 Cultivating long term partnerships

15. Conclusion
The world needs to keep its fingers crossed for interesting times ahead
in Middle Eastern politics.