Law 9780198298519 Chapter 23

Part IV Privileges and Immunities, 23 Inviolability
of Consular Premises
From: Consular Law and Practice (3rd Edition)

Luke T. Lee, John B Quigley
Content type: Book content

Product: Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
Published in print: 03 July 2008
ISBN: 9780198298519
Subject(s):
Diplomatic missions — Consulates — Consular relations — Diplomatic immunity — Treaties, application
— Diplomatic protection
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Graduate Institute; date: 11 October 2021
(p. 353) 23 Inviolability of Consular Premises
1. General
One aspect of a sending State’s protection from infringements on its consular premises—
protection from electronic surveillance—was noted in Chapter 22. Electronic surveillance is
one of a number of ways in which unwanted intrusion may interfere with consular functions.
Immunity for consular premises, and for consular housing, emerged in State practice, to
deal with these concerns.
Immunity of consular premises arises in a variety of situations. One is service of legal
process within consular premises, a topic considered in Chapter 24. Another is the
protection of consular archives, considered in Chapter 25. This chapter deals with the
obligation of the receiving State to refrain from unconsented entry into consular premises
and residence, and with its obligation to protect consular premises from intrusion.
Prior to the VCCR, three schools of thought were found on the immunity of consular
premises from receiving State jurisdiction:
1. No immunity: Consular premises, not being diplomatic missions, were entitled to
no inviolability except in regard to consular archives. Italy held this view. 1 In a 1953
Israeli case, the President of the Execution Office of Jerusalem ruled that the local
police in the absence of a treaty were empowered to enter the Belgian Consulate-
General to arrest a chauffeur in execution of a judgment against him for negligent
driving resulting in death. 2 The Portuguese delegation at the Vienna Conference also
expressed the view that inviolability of consular premises was not admitted in
customary law, except as to archives. An extension of that principle to consular
premises would thus derogate from, instead of contribute to, codification of
customary law. 3 The approach of this school of thought was not widely shared. Even
Italy was willing to accept the ILC Draft, which called for absolute immunity for
consular premises, 4 as a working basis for discussion at the Vienna Conference. 5
(p. 354) 2. Absolute immunity: Consular premises enjoyed absolute immunity, on the
same basis as diplomatic missions. A few US treaties concluded prior to 1950, 6 as
well as those with Communist States, 7 accepted full immunity. Bilateral consular
treaties involving Communist States adopted this approach, like the China-USSR
Consular Convention of 1959: ‘The consular premises shall be inviolable. The
authorities of the receiving country shall not use coercion, in any form whatsoever, in
the consular premises.’ 8 This position was consistent with the Communist approach
of narrowing the diplomatic-consular gap. The traditional distinction between the
diplomatic (political) and consular (economic) functions was meaningless for
countries whose export-import trade was a Government monopoly. Many of the
considerations that justified absolute immunity for diplomatic premises—sovereignty,
mutual respect, unimpeded exercise of functions, the need for secrecy, etc.—applied
also to consular premises. A factor that inclined Western States less to absolute
immunity was that there were fewer consulates in the Communist States. As a result,
Western States would suffer more exceptions to ordinary legal processes. On the
other hand, the principle of reciprocity and functional need also weighed heavily in
the Western powers’ consideration of conferring immunity upon consular premises.
3. Conditional immunity: A third school, a compromise between the other two, was
reflected in the 1932 Harvard Research Draft (Art. 17):
A receiving State shall prevent the invasion of a consular office by its agents
of any character, provided such office is used solely for consular purposes;
and shall furnish special protection to such office and the property used in
connection there with when necessary to defend them from attacks directed
against them because of their official character.
The clause ‘provided such office is used solely for consular purposes’ could be taken to
mean that, if the receiving State had reason to believe that the consulate was not used
‘solely’ for consular purposes, inviolability could be set aside. In line with this reasoning,
Poland’s Consular Conventions with Hungary of 19369 and with Bulgaria of 1934,10 while
upholding the inviolability of consular premises in general, permitted the entry of police ‘for
the purpose of arresting a person charged with an offence graded as a crime or delict’ or
‘punishable with a penalty involving loss of liberty the maximum form of which is at least
one year, or some more serious penalty’. However, ‘the authorities may in no case search
such premises or examine or detain papers or other articles found therein’.
(p. 355) 2. Conditional Immunity

An impetus towards the adoption of conditional immunity was provided by the Kasenkina
incident of 1948.11 Mrs Oksana Stepanovna Kasenkina, a Soviet citizen who taught children
of members of the Soviet UN delegation, sought to remain in the United States instead of
returning to the USSR. Steamship passage had been booked for her journey. She went to
Reed Farm, Valley Cottage, New York, a White Russian welfare organisation headed by the
Countess Alexandra Tolstoy. From there, she was taken by Soviet Consul-General Y. M.
Lomakin into the Soviet Consulate-General in New York, and held there to await
repatriation. While in custody there, she jumped from a window in an attempt either to
escape or commit suicide. Thereupon, the New York police entered the Consulate-General
to investigate her possible suicide attempt. The United States insisted that Consul-General
Lomakin had consented to the entry, but the USSR protested. This protest left the United
States in a dilemma. On the one hand, it wished to deny any violation of international law by
the entry of New York police. On the other hand, it feared that a denial might serve as
precedent for other countries to invade US consulates.
The dilemma was resolved by asserting inviolability in principle, but without tying the
hands of the local authorities in doubtful cases. The United States found what it considered
an appropriate formula when it concluded the US-UK Consular Convention of 1951 (Art.
8(4)):
A consular office shall not be entered by the police or other authorities of the
territory provided such office is devoted exclusively to consular business, except
with the consent of the consular officer or, if such consent cannot be obtained,
pursuant to appropriate writ or process and with the consent of the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs in the case of the territories referred to in paragraph (2) of
Article 1 and of the Secretary of State in the case of the territories referred to in
paragraph (1) of Article 1. The consent of the consular officer shall be presumed in
the event of fire or other disaster or in the event that the authorities of the territory
have probable cause to believe that a crime of violence has been or is being or is
about to be committed in the consular office. The provisions of this paragraph shall
not apply to a consular office which is in the charge of a consular officer who is a
national of the receiving State, or who is not a national of the sending State.
The consent of consuls to the entry into the consular premises by the police or other
authorities is thus ‘presumed’ in case of fire or other disaster, or if the local authorities have
‘probable cause to believe’ that a crime of violence has occurred, is occurring, or is about to
occur in the consular premises. If consular consent is withheld, the authorities could still
enter with the permission of the Secretary of (p. 356) State and with appropriate writ or
process. This formula was incorporated into consular treaties of the United States,12 United
Kingdom,13 and France.14
3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

During the Vienna Conference, the absolute immunity and conditional immunity schools of
thought were both strong. The former had an edge initially because it was reflected in the
ILC Draft.15 The Communist States backed absolute immunity, while the non-Communist
States were divided. The following arguments were advanced in favour of absolute
immunity:
16
1. A majority of States recognise, in practice, inviolability of consular premises;
2. Many consular treaties, including all the Soviet treaties, some US treaties, and the
Havana Convention of 1928 (Art. 18), accept inviolability; 17
3. Cases of force majeure like fire and burglary were exceptional and should
therefore be settled in accordance with common sense and not be put in the text of
the proposed Convention; 18
4. No such difficulty had ever arisen in case of fire or other disaster as to justify the
inclusion of the fire clause in a multilateral convention; 19
5. Neither the VCDR nor other conventions regulating immunity of premises, such as
the UN Headquarters Agreement of 1947, 20 singled out fire, a hypothetical hazard,
as justification for intrusion into the diplomatic premises or missions accredited to the
United Nations; 21
(p. 357) 6. It would be illogical to confer absolute inviolability upon residences of
diplomatic agents under VCDR Art. 30, but not upon consular premises, which were
more important than diplomatic residences; 22
7. Authorisation by a court or the Minister for Foreign Affairs to enter consular
premises could be obtained only by a time-consuming process, which would be futile
in an emergency situation; 23
8. Consuls and diplomatic agents were both representatives of the sending State and
should therefore enjoy the same privileges and immunities; 24
9. Entry into consular premises upon a ‘presumed’ consent or ‘reasonable cause to
believe’ that a crime of violence was being committed would be susceptible to abuse
and even provocation in addition to leaving unanswered the questions of (a) who was
to decide on the question of entry and (b) what would constitute a ‘reasonable cause’;
25
10. Since fire and ambulance services were privately operated in some States, the
clause restricting inviolability was inappropriate. 26
Opponents of absolute immunity stressed the traditional difference between diplomatic and
consular immunity, with the latter protecting only consular archives.27 Opponents insisted
that progressive development of international law should not result in greater consular
immunity.28 A four-power amendment,29 which consolidated previously separate
amendments by Nigeria,30 Japan,31 Greece,32 and the United Kingdom,33 reflected this
view. It provided:
1. Consular premises shall be inviolable to the extent provided in this Article.
2. The authorities of the receiving State shall not enter that part of the
consular premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of the work of the
consulate except:
(a) with the consent of the head of the consular post or of the head of
the diplomatic mission of the sending State, or
(p. 358) (b) failing such consent, pursuant to an order of the
appropriate judicial authority and with the authorisation of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other Minister as may
be agreed.
3. The consent of the head of the consular post may, however, be assumed in
case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action or if the
authorities of the receiving State have reasonable cause to believe that a
crime of violence to person or property has been or is being or is about to be
committed within the consular premises.
4. If the consular premises are entered by the authority of the receiving State
without consent as provided in paragraph 2(a) of this Article , an explanation
in writing stating the grounds for such action shall be furnished immediately
by the receiving State to the sending State through the diplomatic channel.
A compromise between this approach and absolute immunity was reached in VCCR Art.
31(2) as finally adopted. Exclusivity was retained, meaning that immunity hinged on
exclusive use for consular functions, as were consent to entry and the possibility of entry in
case of fire or other disaster. However, entry pursuant to judicial writs and authorisation of
the Foreign Office in the absence of consent was discarded as being susceptible of abuse.
There may be room for argument that reasonable cause to believe that a crime of violence
has been, is being, or is about to be committed could be regarded as a ‘disaster requiring
prompt protective action’. This argument would be easier to make in the event of violence
against a person, rather than against property.
The provision concerning fire and disaster was advocated principally by the UK because
many British consulates had been burned or invaded by mobs in protests against British
policies.34 VCCR Art. 31(2) requires consent for entry but assumes consent ‘in case of fire
or other disaster requiring prompt protective action’. The inclusion in the VCCR of this
provision may be contrasted with the absence of a similar provision in the VCDR or the
Harvard Research Draft on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities. The Commentary on the
latter provides, however:
The draft does not undertake to provide for well-known exceptions in practice, as
when the premises are on fire or when there is imminent danger that a crime of
violence is (p. 359) about to be perpetrated upon the premises. In such cases it
would be absurd to wait for the consent of a chief of mission in order to obtain entry
upon the premises. Like acts of God and force majeure these are necessarily implied
as exceptions to the specific requirement of prior consent for entry. Whether or not
the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to justify non-observance of the
rule would be a matter for diplomatic reclamation.35
Disagreeing with this account of State practice, Denza wrote that it was:
difficult to find examples of State practice before the Vienna Convention [on
Diplomatic Relations] supporting the existence of such an implied exception to the
inviolability of mission premises. The evidence, and the examples cited in the
International Law Commission debate, showed rather that heads of mission decided
on each occasion and in the light of all relevant considerations whether to invite
assistance. There had been refusals of consent when fire or yellow fever were
raging. The Commission agreed that any definition of circumstances in which entry
could be made without prior permission could lead to more controversy than it
would avoid. Any incursion by an unfriendly State could be alleged to be ‘to
safeguard the security of the State’ —a claim which it would be very difficult for the
sending State to disprove.36
There are three plausible reasons for a fire-exception clause in the VCCR, but not in the
VCDR. First, embassies, though no longer regarded as ‘exterritorial’ in the sense of being
territory of the sending State, symbolise its sovereignty, which would be denigrated by
entry without permission. Second, embassies typically house more politically sensitive
documents, thus requiring greater safeguards against intrusion. Third, embassies are
typically housed in detached buildings, so that a fire hazard is contained, whereas
consulates are often located in parts of downtown office buildings.
It remains possible, of course, for full diplomatic inviolability to be accorded to consular
premises on the basis of bilateral consular agreements. Such was often provided in consular
agreements involving Communist States.37 However, China’s Consular Privilege and
Immunity Act of 1990 (Art. 4) follows the VCCR approach for emergencies: ‘In case
consular premises are on fire or face other calamities and need prompt, protective action, it
will be presumed that the consulate head has given permission.’ What neither this provision
nor VCCR 31(2) makes clear is whether the assumed consent dissipates if the head of post
is on the scene and refuses permission to enter. The Russian Federation-Pakistan Consular
Convention of 1997 addresses this circumstance, providing, ‘Unless there is a direct refusal
by [the head of the consular post], then in case of fire or other natural disaster requiring
immediate protective measures, the authorities of the receiving State may enter consular
premises.’38
(p. 360) 4. Consular Residences

The living quarters of consuls situated in the same building as consular offices have often
been treated in the same way as consular offices,39 but the VCCR distinguishes the two.
Thus, VCCR Art. 1(j) defines ‘consular premises’ as ‘the buildings or parts of buildings and
the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used exclusively for the purposes of
the consular post.’40 In contrast, VCDR Art. 1(i) defines ‘premises of the mission’ as ‘the
buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership,
used for the purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of the mission’.41
Furthermore, VCCR Art. 32(1), which concerns the taxation of consular premises, uses the
expression, ‘Consular premises and the residence of the career head of consular post’.42
Thus, ‘consular premises’ does not include a consular ‘residence’. Nonetheless, in order to
remove doubt, it would have been preferable to include a provision requiring that living
quarters located in a consular building be separated from consular offices.43
To clarify the position, the US Department of State sent identical notes to the Chiefs of
Mission on 1 May 1986, reading:
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies and

Messieurs and Mesdames the Chiefs of Mission and has the honour to refer to the
practice of many States to include in a single building the residence of the principal
consular officer and/or other consular personnel as well as the offices and other
facilities constituting the premises of a consular post.
The United States recognises the convenience and economic benefits attaching to
this practice and wishes to emphasise that it has no objection to the continuation
thereof. The Chiefs of Mission are reminded, however, that consular residences and
consular premises do not enjoy the same degree of inviolability. In particular, Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides that only the ‘part of
the consular premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of the work of the
consular post’ enjoys inviolability.
Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the government operating multiple-use
buildings to delineate clearly, by means of appropriate signs in the English language
and other markings in the interior of such buildings, those areas which are used
exclusively for the purpose of the work of the consular post. In the event that it is
necessary for authorities of the United States or its States or municipalities to enter
these buildings, the absence of (p. 361) such internal markings would be taken as
an indication that only those portions of the buildings clearly and immediately
identifiable as office space are used exclusively for the purpose of the work of the
consular post and thus entitled to inviolability.
5. Requisition or Expropriation

Since consular functions should not be impeded, but rather assisted, by the receiving State,
it is only logical that many consular regulations and treaties provide for consular exemption
from military requisition and national expropriation and services of various kinds. Under
pre-Vienna US,44 Swiss,45 and French46 regulations, consuls were exempt from military
requisitions, contributions, or billeting with respect to official premises, as well as to their
private residences, furniture, other household articles, and vehicles. This practice was
recognised by some authorities on international law.47 Before 1948 absolute consular
immunity from military requisition and expropriation was granted irrespective of
considerations of military defence or public policy.48 Perhaps because of experiences gained
during the Second World War, a certain change was introduced in the US-Costa Rica
Consular Convention of 1948 (Art. 2(6), (7)). It became permissible to expropriate or seize
consular premises or residences to aid national defence or public utility in accordance with
the law of the receiving State, if adequate compensation was paid and due consideration
given to avoiding interference with consular service. The US-Costa Rica Convention became
a precedent for many consular treaties concluded by the United States or by the United
Kingdom.49
In the absence of permissive treaty provisions, however, the requisitioning of consular
premises by the receiving State could lead to serious disputes between States. For example,
the US decision to withdraw its diplomatic and consular personnel from mainland China in
1950 was touched off directly by China’s requisitioning of former military barracks that at
the time served as US consular premises.50 It therefore came as no surprise that the US-
People’s Republic of (p. 362) China Consular Convention of 1980, which restored consular
relations between the two countries, contained the following provision (Art. 19):
Consular premises as well as the official means of transport of the consulate are not
liable to any form of requisition. If for the needs of the national defence or other
public purposes expropriation of consular premises, residences or means of
transport becomes necessary, all possible measures must be taken by the receiving
State to avoid interference with the performance of consular functions and promptly
to pay appropriate and effective compensation to the sending State.
Reflecting the trend in State practice on requisition and expropriation, VCCR Art. 31(4)
provided:
The consular premises, their furnishings, the property of the consular post and its
means of transport shall be immune from any form of requisition for purposes of
national defence or public utility. If expropriation is necessary for such purposes, all
possible steps shall be taken to avoid impeding the performance of consular
functions, and prompt, adequate and effective compensation shall be paid to the
sending State.
The term ‘requisition’ is used in the first sentence, while ‘expropriation’ is used in the
second. Although the two terms are often used interchangeably, their meanings here may
differ, in light of the British interpretation of the Greek amendment,51 with which the UK
associated itself, that became the basis of the final text of Art. 31(4). The UK distinguished
between property being requisitioned, for example during a national emergency, to be
returned to its owner, and being expropriated, permanently, on grounds of national defence
or public utility. Consular premises and property should be immune from the former but not
the latter, it was thought, on the rationale that consuls should not be able to stand in the
way of the construction of a railway or highway.52
VCCR Art. 31(4) is reinforced by VCCR Art. 52, which provides:
The receiving State shall exempt members of the consular post and members of
their families forming part of their households … from military obligations such as
those connected with requisitioning, military contributions and billeting.
Thus, in so far as requisition is concerned, consuls enjoy the same immunity as diplomatic
agents. VCDR Art. 22(3) similarly provides: ‘The premises of the mission, their furnishings
and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from
… requisition.’
Italy and Argentina elaborate on VCCR Art. 31(4) by requiring that compensation paid upon
expropriation must be readily convertible:
Consular premises, goods used in the consular office, and official vehicles shall not
be subject to any form of requisition or expropriation.
(p. 363) Nevertheless, the expropriation of consular premises shall be permissible if
deemed necessary for national defence or on considerations of public utility. In such
a case, the receiving State shall be obliged to take possible measures that are
necessary to avoid any interference in the performance of consular functions and
shall be obliged to pay the sending State an immediate, adequate, and effective
indemnity, freely transferable to that State.53
6. Search, Attachment, or Seizure

The immunity of consular premises and property from any search, attachment, or execution
was proposed in the ILC Draft,54 in order to accord with the VCDR.55 However, such
immunity was deleted before the text of the VCCR was finalised, in view of the VCCR’s
departure from the absolute immunity approach. In certain circumstances, authorities of
the receiving State may, under the VCCR, enter consular premises without sending State
consent, which right of entry would presume the right of search.56 The abandonment of
immunity from execution or attachment was motivated by a desire to avoid inequity to
creditors if a landlord could defeat their attempts to attach his property by leasing to
consuls.57
In executing search, attachment, or seizure on consular premises or property, however, the
receiving State must not compromise the absolute inviolability of consular archives and
documents, as safeguarded in VCCR Art. 33.
7. Asylum
Prior to the VCCR, there had been no unanimity of view on asylum within consular
premises. Many treaties58 and some national laws and regulations59 (p. 364) explicitly
prohibited consuls from allowing consular premises to be used as places of asylum. In
certain instances, however, a distinction was made between persons fleeing from judicial
and law-enforcement authorities on the one hand, and those eluding mob violence on the
other. The former would be denied asylum, whereas the latter, on humanitarian grounds,
might be granted asylum.60
At the Vienna Conference, the UK proposed: ‘Consular premises shall not be used to afford
asylum to fugitives from justice.’61 By emphasising only ‘fugitives from justice’, the proposal
left open the question of ‘political’ asylum and asylum from mob violence. But even a
proposal of such narrow scope was defeated in the Second Committee by a vote of 46 to 19,
with 4 abstentions.62 Two arguments were advanced for its defeat:
1. The Vienna Conference should refrain from treating a subject the study of which
was being undertaken pursuant to a General Assembly Resolution of 1959. 63
2. The VCDR did not mention asylum. If the VCCR excluded asylum, it might be
deduced a contrario that a right of asylum exists under the VCDR. 64
After defeat of the UK proposal, no provision was written into the VCCR on asylum. In State
practice, a consular right to afford asylum has seldom been invoked. One reason is that
diplomatic missions, whose inviolability is not open to doubt, have been more appropriate
venues for persons seeking asylum. In the few modern instances involving consulates, the
asylum seekers were often removed from the consular premises or turned over to the local
authorities. For example, in the wake of the assassination in Vietnam of President Ngo Dinh
Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, who reportedly ruled
central Vietnam with an iron hand, sought refuge in the US Consulate in Hué. Can was
flown under US escort to Saigon, where he was turned over to the military junta.65 He was
subsequently sentenced to die on the guillotine by (p. 365) a revolutionary court.66 US
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was reported as commenting:
If Can [sic] had sought refuge at the American Embassy in Saigon I would have
given him asylum, as I did when the Buddhist monks sought refuge under Diem’s
Government. But Can went to the American consulate in Hué and consulates have
no authority to grant asylum. The government took him from us and it had a perfect
right to do so.67
In another episode, six South African anti-apartheid activists entered the British Consulate
in Durban, South Africa, on 13 September 1984, seeking temporary refuge. The UK
refrained from evicting them on humanitarian grounds. On 6 October, three of the six left
the consulate voluntarily and were arrested. The next day, one of the three who remained
gave an interview to a reporter, using a radio transmitter smuggled into the building. The
UK sought assurances that the guests would not again seek to engage in political activity,
which it regarded as an abuse of consular premises. However, a statement issued by the
three on 18 October made clear that they intended to continue political activities if they
could. This was followed on 21 October by the UK withdrawing permission for them to
receive visitors, including their lawyers and wives, with the exception of doctors if that
should be necessary.
South Africa retaliated against the British decision not to surrender the six activists, or to
permit South Africa to arrest them in the consulate, by refusing to surrender to the UK four
South African governmental employees charged with offences under the UK Customs and
Excise legislation for their alleged conspiracy to export parts for guided missiles. South
Africa also warned other countries against providing the activists with sanctuary if they left
the British Consulate. The United States subsequently refused to offer the activists
sanctuary.
The three activists left the British Consulate on 12 December. Two were immediately
arrested to face high treason charges, although these charges were later dropped.
Notwithstanding the three-month stay of the three South African activists in the British
Consulate, the British Government, when asked in Parliament to confirm that in
international law there was no right to asylum in consular premises, made clear that
although there had been no specific request for political asylum, the Government’s view
was that there was no such right.68
Four years later, on 13 September 1988, three prominent anti-apartheid activists, who had
been detained for more than a year without charge under (p. 366) South Africa’s state-of-
emergency laws, escaped from a hospital and took refuge in the US Consulate in
Johannesburg. They were granted indefinite sanctuary there. The US Embassy explained
that it had ‘high regard’ for the dissidents and would not press them to leave against their
will. During their stay at the consulate, however, the activists were forbidden to issue press
releases or conduct interviews. The group decided to leave the consulate on 19 October, to
test South Africa’s assurances that they would not be restricted or detained again.69
Although the official position of South Africa was that the three activists were due to be
released anyway, hence the government was ‘not interested’ in them, the case revealed a
change in position by the United States on consular premises as a place of asylum.
In these South Africa cases, asylum in the consular premises was granted de facto by the
UK and de jure by the United States, with their inviolability preserved intact.
In a series of incidents in China in 2002, nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea sought asylum in consulates, seeking to avoid repatriation to the DPRK. A number of
sending States, including Japan and the United States, accepted the individuals and
facilitated their transport via a third country to the Republic of Korea, after the ROK agreed
to receive them. In one incident, Chinese police entered the Japanese Consulate in
Shenyang and forcibly removed a family of five that was seeking asylum. Japan protested
the entry as a violation of consular premises. China responded by saying that Japanese
consular officials on the scene had consented to the entry.70
8. Violence against Consular Premises

Foreign official premises, including consulates, have frequently been picketed to protest the
policies of a sending State.71 In the 1930s, picketers at consulates in Washington DC of
Italy, Poland, and Germany condemned those States for (p. 367) aggression.72 Consulates of
many States have been targets of picketing over a variety of issues.73
On occasion, protests result in physical intrusion into a consulate, or physical damage to
consular premises. A well-known example is the seizure of consular premises in Iran in
1979, described infra in Chapter 28. However, invasions or attacks at consulates stemming
from political protest have been common.
In 1984, in solidarity with the three South African anti-apartheid activists who sought
refuge in the British Consulate in Durban,74 20 people occupied the British Consulate in
Amsterdam.75 In 2003, bombs were detonated outside the British consulate-general in
Istanbul, resulting in mass casualties, including the death of the Consul-General.76 Several
dozen persons were convicted for this bombing, including some with apparent connections
to the Al-Qaeda organisation.77 In 2006, Danish Consulates in many countries were the
object of protest after a Danish newspaper published a cartoon, regarded by many Muslims
as blasphemous, depicting the Prophet Mohammed. In Beirut, Lebanon, protesters set fire
to the Danish Consulate.78 Also in 2006, a suicide car bomber drove into the vehicle of a US
foreign service officer who served as a management officer at the US consulate in Karachi,
Pakistan, just outside the consulate building. The officer and a local employee of the
consulate were killed. (p. 368) Two other Pakistanis were killed and 48 injured, and the
consulate building was damaged.79 The attack was apparently carried out to protest against
US President George Bush, who was scheduled to visit Pakistan that week.80
Even honorary consulates may become objects of protest and violence. In 1988, 25
members of the Kurdistan National Liberation Front occupied the honorary consulate of the
Federal Republic of Germany in Basle, Switzerland, and took hostages. The Swiss riot police
stormed the consulate and freed the hostages.81
In the 1980s, consulates of Chile were a frequent object of protest, and often violence, over
the policies of the Chilean Government of General Augusto Pinochet.82
On occasion, an intrusion into a consulate may be prompted not by hostility towards the
sending State, but by concern over activity occurring in the consulate itself. In 1961, the US
Consulate’s visa office in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, was invaded by Dominicans
who thought that informers of the former Trujillo regime were seeking entry into the United
States. Some of the crowd briefly trapped three men in the office alleged to be informers,
but police arrived and ‘rescued’ the men.83
Violence against a consulate may also result from political turmoil in the sending State and
may present a complicated issue for the receiving State. In 1988 Panama’s Consulate in
London was the scene of violent incidents following its occupation by supporters of Eric
Arturo Delvalle, the recently deposed President of Panama. Panama’s Ambassador in the
UK, Guillermo Vega, supported Panama’s military ruler, General Manuel Noriega. Panama’s
consul, Eduardo Arango, who supported Delvalle, was dismissed by letters from Panama but
ignored them. Ambassador Vega hired a security firm that apparently evicted Consul
Arango from the Panamanian consulate. On 2 March a (p. 369) message was received by
police that a bomb was on the premises. According to the UK Government, ‘There were two
security guards on the premises who were advised in accordance with normal practice that
the decision whether the consulate should be evacuated and searched, with police
assistance, rested with them.’ In fact, the security guards did not request a search but left
of their own volition and the consul moved back in.
A few days later, however, six security guards returned and used a Land Rover to smash
their way into the consulate. Claiming to act in the name of Ambassador Vega, they evicted
Consul Arango and his staff. The UK Foreign Office summoned Ambassador Vega and asked
him to waive his own immunity and answer questions about the incident. The Government
of Panama agreed to waive Vega’s immunity. The British men involved in the raid were
charged with violent disorder, but the case against them was dropped when it emerged that
before their assault they had consulted the Diplomatic Protection Group (a special UK
police unit). The police had kept a watching brief, in the light of the special status of the
consulate.84
Attacks against consular premises, as well as others against diplomatic missions, have led
the UN General Assembly to include on its agenda the item, ‘Consideration of effective
measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular
missions and representatives’. A 1987 General Assembly resolution85 read:
The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General, [A/42/485 and Add.1-5 and
Add.5/Corr.1.]
Emphasising the important role of diplomatic and consular missions and
representatives, as well as of missions and representatives to international
intergovernmental organisations and officials of such organisations, in the
maintenance of international peace and the promotion of friendly relations among
States, and also the need for enhancing global understanding thereof,
Convinced that respect for the principles and rules of international law governing
diplomatic and consular relations, in particular those aimed at ensuring the
inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, is a basic
prerequisite for the normal conduct of relations among States and for the fulfilment
of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Concerned at the continued failure to respect the inviolability of diplomatic and
consular missions and representatives, and at the serious threat presented by such
violations to the maintenance of normal and peaceful international relations which
are necessary for co-operation among States,
Also concerned at the abuse of diplomatic or consular privileges and immunities,
particularly if acts of violence are involved,
(p. 370) Alarmed by the acts of violence against diplomatic and consular
representatives, as well as against representatives to international
intergovernmental organisations and officials of such organisations, which
endanger or take innocent lives and seriously impede the normal work of such
representatives and officials,
Expressing its sympathy for the victims of such illegal acts,
Emphasising the duty of States to take all appropriate steps, as required by
international law:
(a) To protect the premises of diplomatic and consular missions, as well as of

missions to international intergovernmental organisations,
(b) To prevent any attacks on diplomatic and consular representatives, as
well as on representatives to international intergovernmental organisations
and officials of such organisations,
(c) To apprehend the offenders and to bring them to justice,
Noting that, in spite of the call by the General Assembly at its previous sessions, not
all States have yet become parties to the relevant conventions concerning the
inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives,
Welcoming the measures already taken by States in conformity with their
international obligations to enhance the protection, security and safety of
diplomatic and consular missions and representatives,
Convinced that the reporting procedures established under General Assembly
resolution 35/168 of 15 December 1980 and further elaborated in later Assembly
resolutions are important steps in the efforts to enhance the protection, security
and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives,
Welcoming the guidelines [A/42/485, annex.] prepared by the Secretary-General
embodying the relevant questions that States may wish to consider when reporting,
Desiring to maintain and further strengthen the reporting procedures,
1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General;

2. Strongly condemns acts of violence against diplomatic and consular
missions and representatives, as well as against missions and representatives
to international intergovernmental organisations and officials of such
organisations, and emphasises that such acts can never be justified;
3. Emphasises the importance of enhanced awareness throughout the world
of the necessity of ensuring the protection, security and safety of such
missions, representatives and officials, as well as of the role of the United
Nations in this regard;
4. Urges States to observe and to implement the principles and rules of
international law governing diplomatic and consular relations and, in
particular, to take all necessary measures in conformity with their
international obligations to ensure effectively the protection, security and
safety of all diplomatic and consular missions and representatives officially
present in territory under their jurisdiction, including practicable measures to
prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and
organisations that encourage, instigate, organise or engage in the
perpetration of acts against the security and safety of such missions and
representatives;
(p. 371) 5. Calls upon States to take all necessary measures at the national
and international levels to prevent any acts of violence against diplomatic and
consular missions and representatives, as well as against missions and
representatives to international intergovernmental organisations and officials
of such organisations, and, in accordance with national law and international
treaties, to prosecute or extradite those who perpetrate such acts;
6. Recommends that States should co-operate closely through, inter alia,
contacts between the diplomatic and consular missions and the receiving
State, with regard to practical measures designed to enhance the protection,
security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives
and with regard to exchange of information on the circumstances of all
serious violations thereof;
7. Calls upon States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to
the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic
and consular missions and representatives;
8. Calls upon States, in cases where a dispute arises in connection with a
violation of the principles and rules of international law concerning the
inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, to make
use of the means for peaceful settlement of disputes, including the good
offices of the Secretary-General, and requests the Secretary-General to offer,
when he deems it appropriate, his good offices to the States directly
concerned;
9. Requests:
(a) All States to report to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible

serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic
and consular missions and representatives, as well as missions and
representatives with diplomatic status to international
intergovernmental organisations;
(b) The State in which the violation took place—and, to the extent
possible, the State where the alleged offender is present—to report to
the Secretary-General as promptly as possible on measures taken to
bring the offender to justice and eventually to communicate, in
accordance with its laws, the final outcome of the proceedings against
the offender, and to report on measures adopted with a view to
preventing a repetition of such violations;
(c) The States so reporting to consider using or taking into account the
guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General;
10. Requests the Secretary-General:
(a) To circulate to all States, upon receipt, the reports received by him
pursuant to paragraph 9 above, unless the reporting State requests
otherwise;
(b) To draw the attention, when appropriate, of the States directly
concerned to the reporting procedures provided for in paragraph 9
above, when a serious violation has been reported pursuant to subparagraph
9 (a) above;
(c) To address reminders to States where such violations have occurred
if reports pursuant to subparagraph 9 (a) above or follow-up reports
pursuant to subparagraph 9 (b) above have not been made within a
reasonable period of time;
(d) To send, in due time before the issuance of his yearly report on the
present item, a circular note to all States requesting them to indicate
whether they have any such violations, as referred to in subparagraph 9
(a) above, to report for the preceding twelve months;
(p. 372) 11. Also requests the Secretary-General to invite States to inform
him of their views with respect to any measures needed to enhance the
protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and
representatives;
12. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General
Assembly at its forty-third session a report containing:
(a) Information on the State of ratification of, and accessions to, the
instruments referred to in paragraph 7 above;
(b) The reports received and views expressed pursuant to paragraphs 9
and 11 above;
13. Invites the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its
forty-third session any views he may wish to express on the matters referred
to in paragraph 12 above;
14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the
item entitled ‘Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection,
security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives:
report of the Secretary-General’.
94th plenary meeting

7 December 1987
Annex
Guidelines embodying the relevant questions that States may wish to consider when
reporting serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and
consular missions and representatives, as well as of missions and representatives
with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organisations [Prepared
by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 41/78 and
circulated to all States under cover of a note verbale from the Secretary-General
dated 10 June 1987.]
1. Time, date and location of the reported violation.

2. Characteristics of the reported violation.
3. Mission(s) or representative(s) against whom the reported violation was
directed.
4. Casualties sustained and damage caused by the reported violation.
5. Name, nationality, place of habitual or permanent residence of the alleged
offender(s) and other available information regarding the identity of such
offender(s).
6. Devices and means used for carrying out the reported violation.
7. Accomplices of the alleged offender(s).
8. Measures taken to apprehend and to bring the alleged offender to justice.
9. Final outcome of the proceedings against the offender.
10. Assistance of other States directly concerned in connection with the
proceedings brought in respect of the offence(s) committed.
11. Measures adopted with a view to preventing a repetition of the reported
violation.
12. Other relevant information.
(p. 373) The UN Secretary-General has continued to collect data on incidents of violence
against consulates.86
Trespass on the premises of foreign consulates or diplomatic missions is a criminal offence
under the domestic law of many States. The UK Criminal Law Act 197787 provides that ‘a
person who enters or is on any premises to which this section applies as a trespasser is
guilty of an offence’. The premises covered include consular premises as defined in VCCR
Art. 1(j). Prosecution for offences of this type, or prosecution under a general trespass
statute, may constitute part of the reparation made to the sending State when a receiving
State has failed in its obligation to protect consular premises.
9. Protection against Picketing

Receiving States are typically attentive to their obligation to protect consulates when they
are the object of protest. Tunisian police in 1957 dispersed crowds that were planning to
march on France’s Consulate to protest France’s insistence on a right to pursue Algerian
rebels across the Algerian border into Tunisia.88 In 2006, when Danish consulates were
besieged in many countries, local police typically were dispatched to maintain order and
ensure against violence.
Protests at consulates present a dilemma for a receiving State. Receiving States are
required, as a human rights matter, to allow peaceful assembly and free speech.89 At the
same time, they are entitled to preserve public order and, moreover, are under a duty to
protect consulates against intrusion or damage and to prevent disturbance of their peace or
impairment of their dignity.90 This obligation may be reflected in special domestic laws, or it
may be left to the police in the circumstances of each case.
In 1937, a Joint Resolution was introduced in the US Senate to protect foreign diplomatic
and consular officers and premises in the District of Columbia. It read:
it shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard or device designed or

adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government,
party, or organisation, or any officer or officers thereof, or to bring into public
disrepute political, social, or economic acts, views or purposes of any foreign
government, party, or organisation, (p. 374) or to intimidate, coerce, harass or bring
into public disrepute any officer or officers or diplomatic or consular
representatives of any foreign government, within 500 feet of any building or
premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign
government or its representative or representatives as an embassy, legation,
consulate, or for other official purposes, except by, and in accordance with, a permit
issued by the superintendent of police of the said District; or to congregate within
500 feet of any such building or premises, and refuse to disperse after having been
ordered so to do by the police authorities of the said District.91
Although this Resolution was opposed by the House of Representatives in 1937, it was
adopted in 1938.92 Under the Resolution, several persons were convicted of picketing at the
German Embassy in Washington DC with placards containing language critical of the
German Government. The defendants challenged the Resolution as abridging freedom of
assembly and speech. The US Court of Appeals affirmed these convictions, holding that
Congress has ‘not only the power to define and punish offences against the law of nations,
but also all the police power of a State in relation to the District of Columbia’.93
Publicist opinion on the protection against picketing was summed up by Preuss:
Although picketing may not, in the present state of the law, occasion an immediate
international responsibility, failure to take adequate steps to prevent it would be of
strong evidential value in proving a lack of due diligence in fulfilling the duties of
protection in the event that attacks upon foreign officers or their premises should
take place.94
The VCCR would seem to support this view. It does not require a receiving State to prevent
picketing. However, if violence ensues under circumstances in which it might have been
anticipated, the sending State may protest for lack of compliance with the VCCR Art. 31(3)
obligation to protect, or the VCCR Art. 40 obligation to protect consuls.
In contrast to the absolute ban on picketing within 500 feet of diplomatic or consular
premises in the District of Columbia imposed prior to the adoption of the two Vienna
Conventions, restriction became less rigid after adoption of the (p. 375) two Conventions.
Thus, a rule later adopted to apply in the United States outside the District of Columbia
applies only to the area within 100 feet and takes into account the nature of picketing—
whether peaceful and orderly or intimidating and threatening:
Whoever within the United States but outside the District of Columbia and within
one hundred feet of any building or premises belonging to or used or occupied by a
foreign government or by a foreign official for diplomatic or consular purposes, or
as a mission to an international organisation, or as a residence of a foreign official,
or belonging to or used or occupied by an international organisation for official
business or residential purposes, publicly—
(1) parades, pickets, displays any flag, banner, sign, placard, or device, or
utters any word, phrase, sound, or noise, for the purpose of intimidating,
coercing, threatening, or harassing any foreign official or obstructing him in
the performance of his duties, or
(2) congregates with two or more other persons with the intent to perform
any of the aforesaid acts or to violate subsection (a) or (b) of this section, shall
be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both.
In response to an inquiry from the Philippines, relating to a demonstration near the

Philippines Consulate in San Francisco, Louis G. Fields, Jr., Assistant Legal Adviser for
Special Functional Problems of the Department of State, wrote to the Philippines
Ambassador on 31 July 1975:
The statute permits peaceful and orderly demonstrations within one hundred feet of
a diplomatic establishment, when such demonstration does not obstruct the conduct
of business at those protected premises. In the instance of your San Francisco
consulate, it would appear from the photographs that the demonstrators did
obstruct free access to the consular office and in such a case there would be a
violation of the statute.95
Attached to the letter was a communication from the Department of Justice:
Although there is no prohibition against a peaceful orderly demonstration within

100 feet of a consulate, intentional blocking of access thereto is a violation of 18
USC 112 in our view. Thus police authorities on the scene should not tolerate any
such interference. If the demonstrators do not heed cautionary instructions as to
free access or do otherwise evidence an intent to violate the cited statute, we would
expect the police to require the demonstrators to shift their activity 100 feet away
from the premises and, particularly if requested by Federal authorities, to make
such arrests for State or Federal violations as may serve to preserve or restore
order.96
In 1976 the Congress repealed the anti-picketing provision altogether for places outside the
District of Columbia, leaving in place only the prohibition on wilful acts or attempts to
‘intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign official’ under 18 USC §112(b)(2).
(p. 376) In 1978 the Soviet Embassy complained to the Department of State about two
demonstrations near the Soviet Consulate-General in San Francisco. The Department
replied:
The Department understands from San Francisco authorities that the Consulate
General was informed of the demonstration in advance. The San Francisco
authorities took steps to insure that the normal functioning of the Consulate
General would not be interrupted by approving the event on a Sunday, normally a
non-working day for the Consulate General.
The Department of State confirms that the events referred to in the Embassy’s note
were of a peaceful nature. Under US law the demonstration was not illegal, since it
was of a peaceful nature and there was no intent to violate any provision of … [18
USC 112].
The Department of State reiterates its earlier and continuing assurances to the
Embassy of the USSR that as the host country the United States will continue to
take the necessary measures to safeguard Soviet properties and personnel in San
Francisco.97
Responding to a proposal to repeal §22-1115 and to amend 18 USC §112 to include the
District of Columbia, a sense-of-the-Congress resolution stated in §1302 of the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986:
(1) [T]he District of Columbia law concerning demonstrations near foreign

missions in the District of Columbia (D. C. Code, sec. 22-1115) may be inconsistent
with the reasonable exercise of the rights of free speech and assembly, that law may
have been selectively enforced, and peaceful demonstrators may have been unfairly
arrested under the law;
(2) the obligation of the United States to provide adequate security for the
missions and personnel of foreign governments must be balanced with the
reasonable exercise of the rights of free speech and assembly; and
(3) therefore, the Council of the District of Columbia should review and, if
appropriate, make revisions in the laws of the District of Columbia concerning
demonstrations near foreign missions, in consultation with the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of the Treasury.98
The District of Columbia Government subsequently decided to repeal §22-1115, contingent,

however, on Congress’s extension of §112 to the District.99 The constitutional issues
relating to anti-picketing measures were not resolved until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Boos et al. v. Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia.100 Petitioners were three individuals
who wished to carry signs critical of the Governments of the USSR and Nicaragua on the
public sidewalks within 500 feet of the embassies of these Governments in Washington, DC.
Bridget M. Brooker and Michael Boos wished to display signs in front of the Soviet Embassy
(p. 377) stating ‘RELEASE SAKHAROV’ and ‘SOLIDARITY’. J. Michael Waller wished to display a
sign within 500 feet of the Nicaraguan Embassy reading ‘STOP THE KILLING’. All of them
wished to congregate with two or more other persons within 500 feet of these embassies.
Asserting that DC Code §22-1115 (1981) prohibited them from engaging in these expressive
activities, they, together with respondent Father R. David Finzer, challenged the provision
as a violation of freedom of speech. The United States intervened as amicus curiae in
support of the constitutionality of the statute.
The US District Court for the District of Columbia granted respondents’ motion for
summary judgment, relying upon Frend v. United States.101 A divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.102 The Court of Appeals considered the
display clause and the congregation clause of §22-1115 separately. With respect to the
display clause, the court concluded that it was a content-based restriction on speech.
Nevertheless, the court found it constitutional because of a compelling governmental
interest. As for the congregation clause, the court concluded that it was constitutionally
valid but that it should be construed to authorise an order to disperse ‘only when the police
reasonably believe that a threat to the security or peace of the embassy is present’.
In reviewing the case, the US Supreme Court said that 18 USC §112 was enacted to
implement the international obligations of the United States, and that its exclusion of the
District of Columbia from its reach was due to misinformation supplied to the Congress that
a ‘similar’ statute already applied inside the District. In fact, however, §112 was different
from §22-1115 in two constitutionally significant ways. In the words of the Supreme Court:
First and foremost, §112 is not narrowly directed at the content of speech but at any
activity, including speech, that has the prohibited effects. Moreover, §112, unlike
§22-1115, does not prohibit picketing; it only prohibits activity undertaken to
‘intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass.’ Indeed, unlike the display clause, even the
repealed antipicketing portion of §112 permitted peaceful picketing.
In its conclusion, the Supreme Court stated:
We conclude that the display clause of §22-1115 is unconstitutional on its face. It is

a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, and it is not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling State interest. We also conclude that the
congregation clause, as narrowed by the Court of Appeals, is not facially
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part.103
Barely one day after the Supreme Court struck down the restrictive District of Columbia
law banning all demonstrations within 500 feet of foreign embassies and consulates, tests
were made to ascertain the permissive limits of the decision. Twelve members of Jewish
groups from Washington and New York, (p. 378) joined by two US senators, moved the issue
from the legal pages to 16th Street, Northwest, Washington. On 23 March 1988, the 12
demonstrators, along with 13 police officers and uniformed Secret Service agents, and 26
reporters and photographers, assembled outside the Soviet Embassy. No objection was
made by the police to the group’s speech-making, chanting, praying, stuffing the mailbox
attached to the embassy with leaflets, and even offering leaflets to and shouting short
messages at three Soviet diplomats leaving the embassy. However, when a rabbi-
demonstrator blocked the path of another group of exiting Soviet diplomats, the police
intervened.104
The District of Columbia anti-picketing law had been invoked against demonstrations not
only near foreign missions, but also in front of the Department of State. Thus, in a
memorandum dated 11 September 1987, Louis Schwartz, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Diplomatic Security, stated that the main building of the Department in Foggy Bottom
would be designated a foreign diplomatic mission during a planned visit by Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on 15 September. Protests against Shevardnadze over
human rights issues in the USSR were anticipated.
To Senator Jesse Helms, such action amounted to raising a ‘red flag’ over Department and
violated the constitutional rights of protestors. Subsequently, the Senate by a vote of 90 to 7
approved an amendment to the defence bill to prohibit the Department from ever again
declaring itself to be a foreign diplomatic mission.105
The balancing of the protection of diplomatic and consular premises and the right of
peaceful assembly and speech was given careful consideration by the UK after a
demonstration outside the premises of the Libyan People’s Bureau (accepted as premises of
their diplomatic mission). A British policewoman who had been policing the demonstration
was shot and killed by a machine gun fired from within the premises.106 The UK
conclusions, in the light of the Report by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
on the Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, were set forth in the 1985 Review of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations:
(e) we have also considered whether new measures are required to prevent
demonstrations disrupting the peace of diplomatic missions or impairment of their
dignity (as required under Article 22), or becoming so provocative as to lead to violent
incidents. The Government fully share the Committee’s view (paras 45–52) that the
UK’s duty to protect the peace of diplomatic missions cannot be interpreted so widely
that no demonstrations are allowed outside them. The Government also agree with
the Committee that the essential requirements are that the work of the mission
should not be disrupted, that mission staff are not put in fear, and that there is free
access for both staff and visitors. How (p. 379) each demonstration is policed in order
to ensure that these requirements are met without undue infringement of freedom of
speech is primarily a matter for the police. There are some 350 demonstrations a year
outside embassies in London. In most cases the police keep demonstrators on the
opposite side of the road from a mission so the question of Article 22 being breached
seldom arises. But the practice varies in special circumstances (such as the holding of
a function at the embassy). The police are the best judges in each case of the controls
required: how to preserve the peace and dignity of a mission is essentially a matter of
sensible policing practice rather than a question of law. Only rarely will consultation
with the Home Office and the FCO be required, e.g. at time of increased tension. The
police already have powers to deal with demonstrations and marches outside mission
premises. These include their statutory powers under the Public Order Act 1936 to
control marches which may result in serious public disorder and to prevent
obstruction of the highway. 107
10. Exceptional Circumstances

Under the VCCR, the duty to protect a consular post continues even in the event of its
temporary or permanent closure,108 the severance of consular relations, or even armed
conflict between the sending and receiving States.109 The premises, along with consular
archives and property, must be respected by the receiving State. They may be entrusted to
the custody of a third State acceptable to the receiving State,110 or to another consular post
of the sending State in the receiving State, if there is one, in the event of the closure of a
post.111
11. Honorary Consulates
Consular premises in the charge of an honorary consul are entitled under the VCCR to a
reduced level of protection.112 They are protected against intrusion, damage, disturbance of
the peace, or impairment of dignity. But receiving State authorities may enter for any
legitimate purpose without the consent of the honorary consul, in the same way as they can
enter any private residence or building. This is a far cry from the degree of inviolability
proposed by the ILC Draft:113 ‘The premises of a consulate headed by an honorary consul
shall be inviolable, provided that they are used exclusively for the exercise of consular
functions. In this case the agents of the receiving State may not enter the premises except
(p. 380) with the consent of the head of post.’ This approach was rejected at the Vienna
Conference.
The VCCR’s near assimilation of honorary consular premises with private residences case
may be justified, however, on the grounds that honorary consuls, many of whom are
nationals of the receiving State, are often engaged in a private gainful occupation that
cannot properly be excluded from supervision by the State. Moreover, secret information is
less likely to be entrusted to an honorary consul by a sending State.
12. Beginning and End of Inviolability

Unlike the elaborate provisions in VCCR Art. 53 specifying the beginning and end of the
privileges and immunities of members of consular posts and their families, no provision
covers the beginning and end of the inviolability of consular premises. And yet the subject
matter is of practical concern.
The matter was disputed in the context of a 2007 incident in Iraq that may have constituted
intrusion into consular premises. US military forces operating in Iraq attacked an Iranian
government facility in the Iraqi city of Erbil, detaining five employees on suspicion of
involvement with insurgent forces in Iraq. The assault would clearly have violated the
inviolability of consular premises, if indeed the facility was properly viewed as consular
premises. The United States maintained that the facility had no consular status and did not
enjoy inviolability. Iran, along with Iraqi central and provincial authorities, viewed the
facility as enjoying such status, even though it was a new facility and its status had
apparently not officially been determined by the central government. Employees of the
facility apparently had been processing work documents, which is activity of a consular
type. Iraq said that the Iranian office operated with Iraqi government approval and was in
process of being approved as a consulate.114
(p. 381) Any one of a number of points in time might, in principle, be regarded as the
commencement of inviolability. It might date from purchase or lease by the sending State. It
might date from actual exclusive use for consular purposes. It might date from notification
by the sending State of its possession or use of the premises to the authorities of the
receiving State. If a building is to be constructed or converted for consular purposes, the
question arises as to whether inviolability begins only upon completion of interior
installation and commencement of use, or at an earlier time?
As to a termination date, possible points in time are the date of the expiry of the lease, the
vacating of the premises, or the receipt of notification by the authorities of the receiving
State that the premises are no longer used for consular purposes.
ILC deliberations on diplomatic privileges and immunities shed light on the various possible
approaches to the beginning and end of inviolability in regard to the analogous concept in
diplomatic law, referred to as franchise de l’hôtel (immunity of premises).
Professor Verdross stressed the importance of knowing when franchise de l’hôtel
commenced: whether at the time the sending State bought or leased premises to be used
for diplomatic purpose, or whether at the time the mission entered into possession.115 Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice suggested that inviolability began from the time premises were put at
the disposal of the mission.116 Roberto Ago, on the other hand, placed emphasis on the
practice of the sending State to notify the receiving State that certain premises had been
acquired for the use of its mission, with inviolability thus dating from the time such
notification reached the receiving State.117 After noting a similar notification requirement
in Art. 3 of the Harvard Research Draft on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities,118 Ago
proposed: ‘The premises of the mission shall be inviolable from the time of (p. 382)
notification to the receiving State that they are being used for the purposes of the
mission.’119
Notwithstanding considerable support for Ago’s proposal among ILC members, the VCDR
does not specify when the inviolability of premises begins or ends.120 Nor does the VCCR.
Three other VCCR provisions, however, may shed light on the issue. VCCR Art. 1(j) defines
‘consular premises’ as ‘the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto,
irrespective of ownership, used exclusively for the purposes of the consular post’ (emphasis
added). VCCR Art. 14 requires a receiving State to ‘immediately notify the competent
authorities of the consular district’ of the admission of the head of a consular post to the
exercise of his functions and to ‘ensure that the necessary measures are taken to enable the
head of a consular post to carry out the duties of his office and to have the benefit of the
provisions of the present Convention’. VCCR Art. 53(3) provides:
When the functions of a member of the consular post have come to an end, his
privileges and immunities … shall normally cease at the moment when the person
concerned leaves the receiving State or on the expiry of a reasonable period in
which to do so (emphasis added).
As applied to the duration of the inviolability of consular premises, these three provisions
justify the following as reasonable general rules: (a) The inviolability of consular premises
dates from the notification to the authorities of the receiving State that premises have been
acquired for the exclusive use of consular purposes. Such notification is essential to the
receiving State so that it can take necessary measures to secure inviolability. (b) If the
notification is not followed by actual exclusive use for consular purposes within a
reasonable time, the premises lose inviolability. (c) Inviolability ends when the receiving
State is notified that the premises are no longer used for consular purposes. (d) Even in the
absence of notification, inviolability ends after a reasonable time in which the premises
cease to be used exclusively for consular purposes.
The question of fixing a precise beginning or end to consular status of premises arises most
often in the context of relief from property taxes. Receiving States typically accept
notification by the sending State as determining when premises begin or cease to be ‘used
exclusively for the work of the consular post’.
The United Kingdom dealt by legislation with the issue of the beginning and end of status as
diplomatic or consular premises. Study was first undertaken, resulting in 1985 in concepts
described in the Government’s Review of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations:
(d) The Government has under active consideration proposals for legislation to
control in exceptional circumstances the acquisition and disposal of diplomatic
premises (p. 383) in London. The proposals now under consideration would enable the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs:
(i) to require diplomatic missions to obtain his express consent before office
premises acquired by them, or following a change of use, could be regarded as
premises ‘used for the purposes of the mission’, and therefore entitled under
the Diplomatic Privileges Act to inviolability and rating relief;
(ii) to provide that such consent could be withdrawn in respect of existing
premises in certain circumstances and that the premises would then cease after
a specified period to be premises of the mission (with consequent loss of
inviolability and rating relief);
(iii) to acquire the title, after a further specified period, of premises formerly
used for the purposes of a diplomatic mission which the Government concerned
refused to dispose of (with a view to selling the premises and remitting the
proceeds to the foreign Government in question).
The Government regard these proposals as fully consistent with all their obligations under
the Vienna Convention. We have made careful comparisons with laws and practice of other
countries and in particular the United States Foreign Missions Act 1982.
Two years later these intentions were turned into legislation, with the adoption of the
Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act 1987.121 The Act defined which land constitutes
diplomatic or consular premises and vested the Government with power to sell lands
formerly used as diplomatic or consular premises:
1.—(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, where a State desires that land shall
be diplomatic or consular premises, it shall apply to the Secretary of State for
his consent to the land being such premises.
(2) A State need not make such an application in relation to land if the
Secretary of State accepted it as diplomatic or consular premises
immediately before the coming into force of this section.
(3) In no case is land to be regarded as a State’s diplomatic or consular
premises for the purposes of any enactment or rule of law unless it has
been so accepted or the Secretary of State has given that State consent
under this section in relation to it; and if—
(a) a State ceases to use land for the purposes of its mission or
exclusively for the purposes of a consular post; or
(b) the Secretary of State withdraws his acceptance or consent in
relation to land, it thereupon ceases to be diplomatic or consular
premises for the purposes of all enactments and rules of law.
(4) The Secretary of State shall only give or withdraw consent or

withdraw acceptance if he is satisfied that to do so is permissible under
international law.
(5) In determining whether to do so he shall have regard to all material
considerations, and in particular, but without prejudice to the generality
of this subsection—
(a) to the safety of the public;

(b) to national security; and
(c) to town and country planning.
(p. 384) (6) If a State intends to cease using land as premises of its
mission or as consular premises, it shall give the Secretary of State
notice of that intention, specifying the date on which it intends to cease
so using them.
(7) In any proceedings a certificate issued by or under the authority of
the Secretary of State stating any fact relevant to the question whether
or not land was at any time diplomatic or consular premises shall be
conclusive of that fact. 122
Footnotes:
1
Angelo Piero Sereni, Italian Conception of International Law (1943), p. 335.
2
Heirs of the Late Moshe Shavaco v. Roger Hylan, 9 Psakim (District Court), p. 502.
3
UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.8, 11 Mar. 1963, p. 2; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec., 299.
4
ILC Draft, Art. 30.
5
UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.7, 8 Mar, 1963, p. 7; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec., 298.
6
See e.g. US Consular Conventions with Sweden, 1910, Art. 6; with Austria, 1928, Art. 16;
with Liberia, 1938, Art. 2; with Mexico, 1942, Art. 2(1); with the Philippines, 1947, Art. 2(1);
and with Costa Rica, 1948, Art. 18.
7
See e.g. US Consular Conventions with USSR, 1964, Art. 17; with China, 1980, Art. 10.
8
Art. 13(2).
9
Art. 7(1).
10
Art. 7(1).
11
Lee, pp. 242–4; 19 Dept. of State Bulletin 253–5, 408 (1948); Lawrence Preuss,
‘Consular Immunities: The Kasenkina Case’, 43 AJIL 46 (1949).
12
US Consular Conventions with Ireland, 1950, Art. 8(4); with Iran, 1955, Art. 13(2) (no
mention regarding the role of the Secretary of State); with Korea, 1963, Art. 3(1) (no
mention regarding the role of the Secretary of State); and with Japan, 1963, Art. 8(4).
13
UK Consular Conventions with Norway, 1951, Art. 10(4); with Sweden, 1952, Art. 10(3);
with Greece, 1953, Art. 10(3); with Mexico, 1954, Art. 10(3); with Italy, 1954, Art. 10(2);
with the Federal Republic of Germany, 1956, Art. 8(3); with Austria, 1960, Art. 11(1); with
Belgium, 1961, Art. 16(1); with Spain, 1961, Art. 9(4); with Denmark, 1962, Art. 9(3); and
with Japan, 1964, Art. 11(5).
14
France Consular Conventions with the UK, 1951, Art. 11(1); with Italy, 1955, Art. 11;
and with Sweden, 1955, Art. 13.
15
ILC Draft, Art. 30.
16
Statement by USSR, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.8, 11 Mar. 1963, p. 3; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec.,
299.
17
Ibid.
18
Statements by Cuba, Belgium, Kuwait, Liberia, Brazil, Norway, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.
7, 8 Mar. 1963, pp. 4–7; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec., 297–8. See further statement by Norway, UN
Doc. a/conf.25/sr.8, 11 Apr. 1963, p. 9; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec., 23.
19
Statement by Czechoslovakia, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.8, 11 Mar. 1963, pp. 7–8; 1
Vienna, Off. Rec., 301.
20
11 UNTS 26.
21
Statement by USSR, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.8, 11 Mar. 1963, pp. 3–4; 1 Vienna, Off.
Rec., 299–300.
22
Ibid.
23
Statement by Thailand, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.8, 11 Mar. 1963, p. 4; 1 Vienna, Off.
Rec., 300.
24
Statement by Poland, UN Doc. a/conf.25/sr.8, 11 Apr. 1963, p. 7; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec., 22.
25
Statement by France, UN Doc. a/conf.25/sr.8, 11 Apr. 1963, pp. 4–5; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec.,
21.
26
Statement by Austria, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.7, 8 Mar. 1963, p . 8; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec.,
298.
27
Statement by Portugal, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.8, 11 Mar. 1963, p. 2; 1 Vienna, Off.
Rec., 299.
28
Statement by Ireland, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.9, 11 Mar. 1963, pp. 3–4; 1 Vienna, Off.
Rec., 303.
29
UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/l.71.
30
31
32
33
34
In 1948, after Great Britain ordered that shacks in the ancient section of Kowloon be
removed for health reasons and that 300 of the 2,000 inhabitants be evicted, a
demonstration erupted in Canton (now Guangzhou) during which the British consular office
and residence were destroyed by fire; bodily injuries were inflicted upon six Britons,
including a vice-consul and a press attaché and his secretary; and damage was done to the
Danish and Dutch consulates as well as to the residence of a US military attaché. The
Times, 17 Jan. 1948, p. 4e; New York Times, 17 Jan. 1948, p. 8, cols. 6, 7.
When Great Britain extended de jure recognition to the People’s Republic of China in Jan.
1950, its consulate in Tamsui was repeatedly attacked by mobs that twice pulled down the
British flag. The Times, 11 Jan. 1950, p. 6g; 18 Apr. 1951, p. 6a.
Fifty African Rhodesians who in vain sought absentee ballots for the elections in Northern
Rhodesia from British consuls damaged the British Consulate-General in Elisabethville
(Katanga) and injured the Consul-General and a Vice-Consul. New York Times, 31 Oct.
1962, p. 5, col. 7.
The announcement by British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys that an area claimed by
Somalia would become one of independent Kenya’s seven provinces caused crowds to
attack the British Consulate in Hargeisa, former capital of British Somaliland. Times
Magazine, 22 Mar. 1963, p. 28.
35
26 AJIL 52 (Sup. 1932).
36
Denza, Diplomatic Law, p. 121.
37
See e.g. UK-People’s Republic of China, 1984, Art. 3. The enabling provision is in para. 5
of Schedule 2 to the Consular Relations Act 1968 (c. 18).
38
Russian Federation-Pakistan 1997, Art. 13(2).
39
See e.g. Yin-Tso Hsiung v. Toronto [1950] 4 DLR 209; Annual Digest, 1950, Case 40.
Some treaties specifically prohibit the use of force by a receiving State against either
consular offices or the living quarters of consuls. See e.g. Czechoslovakia Consular
Conventions with Bulgaria, 1959, Art. 6(2), and with Romania, 1960, Art. 7(2).
40
Emphasis supplied.
41
Emphasis supplied.
42
Emphasis supplied.
43
Such a provision is, for example, included in the Poland-Czechoslovakia Consular
Convention, 1960, Art. 6(2).
44
United States Regulations, III-2, n. 1(b)(d), implied in 1 FSM I 232.2.
45
Switzerland, Règles (Dec. 1952), II-3(a).
46
France, Manuel (1946), I, pp. 29–30.
47
See 1 Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 842–3; 2 Hyde International Law, p. 1340.
48
For treaties concluded before 1932, see Harvard Research Draft, pp. 345–6. For
post-1932 treaties, see Italy-Latvia, 1932, Art. 9; Poland-Bulgaria, 1934, Art. 8(1);
Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union, 1935, Art. 9(4); Poland-Hungary, 1936, Art. 8(1); US-Liberia,
1938, Art. 2; US-Mexico, 1942, Art. 2(1); US-Philippines, 1947, Art. 2(1). A few post-1948
treaties also take this approach: France-Italy 1955, Art. 12; France-Sweden, 1955, Art. 14;
Hungary-German Democratic Republic, 1957, Art. 8(2). See also the ILC Draft, Art. 31(3).
49
See US-Ireland, 1950, Art. 9; UK-Norway, 1951, Art. 11; US-UK, 1951, Art. 9; UK-France,
1951, Art. 12; UK-Sweden, 1952, Art. 11; UK-Greece, 1953, Art. 11; UK-Mexico, 1954, Art.
11; UK-Italy, 1954, Art. 11; UK-Federal Republic of Germany, 1956, Art. 9. Cf. Poland-
German Democratic Republic, 1957, Art. 13(2).
50
22 Dept. of State Bulletin 119 (1950).
51
52
UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.9, 11 Mar. 1963, pp. 8–9; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec., 304–5.
53
Italy-Argentina, 1987, Art. 31.
54
Art. 30(3) and Commentary (7).
55
Art. 22(3).
56
See UK statement, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.9, 11 Mar. 1963, pp. 8–9; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec.,
304–5.
57
Ibid.
58
See similar provisions in US-Ireland, 1950, Art. 8(5); UK-Norway, 1951, Art. 19(5); UK-
France, 1951, Art. 11(2); UK-Sweden, 1952, Art. 10(4); UK-Greece, 1953, Art. 19(4); UK-
Mexico, 1954, Art. 10(4); UK-Italy, 1954, Art. 19(3); UK-Federal Republic of Germany, 1956,
Art. 8(4).
Compare the above with the following treaties without enforcement provisions: Italy-Latvia,
1932, Art. 7; Poland-Bulgaria, 1934, Art. 5; Czechoslovakia-USSR, 1935, Art. 7; Poland-
Hungary, 1936, Art. 5; US-Philippines, 1947, Art. 6(2); Greece-Lebanon, 1948, Art. 15;
Philippines-Spain, 1948, Art. 9(4); France-Italy, 1955, Art. 11; France-Sweden, 1955, Art.
13.
59
Argentine laws, for example, specifically deny consuls such a right on the ground that
consuls themselves are subject to local civil and criminal jurisdiction. Argentina,
Reglamento Consular (1947), I, Art. 8-F-13. Hence, Argentine consuls are instructed to
surrender to the local authorities any fugitives seeking asylum in Argentine consulates.
Ibid. Art. 8-D-7. See also Honduras, Act No. 109 of 14 Mar. 1906, Art. 36.
60
Graham H. Stewart, Consular Privileges and Immunities (1926), p. 89.
61
Para. 5 of the UK amendments to Art. 30, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/l.29.
62
UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.10, 12 Mar. 1963, p. 7; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec., 308.
63
Statements by the Chairman and by Czechoslovakia, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.10, 12
Mar. 1963, p. 6; 1 Vienna, Off. Rec., 308. On 14 Oct. 1959, the Sixth Committee of the UN
General Assembly adopted by a roll-call vote of 63 to 1, with 12 abstentions, a proposal of El
Salvador (UN Doc. a/c.6/l.443) requesting the ILC to codify international law relating to the
right of asylum ‘as soon as it considers it advisable’. See also Lee, ‘Jurisdiction over Foreign
Merchant Ships in the Territorial Sea’, 55 AJIL 92 (1961).
64
Statement by France, UN Doc. a/conf.25/c.2/sr.10, 12 Mar. 1963, p. 3; 1 Vienna, Off.
Rec., 307.
65
New York Times, 25 Dec. 1963, p. 1.
66
New York Times, 23 Apr. 1964, p. 2. His appeal for clemency to the Chief of State, Maj.-
Gen. Duong Van Minh, was rejected. New York Times, 6 May 1964, p. 6.
67
Associated Press dispatch from Saigon, Durham Morning Herald (Durham, North
Carolina), 7 May 1964, p. 6A.
68
Hansard H. C. Debates, vol. 65, cols. 559–62, 23 Oct. 1984. See also The Times, 7 Oct.
1984, p. 1d; 5 Oct., p. 10f; 13 Dec., p. 1f.
69
See Washington Post, 14 Sept. 1988, p. A1; 22 Sept. 1988, p. A42; 19 Oct. 1988, p. A31.
70
Michael A. Lev, ‘China, Japan in feud over N. Koreans’, Chicago Tribune, 15 May 2002,
p. N8; Shao Zongwei, ‘Japan urged to take a responsible attitude’, China Daily, 24 May
2002; Harvey Stockwin, ‘Refugees leave, Sino-Japanese impasse remains’, Times of India,
25 May 2002.
71
See E. C. Stowell, ‘The Joint Resolution Prohibiting the Picketing of Diplomatic and
Consular Premises in the District of Columbia’, 32 AJIL 344–6 (1938); see also Lawrence
Preuss, ‘Protection of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Premises against Picketing’, 31 AJIL
705–12 (1937). Examining Sir Ernest Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice (3rd ed. 1932),
and Raoul Genet’s Traité de diplomatie et de droit diplomatique (1931), Preuss found no
material on this subject. In US For. Rel., he found only one case dealing with the picketing
of foreign consular premises: For. Rel., 1911, pp. 481, 485 (see Preuss, p. 708 n. 10).
72
See report of Inspector Kelly of the District of Columbia Police Department on the
picketing of the Italian, Polish, and German Embassies in Washington, 81 Cong. Rec., No.
152, p. 10896. The Polish aggression apparently referred to the Polish demand for and
occupation of Teschen and other areas from Czechoslovakia at the time of Germany’s
annexation of parts of Czechoslovakia. Following its occupation of Teschen, Poland ordered
the departure of Czechoslovaks who had settled in that area since 1918. New York Times, 1
Oct. 1938, p. 1; ibid., 2 Oct. 1938, p. 1; ibid., 3 Oct. 1938, p. 1; ibid., 10 Oct. 1938; p. 1;
ibid., 14 Oct. 1938, p. 15.
73
On picketing against New York consulates of South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and Cuba, see
New York Times, 24 Mar. 1960, p. 8; 17 Apr. 1960, p. 21; 3 May 1960, p. 4; and 21 May
1960, p. 10. The death under suspicious circumstances in Congo of Patrice Lumumba
sparked widespread picketing of Belgian and US Consulates. New York Times, 15, 16, 19
and 22 Feb. 1961. For picketers of Chinese consulates in the United States charging
suppression of pro-democracy elements at Tienanmen Square in Beijing, China, see
Washington Post, 5 June 1989, p. A21. ‘Pro-Kremlin movements to be checked in connection
with picketing Estonia embassy’, BBC World Monitoring, 21 June 2007 (picketing in
Moscow at Estonian consulate in response to removal in Tallinn, Estonia, of a monument
depicting Soviet soldier as liberator of Estonia). ‘Kazakh group demands Aliyev be
extradited from Austria’, Interfax News Agency, 6 June 2007 (picketers at Austrian
consulate in Astana, Kazakhstan, demanded extradition to Austria of former Kazakhstan
ambassador to Austria for trial on criminal charges).
74
See text supra accompanying n. 69.
75
Times, 27 Oct. 1984, p. 6h.
76
Turkey in Terror’s Grip: Another double bombing in Istanbul kills 27, injures 450,
Newsday, 21 Nov. 2003, p. 7.
77
Sebnem Arsu, ‘7 get life in Istanbul synagogue and office blasts’, New York Times, 17
Feb. 2007, p. A8, col. 3.
78
Megan K. Stack, ‘Beirut rioters attack church; Muslims outraged over cartoons of the
prophet Muhammad target a Christian community and Danish Consulate,’ Los Angeles
Times, 6 Feb. 2006, p. A1.
79
Kamran Khan & John Lancaster, ‘Pakistan Blast Kills U.S. Diplomat; 3 Others Die,
Dozens Hurt in Apparent Suicide Attack Outside Consulate in Karachi’, Washington Post, 3
March 2006, p. A10.
80
Declan Walsh, ‘Car Bombing: Explosion at US Consulate in Karachi Kills Diplomat’,
Guardian, 3 March 2006, p. 22.
81
Times, 13 July 1988, p. 10H.
82
The following incidents at Chilean consulates occurred July 1986 to July 1987: Hamburg,
3 July 1986, broken in by 35 people; Munich, 11 September 1986, paint thrown on façade of
consular office; Frankfurt, 11 September 1986, painting of political slogans at entrance;
Salta, Argentina, 11 September 1986, paint thrown on offices; Cochabama, Bolivia
(honorary consulate), 11 June 1987, explosive device at consular office and residence
causing damage; Rio de Janeiro, 11 September 1986, slogans painted on façade of building;
São Paulo, 10 July 1987, reception hall occupied by Chileans who unfurled banners bearing
anti-Government slogans; Madrid, 17 July 1986, office occupied by 17 young Spaniards
belonging to Communist youth movement; Barcelona, 7 July 1986, entrance hall forced into
by 17 people shouting slogans; Madrid, 9 September 1986, occupied by 30 people;
Barcelona, 9 September 1986, occupation attempted; Madrid, 2 April 1987, occupied by
force, painting; Paris, 4 September 1986, forced entry, posters, shouting slogans; Paris, 23
November 1986, private vehicle of Consul-General set on fire near Embassy; Amsterdam
(honorary consulate), 15 September 1986, paint bombs broke window panes; Zurich, 26
September 1986, building painted with slogans. Compiled from UN Doc. a/42/485/Add.2, 28
Sept. 1987.
83
New York Times, 14 Dec. 1961, p. 1.
84
Hansard H. C. Debates, 10 Mar. 1988. Written Answers, c. 288, 17 May 1988; Written
Answers c. 376; The Times, 8, 9, 10, 11 Mar. and 4 June 1988.
85
Resolution 42/154, adopted 7 December 1987, in UN Doc. a/res/42/154, 4 Mar. 1988.
86
Report of the Secretary-General, Consideration of effective measures to enhance the
protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, UN
Doc. A/INF/54/5, 4 Oct. 1999.
87
c. 45, sec. 9.
88
See New York Times, 5 Oct. 1947, p. 5, col. 1. For other instances of Tunisian
demonstrations in front of French consulates, see Charles Rousseau, ‘Agents diplomatiques
et consuls’ (§5. Expulsion de consuls français par le Gouvernement tunisien), 29 Revue
générale de droit international public (April–June 1958), pp. 256–7.
89
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19, 21, 999 UNTS 171.
90
VCCR Art. 31(3).
91
SJ Res. 191, 81 Cong. Rec., No. 154, pp. 11027, 11034.
92
52 Stat. 30, 22 USCA §§255a, 255b, classified as 22-1115 and 22-1116 of the Washington
DC Code.
93
Frend et al. v. United States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied 306 US 640
(1939); Annual Digest, 1938–40, Case 161. Even prior to of the joint resolution, US police
had dispersed demonstrations at of foreign official premises. Five demonstrators were
sentenced to $100 fines or 30 days in jail for parading at the German Embassy against
Germany’s intervention in Spain on 3 Dec. 1936. An attempt by Chinese businessmen and
students to parade at Japan’s Embassy in Oct. 1937 was stopped by Washington DC police.
See Stowell, supra n. 71, at 344–5. London police prevented a crowd of 25,000
demonstrators from marching towards the German Embassy to protest Germany’s action in
Austria in Mar. 1938. Ibid. at p. 345.
94
Preuss, supra n. 71, at 710. For similar views, see Stowell, supra n. 71, at 344; H. V.
Evatt, ‘The International Responsibility of States in the Case of Riots or Mob Violence’, 9
Australian Law Journal (Supp. 1935), p. 10; Cordell Hull’s letter to Senator Key Pittman, 3
Aug. 1937, 81 Cong. Rec, No. 151, p. 10864.
95
Dept. of State File No. p75 0134-1955; Dept. of State, Digest, 1975, p. 257.
96
Ibid (communication of 18 July 1975).
97
Reply of 23 Feb. 1979, Dept. of State File No. p79 0025-1898; Dept. of State, Digest,
1979, p. 674.
98
PL 99-399, §1302, 100 Stat. 853, 897.
99
See Protection for Foreign Officials, Official Guests, and Internationally Protected
Persons Amendment Act of 1987, §3, DC Act 7-138, 35 DC Reg. 728–29 (5 Feb. 1988).
100
485 U.S. 312 (1988).
101
See supra n. 93.
102
Finzer v. Barry, 255 US App. DC 19, 798, F. 2d 1450 (1986).
103
See supra n. 100.
104
Washington Post, 24 Mar. 1988, p. D1, col. 5.
105
Ibid. 1 Oct. 1987, p. A19, col. 1.
106
Richard Johns and John Hunt, ‘Siege ends as 30 Libyans leave St. James’s Square,’
Financial Times, 28 Apr. 1984, p. 1.
107
Hansard H. C. Debates, vol. 65, col. 562: 23 Oct. 1984.
108
VCCR, Art. 27(2).
109
VCCR Art. 27(1)(a).
110
VCCR Art. 27(1)(b).
111
VCCR Art. 27(2)(1).
112
VCCR Art. 59.
113
VCCR Art. 58.
114
‘Iraq describes Iranian office,’ International Herald Tribune, 13 Jan. 2007, p. 5. The
United States apparently did not contest the unstated premise of Iran’s argument, namely,
that the United States was bound to respect the inviolability of its consular premises in
Iraq, even though the United States was not the receiving State. The US appeared to
assume a US obligation in that regard but argued that in the circumstances it did not
violate any consular premise rights of Iran. The VCCR does not address any obligation of
third States to respect inviolability, but it seems unlikely that a third State that violates
consular premises could plausibly assert that it is free to do so. A third State that exercises
police or military power in the receiving State on any basis would seem obliged to respect
consular premises. Or if a third State, from outside the receiving State, launched a missile
into a consular building, the third State would seem to be in violation of the rights of the
sending State. A third State would be liable as well if it assists a receiving State to violate
consular premises. In that situation, it could be held on the basis of complicity. ILC,
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 16, UN GAOR, 56th sess.,
Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). John Quigley, ‘Complicity in International Law: A
New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility’, 57 BYIL 77 (1986).
115
YILC, 1957, I, p. 52. In a case involving diplomatic premises, Tietz et al. v. People’s
Republic of Bulgaria (Decisions of the Supreme Restitution Court for Berlin, vol. 13, p. 393
(in English); 28 ILR, at 369, 382), the Bulgarian Government acknowledged ‘that the mere
purchase of real property for ambassadorial purposes did not suffice to found its
exterritoriality, but that [it] was founded only when the property was in fact used for
diplomatic purposes.’
116
YILC, 1957, I, p. 53. Thus, if part of the premises is occupied by a tenant, it may be
argued that the premises are not entirely at the disposal of a mission. In Petrococchino v.
Swedish State (France, Civil Tribunal of the Seine, 30 Oct. 1929; 59 Clunet (1932), p. 945;
Annual Digest, 1929–30, No. 198), the tribunal held: ‘The acquisition of real property by a
foreign State does not ipso facto invest that property with the privilege of exterritoriality: it
is necessary that the property be completely appropriated to the service of the embassy.’
Since in this case such appropriation had not been effectuated, the acts of the Swedish
Government regarding the property could not be considered as acts of State (de puissance
publique), but as private transactions subject to the same laws. The tribunal concluded that,
although the premises in question formed part of the buildings in which the Swedish
Legation was established, the tenant occupied all of them, and no part of them was ever
used for the purposes of the Legation.
117
YILC, 1957, I, p. 53.
118
26 AJIL 50 (Supp. 1932).
119
YILC, 1957, I, p. 59.
120
See Denza, Diplomatic Law, p. 146.
121
c. 46.
122
On application of this statute to the case of the abandoned Cambodian Embassy in
London, see R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte
Samuel, 28 July 1989, in Times Law Reports, 17 Aug. 1989, and in Independent, 23 Aug.
1989, p. 22.

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Part IV Privileges and Immunities, 23 Inviolability

From: Consular Law and Practice (3rd Edition)

Content type: Book content

(p. 355) 2. Conditional Immunity

3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

(p. 360) 4. Consular Residences

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies and

5. Requisition or Expropriation

6. Search, Attachment, or Seizure

8. Violence against Consular Premises

The General Assembly,

(a) To protect the premises of diplomatic and consular missions, as well as of

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General;

(a) All States to report to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible

10. Requests the Secretary-General:

94th plenary meeting

1. Time, date and location of the reported violation.

9. Protection against Picketing

it shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard or device designed or

In response to an inquiry from the Philippines, relating to a demonstration near the

Attached to the letter was a communication from the Department of Justice:

Although there is no prohibition against a peaceful orderly demonstration within

(1) [T]he District of Columbia law concerning demonstrations near foreign

The District of Columbia Government subsequently decided to repeal §22-1115, contingent,

In its conclusion, the Supreme Court stated:

We conclude that the display clause of §22-1115 is unconstitutional on its face. It is

10. Exceptional Circumstances

12. Beginning and End of Inviolability

(4) The Secretary of State shall only give or withdraw consent or

(a) to the safety of the public;

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