GARCIA V. DRILON (G.R. NO.

179267)

Facts:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and
in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition(Civil Case No. 06-797) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant
to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the
former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private
respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J.
Garcia, 3 years old.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against

the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a
TPOon March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days,

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPOseeking the denial of the renewal of the
TPO. Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner movedfor the modification of the
TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to
the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to

faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her
and their children, private respondent filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte.
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,effective for thirty (30) days, which
reads as follows:

In its Orderdated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO
for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which
to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon
petitioner's manifestation, however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Orderdated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Orderdated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued

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renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:
it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30)
days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as
may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO
arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petitionfor prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer
for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses,
and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an
unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order(TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed the
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings
before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for
prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolutiondated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible
opportunity?

2. Whether or not RA 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause?

3. Whether or not RA 9262 is violative of the due process clause of the

constitution?

4. Whether or not the law is violative of the policy to protect the family as a basic
social institution?

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5. Whether or not the law is an undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay
officials?

Held:
Petition for Review is denied.

Petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City. We disagree. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the
trial, and if not considered in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.

Equal protection clause requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same, and does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. Classification in
law is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars, and is not invalid because of simple inequality. All
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, germane to the purpose of the law, not
limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is
based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not
violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach
of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the
Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.In
the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were
presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A.
9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the
co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

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ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ (G.R. No. 93567)

Facts
Petitioners were employees of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB). An anonymous letter was received by the Office of the Ombudsman which
prompt the latter to conduct an investigation against the petitioners. The contents of
the anonymous letter alleged that funds representing savings from unfilled positions
in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. Thereafter, the Graft Investigation Officer
of the Ombudsman’s office issued a subpoena to petitioners Almonte and Perez,
requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum. Petitioners moved to quash the
subpoena requiring them to submit counter-affidavits and the subpoena duces
tecum. The Ombudsman granted the former and denied the latter. The petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assailed the validity of the anonymous letter complaint which was used
to start an investigation among them. They contend that commencing an
investigation against them by virtue of an anonymous letter is a violation of the
equal protection clause. This is because “in all forum and tribunals . . . the
aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or
sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,” while in proceedings before
the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation.
Moreover, Section 12, Art XI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 26 of RA No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provide that the “Ombudsman and his
Deputies … shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner” or “shall
receive complaints from any source in whatever form”, respectively.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause when the law
permits the Office of the Ombudsman to commence investigation on the basis of an
anonymous letter while it is not so in other proceedings?

Held:
None. Firstly, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in
the Constitution itself. Secondly, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints “in any form and in a manner,” the framers of the Constitution took into
account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining
against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of
the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies
of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who,
through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
held against them.

Hence, there is no violation of the equal protection clause.

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Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission (G.R. No. 192935)

Facts:
At the dawn of his administration, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, on July
30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Petitioner Louis Biraogo, in his capacity
as a citizen and taxpayer, assails EO No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate
funds therefor.A special civil action for certiorari and prohibition was likewise filed
by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,et al. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

As can be gleaned from the provisions of the EO, the Philippine Truth Commission
(PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has
been described as an “independent collegial body,” it is essentially an entity within
the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an
adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may
create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an
authorization vested in him by law. Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-
legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of
Congress and not with the executive branch of government.

Issue:
Whether or not the Executive possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding
committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions
and in the exercise of its administrative functions.

Held:
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
mean that he is bereft of such authority. Indeed, the Executive is given much
leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the

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powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution.

One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this

constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the authority of
the President to issue A.O. No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into
the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health
for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot
be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. xxx
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to
exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power
of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made
in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. In this regard, it must be
borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is,
a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution. The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government."

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own
will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government
isdone in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations
of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.

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Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional. GRANTED.

REPUBLIC v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO (GR No. 221029)

FACTS:
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. Finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and in substance, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
set the case for initial hearing. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering
that, based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. As a result, Manalo moved to
admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.

The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the
right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they
are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos’ family rights and duties, together with the determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including
marriages.”

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition

Issue:

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Whether a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against
his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of
having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter
is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid
divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce,
i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming
arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should
be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation
since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court
ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind
adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal
protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal
protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino
spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a
divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings.
Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to
the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly
discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of
the Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by
the foreign spouse.