Dirk Geeraerts - Diachronic Prototype Semantics - A Contribution To Historical Lexicology-Clarendon Press (1997) PDF

Introduction
IN a survey of diachronic semantics published some twenty years

ago , Winfred Lehmann ( 1 976) suggested that future progress in the
study of meaning changes would have to come primarily from a
systematic application of the descriptive model provided by
componential analysis. But although such feature-based approaches
were indeed developed in the context of various componential
models of semantic structure , by authors such as Voyles ( 1 973),
Fritz ( 1 97 4 ) , Werth ( 1 9 74 ), Lipka ( 1 985) , and Kleparski ( 1 986), the
main developments in historical semantics were to lie elsewhere.
Two overlapping domains of research , in fact, stand out in the
most innovative forms of recent research into historical semantics .
One of them is the renewed search for regularity in the development
of meaning. This approach mainly takes on two closely related
form s. On the one hand, there is an interest in changes affecting
entire semantic fields at the same time. Representative examples are
J. Williams ( 1 9 7 6, 1 980), Kittay and Lehrer ( 1 98 1 ) , and Lehrer
( 1 98 5 , 1 990) . On the other hand , there is an interest in the recurrent
patterns of change that affect items shifting towards a pragmatic and
grammatical function. The burgeoning field of grammaticalization
research is exemplified by such major publications as Sweetser
( 1 900) , Heine et al. ( 1 99 1 ) , Hopper and Traugott ( 1 993), and Bybee
et al. ( 1 994) .
The second development to have influenced historical semantics is
the introduction of a prototype model of semantic structure. It is
with the latter that we will be concerned here . What I propose to do
is to give an overview of the various ways in which the notion of
prototype can be made to bear fruit, descriptively as well as
theoretically, in historical semantics .
The book consists of five chapters . Chapter l introduces cognitive
semantics, and identifies four structural features of prototypically
organized semantic categories . Each of these features is further
2 Introduction
correlated with specific descriptive characteristics of lexical-semantic

changes . As each of these features embodies a hypothesis about the
nature of semasiological change, Chapter 2 consists of four case
studies that successively support the four hypotheses.
In Chapter 3 , the question is raised whether these prototype-based
characteristics of semantic changes can contribute something, not
just to the description of meaning changes , but also to their
classification. A functional classification of types of semantic change
is presented that acknowledges the role of prototypicality in an
explanatory model of shifts of meaning . At the same time , this
functional approach to the classification of meaning changes evokes
the question of the explanation of prototypicality itself. How can the
overall prototypical nature of semasiological structures be explained?
What advantages are there to organizing the semantics of lexical
items in prototype-based fashion? It will be argued that a functional
model of semantic change that distinguishes between speaker
orientated optimization of production and hearer-orientated optim
ization of reception as functional motivations of linguistic change
may explain prototypicality as a singularly efficient form of
organizing the semantic substance of the language.
The incorporation of prototypicality in a classification of causes of
semantic change leads to a further question about the conflict that
may exist between the prototypical , cognitive-semantic conception
of the lexicon and the structuralist conception (specifically , as
embodied by the principle that languages exhibit a tendency towards
isomorphism). While prototypicality implies a tendency to enhance
the polysemy of a lexical item, the tendency towards an isomorphic
relation between forms and meanings implies exactly the reverse: as
against the isomorphic principle of 'one form, one meaning',
prototypicality seems to embrace a tendency towards a multiplication
of the meanings associated with a particular item. Chapter 4 explores
the extent of the possible conflict, and suggests how both competing
motivations might be reconciled.
Chapter 5 shifts the attention to the metatheoretical level . It will
be argued that the introduction of a prototype-theoretical conception
of categorial structure constitutes a major change in the theory and
methodology of historical semantics . This methodological and
theoretical position of diachronic prototype theory will then be
situated against the history of the discipline. It will be suggested that
prototype theory constitutes a return to the hermeneutic tradition of
Introduction 3
pre-structuralist historical semantics that dominated the scene of

linguistic semantics between 1850 and 1930.
The scope of the book is strictly limited to the lexicological
domain. Although the prototype-theoretical model has already been
successfully applied to diachronic developments in the grammatical
rather than the lexical realm, this book deliberately stays within the
bounds of lexicology. There is a specific reason for this restriction,
which is connected with the fact that the application of prototype
theory to the study of natural language is part and parcel of cognitive
linguistics. As will be explained in Section 1. 1, the lexicon fulfils
an exemplary methodological function within cognitive linguistics:
models of semantic description primarily developed in lexical
semantics (like prototype theory, or generalized metaphor research
along the lines of Lakoff and Johnson I 980) are later extrapolated to
the description of grammatical constructions. It seems to me that
one way of contributing to such a research strategy is to provide in
depth analyses of the lexical phenomena in question. Rather than
broadening the domain of diachronic prototype theory, I will try to
have a closer look at the lexical basis of such extrapolations.
This does not mean, on the other hand, that the treatment of
prototypicality as presented in this book in any way aspires to
exhaustivity or definitiveness. What I have to offer is not a final
picture of the matter, but merely a modest (though, I hope,
systematic and well-documented) round-up of the importance of a
prototype-theoretical model for diachronic lexical semantics. Such
a round-up will have served its purpose if it engenders further
research.
Presenting such an overview (intermediate and temporary though
it may be) is all the more important because the insights of the
prototype-theoretical approach have not yet reached textbook level.
Apart from some references to grammaticalization research, the
treatment of diachronic semantics in recent introductions to
historical linguistics such as Crowley (1992), Lehmann (1992), or
McMahon (1994) is highly traditional in its almost exclusive focus on
mechanisms of change; the role played by semasiological structures
in the history of words passes largely unnoticed.
Being situated in the framework of cognitive semantics, the book
will assume some familiarity with the cognitive approach, or at least,
with the basic tenets of prototype theory as developed in Eleanor
Rosch's psycholinguistic research and as used in synchronic
4 Introduction
linguistics. The expected familiarity does not, however, go beyond

what can be learned about prototype theory in linguistic reference
works or textbooks. (See, for instance, Coleman 1 992; Geeraerts
l994a . ) Also, an introduction to those aspects of prototype theory
that are relevant for the course of my investigation will be given in
Section l . 2 below.
Throughout the book descriptive detail will go hand in hand with
theory formation: the theoretical points to be made will be supported
and illustrated by means of various extensive case-studies. These
case-studies will take different forms; they may involve the historical
development of single lexical items or that of sets of related words,
or they may focus on a particular diachronic-semantic phenomenon.
The case-studies constitute the backbone of the book, both with
regard to the argumentation that I will try to develop, and with
regard to the aims that I would like to achieve. It is, in fact, not just
my intention to bring home a theoretical point about the usefulness
of a prototype-theoretical conception of lexical-semantic structure
for diachronic semantics. As well as that (and perhaps even more
than that), I hope to present a number of models--methodological
strategies coupled with representational formats-for the description
of semantic changes that may be useful for future research. If this
book is to teach the reader something, it should not just be an
abstract knowledge of diachronic prototype theory, but rather more
importantly a certain knowledge how to do diachronic-semantic
research in ways that bring to the fore phenomena that usually
receive only little attention in diachronic studies of meaning.
I would particularly like to draw the attention to one specific
feature of the major case-studies (which, incidentally, will all be
based on data from the lexical history of Dutch). The investigations
will predominantly be based on actual language use as represented
by a corpus of quotations from historical texts. The real life of the
language cannot be adequately understood unless one takes into
account real language use in actual contexts--and the real
methodological requirements of diachronic-semantic research cannot
be properly appreciated unless one has become acquainted with such
concrete instances of language use.
This book reflects an involvement of more than a decade with
diachronic semantics. Many of the case-studies and theoretical
analyses collected here draw on articles that were published
separately in the period between 1 983 and 1 994· To be sure, the
Introduction 5
book goes well beyond the individual pieces, in that it highlights the
connections between them, brings them together in an encompassing
framework, and shows how each of them contributes in its own way
to an overall prototype-theoretical conception of semantic change.
The ultimate source of this text, however, lies in the period
between 1977 and 1985, when I worked as a historical lexicographer
for the Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal, the Dutch counterpart
of the Oxford English Dictionary. The day-to-day confrontation with
authentic linguistic data, actual lexical structures, and real semantic
changes that accompanied my share of work in the compilation of
the dictionary has proved a continuing source of inspiration for the
more theoretical work that was to occupy me afterwards.
It has long been my contention (see, for instance, the remarks in
Geeraerts 199oa) that theoretical lexicology could benefit greatly
from a closer acquaintance with the descriptive results and the
methodological problems of large-scale dictionaries such as the
Woordenboek der Nederland sche Taal or the Oxford Engli sh Dictionary .
The present contribution to diachronic semantics is not only meant
as an illustration of that point. It is also a tribute to all the historical
lexicographers who do not find the occasion to translate their
knowledge and experience into theoretical statements. That their
work is not likely to be acknowledged on the scene of linguistic
theorizing is an obvious indication of how greatly its intellectual
substance and linguistic relevance is underestimated.
I
Cognitive Semantics and

Prototype Theory
W I T H the birth of cognitive semantics, new ideas from the field of

theoretical semantics have found their way to the study of meaning
changes, and that should not come as a surprise: one of the major
things cognitive semantics is interested in is polysemy-and
polysemy is, roughly, the synchronic reflection of diachronic
semantic change. As elsewhere in the language, diachrony within
synchrony equals variation, and in the present case that means
semantic variation. The interest of theoretical semanticists working
within the framework of cognitive semantics in the study of meaning
changes derives from their interest in polysemy, if only because the
synchronic links that exist between the various senses of an item
coincide with diachronic mechanisms of semantic extension such as
metaphor and metonymy.1
This chapter explores the question what could be the descriptive
importance of a prototype-theoretical conception of semantic
structure for diachronic semantics: to which kinds of diachronic
phenomena does prototype theory draw the attention? As the term
cognitive semantics is used here to refer to the study of semantics
within the framework of cognitive linguistics, Section I . I gives a
brief introduction to the major theoretical tenets and methodological
strategies of cognitive linguistics. Section I .2 introduces and
analyses the concept of prototypicality; four prototype-theoretical
characteristics of semasiological structures will be identified. In the
final section of this chapter, each of those four features will be
correlated with a specific hypothesis about the nature of semantic
changes. In Chapter 2 each of the four hypotheses will then be tested
by means of a historical-semantic case-study.
6
Cognitive Semantics and Prototype Theory 7
I . I I N T R O D UCI N G CO G N I T IV E L I N GUI S T ICS
Cognitive linguistics is an approach to the analysis of natural

language that focuses on language as an instrument for organizing,
processing, and conveying information. Methodologically speaking,
the analysis of the conceptual and experiential basis of linguistic
categories is of primary importance within cognitive linguistics: it
primarily considers language as a system of categories. The formal
structures of language are studied not as if they were autonomous,
but as reflections of general conceptual organization, categorization
principles, processing mechanisms, and experiential and environ
mental influences. Because cognitive linguistics sees language as
embedded in the overall cognitive capacities of mankind, topics
of special interest for cognitive linguistics include the structural
characteristics of natural language categorization, the functional
principles of linguistic organization, the conceptual interface between
syntax and semantics, the experiential and pragmatic background of
language in use, and the relationship between language and thought,
including questions about relativism and conceptual universals.
Leading figures within cognitive linguistics are George Lakoff
(1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989), Ron
Langacker (1987, 1990, 1991), and Len Talmy (1978, 1983, 1988).
Sample work in the tradition of cognitive linguistics can be found in
Rudzka-Ostyn (1988), Geiger and Rudzka-Ostyn (1993), and Casad
(1995). A brief introduction to some of the fundamental descriptive
concepts of cognitive linguistics may be found in Radden (1992).
Terminologically, a distinction imposes itself between cognitive
linguistics (as intended here) and the wider domain of approaches
to natural language as a mental phenomenon (see, for instance,
Schwarz 1992 for an overview of the latter field, which is sometimes
also referred to as 'cognitive linguistics'). Cognitive linguistics in the
more restricted sense is but one type of a cognitive science approach
to language, to be distinguished from, for instance, generative
grammar and many forms of linguistic research within the field of
artificial intelligence.
Against the background of the basic characteristics of the
cognitive paradigm in cognitive psychology, the philosophy of
science, and related disciplines (see De Mey 1992 ), the viewpoint
adopted by cognitive linguistics can be defined more precisely.
8 Cognitive Semantics and Prototype Theory
Cognitive linguistics is the study of language in its cogmt1ve

function, where cognitive refers to the crucial role of intermediate
informational structures in our encounters with the world. Cognitive
linguistics is cognitive in the same way that cognitive psychology is:
in that it assumes that our interaction with the world is mediated
through informational structures in the mind. It is more specific
than cognitive psychology, however, in that it focuses on natural
language as a means for organizing, processing, and conveying that
information. Language, then, is seen as a repository of world
knowledge, a structured collection of meaningful categories that
help us deal with new experiences and store information about old
ones.
From this overall characterization, three fundamental character
istics of cognitive linguistics can be derived: the primacy of
semantics in linguistic analysis, the encyclopaedic nature oflinguistic
meaning, and the perspectival nature of linguistic meaning. The first
characteristic merely states that the basic function of language
involves meaning; the other two characteristics specify the nature of
the semantic phenomena in question. The primacy of semantics in
linguistic analysis follows in a straightforward fashion from the
cognitive perspective itself: if the primary function of language is
categorization, then meaning must be the primary linguistic
phenomenon. The encyclopaedic nature of linguistic meaning follows
from the categorizing function of language: if language is a system
for the categorization of the world, there is no need to postulate a
systemic or structural level of linguistic meaning that is different
from the level where world knowledge is associated with linguistic
forms. The perspectival nature of linguistic meaning implies that the
world is not objectively reflected in the language: the categorization
function of the language imposes a structure on the world rather
than just mirroring objective reality. Specifically, language is a way
of organizing knowledge that reflects the needs, interests, and
experiences of individuals and cultures. The idea that linguistic
meaning has a perspectivizing function is theoretically elaborated in
the philosophical, epistemological position taken by cognitive
linguistics (see Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Geeraerts 1985a). This
position is characterized by two features: negatively, by the rejection
of epistemological objectivism, and positively, by experientialism
(the view that human reason is determined by our organic
embodiment and by our individual and collective experiences).
Cogn itive Semantics and Prototype Theory 9
It is crucial to note that cognitive linguistics is not a single theory

of language, but rather a cluster of broadly compatible approaches
compatible not just on the theoretical level, but also with regard to
the methodological approach taken. The general research strategy of
cognitive linguistics, in fact, is characterized by two major features.
First, the study of categorization processes in the lexicon is taken as
a methodological point of departure for the study of categorization
processes in the grammar at large. If linguistic categorization is the
major focus of cognitive linguistics, then studying the lexicon first is
a plausible step to take: the categorizing function of the lexicon has
received more attention in the linguistic tradition (and is also,
perhaps, easier to investigate) than that of grammatical constructs.
The intention to study the grammar of the language along the same
lines as its lexicon obviously leads to a specific kind of grammatical
theory, namely one in which the grammar, like the lexicon, is
conceived of as an inventory of meaningful units. At this point in
time, this idea has received its clearest and most elaborate form of
expression in Ron Langacker's cognitive grammar ( 1 987 , 1 990,
1 99 1) , and in Charles Fillmore's construction grammar (Fillmore et
al. 1 9 8 8 ; Goldberg 1 99 5 ). The symbolic, construction-based per
spective epitomized by these models also implies that less attention
has so far been devoted to the procedural, algorithmic aspects of
grammar (that is to say, to the way in which the various units in the
symbolic inventory are combined into larger constructs like phrases
and sentences).
Second, the categorization function of linguistic units is system
atically studied from three different perspectives: the internal
structure of the categories taken separately, the larger conceptual
structures that combine several individual categories into coherent
mental models, and the relationship between form and meaning.
The internal structure of categories is studied primarily in terms of
prototype theory ; see Taylor ( 1 99 5 ) for an introduction to the
application of prototype theory in linguistics, and compare MacLaury
( 1 99 l) for a bibliographical overview. The larger conceptual
structures that combine more specific categories have been studied
from different angles. Popular areas of investigation include
metaphor research (see, inter alia , Paprotte and Dirven 1 9 8 5 ) , more
specifically in the form of the theory of generalized metaphors (Lakoff
and Johnson 1 980; Lakoff and Turner 1 989; Sweetser 1 990), and
frame semantics (Fillmore 1 985) . When these larger conceptual
IO Cognitive Semantics and Prototype Theory
structures are studied in their relationship to their cultural environ

ment, the investigation is broadened to the study of cultural models
(Holland and Quinn 1987; Kovecses 1986). The mental models that
combine individual categories need not have the permanent character
that they receive within the approaches mentioned so far; the theory
of mental sp aces developed by Fauconnier (1985) describes the way in
which mental models are built up during discourse as temporary
constructs. Finally, the relationship between linguistic form and
linguistic meaning is studied under the general rubric of motivation,
more specifically in the form of iconicity (that is to say, the idea that
linguistic forms may in some way reflect aspects of the message that
is being communicated; see Haiman 1980; De Pater and Van
Langendonck 1989).
Needless to say, this investigation primarily links up with the use
of prototype-theoretical models in cognitive linguistics. Basically, it
presents an extrapolation of prototype theory to diachronic semantics.
Other aspects of the cognitive linguistic approach as sketched above
will not be absent from the book, however. In particular, iconicity
(and the related notion of isomorphism) will play an important role
in Chapter 4, and the philosophical questions concerning the
perspectival nature of linguistic meaning will occupy a central
position in the discussions of Chapter 5.
1.2 C H ARACT E R I S T I C S OF P RO T O T Y P I C A L I T Y
This section describes the scope of the concept 'prototypicality'. In

the next section, I shall derive a number of hypotheses about the
descriptive characteristics of semantic change that link up with a
prototype-theoretical conception of semantic structure. Four
prototype-based features of semasiological structures will be
identified, and for each of those four features, a specific hypothesis
about the nature of semantic changes will be determined in Section
1. 3. Then, in the next chapter, each of the four hypotheses will be
corroborated by means of a historical-semantic case-study.
The starting-point of the prototypical conception of categorial
structure is summarized in the statement that
when describing categories analytically, most traditions of thought have
treated category membership as a digital , all-or-none phenomenon. That
is, much work in philosophy, psychology, linguistic s , and anthropology
Cognitive Semantics and Prototype Theory II
assumes that categories are logical bounded entities, membership in which is

defined by an item's possession of a simple set of criteria! features , in which
all instances possessing the criteria! attributes have a full and equal degree of
membership . In contrast , it has recently been argued . that some natural
categories are analog and must be represented logically in a manner which
reflects their analog structure . (Rosch and Mervis 1975 : 573-4)
The theory originated in the mid-r97os with Eleanor Rosch's

research into the internal structure of categories. 2 From its
psycholinguistic origins, prototype theory has moved mainly3 in two
directions. On the one hand, Rosch's findings and proposals were
taken up by formal psycholexicology (and more generally,
information-processing psychology), which tries to devise formal
models for human conceptual memory and its operation. 4 On the
other hand, prototype theory has had a steadily growing success in
linguistics since the early 1980s, as witnessed by a number of
monographs and collective volumes in which prototype theory and
its cognitive extensions play a major role. 5
This study is situated within the latter, linguistic approach to
prototypicality. In particular, I shall try to determine what the
importance of prototype theory for diachronic semantics might be.
What aspects of prototype theory could be relevant for historical
semantics? As a first step, let us have a look at four characteristics
that are frequently mentioned (in various combinations) as typical of
prototypicality. 6
(a) Prototypical categories exhibit degrees of typicality; not every
member is equally representative for a category.
((3) Prototypical categories exhibit a family resemblance structure,
or more generally, their semantic structure takes the form of
a radial set of clustered and overlapping readings.
(y) Prototypical categories are blurred at the edges.
(b) Prototypical categories cannot be defined by means of a single
set of criteria! (necessary and sufficient) attributes.
For each of these four characteristics, a reference to early
prototype-theoretical studies may be mvoked to illustrate the points
at issue. The following quotations respectively exemplify the four
characteristics.
By prototypes of categories we have generally meant the clearest cases of

category membership defined operationally by people's judgements of
goodness of membership in the category we can j udge how clear a case
something is and deal with categories on the basis of clear cases in the total
absence of information about boundaries . (Rosch 1 97 8 : 36)
The purpose of the present research was to explore one of the major
structural principles which , we believe, may govern the formation of the
prototype structure of semantic categories. This principle was first
suggested in philosophy; Wittgenstein ( 1 953) argued that the referents of a
word need not have common elements to be understood and used in the
normal functioning of language . He suggested that, rather , a family
resemblance might be what linked the various referents of a word. A family
resemblance relationship takes the form AB, BC, CD, DE. That is, each item
has at least one , and probably several , elements in common with one or more
items , but no, or few , elements are common to all items . (Rosch and
Mervis 1975 : 574-5)
New trends in categorization research have brought into investigation and

debate some of the major issues in conception and learning whose solution
had been unquestioned in earlier approaches . Empirical findings have
established that . . . category boundaries are not necessarily definite.
(Mervis and Rosch 198 1: 109)
We have argued that many words . . . have as their meanings not a list of
necessary and sufficient conditions that a thing or event must satisfy to
count as a member of the category denoted by the word, but rather a
psychological object or process which we have called a prototype. (Coleman
and Kay 198 1: 43)
For further illustration, let us consider a category that is a typical

example of prototypicality , in the sense that it exemplifies all four
characteristics mentioned above. The category fruit is, to begin with ,
among the categories originally studied by Rosch (1 975; Rosch and
Mervis 1 97 5 ) . The experimental results exemplify characteristic
(a): for American subjects, oranges and apples and bananas are the
most typical fruits , while pineapples and water-melons and pom
egranates receive low typicality ratings.
But now consider coconuts and olives. Is a coconut or an olive a
fruit? Notice , first, that we are not concerned with the technical,
biological reading of fruit, but with folk models of fruit as a certain
category of edible things . Technically , any seed-containing part of a
plant is the fruit of that plant ; as such , nuts in general are fruit. In
ordinary language, on the other hand, nuts and fruit are basically
distinct categories (regardless of the possible boundary status of the
coconut): nuts are dry and hard, while fruits are soft , sweet, and
juicy ; also , the situations in which nuts and fruits are eaten are
typically different. Second, category membership is not the same

thing as typicality: a penguin is undoubtedly an uncharacteristic
kind of bird, but it is a bird none the less; as to the olive, the
question is not just whether it is a typical fruit, but rather whether it
is a fruit at all.
This indeterminacy establishes characteristic (y), but it also has
an immediate bearing on characteristic (b). In fact, a definitional
analysis is initially hampered by the uncertainty surrounding the
boundaries of the category. If there is a consensus that olives are not
fruit, we should not include the olive m an analysis of fruit.
Conversely, if an olive 1s considered to be a fruit (however peripheral
and uncharacteristic), it will have to be included. To circumvent the
problem with olives and their like, let us restrict the definitional
analysis to clear cases of fruit, that is, cases for which doubts about
membership do not play a role. Even for these clear cases, it can be
shown that characteristic (b) holds true, that is, that fruit cannot be
defined by means of a single minimally specific set of necessary
attributes. A starting-point for the discussion (which necessarily has
to be presented in some detail, and which will therefore inevitably
take up some space) can be found in Wierzbicka's definition of the
category (1985: 299-300), outlined below. In order to show that this
is not a classical, necessary-and-sufficient definition, it has to be
established, on the one hand, that not all attributes of fruit as
mentioned by Wierzbicka are general (even within the set constituted
by the examples of fruit that are high on Rosch's typicality ratings),
and, on the other hand, that the remaining set of general attributes is
not minimally specific, that is, does not suffice to distinguish fruit
from, for instance, vegetables.
The following characteristics mentioned by Wierzbicka are not
general, that is, they are not shared by all examples of fruit.
(Wierzbicka's formulations are repeated here, though not in the
order in which she presents them.)
(a) They have a skin harder than the parts inside.
(b) They have some small parts inside, separate from the other
parts, not good to eat. These parts put into the ground could
grow into new things of the same kind growing out of the
ground.
(c ) They are good to eat without being cooked, without having
anything done to them, without any other things, and people
can eat them for pleasure.
(<i) Eating them uncooked makes one feel good.

( e) Before they are good to eat they can be sour.
(j) They have a lot of jmce.
(g) Their juice is good to drink.
(h) They are also good to eat dried.
Characteristic (a) is contradicted by the strawberry, which as no
skin worthy of that name. Strawberries likewise do not have the
seeds mentioned m (b); bananas are another case in point. Attributes
(c) and (<i) indicate that fruit can be eaten (with pleasant results)
without further preparation, but this does not seem to hold for the
lemon, whose sour taste generally requires sugaring. 7 Attributes (e)
and (j) are not valid for the banana: first, an unripe banana is bitter
rather than sour, and second, there is no juice in a banana. Because
the generality of (g) depends on the generality of (j), it may likewise
be discarded. Finally, as far as (h) is concerned, it is difficult to
imagine a dried melon as being good to eat.
Next, there is a set of characteristics whose non-generality seems
to be accepted (or at least, implied) by Wierzbicka herself.
(i) Wanting to imagine such things, people would lillagine them
as growing on trees.
(J) They can be small enough for a person to be able to put easily
more than one thing of this kind into the mouth and eat them
all at the same time, or too big for a person to be expected to
eat a whole one, bit by bit, at one time, but wanting to
imagine such things, people would imagine them as too big
for a person to put a whole one easily into the mouth and eat
it, and not too big for a person to be expected to eat a whole
one, bit by bit, at one time, holding it in one hand.
(k) After they have become good to eat they are sweet, or slightly
sweet, or sour but good to eat with something sweet.
([) Wanting to imagine such things after they have become good
to eat, people would imagine things which are slightly sweet.
(m) Things on which such things can grow can also grow in some
places where people don't cause them to grow, but wanting to
imagine such things, people would imagine them as growing
on things growing out of the ground in places where people
cause them to grow.
While (k) is a disjunctively defined attribute (that is, is a
superficial combination of two characteristics that are each not
general when taken separately), the other features are introduced by

the formula 'wanting to imagine such things, people would imagine
them as'; this would seem to indicate that the attribute is merely
typically associated with the concept, rather than being general. For
instance, the sweetness mentioned in (T) d'oes not hold for lemons,
and berries do not grow on trees, in contradistinction with the
feature involved in (i) .
The set of general characteristics that is left over after the
elimination of the previous sets contains the following features.
(n) They grow as parts of certain things growing out of the
ground.
(o) They don't grow in the ground.
(p) They become good to eat after they have grown long enough
on the things growing out of the ground.
(q) Before they are good to eat they are green or greenish outside.
(r) People cause things of this kind to grow in many places
because they want to have those things for people to eat.
(s) They are good to eat cooked with sugar, or cooked as part of
some things which have sugar in them.
Is this set minimally specific? Up to characteristic (r), the set
applies not only to fruit, but also to nuts, herbs, and large collections
of vegetables (though not to the ones that grow in the ground, like
carrots), so that the crucially distinctive attribute would be (s).
However, if one takes into consideration the use of almonds and
other nuts in certain types of pastry, the use of herbs (such as tansy)
in pancakes, and the habit of cooking rhubarb with sugar, it soon
becomes clear that there are counter-examples with regard to (s) in
each of the three categories (nuts, herbs, and vegetables). All in all,
most of the attributes mentioned by Wierzbicka are not general,
whereas those that are, taken together, apparently do not suffice to
exclude non-fruits.
Given, then, that we cannot define the uncontroversial core
members of fruit in a classical, necessary-and-sufficient fashion, we
have not only illustrated characteristic (b), but we can also
appreciate the importance of characteristic (/3). If fruit receives a
classical definition in terms of necessary and sufficient attributes, all
the definitional attributes have the same range of application
(namely the category fruit as a whole). However, because such a
classical definition cannot be given, the attributes that enter into the
semantic description of frnit demarcate various subsets from within

the entire range of application of frnit. As a whole, the description of
fruit then takes the form of a cluster of partially (but multiply)
overlapping set s.
The importance of characteristic (/3) may b e illustrated in yet
another way . So far, we have been concerned only with the most
common , everyday meaning of fruit (roughly , 'soft and sweet edible
part of a tree or a bush') . There are other meanings to fruit, however.
In its technical sense ('the seed-bearing part of a plant or tree'), the
word also refers to things that lie outside the range of application of
the basic reading, such as acorns and pea pods. In an expression like
the fruits of nature, the meaning is even more general, as the word
refers to everything that grows and that can be eaten by people
(including, for instance , grains and vegetables). Further, there is a
range of figurative readings, including the abstract sense 'the result
or outcome of an action' (as in the frnits of his labour or his work bore
fruit), or the somewhat archaic reading 'offspring, progeny' (as in the
biblical expressions the fruit of the womb, the frnit of his loins) . These
meanings do not exist in isolation, but they are related in various
ways to the central sense and to each other. The technical reading
('seed-containing part') and the sense illustrated by the frnits of nature
are both related to the central meaning by a process of generalization .
The technical reading generalizes over the biological function of the
things covered by the central meaning, whereas the meaning
'everything that grows and that can be eaten by people' focuses on
the function that those things have for human beings. The figurative
uses, on the other hand, are linked to the other meanings by a
metaphorical link, but notice also that the meaning 'offspring' is still
closer to the central sense, because it remains within the biological
domain. The overall picture, in short, is similar to that found within
the single sense 'soft and sweet edible part of a tree or a bush': we
find a cluster of mutually interrelated readings . Characteristic (}3),
then , not only applies within a single sense of a word like frnit, but it
also characterizes the relationship among the various senses of a
word . (In what follows, I shall consider characteristic (}3) primarily
from this second angle . )
Having illustrated features (a)-(c5), i t should b e stressed that
they are not necessarily coextensive; in spite of what might be
suggested by the discussion of fruit, they do not always co-occur.
There is now a consensus in the linguistic literature on prototypicality
Cognitive Semantics and Prototype Theory
that the characteristics enumerated here are prototypicality effects

that may be exhibited in various combinations by individual lexical
items, and may have very different source s. 8 Exactly what those
sources are is not a point to be settled in the context of a historical
linguistic discussion (and, in fact , there is as yet no general
theoretical agreement on this point) . For our purposes, it may be
sufficient to recognize that the linguistic literature on prototypicality
effects has identified various characteristics of semantic structure
that fit into a prototype-theoretical framework. Our task as historical
linguists will then be to check whether these features may be
recognized in the structure of lexical-semantic change.
This remark does not exhaust the comments to be made with
regard to features (a)-(b) and their mutual relationships, but
before we proceed any further, a number of key concepts that will
recur in the course of the book will now have to be defined, if only to
clarify the terminological conventions that we will adhere to .
To begin with, let us clarify the distinction between semasiology
and onomaswlogy. Given that a lexical item couples a word form with
a semantic content , the distinction between an onomasiological and a
semasiological approach is based on the choice of either of the poles
in this correlation as the starting-point of the investigation . Thus,
the onomasiological approach starts from the content side, typically
asking the question 'Given concept x, what lexical items can it be
expressed with?' Conversely, the semasiological approach starts
from the formal side, typically asking the question 'Gi ven lexical
item y, what meanings does it express?' In other words, the typical
subject of semasiology is polysemy and the multiple applicability of a
lexical item , whereas onomasiology is concerned with synonymy and
near-synonymy , name-giving , and the selection of an expression
from among a number of alternative possibilities . Traditionally, the
onomasiological approach takes the form of various types of lexical
field research . 9 Our approach will be predominantly semasiological ,
but excursions into the onomasiological domain will occur
throughout the book.
Now, the semasiological analysis of a word usually distinguishes
between two levels. To begin with, a word is associated with one or
more meanings, or (in slightly more technical parlance) senses. In the
case of ftuit, for instance, we may at least distinguish between the
senses 'something that people can eat and that grows on a tree or a
bush' and 'the result or effect of something' . On this level of
analysis , senses are represented by definitions . On a further level of

analysis, senses are represented by sets , each set consisting of the
members of the semantic category constituted by each separate
sense . The central sense of fruit, for instance, corresponds with
the set having as its members oranges, apples, bananas, and so
on . 10
In line with the terminology used m formal, logical semantics, I
shall use the terms intensional and extensional to refer to the level of
senses and the level of members respectively . For obvious reasons,
the intensional level may also be referred to as the definitional level.
As an equivalent name for the extensional level, I shall use the term
referential: the extension constitutes the referential range of applica
tion of a word as used in a specific sense-the range of things (in the
broadest possible meaning of that word) that the word may possibly
refer to. The extension may then also be said to consist of the
(potential) referents of the word in question.
The related term denotational, however, will explicitly not be used
as a synonym of extensional and referential as just defined. Rather
than indicate a particular level in a semasiological analysis , d enota
tional will name a particular type of meaning. When I need to
distinguish between the basic ref erring function of language
(regardless of whether this function is considered at the intensional
or at the extensional level), and the fact that words may carry
emotive or stylistic overtones of various kinds, the term denotational
will be used for the former function. Non-denotational kinds of
meaning will then include phenomena such as euphemism, or
pejorative and ameliorative shifts of meaning. The distinction
between denotational and non-denotational kinds of meaning will,
however, not play a central role in this study; it will mainly come to
the fore in Chapter 3.
In many traditional conceptions of lexical semantics (specifically,
in the approaches situated within the tradition of structuralist
semantics), the internal structure of the extensional level has no role
to play in the semantic analysis . Differences between oranges and
water-melons , for instance, are deemed irrelevant as far as their joint
membership of the category fruit is concerned. This restrictive
conception is terminologically linked to the distinction between
polysemy and vagueness . Distinctions among senses illustrate poly
semy: fruit is polysemous because it has at least the meanings
'something that people can eat and that grows on a tree or a bush'
and 'the result or effect of something' . Distinctions among the

members of a single sense are cases of vagueness: fruit is semantically
vague with regard to the differences between oranges and water
melons, because those differences do not lie at the basis of a
distinction between senses.
Another terminological distinction that is related to the restrictive
conception of semantic analysis is the contrast between encyclopaedic
and semantic information . Semantic information (in a narrow sense
of semantic , obviously) is information that enters into the definition
of senses . Encyclopaedic information, on the other hand, is
information that pertains to the members of the extension, but that
is not included in the definition because it does not apply to all the
members of the extension, or because it is not sufficiently distinctive
with regard to other categories . If, for instance, the attributes (a) to
(h) listed above were to constitute an adequate definition of fruit
(according to a classical model for definitions requiring generality
and distinctiveness), then (i) to (s) could be considered encyclopaedic
attributes.
It will have become clear from the discussion of fruit in the
previous pages, that prototype theory rejects the restriction of the
analysis to the intensional level. Prototype-theoretical analyses show
that an analysis of the int ernal structure of the referential range of a
word may be semantically relevant, first because the various
members of the extension need not have the same structural weight,
and second because clusters of overlapping extensional subsets may
take the place of classical definitions in those cases where a definition
in terms of necessary and sufficient attributes appears to be
impossible.
One terminological consequence of this recognition is , of course,
the fact that in a prototype-theoretical conception of meaning, the
distinction between semantic and encyclopaedic information cannot
be strictly maintained . Surely, there remains a distinction in the
structural status of information that pertains to all the members of a
category as compared to information that concerns only a single
individual member, but in general, no strict dichotomy can be
imposed between those attributes that are and those that are not
relevant for the definitional description on the intensional level.
Rejecting a very strict dichotomy between semantic and encyclo
paedic information has yet another terminological consequence: in
talking about the semantic structure of a lexical item, it may
sometimes be useful to replace sense with a term that is less theory

laden, in the sense of being less suggestive of a strict separation
between the level of senses and the referential level . In this respect, I
shall often resort to the term reading as an alternative for sense .
The various readings of a lexical item may also be referred to by
means of the term category, because they embody a linguistic way of
grouping extralinguistic things on the basis of common character
istics. (Again, thing is used here in the broadest possible meaning; it
may refer to objects , actions, events, properties , relations, or
whatever . ) Category, however, will be used with a broader range of
application than sense or reading. Specifically, it may also refer to the
semantic side of a lexical item as a whole, that is, to the cluster of
interrelated readings that together constitute the intensional level of
the semantic analysis. Thus, the reading 'edible part of a tree or
bush' of fruit is a semantic category , but the lexical item frnit as a
whole will also be said to constitute a category, because the various
readings of fruit ('edible part of a tree or bush', 'the result or effect of
something', and so on) together form a cohesive semantic structure .
In most cases where I use the term category, the context will readily
distinguish between these two ways of using the term; where it is
necessary to stress the fact that I am talking about the (polysemous)
semantic structure of a lexical item as a whole, lexical category will be
the standard expression.
Finally, a prototype-theoretical conception also calls fo r a specific
terminology to describe differences in structural weight within the
semasiological structure of a lexical item (the fact that some
members are recognized as more typical than others, or the fact that
some senses occupy a more central position on the intensional level ) .
These differences as such may b e referred to b y means o f the concept
salience: greater structural weight equals greater cognitive salience .
The structures themselves may be described in terms of a core or
central area surrounded by a periphery of less salient readings .
Because the peripheral readings often arise as variants o r modulations
of existing, more salient cases, they may sometimes be referred to as
nuances.
Returning from our terminological excursion to the four character
istics (a)-(6), we can now more easily appreciate that they
are systematically related along two dimensions. On the one hand,
the first and the third characteristic take into account the referential,
extensional structure of a category. In particular, they have a look at
the members of a category; they observe, respectively, that not all

members of a category are equal in representativeness for that
category, and that the referential boundaries of a category are not
always determinate.
On the other hand, these two aspects (non-equality and non
discreteness) recur on the intensional level, where the definitional
rather than the referential structure of a category is envisaged . For
one thing, non-discreteness shows up in the fact that there is no
single definition in terms of necessary and sufficient attributes for a
prototypical concept. For another, the clustering of meanings that is
typical of family resemblances and radial sets implies that not every
reading is structurally equally important (and a similar observation
can be made with regard to the components into which those
meanings may be analysed) . 1 1
To summarize what has been said so far, the following statement
may be put forward .
(t:) The concept o f prototypicality i s itself a prototypically
clustered one 1 2 in which the concepts of non-discreteness and
non-equality (either on the intensional or on the extensional
level) play a major distinctive role. Non-discreteness involves
the existence of demarcation problems and the flexible
applicability of categories . Non-equality involves the fact that
categories have internal structure: not all members or
readings that fall within the boundaries of the category need
have equal status, but some may be more central than others;
categories often consist of a dominant core area surrounded
by a less salient periphery.
The distinction between non-discreteness (the existence of demarca
tion problems) and non-equality (the existence of an internal
structure involving a categorial core versus a periphery) cross
classifies with the distinction between an intensional perspective
(which looks at the senses of a lexical item and their definition) and
an extensional perspective (which looks at the referential range of
application of a lexical item, or that of an individual sense of that
item ) . The observation that the structural characteristics found
among the readings of a lexical item are basically the same as those
found among the referents of a single reading provides further
support for the idea that the distinction between the semantic level
(that of senses) and the referential level (that of category members)
may be less important than is suggested by the tradition of

structuralist semantics (which tends to restrict the description of
linguistic meaning to the level of senses) . This suggestion is
corroborated by the recent finding that from a theoretical point of
view, the borderline between both levels does not appear to be
stable 1 3-an observation that will have to be kept in mind when I
discuss the diachronic relevance of characteristic (c5) .
The cross-classification between both relevant distinctions (the
distinction between non-discreteness and non-equality, and the
distinction between an intensional and an extensional perspective)
yields a two-dimensional conceptual map of prototypicality effects in
which the four characteristics mentioned before are charted in their
mutual relationships . Figure I . I schematically represents these
relationship s .
Characteristic ( c5 ) illustrates the extensional non-equality o f
semantic structures: some members o f a category are more typical or
more salient representatives of the category than others. Character
istic (/3) instantiates intensional non-equality: the readings of a lexical
item may form a set with one or more core cases surrounded by
peripheral readings emanating from the central, most salient
readings. Characteristic (y) manifests the notion of extensional non
discreteness: there may be fluctuatio ns at the boundary of a
category. And characteristic (tS) represents intensional non-discrete
ness: the definitional demarcation of lexical categories may be
problematic, measured against the background of the classical
E xte n s i o n a l Intensional
( o n t h e refere n t i a l (on the level of
leve l) senses)
N o n -eq u a l ity ( a ) D i ffe r e n ces o f ( j3 ) C l u ste r i n g of

( s a l i e nc e effects, salience a m o n g rea d i n g s i nt o f a m i ly
i n t e r n a I st r u c t u r e of m e m be rs o f a rese m b l a n ces a n d
core a n d p e r i p h ery) c a t e g o ry r a d i a l sets
N on - d is c r et e n e s s (y) F l u ct u a t i o n s at t h e (c5) A b s e n c e of
( d e m a rcat i o n p r o b l e m s , e d g es o f a cate g o ry defi n it i o n s in t e r m s
f l ex i b l e a p p l i c a b i l ity) of n ec e s s a ry a n d
s u ffic i e nt a tt r i b utes
FIG. 1 . 1 . Four types of prototypicality effects

requirement that definitions take the form o f a set o f necessary

attributes that are j ointly sufficient to delimit the category in
contrast with others .
I.3 HYPOTHESES ABOUT SEMASIOLOGICAL CHANGE
A s fa r a s historical semantics i s concerned, w e can now turn each o f

the four characteristics o f prototypicality into a statement o n the
structure of semantic change .
( �) By stressing the extensional non-equality of lexical-semantic

structure, prototype theory highlights the fact that changes in
the referential range of one specific word meaning may take
the form of modulations on the core cases within that
referential range .
(r1) By stressing the intensional non-equality of lexical-semantic
structure, prototype theory highlights the clustered set
structure of changes of word meaning.
(8) By stressing the extensional non-discreteness of lexical
semantic structure, prototype theory highlights the pheno
menon of incidental , transient changes of word meaning.
(1) By stressing the intensional non-discreteness of lexical
semantic structure, prototype theory highlights the encyclo
paedic nature of changes in word meaning.
Because actual examples corroborating these hypotheses will only be

presented in the context of the case-studies brought together in
Chapter 2, the hypotheses will inevitably remain somewhat abstract
at this stage . Still , it can be spelled out how they derive in a
straightforward manner from the characteristics listed under ( a ) to
( c5 ) .
Hypothesis ( �) suggests that changes i n t h e extension of a single
sense of a lexical item are likely to take the form of an expansion of
the prototypical centre of that extension . If the referents that may be
found in the range of application of a particular lexical meaning do
not have equal statu s , the more salient members will probably be
more stable (diachronically speaking) than the less salient ones .
Changes will then take the form of modulations on the central cases :
if a particular meaning starts off as a name for referents exhibiting
the features ABCDE, the subsequent expansion of the category will
consist of variations on that type of referent. The further the

expansion extends, the fewer features the peripheral cases will have
in common with the prototypical centre . A first layer of extensions ,
fo r instance, might consist of referents exhibiting features ABCD ,
BCD E , or ACD E ; a further growth of the peripheral area could then
involve feature sets ABC, BCD, CDE , o r ACD (to name just a few) . In
Section 2 . 1 this hypothesis will be supported by a case-study
involving the close inspection of the development of a recent Dutch
neologism , namely the clothing term legging.
Hypothesis (rt) shifts the attention from the extensional structure
of an individual meaning of a lexical category to the intensional
structure of the lexical item as a whole, that is, to the overall
configuration of the various readings of the word. The hypothesis
suggests that the structure of semasiological change mirrors the
synchronic-semantic structure of lexical categories, given that the
latter involves family resemblances, radial set s , and the distinction
between central and peripheral reading s . Semasiological change,
14
then, involves the change of prototypically clustered concepts.
This general statement c a n b e broken down into two more specific
one s . First, the structure of semasiological change a s a whole i s one
of overlapping and interlocking reading s ; specifically, a novel use
may have its starting-point in several existing meanings at the same
time. Second, there are differences in structural weight among the
readings of an item; specifically, there are peripheral meanings that
do not survive for very long next to more important meanings that
subsist through time . 1 5 In Section 2 . 2 hypothesis (rt) will be
corroborated by means of an extended case-study involving the
Dutch item vergrijpen.
Hypothesis (8) suggests that the synchronic uncertainties regard
ing the delimitation of a category have a d iachronic counterpart in
the form of fluctuations at the boundaries of the item. In Section 2. 3
a specifically striking example of such fluctuations will be d iscussed
under the heading ' Semantic pol ygenesis' . Seman tic pol ygenesis
involves the phenomenon that one and the same reading of a
particular lexical item may come into existence more than once in the
history of a word, each time on an independent basis. Such a
situation involves what may be called extremely peripheral instances
of a lexical item: readings that are so marginal that they seem t o crop
up only incidentally and that disappear as fast a s they have come into
existence. Specifically, when the same marginal meaning occurs at
several points i n time that are separated b y a considerable period, we

can conclude that the discontinuous presence of that meaning is not
due to accidental gaps in the available textual sources , but that the
meaning in question must actually have come into existence
independently at the two moments. The theoretical importance of
the phenomenon of semantic polygenesis resides in the fact that it
illustrates the existence of transient meanings in the diachronic
development of lexical categorie s . Since such transient meanings
could spring into existence at any moment in the history of a word ,
they are at the same time an illustration of the synchronically flexible
character of word meanings: exactly what belongs to a category at
one particular moment is not necessarily clear.
Hypothesis ( i ) , finally, suggests that diachronic semantics has
little use for a strict theoretical distinction between the level of senses
and the level of encyclopaedic knowledge pertaining to the entities
that fall within the referential range of such senses. In semantic
change, the 'encyclopaedic' information is potentially j us t as
important as the purely semantic 'senses' (to the extent, that is, that
the distinction is to be maintained at all) . This view follows from a
prototype-theoretical conception in general, and from feature (b) in
particular, in the following way .
If the meaning (or a meaning) of a lexical item cannot be defined
by means of a single set of necessary features that are j ointly
sufficient to distinguish the category from others, the definition
necessarily takes the form of a disjunction of clustered subsets . If,
for instance, there is no feature or set of features covering A BCD E in
its entirety, the category may be disjunctively defined as the
overlapping cluster of, for instance, the sets ABC , BCD, and CD E (and ,
in fact, others) . More concretely (and turning from a description
from an extensional level to a description from an intensional
perspective), if no single combination of the features (a) to (s) yields
a classical definition of the core reading of fruit, the category can only
be properly described as a disjunction of various groupings of the
features in question.
The subsets within the family resemblance structure need not
themselves constitute different senses (in the theory-laden interpreta
tion of the word ) ; they will not necessarily be recognized as such by
the language user . But even if they do not constitute separate sense s ,
they are defini tionally (and hence structurally) important : even
though ABC does not constitute a separate meaning of the category
ABCDE in any psychologically or intuitively important interpretation,

it is a subset that has to be taken into account in the (disjunctive,
clustered) definition of the category. Hence, it is impossible to
maintain the view that only the senses of a category (and not those
extensional subsets that do not constitute separate meanings, or
those descriptive features that are supposed to have 'encyclopaedic '
rather than ' semantic ' status) are structurally important .
From a diachronic point of view, this means that semantic changes
may take their s tarting-point on the extensional level just as well as
on the intensional level, or in the domain of encyclopaedic
information just as well as in the realm of semantic information .
Even where a classical definition zs possible , extensional subsets or
intensional features with an 'encyclopaedic ' rather than a 'semantic'
s tatus may play a crucial role in processes of semantic change . The
examples that I shall discuss in S ec tion 2. 4 will show precisely that :
the semantic extensions through which new meanings arise may take
their starting-point in extensional subsets that do not correspond
with senses in the structuralist sense, even in those cases where the
categories in question might be classically defined .
Although specific case-studies will be presented in the following
sections to substantiate the claims made in (�) to (i), there will be
an inevitable overlap between the studies in question. The semantic
phenomena to be presented are not restricted to specific word s ; each
word may exhibit various prototype-theoretical characteristics at the
same time, and I shall obviously point them out when we encounter
them .
To round off this overview of the potential descriptive impact of
prototypicality, it should be stressed that the aspects of semantic
change enumerated here are not necessarily new to diachronic
semantics . What is indubitably new, h owever, is the fact that these
more or (more likely) less known aspects of change can now be
incorporated into a global model of lexical-semantic structure. That
is to say , from a descriptive point of view the importance of
prototype t heory probably resides less in the novelty of its
observation s , taken separately, than in the fact that it brings
them toge ther in a n overall model of the structure of lexical mean
ing .
Further, the cognitive-semantic interest in historical semantics
has to be considered in a historical p erspective, if only to appreciate
its limits together with its innovative features. (This historical
comparison will be taken up again in Section 5 . 2.) The cognitive

semantic approach as a whole links up with the pre-structuralist
tradition of historical semantics that we commonly associate with the
names of Breal , Darmesteter, Paul, Wundt, Marty, Carnoy, Stern,
and the like; it does so because of its interest in polysemy and the
mechanisms underlying i t .
B u t , o n t h e other h a n d , cognitive semantics is not a simple re
enactment of the approach of the older schoo l . Specifically, if we
make a distinction between those aspects of semasiological structure
that involve the 'qualitative' links between the elements in such
structures ( l ike metaphor and metonymy), and the 'quantitative'
aspects of semasiological structure, involving the salience effects and
the differences of structural weight studied by prototype theory, it
may be noted that traditional historical semantics has been primarily
interested in the 'qualitative' aspect s . Most of the research situated
in the pre-structuralist tradition of historical semantics , in fact , is
concerned with the classification of semantic changes, that is, with
an analysis of the qualitative links in semasiological structure s , seen
from a diachronic angle . Notions of prototypicality are certainly not
absent from the tradition: there is, for instance, a remarkable
passage in Karl Otto Erdmann's Die Bedeutung des Wortes that reads
like a straightforward statement of prototypicality. 16 In general,
however, these overall 'quantitative' aspects of semasiological
structures received much less attention than the individual
mechanisms of change that lead from one existing sense to anothe r .
After all , t h e main product of pre-structuralist historical semantics i s
almost invariably a classification of such mechanisms of change.
So the received view that traditional , pre-structuralist historical
semantics is basically atomistic is correct, but we can now see that it
is atomistic in two respects. The structuralist criticism of traditional
historical semantics (as initially voiced by Leo Weisgerber in 1927)
blames it (among other things) for not taking into account what
ffilght be called the external structure of an item-the fact, that is,
that words are part of larger structures i n t h e lexicon (such as lexical
fields), and that the onomasiological structures in which a word
participates have to be studied to get a good grasp of the particular
value of the word in question . B ut we can now see , in the light
of prototype theory, that traditional semantics and structuralist
semantics alike tended to neglect the internal , semasiological
structure of lexical items (in the sense, that is, that they paid
relatively little attention to phenomena such as the clustered nature

of polysemy and the difference in salience of the various readings of
an item ) . Traditional, pre-structuralist diachronic semantics is
atomistic in the sense meant by the proponents of a structural
approach, but it is also atomistic on its own semasiological domain,
because it concentrates on the meaning relations that hold between
individual readings of an item, rather than envisaging the polysemic
structure of the item in its entiret y . In this respect, the cognitive
contribution to historical semantics is at once a return to the pre
structuralist interest in polysemy, and an addition to i t .
In general, then, w e shall have t o keep t h e modest observation in
mind that prototype theory, as a model of semasiological structure,
can never be a comprehensive theory of diachronic lexicolog y : it
does not cover the field of onomasiology, nor does i t even cover
the entire field of semasiology . Prototype theory, in short, may well
be a useful addition to diachronic lexicology, but it certainly does not
replace the older endeavour s .
Notes t o Chapter I
l. The correlation between synchronous polysemy and diachronic change

is formulated by Brown and Witkowski ( 1 98 3 : 83) in the following
term s : 'Polysemy is ubiquitous in language and its investigation has
considerable potential for illuminating human cognition. In addition,
the regular patterns of lexical change indicate that the lexicon is
amenable to systematic investigation as are other components of
language . Most importantly, the study of these regular lexical patterns
can contribute significantly to knowledge of the processes and capacities
which underlie human language and culture.' For statements along the
same lines, see , inter alia, Sweetser ( 1 990: 3 ) ; Ludtke ( 1 98 5 : 3 5 7 ) .
2. Overviews m a y b e found in Rosch ( 1 97 8 , 1 98 8 ) and Mervis and Rosch
( 1 98 1 ) ; the basic research is reported on mainly in Heider ( 1 972) , Rosch
( 1 97 3 , 1 97 5 , 1 977), and Rosch and Mervis ( 1 97 5 ) .
3. Though n o t exclusively: s e e Rosch ( 1 98 8 : 386).
4. Excellent overviews of the representational and experimental issues at
stake here are Smith and Medin ( 1 98 1 ) and Medin and Smith ( 1 984);
samples of more recent psycholinguistic research may be found in
Neisser ( 1 98 7 ) .
5. Wierzbicka ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; Lakoff ( 1 98 7 ) ; Langacker ( 1 98 7 , 1 99 1 ) ; Craig
( 1 986); Holland and Quinn ( 1 98 7 ) ; Rudzka-Ostyn ( 1 98 8 ) ; Taylor
( 1 99 5 ) ; Tsohatzidis ( 1 990) ; Kleiber ( 1 990) ; Dubois ( 1 99 1 ) ; Geiger and
Rudzka-Ostyn ( 1 99 3 ) ; Tyvaert ( 1 994) .
6. The classification of types of prototypicality effects presented here was

first introduced in Geeraerts ( 1 989a) ; it also features prominently in
Geeraerts et al. ( 1 994). A first attempt to apply this classification to the
various prototypicality effects that may be observed in historical
semantics is to be found in Geeraerts ( 1 992); the present approach ,
though, is not entirely identical to the one presented in the ( 1 992 )
article.
7. Even if this counter-example were not accepted, adding (c) and (d) to
the list of attributes that are general for fruit would not solve the
problem that that list does not suffice to distinguish fruits from some
vegetables and nuts .
8 . See Geeraerts ( 1 989a) for an illustration of the prototypicality of the
notion of prototypicality, i . e . for the idea that some lexical items exhibit
more typically prototype-theoretical characteristics than others. An
overview of possible sources of prototypicality effects is to be found in
Lakoff ( 1 98 7 ) .
9 . It could also be said that onomasiology deals with (formal) lexical
variation whereas semasiology deals with semantic variation-except for
the fact that actual usage of these terms tends to be looser, tending to
obscure the distinction. From a terminological point of view, it should
also be noted that semasiology is sometimes used in a broader sense than
when it is defined in contrast with onomasiology; that is to say ,
semaswlogy may sometimes be used in the sense of lexical semantics at
large (encompassing both onomasiology and semasiology in the narrow
sense).
I O . This model applies primarily to common noun s: it is a matter of debate
whether proper names have a sense .

l l . If, for instance, one has a family resemblance relationship of the form
AB , BC, CD, DE, then the cases BC and CD have greater structural weight
than AB and D E .
12. This formulation was first used by Posner ( 1 986).
1 3 . The synchronic instability of the borderline between the level of senses
and the level of referents is discussed in Taylor ( 1 992), Geeraerts
( 1 993a ) , and Tuggy ( 1 993) . The common strategy of these articles is to
show that different polysemy criteria ( i . e . criteria that may be invoked
to establish that a particular interpretation of a lexical item constitutes a
separate sense rather than just being a case of vagueness or generality)
may be mutually contradictory, or may each yield different results in
different contexts. The importance that prototype theory attaches to the
structural similarities that exist between the referential and the semantic
levels contrasts with Kleiber's view ( 1 990) that the extrapolation of
prototype-theoretical studies from the referential to the semantic level
somehow weakens the theory. By contrast, the impossibility of
maintaining the distinction between both levels in a stable way makes
the extrapolation more plausible.
1 4 . This is the aspect of prototypicality that has so far received the most
attention in diachronic semantics . The radial set structure of semantic
change is acknowledged or exemplified in Geeraerts ( 1 983a , 1 984a, b ,
1 985b) , Aijmer ( 1 985), Dirven ( 1 985) , Dekeyser ( 1 990 , 1 99 1 , 1 995) ,
Casad ( 1 992 ) , L . Goossens ( 1 992 ) , Rudzka-Ostyn ( 1 992) , Nerlich and
Clarke ( 1 992 ) , Evans ( 1 992 ) , and Anstatt ( 1 995) . The application of the
model to grammatical rather than lexical categories is illustrated by
Winters ( 1 989, 1 992a, b), Melis ( 1 990) , and Nikiforidou ( 1 99 1 ) .
1 5 . A s Margaret Winters ( 1 989) has pointed out , this distinction between
the central and the peripheral senses of an item may be the basis for a
new typology of semantic changes . She claims , in this respect , that
semasiological changes can ( simplifyingly) consist either of the change
of the prototypical centre of a category, or of a change in the periphery .
It should b e added , however , that this is a n incomplete classification :
we should also take into account splits and mergers next to mere
changes of prototypical centres. (An example of a process of merger will
be discussed in Chapter 4 . )
1 6 . The passage reads a s follows : ' Denn welche Theorien iiber Wesen,
Bedeutung und Entstehung der Begriffe man auch vertreten mag : vom
Standpunkt der Logik wird man immer fordern miissen, dafi sie eine
unzweideutige , klare Grenze aufweisen , dafi sie einen bestimmten
lnhalt und Umfang haben . Und Begriffe dieser Art werden <lurch
Worte nicht ohne weiteres bezeichnet . Worte sind vielmehr im
allgemeinen Zeichen for ziemlich unbestimmte Komplexe von Vorstel
lungen , die in mehr oder minder loser Weise zusammenhiingen . . . Die
Grenzen der Wortbedeutung sind verwaschen , verschwommen , zer
fliefiend . Treffender aber noch wird meines Erachtens der Sachverhalt
gekennzeichnet , wenn man iiberhaupt nicht von Grenzlinien des
Umfangs redet, sondern . . . von einem Grenzgebiet, das einen Kern
einschliefit . . . Den Kern denken wir uns dann alle diejenigen Dinge
oder anderen Vorstellungen enthaltend , denen unter alien Umstiinden
die Benennung <lurch das fragliche Wort zukommt , wiihrend wir dem
Grenzgebiet alle diej enigen Vorstellungen zuweisen , denen man die
Benennung sowohl zu- wie absprechen kann . . . Nun erscheint es wohl
am einfachsten , das Auftreten des Grenzgebietes darauf zuriickzu
fii h ren , dafi ein Wort nicht einen , sondern gleichzeitig mehrere Begriffe
bezeichne , die wohl teilweise sich decken und daher ein gemeinsames
Gebiet haben' [But whatever theories about the essential nature , the
meaning , and the origin of concepts one may adhere to, from the point
of view of logic one will always have to require that they exhibit
unambiguou s , clear boundaries , that their extent and content are clearly
specified . But words simply do not indicate concepts of that kind . In
general, words are rather signs for fairly unspecific complexes of mental
representations that belong together in a more or less loose way . . . The
boundaries o f words are vague, unclear, indeterminate. The situation is,

I would say, even more adequately described if one simply did not talk
about the borderline of the range of application of a word , but if one
were to talk about a border area that includes a core area �'e can
then think of the central area as including all those things or
representations for which the word in question is an adequate name in
all circumstances, while the border area consists of those concepts to
which the lexical expression could simultaneously be attributed and not
attributed . I t is easiest to derive the presence of a border area from
the recognition that a word does not just name one concept, but several
concepts that partially cover each other] (Erdmann 1 9 1 0 : 4-6). Note
that all the major characteristics of prototype theory appear in the
quot ation: the distinction between the core and the periphery of a
category, the clustered overlapping of senses, and the absence of clear
boundaries.
2
The Prototypical Characteristics of

Semasiological Change
IN the previous chapter , I identified four prototype-theoretical

features of semasiological structures, and correlated each of those
features with a descriptive hypothesis about the structural character
istics of semasiological change s . In this chapter , four case-studies
will be presented that successively support the hypotheses ( �) to ( i ) .
2.1 MODULATIONS OF CO RE CASES
I n what follow s , a case-study will b e presented that exemplifies the

first prototypical characteristic of semantic change identified in
Section 1 . 3 . At the same time, the case-study will demonstrate how
the prototype-theoretical interest in salience phenomena can be
extended to the domain of onomasiological variation.
In fact, prototype theory is basically a model for the semasiological
structure of lexical categories , but lexicology at large is concerned
with more than just semasiological structures: as mentioned at the
end of the p revious chapter, it includes the field of onomasiological
research. Moreover, even within the semasiological realm, proto
typicality effects are not the only topic to be incorporated mto a full
fledged theory of semanti c s . If prototype theory is, so to speak,
mainly concerned with the 'quantifiable' relationships (like s alience ,
centrality, degree of membership) that exist between the elements in
a semasiological structure, there exists a more traditional kind of
research that is concerned with the 'qualitative' links between the
elements in semasiological structure s . Studying metaphor and
metonymy, for instance , implies focusing on the nature of the
associations that occur between a literal meaning and its transferred
reading . This section, then, will not only try to establish the validity
32
Characteristics of Semasiological Change 33
o f hypothesis (�), b u t will also suggest that the concept o f salience

may be profitably introduced into diachronic onomasiology.
The case-study involves the changes that the concept 'legging' has
undergone in the first five years of its existence in Dutch .
Leggings-a tight-fitting pair of trousers for women, usually made
of an elastic material-are a relatively recent addition to the
vestimentary habits of European women. The first examples
probably date from around 1 98 7 , but the garment soon became very
popular, to the extent that i t is now a standard piece of clothing, of
the same common kind as blouses or skirts. Linguistically, the
introduction of such a new concept raises some interesting questions .
Semasiologically, the question is how fast the category starts to
exhibit prototype-based flexibility . Onomasiologically, the question
could be whether a linguistic analysis can reveal that the concept
does indeed become more popular: if the concept 'legging' does
indeed catch on as a category in its own right, one may expect to see
an increase in the relative frequency of the lexical items that
specifically name that concept . What I shall do, in other words, is to
follow the diachronic development of a neologism at very short
range.
The corpus used in the study consists of Dutch women's
magazines and catalogues from mail order firms . 1 These sources
were fol lowed from 1 988 to 1 99 1 . In order to study any differences
between Belgian Dutch (the variety of Dutch spoken in the Flemish
part of Belgium) and Netherlandic Dutch (the variety of Dutch
spoken in the Netherlands ) , the sources are more or less evenly
distributed over both countrie s : there ere two mail order catalogues
from each region , and there are three Belgian magazines versus two
from the Netherlands .
2
In the database compiled from these sources, each record
describes a reference to a legging as found in the magazines or the
mail order catalogues . For reasons that will become clear presently ,
only those references to leggings have been included for which the
actual referent of the word is visible: only if a picture or a drawing
illustrates the use of the word has the word been included in the
database. The database does not just contain leggings that are
referred to by means of the word legging or any of its synonyms , but
also leggings that are named by means of other lexical item s . This
implies, to be sure , t hat the compilation of the database proceeds in
two step s : first the semasiological range of application of the
34 Cha racteristics of Semasiological Change
category 'legging' is determined, and next, all the alternative names

are charted with which the elements in that range of application
occur. These alternative terms include hyperonyms like broek 'pair
of trousers' and hyponyms like stretchlegging 'legging made of a
stretchy fabric ' , but also words that overlap with the range of
application of legging. Tricotbroek 'tricot trousers' , for instance, may
occur as an alternative for legging when referring to more or less
tight-fitting pairs of trousers, but not all kmtted trousers need be
tight enough to fall within the extension of legging. In the same way ,
trousers that do not reach down to the ankles and that sometimes
appear with the name legging may on other occasions receive the
alternative name kuitbroek 'calf-length trousers' . But conversely, not
all calf-length trousers are so tight-fitting as to be named legging.
The description in the database consists of three parts: the lexical
part, the contextual part, and the referential part. The contextual
part is simply the identification of the place where the attestation is
found (which page of which issue of which magazine, etc . ) . The
lexical part contains the lexical item used as a name for the depicted
garment . 3 The referential part, finally, describes the garment in
question in a componential format. It will be clear now why the
database is restricted to names for depicted garments: only in this
way can an independent access to the referential level of language be
insured. The componential system used for the description of the
referents refers to six dimensions : the length of the garment, its
width, the presence of a crease, the material the garment is made of,
its function, and the sex of the person wearing it . The fact that
leggings are trousers is not included in the componential description:
this is a common feature, shared by all the instances of the category
compiled in the database. The full componential system is sum
marized in Table 2 . 1 . The left-hand column indicates the various
featural values used in the description. The right-hand column
describes the conditions for attributing a particular value. 4
The prototypical legging, then, receives a componential descrip
tion of the form < 3 1 1 1 1 f> . The digits refer to the various
descriptive dimensions in the order in which they are given in Table
2. 1 : the first digit gives the value for the dimension 'length ' , the
second for 'width' , and so on . The prototypical legging, in other
words, is long (L = 3), tight-fitting (W = 1 ) , does not have a crease
(C = 1 ) , is made of an elastic material (M = 1 ) , is worn like a pair of
trousers rather than, for instance, a piece nf underwear (F = 1 ) , and
Characteristics of Semasiologfral Change 35
T A B L E 2 . r The componential system used in the compilation of the legging

database
Feature Descriptive condition
Dimension L: length
value r The garment is not longer than the knee
value 2 The length falls in a range from just below the knee to the
calves
value 3 The length of the garment falls in a range from below the
calves to the ankles
Dimension W: width
value r The garment is very tight-fitting as if it were sticking to skin
value 2 The garment is somewhat tight-fitting, but not extremely
value 3 The garment is loose-fitting
Dimension C: crease
value r The garment does not have a crease
value 2 The garment has a clearly identifiable crease along the
middle of the front and the back of the leg
Dimension M : material
value I The garment is made of a smooth, finely woven or knitted
material
value 2 The garment is made of a more coarsely woven or knitted
material
value 7 The garment is made of a transparent material (like lace or
voile)
value x The garment is made of any other type of material
(corduroy, jeans .)
Dimension F: function
value r The garment is worn as a piece of upperwear, that is, is at
least partly visible as the uppermost layer of clothing
value 2 The garment is worn as a piece of underwear, or as part of a
night-dress
Dimension S: sex
value f The garment is worn by a woman
value m The garment is worn by a man
is worn by a woman (S f) . The determination of the prototype is

=
straightforward: not only is < 3 I I u f> the single most attested

configuration of features in the entire database, but also, it is the
combination of all the featural values that are dominant on each of
Characteristics of Semasiologi,cal Change
the six dimensions . Note that there is no logical reason why this
should be so, that is, why the preponderant values on each
dimension should have a tendency to co-occur . It is, on the other
hand , part and parcel of the prototypical model of semantic structure
that this should be so .
On the basis of the corpus as just described , the semasiological
development of the category ' legging' in the period from 1 988 to
1 992 can be charted as in Figures 2 . 1-2 . 5 . The category is
represented by three synonymous words : leggi,ng, leggi,ngs, and
calefon . As we shall see further on in this section , the distinction
L=2,
L=2,331
I
M=1
S=f
� �
11111f(1)
31 1 11t m
2111u m
I
I
32111f(1)
22111f (2)
'"""·-----·-1--- ·----+------- --1--- 1
Fm. 2 . I . The semasiological range of application of the category

legging in 1 988
-----J=��=-=�=- =��-----·- ,_ L=2,3
E
! '
M=1
I
.
! ! !
S=f
l ' 31112f(4)
21112fl1)
I F=1
! 31 1 Hf( 1 1 }
21 11 1f(31
311x1f(1)
-----·--·-·- L
32111f(1)
l
! ___
FIG. 2 . 2 . The semasiological range of application of the category

legging in I 989
between these alternative items involves geographic variables,

namely the distinction between Belgian Dutch and Netherlandic
Dutch . Because there are no differences in the referential value of
the three items , the diagrams describe the range of application of the
category ' legging' as represented by the three synonyms taken
together .
In each diagram, the range of application of the category in one
particular year is represented as a cluster of overlapping sets . Each
set contains a number of componential configurations as attested in
the corpus; a set is defined on the basis of one of the componential
Characteristics of Semasiological Change
L=2,3
W=1
M=1
S=f
31112f(3)
F=1
nu ifl l?) 31121f(3)

11111f (3) 2 Hi 1fm 311x1f (1)
at2tu m
32111f (8) 32121f(1)

22111f(3) 331x1f (1)
32211f (2) 22121f (1)
FrG . 2 . 3 . The semasiological range of application of the cateogory

legging in I 990
features used in the description of the garments . For reasons of

graphical economy and elegance, the C-dimension (referring to the
presence of a crease) has been ignored. For each dimension , only the
dominant feature receives a separate representation as one of the
overlapping sets . (For the L-dimension , the values 2 and 3 are taken
together; we shall presently see that the overall picture does not
change significantly when this is not the case . ) The figures in
parentheses accompanying the componential configurations indicate
the absolute frequency with which that configuration is present in
the 'legging' material for the year under description .
L=2,3
W=1
31112m (1)
21112f(1) S=f
31112f (6)
31121f(11)
3111 1f {6$J
311x1f(13)
31171f(1)
211x1f(1)
l
32121f(2)
32111f(30)
I 32211f(1)
' 22111f(2)
321x1f(2)
32171f(1)
221x1f(1)
""" t i"'
"""''"""""'"'""''"'"""" """"""--··---""""""""""'"
32112f(2) 32122f(1)
} '
22112f(1) 321x2f(1) :
I I i
321x2m (1)
[
t::= �::· · · · · · · · · ....................
FrG. 2 . 4 . The semasiological range of application of the category

legging in r 99 1
The overall picture resulting from the overview exhibits two

striking features , each of which conforms to the expectations put
forward by prototype theory . First, at each synchronic point, the
semasiological structure of the category is characterized by a
dominant core (the prototypical instantiation of the category) ,
surrounded by peripheral instantiations that deviate i n one o r more
features from the central cases . The category does not consist of
identical cases with equal weight, but the category is, as it were , held
together by the presence of a predominant central case, less central
and less frequent instantiations being related by similarity to the
40 Characteristics of Semasiological Change
'"'""""""-"'"'-""'""""""""'�""'"'""""""··-"'·""-'" -__...,
L=2,3
W=1
M=1
21112f (6) 21122 f(1) S=f

11112f (1) 31112f (12) 31122f (3)
31172f (1)
F=1
31121f (13)
31 1 � ff( 1iai 311x1f (10)
!\:.
31171f (2)
21111'.f ��1)
� t21tf.JH
21121f (1)
211x1f (1) lI\
1
1
21171f (1)
12111f(1)
32111f (60)
32211f (3)
32121f (6)
321x1f (4) l� 131x1f
1 3 1 x 1 f (1)
(1)
I
•
33111f (4)
32221f (1)
I-�,,��::� :�:��1-- 1
33211f (1)
33121f (1)
22111f (1)
32112f (5) 32122f (1)

12112f (1)
321x2f (1)
12112m (1)
FIG . 2 . 5 . The semasiological range of application of the category

legging in I 992
central case . The dominant area is not just statistically dominant (in
the sense that it contains the majority of cases), it is also structurally
dominant, in the sense that it constitutes the area where the sets in
the semasiological cluster exhibit maximal overlap .
Second, from a diachronic angle, the category shows a n increasing
flexibility : from year to year, the periphery of the category becomes
more and more extended . The core area remains intact, but the
fringe area of allowed variation grows broader and broader. The
pattern is quite regular: in each year, the innovations for that year
are the least frequent cases. Again, this is a pattern that fits in neatly
with the predictions of prototype theory. Although the prototypical

view does not predict that all categories will exhibit a flexibility that
increases over a certain period, it does imply a hypothesis about the
path that the increasing flexibility (if it occurs at all) will take: taking
its starting-point in the prototypical core, it will move ever further
away from the centre. Such a step-by-step development is precisely
what is revealed by the gradual filling up of the representation from
Figure 2 . 1 to Figure 2 . 5 .
Two remarks are necessary a t this point . T o begin with, the fact
that this exploitation of the prototype-based flexibility of the
category occurs already after no more than five years of the
category's presence in the language is perhaps surprising, but the
phenomenon has in fact been observed before: see, m particular,
Moerdij k's minute description of the rapid semantic development of
the Dutch neologism kamerbreed 'wall-to-wall' (Moerdij k 1 985 ) .
Further, i t is o f course true that the increased flexibility i s
correlated with a n increased absolute frequency o f the category . So
could we not presume that the 1 988 material would exhibit the same
degree of diversity as the 1 992 material, if only we had a similar
number of attestations for the former year as for the latter? Note ,
however, that the differences in absolute frequency are not without
significance: they do not result from a deficient coverage of the
earlier years, but reflect the actual situation that leggings are less
present in the early material than in the later material, relatively
speaking j ust as well as absolutely speaking . Leggings simply were
not as common in 1 988 as they were in 1 992 , and in this sense, the
expansion away from the prototypical centre that is attested in the
figures is likely to reflect an actual progression, rather than just
being an observational artefact .
An alternative way of charting this semasiological development
towards increasing flexibility is to determine the degree of deviation
of the exemplars of the category that do not conform to the
prototype. The degree of deviance increases as a particular exemplar
of the category shares fewer features with the prototype . The nature of
the features has to be taken into account as well: if a dimensional
value is not prototypical but still quite common, a degree of variation
of 0 . 5 rather than 1 may be attached to it. In practice , the
dimensional values L = 2, W = 2, and M =2 were given a
deviational weight of o. 5 . The dimensional values of the prototypical
configuration < 3 I I I I f> obviously received a weight of o. All the
other dimensional values were weighted as exhibiting a degree of

deviation of 1 . It will be noted, then, that the calculation is slightly at
variance with the picture drawn in Figures 2 . 1-2 . 5 : the C-dimension
is not ignored , and the prototypical core is determined in a more
restricted way (to the extent that only the value 3 on the L-dimens1on
is included in the prototype).
The overall picture remains the same, though. In Table 2 . 2 , the
top row indicates the degrees of variation found in the range of
application of the 'legging' category. (The zero degree obviously
corresponds with the prototype . ) The columns specify the relative
frequency with which the configurations exhibiting a particular
degree of deviation occur in the material for each particular year.
The crucial point about the table is the fact that the degrees of
variation attested in the corpus increase over the years, and that the
increase follows a regular pattern from less to more deviant cases.
The new configurations that are added to the range of application of
the category are not chosen randomly, but exhibit a more or less
stepwise pattern from minimal to maximal deviation.
As an addition to Table 2 . 2 , it can also be shown that the number
of configurations exhibiting a given degree of variation increases
over the time . Table 2 .2 c h a r t s the relative frequency of the
configurations with a given degree of deviation compared to the
prototype. Table 2 . 3 , on the other hand, indicates how many
different configurations may each year be found with a given degree
of deviation . Table 2 .2 shows, for instance, that 4 . 8 per cent of the
I 989 materials consists of configurations with a degree of deviation
T A B L E 2 . 2 Relative frequencies of configurations with a given degree of

deviation with regard tD the prototype
Year Degree of deviation
0 0.5 1 .5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1988 38.9 44 . 4 16.7

1 989 52 .4 19.0 23 . 8 4. 8
1990 3 1 .9 38 . 3 21.3 6.4 2. I
1 99 1 47 . 8 30. 1 1 4 .0 4.8 1 .6 I.I 0. 5
1 992 42 . 8 3 4 .6 I 1 .3 8.2 1 .9 o.6 0.3 0.3
TABLE 2 . 3 Number of different configurations corresponding with the

various degrees of deviation
Year Degree of deviation
0. 5 r .5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1988 2 2
1 989 2 2
1 990 3 6 2
1 99 1 3 6 6 3 2
1 992 3 6 9 6 2
of i . 5 . Table 2 . 3 reveals that there is actually only one such

configuration. In 1 992 the frequency of the configurations with a
degree of deviation I . 5 has increased to 8 . 2 per cent, but Table 2 . 3
adds the information that this 8 . 2 per cent i s distributed over mne
different configurations . Table 2 . 2 stresses the horizontal dimension :
from year to year, there is an increase in the degree of deviation that
occurs in the corpus. The increase in the flexibility occurs along the
vertical dimension as well, as Table 2·. 3 shows: the number of
different configurations exhibiting a degree of variation of I .5
gradually increases from I to 9 .
Given that these data establish the validity o f hypothesis m from
Section i . 3 , we may now venture an excursion into the onomasio
log1cal domain. The onomasiological development of the category
'legging' , m fact, will appear to be no less outspoken than its
semasiological development. It is well known, of course, that
onomasiology involves a reversal of the semasiological perspective .
While a semasiological perspective takes the word form as its
starting-point, and investigates how several meanings are associated
with that word, onomasiological research reverses the perspective,
and takes its starting-point in the concepts expressed; it investigates ,
basically, which various words may express a given concept, and
what the structural links between those words are .
An onomasiological interpretation of salience phenomena, then,
will be concerned with statistical differences m the selection of one
lexical item rather than another for naming a referent or a class of
referents . Such a selection procedure may, however, involve two

radically distinct kinds of choice. 5
First, the choice for one item rather than another may imply
semantic difference s : a miniskirt that is at the same time a wrap
around skirt could be called miniskirt or wrap-around skirt, or simply
skirt. Each time , a distinct semantic category is chosen: the concept
'miniskirt' is different from the concept 'wrap-around skirt' , that is,
miniskirt and wrap-around skirt are not synonyms. Selecting the term
miniskirt for naming a particular garment automatically places it in a
different category than if wrap-around skirt had been used . The
onomasiological salience of a lexical item like miniskirt or wrap
around skirt or skirt may then be defined informally as the probability
that the category in question will be chosen to name any of the
entities that it may legitimately refer to.
The following operational definition of onomasiological salience
may be put forward : the onomasiological salience of a category is the
frequency of the lexical item naming the category divided by the
cumulative token frequency in the database of the referents in the
extension of that lexical item . The rationale behind this definition is
as follows. For each kind of referent in the extension of a lexical
item , there may exist alternative terms (co-hyponyms, hyponyms,
hyperonyms). A category is onomasiologically highly salient if it is a
likely choice for the referents it names, that is, if it is stronger than
the alternatives . Thu s, given a corpus of language use , the
onomasiological salience of an item like miniskirt can be calculated by
counting how many times miniskirts (that is, the potential referents
of miniskirt) are named in the corpus , and then checking how many
times these are actually referred to with the lexeme miniskirt, rather
than alternative ones like wrap-around skirt or skirt.
With regard to our 'leggings' example, the formula for calculating
the entrenchment (that is, the onomasmlogical salience) of the
category will have to take into account the fact that the category may
be named by three synonymous items . As mentioned above, the
category 'legging' occurs with three names: legging and leggings , with
an English origin, and the French calefon . In calculating the
entrenchment of the category 'leggings' , the occurrences of these
three synonyms will clearly all contribute to the salience of the
category . However, the question then arises whether no preferences
can be discovered in the selection of either legging or leggings or
calefon with regard to each other. The variation at stake here, in
other words , is of a formal rather than conceptual nature-an

observation that suggests looking for a correlation between the
frequency of legging, leggings, and calefon, and classical variational
parameters of a sociolinguistic or geographical or stylistic nature .
What then are the actual results of the mvestigation? Table 2 . 4
charts the development o f the onomasiological entrenchment of the
category . The results clearly show that 'legging' is a category that
catches on : more and more, the garments that fall within the range of
application of 'legging' are actually being called by one of the names
that are unique for the category. The growing success of the category
does , of course, also show up in the rising absolute frequency of the
items legging and calefon, which we noticed in the semasiological part
of the investigation. It should be clear, however, that the notion of
onomasiological entrenchment described here is an independent
measure that does not coincide with the absolute frequency of the
items legging and calefon . Table 2 .4 , in other words, shows that it
becomes more and more natural to identify and name leggings as
leggings, and not as anything else . Or, one could say, the cognitive
salience of the category 'legging' as such increases. This is, to be
sure, not a necessary development: a newly introduced concept
could just as well have no success and remain in a marginal position.
The onomasiological entrenchment measure described in Table
2 . 4 is based on a cognitive conception of onomasiological variation.
The phenomena in question are straightforwardly semantic
phenomena: they involve a cognitive preference for categorizing a
particular thing (or set of things) one way rather than the other. As
mentioned above, there is yet another interpretation of onomasio
logical salience, according to which differences of salience between
TABLE 2 . 4 The development of the onomasiological entrenchment of the

category legging
1 98 8 1 989 1990 1 99 1 1 992
(a) Frequency of legging, leggings,

cale�on 18 21 47 185 318
(b) Corpus frequency of
corresponding referents 52 57 83 231 404
Entrenchment ratio: (a I b) 0 . 346 0 . 368 0 . 566 o.8 0 . 787
denotational synonyms are correlated with contextual factors such as

are commonly studied in dialectological research, sociolinguistics,
and stylistics . In the present case-study, such phenomena can, in
fact , also be found .
Table 2 . 5 shows that the distribution of the three synonyms
legging, leggings, and caleqon is not random: there is a clear
preference for caleqon in the Belgian sources, whereas legging(s) is
virtually the only form in the Netherlands . (The figures are
percentages; legging and leggings are treated as a single lexical type
for simplicity . ) Remarkably, though, the Belgian preference for the
French term diminishes over the years. It would seem, however,
that this ties in with the specific relationship that exists between
Belgian Dutch and Netherlandic Dutch. Historically, the standard
ization process in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium developed
much later than that in the Netherlands . In the Netherlands,
standard Dutch largely developed in the seventeenth century. In the
Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, on the other hand, the development
of a Dutch standard was halted by the dominant presence of French
as the language of government, education, and higher culture,
specifically in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century. When,
from the late nineteenth century onwards, the Flemish nationalist
movement stimulated the gradual adoption of Dutch as the standard
language in those parts of Belgium where a situation of diglossia was
found (with Dutch dialects as a substratum and French as the
superstratum), the Dutch standard as it existed in the Netherlands
was generally accepted as the normative model for the Belgian
variety of standard Dutch . Contemporary sociolinguistic research
reveals , however, that the influence of French is still present in
Belgian Dutch, specifically in its more informal or regional varieties.
In this respect, the pattern exhibited by the data i n Table 2 . 5
makes good sense . I n line with the historical background, Belgian
Dutch initially appears to have undergone the influence of French.
After a while, however, the normative model provided by Nether
landic Dutch begins to exert its influence, and the English terms that
are prevalent in the Netherlands penetrate into Belgian Dutch . This
interpretation of the data in Table 2 . 5 should not, to be sure , be
extrapolated into a general model of the present-day linguistic
relationship between Belgian Dutch and Netherlandic Dutch; in
many other cases, in fact, both language varieties share innovations
taken over from English. At any rate, Table 2 . 5 clearly exemplifies
T A B L E 2 . 5 The geographical distribution of legging, leggings, and calec;on
Year Belgium The Netherlands
calefon legging(s) calefon leggings
1 98 8 I OO . O
1 989 IOO.O I OO . O
1 990 96 . 9 3. I I OO . O
1991 55.5 44 . 5 0.9 99 . 1
1 992 66. 5 33 . 5 IOO.O
the second, formal type o f onomasiological salience introduced

above.
2.2 RADIAL SETS THROUGH TIME
In the previous section, we saw that the internal extensional

structure of the individual senses of a lexical item is reflected in the
way in which those senses develop over time. In the classificatory
terminology introduced in Section I . 2 , this means that we have so
far restricted our attention to aspects of the extensional level of
semantic structure. Specifically, we have tried to establish hypothesis
(�), which involves the extensional non-equality of lexical-semantic
structure. But Section r .2 also argued that there is a far-reaching
structural parallelism between the extensional and the intensional
aspects of lexical-semantic structure . In the form of hypothesis (17),
it was especially suggested that intensional non-equality effects
would show up in the clustered set structure of the changes that
affect polysemous lexical items .
As a case-study6 of this phenomenon, we will consider the
semantic development of Dutch vergrijpen from 1 5 00 up to 1 900,
taking into account the empirical material provided by the historical
dictionary of Dutch , the W oordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal
(WNT) . 7 Vergrijpen is a morphologically complex word derived from
the verb grijpen ' to seize, to catch, to grasp' , which is cognate of
English to grip, German greifen, Gothic greipan, and the prefix ver-,
which can occur with a large number of semantic values. (It will be
specified presently which ones are important for the meaning of

vergnjpen . ) In present-day Dutch, it is used in reflexive valency, 8 in
combination with a prepositional phrase introduced by aan: zich
vergnj'pen aan means, roughly, 'to lay violent hands upon' . With
regard to money, it can be used with the value 'to steal ' ; with regard
to women, it may mean 'to assault, to rape' .
The first attested occurrence of vergrijpen in the M iddelnederlandsch
Woordenboek, 9 the historical dictionary of Middle Dutch, stems from
the writings of the mystic Jan van Ruusbroec ( 1 293-1 3 8 1 ) :
( r ) Alwaert dat hem die mensche vergrepe o f misprake o f dat wel sulce
dine hem invallen mochte die onrecht ware [If it happened that a man
made a mistake or spoke the wrong words or if things occurred to him
that were unjust) (Ruusb . 3 . 97) 1 0
The meaning of the prefix in vergrijpen as used in the quotation may

be rendered by the adverbial phrase 'in the wrong way, with negative
results' . This is a common function of ver- : it can be found in other
reflexive verbs, such as zich verspreken 'to mispronounce a word, trip
over a word' , zich verslikken 'to choke in swallowing' , zich verrekenen
' to miscalculate' . In this respect, the morphological structure as well
as the meaning of vergrijpen parallels that of to mistake in its
etymological sense (to mis-take). However, taking into account the
frequent occurrence of pleonastic disjunctions in older texts, the
exact value of Ruusbroec's vergrijpen is somewhat indeterminate: if
there was no opposition between hem vergrepe and hem misprake, the
former expression would be synonymous with the latter, meaning 'to
make a mistake in speaking, to say something wrongly' . In the other
case, the meaning would be 'to do something wrong' rather than 'to
say something wrongly' . The difference is not without importance: it
will not only reappear in the later ages, but it can also be found in the
remaining Middle Dutch quotations in the Middelnederlandsch
Woordenboek , both from the fifteenth century. Quotation (2) belongs
to the 'to do something wrong' interpretation, whereas (3) exhibits
the reading 'to say something wrong' .
(2) Heb ic mi yet vergrepen in enigher manyeren; soo will ic(t) altoos
gaerne laten corregieren. [If I have done wrong in any way , I will
gladly have it corrected any time . ] (Sp. d . Leken I 893v)
(3) Die stamerende man, of hi hem in sinen woorden vergrype, hi moet
hem we! verhale n . [The stammering man, if he made a mistake in his
words, he will have to repeat and correct himself. ] (Sassensp. I . 36.
65)
The Middle Dutch situation, however, is not the primary focus of

this investigation, which will concentrate on the readings attested
from 1500 onwards, that is, the period covered by the WNT. The
relevant groups of quotations will be chronologically presented; for
each reading to be distinguished, the oldest and the most recent
quotation will be given. The different developments will first be
analysed separately; an analysis of the development in general will
follow further on. Readers may find it useful to consult Figure 2.6
below as the discussion unfolds, in order to better capture the
gradual emergence of the graphical representation.
(4) Doen sprac Juda tot sinen broederen wat helpet ons, <lat wi onzen
broeder dooden ende zijn bloet verbergen? Coemt laet ons hem den
Ismaeliten vercoopen, op <lat onse handen hem niet en vergrijpen aen
hem, want hi is onse broeder. [Then spoke Judah to his brothers:
what good is it to us to kill our brother and hide his blood? Come, let
us sell him to the Ishmaelite, lest our hands lay violent upon him, for
he is our brother.] (Bijbel v. Liesveldt, Gen. 37E; 1526)
(5) Bava hadde misschien niet altoos aan het verlangen kunnen weerstaan
den laffen opstoker te tuchtigen, en vroeg of laat zich aan hem
vergrepen, indien hij !anger hem dagelijks onder zijne oogen hadde
moeten zien. [Bava might not have been able to resist for ever the
desire to castigate the cowardly firebrand, and might have laid violent
hands upon him sooner or later, if he had had to face him daily any
longer.] (Sleeckx 16. 43; 1863)
The meaning 'to use violence against someone' that is exhibited

here, seems to be connected to the Middle Dutch reading 'to do
something wrong': it is a concrete specification of the more general
meaning, interpreted along moral lines. On the other hand, a more
direct relation to grijpen 'to catch' should not be excluded either,
given the 'laying hands upon, catching hold or that is part of the act
of committing physical violence; under this interpretation, the
meaning could be paraphrased as 'to take hold (unlawfully,
unethically) of someone, with the intention of exerting violence upon
him'.
(6) Ende sterft opten berch, als ghi daer ghecomen sijt ... Om <lat ghi v
vergrepen hebt aen mi onder die kinderen van Israel by <lat twist water.
[And die on the mountain when you have come there, for you have
acted against me among the children of Israel by the waters of
discord.] (Bijbel v. Liesveldt, Deut. 32G; 1526)
(7) Tegen God vergrepen zij zich! [Against God they misconducted
themselves!] (Drost, Hermingard 180; 1832)
In (6) and (7), the notion of acting against someone's physical

person is replaced by that of acting against someone's wishes or
someone's authority. The meaning comes near to that of 'to rebel
against, to revolt against, to oppose'. The above quotations only
contain examples of actions against God, but other examples have
been attested where the object is a person to whom one owes respect
and obedience (such as one's mother).
(8) Ick wil v broederlicken vermaendt ende ghebeden hebben, mijn

lieue L., dat wanneer v conscientie tuyght, dat ghy v teghen God of
uwen naesten, moght in eenighe maniere vergrepen, oft door quade
exempelen yemandt gheerghert hebben, dat ghy als dan tot God ...
v hert keeren wilt. [I want to have you fraternally prayed and
warned, dear L., that when your conscience proves you have acted
badly against God or your fellow man, or have vexed someone
by bad examples, that you should turn your heart towards God.]
(Gnapheus, Tab. E iijr; 1557)
(9) Omdat men zich eenmaal aan haar vergrepen had, wilde Margaretha
zich wreken op de geheele wereld. [Because they had once treated
her badly, Margaretha wanted to revenge herself on the whole
world.] (Bohn-Beets, Onze buurt 14; 1864)
The interpretation shifts away from that in (4) and (5) towards a
less physical or violent way of doing harm to someone; the meaning
may be paraphrased as 'to treat badly, to harm in a moral (or
otherwise not primarily physically violent) way'.
(ro) Achar, welcke bedroefde Israel, doe hy hem aen het verbannen
vergreep [Achar, who saddened Israel, when he violated the
exile] (Bijbel v. Deux Aes, l Kron. 2: 7; 1562)
(rr) Dat des Koninx Inlandsche subjecten, die hun tegens de voorsz.
contracten, ofte des Koninx bevel, eenigzints mogten komen te
vergrypen . . . naar bevindinge van zaaken zullen worden gestraft
[That the native subjects of the King, when they violated the
contracts mentioned above, or acted against the King's orders,
should be punished according to the matter] (Valentijn, 0.-/. II.
2. 12ob; 1724)
The kind of use exemplified by (IO) and (II) is closely connected

with that in (6)-(7): what is acted against is not a person, but an
abstract guide-line, such as a contract, a rule, an order, a
punishment; hence the paraphrase 'to violate'. To a certain extent,
the difference from (6)-(7) is one of selectional restrictions: in
(6)-(7), the prepositional object is a person, in (10)-(11), it is an
abstract notion . Because the examples (6) and (7) imply such an
abstract object (rebelling against a person is wanting or trying to
violate his abstract wishes , commands , authority, and so on), the
difference is, so to speak, one of semantic surface structure rather
than deep structure .
( r 2 ) Hij heeft hem vertast, vergrepen . [He has mis-felt, mis-taken . ]

(Sartorius 2 . 7 . 6 3 ; r 5 6 r )
This i s the 'etymological meaning' o f vergrijpen: t o grasp, catch,

seize (etc . ) in the wrong way , speaking literally. However, simple as
this kind of usage may seem, it has a somewhat dubious quality to it .
To begin with, the quotation given here occurs in a collection of
proverbs: as such, it probably exhibits the literal meanmg together
with the figurative meaning 'to make a mistake' (see examples ( 1 6)
and ( 1 7) below) . Also, the other occurrences of the literal meaning
( 1 2 ) are all to be found in dictionaries, ranging from 1 5 76 to the
twentieth century . As such, there are strong indications that the
literal meaning, though possible, is relatively infrequent. This is no
reason to ignore it, but it will be shown further on that this fact has
some importance for the interpretation of the figurative meaning 'to
make a mistake' .
( r 3) So hem yemant int heymelijcke met eenige handelinge ofte were
vergrepen hadde, ende claechde dat eenen anderen broeder vvt
grooter smerte ende droeffenisse zijns herten, dat hy also tegen
zijnen God gesondich t hadde [If anyone had committed a fault in
secret by any act or accomplishment, and , from great sorrow and
sadness of the heart, confessed this unto another brother, that he had
thus sinned against the Lord] Nicolai, in Bihl. Reform . Neerl. 7 .
446 ; 1 569)
( r 4) Sy namen nimmermeer het gebiet van die overwonnen Caciquen ofte
Heeren dat ghebooren Heeren waren, ende ofte al yemandt van
desen hem vergreep , soo straften sy den selvighen, doch ghevende
zijn officie, ofte aen zijn kinderen ofte aen zijn broeders, ende
gheboden haer onder danich te wesen. [They never again took the
land of those conquered Caciques or Lords that were Lords by birth,
and i f one among these committed a crime, they punished the same,
though giving his office either to his children or his brothers, and
ordered them to be obedien t . ] (V. Linschoten, Beschr. v. Guinea g
2ra; I 5 96)
( r 5 ) De Sluische , in ontroerd-begrijpen, dat iedereen zich we! eens
vergrijpen kon , zou dan geneigd zijn tot schikken en vergeven. [The
woman from Sluis, in moved understanding that anyone could go

beyond the accepted limits, would then be willing to arrange things
and forgive.] (Hartog, Sjofelen 186; 1902)
The meaning of vergnjpen in these quotations is 'to do something

that is not allowed by certain (moral, legal, religious) standards' To
show the different shades of this concept, two sixteenth-century
quotations are included. In the first one, the transgression involves
religious standards, and zich vergnjpen means as much as 'to sin'. In
the second case, legal standards are at stake, and the meaning is 'to
act against the law, to commit a crime'. (This is the most frequent
case in this category.) The general meaning 'to do something
unallowed' is a generalizing abstraction from the more specific kinds
of doing something wrong that we found m (4)-(5) and (6)-(_7)
(and, derived from them, in (8)-(9) and (I0)-(11) as described
above). Syntagmatically, it is characterized by the fact that the verb
is very often without a prepositional object: the semantic
development from particular cases of unacceptable actions to the
more general reading of committing any unallowable action is
paralleled by a syntactic loss of specificity.
(16) Ick ben ghedwonghen tselve te beantwoorden en op het cortste te

wederlegghen, opdat zijne Excellentie met noch vele hem niet
voorder en vergri,jpe. [I am forced to answer the same (a paper) and to
refute it presently, so that his Excellency, with many more, should
not be in error further.] (in Fredericq, Pamfl. 167; 1583)
(17) Gewis gelooft gy, in uwe redekundige eenvoudigheid, dat men, om
Dahlialiefhebber te zyn, alleenlyk de Dahlias moet liefhebben. Laet
my toe u te zeggen dat gy u leelyk vergrypt! [Surely you believe, in
your logical simplicity, that one, to be a dahlia-lover, should only
love the dahlia. Allow me to say that you are badly mistaken!]
(Consc., Avondst. 122; 1846)
On the face of it, the relationship between (12) and (16)-(17)

seems quite simple: the latter is the figurative extension of the
former, literal notion of not catching, or catching wrongly, into that
of making a mistake. This development, of course, is analogous to
that in English to mistake. However, if one takes into account the
remarks made with regard to (12), and the fact that the reading 'to
make a mistake (for instance, in speaking)' is already present in
Middle Dutch, it becomes less obvious that there is a straightforward
line from (12) to (16)-<..17): rather, it could be the case that the
figurative interpretation, being chronologically prior , has an

autonomous origin, in the sense that the morphological derivation
vergrijpen might have arisen immediately in a non-literal use .
( 1 8) Homerus heeft . versiert en toe bereyt De lichte Circe Vrouw van
d'ongebondenheyt, In dartelheden gay! en wellust opgetrocken : Wie
sich met haar vergreep , veranderde in Boeken, In Beeren, Swijnen en
dus antler dom gediert. [Homeros has adorned and equipped the
light Circe, unconstrained woman, in frolicsomeness randy and
accomplished in desire: whoever committed adultery with her
changed into a he-goat, bear, pig, or other dumb animal . ] (Bredero
I . 3 1 5 ; c. 1 6 1 5 )
This first seventeenth-century quotation exhibits the meaning 'to
be adulterous , to fornicate' , which may be seen as yet another
specification of the reading 'to do something unallowed' . Though
there is only one WNT quotation with this meaning, we shall see in
connection with (25) and (26) that there exists a related reading that
is much more frequent.
( 1 9) Hoewel daer een van me Confraters, hem laetstmael, te bijster had
vergist, Dat hy sich vergreep , te Disputeeren, tegens een Latinist
[Although one of my colleagues, the other day, made such a
miscalculation that he made the mistake of discussing with a
Latinist] (Kl. v. d. Gew. Hoorendr; 1 626)
(20) Wanneer hy elders hoort jokken en boerten, moet hy zich wagten
van overluyd te lagchen, te schateren, of een ma! gelaat aan te stellen
met klappen in de handen, en zich alzo te vergrypen. [When he (a
sagacious courtier) hears joking and jesting, he should abstain from
laughing too loud or making a preposterous sight by clapping his
hands and doing thus what is improper . ] (Welleventheid 22; 1 733)
These quotations belong together with examples ( 1 3 )-( 1 5 ), the

difference being that the fault committed here is not something that is
ethically or legally unallowed, but something that is improper,
unwise, or impertinent . The reading illustrated by ( 1 3)-( 1 5 ) is more
rigid than that represented by ( 1 9)-(20) : in the former case, what is
done is something that is formally forbidden, whereas in the present
instances , something inadvisable is done .
(2 1 ) Het pack is rampeloos overgekomen, maer wie salder de hand aen
steken? En, van <lieder sich aen vergrijpen sullen, wie salder niet
meer uyt als ingebracht hebben? [The packet (a manuscript) has
arrived without calamities , but who will take it up? And those who
will have laid their hand upon it, who will not have taken more out
than he has put in?] (Huyghens, in Hooft, Br. 2 . 298 ; 1 633)
(22) Aen de roem v a n U . M . regering en a e n d e n voorspoed der
Nederlandsche natie zoude zich die Minister vergnjpen welke in zulk
eene geschapenheid van zaken voorstellen mogt, om de gelden .
op eene aanmerkelijke wijze te verminderen. [Against the fame of
your Majesty's government and the prosperity of the Dutch nation
would act he who might propose in such a situation to diminish the
funds in a drastic way . ] ( Falck, Ambstbr. 5 5 ; 1 8 1 8 )
The kind o f u s e illustrated by (21 )-(22) i s closely connected with
examples (8)-(9) , and hence also with (4)-( 5 ) . In contrast with
(2 1 )-(22 ) , the object is not a person, but an abstract thing (fame ,
prosperity, the contents of a text, and so on) . As such, the relevant
meaning is 'to exert a negative influence upon, to harm in an abstract
way ' . In contrast with (4)-( 5 ) , the harm done is not physical; in this
respect, it is surprising that a more direct application of (4)-(5) with
regard to objects (in the reading ' to damage physically') occurs only
in the nineteenth century ( see (34)-(3 5 ) below) . Within the group of
quotations presented here, the first one stands out because of its
allusion to the physical act of seizing; in the later examples, this
overtone is a b s en t .
( 2 3 ) Wat kan h e t de stadt voordeelen of er 2 o o f 50 millioenen in de banck

gevonden wert, indien se haar van de penningen der kooplieden n iet
bedient? En soo wanneer de stadt haar daarin wilde vergrijpen,
deselve aantasten, en haar daarvan bedienen, hetselve soude soowel
konnen geschieden uit de minder als uit de meerder somme. [What
advantage can it be to the city if 20 or 50 million is found in the bank ,
if it does not avail itself of the money of the merchants? And if the
city would want to take hold of this, interfere with it, and make use
of it, this might be done equally with regard to the smaller as with
regard to the larger mm . ] (Phoonsen, in Ecan. -Hist. Jaarb . 7. 5 4 ;
1 677)
(24) Dat het arme volk, om uit de ellende te komen , zich we! vergrijpen
moest aan hetgeen anderen zich hadden toegeeigend [That the poor
people, to rise from misery, had to lay their hands upon what others
had appropriated] (Quack, Soc. 1 . 1 8 3 : 1 9 1 1 )
The reading illustrated here may b e paraphrased a s 'to take
unlawfully into possession , and hence: to steal ' . It is to be linked to
the literal meaning of grijpen , and to the aspect of doing something
unlawfully that is present in the major readings (4)-(5), (6)-(7), and
most of their cognates , especially ( 1 3 )-( 1 5 ) .
( 2 5 ) ' k Was immers maar een bloed, J a gek, soo i k mijn selven aan haar
gong vergrijpen . [I was but an ignorant boy ; crazy , if I would have
violated her honour . ] (Bellamante 2 3 ; 1 689)
(26) Deze eerwaardige persoon kwam nu met den voorslag ter baan om
het meisje van hen over te nemen, zeggende dat hij te Larissa kennis
had aan een niet minder eerzamen handelaar, die steeds een aantal
schoone slavinnen den kost gaf, ten einde door hare bekoorlijkheden
zijn jonge en ook oude stadsgenooten te beletten zich aan de vrouwen
hunner buren te vergrijpen. [This respectable person came with the
proposal to take over the girl from them, saying that he was
acquainted with an equally respectable merchant at Larissa, who
continually kept a number of beautiful slaves, in order that their
charms might prevent his young (and old) fellow citizens from
interfering with their neighbours' wives . ] (V. Limb . Brouwer 1 .
35 4 ; 1 8 5 7 )
Though there is a clear connection between these examples and
the case represented by ( 1 8) , because of the sexual context, there is
this difference between ( 1 8) and the reading ' to violate a woman's
honour' , that the latter need not involve an actual deed of adultery,
and that the former misses the notion that the woman in question is
treated badly (adultery implies mutual consent) . Because of the
aspects 'to violate' and 'to exert (moral) violence upon someone' ,
(2 5 )-(26) i s close t o (4)--( 5 ) . I n this respect, i t i s worthwhile remarking
that the reading ' to rape, to violate in a physical sense ' , which is even
closer to (4)-- ( 5 ) than (25)--( 2 6) (where the violence is primarily moral
and where the violation is primarily of a woman's honour in
abstracto) , is not found unambiguously before the twentieth century .
Beside the links with ( 1 8) and (4)--( 5 ) , there is also a much weaker
relationship between (23)--( 24) and (25)--( 26), if one takes into
account that the notion of 'possession' , at work in (23)--{24) , may
also be linked with the sexual 'possession' hinted at in (25 )--( 26).
(27) Dat . . . a l s het derde dee! van het leger der Massageten onder het
beleit van S . . . . ter plaetse gekomen was daer alle deze spys en
drank was , zich zodanigh daer i n vergrepen heeft, dat al het krygsvolk
verwonnen van den drank in slaep vie! [That, when the third part of
the army of the Massagetes, under the command of S . , had reached
the place where all the food and the drinks were, they so indulged in
this that all the soldiers fell asleep, overcome by the beverage] (De
Bruyn , Reizen 2. 244b ; 1 7 14 )
(28) Wanneer z y den beker w a t t e sterk gelicht, en zig i n ' t drinken van
Saguweer . . '/Jergrepen hadden [When they had lifted the cup too
.
much, and had mdulged in drinking Saguweer] (Valentijn , 0 . -/ .

II. I . I 36a; I 724)
This early eighteenth-century meaning ('to indulge in eating or

drinking, to one's own detriment') is related to the concept 'to do
something violent, to do something in a violent, unrestricted way'
(as in (4)-(5 ) above), to the concept 'to do something forbidden or
inadvisable, unwise, improper' (as found in ( 1 3)-( 1 5 ) , or ( 1 9)-(20)),
and t o th e notion 'seizing, grabbing, taking' (the meaning o f grijpen) .
An additional link with (4)-( 5 ) might be found in the notion of doing
harm to someone (specifically, oneself), but since the person harmed
is expressed by the reflexive pronoun and not in the form of a
prepositional object as in (4)-( 5), it becomes apparent that the
function of ver- in ( 1 3) is slightly different from that in the previous
readings. In fact, ver- may form compounds with the conceptual
structure ' to harm the person or thing referred to by the object or the
reflexive pronoun by performing the action named by the head
word' . (For another example, see (29) below . )
(29) Die d e handt vergrepen, een voet , vinger o f hant verstuykt, of

vertreden heeft . . die stryken hun 's avonds ende 's morghens met
desen Balsem . [Those who have hurt their hand in catching, ricked
or sprained a hand , finger or foot, should rub themselves with this
balm in the evening and the morning . ] (Simons, Troost d . Annen 9 ;
I 72 I )
Though connected with ( 1 2) , the meaning 'to harm i n seizing' is

singular by its transitive nature, and by the additional aspect of
harming the thing named by the direct object, due to a function of
ver- that is identical to that in (27)-(28) . Because (29) is easily
derivable on the basis of grijpen and the conventional readings of ver-,
dictionaries mention it up to the twentieth century: yet , the example
given above is the only one in the W NT corpus based on actual use.
(30) Zoo het gebeurde, dat eenige plaatzen ofte dorpen , zich jegens haren
Heere vergrepen, ofte quamen te rebelleren, zullen de Gouverneur en
Stadhouder des Koninks de zelve rechten, of wel naar gelegenheit,
vyandelyk aantasten, en tot gehoorzaamheit brengen . [If it occurred
that any hamlets or villages revolted against their chiefs or came to
rebellion, the Governor and Representative of the King shall try the
same, or, if necessar y , attack them and bring them to obedienc e . ]
(Valenti j n , 0 . -l . I I . 2 . 7 6 b ; I 724)
( 3 I ) De gestatueerde wetten omtrend slaaven, die zich aan hunne
Characteristics of Semaswlogical Change 57
lyfheeren of vrouwen vergrypen [The statutory laws concerning

slaves violently rebelling against their masters or ladies] (N . -1 .
Plakaatb . 1 3 . 3 0 4 ; 1 80 1 )
The quotations (30) and (3 1 ) exemplify the meaning 'to rebel

violently ' , which combines readings (4)-( 5 ) and (6)-(7).
( 3 2 ) D . en P . worden v a n de Dienders gevat D . M y n Heertj es ! j e vergryp
j e , zeker! [ D . and P. are caught by policemen. D . My Lord ! You
must be mis-taking , surely ! ] (Langendijk 4. 236; 1 732)
In this (isolated) quotation, the literal meaning of ( 1 2) and the

figurative one of ( 1 6}-( 1 7) are consciously combined: by catching the
wrong person, the policemen 'seize wrongly' and at the same time
'commit an error'
(33) Ik zou my aan my zelf zo vergrypen kunnen. [I might well lay a

violent hand upon myself.] (Wolff en Deken, Burg. 7 3 2 ; 1 7 82 )
The notion ' t o commit suicide' a s found i n (33) i s a specific

concretization of (4)-( 5 ) , with euphemistic overtone s .
(34) Want eenige kwajongens, die zich aan d e ruiten der inwoners
vergrijpen, willen wij niet de eer bewijzen van eene vlek op deze
bemoedigende schets te doen werpen. [We won 't do a few
mischievous boys who damaged the windows of the inhabitants the
honour of spoiling this appealing picture . ] (Kneppelh. I O . 8 1 ;
1 848)
(35) Alzoo heeft een roekelooze knaap, met baldadige hand, zich
vergrepen aan den lauwerkrans van den meest populairen, vader
landschen zanger. [Thus a reckless boy with wanton hand has raised
his hand against the laurel-wreath of the most popular national
poet . ] (De Genestet 2 . 3 1 1 ; 1 85 7 )
Here too , we fi nd a direct extension of (4}-( 5 ) : violence is

exercised against objects instead of against persons, so that the
meaning becomes 'to damage in a physical sense', as opposed to
( 1 8)-(20) and (2 1 }-(22), where the harm done is abstract, not
physical.
Figure 2 . 6 summarizes the findings of the previous pages . For the
sake of simplicity, eight points m time are distinguished: readings
occurring within the same half-century are taken to be synchronically
contemporaneous . The lines in the picture indicate the diachronic
relations between readings; interrupted lines symbolize weaker links
than uninterrupted ones . To facilitate comprehension, a concise list
Ce nt u ry
1 6- 1 1 6- 1 1 1 7-1 1 7-11 1 8- 1 1 8- 1 1 1 9-1
R ___
Q _______
'
'
D ---..,-----��
B �-----�---
E ------�---
N ___________
G -------�--
FIG . 2 . 6 . The diachronic structure of vergrijpen

Fm. 2 . 6 . Continued
Label Example Def i n i t i o n a l g l os s
A (4)-( 5 ) t o u s e p h y s i c a l v i o l e n ce a g a i n st ( s o m e o n e )
B (6)-( 7 ) to o p p o s e s o m e o n e to w h o m o n e owes respect a nd
obedience
c (8)-(9) to h a r m ( s o m e o n e ) i n a n o n - p h y s i c a l w a y
D ( 1 0-1 1 ) to o p p ose an a b s t ract p r i n c i p l e
E ( 1 2) to m i s-take
F ( 1 3 )-( 1 5 ) to d o s o m et h i n g fo r b i d d e n
G ( 1 6 )-( 1 7 ) to m a k e a m i st a ke
H ( 1 8) to a d u l t e rate
I ( 1 9 )-( 20) t o d o s o m et h i n g i n a d v i s a b l e , u nw i s e , i m p ro p e r
J ( 2 1 )-(22) to h a r m ( s o m et h i n g ) in a n o n - p h y s i c a l w a y
K ( 23 )-(24) to s te a l
L (25)-(26) t o v i o l a t e a wo m a n ' s h o n o u r
M (27 )-(28) t o e a t o r d r i n k exces s i v e l y
N (29) t o h u rt w h i l e c a tc h i n g o r s e i z i n g
0 ( 3 0 )-( 3 1 ) to r e b e l v i o l e n t l y
p ( 32) to catch t h e w r o n g p e r s o n
Q (33) to c o m m it s u i c i d e
R ( 34)-( 3 5 ) to d a m a g e ( s o m et h i n g )
of the eighteen readings that make up the diachronic structure of

vergrijpen is added to the figure . 12 Also for the sake of simplicity, the
link of similarity that exists between the two major clusters in the
structure of vergrzjpen (the major cluster with the central reading 'to
do something wrong' and the smaller cluster with the central
meaning 'to mistake') has not been indicated . The similarity can be
most economically presented by stating that the meaning of
vergrijpen is either 'to do something wrong' or 'to do something
wrongly' : either to do something that is considered inappropriate in
itself, or to do something in an inappropriate manner. 1 3
A single glance a t th e figure suffices t o appreciate the fact that the
process of semantic development is not a straightforward one : the
multiple relations between the readings of vergrijpen alone might
suffice to corroborate the thesis that diachronic semantics supports
prototype theory, or, at least, supports those theories that oppose the
view that the conceptual categories of natural language are rigidly
delineated. Rigid delimitation among concepts implies rigidly
defined semantic changes , but nothing of the sort seems to apply in
the case of actual developments.
I n various ways, the limits of individual word meanings partially
fade in the course of semantic development . Instead of rigidly

defined senses developing individually, one finds synchronically
distinct meanings being blurred in the process of semantic change .
Three features of the structure exhibited by Figure 2 . 6 may be
mentioned separately.
In the first place , new meanings frequently arise through the joint
influence of several existing ones: cases such as ( 1 3)-( 1 5 ) , ( 27)-(2 8 ) ,
(30)-(3 1 ) , and ( 3 2 ) are clear examples . Although a description o f this
fact is not impossible within a traditional brand of rigid semantics, it
does not fit naturally into such an approach: if meanings exist as
well-delimited entities, one would expect these clear-cut distinctions
to be maintained diachronically, that is, one would expect new
senses each time to develop from one particular meaning. Instead,
one finds multiple origins, suggesting a prototypical organization of
partially overlapping readings without clear boundaries.
In the second place, meanings develop marginal nuances that
do not subsist in time, but that seem to crop up more or less
occasionally. Examples are (32) and (33), and , to a lesser extent,
( 1 9)-(20) . In each of these case s , existing readings are extended into
nuances that are only marginally different from them . On the fringe
of particular categories, there appear incidental specifications that
give a particular conceptual twist to those categories , much in the
same way as the modulations on legging that were described in
Section 2 . 1 . From this angle, the borderlines of meanings appear to
be vague, not just because several meanings at a time may produce a
new one but also because separate meanings as such can be used with
slightly different variations . This is an eminently prototypical fact :
around a hard conceptual core , peripheral nuances arise. Diachronic
ally, the central meaning is represented by categories that persist in
time, whereas the conceptual satellites consist of specifications that
do not live on, such as ( 3 3 ) , ( 1 9)-(20) , and ( r n)-( 1 1 ) , which more
or less marginally develop readings (4)-(5 ), ( 1 3)-( 1 5 ) , and (6)-(7)
respectively. A combination of overlapping and incidentality is
found in (32) and (27)-(28 ) .
I n the third place , n o t all concepts o r subconcepts are equally
important in the process of semantic change: the figure exemplifies
that some concepts play a larger role in the determination of changes
than others. The feature of doing something wrong, for instance,
which is present in readings (4)-( 5 ) , ( 1 3)-( 1 5 ) , (8)-(9), (34)-( 3 5 ) ,
and s o o n , i s more important than a less general aspect, such a s that
o f making a wrong catch, i n ( 1 2) and ( 1 6)--( 1 7) . The latter notion has

less conceptual offspring than, for instance, (4)-( 5 ) , or that of
committing suicide, (33), or rebelling violently, (30)-(3 1 ) , which do
not themselves give rise to new developments . The different weight
of particular features in semantic change is the diachronic parallel of
the difference in salience in a synchronous prototypical organization :
the fact that the structural role of particular subconcepts within a
conceptual structure may vary is analogous to the diachronic
observation that the role of certain features in setting off semantic
changes is more important than that of others .
Taken together, these features paint a general picture of vergrijpen
that consists of clusters of interlocking and overlapping meanings .
There are two major clusters: the one with the central meaning 'to do
something wrong' , and the (smaller) one with the central meaning
'to mistake ' . Both clusters are related by similarity (but this is not
indicated in the figure). A comparison with the Middle Dutch
material analysed at the beginning of the discussion shows that both
clusters were already existent before the sixteenth century, in the
readings 'to do something wrong' and 'to make a mistake in saying'
respectively . Within the first cluster, the figure allows us to
distinguish three related subcentres: the most important one with its
origin in (4)-( 5 ) , the smaller one with its origin in (6)-(7), and the
intermediate one centred round ( 1 3)-( 1 5 ) .
The prototype-theoretical nature o f the structure now becomes
fully apparent: not only do individual meanings receive closely
related nuances, but vergrijpen as a whole appears to consist of two
clusters of internally related meaning s. Even on the highest level of
structural organization, meanings combine and interrelate to form
conceptual networks. In this respect, it seems natural to say that
vergrijpen contains two separate prototypes ( ' to do something wrong'
and 'to mistake'), of which the most important one is itself made up
of three smaller prototypical centres (with (4)-(5 ) , (6)-(7), and
( 1 3)-( 1 5 ) as examples of the prototypical kernels ). Saying, in this
way , that the diachronic structure of vergrijpen is prototypical
expresses that the diachronic relationship between the different
readings of that word is parallel to that between the various
subconcepts in a synchronic prototypical structure.
Another way of expressing the same insight would be to say that a
kind of Wittgensteinian family resemblance holds between the
elements of the major 'families' in the conceptual structure of
vergrijpen . On the one hand, readings (4)-( 5) and (6)-(7) are

connected through their common aspect of illicitly acting against an
individual' s person or will , wishes, instructions, and so on . On the
other, hardly any common aspect exists between (8)-(9), derived
from (4)-( 5) and having a number of features in common with it, and
( r n)-( 1 1 ) , derived from (6)-(7) . The readings in the clusters of
vergrijpen are mutually related in several ways, but there is no single
definition covering all of them .
In order to avoid misunderstandings, the following point has to be
clarified: saying that the diachronic structure of vergrijpen is
prototypical does not imply that there is one and only one
prototypical concept that holds together the different chronological
developments, to such an extent that all the readings mentioned in
the separate clusters can be considered variations of a single central
meaning. The example studied in the previous section consisted of a
category with a single prototypical centre, whereas the present
example s hows that a prototypical cluster may itself contain salient
subconcepts . (For instance, ( 1 3)-( 1 5 ) and ( 1 9)--(20) are closer than
( 1 9)-(20) and (2 1 )-(22), because ( 1 3)-( 1 5) and ( 1 9)-(20) belong
together in a particular subprototype . ) What our analysis show s , in
general, is that these additional subprototypical centres can be
analysed in a way that is similar to the prototypical analysis that was
given in the previous section of the development of legging.
2.3 S EMANTIC POLYGE NESI S
I n the previous section w e encountered innovations in the semasio

logical structure of vergrijpen that appeared to be incidental:
transient readings that did not subsist over time. Such passing new
meanings illustrate hypothesis (8) as described in Section 1 . 3 : the
extensional non-discreteness of lexical-semantic structure shows up
diachronically in the form of fleeting modulations at the edges of a
category . In this section the same hypothesis will be further
corroborated on the basis of a related phenomenon: the fact that a
particular reading of a lexical item may come into existence at several
occasions in the history of the word , each occurrence being
genetically independent of the others. A first example of this
phenomenon, which may be called 'semantic polygenesis' , is the
following. 1 4
In the course of 1 983 the Dutch singer-songwriter Herman van

Veen appeared in Amsterdam in a concert for the benefit of Amnesty
International . Referring to the mothers and wives of the people who
disappeared during the military regime of General Videla in
Argentina, who gathered daily on the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires
to protest the abduction of their family members , he spoke of 'de
dwaze moeders van het plein , wier kinderen verduisterd zijn [the
crazy mothers of the square , whose children have been eclipsed] .
Van Veen's use of the word verduisteren in this context is remarkable
for two reasons . First of all , it is synchronously unusual . Verduisteren
is normally only used with regard to things , not with regard to
people; its literal meaning being 'to become or to make dark' , it is
commonly used in the reading 'to eclipse ' , as said of the sun or the
moon . Among its figurative readings , the most common one refers to
the embezzling of money . In Van Veen's poetic language , however,
it refers to people rather than things ; the word might be interpreted
as 'to make (someone) disappear unlawfully and against his will , to
abduct' . This is a metaphor that can be easily interpreted as an
extension of the conventional synchronous meanings , but that is still
innovative enough to be stylistically forceful .
Remarkably, though , this kind of usage is not entirely new in the
history of Dutch . In the WNT corpus for the sixteenth, seventeenth ,
and eighteenth centuries, a number of quotations can be found that
refer precisely to situations in which people disappear from the
public scene , by being hidden against their will from the public eye .
Examples are given in (36) and (37) . 1 5
(36) Dat d e Heeren Gouverneurs . . . vande Steden van Sale . . . haer

verobligeren over te leveren alle de Slaven ghenomen inde Schepen
vande voornoemde Vereenichde Provintien . . . ende sullen alle de
selve in vryheyt stellen , met conditie , dat van haren 't wegen men
overlevert het gelt , dat de voornoemde Slaven op d'eerste opveylinge
. . . hebben gekost . . . sonder dat terwijle hare Vrienden
Ransoenen versamelen , de Patroonen haer sullen mogen verduysteren
of tot andere Plaetsen versenden . [The Governors of the city of Sale
commit themselves to hand over all the slaves taken in the ships of
the United Provinces , and to set them free , on condition that on their
part they hand over the money that the slaves have yielded at the first
auction . While their friends raise their ransom money , the bosses
will not be allowed to hide the slaves or send them to different
places . ] (Gr. Placaetb . 1 . 1 29 ; 1 65 1 )
(37) Den Sulthan (belooft) de vereyschte ordres te sullen stellen en doen

verexecuteeren , ten eynde desselvs koningryk van alle weggelope
slave en andere snood geboefte werde gesuyvert . . . insonderheyd
met soodanige 30 mans en 22 vrouwen als jongst . . . aftogt verleend
tot nog toe verduysterd en (na de gerugten) onder de Bantamse
ryxgrooten verdeeld zouden zyn . [The sultan promises to give the
necessary orders and to have them executed , in order to clear his
kingdom from all runaway slaves and other evil riff-raff, specifically
those 30 men and 22 women who, recently having been granted an
unopposed withdrawal , have so far remained hidden and have been
(as the rumours go) divided among the mighty of the kingdom of
Bantam . ] (in D e Jonge , Opk . 9. 1 8 5 ; 1 7 3 1 )
Because i t i s not really likely that Van Veen might have been
inspired by seventeenth-century Dutch , his use of verduisteren is a
novel creation rather than an archaism. This very fact , then (that is ,
that a particular reading of a word may crop up several times in the
history of the item , on independent grounds , and with a remarkable
temporal hiatus), is what we will understand by the term 'semantic
polygenesis' .
The theoretical importance of the concept will be clear . It resides
in the fact that the phenomenon of semantic polygenesis illustrates
the existence of transient meanings in the diachronic development of
lexical categories . Since such transient meanings could spring into
existence at any moment in the history of a word , they are an
illustration of the flexible and fuzzy character of word meanings:
exactly what belongs to a category at one particular moment may be
subject to highly transient modulations . At the same time, semantic
polygenesis illustrates the importance of the prototypical salience
effects that are an aspect of the structure of lexical categories . Why,
in fact , can specific , marginal instantiations of a category be
'invented' time and again, independently of each other? Two things
are needed . On the one hand , semantic polygenesis involves the
application of such general mechanisms of semantic change as (in
the case of verduisteren) metaphor .
On the other hand , these mechanisms of semantic extension can
only yield similar results when applied at different moments in time
if they take their starting-point in the same kind of meaning .
Whereas the 'polygenetic' meanings are not handed over from
generation to generation, the basis for the semantic extension
yielding the polygenetic readings necessarily has to be a reading (or a
cluster of readings) that is continuously transmitted. Because these

continuously transmitted readings are among the more salient ones
within a lexical item (whereas the polygenetically derived ones are
highly peripheral), semantic polygenesis presupposes a prototypical
structure conceived of in terms of a salient core surrounded by an
ephemeral periphery . Semantic polygenesis, in short, consists of the
diachronic discontinuity of peripheral meanmgs based on the
continuous transmission of the more salient readings of a lexical
item .
Before we move to the consideration of some additional examples ,
a number o f methodological issues have t o b e treated. It should be
clear, to begin with, that the analysis of cases of semantic polygenesis
rests on the representativity of the corpus used . If the temporal
hiatus reflects a general lack of attestations for a particular word ,
rather than being the result of a discontinuous transmission, the
hiatus illustrates the lack of representativity of the corpus rather
than semantic polygenesis. In general, the WNT corpus (with some
20 million quotations) is quite reliable. Specific precautions may ,
however, be taken to avoid the difficulty just described.
First, if the overall number of quotations in the corpus for a lexical
item is low, it will be difficult to attribute semantic poly genesis to
any of the readings of that item. In the case of verduisteren, for
instance, the analysis of the word as a whole is based on several
hundreds of quotations . The disappearance of quotations like (36)
and (37) after the seventeenth century, m other words, can be safely
attributed to an actual change in the language rather than to an
accidental gap m the corpus .
Second, the temporal hiatus has to be sufficient: a gap of fifty
years would obviously be a rather weak indication of polygenesis. In
actual practice, the following examples of polygenesis will involve
cases with a temporal hiatus of roughly two centuries.
And third, as the corpus primarily addresses the written, standard
language, care has to be taken not to include readings that occur with
a geographically or sociolinguistically restricted distribution . It
sometimes happens, for instance, that a reading that disappeared
from the written language in the seventeenth century subsists in one
or other dialect and then surfaces again in the corpus as an entry in a
nineteenth-century dialect dictionary.
In addition to these methodological restrictions, potential examples
of two specific types have to be discarded for theoretical reasons :
semantic polygenesis in the pure sense has to be distinguished from

repeated borrowing, and from what might be called 'morphological
polygenesis'-the fact that a word receives a discontinuous reading
by a non-conventional analysis of its morphologically complex
structure. As a case in point of morphological polygenesis, consider
( 3 8 ) , where vergraven is formed from the prefix ver- and graven 'to
dig, to excavate, to delve' . The usual readings of vergraven are 'to dig
up' and 'to remove by digging' . In the sixteenth century, one may
also find the reading ' to hide (something) by burying it' , specifically
in the figurative interpretation illustrated by quotation ( 3 8 ) ;
vergraven then means as much a s 'to cover up' .
(38) Het dochte ons veel beter, eenen dee! van haer ongheschickte ende
onbehoorlicke aenslaghen met stilswijghen te vergrauen, dan de selue
. . . ruchtbaer maeckende , jemandt oorsaecke geuen om (etc . ) . [It
seemed much better to us to silently bury part of their useful and
wanton attacks, rather than, by making them public, give someone a
reason to (etc . ) . ] (Apol. v. W. v. Or. 1 5 ; 1 5 8 1 )
After the sixteenth century, n o quotations are found involving

precisely this reading . In the Hollandsch-Hoogduitsch Hand
woordenboek of 1 809, however, the entry vergraven features the
reading 'to hide by burying', both in its literal reading and in the
figurative reading illustrated by ( 38 ) . This is not the result , to be
sure, of a continuous lexicographical tradition: it sometimes happens
that readings that disappear from the actual language are retained in
the dictionaries , but that is not the case here . Rather, the reading ' to
hide by burying' activates one of the morphological possibilities of
the prefix ver-, which regularly indicates a process of disappearance,
of removing someone or something out of sight (as in verbergen 'to
hide' , verduisteren ' to eclipse' , verhullen 'to conceal', verstoppen 'to
hide' ) . This morphological reinterpretation of vergraven falls entirely
within the systematic possibilities of nineteenth-century Dutch. The
resulting reading is not conventional within mneteenth-century
Dutch (at least, it is not found elsewhere in the WNT materials for
the nineteenth century, except in the Hollandsch-Hoogduitsch
Handwoordenboek), but it is clearly a morphologically possible
reading. Cases such as these, involving a morphological reanalysis of
a lexical item, will not be considered instances of semantic poly
genesis in what follows: only examples will be mentioned that involve
purely lexical-semantic (rather than morphosemantic) extensions . 1 6
Given these restrictions, we may now have a look at some
additional examples of bona fide semantic polygenesis . 1 7 All of them

involve a metaphorical extension of an existing meaning.
(39) En elck will lobs verdriet en lobs verdragen hooren : Soo lieffelick
wordt leed met sulcken lied verguldt. [And everybody wants to hear
Job's sorrow and Job's endurance; thus gently, grief is attenuated
with such a song . ] (Huygens, Ged. 6. 2 5 1 ; 1 65 8)
(40) Z i j was heel devoot en probeerde haar verdriet met den troost van
het geloof te vergulden. [She was very pious and tried to tone down
her sorrow with the comfort of religion . ] (Timmermans , Anna
Maria 8; 1 92 1 )
(4 1 ) Wat mach Salemon baten die groote macht Van rijckdom, datmen
gelijcx niet en mocht weten Vander Sonnen opganck, tot daer zy
vernacht? [What good is the power of riches to Salomon, such that no
equal can be found from where the sun rises to where it passes the
night?] (Numan, Sp. d. M. A vj'; 1 5 95 edn . )
(42) Een zonne alleen, die eeuwig daagt, die nooit e n zal vernachten, die
zonne en kent geen Dalila, die Samson geen ontkrachten! [One sun
only , that rises forever, that will never pass the night, that sun knows
no Delilah, that Samson knows no emasculation ! ] (Gezelle, ed.
Baur 2 , 427; 1 896)
(43) Die Heere der heyrscharen . . . wecket mi alle morgen, Hy wect mi
dat oore, <lat ick hoore ghelijck als een leerkint. [The Lord of hosts
. . . awakens me every morning; he awakens my ear , so that I might
listen like a pupi l . ] (Bijbel v. Liesveldt, Jes. 50B ; 1 5 32)
(44) Dat zij sedert echter z o o gewillig, zoo gaarne, iederen avond d e
sluimerende snaren had gewekt, als haar vader zich neerzette [That,
afterwards, she had so willingly, so gladly awakened the slumbering
strings when her father sat down] (Potgieter 1 . 65 ; 1 844)
Examples (39) and (40) feature the verb vergulden, which literally
means 'to gild, to paint or cover with gold' . Vergulden occurs with a
number of metaphorical nuances, which may all be subsumed under
the general concept 'to embellish, to present (something) as more
beautiful than it actually is' . The examples (39) and (40) exhibit a
further metaphorical extension: the reading 'to make (something
ugly) more beautiful than it actually is' is generalized into 'to make
(something painful) less unpleasant than it actually is; to attenuate ,
tone down (grief, sorrow etc . ) ' . Crucially, the process of making the
unpleasant experience more palatable is not just one of presenting it to
the outside world as better than it is (which is the usual metaphorical
interpretation of vergulden) , but of actually making more it bearable
to oneself. 1 8
In (4 1 ) and (42), vernachten equals overnachten 'to spend the night,

to stay somewhere to sleep' . The quotations can be read in two
different ways . If vernachten is taken in its literal sense, the sun is to
be considered a personification; because only living people can
spend the night at a particular place, maintaining the literal reading
of vernachten entails taking the sun in a derived, personified sense .
Conversely, if it is assumed that sun is to be interpreted literally, 1 9
vernachten undergoes a metaphorical shift towards a reading that
may be paraphrased as 'to be absent during the night, to disappear
into the night' .
Finally, i n (43) and (44), the verb wekken 'to awaken, t o wake up'
is used with a reading 'with regard to certain organs or artefacts : to
make them work , to start them functioning' . The transition from the
basic meaning to the derived one is based on the metaphor that
things with a certain function that are in a temporary state of rest
are, so to speak, sleeping; bringing them to function again is then
equivalent to waking them up. (In the first quotation, the
metaphorical reading is contextually quite closely related to the
literal reading, as the process of making the person's ears start
listening is presented as part of the general process of waking him up
from sleep . )
T o summarize , semantic polygenesis supports the view that the
flexibility of lexical categories forms an essential characteristic of
their structure at each moment of their history (and not just during
the transition from one diachronic period to the other). Typical of
this synchronous dynamism is the emergence of incidental readings
in the range of application of a word, together with the fact that one
and the same reading may diachronically emerge at different
moments and on independent grounds. 20 In a prototypical conception
of meaning, the more salient readings are among those that are
conventionally handed down from generation to generation, while
other readings may at any moment be creatively and independently
based on these transmitted readings .
2 . 4 S E M A N TI C C H A N G E F R O M S UB S E T S
I n Dik ( 1 977) attention is drawn t o the fact that semantic changes

need not always take their starting-point in an existing meaning as a
whole, but may be based on a subset of the original reading . For
instance, when the Dutch kruipen develops the reading 'to go

slowly ' , the new meaning is, so to speak, an extrapolation of what is
originally no more than a specific subset of the initial reading 'to
crawl, to move on hands and feet' . The separate status of the new
reading shows up when kruipen 'to go slowly' occurs in an
environment where there is no reference to crawling on hands and
feet (as when, for instance, it is said of the cars in a traffic jam that
they are crawling by) . Before 'to go slowly' occurs without reference
to moving on hands and feet , it does not have separate semantic
status; it is just a statistically prominent but by no means universal
side-effect of crawling. 'To move slowly on hands and knees' merely
singles out a set of individual members of the category defined by 'to
move on hands and knees' , but t here is no reason to call it a separate
meaning of kruipen . In theoretical terms, the distinction between 'to
crawl slowly' and 'to crawl swiftly' is a case of vagueness rather than
polysemy. When, however, the feature of going slowly is detached
from the feature of moving on hands and knees, it acquires the status
of a separate meaning. This new meaning, then, is not a straight
forward extension of the category kruipen 'to crawl' as a whole, but is
rather a semantic extension of a prominent subset of that category .
Although the subset in question is referentially salient to the extent
that most instances of crawling imply going slowly, it does not
initially represent a separate sense of kruipen .
Although Simon Dik's paper was written before prototype
orientated conceptions of semantic structure were developed, the
link between his notion of inductive generalization and prototype
theory is not difficult to specify : whereas the importance of the
individual members of a category for the synchronic structure of the
category is one of the features of lexical categories that are
highlighted by prototype-orientated approaches, the notion of
inductive generalization focuses on the role of individual members
(or subsets) for the historical development of the category. Taking a
synchronic perspective, a prototype-theoretical approach might note
that of all the diverse kinds of movement that may be designated by
the verb kruipen 'to crawl' , those kinds of movement where one goes
slowly are special, in the sense that they occupy a central position in
the category. Analogously, the inductive generalization view takes a
diachronic perspective, showing that the same instantiations of
kruipen are singled out in the historical development of the verb as
they give rise to specific new developments.
Against the background of the classification of prototype

theoretical phenomena that was presented in Section 1 . 3 , the notion
of inductive generalization exemplifies characteristic ( i ) . From a
structuralist point of view, subsets of a particular word meaning do
not belong to the semantic level of linguistic structure : differences
within the boundaries of a particular sense are encyclopaedic at
most, and hence fall outside the proper domain of linguistics, which
is concerned with language rather than world knowledge . In the
context of prototype theory , however, the synchronic observation is
made that the borderline between semantics and world knowledge is
inherently ill defined . Diachronically, this is reflected in the fact that
alleged encyclopaedic information may at any moment be the
starting-point for the birth of a new reading, and, as such, has to be
taken into account when studying semantic changes .
If, then , the concept of inductive generalization is congenial to the
spirit of cognitive semantics, it may be worth while to have a closer
look at the way in which subsets contribute to semantic change .
Specifically , it will be argued in what follows that inductive
generalization should not be considered a mechanism of semantic
change apart from and next to traditional mechanisms such as
metaphor and metonymy , but rather cross-classifies with these . 2 1
A s a starting-point, let u s consider the relationship between Dik's
concept of inductive generalization and traditional historical
semantics . Dik claims that 'the process . . . does not seem to have
found explicit recognition in the rather voluminous literature on the
subj ect [of semantic change] , at least not in the form in which I will
present it' ( 1 977 : 2 8 3 ) . Dik does not explicitly work out his
suggestion that inductive generalization has been implicitly known
to traditional analyses of semantic change , but the point is
corroborated implicitly through the fact that a lot of his examples
come from existing treatments of semantic change , such as Meillet
( 1 906) , Ullmann ( 1 95 1 ) , and Lehmann ( 1 962 ) . In particular, it
should be noted that most of his examples would traditionally seem
to be classified as cases of metonymy . Restricting the attention to the
examples discussed by Dik in the first part of his paper (that is,
disregarding the case-studies on demonstratives that occupy the
second half of the paper) , it appears that many of them involve
metonymical transfers on the basis of concomitance . In each of the
transfers included in Table 2 . 6, for instance , the name of a primary
phenomenon is transferred to a second one that habitually co-occurs
TABLE 2 . 6 Examples of inductive generalization grounded in metonymical

concomitance
Item Basic meaning Derived meaning
French chetif captive miserable, weak

English fly move through the air move relatively fast
Dutch kruipen move on hands and knees move relatively slowly
with it: 'miserable' comes to be expressed by chetif, because being

held captive is typically a disconsolate state.
Two other example s are cited by Dik as traditionally recognized
cases of 'narrowing of meaning' . This may be correct for the
transition of Old English mete 'food' to Middle English meat 'edible
flesh' , but Dik's example involving French soul is based on an
incorrect etymological reading: the present-day reading 'drunk,
intoxicated by liquor' of the French soul is not to be derived via an
older reading 'seized, possessed' , but via the reading 'more or less
filled with food (including drink), having had plenty to eat and/or
drink' of soul's Latin predecessor satullus. 2 2 (As satullus is the
diminutive of satur, an element of euphemistic litotes is clearly
involved in the formation of satullus . ) The semantic shift from
'having had plenty to eat and/or drink' to 'drunk' can be construed
as a metonymical one: the state of intoxication is a product of the
condition of having had plenty to drink.
While it might perhaps be objected that this metonymical
reinterpretation of some of Dik's cases of inductive generalization is
unwarranted because the metonymical relationship underlying the
transfer does not involve all the members of the basic categories but
only a subset of these, it should be noted that the concept of
metonymy traditionally does not really carry such a presupposition
of universal quantification. That is to say, stating that the transfers
in Table 2 . 6 are not metonymical because the concomitant phenomena
are only habitually or typically (and not generally) present is
irrelevant because the concept of metonymy as traditionally used
clearly also includes examples of habitual or typical (rather than
general) contiguity . For further illustration, consider the Dutch
examples of metonymical relations other than concomitance in Table
TABLE 2 . 7 Examples of inductive generalization grounded in metonymical

relations other than concomitance
Relationship Item Basic meaning Derived meaning
receptacle - glas vessel made of what is in the

contents glass vessel
space - what is winkel corner (now shop
situated there obsolete)
part - whole bakken to bake something prepare food with
in an oven oven-baking as
final stage
2. 7. The definitions in the Table are nothing more than indicative

glosses . )
I n all o f these cases, the entity indicated b y the transferred reading
is only typically (and never always and irremediably) connected with
the referent of the basic reading. Not every building at the corner of
a street is (or used to be) a shop , and a glass need not always contain
something. And the action of baking something in an oven is not
necessarily a part of a larger process in which food is being prepared :
a sculptor may , for instance, bake his clay figures .
Summing u p : many o f Dik's cases o f inductive generalization fit
into traditional classifications of semantic change as metonymical
transfers on the basis of (mostly) habitual concomitance. Further
more, cases of inductive generalization (semantic change involving a
subset of the original reading) may be found that are grounded in
other types of metonymical association than concomitance.
The picture painted so far, however, is misleading to the extent
that it does not sufficiently distinguish between the semantic
relationship that connects the original category as a whole to the
new reading and the semantic relationship that exists between the new
reading and the subset of the original category in which the new
reading is grounded. Consider the development of Dutch kruipen as
schematically represented in Figure 2. 7 .
I n the original situation (represented by the upper circle), 'to
move slowly on hands and knees' is a salient subset of 'to move on
bands and knees, to crawl' in general . In the next stage, the reading ' to
crawl' still subsists, but 'to move slowly on hands and knees' has given
Phase I
t o move o n hands
a n d knees
2 to m ove s l ow l y
o n hands and knees
3 to m o v e s l ow l y
( w h et h e r o n h a n d s
a n d knees o r not)
Phase I I
FIG. 2. 7. Schematic representation of the development of Dutch kruipen
rise to a new reading that can be glossed 'to move slowly (in general,
regardless of whether the motion takes place on hands and knees or
not)' . The overlapping between circles I and 3 in the lower part of
the figure obviously represents the idea that some of the cases of
going slowly captured under 3 may actually involve moving on hands
and knees . Now, while the relationship between readings I and 3 may
be classified as a case of metonymical concomitance (as was done
in the previous pages), the relationship between 2 and 3 is not a
metonymical one, but rather one (as Dik has stressed) of semantic
generalization: reading 3 'to move slowly (in general)' is a more
encompassing concept, of which the source of the development
(namely 'to move slowly on hands and knees') is a proper subcase.
This observation calls for a reassessment of the reinterpretation of
Dik's e xamples that was presented in the previous pages. This
reinterpretation of Dik's examples as traditionally recognized cases
of metonymy merely shows that the traditional classification tended
to focus on the semantic shifts involving the category as a whole,
rather than on the relationship between the relevant subset of the
original category and the new reading . However, once the perspective
is shifted towards this relationship , a more radical departure from
Dik's views becomes possible. Could it be the case, in fact, that next
to generalization, other types of semantic relationship could link the
original salient subset to the new reading? Could it be the case, for
instance, that next to 'inductive generalization ' , cases can be found
of 'inductive metaphor' and 'inductive metonymy' ?
A reconsideration of one of the examples presented i n Table 2 . 7
may illustrate the existence of cases of inductive metonymy . In its
reading 'object made of glass', the range of application of the Dutch
glas contains glasses for drinking as a salient subset. (The count
noun reading 'object made of glass' is already the result of a
metonymical extension working on the mass noun reading 'hard ,
brittle, and transparent substance made from sand and soda and/or
potash'. This preliminary extension is not under consideration here,
however . ) Members of glas 'object made of glass' that are not
drinking-vessels include, for instance, window-panes and hour
glasses . A metonymical extension then leads from 'drinking-vessel
made of glass' to the contents of such a vessel: een glas drinken 'to
drink a glass' does not mean that the vessel itself was swallowed .
This extension has been traditionally recognized as one in which the
name of a receptacle comes to stand for what is contained in the
receptacle. Specifically, a quantity corresponding with the usual
contents of the receptacle may be involved; after all, one might add a
glass of water (the amount of water corresponding with a glass) to a
recipe without using an actual glas s.
The development is graphically represented i n Figure 2 . 8 . In
Phase I
o bj e ct m a d e of
g lass
2 d r i n k i n g -v e s s e l
m a d e of g l a s s
3 the c o ntents of
such a d r i n k i n g
vessel
Phase l l
Fm. 2 . 8 . Schematic representation of the development o f Dutch glas

contrast with Figure 2. 7 , the ranges of application represented in the

lower part of the figure do not overlap: the contents of a glass are not
themselves a glass object . Note that, in order to avoid cluttering the
image, the figure has not been drawn with all possible detail : strictly
speaking, the salient subset 2 should be repeated within circle I
in the bottom part of the figure (in the second stage of the
development, the glass for drinking remains salient in comparison
with the hourglass and the window-pane).
But glas might be considered a dubious example of the pheno
menon of 'change from subsets' , to the extent that 'drinking-vessel
made of glass' could be a different meaning of glas, and not just an
extensional subset of 'object made of glass' without proper semantic
value. If glas is an autohyponymous term in the stage of its
development depicted in the upper part of Figure 2 . 8 , the
subsequent development takes its starting-point in a different
meaning, and not just in a salient subset. 2 3
Now , for one thing, synchronic research has shown that the
borderline between vagueness and ambiguity is less outspoken than
has traditionally been assumed; it has been argued, for instance, that
the major types of test that are usually mentioned for distinguishing
vagueness and ambiguity may yield mutually contradictory and
contextually variable results . 2 4 If this is correct, borderline cases are
likely to appear in the diachronic realm as wel l .
For another, examples can be found w i t h regard t o which doubts
about the semantic status of the relevant subsets are unlikely.
Consider the metonymical development that occurs in the case of the
Dutch bakken . The general reading ' to expose to heat in an oven'
contains those applications as a salient subset in which food is
involved . But baking food in an oven is part of a more general
activity of which the actual baking is but the final stage: baking
bread (brood bakken), for instance, involves other things such as
kneading the dough, shapmg the loaf, and letting it rise besides the
process of heating the loaf in the oven . On the basis of this
metonymical association of the part-whole kind, bakken acquires the
reading 'to prepare food for consumption in such a way that baking
in an oven is the final stage of the preparation' .
As for cases of inductive metaphor, notice that zoological
metaphors are generally based on the habitual characteristics of the
animals in question rather than on general characteristics. Calling a
shrewd person a fox does not mean that foxes are always equally
cunning, nor does calling a brave fighter a lion mean that all lions are
fierce fighters. The semantic shift involved in these and similar
examples is schematically represented in Figure 2 . 9 . Clearly, the
transition from application 2 to reading 3 is a metaphorical one :
going from ' sly animal' to 'shrewd person' involves a process of
figurative comparison.
Given, then, that metaphor, metonymy, and generalization alike
may characterize the semantic extensions that take their starting
point in subsets of the original readings rather than in the original
categories as a whole, two additional points have to be clarified. In
the first place, it should be noted that the mechanisms identified so
far may occur in combination. For instance, in order to arrive at
' shop' by starting from the original meaning 'corner' of Dutch
winkel, an intermediate stage has to be posited, in which the relevant
meaning is 'building situated at a street corner' .
In the analysis presented in Figure 2. r o , this reading is derived
from 'corner' through a process of inductive metonymy : a salient
subset 'street corner' within the original range of application of
winkel 'corner' gives rise to a concept 'building situated at a street
corner" the metonymical link between both readings involves the
spatial association between a place and the entities situated there .
Next, 'shop situated at a street corner' as a salient subset of 'building
situated at a street corner' yields 'shop (in general, regardless of
Phase I
fox, m e m be r o f
the g e n u s Vu/pes
I
2 cunning member
I
o f t h e g e n u s Vulpes
3 s h rewd, c r a fty
person
Ph'5e l l
FIG. 2 . 9 . Sch esentation o f t h e development o f English fox

Phase I
8 1 corner
2 street c o r n e r
3 b u i l d i ng s i t u a t e d
at a s t r e e t c o rn e r
4 s h o p situated
@
at a street c o r n e r
0
5 shop
Phase II
Phase I l l
()
FIG. 2 . I O . Schematic representation o f the development o f Dutch winkel
whether it is situated at a street corner or not)' through a process of

inductive generalization . The development of winkel may then be
characterized as a combination of the metonymical pattern
exemplified by glas, and the generalizing pattern illustrated by fox,
in that order. 2 5
The second point to be clarified relates to the fact that the kinds of
semantic extension discussed so far (generalization, metonymy, and
metaphor) constitute only three out of four of the basic mechanisms
of semantic change that are usually mentioned in traditional
treatments of diachronic semantics . At least since Paul ( 1 8 80) , the
basic foursome also includes semantic specialization . So is there such
a thing as inductive specialization? As a first step towards an answer,
consider the development of the English meat, as represented in
Figure 2 . I 1 . As mentioned before, from the point of view of the
original category as a whole, the process is clearly one of semantic
specialization: the new meaning is a proper subset of the old one .
Phase I
1 fo o d
2 meat
Phase I I
FIG. 2 . 1 I. Schematic representation o f the development o f English meat
The relationship between the subset that is the source of the

development and the new reading, on the other hand, can only be
described as one of identity: what is originally a subset remains as
the entire contents of the category after all the other members have
disappeared. 2 6
To summarize , it has become clear that the concept of inductive
generalization has to be generalized into a broader concept of
'semantic change starting from subsets', which may be alternatively
realized as inductive specialization, inductive generalization,
inductive metonymy, or inductive metaphor. The idea that salient
subsets or individual members of a category play a role in semantic
change even though they do not properly speaking represent distinct
meanings fits in with the general view of prototype theory that the
linguistically relevant structure of categories does not just involve
their polysemy, but has to be considered on the extensional level as
well . 2 7
The recognition that the borderline between vagueness and
polysemy is diachronically unstable rounds off the line of argumenta
tion followed in this chapter. On the basis of diverse case-studies, it
was argued that processes of semantic change exhibit structural
characteristics that link up in a straightforward way with the features
that are highlighted by a prototype-theoretical conception of
synchronous lexical-semantic structures. In the following chapters,
we will explore the theoretical consequences of the descriptive

suitability of prototype theory for diachronic semantics.
Nates to Chapter 2
l . The women's magazines are the following: Feeling, Flair, Margriet,

Libelle (Belgian edition), and Libelle (Dutch edition). The two Libelles
are entirely autonomous, i . e . they have separate editorial staffs and do
not have institutional or commercial links between them. The mail
order firms are La Redoute, Les Trois Suisses, Neckermann, and
Wehkamp.
2. For a more detailed description of the database , see Overbergh ( 1 99 3 ) .
3 . T h e lexical description i s , in fact , more intricate, to t h e extent that pre
modif ying adjectives and post-modifying phrases are also included in
the database. In some cases , in fact, the regular name for a particular
piece of clothing could be an idiomatic expression rather than a single
lexical item. In the case of leggings, this does not appear to be the case ,
which is why the complexities of the lexical description may further
remain unmentioned.
4. The description in the Table is actually somewhat simplified in
comparison with the original database. In particular, the description of
the dimension material has been simplified: the x stands for a number of
values that were originally kept distinct, but that may be collapsed
because of their low frequency. This reduction of the parameters also
explains the jump, in the set of listed values, from values I and 2 to 7 .
5 . I n Geeraerts e t al. ( 1 994) the theoretical background o f the following
discussion is treated in detail, and synchronic examples of the types of
variation involved are supplied.
6. Additional case-studies may be found in the publications mentioned m
Ch . l n. 1 4 .
7 . For more information about the WNT, see Heestermans ( 1 979) and
Moerdijk ( 1 994) . It should be mentioned that not all the senses and
applications to be found in the WNT material have been included in the
following discussion. In particular, two quotations by Bredero and
Bilderdijk have been left out because they pose difficulties of
interpretation, as well as the sense 'to seize differently, to take hold in
another way ' , which occurs only in a number of the nineteenth-century
dictionaries , and which is the result o f a conscious etymological
reinterpretation , rather than a reflection of actual usage. Also , the
structure of the development of vergrijpen as given here does not
correspond closely to the dictionary entry vergrijpen that may be found
in the W NT itself. This is due to the fact that the linear lexicographical
ordering of senses is not sufficient to indicate the multiple clustering
that is at stake here . Also , the WNT treats the period 1 5 00- 1 920 as a
single era , whereas a further subdivision of that period is crucial for the
present discussion .
8. Transitive or intransitive uses may occasionally be found in the
historical material. For all practical purposes, however, vergrijpen can
be considered a reflexive verb . This means that every time the verb
vergrijpen is mentioned in the present text, one could substitute the full
reflexive form zich vergrijpen .
9. No instances of vergrijpen are found in the Corpus Gysseling, i . e . the
corpus of the oldest D utch texts up to 1 300 .
IO. The translations are as literal as could possibly be achieved without
endangering intelligibility: if the English of some of the translations
sounds a bit awkward, so does the archaic Dutch of the original
quotations. The bibliographical references for the quotations taken
from the Middelnederlandsch Woordenboek are those given in that
dictionary. Likewise, the references for the quotations taken from the
WNT use the standard WNT abbreviation s . For full references, the
source lists to the WNT s hould be consulted.
12. The definitions given in the list should be seen as mnemonic glosses, not
as definitions that could feature in a dictionary .
13. A schematic definition for the verb as a whole, bringing out the
correspondences between the two major clusters, could then be
something like 'to act inappropriately, either measured against general
normative standards for acceptable behaviour, or measured against the
specific standards that hold for the execution of the act in question ' .
This schematic definition raises two additional points. First, the
representational format used in Fig . 2 . 6 is primarily meant to bring out
the diachronic relations between the various readings of vergnjpen , but
it may not be entirely satisfactory for indicatmg the relations between
the readings at each synchronic stage of the analysis. If we were to bring
the schematic definition into the figure, for instance, the represent·
ational format would not reveal explicitly that this reading actually
encompasses all the others. This means that a representation such as
that in Fig. 2 . 6 may be usefully supplemented with separate synchronic
analyses such as those used in Sects . 2 . I and 4 . 2 . The second point
concerns the question whether it would not be possible to restrict the
analysis to the general definition 'to act inappropriately' . Such a
restrictive approach would, however, be unable to explain the uneven
distribution of the various applications distinguished in our analysis.
The relative prominence of the readings involving physical and material
violence, for instance, only makes sense if it is recognized that the literal
meaning of grijpen 'to catc h , to take hold of is among the factors
determining the semasiological range and structure of vergrijpen. In the
same way, 'to act inappropriately' wrongly suggests that the mild form
of inappropriateness exemplified by quotations ( 1 9) and (20), and the

stronger forms of transgressive behaviour, as in (7) , would occur with
more or less the same frequency . Actually, however, cases with a strong
negative overtone dominate. In other words , restricting the analysis to
the most general, schematic level makes the wrong predictions about
the way in which the word is being actually and conventionally used .
There is yet an additional argument for the view that the level below the
most schematic definition has to be included in the description . The
more detailed description could possibly be dispensed with if the more
specific readings of vergrijpen could be automatically derived from the
schematic definition on the one hand , and , on the other, the
syntagmatic context in which the verb appears . However, the same
prepositional object of zich vergrijpen aan may lead to quite different
interpretations: when it occurs with a prepositional object naming a
person, the interpretation could at least be 'to use violence' , or 'to harm
in a non-physical way ' , or 'to oppose, to rebel against' . In such a case,
the syntagmatic context does not automatically and straightforwardly
indicate how the general definition 'to act inappropriately' has to be
specified . Rather , it makes good sense to assume that specific readings
such as 'to use violence' are part of the conventionalized semasiological
inventory of vergrupen, that is to say, it makes good sense to assume that
they are stored in the mental lexicon rather than being derived each time
they occur .
14. The phenomenon was first presented in Geeraerts ( 1 985d) . Some of the
examples presented in the present section are taken from 0. Grondelaers
( 1 99 3 ) . The verduisteren example was suggested in personal communica
tion by Alfons Moerdi j k .
1 5. T h e reading ' t o hide' i n general is not restricted t o people: a transitive
reading occurs with entities as direct object of the verb , and a reflexive
construction with the reading 'to hide oneself may also be found . The
youngest quotation of the entire set dates from 1 77 3 ; it illustrates the
application with regard to objects .
16. As the Hollandsch-lloogduitsch Handwoordenboek is a Dutch-German
dictionary, an additional reason for caution is the fact that vergraben in
German occurs precisely with the reading 'to hide by burying, to cover
up' : in the context of the dictionary, the morphological polygenesis is
probably triggered by a process of loan translation.
17. For yet another example, see Sect. 5 . 1 .
I8. I t is quite likely that this metaphorical reading may be triggered , or at
least supported , by the existence of the conventional expression de pil
vergulden 'sweeten the pill ' . If vergulden in the expression is subjected to
a reinterpretation of the type described in Geeraerts ( 1 99 5 ) , the reading
'to soften (some unpleasant experience)' could be conceived of as
extracted from the idio m .
82 Characteristics of Semaswlogical Change
1 9 . The two readings arc not mutually incompatible, and might very well
be envisaged together: the stylistic effect of the expression probably
derives precisely from the simultaneous presence of the two interpreta
tion s .
20. T h e first point has , again, n o t escaped the attention of traditional
historical semantics: compare Paul's concept o f okkasionelle Bedeutung
as opposed to the usuelle Bedeutung ( 1 8 8 0 ; § 5 7 ) . The second point is a
straightforward consequence of the first.
2 1 . The materials constituting this section were originally published as
Geeraerts ( 1 994c).
22 . See the Franzosisches Etymologisches W&terbuch 1 1 : 246-5 I .
2 3 . A lexical item is autohyponymous if, i n one o f its senses, it is a hyponym
of itself in one of its other senses . Dog, for instance, is an auto
hyponymous word , because the meaning 'male Canis familiaris' (in
which reading dog is an antonym of bitch) is hyponymous with regard to
the meaning 'Canisfamiliaris' ( in general , in which reading dog contrasts
with wolf o r cat) .
24 . Cf. C h . 1 n. 1 3 .
25 . Note that the intermediate stage i n the development i s posited primarily
as a logically necessary bridge for reconstructing the semantic develop
men t . Whether it is actually possible to find winkel in the historical texts
with the reading 'building situated at a street corner' referring to other
buildings than shops is an empirical matter. The actual absence of such
an application does not necessarily invalidate the analysis p resented
here: it is not be excluded that the semantic development reconstructed
in Fig . 2 . 1 0 i s psychologically taken in one step .
2 6 . Further, it is difficult to imagine that a subset such as 2 in the figure
would be identified as the basis for a process of semantic specialization
at all. Because this process would mean singling out a further subset
(say, 2a) from within subset 2, any reconstructive activity of the kind
embodied by Fig. 2. 1 1 would automatically and immediately select 2a
rather than 2 as the relevant subset to be considered . For basic
me thodological reasons of explanatory economy, a one-stage develop
ment of the kind sketched in Fig. 2. 1 1 , leading directly from 1 to 2 a ,
would be preferred ov e r o n e in which the specializing movement is split
up and duplicated .
2 7 . These observations obviously do not exhaust the topic of 'semantic
change from subsets' . Briefly , the following may be mentioned among
the questions that will have to be addressed in a more extended study of
the phenomenon. What is the relationship between Dik's notion of
inductive change, and the Peircean notion of abduction, as applied to
historical linguistics by Andersen ( 1 973)? Do only salient subsets lead to
inductive changes, or could any subset be the basis for inductive
extensions? And what is the relationship between change from subsets
Characteristics of Semaswlogical Change
and the conventionalization of implicatures ? The importance for

linguistic change of the conventionalization of implicature has recently
been stressed by Konig and Traugott ( 1 98 8 ) , Traugott ( 1 989), Warren
( 1 992), Bybee et al. ( 1 994), and others . These papers illustrate a
growing tendency in the literature on semantic change to treat the
conventionalization of conversational implicatures as a separate
mechanism of semantic change, on a par with and of the same nature as
more traditional mechanisms like metaphor and metonymy. It is
beyond the scope of this book to discuss the matter in great detail , but it
should be noted that the concept of 'semantic change from subsets' goes
against this tendency. Let us first note that the importance of
implicature corresponds well with the role of subsets as presented here.
While regular implications (at least according to a strict, logical
definition of that term) apply to any member of a category , conversa
ti onal implicatures typically do not involve the category as a whole but
only a contextually salient subse t . Consider the fol lowing example from
Warren ( 1 992 : 5 3 ) . The reading ' to be in a difficult situation' of to be in
deep water is not a regular implication of the literal meaning ' to be in
water where one does not reach the bottom' but rather an implicature,
because there may very well be cases where (for instance) an
experienced, well-trained swimmer is in deep water without being in
danger; in the right context, however, one may well infer the danger
from the situation in general and the depth of the water in particular.
But this , o f course, amounts to s aying that the reading 'to be in a
difficult situation' derives from a subset of the range covered by the
literal reading. If t his is a correct interpretation of the notion of
implicature , our discussion of 'semantic changes from subsets' shows
that mechanisms of change like metaphor and metonymy and change
from subsets are not mutually exclusive, but rather regularly interac t .
In the deep water case, for instance, a metonymical link o f concomitance
connects the relevant subset with the new reading: being in trouble is a
side-effect of being in deep wate r , at least in those cases belonging to the
relevant subse t. In short, it seems useful to maintain a distinction
between the conceptual link that exists between the starting-point of a
shift of meaning and the new reading, and the relationship that exists
between that starting-point and the category as a whole. The con textual
selection of a subset of the entire category belongs to the latter, whereas
links such as metaphor and metonymy belong to the former.
3
Prototypicality in a Classification of
Lexical Change
I F prototype-based features do indeed (as demonstrated in the

previous chapter) characterize the process of semantic c hange, an
obvious next question to ask involves the relationship between
prototypicality and the more traditional analyses of changes of
meaning. As these traditional analyses commonly take the form of a
classification of semantic changes , the question that will detain us in
this chapter boils down to the following: what is the position of
prototypicality in a classification of lexical changes ? The question
will be approached from a functional angle. It will be suggested that
prototypicality, as a principle organizing the semasiological structure
of lexical items, plays an important functional role in the language,
and should therefore be properly incorporated into a functionally
orientated classification of lexical changes .
T h e chapter, then, comprises fo u r parts. The first step in the
argumentation specifies the requirements for a functional classifica
tion . The starting-point here will be Ullmann's well-known classifica
tion of semantic changes, which he presents as a functional one, but
which will appear to be less adequate than may be expected. As one
of the requirements derived from the critical confrontation with
Ullmann involves the strict separation between mechanisms and
causes of change, the second section of the chapter will present a
succinct overview of the various mechanisms of lexical change that
may be distinguished. The reference to 'lexical change' rather than
the more common expression 'semantic change' is quite deliberate
here: another of the requirements derived in the first section
concerns the necessity of broadening the traditional semasiological
perspective of the classification of semantic changes with an
explicitly onomasiological perspective. The third section of the
chapter presents a classification of the functional causes of lexical
Classification of Lexical Change
change . In the final section, specific attention will be paid to the

cognitive basis of the functional role of prototypicality .
3 . 1 FUNCT I O N A L C L A S SIFIC A TIO N S IN

D I ACH R O N IC S E M A N T ICS
Because it constitutes one of the best known of a long series of

attempts to give a coherent overview of the mechanisms of semantic
change, we may take our starting-point in Ullmann's classification
( 1 95 1 : 220-44; 1 962 : 2 1 1 -2 7 ; 1 972: 363-4 ); moreover, his is a
classification that deliberately aspires towards a functional status.
The discussion will be somewhat extended, but not only does it serve
the purpose of deriving a number of requirements that a functional
classification of semantic changes has to comply with. Rather, it also
introduces a number of diachronic-semantic phenomena that will
have to be included in such a classification. 1
In its initial, most extended version, Ullmann's classification is
based on the distinction between changes due to linguistic conservat
ism and those due to linguistic innovation . Within the latter
category, transfers of names, transfers of senses, and composite
transfers have to be distinguished . Filling out this skeleton scheme
with examples, we get the following picture.
Ullmann talks of changes due to linguistic conservatism when actual
changes in the referent of a word do not entail a change in the name
of that referent. When the quill pen was replaced by wooden pens ,
fountain-pens, and ball-points, linguistic inertia caused the word pen
to acquire a new meaning ('any writing instrument with ink'), rather
than disappearing together with the original referent . 2
Under the rubric o f changes due to linguistic innovation, Ullmann
mentions the cases in which the associative network of a word or an
idea influences its development to such an extent that new meanings
or names arise. In the case of name transfer, the associative link
between two senses causes the name of one of them to be used for the
other; in the case of sense transfer, an associative link between two
names of different concepts causes one of those concepts to be
expressed by the other name. In both cases , the associative link can
be either one of similarity or one of contiguity.
Transfer of names through similarity between senses includes all
86 Classification of Lexical Change
metaphorical changes; transfer of names through contiguity between

senses is exemplified by metonymy .
Transfer of senses through similarity between names can be found
in popular etymology : when the older word samblind was transformed
into sandblind, under the influence of the similarity between the
element sam (which is probably related to Latin semi) and the more
familiar sand, it not only changed its form, but also its meaning .
Contiguity between names leads to transfer of senses in the case of
ellipsis : as a noun, capital acquires different meanings according to
its elliptical derivation from word groups such as capital letter, capital
fund, or capital city .
In composite transfers, names and senses are transferred simul
taneously. One example will suffice: the use of an expression such as
a Rembrandt derives from name contiguity (an ellipsis starting from
a Rembrandt picture) as well as from sense contiguity (a metonymical
link between author and product).
The success of Ullmann's classification may be attributed to
several factors. Apart from its simplicity and elegance, its sound
theoretical basis makes it highly attractive as a principled attempt to
cope with the variety of semantic change. In fact, it is based on
definitely Saussurean principles : as indicated in Table 3 . 1 , the
distinction between sense transfer and name transfer is a consequence
of the Saussurean distinction between signifiant and signifie, whereas
TABLE 3 . r An overview of Ullmann's classification of semantic changes
(a) Changes due to linguistic conservatism
(b) Changes due to linguistic mnovation
Transfer of signifiant, Transfer of signifie,

based on associative based on associative
link between signifies link between signifiants
Paradigmatic links :
similarity Metaphor Popular etymology
Syntagmatic link s:
contiguity Metonymy Ellipsis
(c) Composite transfers

the associative mechanisms of similarity and contiguity can be

likened to the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships of
Saussurean theory. Ullmann's approach is decidedly structuralist :
the idea that associative networks functionally underlie semantic
change derives from the structuralist importance attached to
semantic field s .
Moreover, h i s classification tries t o be more than a mere
taxonomy: being functional, it tries to give an explanation of how
linguistic changes come about. He explicitly classifies his own
functional approach under the heading 'genetic classifications ' ,
together with the 'causal classifications' provided b y Meillet ( 1 906)
and Sperber ( 1 92 3 ) , and in contrast with the traditional 'logico
rhetorical classifications' , which leave the 'causes, historical back
ground, psychological and social significance' of semantic changes
unexplained (Ullmann 1 95 1 : 205 ) . In contrast with Meillet and
Sperber, Ullmann tries to achieve this kind of explanatory adequacy
not by looking for ultimate social or psychological causes, but by
analysing the structural mechanisms at work in language at large.
Given the general appeal of an explanatory approach going beyond
a purely taxonomical classification, we may try to carry further
Ullmann' s functional line of thought. In order to do so, I shall first
mention a number of criticisms to which his theory is subject. The
requirements arising from this discussion will be the basis for an
alternative classification, to be developed in the fo l l owi n g sections.
Four critical points will be discussed. First, the distinction between
changes due to linguistic innovation and those due to lingmstic
conservatism cannot be maintained . Second, the classification
wrongly excludes innovative changes due to the introduction of
names; more generally, its treatment of onomasiological changes is
incomplete. Third, the causal factors considered should not be
restricted to the formal and semantic associations that constitute the
structure of the lexicon; specifically, the types of semantic change
dealt with by Meillet and Sperber should not be excluded from the
classification . And fourth, the distinction between 'ultimate' and
'immediate' causes of change has to be clarified . 3
1 . The distinction between changes due to linguistic innovation
and those due to linguistic conservatism may be discarded as
specious. Ullmann's examples of changes due to conservatism can be
interpreted as the result of an innovation : due to changes in the
outside world, a new concept is introduced into the language.
Though it could be said that conservatism shows up in the fact that

no new name is added to the lexicon together with the new concept,
the same is true of a number of changes mentioned as examples of
innovation: for instance, an ellipsis like the one involved in the
development of capital does not change the formal inventory of
vocabulary items, but that obviously does not suffice to call it an
example of linguistic conservatism. In general, no language subject
to change can be called conservative; more particularly, any alleged
conservatism in the retention of an old name for a new concept is
always counterbalanced by the innovative act of introducing that
concept within the semasiological range of the name in question .
Ullmann seems t o have realized this too : i n the 1 962 and 1 972
versions of his scheme, he has only retained the classification of
changes due to innovation . 4
2 . The classification excludes innovative changes due to the
introduction of names . On a strictly Saussurean basis, Ullmann only
deals with the associative links (be they formal or conceptual) within
an existing language structure, without accommodating extensions
of that structure due to morphological creativity or lexical borrowing.
Since the introduction of loan words, new compounds, or new
derivations cannot be described in terms of name or sense transfers
within an existing inventory of forms and senses, but only as an
extension of it, it has no place within the classification.
Taking into account associative links across different languages
would not completely solve the problem: broadenmg the structuralist
position from intralinguistic transfers and internal associations to
interlinguistic transfers and external associations would not explain
the derivation or compounding of new terms within one and the
same language, nor would it explain lexical borrowmg accompanied
by conceptual borrowing. In the latter case, a foreign name is
borrowed not to express an already existing concept (as in the pairs
manual-handbook , celestial-heavenly, actor-player), but to express a
new concept. This is frequently the case with the products of
modern civilization: the transatlantic jump of jogging as a recreational
activity was accompanied by the spread of the term jogging in a
number of European languages . Given the simultaneous introduction
of the name jogging and the concept ' j ogging' , it would be impossible
to explain the borrowing process as a case of name transfer on the
basis of sense identity : there simply was no pre-existing identical
concept.
It is interesting to note that conceptual borrowing can take place

unaccompanied by lexical borrowing: this phenomenon, known as
'semantic borrowing' (Ullmann 1 96 2 : 1 65-7) , occurs when the
polysemy of a foreign term gives rise to parallel semantic changes in
the corresponding term of the other language. The German word
SchOpfung ('the act of creation'), for instance, acquired its reading
'the created world' in the eighteenth century under the influence of
an analogous polysemy in English creation. Here too, regular
innovations can be found: the copying of the polysemy of Hebrew
mi ' l ('messenger') into the angelos of the Greek Bible did not rename
an existing lexical concept 'angel ' , but introduced it into Greek
(Ullmann 1 962 : 1 6 5 ) . We can now see that our criticism of
Ullmann's classification can be extended from formal innovations to
all kinds of conceptual innovation going beyond the limits of the
existing conceptual structure (as in some cases of semantic and
lexical borrowing) . Because transfer is taken as a basic mechanism ,
the changes classified b y Ullmann, presupposing the names or senses
to be transferred, are in principle restricted to transfers within the
existing associative network.
More generally, the exclusion of the introduction of entirely new
names indicates that the onomasiological part of Ullmann's classific
atory schema is not systematic enough. The distinction between
name transfers and sense transfers seems to be inspired by the
distinction between onomasiology and semasiology : giv i ng another
name to a given sense is an onomasiological change, whereas giving a
new sense to a given name is primarily a semasiological change.
Onomasiological changes, however, include more than just transfer
of name s , as our discussion of loans illustrated . In itself, the
inclusion of onomasiological mechanisms such as ellipsis and
popular etymology is an asset of Ullmann's classification: if one of
the basic motives behind lexical changes is the desire to have a name
for certain things, a comprehensive theory of lexical change will
unavoidably have to offer an overview of the various ways in which
nomination may occur . Restricting the overview of onomasiological
mechanisms to ellipsis and popular etymology, however, gives an
incomplete picture of the relevant onomasiological mechanisms .
3 . The causal factors considered should not be restricted to the
formal and semantic associations that constitute the structure of the
lexicon. Specifically, the types of semantic change dealt with by
Meillet and Sperber should not be excluded from the classification.
Roughly speaking, Meillet ( 1 906) draws the attention to social

factors determming meaning development, whereas Sperber ( 1 923)
considers the influence of emotional factors. 5 In fact, Meillet
distinguishes between changes due to linguistic reasons (such as
ellipsis), changes due to historical reasons (such as the introduction
of new thmgs and concepts in the course of history), and changes
brought about by the social stratification of language. It is the latter
phenomenon that comes insufficiently to the fore in Ullmann's
approach. It is exemplified by concepts acquiring a specialized
reading in a specific social group . (The Dutch zetten, 'to put, to
place' acquires the restricted meaning 'to set up, to typeset, to
compose' in typographical terminology . ) Social determination can be
traced elsewhere as well : it is well known that the introduction of
loan words ('learned words' , for instance) into the lexicon very often
serves the purpose of stylistically setting off different social
subgroups.
Inspired by psychoanalytical theories, Sperber is concerned with
the role of emotional factors in semantic change . Apart from the
familiar types of change due to euphemism and taboo, irony,
pejoration, hyperbole, and litotes, their influence can be found in
the choice of particular metaphors : when a French First World War
soldier called a machine-gun 'une machine a coudre' (a sewing
machine), he was trymg to discharge the negative emotive force
carried by the object in question by designating it with a homely,
positively connoted name.
4. The distinction between 'ultimate' and 'immediate' causes of
change has to be clarified. While Ullmann' s classification has no
place for social and emotive influences, since it focuses on
conceptual and formal associations within the language, he does
accept Sperber's and Meillet's approach as complementary to his
own : he mentions their theories as genetic classifications based on
ultimate causes, whereas his own proposal is presented a s a genetic
classification based on immediate causes. He does not , however, give
a thorough explanation of the differences between both kinds of
cause, nor does he explain how they work together in particular cases
of semantic change. Does the fact that the immediate causes
constitute 'a general functional or structural background, a kind of
matrix in which the semantic innovation takes place' (Ullmann l 95 l :
206) mean that all types of change studied by Ullmann can also be
related to an 'ultimate cause ' ? But some of the types quoted by
Classification of Lexical Change 91
Ullmann might just a s well b e ultimate causes: if, along Meillet's

lines, one wants to talk of 'linguistic' ultimate causes, then surely
ellipsis and popular etymology can be cited as examples . Popular
etymology, for instance, may be triggered by a linguistic need for
semantic transparency, and possibly not by social , emotive, or
historical reasons, whereas sense transfer through contiguity of
words (Ullmann's ellipsis) is explicitly mentioned by Meillet as a
linguistic cause of change under the name 'contagion' But if
immediate causes such as ellipsis and popular etymology sometimes
coincide with ultimate ones, where exactly does the borderline lie ?
Ullmann seems to have been aware of the general difficulty of
distinguishing between both kinds of cause : by 1 962 he has changed
the distinction between ultimate and immediate causes into a
distinction between 'the cause of semantic change' and 'the nature of
semantic change' ( 1 962 : 1 97 , 2 1 1 ) , thus reinforcing the suggestion
that immediate causes play a subsidiary part and are not causes in the
true sense of the word . Clearly, then, it will be necessary to try to
integrate the different factors (difficult to distinguish as they are)
into a single coherent approach. At the same time, it may be useful
to maintain the distinction between immediate causes and ultimate
causes , though in a different form from the one envisaged by
Ullmann: immediate causes appear to be rather mechanisms of
changes, whereas ultimate causes are the motives triggering the
operation of the mechanisms . In this sense , the immediate causes do
indeed 'provide the material from which to choose' (Ullmann 1 95 1 :
22 1 ) , . but it is only the ultimate causes that ensure that an actual
choice is made . Accordingly, it is these ultimate causes that should
receive most of the attention in a functional classification.
O n a more fundamental level, the functional nature itself o f
Ullmann's allegedly functional approach can be subjected t o a
critical scrutiny. His functionalism involves an attempt to explain
language change in terms of the structural nature of language, that
is, it rests on the structuralist twin assumption that language
functions as a system of associations and oppositions (Ullmann 1 95 1 :
5 5 ) , and that the linguistic sign functions as the union of a signi.fiant
and a signifie, so that a functional definition of meaning defines it as
'a reciprocal relation between name and sense, which enables them
to call up one another' ( 1 95 1 : 70) . But why would the structuralist
theory of the linguistic sign be the only relevant one for semantic
change? Given the incompleteness of a p urely structural classification
of meaning change (as demonstrated above), one should look for

other (alternative or additional) functional principles as a basis for
such a classification. Instead of starting from an a priori accepted
structuralist brand of functionalism, shouldn' t one try to deduce the
relevant functional principles from the different types of semantic
change themselves? Endorsing the explanatory value of Ullmann' s
search for a functional classification, I shall now try to derive such
principles from the analysis of two particular cases of semantic
change. The causal factors that will be derived in this way are
expressivity and efficiency . In Section 3 . 3 they will be treated in more
detail . (Note that, terminologically, expressive will be used here not
in the sense ' striking, vivid, emotional, suggestive' , but in the
broader reading 'serving to express something, communicating any
kind of message ' . )
First, let u s consider the case of regular innovations, fo r instance
loan words introducing new concepts . The relevant functional factor
is easy to single out: the primary motive for the borrowing p rocess is
a change in the expressive needs of an individual or a linguistic
community . A new word is needed because a new concept has to be
expressed. But clearly, to this conceptual expressivity can be added
the formal expressivity of words: not only do these express signifies
on the conceptual level, but their signifiants may, so to speak, be
expressive as well. The sociological value of words as indicators of
group membership, for instance, is largely a formal matter, in the
sense that it is only the formal choice between synonymous
expressions with different sociolinguistic values that signals the
sociological characteristics of the speaker. As such , borrowing
learned words may be due less to expressive requirements on the
level of denotational meaning (expressing a new thought, naming a
new thing), than to an expressive need on the level of non
denotational meaning : through the foreign form of the word, the
speaker wants to express (roughly speaking) that he is a member of
the group of educated people. In this way, an expressive need,
either with regard to denotational or with regard to non-denotational
meaning, is seen to be a functional factor with regard to semantic
change.
Second, let us consider homonymic clashes. Gillieron's famous
example involves the collision of Latin cattus 'cat' and gallus 'cock'
into south-western French gat (Gillieron and Roques 1 9 1 2 ) . The
tension is resolved by replacing gat 'cock' by bigey, a local variant
of vicaire 'curate ' , or by azan, the local equivalent of faisan

'pheasant' , or by the cognates of Latin pullus . The moral of the story
is usually taken to be that homonymic ambiguities set off therapeutic
diachronic changes towards their resolution. The rationale behind
the avoidance of homonymy might be called a principle of formal
efficiency , more particularly a 'one form, one meaning' principle :
formally disambiguated languages are functionally superior, because
they avoid communicative misunderstandings .
It will be readily appreciated that a functional classification
starting from expressivity and efficiency as basic factors may well
avoid the critical points raised with regard to Ullmann's classification .
Expressivity and efficiency are 'ultimate' functional causes: more
specific factors (such as metaphor and metonymy) are among the
mechanisms that may be brought into play to achieve those deep
functional causes, but they are not to be mistaken for the causes
themselves. Also, because expressivity may involve (as we have seen)
both denotational and non-denotational types of meaning, starting
from expressivity as a basic cause of change naturally provides room
for an inclusion of the emotive and social overtones of lexical items
that feature in Sperber's and Meillet's approaches . And finally,
because expressivity directly refers to nominat10n (giving names to
extralinguistic entities), it allows for the inclusion of a comprehensive
onomasiological perspective .
3.2 TH E MECHANISMS OF LEXICAL C HANGE
The requirements fo r a functional classification of semantic changes

resulting from the previous section may be summarized in the
following three points . First, a classification of lexical changes
should be based on a strict distinction between mechanisms of
changes (determining the space of possible changes) and the causes
of changes (determining which mechanisms are actually set in
operation ). Second, the classification should combine the onomasio
logical and the semasiological perspective. Third, the classification
of ultimate causes may take its starting-point in the distinction
between expressivity and efficiency as ultimate causes of change . In
this section, a classification of the mechanisms of semantic change
will be presented. The presentation will be quite brief, both because
the traditional literature has tended to concentrate on mechanisms of
change at the expense of ultimate causes, and because the role of

prototypicality in lexical change involves those causes rather than the
mechanisms . In a sense , this section is added for the sake of
completeness only .
An overview of the classification is given in Table 3 . 2 . 6 The basis
of the classification is the distinction between semasiological and
onomasiological mechanisms . Semasiological mechanisms involve
the creation of new readings within the range of application of a
lexical item . Onomasiological mechanisms, conversely, involve
changes through which a concept (regardless of its being previously
lexicalized or not) comes to be expressed by a new or another lexical
item . Semasiological innovations provide existing words with new
meanings . Onomasiological innovations couple concepts to words in
a way that is not yet part of the lexical inventory of the language .
Within the group of semasiological mechanisms , a basic distinction
involves that between changes of denotational meaning and changes
of non-denotational meaning . The changes of denotational meaning
are divided into analogical changes and independent changes,
according to whether the new meaning does or does not copy the
semantics of another , related expression . The 'independent' changes
of denotational meaning comprise the classical quartet of specializa
tion, generalization, metonymy , and metaphor.
Although classifications of lexical-semantic changes are often
restricted to the semasiological perspective , such a strict distinction
between the semasiological and the onomasiological approaches is
TABLE 3 2 Current mechanisms of lexical change

.
Onomasiological Semasiological changes

changes
of denotational of non-denotational
meaning meaning
Word formation Independent Inter alia

Deformation Specialization Pejorative change
Borrowing Generalization Ameliorative change
Word creation Metonymy
Semasiological Metaphor
extension Analogical
misleading . It should not be forgotten , in fact, that the semasiological

extension of the range of meanings of an existing word is itself one of
the major mechanisms of onomasiological change-one of the
mechanisms, that is, through which a concept to be expressed gets
linked to a lexical expression . In this sense , the study of onomasio
logical changes is more comprehensive than the study of semasio
logical changes, since it encompasses the latter (while the reverse is
obviously not the case) . Furthermore , if lexical-semantic change is
broadly defined as any change in the inventory of the lexical
semantic means of expression of a language , it is justified to bring
the onomasiological and the semasiological perspective on lexical
semantic (or, in slightly more neutral terms, lexicological) change
together in a single classification of the relevant mechanisms , as is
done in Table 3 . 2.
The basic onomasiological mechanisms in the table may be briefly
identified and illustrated as follows. First , new words may be formed
by word formation , that is, the regular application of morphological
rules for derivation and composition . Second , new words may be
formed by the deformation of the sound shape of existing words, for
instance through ellipsis (pro from professional) or blending (brnnch
as the merger of breakfast and lunch) . Third , new expressions may be
borrowed from other languages . Fourth , new words may be created
(entirely or partially) out of the blue , for instance on the basis of
onomatopoeia , or in brand names like sellotape. 7 And fifth , of
course , new expressions may be semasiological extensions of existing
ones .
The traditional classification of denotational semantic changes
includes four basic types : specialization, generalization , metonymy,
and metaphor. 8
Semantic specialization and generalization are types of lexical
semantic change by means of which a lexical item develops a new
meaning that stands in a relationship of, respectively , subordination
or superordination to the older meaning. If the semantic range of
application of an item is conceived of in set-theoretical terms,
specialization implies that the range of application of the new
meaning is a subset of the range of the old meaning. In the case of
generalization , the new range includes the old one . Terminologically ,
'restriction' and 'narrowing' of meaning equal 'specialization' , and
'expansion' , 'extension ' , 'schematization' , and 'broadening' of
meaning equal 'generalization ' .
Examples of specialization are com (originally a cover term for all

kinds of grain, but specialized to 'oats' in Scotland and to 'maize' in
the United States) and queen (originally 'wife , woman' , now
restricted to 'king's wife , or female sovereign' ) . Examples of
generalization are moon (primarily the earth's satellite, but extended
to any planet's satellite), and French arriver (which etymologically
means 'to reach the river's shore, to come to the bank' , but which
now signifies 'to reach a destination' in general) . A comparison of the
moon example and the queen example shows that the original
meaning may either remain present or disappear after the develop
ment of the new meaning.
It is quite common for specialization and generalization to go hand
in hand with external factors of a social nature. For instance,
specialization regularly originates in specific social or professional
circle s. Thus , the Dutch word drukken 'to press, to push hard'
acquired the specialized meaning 'to print' in the context of the
(older) printing-house. Conversely, generalization may signal the
spreading of a term outside its original, technically restricted
domain . For instance, the generalization of arriver is said to have
involved its spread from the language of boatmen and sailors to the
general vocabulary . Other social factors than the relationship
between technical and general vocabulary may also play a role .
When, for mstance, to drink specializes to 'to drink alcohol
habitually and excessively' , the crucial factor is euphemism .
Metonymy is a semantic link between two readings of a lexical
item that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the
referents of the expression in each of those readings . When, for
instance, one drinks a whole bottle, it is not the bottle but merely its
contents that are consumed: bottle can be used to refer to a certain
type of receptacle and to the (spatially contiguous) contents of that
receptacle. The concept of contiguity mentioned in the definition of
metonymy should not be understood in a narrow sense as referring
to spatial proximity only, but broadly as a general term for various
associations in the spatial, temporal, or causal domain. Metaphor, on
the other hand, is commonly analysed as being based on similarity
rather than contiguity ..
The definitional opposition between similarity and contiguity has
not been the subject of continuous theorizing. When the notion of
contiguity has not just been taken for granted, it is often
operationally defined negatively as that which is not a relationship of
similarity (or specialization-generalization). There are, however,

two ways of characterizing contiguity in a positive sense that deserve
to be mentioned separately . First, whereas similarity exists as a
paradigmatic relation that connects entities across different domains
of experience, contiguity is a syntagmatic relationship that holds
between entities in the same 'chunk of experience' .9 Second ,
whereas entities that are similar need not have anything to do with
each other objectively (that is, before the similarity is noticed or
apart from its being noticed), entities that are related by contiguity
can be said to have something to do with each other in an obj ective
sense: they interact or co-occur in reality, and not 1ust in the mind of
the beholder (as in the case of relations based on similarity) .
The classification o f types o f metonymy i s most often based o n an
identification of the target and source concepts involved. Thus , the
bottle example mentioned above exhibits the name of a receptacle
(source) being used for its contents (target), a pattern that can be
abbreviated as 'receptacle for contents' . Making use of this
abbreviated notation , other common types of metonymy are the
following: a spatial location for what is located there (the whole
theatre was in tears) ; a period of time for what happens in that period,
for the people that live then, or for what it produces (the nineteenth
century had a historical outlook) ; a material for the product made from
it (a cork); the origin for what originates from it (astrakhan ); an
activity or event for its consequences (when the blow you have
received hurts , it is not the activity of your adversary that is painful,
but the physical effects that it has on your body); an attribute for the
entity that possesses tl:\e attribute (majesty refers not only to royal
dignity or status, but also to the sovereign himself); part for whole (a
hired hand) . The relations can often work in the other direction as
well . To fill up the car, for instance, illustrates a type 'whole for part' .
As far as metaphor is concerned, we may restrict the discussion to
two brief remarks . Firs t, the recent revival of metaphor research has
started to fill a gap in the traditional treatments of the subject . 1 0
Whereas the identification o f regular patterns of metonymy o f the
kind illustrated above is quite common in traditional treatises on
diachronic semantics , similar metaphorical patterns were not
recognized. With the advent of Lakoff and Johnson's theory of
'generalized metaphors' , however, a finer-grained description of
metaphorical patterns has evolved that takes the form of the
identification of conceptual metaphors such as AN ARGUM ENT IS A
JOURNEY, LOVE IS WAR, MORE IS UP , or THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS (see

Lakoff and Johnson 1 980).
S econd, the definitional demarcation of metaphor in terms of
similanty is deceptively simple . The difficulty may become apparent
by considering the shift in meaning of, for instance, a word like pen :
when the quill pen is replaced by the fountain pen , the word pen is
used to name the new object . Likewise, the Dutch word blik 'tin,
can' is used to name receptacles for vegetables and the like even if
the receptacles are not made of tin or any other metal. These shifts
can be easily explained in terms of similarity : using the old words pen
or blik for the new objects is motivated by the fact that there is a
functional (and, to a lesser extent, material) similarity between both
objects. But are these shifts of meaning metaphors? Assuming that
there is a tendency to answer the question negatively, the definition
of metaphor will have to be refined by stating, for instance, that
metaphor involves figurative similarity. At the same time, the set of
basic mechanisms will have to be expanded with the concept of
changes based on literal similarity, to account for the shifts in pen
and blik . This solution will, however , remain largely terminological
as long as we do not have a theory of figurativity-a theory, in other
words, that allows us to determine when a particular word meaning
is (possibly, to a certain degree) figurative or not .
Non-denotational meaning changes may involve any type of non
referential meaning. As a preliminary step , let us consider the
different types of lexical meaning that a word may carry. Apart from
the most common type, namely denotational meaning, it is useful to
distinguish between three kinds of lexical meaning . 1 1 The emotional
meaning of a word expresses the attitude of the speaker with regard
to what is referred to by the conceptual part of the meaning of the
word . Thus, words with the same denotational meaning may have
different emotional (or, more generally, non-denotational) values;
next t o a more o r less neutral term such a s homosexual stand
derogatory terms such as bugger, queer, poof, and pansy. The stylistic
meaning of a term involves not the speaker's evaluation of the
referent of the term, but its appropriateness against the background
of the social stratification of reality. Thus, neutral terms such as meal
and corpse contrast with the formal terms repast and remains, and
with the informal terms grub and stiff. According to the setting of the
discourse, it will be appropriate to use one term rather than the
other . Of course, stylistic meaning also expresses the speaker's own
social position; using dinner instead of lunch ranges one with the
English working class rather than with the upper class. 12 Finally, the
discursive (or 'pragmatic') meaning of an item involves its conven
tional conversational value, such as the fact that please (basically a
verb) can be used as an interjection indicating that an utterance has
the pragmatic value of being a request .
I n actual practice, t h e non-denotational semantic developments
that have been discussed extensively in the literature involve emotive
meanings ; the major types of emotive meaning change that are
usually distinguished are pejorative change (shift towards a (more)
negative emotive meaning) and ameliorative change (shift towards a
(more) positive emotive meaning). The emphasis on evaluative
changes is realized at the expense of the attention for changes
involving the other types of non-denotational meaning. For instance,
changes in discursive meaning (such as the process by means of
which morning! becomes a conventional greeting formula) are not
regularly envisaged (although the recent rise of interest in the
phenomenon of grammaticalization could possibly change this
situation) .
There is an important distinction to be noted between the shifts
of emotive meaning involved in the use of devices such as euph
emism and hyperbole, and conventionalized diachronic changes .
Euphemism, for instance, is the use of a positively (or less
negatively) connoted word instead of a negatively connoted one with
the same denotational meaning. Thus, to pass away or to depart this
life are euphemistic expressions for to die, just like lady of the night
and prostitute for whore. Euphemism presupposes a particular
emotive value in the euphemistic expression, but it does not change
that value . For instance, using prostitute as a euphemism for whore
presupposes that the former word has less negative overtones than
the latter, but it does not change those overtones . By contrast, there
is a change of emotive value, and hence a true pejorative shift, when
a word such as boor changes its meaning from the primarily neutral
value 'farmer' to the negative meaning 'unmannered man' . In short,
whereas pejorative change is a diachronic semasiological process,
devices such as euphemism involve onomasiological relations among
denotationally synonymous word s. 13
A similar pattern occurs with other stylistic devices . Specifically,
hyperbole involves the exaggerated expression of a negative or
positive appreciation of something (such as when someone is called
1 00 Classification of Lexical Change
an absolute genius when he has had a single bright idea, or when,
conversely, someone's behaviour is called moronic when it is merely

unwise or foolish) . Whereas the use of hyperbole initially presupposes
the stronger negative force of a word such as moronic as against
unwise or foolish, the repeated use of the hyperbolic expression may
erode its emotive force . Thus , dreadfully (in expressions like to be
dreadfully sorry) has gone through an ameliorative shift from 'to be
dreaded' to the neutral meaning 'extremely' , the link between both
being the hyperbolic use of the former meaning.
Pejorative and ameliorative changes may or may not be accom
panied by denotational changes. The shift that leads boor from
'peasant, farmer' to 'unmannered man' is simultaneously a shift of
denotational and one of emotional value. The transition seems
impossible, however, without a primary shift that changes the
emotive overtones of boor without changing the denotation. Rather
in the way in which the negative expression whore contrasts with the
neutral expression prostitute (while basically expressing the same
denotational content), boor was a derogatory denomination for
peasants before the negative part of its semantic value was detached
and generalized into 'unmannered person' . Notice also, in this
respect, that the pejorative or ameliorative change may or may not
involve the retention of the original meaning. Boor has lost its
original meaning, but its Dutch cognate boer has both the original
reading 'farmer' and the pejorative reading 'unmannered person'
Sensual, to mention another example, has undergone a denotational
and pejorative change from the neutral meaning 'pertaining to the
senses' (sensual pleasures), over 'given to the pursuit of the pleasures
of the senses' (a sensual person), to 'voluptuous, licentious' (a sensual
novel), but, as the examples show, all three readings continue to exist
alongside each other.
Because the emotive meaning of words involves the expression of
values and evaluations, emotive meanings characteristically reflect
the existence of social structures (as in cases involving euphemism),
or the way in which a particular social group is stereotypically
appreciated (as in the boor example).
Finally, the group of analogical changes can be subclassified on the
basis of the associative link that exists between the expression that is
subject to the semasiological extension and the expression that
furnishes the model for the extension.
First, there is a syntactic (or, if one wishes, syntagmatic)
Classification of Lexical Change IOI
relationship between both expressions when a word takes over

meanings from a syntactically complex expression of which it is a
part . A typical case is ellipsis: through the shortening of private
soldier, the word private takes over the meaning 'ordinary soldier (as
opposed to officer)' of the full expression .
Second, the association may be of a phonetic nature. Because the
most extreme case of phonetic similarity is identity, parallel
developments in homonymous expressions belong in this category.
It has been suggested, 14 for instance, that the fact that French
maroufle '(fat) tom-cat' sometimes occurs with the meaning 'starch'
could be due to its duplicating the homonymy of chat 'cat' and chas
'starch' .
Third, the associative link between source expression and target
expression can have a semantic character . If the two expressions
belong to different languages, semantic borrowing obtains, that is,
the process by means of which a word x in language A that translates
the primary meaning of word y in language B copies a secondary
meaning of y. Thus , the Greek word angelos originally just meant
'messenger', but developed the meaning 'angel' by translational
copying of the Hebrew ml' k, which means 'human messenger,
envoy' as well as 'heavenly messenger, angel ' .
Within a single language, analogical changes o n the basis of
semantic associations can b e observed when a semasiological
extension in one element of a lexical field is imitated by other items
m the same field . In contemporary Dutch, for instance, the use of
zwart 'black' in expressions such as zwarte markt 'black market,

illegitimate trade' and zwart geld (literally 'black money') 'money
earned on an illegitimate basis, specifically as not having been
reported to the tax service' has given rise to similar shifts in the
meaning of other colour terms. Geld witwassen, for instance, which
literally means 'to make money white by washing', refers to the fiscal
whitewashing of illegitimately earned money. Similarly, gnjs 'grey' is
used to characterize activities that, although not entirely illegal,
evade existing rules and regulations (grijs rijden is not to pay full fare
when using public transport, in contrast with zwart rijden , which
implies not paying at all) . 1 5
I t should b e noted that the analogical basis o f a particular semantic
change does not necessarily imply the inapplicability of the
mechanisms classified as 'independent' changes. The development
of grijs illustrated above, for instance, is basically a metaphorical
process ; it can then be said that the possibility of a metaphorical

change in the case of gri,js is enhanced by the existence of a similar
metaphorical pattern in zwart. In the maroufle case, on the other
hand, none of the traditional mechanisms of semasiolog1cal extension
(metaphor, metonymy, specialization, generalization) can be
discerned. Further, note that the three subclasses distinguished
above are not mutually exclusive. If the Dutch evidentie 'obvious
ness' can now sometimes be found with the reading 'proof , the
explanatory analogical link with the English evidence involves not
merely the phonetic similarity between both words, but also their
semantic, translational equivalence in the reading 'obviousness' . It
should also be mentioned that the notion of analogical change can
also be applied to non-denotational changes (for instance, when a
word acquires negative overtones, an expression that is denotationally
synonymous may be contaminated by the pejorative change ) .
Although various types o f analogical change have traditionally
been identified (specifically under labels such as 'semantic analogy ' ,
'semantic calques' , or 'sympathetic semantic changes' ) , they are not
usually presented as a separate group in precisely the combination
suggested here (nor is the terminological pair 'analogical
independent' change a traditional one) .
3.3 THE CAUSES OF LEXICAL CHANGE
A proper explanation o f semantic change has to consist o f three

logically distinct parts: 16 an overview of the range of possible
changes, a definition of the factors that cause an mdividual speaker
to realize one of those possibilities, and an analysis of the way in
which such a change spreads through a linguistic community. From
an explanatory point of view, the second step is the essential one
(and this is the one we will be concentrating on) : if you can explain
why an individual speaker changes his linguistic habits, you can in
principle also explain why a group of speakers does so . This does
imply, however, that social mechanisms such as the borrowing of
prestigious forms are included among the factors causing individual
changes . As such, the third part of the explanatory triad is
anticipated by the second one-a point I shall come back to below.
The distinction between the second and the third part of the
explan ation is less important than their common difference with
Classification of Lexical Change 1 03
regard to the first part . In the past, mechanisms of semantic

extension such as metaphor and metonymy have sometimes been
cited as ultimate functional causes of change . 17 To repeat what was
suggested at the end of Section 3 . 1 , however, they only indicate the
associative mechanisms t hat define and delimit the set of possible (or
plausible) semantic changes. Ultimate causes of change will have to
make clear, for instance, why a potential metaphorical extension of a
lexical concept is actualized. A mechanism of change is not a cause of
change; a mechanism indicates the possible paths of change , whereas
a cause indicates why one of those possibilities is realized . The
traditional mechanisms of semantic change define what we might
call the space of possible developments; they specify along what lines
new meanings and new words can be associatively connected with
existing meanings and existing words. Causes of semantic change, on
the other hand, s pecify why these potential developments are
realized at all . Of course, the secondary question remains whether
the actual restrictions on possible semantic changes can be function
ally explained . For instance, why is a metaphorical extension more
acceptable than a semantic change by means of which a lexical item
takes on the meaning of, say, the item that is next in alphabetical
order? I shall come back later on to the question of the functional
background of the accessibility of semantic changes, but, at this
point, the primary explanatory question relates to the actualization
of the accessible changes . 1 8
Now , functional explanations may be equated (following Nagel
1 96 1 ) with teleological explanations , that is, explanations that make
reference to goals or functions that a system entertains or fulfils . 1 9
Such explanations 'take the form o f indicating one o r more functions
. . . that a unit performs in maintaining certain traits of a system to
which the unit belongs, or of stating the instrumental role an action
plays in bringing about some goal' (Nagel 1 96 1 : 23-4). It is
important to realize that this definition implies the existence of two
kinds of teleological explanation, illustrated by the following
examples (taken over from Nagel). First, Henry VIII wanted to
divorce Catherine of Aragon because, since she bore him no son, he
wished to remarry in order to obtain a male heir. Second , human
beings have lungs because oxygen is indispensable for the combustion
of food substances in the body, and lungs are instrumental in
supplying the body with oxygen . The first is a case of an action
(divorcing) to bring about some goal (remarrying in order to get a
I 04 Classification of Lexical Change
son), whereas the second specifies the function of a unit (the lungs)
within a system (the body), of winch it helps to maintain certain
traits (the combustion of food with the aid of oxygen) . An important
distinction between both types of explanation consists of the fact that
the first example implies conscious action and preconceived goals (or
at least, deliberate activity) , whereas the second does not . 20
Although the existence of intermediate cases should not be denied
(see below), the two types of teleological explanation can be
contrasted as typically involving the oppositions mentioned in Table
3.3.
The distinction between both types of teleological explanation is
important, because it guides us towards a first classification of the
functional causes of semantic change . On the one hand, there are
changes involving the particular goals that the users of language may
fulfil (in particular , communicating specific messages) . On the other
hand, there are changes relating to the structure of the language, that
is, to the general structural characteristics that the linguistic system
has to possess if it is to fulfil its communicative function (and fulfil it
optimally) . Each of these explanatory types may now be considered
in more detail. Specifically , they may be equated with the two
factors of change that we introduced at the end of Section 3 . 1 :
expressivity and efficiency.
The first type of teleological explanation in lexical semantics
directly mvolves what is probably the basic function of natural
languages : communication. From this point of view, speakers use
language to express messages, and it is their communicative ,
expressive intentions that cause semantic change . Roughly , the
expressive means of a language change because people want to
T A B L E 3 . 3 The two basic types of teleological explanation
The 'Henry VIII' type of The lungs type of

fu nctional explanation functional explanation
involves: involves :
singular actions permanent structures
and their operation
particular goals general functions and the
prerequisites thereof
deliberate behaviour unconscious processes
express something for which they have no adequate means of

expression. 2 1 Because we are dealing primarily with idiolectal
change, this absence of adequate means of expression is a strictly
individual phenomenon, which may even involve temporary per
formance restrictions . 2 2 The basic importance of the notion
'communicative need' can be specified by giving a classification of
the kinds of expressive needs that are at work in lexical semantics .
These needs may involve each o f the types o f meaning identified
in the previous section. Conceptual expressive needs occur (roughly)
when the world changes (a new object enters our culture, and we
coin--or borrow-the term hang-glider), or when our conception of
the world changes (having discovered that jade can consist of two
different substances, we invent the words jadeite and nephrite) . The
effect of expressive needs on the level of emotional meaning can be
observed in euphemisms: in order to have a word at one's disposal
that is less negatively marked, tumour receives growth as an
alternative, and similarly, black and coloured person arise next to negro
and nigger, and the Dutch werkzoekend 'seeking employment' is
coined next to werkloos 'unemployed' . Examples of the effect of
stylistic expressivity can be seen in the development of m-crowd
expressions as markers of membership of a particular social group
(think of army or schoolboy slang). 23
Let us now turn to the second type of teleological explanation
distinguished above. As we mentioned earlier, a rather clear case of
this second type is the invocation of a tendency to avoid homonymy
as the explanation of lexical loss . The classical illustration is
Gillieron' s gallus-cattus example, to which I have already drawn
attention. Most important for our purposes is the fact that the
ultimate motive for avoiding homonymic clashes is taken to be the
danger of communicative confusions. The homonymic configuration
in which one and the same lexical form refers to the rooster as well as
to the cat is bound to create communicative problems in the context
of an agricultural community. In more general terms, avoidance of
homonymy is taken to be an example of the isomorphic principle ,
stating that natural languages aspire towards a one-to-one relationship
between lexical forms and lexical meanmgs. 24 The 'one form, one
meaning' principle is not only realized in the form of avoidance of
homonymy. Other instantiations of the same principle are, for
instance, proportional analogy and the avoidance of polysemy. 25
The isomorphic principle is clearly an explanatory principle of the
second teleological type . First, it involves the structure of language

(the relationship between lexical forms and lexical meanings) rather
than specific linguistic performances . Second , it relates to general
operational principles of language (avoiding communicative
confusion) rather than to particular needs. And third, the changes
are described as occurring more or less autonomously. Also , the
isomorphic principle is an efficiency principle: it tries to make sure
that communicative exchanges happen smoothly, without misunder
standings.
The isomorphic principle, to be sure, is not the only possible
realization of the efficiency principle. Because it is not the aim of this
chapter to give an exhaustive overview of all kinds of efficiency
principles that can actually be found at work in lexicological
changes , a single additional example next to the isomorphic principle
may suffice. Popular etymology instantiates a tendency (at least in
some cases) towards formal, morphological transparency. In Dutch ,
for instance, the loan word hamac 'hammock' is changed into
hangmat 'hanging carpet' . The semantic transparency of the latter
expression (which is composed of the verbal stem hang 'to hang' and
the noun mat 'carpet , mat') is communicatively efficient; those who
are not familiar with the foreign word may grasp (or at least get an
idea of) what is referred to. 2 6
Before we turn to a discussion of prototypicality as a factor in the
functional explanation of lexical change, a number of additional
questions have to be dealt with to complete the overall picture of a
functional explanation of lexical-semantic change . The questions
involve the following. How strict is the distinction between
expressivity and efficiency as functional factors? How do lexical
semantic changes spread in a linguistic community? And how do
functional explanations feature in the history of historical semantics?
To begin with, let us note that the distinction between the two
basic functional factors is less rigid than might be suggested by the
way in which we introduced them. For one thing, the existence of
unconscious (or subconscious) expressive intentions somewhat
subverts the initial dichotomy .
In fact, the invocation of motives as the source of expressive
changes does not imply that these changes can only be explained on
the basis of conscious, voluntary action. As a case in point, would it
be methodologically acceptable to say that Henry VIII's true (but
unconscious) motive for divorcing Catherine of Aragon was his
desire to break with papal authority, whereas his conscious (but

misleading) motive was his desire for a male heir? The question is
relevant because unconscious motives have in fact been singled out
as the source of semantic change. The best example is probably
Sperber's study of the jargon of First World War soldiers, to which I
referred in the first section of this chapter. He explains their use of
j ocular metaphors such as machine a coudre or moulin a cafe for the
machine-gun on the basis of subconscious impulses rather than on
the basis of a conscious intention to be humorous . The deeply felt
threat presented by the weapon is relieved by likening it to the
familiar and harmless objects of everyday life . The psychological
tension that triggers the metaphorical process need not be conscious,
but the resulting expressions are emotionally expressive none the
less; their emotional value is indicative of the psychological stress
that engenders them. In this way, expressivity appears to be a more
encompassing notion than (conscious) communicative intention :
there can be expressivity without the explicit intention to
communicate. The soldiers' slang reveals something about their state
of mind, even if they may have had no explicit intention whatsoever
to convey it.
It is not necessary t o discuss the methodological respectability of
this kind of explanation at great length. It is sufficient for the
purposes of this chapter to point out its existence, and to make clear
that it is neither uncommon nor prima facie unacceptable. This can
be done by pointing to the similar teleological explanation of animal
behaviour in terms of unconscious motives . A cat backs away from
the fire to avoid getting burnt, but (though it may be said to be
conscfously aware of the fire) it probably isn't aware of its own
motive (to escape from burning) . If the reference to subconscious
expressive motives is indeed similar to the teleological explanation of
reflex actions, it is, so to say , situated half-way between the basic
types of teleological explanation presented above . Its expressive
character links up with the reference to voluntary communicative
acts, but its subconscious character refers to the type of teleological
explanation that merely invokes the involuntary functions of the
organism .
The distinction between both types of teleological change is less
strict than originally suggested for yet another reason: principles of
efficiency are, so to speak, parasitic with regard to the expressivity
principle . Whereas it is expressive needs that actually trigger the use
of linguistic forms , efficiency only plays a role in the execution of

those communicative acts : if there were no communicative intentions
to be fulfilled, there would be no need for an efficient organization of
the language that is used in fulfilling those intentions. Gillieron's
example of avoidance of homonymy may again serve as an
illustration: the ultimate stimulus for the lexical reorganization lies
in the communicative problems that apparently arise when the
homonymy is maintained . In terms of Table 3 . 3 , the 'general
function' that language has to support is precisely the communicative
expressivity that triggers individual language use . Expressivity and
efficiency, in short , are complementary sides of the same coin rather
than principles that compete with each other. Expressivity factors
specify what kind of instrument natural language is; efficiency
factors involve the optimization of that instrument.
Against this background, something can now also be said about
the way in which changes spread through a linguistic community
(the third step in a full-fledged theory of semantic change , as
described at the beginning of this section) . Rudi Keller ( 1 990) has
introduced a revealing terminology to describe this kind of
phenomenon. Borrowing a term from economic theory, he suggests
that linguistic change may be described as an 'invisible hand'
process. As applied to economic theory, the invisible hand metaphor
involves two levels of analysis. On the micro-level, the economic life
of a community consists of countless individual actions and
transactions. Macro-economically, however, these individual actions
result in global phenomena, such as inflation or an economic boom.
Crucially, the individuals who engage in the basic transactions do
not have the conscious private intention of, for instance , changing
the rate of inflation . Nor do they act in accordance with a collective
decision. Rather, phenomena like inflation are a cumulative conse
quence on the macro-level of a myriad of individual acts on the
micro-leve l . Similarly, changes spread through a linguistic
community as if guided by an invisible force, whereas the actual
process involves a multitude of communicative acts .
The invisible hand metaphor, however, stops short o f indicating
precisely how the transition from the individual level to the global
level occurs. What exactly are the mechanisms that enable the
cumulative effects? Logically speaking, two situations may occur :
either the changes work in parallel, or they take place serially. The
first situation occurs when members of a speech community are
confronted with the same communicative, expressive problem, and

independently choose the same solution . The introduction of
computer as a loan from English into Dutch (and many other
languages) may at least to some extent have proceeded in this way .
More or less simultaneously, a number of people face the problem of
giving a name to the new thing in their native language; independently
of each other, they then adopt the original name that comes with the
newly introduced object. 27
The second type occurs when the members of a speech community
imitate each other. For instance , when one person introduces a loan
word, a few others may imitate him, and they in turn may be
imitated by others, and so on. In the same way , the overall picture of
a traffic jam is one in which a great number of cars appear to be
halted by an invisible hand , while what actually happens is a
cumulative process of individual actions : when the first car brakes to
avoid a dog running over the highway, the car behind him has to
slow down to avoid an accident, and so on .
It is interesting to note, by the way, that a particular type of
expressivity plays a crucial role in this process of serial linguistic
imitation. Initially, of course, there is a straightforward expressive
need (like nomination) to be fulfilled. But the fact that the need is
fulfilled through a process of imitation involves another type of
expressive values. The Labovian conception of linguistic change
reveals that imitation involves prestige: a particular type of linguistic
behaviour will only be taken over by others if it is invested with a
certain degree of social prestige . In the classification of non
denotational semantic values presented in the previous section, then,
prestige is one of the factors that belong to what we called 'stylistic'
meaning, precisely because prestige refers back to the social
stratification of reality .
To round off the presentation of our functional explanatory
framework, two points may be added. To begin with, it may be
noted that both the asymmetrical relationship between the
expressivity-related type of teleological explanation and the
efficiency-related type, and the importance of invisible hand
phenomena for a full-fledged explanatory theory of language change,
point to the importance of the social aspects of language. Not just the
spread of an innovation over a language community (the processes
driven by the invisible hand), but the individual acts themselves that
constitute the micro-level in the analysis, are pre-eminently social
I IO Classification of Lexical Change
phenomena-given that an expressive intention to communicate is

inherently social.
This also means that the prototype-based semasiological structures
that we described in the previous chapters may receive a socially
inspired interpretation next to a psychological one. They may be
interpreted as representing an individual speaker's knowledge of the
language, but we would probably not want to maintain that all
mature speakers of the language actively command the entire range
of semasiological possibilities that are combined in the prototype
based descriptions . An alternative way to interpret diagrams such as
Figure 2 . 5 or Figure 2 . 6 is to think of them as representing the
summed knowledge of language users at a certain moment in the
development of the language (and then also, of course, the
knowledge of an ideal language user) .
The link between such a cumulative, macro-level picture of the
language and the individual language user's micro-level knowledge is
double . On the one hand , individual speakers actively command
various overlapping portions of the entire range, but the overlapping
is more intense towards the prototypical core of the category:
regardless of their command of the more marginal readings, all the
speakers of the language share at least the central uses . On the other
hand, precisely because there is a common prototype, the language
users' passive command covers a broader range than their active
command: knowing the prototype enables you more easily to
understand peripheral instances of use that are novel to you . In what
follows, as in what precedes, we will focus on the cognitive,
psychological interpretation of prototypicality, but it will be useful
to bear in mind that there exists a complementary and fully
compatible social interpretation. 2 8
Further, a brief glance at the history of diachronic semantics is
necessary to evaluate the scope of the functional point of view. There
are roughly two periods to be distinguished before the rise of the
cognitive approach : the pre-structuralist period in which diachronic
semantics reigned supreme within linguistic semantics, and the
structuralist period in which a synchronic reorientation of linguistics
gradually diminished the appeal of diachronic semantics . The
turning-point in this e volution can be situated around 1 930. The
publication, in 1 93 1 , of Gustaf Stern's traditional monograph on
semantic change (the last major one of the old school), and the
publication, in the same year, of Trier's epoch-making work on
Classification of Lexical Change III
semantic fields, symbolically characterize the boundary between the

periods in question .
Functional explanations, then, have been put forward i n both
periods of the methodological history of diachronic semantics , albeit
in different ways. In the pre-structuralist period, stress falls on the
expressivity principle; by and large (that is, leaving aside incidental
individual differences), the cause of semantic change is taken to be
the effort of individual speakers to express and communicate their
thoughts . An exemplary formulation of this point of view can be
found in the following quotation. It is taken from the work of Michel
Breal, not because he is the first or most important author of the pre
structuralist school, but because his book clearly expresses a view
that is common to most of the writers of that period :
Le but, en matiere de langage, c'est d'etre compris. L'enfant, pendant des

moi s , exerce sa langue ii proferer des voyelles, ii articuler des consonnes :
combien d'avortements, avant d e parvenir ii prononcer clairement une
syllabe! Les i nnovations grammaticales sont de la meme sorte, avec cette
difference que tout un peuple y collabore. Que de constructions maladroites,
incorrectes, obscures, avant de trouver celle qui sera non pas ! 'expression
adequate (ii n 'en est point), mais du moins suffisante de la pensee ! [The aim,
as far as language is concerned, is to be understood . The child, over a period
of months, exercises its tongue to produce vowels, to pronounce consonants:
how many abortive attempts before it succeeds i n articulating a syllable
correctl y ! Grammatical innovations are of the same kind, with this
distinction that an entire people co-operates in them. How many clumsy,
incorrect, obscure constructions before one is found that constitutes, not an
adequate (there is none) , but at least a sufficient expression of thought ! ]
(Brea! 1 89 7 : 8 )
In the structuralist period, o n the other hand , the stress has

tended to fall on the efficiency principle , and more particularly on
the isomorphic principle as the cause of semantic change (and, in
fact , of linguistic change at large). Disregarding the very important
descriptive innovations of structuralism (such as lexical fields and
semantic components), it is fair to say that its explanatory
endeavours have drawn attention mainly to mechanisms such as the
avoidance of homonymy and polysemy, in which the isomorphic
principle is at work .
The structuralist interest in the isomorphic principle is not just
motivated by the fact that it involves the optimization of structural
configurations of words and meanings (rather than changes in
I 12 Classification of Lexical Change
individual words), or by the fact that it embodies the Saussurean

definition of the linguistic sign as a unique combmation of signifiant
and signifie. Rather, the importance that structuralism attaches to
the isomorphic principle is at least partly due to the fact that it is an
example of the second type of functional explanation identified by
Nagel. Since structuralist semantics starts off in a rather aggressive
anti-psychological mood , 2 9 and since it has been guided throughout
its development by the idea that language is an autonomous system,
it is quite understandable that it is interested mainly in a type of
teleological explanation that does not rest on a subjective notion such
as the communicative intentions of an individual, but that mvolves
objective requirements that the structure of a system has to comply
with if it is to function efficiently .
With respect to this historical background, the functional
framework for the study of semantic change sketched here tries to do
a number of things. First, it tries to restore the pre-structuralist
interest in expressivity by pointing out that the efficiency principle
(as it has been highlighted by structuralism) cannot explain the
whole of semantic change. Second, it tries to bring together the
principle of expressivity and the principle of efficiency in what is
hoped to be a coherent classification of the causes of semantic
change . And third, it tries to broaden the structuralist and pre
structuralist interests by incorporating the most recent development
in historical semantics, namely cognitive semantics . But that, of
course, is a step still to be taken .
3.4 P R O T O T Y P IC A LIT Y A S A N E F F I CI E N C Y
P R I N CI P L E
Given a prototypical conception of semasiological structure, we can

explain the presence of this type of conceptual organization on
functional ground s . There are three functional reasons for having a
prototypical conceptual structure of word meanings, and all three
are functional requirements that the conceptual system has to fulfil if
it is to carry out optimally its task of storing categorial knowledge
and making it accessible for cognitive and communicative purposes.
The first of these requirements has been mentioned b y Eleanor
Rosch (who has introduced the prototypical view into lexicology)
herself (see Rosch 1 977): it is cognitively advantageous to lump as
Classification of Lexical Change I I3
much information as possible into one's conceptual categorie s .

Making conceptual categories as informatively dense as possible
enables one to retrieve the most information with the least effort.
Clearly, prototypically organized categories achieve such an informa
tional density because they are clusters of subconcepts and nuances .
Further, the cognitive system should combine structural stability
with flexibility. On the one hand , it should be flexible enough to
adapt itself to the ever-changing circumstances of the outside worl d.
On the other hand, the categorial system can only work efficiently if
i t does not change its overall structure every time it has t o cope with
new circumstances . Again, prototypical categories obviously fulfil
the joint requirements of structural stability and flexible adaptability.
On the one hand , the development of peripheral nuances within
given categories indicates their dynamic ability to deal with changing
conditions and changing cognitive requirements . On the other hand,
the fact that marginally deviant concepts can be peripherally
incorporated into existing categories indicates that the latter have a
tendency to maintain themselves as particular entities, thus main
taining the overall structure of the system. Prototypical categories
are cognitively efficient because they enable the subject to interpret
new data in terms of existing concepts; as expectational patterns with
regard to experience, prototypically organized categories maintain
themselves by adapting themselves to changing circumstances .
I n short , the cognitive system favours prototypical categories
because they enable it to fulfil the functional requirements of
informational density, structural stability, and flexible adaptability as a
pattern of expectations .
This functional view of conceptual structure can be further
specified in the following way . The flexibility that is inherent in
prototypically organized concepts cannot work at random; there
have to be a number of principles that restrict the flexible
extendibility of concepts , or, to put it another way , that specify the
principles according to which concepts can be used flexibly . These
principles define what is an acceptable extension of a particular
concept. It should be clear from what was said above with regard to
the first part of an explanatory diachronic semantics that the
traditional associationist mechanisms of semantic change (such as
metaphor and metonymy) have precisely that function; they restrict
the set of acceptable conceptual extensions to those changes that are
brought about by regular associationist mechanisms such as metaphor
and metonymy . In this sense , then, the traditional classificatory

categories of historical semantics can in fact be incorporated into a
functional classification of the causes of semantic change. But
prototypicality itself has a similar restrictive function: the constraint
that new meanings be linked to existing ones prevents the semantic
flexibility of lexical items from deteriorating into communicatively
inefficient arbitrarines s .
In this respect, the most profound reason fo r the adequacy of
prototype theory for specifying the characteristics o f semantic
change is most likely the dynamic nature of the synchronous notion
of a prototypical conceptual organization . The recognition that
conceptual categories are not rigidly defined, and that they combine
a number of nuances through the centralizing action of a conceptual
kernel, implies the possibility of dynamically actualizing the
prototypical concept in new peripheral uses . The multiple actualiz
ability of a prototypical concept into variously deviant nuances marks it as
an inherently flexible, dynamic structure.
This dynamic character of prototypes can be situated on an even
more fundamental epistemological level: it then characterizes the
basic trait of human cognition of interpreting new facts through old
knowledge . Incorporating slight deviations into flexibly interpreted
existing concepts is but a special example of the general characteristic
of achieving conceptual efficiency through flexible constancy : the
conceptual organization is not drastically altered any time a new
concept crops up, but new facts are as much as possible integrated
into the existing structure, which can thus remain largely unchanged.
From this point of view, prototype theory in semantics is connected
with the 'cognitive ' trend in psychology, stressing the mediating role
of existing concepts m cognitive development (Bruner, Piaget); with
the paradigmatic trend in the theory of science, stressing the role of
existing scientific theories (or 'research programmes') in the forging
of new ones (Kuhn, Lakatos) ; and with the phenomenological trend
in philosophy , in so far as it stresses the interactional nature of
human knowledge a n d opposes the epistemological monism o f
idealism a n d realism (Husserl's theory o f intentionality) . 3 0
Given these considerations , it will become clearer why the
prototypical nature of semantic change, as exemplified by the
findings of Chapter 2 , is more than just an empirical question.
Basically , it was argued in Chapter 2 that the empirically observable
characteristics of semantic change are prototypical, but this in itself
Classification of Lexical Change I I5
need not imply an endorsement of prototype theory as such . In fact,

traditional, non-prototypical theories of semantic structure might
well be descriptively compatible with those fact s : it is not excluded
to describe the flexible and graded nature of word meanings by
working with fuzzy sets of componential features; it is not excluded
to describe semantic change in terms of 'transformational' changes in
feature definitions; and so on. However, descriptive adequacy being
equal, it has more explanatory value to study diachronic semantics
within the framework of a prototypical theory, for the following
reason .
If the prototypical view of conceptual structure is accepted, the
diachronic characteristics mentioned above are explained as predic
tions following from that structure: if the synchronous boundaries of
word meanings are vague and flexible, it is natural to find this fact
reflected in the diachronic relationship between readings, and so on .
In general, the implications of prototype theory for the functioning
of the human conceptual capacities make it an explanatory basis for
diachronic semantics, not just because it specifies the principles
guiding the development of new meanings (such as the principle of
similarity), but on a truly essential plane, because the dynamic
nature of human thinking is recognized as one of the fundamental
structural characteristics of conceptual categories. In this respect,
accepting prototype theory beyond the level of observed facts is a
question of explanatory adequacy rather than descriptive adequacy:
prototype theory explains the observed prototypical characteristics
of semantic change, because it relates them to general epistemological
beliefs about the working of the human conceptual system, beliefs
it shares with other cognitive theories. And at the same time, of
course, the overall conception of a prototypical organization of
conceptual categories can itself be explained on functional grounds .
To conclude this chapter, there are two additional steps to be
taken: one which further corroborates the functional theory by
extending it beyond the lexical level, and , conversely, another one
that introduces a note of warning with regard to exaggerated
optimism.
The first question, then, can be phrased as follow s: can the
functional approach to the explanation of linguistic change be
applied to other sectors of the language than the lexicon? And if so,
is there any relationship between the lexical principles and the
functional principles at work in the other areas? It is not the
I I6 Classification of Lexical Change
intention of this chapter to develop a full-fledged functional

approach to linguistic change , but it seems that at least a partial
answer with regard to these questions is possible .
Let us recognize , to begin with, that the efficiency principles
evoked so far involve the relationship between linguistic forms and
linguistic meanings; they describe how linguistic forms can be
efficiently coupled with linguistic meanings . This recognition
naturally leads to the question whether similar functional phenomena
can be encountered on the purely formal level. Restricting the
discussion to phonology, I shall compare the approach developed so
far with the functional principles at work in the theory of Natural
Phonology as developed by Patricia Donegan and David Stampe . 3 1
Natural Phonology assumes that research into phonological
phenomena has to take into account whatever is known about the
physiological structure of our auditory and articulatory organs: the
physiological possibilities of and restrictions on those organs
determine what is 'natural' in phonetics and phonology. The fact,
for instance, that sounds may be subject to a process o f assimilatory
voicing in a voiced environment is a natural phonological process,
because our articulatory organs would generally encounter difficulties
producing a sequence of a voiced, an unvoiced, and then again a
voiced segment. Natural phonological processes do not have to be
learned; they follow automatically from the physiological difficulties
that occur in the production and perception of speech. Conversely,
learning a language implies learning which natural processes have to
be suppressed according to the phonological system of a particular
language. 32
Natural Phonology distinguishes between two major types of
phonological process: lenition and fortition . 33 Fortition occurs when
a sound segment is pronounced in a more outspoken manner, in a
way , that is , in which it can be more clearly distinguished from its
surroundings. Dissimilation, diphthongization , and epenthesis are
frequently occurring examples of fortition processes. Lenition, on
the other hand, occurs when the contrast between a segment and its
surroundings is weakened, as in the case of assimilation, mono
phthongization, shortening , and deletion . Fortition and lenition
processes have a tendency to occur preferentially in specific
environments . Fortition is typical for ' strong' positions, such as
vowels in stressed syllables, or word-initial consonants. Lenition
favours segments in 'weak' positions , such as word-final segments or
in unstressed syllables . In addition, there is a stylistic difference

between both types : fortition is more likely to occur in slow, careful,
and formal speech , whereas lenition occurs more readily in sloppy,
fast, or familiar speech.
Most crucially, both process types serve different aims. Fortition
is a hearer-orientated process : it makes speech more distinctive and
more clear. Lenition is speaker-orientated: it achieves an ease of
articulation (in the traditional terminology) that allows the speaker
to spend less energy. Both mechanisms, of course , are motivated by
efficiency, and hence belong in a functional explanatory framework .
But if the kind of phenomena involved implies a distinction between
speaker-orientated and hearer-orientated efficiency, could not the
same distinction be applied to lexical semantics ? On the one hand,
prototypical polysemization clearly derives from a speaker-orientated
form of efficiency: the advantages achieved through a prototypical
conceptual organization primarily involve the stability of the
speaker's mental lexicon and his capacity for a flexible response with
regard to changing circumstances . On the other hand, efficiency
principles such as isomorphism and transparency primarily help the
hearer. Structural adherence to the principle of 'one form, one
meaning' means that it is easier for the reader to decode a particular
message: a particular formal cue will only lead to one specific
meaning. Similarly , morphological transparency may help the hearer
to understand the intended meaning even if he is not familiar with
the word as such . 34
This means , in other words, that the functional conception of
phonology as developed in Natural Phonology, and the functional
conception of lexicology developed here, can be brought together
naturally if a distinction is maintained between hearer-orientated
and speaker-orientated phenomena. The resulting picture 1s
schematically represented in Table 3 . 4 .
The approach summarized i n Table 3 . 4 could, o f course, be
further extended to still other areas of linguistics . 35 And in fact , the
'naturalness' approach has been developed to include natural
morphology and natural syntax and natural text linguistics3 6-
perhaps, then , the cognitive theory described here could be the basis
for natural lexicology. At the same time, the comparison with
Natural Phonology also suggests a specific problem for a functional
explanatory theory of lexical change, and this recognition should
help to avoid any exaggerated optimism.
II8 Classification of Lexical Change
TABLE 3 . 4 A classification of efficiency principles
Speaker-orientated : Hearer-orientated:
optimization of optimization of
production perception
Concerning Ease of articulation: Fortition processes

phonological form lenition processes
Concerning the lexical Prototype-based Isomorphism

relation between form flexibility and Iconicity
and meaning stability Transparency and
motivation
In general, it has to be recognized that the functional approach

suggested in this chapter is far from answering all the questions that
arise in the context of historical semantics. To illustrate, let us go
back to our discussion of popular etymology in the previous section.
It was suggested then that a form such as the Dutch hangmat (from
hamac) may be explained by an economical tendency to have
morphologically transparent word forms. Some cases of popular
etymology are less clear, however. For instance , while the Dutch
cichorei 'chicory' is sometimes transformed into suikerij 'sugary' ,
semantic transparency is far from achieved: chicory and sugar have
nothing in common; chicory does not even taste sweet. Perhaps we
might say that the functional principle at work here is a tendency to
exploit the morphological possibilities of the lexicon (that is, to
maximize the number of morphologically complex words at the
expense of newly introduced base forms) . This tendency in itself
would then be an illustration of a more fundamental tendency
towards an economical lexical organization (keeping the number of
lexical base forms down is efficient because it diminishes the
memory load of the system).
However, even apart from the fact that the semantic opacity of
suiken; increases rather than diminishes the strain on lexical
memory, 3 7 the operation of the economic principle with regard to
the number of lexical forms is unsuccessful, since cichorei continues
to exist next to suikerij: the transparency principle creates a situation
that is in conflict with the isomorphic principle . We may conclude ,
i n short, that the operation o f the functional principles does not
guarantee success: some changes seem to miss their probable goal, or

at least yield results that are incompatible with other instantiations
of the efficiency factor. In the following chapter, I shall look more
closely into such a possible conflict between different functional
principles . Specifically, given that Natural Phonology accepts that
hearer-orientated and speaker-orientated processes may be in
conflict, the question arises whether there could not be a tension
between the hearer-orientated principle of isomorphism and the
speaker-orientated principle of prototypicality . 3 8
Notes t o Chapter 3
l . The views presented in this chapter are based primarily on Geeraerts
( 1 98 3 b , l 986b ) .
2 . T h i s kind of change i s the same as Stern's 'external change' ( 1 9 3 1 ) ;
within i t , Stern distinguishes between objective , cognitive, and subjec

tive substitutions. The case of pen is an example of the first category.
The second comprises cases in which our knowledge of the referent of a
word changes (as in the case of atom). The third deals with changes in
our emotional or evaluative attitude towards the referent of a term.
3 . It will become clear in the course of the discussion that some of the
critical points were not unknown to Ullmann himself, judging from the
changes that he applied to the original classification in its 1 962 version.
4 . I n passing, it could be noted that the distinction between name transfers
and sense tran sfers as well is terminologically spunous : any sense
transfer is at the same time unavoidably a name transfer, and vice vers a.
F o r instance, if sense s 1 is transferred from word n 1 to word nz, one
might j ust as well say that n 2 is transferred to s 1 : n2 has semasiologically
acquired a new sense, but s1 has onomasiologically received a new
(additional or substitutional) name . Conversely, if name n 2 is transferred
to sense s1 (with the previous name n 1 ) , the p rocess might as well be
described as a sense transfer of s1 to n 2 •
5 . Meillet and Sperber are far from being the only writers stressing the
emotive or social aspects of language and linguistic change ; recent
contributions include those of Dahlgren ( 1 98 5 ) and Hughes ( 1 988) for
the social aspects, and Kleparski ( 1 986) and Allan and Burridge ( 1 99 1 )
fo r the emotive factors . Sperber and Meillet are mentioned here as
exemplary mainly because they feature prominently in Ullmann's
expose .
6. The most readily available survey of semasiological changes is to be
found in Ullmann's books ( 1 95 l , 1 962) . Sappan's discussion ( 1 987) of
non-analogical referential changes (the hard core of diachronic semasi
ology) is a useful addition . For an outstanding integration of a
semasiological and an onomasiological approach, see Tournier ( 1 98 8 ) .

7 . T h e distinction between word formation a n d word creation is modelled
on the German distinction between Wortbildung and WortschOpfung. The
term neologism is sometimes used in the sense of word creation as used
here. At the same time, however, neologism is often used in a broad
sense as a name for any type of lexical innovation. The term word
creation has been adopted here to avoid the ambiguity of neologism .
8. See t h e last note o f t h e previous chapter on the recent trend to include
the conventionalization of implicatures in the set of basic mechanisms .
9. Within cognitive semantics, this idea is sometimes expressed by
referring to the concept of 'domain' (see Croft 1 99 3 ) . For a broader
discussion of the distinction between metaphor and metonymy,
compare Dirven ( 1 99 3 ) , and see also L. Goossens ( 1 990), who draws
attention to the fact that both mechanisms regularly co-occur in a single
change of meaning.
ro. See Nuessel ( 1 99 1 ) for some quantitative data on the boom of metaphor
studies.
rr. I shall not be concerned here with the overlapping of the categories
mentioned, though one should be aware that they are not rigidly
separated from each other ( see Geeraerts 1 989b).
12. S e e McArthur ( 1 98 1 : 2 1 7) .
13. The introduction o f a euphemistic expression into the language, i n other
word s , is basically an onomasiological mechanism , but the euphemistic
expression may possibly have acquired the neutral overtone that makes
it fi t to function as a euphemism through a preliminary semasiological
shift . Conversely, the repeated use of a euphemism can be the cause of
a semasiological change. The euphemistic effect may, in fact, wear off;
the negative evaluation of the referent of the expression then gradually
undermines the original euphemistic value of the expression. Thus, in
Dutch and English, the original euphemistic abbreviation we is now less
positively connotated ( i . e . has less euphemistic force) than toilet.
14. See Guiraud ( 1 9 56) .
15. In examples such a s these, the influence o f lexical fields o n semantic
change is clearly apparent (cf. Lehrer 1 9 8 5 ) .
16. T h e point i s clearly made i n Goyvaerts ( 1 98 1 ) .
I7. A terminological distinction i s sometimes made between causal and
functional explanations (Lieb 1 97 8 : 1 67), a distinction that correlates
with a distinction between 'causes' and 'motivations' . Our use of the
term cause is obviously less restricted: according to a strict interpretation
of the term, the 'causes' of change discussed here are 'functional
mo ti va tions ' .
18. For t h e sake o f completeness, i t should b e added that n o attention will
be paid to the criteria for determining the distinction between incidental
and conventionalized semantic changes (either in an idiolect o r i n a
standard language) . A t this stage of the development of the approach, it

seems better to concentrate on the primary question why changes occur
at all , even if they remain incidental.
19. Nagel is a representative of what is now called the 'standard' theory of
science, as opposed to non-standard views such as those of Kuhn,
Lakatos, and Feyerabend . There might be a difference between the two
schools regarding the acceptability of teleological explanations (the non
standard theorists being more lenient towards them ), but there is
probably no difference regarding the definition of functional arguments.
It should be noted , in addition, that the term teleological is used here in a
broad sense . In the terminology of Coseriu ( 1 974) , the two subtypes of
teleological explanation that are distinguished in Table 3 . 3 receive
different names (cf. Huning 1 993 ) : the efficiency-related type is called
'teleological ' , the expressivity-related type is called 'finalistic' .
20. This i s a warning against the exclusive identification of functional
explanations with explanations that refer to conscious activity or
voluntary action .
2r. As before , expressive is used here in the broad sense 'serving to express
something' , not in the narrow sense 'expressing something in a vivid,
striking, emotional, suggestive way'
22 . Thus, someone may coin a new compound expression on the spot,
simply because he has forgotten the proper word .
23. Of course, stylistic differentiation may serve other purposes than the
identification of group membership. New words may be coined by the
individual as a sign of his personal originality or simply to make his
speech more forceful (for instance, by using vivid metaphors).
24. The principle is sometimes referred to as the 'Humboldtian' principle.
I t is not entirely clear, however, whether the attribution to Humboldt is
entirely warranted (see Huning 1 993 , n. 7). For more background
concerning the isomorphic principle, see the following chapter, n. 8 .
25. I n particular , see J . Goossens ( 1 962), and compare the next chapter,
where avoidance of homonymy and avoidance of polysemy will be
discussed in detail .
26 . The notion 'semantic transparency' is used here in analogy with the
notion 'semantic compositionality' in sentence semantics. A morpho
logically complex word is semantically transparent if its meaning can be
derived from the meaning of its constituent parts and the regular
semantic aspects of morphological structure.
27, This is, if one wishes, a kind of sy nchronic 'lexical polygenesis' , in the
terminology of Sect . 2 . 3 .
28. A n interesting point o f departure fo r a further investigation along the
lines of the social interpretation of prototypicality is furnished by
Renate Bartsch's work on linguistic norms (see Bartsch 1 98 2 , 1 9 8 5 ) .
29. I n particular, see Weisgerber ( 1 927) .
30. These parallels are studied in detail in Geeraerts ( r 98 5 a ) . For the

philosophical aspects, see also Geeraerts ( 1 99 3b).
3 1 . S e e Stampe ( 1 979, 1 98 7 ) ; Donegan and S tampe ( 1 979).
32. Word-final devoicing, for instance, is a natural process, b u t children
learning French or English have to learn not to give in to the natural
te ndency.
3 3 . There is a third type relating to suprasegmen tal, prosodic phenomena,
but the present discussion will be restricted to processes involving single
segments.
3 4 . Another major principle in this hearer-orientated class could be formal
iconicity : sound symbolism, for instance , helps the reader to image
what the referent of a word could be .
3 5 . Note also that the distinction between the basic forms of the efficiency
principle (speaker-based optimization of production versus hearer
based optimization o f perception) features in various forms in the recent
literature on linguistic change. In Langacker ( 1 977) and Kemmer
( 1 992 ) , for instance, it appears in the form of a distinction between a
principle of least effort and a principle of maximal distinctiveness.
Lewandowska-Tomasczcyk's classification of causes of change ( 1 98 5 )
makes clear that a term such a s 'principle o f least effort'-although
traditionally receiving a speaker-orientated interpretation-may also be
interpreted from the perspective of the hearer: maximal coding
distinctiveness on behalf of the speaker favours minimal decoding effort
o n the part of the hearer. In addition, note that the distinction is far
from new: one of the oldest formulations is Von der Gabelentz's
distinction between Bequemlichkeitstrieb and Deutlichkeitstrieb ( 1 8 9 1 ) .
3 6 . See Dressler ( 1 990) fo r a n introductory overview .
3 7 . The language user has to remember that suikerij has nothing to do with
sugar.
38. The tension between isomorphism and polysemization has been noted
elsewhere as well. Consider, for instance, the following quote from
Heine et al. ( 1 99 1 : 260): 'Language constantly contradicts this principle
[ i . e . isomorphism], and it does so for good reasons: polysemy,
homonymy, and ambiguity, as well as other forms of asymmetry
between form and meaning are a natural outcome of grammaticalization,
and hence, form an integral part of language structure . '
4
Prototypical Polysemization and the

Isomorphic Principle
T H E functional classification of semantic changes that was presented

in the previous chapter contains conflicting principles: as noted , the
various realizations of the efficiency principle need not be in
harmony with each other . This seems to apply particularly to the
relationship between isomorphism as emanating from a structuralist
conception of the lexicon, and prototypicality as emanating from a
cognitive conception . To begin with, let us note that prototype
semantics seems to imply that natural languages have a tendency to
enhance the polysemic character of lexical item s. At least, this is the
case when the prototype-theoretical characteristics of lexical
structures are considered at the level of word senses rather than at
the referential level-see Section 1 .2 for the distinction. As a set of
closely connected semantic nuances that are grouped together round
a prototypical core , prototypical categories exploit their own
polysemic potentialities; any nuance that can be incorporated into
the category because of its resemblance to the prototype increases
the polysemy of the item in question by raising the number of
semantic variants grouped together round the prototypical core.
That i s to say, the flexibility of prototypically organized lexical items
is to a large extent a mechanism of polysemization .
The proliferation of polysemy in prototype theory contrasts
sharply with the structuralist principle of avoidance of polysemy (for
ease of reference, the term polysemiophobia will be used), which is
analogous to the principle of avoidance of homonymy (homonymi
phobia) that was introduced into linguistics by the French dialect
ologist Jules Gillieron ( 1 9 1 8 ) . Gillieron claims that homonymy is a
pathological situation that calls for curative devices, namely the
therapeutic elimination of one of the homonyms . Analogously, some
structuralists consider polysemy to be a pathological situation that
123
1 24 Polysemization and Isomorphic Principle
engenders therapeutic measure s. Homonymiphobia and polysemio

phobia are both derived from the idea that there exists an
isomorphism between the form and the content of natural languages ,
a principle that i s summarized i n the maxim 'one form, one
meaning'
Obviously, however, polysemy and homonymy are so widespread
in natural language that the isomorphic principle cannot be
maintained in its rigid form . That is why structuralist theoreticians
consider it a tendency rather than a law ; although admitting that it
is difficult to find generally applicable criteria to decide when exactly
a particular lexical configuration becomes pathological, they maintain
that indubitable examples of therapeutic reactions with regard to
homonymic or polysemic clashes can be found. T hus, the Belgian
linguist Jan Goossens admits that polysemy 'gehort zum Wesen der
Sprache selbs t , die ohne sie nicht existieren kann [belongs to the
language itself, which cannot exist without it] ' CJ . Goossens 1 969 :
r n6); but he adds, 'Fest steht nur-<las hat die Sprachgeographie
bewiesen-, dass die Sprache in bestimmten Fallen gegen hinderliche
Polysemien reagiert [It is clear, however-as proven by geographical
linguistics-- t hat languages in certain cases react against cumbersome
polysemy]' ( 1 969: 1 06) .
In this chapter, I shall explore the relationship between iso
morphism and prototypical polysemization . 1 I shall consider cases
where the influence of the former principle appears to be restricted
by the influence of the latter. That is to say, examples can be found
where the application of the 'one form, one meaning' principle is
blocked because the readings involved are subsumed under a
common prototypical category . In this sense, the prototypical
principle precedes the isomorphic principle, and the latter only
applies to prototypical categories as a whole, and not to the semantic
nuances within these categories . The same point may be formulated
in an alternative way . Prototype theory, one could say, specifies
what is to be understood by 'one form, one meaning ' : according to
the prototypical conception of categorization, the isomorphism
between form and content applies to conceptual categories as a
whole , that is, to prototypically organized bundles of nuances, and
not to the nuances within these categories .
The argumentation proceeds in two steps. In Section 4. 1 it will be
established that semantic reorganizations may intervene before the
isomorphic principle takes effect. And in Section 4 . 2 it will be shown
Polysemization and Isomorphic Principle 125
that such reorganizations may indeed take a prototype-theoretical

form . As it happens, examples of polysemiophobia will be discussed
in the first section of the chapter , while the second section will
present a detailed case-study involving homonyms.
In general, this chapter explores the conflict between hearer
orientated isomorphic efficiency and speaker-orientated prototypical
efficiency that was adum brated at the end of the previous chapter.
Given the possibility of such a conflict, the question arises whether
the outcome of the conflict can be predicted: is prototypical
polysemization a stronger tendency than isomorphism? The answer
that I shall be able to give is somewhat equivocal : I shall be able to
establish cases where prototypicality does indeed win out, but I shall
not be able to determine the overall strength of the principle in such
a way that it might be predicted what will happen in cases of conflict
between the two principles . In Section 4 . 3 the theoretical conse
quences of this observation will be spelled out.
4. 1 P O L Y S E M I O P H O B I A A N D S E M A N T I C R E O R G A N I Z A T I ON
The most convincing examples of homonymic and polysemic clashes

have been revealed by dialect-geographical studies. Gillieron's
famous example of a homonymiphobic reaction has already been
mentioned in the previous chapter. In a particular region of the
south-west of France, the reflexes of Latin gallus 'rooster' and
Latin cattus, 'cat' coincide in the form gat. Because this homonymic
configuration can be quite confusing in the context of, say, the
farmyard or an agricultural society in general, the homonymic
tension is resolved by replacing gat 'rooster' by other terms. Along
the same lines, examples of polysemiophobia have been presented,
most notably by Jan Goossens ( 1 962 ; 1 963 : 208-2 8 ; 1 969 : 98-1 06;
1 977: 98-1 0 1 ) . 2
A good example of the therapeutic resolution of polysemic
tensions is the example that is schematically represented in Figure
4. 1 3 There are three geographical regions involved. The region to
.
the right and the region to the left have the word keest in common,
albeit in different sense s. The region in the middle is much narrower
than the other two ; in this border area, keest has disappeared, a fact
that can be explained if we accept that the border area is a region of
overlap where keest normally receives both the reading it has on the
Rea d i n g Left a rea Border a rea R i g ht a rea
'sto n e o r c o re
( of a fru i t ) ' keest kern kern
' s h oot (of a

p l a nt ) ' scheut scheut keest
FIG. 4 . I . The keest example of the avoidance of polysemy
right-hand side and the reading it has on the left-hand side of the
border, and if we assume , along polysemiophobic lines, that the
ensuing polysemy is for some reason or other inconvenient for the
language users in that overlapping area . 4
Goossens explains the disappearance of the polysemic item in the
border area in pragmatic , communicative terms. The inhabitants of
the border area , he claims, will be misunderstood if they use the
word in the region to the left of their own area in the reading it has to
the right of the border area , and vice versa . That is to say , assuming
that keest in Figure 4 . I is originally polysemic in the border area,
having both the meaning 'core (of a fruit)' and ' shoot (of a plant)' ,
the inhabitants o f that area will b e misunderstood i f they use keest
'core (of a fruit)' in the right-hand area , and if they use keest ' shoot
(of a plant)' in the left-hand area . Because they know and use keest in
both readings in their own dialect, there is nothing to prevent them
from running into these communicative problems, except, of course ,
the removal of keest from their vocabulary . Goossens explains:
D i e ideale Losung d e r i n Grenzgegenden durch Polysemie hervorgerufenen
Probleme besteht dari n , class man das doppeldeutige Wort aus dem
Vokabular verbannt und es in beiden Bedeutungen durch andere ersetzt . In
diesem Fall miissen auf den Karten zwischen den Bedeutungsbereichen
' leere' Streifen erscheinen, schlauchartige Gebiete also , in denen das
betreffende Wort einfach fehlt . [The ideal solution of the problem created
by the polysemy in the border areas implies that the ambiguous word is
banned from the vocabulary and is replaced in both of its readings by other
word s . I n such a case , the maps will show 'empty' areas between the
geographical areas where each reading is found , bandlike areas, in other
words , where the lexical item in question is absent . ] ( 1 969 : 1 02)
This is exactly what can be observed in cases such as keest: the

border area exhibits lexical loss . However, the communicative
Polysemization and Isomorphic Principle 1 27
explanation is not entirely without problems, since the therapeutic

situation ensuing from the removal of the polysemic item is just as
problematic as the original one. Consider the allegedly therapeutic
situation represented in Figure 4. I. The inhabitants of the border
area are still as liable to be misunderstood as before: if they use kern
in the left-hand area they are misunderstood, and if they use scheut in
the right-hand area, the same unpleasant experience awaits them. As
such, a communicative analysis of the process of lexical loss is not
entirely successful .
We will come back to the explanation of the lexical loss presently,
but the next step to be taken is to show how a semantic
reorganization interferes with the mechanism of polysemiophobia .
Figure 4 . 2 is built up in the same way as Figure 4. I ; it schematically
represents an example of polysemiophobia described by Goossens
( 1 962) . In the left-hand area and the right-hand area, the lexical item
opper has distinct meanings; it refers either to a small or to a large
haycock. It should be mentioned that the distinction between the
two concepts is not just one of size, but that there is also a functional
difference to be taken into account: during the process of haying, the
small haycock represents a small heap of hay raked together, which
is not yet completely dry, and which has to lie one more night in the
open field to dry, whereas the large haycock is completely dry, ready
to be taken away to the farmhouse. In the border area between the
right-hand and the left-hand area, the item opper is absen t , a fact that
is explained by Goossens in the same way as the absence of keest in
the border area of Figure 4. I . However, in distinction from the keest
case, only one lexical item is retained in the border area. This
suggests that a conceptual reorganization takes place in the
overlapping area . Instead of keeping the notions 'small pile of hay'
and 'large pile of hay' apart in distinct lexical categories, they are
lumped together into a single conceptual category whose core is
constituted by the notion 'pile of hay' . The fact that the original con
cepts have now become nuances of a new concept is corroborated by
the observation that the difference between the two original notions
is indicated by means of periphrastic compound expressions, namely
kleine heukel and grote heukel, which literally mean 'small haycock'
and 'large haycock' . The things that were originally lexically distinct
are now considered slightly differing 'subspecies' of a new conceptual
category that combines the original ones. Notice that this process of
reorganization is possible because the original concepts are still quite
close to each other , at least much closer than the two readings of
keest. In the latter case , the two notions involved have moved away
too far from their common etymological origin to be combined into a
single category .
It should be stressed , though , that the conceptual reorganization
affecting opper is not exactly the formation of a prototypical cluster
of overlapping senses, but rather involves a process of semantic
generalization, or abstraction : the original concepts are subsumed
under a superordinate concept of which they constitute special cases.
Of course , the observation that the opper example exhibits a case
of conceptual reorganization does not explain the process of lexical
loss to which Goossens has so convincingly drawn the attention. We
can now see that there is a difference between cases such as keest and
cases such as opper, but we have not explained why both items
disappear in the border area. We have questioned Goossens's own
communicative analysis , but we have not come up with an
alternative explanation yet . Why exactly do words decay ? It can be
argued that the isomorphic principle can explain this phenomenon,
but only on condition, first , that it takes into account the possibility
of preliminary conceptual reorganizations such as the one described
in connection with opper, and second , that we do not try to explain
the isomorphic principle in communicative terms .
If we do not take into account the conceptual reorganization that
takes place in the border area, the configuration represented by
Figure 4 . 2 is an inadmissible case of polysemy . But if we accept (as
suggested above) that the isomorphic principle applies to prototypical
categories and not just to any conceptually distinct readings , it is
easy to explain why opper disappears. Indeed , the border area, being
Re a d i n g Left a rea B o r d e r a rea R i g h t a rea
's m a l l p i l e of
h a y that i s n ot
yet co m p l et e l y
d ry' heukel (kleine) heukel opper
' l a rg e , d ry p i l e
o f h ay ' opper (grote) h e u kel h e u kel
FIG . 4 . 2 . The opper example o f the avoidance of polysemy

the simple combination of the configu rations in the left-hand area and
the right-hand area , first contains two lexical items indicating the
same catego ry , that is , i t knows both heukel and opper, and it uses both
to indicate the large as well as the small haycock . As s u c h , there is no
lexical differentiation between the two concepts, and this may be an
additional factor that facilitates thei r polysemic combination (next to
their semantic similarity) . Given the hypothesis that heukel and opper
can then both be used to indicate the new pro totypical category , we
have an example of synonymy . But of course , synonymy is ruled out
by the isomo rphic principle as superfluou s , and that is why one of the
two items will tend to disappea r . The principle cannot predict which
of the two will decay , but Goossens himself has remarked that the fact
that the choice has fa llen on opper may have something to do with the
avoidance of formal confusion with regard to competing dialectal
forms of opper.
We can now see that the keest example can be explained along the
same H umboldtian lines . I n the border area , we originally had the
situation represented in Figure 4 . 3 . Our modified isomorphic
principle now works in two way s . With regard to each of the
concepts i nvolved , there is a superfluous synonymy , whereas there is
an unacceptable polysemy with rega rd to keest. It is quite normal ,
then , that keest is discarded . This explanation is interesting not only
because it avoids slightly problematic communicative mechanism s ,
but also because it is able to explain t h e regular zigzag pattern which
is schematically represented in Figure 4 . 4 , and which recurs in a
number of the examples of polysemiophobia discussed by Goossens .
In fac t , it is the regular pattern for those cases in which no
conceptual reorganization takes plac e . In those cases , the items to be
Re a d i n g Left a rea Border a rea R i g h t a rea
'sto n e o r co re
(of a fru i t ) ' keest keest-kern kern
' s hoot (of a

plant)' sch e u t sch e u t-keest keest
FIG . 4 . 3 . The keest example of the avoidance of polysemy :

the original situation
Polysemization and Isomorphic Principle
Reading Left a re a B o r d e r a re a Right area
A Item 1 Item 3
8 Item 3 Item 2
FIG . 4 . 4 . A schematic representation of the therapeutic situation in cases of

avoidance of polysemy
found in the border area are exactly the items that occur in the left
hand area and the right-hand area, and that are not involved in the
polysemy . At the same time, it is exactly the presence of these items
in the border area that undermines Goossens's communicative
analysis, as was pointed out earlier in this section. 5
So far, then, we have been able to illustrate how processes of
conceptual reorganization may precede the operation of the iso
morphic principle . Of Goossens's additional examples of polysemio
phobia, only one will be succinctly discussed here . 6 The Korn case, 7
presented in Figure 4 . 5 , is particularly interesting because it exhibits
a combination of the zigzag case and the reorganization case. On the
one hand, the two upper rows show how the border area does not
have the item Korn in the readings it has to the left and to the right of
the intermediate area. On the other hand, Korn does not disappear
completely, but lives on as a cover-term for cereals in general.
Because rye and spelt are the most important cereal crops in the area,
it is easy to understand that Korn can become a general term for
cereals. This case is different from the prototype formation
discussed with regard to opper, because the original concepts
maintain their status as independent lexical categorie s . Still, it does
show that the polysemy of Korn in the border area yields a category
that covers both original concepts, albeit as a superordinate concept
and not as a prototypical cluster.
4.2 HOMONYMIPHOBIA AND CONCEPTUAL MERGER
Ever since Gillieron, the resolution o f homonymic clashes has been

considered a paradigm case of the operation of the isomorphic
principle, that is, of a diagrammatic form of iconicity based on
Read i n g Left a re a B o r d e r a rea R i g ht a re a
' ry e ' Roggen Roggen Korn
'spelt' Korn Fesen Fesen
FIG. 4 . 5 . The Korn example of polysemy
isomorphism. 8 Traditional treatments of homonymic conflicts9

generally exhibit two characteristics . First, it is accepted that there
are many restrictions on the pathological nature of homonymy, and
second, the therapeutic measures are said to involve formal
substitutions: at least one of the conflicting homonymic forms is
replaced by another lexical form . 1 0 It is not usually taken into
account that next to such a formal reorganization on the level of the
signifiant, homonymy may also lead to a conceptual reorganization
on the level of the signifie. The homonymic items may merge
completely, in the sense that their original meanings may be
combined into a single polysemic complex. The process in question
is, to be sure, different from the mere disappearance of one of the
homonym s . For instance, of the Middle Dutch pair of homonyms
quareel 'square tile , brick' and quareel 'arrow with a short, square
shaft, as used in c a t ap u lt s and the like', only the former survives in
the regional form kareel, for the obvious reason that the thing
referred to by the latter is no longer a part of our present-day
culture. The conceptual mergers envisaged here differ from such
cases of lexical loss to the extent that at least some of the readings of
both original items survive after the process of merger. The
existence of conceptual mergers means that any homonymic
configuration may develop in three instead of two different ways.
Instead of a choice between maintaining the homonymy or thera
peutically substituting one of the homonymic forms, the choice is
between conceptual reorganization (merger), lexical reorganization
(substitution), and status quo (extant homonymy).
From a theoretical point of view, the merger of homonyms would
seem to be a downright violation of the same isomorphic principle
that triggers the therapeutic change. Because the conceptual merger
involves a process of polysemization, the desired one-to-one corres
pondence between form and meaning remains blatantly broken up .
However, as suggested earlier in this chapter, this conclusion can be

avoided if it is accepted, first, that conceptual categories may be
prototypically organized clusters of single meanings, and second,
that the requirement of isomorphism applies to the prototypically
clustered conceptual categories rather than to the distinct readings of
which these consist. That is to say, the isomorphic principle may be
reinter preted against the background of the prototypical conception
of conceptual structure. Polysemy within a prototypical category will
then be considered harmless from the point of view of isomorphism,
but polysemy among distinct prototypically organized categories will
be a non-isomorphic configuration.
Prototypicality is now an additional restriction on the operation of
the isomorphic principle . A one-to-one correspondence between the
formal and the conceptual level is compatible with polysemy if the
readings involved are part of a prototypical cluster, precisely because
such a cluster ensures the internal coherence of the lexical category .
This reinterpretation of the requirement of isomorphic iconicity
leads to the hypothesis that mergers of homonyms may involve a
process of prototype formation : if the conceptual reorganization
consists of a process of prototype formation, mergers do not violate
the isomorphic principle .
We can, in short, formulate two hypotheses with regard to the
avoidance of homonymy: ( 1 ) conceptual reorganizations towards
merger involve prototype effects , and (2) conceptual reorganization
precedes the operation of the isomorphic principle. In what follows,
a case-study will be presented in which both hypotheses are tested,
although most of the attention will be given to the first. In
particular, by following the semantic history of two near-homonyms
on the basis of textual material, a closer look at the process of
conceptual reorganization is possible than with regard to Goossens's
dialectological material . Because the latter is based on traditional
questionnaires and dictionaries, it is not suited for a fine-grained
historical analysis based on examples of usage in context.
Before turning to the case-study, 1 1 however, we will have a look at
some preliminary examples that establish beyond doubt that pairs of
homonyms may indeed be subject to semantic merger. The present
day Dutch steunen has the readings 'to sustain (oneself)' and 'to
groan, to moan' . Although they have different etymological origins ,
i t would not b e surprising t o find that th e common language user
conceives of the latter as a metonymical extension of the former (to
groan is what you do when you have to sustain yourself with some
effort).
Verweren means 'to become weather-beaten, to weather' when it is
derived from weer 'weather' , but it can also be derived from weer
'callus , hardened skin ' , in which case it means 'to become calloused' .
However, because the latter weer is rather rare, both readings of
verweren can be subsumed under a common denominator ' to lose its
original smooth form , to become rough (as it) under the influence of
the weather' In fact, phrases such as verweerde huid, een verweerd
gelaat are now commonly interpreted along lines that are similar to
the English expressions weather-beaten skin, a weather-beaten face;
the fact that weather-beaten in English can be used to indicate the
erosion of objects under the influence of the weather as well as
toughened or tanned skin illustrates that the two concepts are very
close indeed and that a combination of the notion 'with regard to
skin: to become tough or rough' with the notion 'to weather' into a
single prototypical category is semantically quite plausible.
An interesting case is the Dutch word tros, because the etymologists
themselves differ over whether the two readings 'bunch (of grapes,
bananas, and so on) , cluster (of flowers), raceme' , and 'train,
baggage (of an army)' have a common origin or not. If they do, 1 2 the
word is to be related to the French trousse (which also lies at the basis
of the English truss), and the common meaning is that of 'bundle,
bunch of things ' . If the two meanings are etymologically distinct, 1 3
only 'train (of a n army)' would come from the French trousse,
whereas 'bunch (of grapes etc . )' would be related to the Old Norse
tros 'withered branch' and the Anglo-Saxon trus 'fallen leaves and
branches or twigs as material for fuel ' . If this hypothesis is correct,
the earlier etymologists' misconception proves how common it is to
devise a prototypical category covering etymologically distinct but
semantically relatable readings .
Finally , as might be expected on the basis of the foregoing
example, relevant phenomena can also be found among the
traditional examples of popular etymology . For instance, the Dutch
uitweiden is derived from weide 'pasture' , but it has lost its literal
meaning ' to graze outside the pasture, to graze freely ' . Its figurative
reading ' to enlarge (upon a topic)' is very often interpreted in
relation to wijd 'wide, large' , so that the word (a traditional snare in
classroom dictation drills) is often misspelled uitwijden . Because
uitweiden is rare in this literal meaning, this is not a very strong case
of homonymy; still , it illustrates once more that the etymology of a

lexical item can be overruled by its semantic resemblance to other
conceptual categories .
On the whole , these examples support the hypothesis that
homonyms may be subject to a process of semantic merger . In what
follows , I shall analyse the process of such a merger in detail .
The present-day Dutch word verduwen exhibits a range of
applicatio ns t hat results from the merger of two etymologically
distinct words . On the one hand , there is the form verduwen itself, a
derivation of the verb duwen 'to push' with the prefix ver-; the basic
meaning is 'to push aside , to push away' . Ver- has a large number of
morphological meanings , of which one other is relevant in the case of
verduwen . Next to the 'removal' reading, a 'destructive' reading has
to be taken into account; verduwen then means approximately 'to
damage or destroy by pushing or pressing' . The relationship
between the subsidiary 'destructive' reading and the main spatial
reading will become clear in the following pages . The vowel /y./ of
verduwen is a reflex of proto-Germanic /u ./, which frequently occurs
with a diphthong /au/ as a regional and/or informal variant: nu
nou 'now' , stuwen-stouwen 'to stow ' , gruwen-grouwen 'to be
horrified ' .
On the other hand , the /au/ form is the historically regular one for
verdouwen , which is a derivation from ver- and douwen 'to thaw ' . The
etymological meaning is 'to make (something) thaw, to make
(something) melt' , but already upon its first attested occurrence in
Middle Dutch , the word displays 'to digest' as its main meaning.
The word is synchronically opaque , because douwen 'to thaw' does
not survive in either Middle Dutch or Modern Dutch . The notion
'to thaw' is now normally expressed by dooien , a historical variant of
douwen . 1 4 If verdouwen occurs at all nowadays, it is experienced as an
informal variant of verduwen , even with the meaning 'to digest' . As
before , the quotations I shall be using are taken from the corpus of
the Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal ( WNT) .
N ow , what method might be used to determine the presence of a
prototypical development? A process of prototypical merger may be
characterized by the following points . First, at a particular moment
in their history , both words have developed kinds of usage that are
identical or that may be experienced as closely related . Second , in
the further course of their development , this common ground
becomes statistically more prominent , whereas the readings that do
not belong to it (or that cannot be reinterpreted in a straightforward

fashion in function of it) become structurally less important. On the
one hand, the prototypical development needs a starting-point: there
has to be some point of contact for it to get started at all. On the
other hand , once it has got started, the merger of the original
concepts into a prototypically structured one implies strengthening
of the common kinds of usage and withering of the others. This
means that a comparison will have to be made between a middle
period in the development of the etymologically distinct words
(when they are no longer restricted to their etymological meaning
but have developed a number of common or related uses) and a
period when the merger is (almost) completed. In the case of
verduwen, the Early Modern Dutch period (sixteenth century) will
be compared with the nineteenth century. Starting the investigation
after the Middle Dutch period avoids a number of methodological
difficulties with regard to the Middle Dutch material, which is often
difficult to date, and which exhibits much more dialectal variation
than the younger material (we shall be concerned primarily with the
development towards and in Standard Dutch) .
At this point, it should be mentioned that the absolute number of
available quotations (about sixty for both periods together) may not
be enough to yield results that are statistically safe . Because the
absolute frequencies with which particular readings appear are
sometimes v ery low, statistical distortions could easily appear. If,
however, it is accepted that the material used here constitutes a
representative sample of sixteenth-century and nineteenth-century
usage, the changes in the relative frequencies of particular readings
would still reflect (however roughly) the actual changes in the
semasiological structure of both words. In other words, a certain
amount of caution is called for; the lines of development traced in
the following pages are only correct to the extent that the WNT
material for verduwen and verdouwen is a representative sample of
sixteenth-century and nineteenth-century usage .
To begin with, let us have a look at the sixteenth-century
quotations that can be semantically related with verdouwen 'to
digest'. The basic meaning 'to digest' itself is found in eight
quotations, illustrated by ( 1 ) . To these eight can be added two others
(among which is (2)) , in which the meaning 'to digest' appears with
an intransitive rather than the more usual transitive grammatical
valence. 1 5
( 1 ) Dat zy in Porto Desir verwintert hadden, alwaer zy op een eylandt

om hun te ververschen soo veel Zee-robben, Pinguins ende
Eyeren haelden als zy verdouwen moghten [That they had spent the
winter in Porto Desir, where they got from an island, to feed
themselves, as many seals, penguins, and eggs as they could
digest] (Wieder, Reis v. Mahu en De Cordes 220; 1 5 59)
( 2 ) S y stercken de Maghe doen de spyse verdouwen, verteeren alle
koude vochticheden . [They (certain flowers) strengthen the stomach,
cause the foodstuffs to digest, consume all cold humours . ] (Tweede
Schipv. 3 . 8 2 ; 1 5 99)
Next to these cases of the literal use of 'to digest' , there are
figurative variants of the same reading, such as ( 3 ) . Here , the
meaning is 'to digest inwardly' (for example, by trying to overcome
the emotional impact of negative experiences, by assimilating facts
or experiences on the intellectual level, or by assessing the
acceptability of something from an ethical point of view) . The
transition from the literal to such a figurative reading is not
uncommon in expressions referring to eating: think of to digest, it
sticks in his throat, to swallow.
(3) Niet we! en conste ick verdouwen, dat so mennighe mensche, so voor
Rechte als anderssins so dickwijlen stonden als verbaest ende
voor thooft gheslaghen, wanneer sy eenighe buytenlantsche woorden
hoorde n . [I could not easily swallow the fact that so many people, in
court o r elsewhere, stood there as if surprised and dumbfounded,
when they heard a few foreign words . ] ( V . d . Werve A ij'; 1 5 5 3 )
( 4 ) G h y moet m y m e t teerder spijsen lauen, sulck woorden die strauen
can ick niet verdouwen. [You must feed me with more delicate food;
such words that punish I cannot swallow . ] (Antw. Sp. f jr; 1 5 62)
(5) Hy can dat ni e t cauwen (of verduwen ) . [ H e cannot chew (or digest)
i t . ] (Gem . Duytsche Spreekw, ed . Kloeke 5 9 ; 1 5 50)
(6) Als die passien ghecoect ende verduwet sijn, soe mogen sij vrylic
metten prophete seggen (etc . ) [When the passions have been cooked
and digested, they may speak in the words of the prophet (etc . )]
(Cassianus, Der ouder Vad. Coll. 8 1 v ; transl. 1 506)
The link between the literal and the figurative use of 'to digest' is
made apparent by quotations (4), (5), and (6) , where verduwen
verdouwen in its figurative reading is used in combination with
another word from the semantic field of eating and digesting: spi,js
'food ' , koken 'to cook', kauwen 'to chew', laven 'to refresh' . The
figurative character of (4) will be clear from the context, whereas in
( 5 ) , it follows from the fact that the expression is cited as a proverb .
In (6), the abstract character of passie 'passion, violent emotion'

would seem to call for a figurative reading of verduwen, but it should
be mentioned that a literal reading is not excluded, if the quotation is
interpreted against the background of the theory of humours : if
emotions are caused by particular fluids in the body, mastering an
emotion equals physiologically digesting the fluids in question. Even
so, given that an abstract reading of passie could hardly be excluded,
(6) would still be a case in which a link between a literal and a
figurative interpretation of 'to digest' is explicitly present . All in all ,
the link with the literal interpretation is apparent in most of the cases
in which the figurative reading is possible. There are two strictly
figurative quotations, such as (3), next to the three mentioned above,
in which reminiscences of the literal interpretation can still be
strongly felt .
( 7 ) Tis meer d an twee maenscynen geleden <lat ian ployaert mijne man
noch <lit noch <lat en dede, ende ben nochtans wijfs genoch om hem te
verduwe;i . [It is now more than two months since easygoing John, my
husband, did either this or that, and yet, I am woman enough to cope
with him . ] (Euang. B ijr; c . 1 500)
In (7) the notion 'to digest' is generalized into the concept 'to cope
physically (sexually) with' . There is only one sixteenth-century
example, although a few seventeenth-century ones may be found . It
should be noted that this r e ading shares the notion 'to endure, to
stand, to bear' with the previously mentioned figurative extensions.
In this sense, it could be said that there is only one non-literal
meamng, namely 'to cope with (something)' , which can be specified
in a mental (intellectual, emotional, moral) as well as in a physical
sense .
As for verduwen 'to push away ' , quotations such as (8), in which
the notion appears in its purest literal form, are relatively scarce;
there is only one other in the corpus. Figurative readings are much
more common; they represent two core meanings: 'to harm' and ' to
make (something) disappear' . The notion 'to harm ' , which is
illustrated by (9) and ( I O) , and which is represented in the corpus by
three other quotations, comes in nuances such as 'to treat badly, to
oppress, to slight, to undermine, to take the strength away from, to
subdue' .
(8) Beesten verschudden vel en wol, Vogelkens haer pluimen verduwen,

Die in 't Niewe Jaer vernuwen . [Animals shake off skin and wool,
birds push away their feathers, which are renewed m the new
year . ] (Spieghel 2 1 3 ; 1 5 83)
(9) Schouten, baillieuwen, d i e vanden coninck gestelt sij n , welcken nu
als gieren donnoselen verduwen en voor beschermers der goeden nu
willen getelt zij n ; wie in heur handen compt, die mach wel gruwen!
[ S heriffs and bailiffs, who are appointed by the king, who oppress
simple people, j ust like vultures, and who would like to be counted
among the protectors of the righteous-who falls into their hands
may well be horrified ! ] (Sp. v . d. llel 8; c . 1 560)
( I O) Men siet nu t priesterscap heel verdouwen, Men heetse afgoden en
Antecristus cnapen; Omdatse som anders doen, dan sij souwen
Versmaet men altsamen muncken en papen. [One can now see that
priesthood is treated badly; they are called idols and servants of the
Antichrist. Because they sometimes behave differently than they
should, monks and priests together are scorned . ] (A . Bijns 47;
1 52 8 )
(II) Eenen persoon, d i e om huwen ghaet Moet thoogen als j c , d a t hy e e n
m a n zy. W a n t d i e hem v a n z y n w y f verduwen l a e t T e s een laenekaert.
[If anyone goes off to marry, he should do as I do and show that he
is a man. For who lets himself be shoved away by his wife is a
coward . ) (Everaert 5 3 3 ; 1 5 3 8 ?)
( 1 2) Verdrinck icse d i e my mint, zoe sullen my verdouwen Alie schoone
vrouwen die draghen amoreus engien. [If I drown who loves me, all
beautiful women who know about love will reject me . ] (A. Bijns, in
Leuv. B. jdr. C4 . 292 ; c . 1 540)
( 1 3) V deruen mi seer rout le beminne v bouen gout Mer fortuine mi
verdout. [To miss you grieves me much. I love you more than gold,
but Fortune rejects me . ] (Ant. Liedb . 2 3 8 ; 1 544 edn . )
As was the case with the figurative reading o f ' to digest', examples
can be found that make the transition between the literal and the
transferred reading of 'to push away' explicit. In fact , the idea of
pushing someone (literally) aside is still vivid in ( 1 1 ) and ( 1 2) . The
figurative reading 'to treat someone in a way that is not to his
advantage' is accompanied by the image of someone being pushed
away from the position he has (or should have, or would like to have)
with regard to someone else . Etymologically, English expressions
such as to push someone into a corner, an outcast, or to reject are based
on the same image: the literal movement of being pushed away from
the presence or the society of a particular person or a group of people
symbolizes and accompanies an abstract action of refusing to support
or tolerate someone. In ( 1 3) the combination of a literal and
transferred reading comes about because the second person involved in

the act of pushing away is, in fact, a personification , namely, Fortune
as an allegorical figure. Needless to say , there may be contexts where it
is not clear whether the literal image behind the transferred reading
is still vividly presen t. If such unclear cases are counted with the
clearly transitional ones, there are five quotations in the corpus of
the type that includes ( 1 1 )-( 1 3) , and five of the type that includes
(9)-( I O) .
The second figurative extension o f 'to push away' i s illustrated b y
( 1 4) . Here again, a quotation such a s ( 1 5 ) presents a borderline case
in which the idea of a literal movement is still present, given the
allegorical character of the context. On the abstract reading, self
interest should be made to disappear, but within the literal context
of the play, the allegorical character Self-Interest is expelled.
Obviously, a transitional case such as ( 1 5 ) also links up with the
transitional cases ( 1 1 )-( 1 3 ) , where a similar literal image (the
expulsion of a person or a personification) lurks in the background of
the figurative reading. In cases such as ( 1 4)-( 1 5 ) , it is even more
difficult than before to separate the transitional from the purely
figurative cases, but there seem to be two quotations in the corpus to
illustrate each of them .
( 1 4) Wilt u niet versaghen, laet die sorghe verdouwen. [Do not lose
courage , let trouble be made to disappear . ] (Roode Roos 9 5 ; 1 5 8 8 ?)
( 1 5 ) Eyghen Wasdom verduut, onder der caritaten subgecxie. [Expel Se!f
I nterest , guided by charity . ] (Everaert 70; 1 5 I I )
( 1 6) U godlyck saet en heeft i n mij niet gevaet . . . I n mij , steenige eerde
. . . Eest verdort, vanden doorne liet ict verdouwen . [Your divine
seed has not germed in me. I t has withered in me, stony earth; I have
let it be destroyed by thorns . ] (A. Bijns 394; 1 567 edn . )
( 1 7) Den helschen zaeyere . . . Heefter crocke ende oncruyt onder
ghezaeyt, Dwelck de goe taerwe heeft verdauwen En ghebrocht in
verflauwen met nyde deurlaeyt. [The infernal sower has sown vetch
and tares amongst it, which have crushed the good corn, and made it
to wither, mixed with envy . ] (Pol/it. Ballad. 23; 1 5 78)
Finally, it should be noticed that the figurative extensions of 'to

push aside' can both be connected with the concept 'to destroy by
pushing or pressing' , which is, as mentioned above, a possible
morphological meaning of verduwen. The link between 'to harm' and
'to destroy' does not need much comment, whereas a connection
between 'destruction' and 'disappearance (being pushed away)' can
be established through the notion 'complete destruction, annihila

tion ' . Unfortunately, the reading 'to destroy by pressing or pushing'
is not found in the corpus in its most literal form. The closest we find
are ( 1 6) and ( 1 7) , where the literal notion of destruction is
allegorically coupled with the abstract idea 'to weaken, to subdue ' ;
the seed that i s destroyed symbolically represents a n abstract notion
such as the word of God . Moreover, it is not impossible to interpret
( 1 6) and ( 1 7) as transitional cases between ' to harm, to subdue' and
'to push aside' . It is possible to read, not that the good seed is
crushed by thorns and weeds, but that it is pushed aside, pushed
away from the place where it might germ. In this sense, the concept
'to destroy or damage by pushing or pressing' appears to play a role
only in the background of the semasiological structure of verduwen .
The foregoing analysis is schematically represented in Figure 4 . 6 .
The numbers i n parentheses i n each o f the boxes refer t o the
illustrative quotations : the numbers not in parentheses give the total
number of illustrations in the corpus for each of the separate areas of
the diagram . Overlapping of boxes indicates that there is a semantic
relationship between the readings represented by those boxes; thus,
' t o digest' overlaps with ' t o cope physically with' , because the latter
meaning is an extension of the former. The quotations in the
overlapping areas are the transitional cases discussed above. The
arrows symbolize the points of contact between the two conceptual
clusters; they connect readings that can be seen as near-identical, or
as extensions of each other.
In the first place, the literal cores of the two clusters can be related ,
in the sense that ' to digest' can be reinterpreted in terms of 'to push
away' . For one thing, digesting involves moving food from the
mouth downward. In this respect, it is interesting to see that the
literal reading 'to push away' may be specified as 'to push
downward' , as illustrated by ( 1 8) .
( 1 8) Ghi hadt mi onder v verduwet E n had ic m i niet cort ghevonden Ghi

hadt mi so o nderbonden Dat ic ghebleuen ware ghesmacht. [ You
had pushed me downward under you , and if I had not been strong,
you would have held me so that I would have choked . ] ( Seghelyn
van lherus b iij•; before 1 5 1 7)
Furthermore , digesting involves the decomposition of foodstuffs

(they disappear, they no longer subsist in the form they originally
had) . The relationship with the figurative extensions of verduwen ('to
B
c
(3) 5 (7) 1
� A 'to d i g e s t '
I
( 4, 5, 6) 3 B 'to c o p e m e n t a l l y '
C 'to cope p h ys i c a l! y '
( 1 , 2) 10
D I
I (8) 2
E
L=_
( 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3)
5 D 'to p u s h a s i d e '
E ' t o h a r m , t reat
__.
b a d l y , s u b d u e , etc . '
( 1 4) 2 F ' t o m a ke d i s a p p e a r '
(9, 1 0) 5
G 'to d es t r o y o r
F
d a m a g e by
( 1 6, 1 7 ) 2
I p re s s i n g o r
pushing'
G I
FIG . 4 . 6 . The structure o f verduwen and verdouwen i n th e sixteenth century
make something disappear' and 'to damage') will be clear. On the

other hand, the link between the two literal concepts should not be
overstressed . First, the notion of pushing or pressing is not terribly
marked in the concept 'to digest' . Second, the notion of assimilation
(specifically, nutritious assimilation), which is essential for 'to
digest', is not a part of 'to push aside' .
The second line t o b e drawn i s rather stronger, because i t i s m fact
based on near-identity . Coping mentally with negative experiences
or facts equals making them disappear from the foreground of one's
(intellectual or emotional) attention . Mentally digesting something
in a successful fashion entails removing its disturbing mental

presence because an adequate emotional, intellectual, or moral
reaction has been achieved . In this sense, there is a fairly direct link
between the abstract readings 'to cope mentally' and 'to make
disappear' : the former can be reinterpreted (exploiting a similar
polysemy in English) as an act of putting certain mental phenomena
aside, or discarding them .
The lines of contact identified in the foregoing analysis lead to a
particular hypothesis about the development of 'to digest' and ' to
push away' . If the two conceptual clusters merge at all , three things are
likely to happen, given the hypothesis that conceptual merger
involves prototype formation . First , readings that do not belong to
the points of contact will become marginal or will disappear. For
instance, this should be the case for 'to harm or damage' and 'to cope
physically with something' . Second, the notion 'to digest' will be
reinterpreted in terms of ' to push away' However, since the
conceptual distance between the two notions is still fairly large, it does
not seem very probable that the structural position of 'to digest' will
be strengthened. Third, the strongest point of contact (the reading
with regard to experiences that have to be overcome) will become
conceptually prominent.
The first hypothesis is easily confirmed. The notion 'to cope
physically with something' does not survive , and ' to treat badly, to
harm (etc . )' survives only in quotation ( 1 9 ) . Typically, ( 1 9) is a
transitional c ase in the sense that the literal interpretation 'to push
aside' is still vivid (due to the presence of another spatial expression,
namely stap) : the separate, autonomous character of the reading 'to
harm (etc . ) ' is greatly reduced. Furthermore, because there are no
cases similar to ( 1 6) and ( 1 7) , the concept 'to damage or destroy
by pushing or pressing' recedes even further into the back
ground.
( 1 9) Ach, by verdrukking, ergernissen Ontmoet, verduwd by elken stap !

Sints ik Jerusalem moest missen In steeds gerekte ballingschap! [Oh,
together w i t h oppression, I encountered offences, pushed aside with
every step , since I had to leave Jerusalem, in an ever prolonged
exile ! ] (Da Costa 3 . 1 60 ; 1 848)
( 2 0 ) De wezenlijke bestanddeelen van de meeste droespoeders, komen
daarin overeen, dat zij , de Ievenskracht verhoogende, zoo wel op de
verduwings-organen als de vaten werken . [The basic components of
most powders against glanders are similar in the sense that they
strengthen the vital forces and exert an influence on the digestive

organs as well as on the vascular system . ] (Claterrijnder s, Paarden
Arts 26; 1 840)
(2 1 ) 'Zou 't nog niet bijdraaien ? ' , weifelde Dik en hij verduwde met
moeite een paar kinderachtige tranen. [In doubt, Dick said:
'Wouldn ' t it be turning to the good yet?' ; with some difficulty, he
pushed back some childish tears . ] (Naeff, Veulen 1 84 ; 1 903)
In accordance with the second part of the second hypothesis, it is

difficult to find quotations in which the literal interpretation of 'to
digest' and 'to push away' occurs ; the more usual terms in the
nineteenth century are verteren and wegduwen respectively. How
ever, examples may be found by slightly stretching the boundaries of
our investigation. If we take into account the derivation verduwing
'process of digesting, digestion ' , we find the compound verduwings
organen 'organs of digestion' in (20) ; and if we go just beyond the
terminus post quem non of 1 900, we find an example of 'to push back'
in (2 1 ) . On the other hand, a metalinguistic quotation such as (22) is
evidence for the conjecture that 'to digest' is reinterpreted in terms
of ' to push aside' ; further evidence will be presented further on. In
(23) the concepts of pushing something away and the notion of
digestion are similarly combined, though this may be a rather more
incidental combination.
(22) De eigenlijke betekenis van het verbum 'verduwen' is wegduwen,
door duwen verplaatsen. In figuurlijken zin zegt men van eene spijs
dat zij niet te verduwen is, als zij moeilijk verteerd kan worden. [The
true meaning of the verb 'verduwen' is to push away, to move by
pushing. Figuratively , one can say of food that it cannot be
'verduwd ' , if it is difficult to digest . ] (Noord en Zuid 8. 25 1 ;
1 885)
(23) 't Is een walvisch, die mij nadert, E n met loddrig oog aanschouwt,
En mij , als een andren Jonas, Leukweg naar zijn maag verdouwt. [It
is a whale that approaches me, and looks at me with blurry eyes, and
simply shoves me to his stomach, like another Jonah . ] (V.
Zeggelen I . 1 3 3 ; 1 8 52 )
(24) Nederlanders, als g e ' t woord 'verzuipen' p l a t vindt--een woord dat
nooit over myn lippen kwam, want ik ben zoo grof niet-bedenkt
dan dat ik tot u spreek, tot u, gy die erger dingen kunt verduwen dan
gemeene woorden. [Dutchmen, if you feel that the word verzuipen
[to drown] is vulgar-a word that never crossed my lips, for I am not
crude-recall that I am addressing you, you who can swallow worse
things than vulgar words . ] (Multatuli 4. 262 ; 1 86 5 )
Finally, the correctness of the third hypothesis appears from the

fact that there are no less than fifteen quotations of the type
including (24) in which the notion 'to cope mentally with something'
is present. As in the sixteenth century, transitional quotations of the
type including (2 5 ) and (26) can be found; the link between 'to digest
(literally)' and 'to digest (mentally)' is apparently still strong enough
to invite allusive or allegorical references to a material process of
digestion in a context that as a whole receives a figurative
interpretation . 1 6
(2 5 ) I k w i l niet dansen naar d e pijpen van Mijnheer. Het heeft m e a l leed

genoeg gedaan, dat u het doet, dat u zelfs de steenen opslikt, die hij u
te verduwen geeft. [I do not want to dance to My Lord's tune. It has
grieved me enough already that you do so, that you even swallow the
stones that he gives you to digest . ] (Schimmel, B. v. Omm. I . 9 ;
1 870)
(26) Wie heden Zijn dagen wil besteden Op ' t veld der politiek, diens
voorhoofd moet vereelt zij n , En hem een maag bedeeld zij n , Die
zonder ooit te schrikken, Verduwen kan en slikken. [Nowadays, if
someone wishes to spend his days on the political field, his forehead
has to be callous, and he has to be endowed with a stomach that can
digest and swallow without ever being surprised . ] ( V . Lennep,
Poet. 1 3 . u 5 ; 1 8 56)
(27) Het scheen, als of hij onze dwaalbegrippen in zijn stille overdenking
verduwd had, en nu eerst deel began te nemen in het gesprek, dat
onze wandeling veraangenaamde . [It seemed as if he had disregarded
our misconceptions in his quiet meditation, and as if it was only now
that he began to take part in the conversation that enlivened our
walk . ) (Geel 226; 1 8 3 5 )
( 2 8) M e n k a n zich w e ! voorstellen, d a t de Keizer dien hoon niet
ongewroken konde verduwen. [One can easily imagine, that the
emperor could not simply disregard such scorn while it was
unavenged . ] (Haafner, Ceilon 230; 1 8 10)
The growing importance of the reading 'to digest mentally' also

follows from the fact that a new nuance of that concept can now be
found ; it is illustrated by (27) and (28 ) . In cases such as (24) the fact
of 'making something disappear' is the result of a mental activity ; for
instance, a negative experience disappears from the foreground of
one' s mental attention because an adequate emotional reaction has
been found . 'To cope with something, to mentally digest something'
presupposes some sort of assimilation, a degree of mental processing
that finally removes the disturbing mental presence of the thing that
catches the attention. 1 7
In (27), o n the other hand, the interpretation i s rather 'to ignore,
to disregard' ; the mental reaction is one of non-consideration, of
downright rejection. This is an important observation, because 'to
ignore, to disregard' is linked directly with 'to push away ' , even
more directly than the concept 'to cope mentally with' , which finds
its primary source in a metaphorical transfer of 'to digest' . In the
latter case , the fact that something disappears from the foreground
of one's mental attention is the consequence of a process of
assimilation; in the former, it is a deliberate act of non-assimilation.
We are now in a position to see that there are two ways in which
the readings 'to digest mentally' and 'to make something disappear'
have grown closer to each other. On the one hand, 'to make
something disappear' no longer occurs with nuances outside the
mental domain, such as ( 1 4) and ( 1 5) . On the other hand, 'to digest
mentally' develops a nuance 'to ignore' in the closest possible
correspondence with 'to make something disappear' . The two
readings involved in the strongest sixteenth-century point of contact
are, so to say , reinterpreted in terms of each other-a further proof
of the conceptual reorganization that has taken place . According to
the same conventions as before, Figure 4. 7 schematically summarizes
the analysis of the nineteenth-century material.
The conclusion that a conceptual reorganization has taken place
may be strengthened by considering the lexicographical treatment of
verduwen and verdouwen in the nineteenth century. The earlier
lexicographical history of the two words is not very instructive .
Verduwen appears for the first time in 1 69 1 (Sewell) , whereas
verdouwen has been present since 1 5 3 7 (Pelegromius); all through
the sixteenth century, verdouwen is mentioned with the meaning 'to
digest' , and occasionally in the figurative reading 'to cope with
something, to endure' . Table 4 . 6 clearly shows that both forms are
identified in the nineteenth century. Two samples of dictionaries
have been consulted, one from the first thirty years, and another
from the last thirty years, of the nineteenth century. 18 For each of
the major meanings , it is indicated whether it is allocated to either
verduwen or verdouwen (or to both). If a particular form merely
receives a reference to the other form (' Verduwen: see Verdouwen') ,
they a r e treated a s semantically identical . I t i s easy to s e e that both
forms are mentioned with roughly the same range of application, as
1 46
�E Polysemization and Isomorphic Principle
(20) 1
( 1 9) 1 I (22, 23) 2
(2 1 ) 1
(25, 26) 3
I
I D
(27, 28) 2 (24) 1 5

H
E
A 'to d i gest'
B ' t o c o p e m e n ta l l y '
D 'to p u s h a s i d e '
'to h a r m , t r e a t b a d l y , s u b d u e , e tc . '
H 'to i g n o re '
FIG . 4 . 7 . T h e s t r u c t ure o f verduwen a n d verdouwen i n the

ninetee n t h century
might be expected . If both forms are mentioned, they are

systematically treated as identical by the end of the century .
On the other hand , it is more or less surprising to find that the
notion 'to push away' is mentioned less often than 'to digest' ; this
would seem to suggest that 'to digest' in its literal meaning is more
common than became apparent from the corpus of quotations
analysed in the previous pages. Likewise , the ouw form is mentioned
relatively more often than it is present in the corpus. However, these
lexicographical data should be handled with caution, in the sense
that they probably do not faithfully mirror the actual facts of
linguistic usage . In the first place , the dictionaries in question are
not based on an extensive lexical documentation; not corpus
analysis , but the intuitions of the lexicographer-and existing
lexicographical reference works-provide the information to be
incorporated into the dictionary . In this sense , the frequency of the
ouw form may well be due to the methodological conservatism of the
dictionaries , that is , to the fact that they often merely copy older
T A B L E 4 . 6 Verduwen and verdouwcn in nineteenth-century dictiona ries
Dictionary Verduwen Verdouwen
2 3 2 3
H o l t rop 1 80 1 + + + +
Weidenbach 1 808 + + + + +
H olla ndsch-H oogduitsch H a ndwoordenboek
1 809 + + + + + +
Benau 1 809 + +
F rieseman 1 8 1 0 + + + + + +
B lusse 1 8 1 3 + +
A gron and Land re 1 8 1 3 + + + +
Janson and Van der Pyl 1 8 1 9 + +
Olinger 1 8 2 2 + + + + +
Martin 1 8 29 + + + +
Van Dale 1 8 72 + + + + + +
Calisch I 8 8 7 + + + +
Manhave 1 892 + + + + + +
Bal 1 899 + + +
Note : I = 'to push away ' , 2 = 'to digest' , 3 = 'to cope , to endure' .
dictionaries . In the second place , pragmatic principles may determine

what information is mentioned explicitly . In particular , the fact that
'to push aside' is a morphologically transparent meaning , whereas 'to
digest' is less predictable , may be an argument for the lexicographer
to mention one explicitly but not the other. In general , the
lexicographical material can be used as evidence for the fact that
verduwen and verdouwen are one word according to the intuitions of
the lexicographers , but it should be treated with some caution as a
reflection of actual linguistic usage .
The conceptual merger of verduwen and verdouwen is accompanied
by a formal reorganization through which verduwen surfaces as the
main form . This is consistent with the fact that ouw forms are
regular regional or informal variants of the uw form . The primacy of
verduwen may further have something to do with the fact that it is a
morphologically transparent form, whereas verdouwen is etymo
logically opaque . The process through which both forms coincide is
already well on its way in the sixteenth century. Figure 4 . 8 indicates

how the e tymologically correct forms are distributed over the two
conceptual clusters distinguished in Figure 4 . 6 . An asterisked form
indicates an etymologically 'wrong' form (that is, ouw forms in the
B
c
F
*1
..... ,_
7 *3
A
2
I
E
2 2 *3
L+
1 *1
2 *3
F
*2
L
A ' t o d i g e st '
B 'to cope mental ly'
C 'to c o p e p h y s i c a l l y '
D 'to p u s h a s i d e '
E ' t o h a r m , t r e a t b a d l y , s u b d u e , etc'
F 'to m a k e d i s a p p e a r '
G 'to d e s t r o y or d a m a g e by p re s s i n g o r p u s h i n g '
FIG . 4 . 8 . The formal merger o f verduwen and verdouwen i n the

sixteenth century
verduwen cluster, and uw forms in the verdouwen cluster) . It will be

seen that 'incorrect' forms appear in large numbers in both clusters:
the conceptual distinction is not mirrored by a clear formal
distinction .
As can be seen in Figure 4 . 9 , the fairly even distribution between
uw and ouw forms has disappeared in the nineteenth century, and
verduwen is unambiguously the main form . (Starred forms now
indicate ouw forms . ) Typically, the ouw forms always occur in
rhyming position in the work of authors who would otherwise use
the uw form s : verdouwen is now a stylistical variant only to be used in
extraordinary circumstances . As we have seen, nineteenth-century
dictionaries list verdouwen rather more frequently than warranted by
our corpus, but this may be due to lexicographical conservatism.
It is tempting to take the redistribution of verduwen and verdouwen
as a proof of the hypothesis that conceptual merger hierarchically
precedes lexical reorganization; formal differences are neutralized if
a conceptual merger is possible, and the conceptual reorganization so
E I
E A
1
1
- 1 *1
1
2 *1
I
I I D
H
2
I 14 *1
A 'to d i g est'
B 'to cope m e n ta l l y '
D 'to p u s h aside'
E 'to h a r m , t r e a t b a d l y , s u b d u e , etc . '
H 'to i g n o re '
FIG. 4 . 9 . The formal merger of verduwen and verdouwen in the

nineteenth century
commands a lexical reorganization. Whereas a straightforward

application of the Humboldtian isomorphic principle would entail
that the formal distinction between verduwen and verdouwen requires
a conceptual distinction to be maintained, independent developments
on the conceptual level now seem to bring about a formal
reorganization.
However, the fact that the distributional scrambling of verduwen
and verdouwen is already well on its way in the sixteenth century,
when the conceptual merger has not yet progressed very far ,
suggests that the formal development is a t least partly independent .
The regular uw-<Juw variation i s probably the primary cause o f the
redistribution, and the sixteenth-century situation can be considered
a case of double homonymy come about by an independent process
of uw-ouw variation. The subsequent development, by which
verduwen becomes the main form, can then be seen as an
isomorphic attempt to remove a superfluous synonymy. (In the
sixteenth century, verduwen and verdouwen are, so to say ,
synonymous homonyms . ) In short, the formal development of
verduwen and verdouwen does not really provide independent
evidence for the second major hypothesis mentioned above .
It can be safely concluded, then, that the development of the pair
verduwen-verdouwen shows , first , that a homonymic conflict may be
resolved by conceptual merger rather than lexical substitution, 1 9 and
second , that such a conceptual reorganization involves prototypical
ci ustering round the meanings that established a link between the
original concepts. The additional hypothesis that conceptual re
structuring might even be independent of complete formal identity
(that is, may itself lead to a formal merger) is more difficult to
confirm, since the tendency of verduwen and verdouwen to become
distributionally identical precedes the process of prototypical re
organization, and can be explained independently from it .
4.3 PREDICTA B I L I T Y AND TELEOLOGY
I n general, the case-studies brought together i n this chapter show

that prototypicality and isomorphism may indeed occur as competing
motivations . In the case of homonymic conflicts, the former
principle leads to a semantic merger round a new prototypical
centre, whereas the latter principle leads to a lexical reorganization .
The insight that both principles may play a role in diachronic

semantic processes does not, however, take the form of a predictive
statement about the relative strength of both tendencies: the cases
we have considered so far do not allow us to predict precisely under
which circumstances one principle will take precedence over the
other.
This conclusion seems to corroborate Lass's argumentation ( 1 980)
that predictability cannot be attained in historical linguistics . It
should be borne in mind , however, that the explanatory framework
developed in the previous chapter hardly leads one to search for (let
alone expect) predictability of the kind discussed by Lass . The type
of explanation that he declares unattainable is a deductive, strictly
causal explanation such as may be found in the physical sciences . It
involves universally valid laws that predict exactly what will happen
and how it will happen . By contrast, a teleological explanation of
linguistic changes could aspire to statistical generalizations and
probabilistic predictions at mos t. For one thing, the variables
involved are so numerous that the exact direction that the invisible
hand processes will take can be formulated in terms of tendencies
only. For another, if the ultimate motivation for change consists of
the expressive needs of language users, then there is an inevitable
moment of freedom in the way languages develop: language users
ultimately choose a particular solution for the expressive problems
facing them.
Although other sources might be cited to the same effect, the
following quotations from Eugenio Coseriu ( 1 9 7 4) may serve as an
apt formulation of the factors involved . Also , they will serve as an
introduction to the questions to be tackled in the next chapter .
Coseriu summarizes the methodological basis of the teleological
approach (or, as he calls it, the 'finalistic' approach) in the following
way .
Nun liiBt sich die Finalitiit als ' subjektive Kausalitiit' nur subjektiv <lurch
eine innere Erfahrung kennen . . . Deshalb ist die in jedem einzelnen Fall
zu stellende Frage nicht: 'Wodurch [<lurch welche empirisch objektiven
Umstande] trat dieser Wandel ein ?' sondern: 'Wofiir [zu welchem Zweck]
wiirde ich, wiihrend ich iiber dieses bestimmte System verfii ge und mich in
diesen und jenen historischen Verhiiltnissen befinde, A in B verwandlen,
das Element C aufgeben oder das Element D schaffen?' [Teleology, as
'subjective causality' can only be known subjectively , through the inter
mediary of a subjective experience . . . That is why the question to be asked
in each particular case is not: 'How [as a consequence of what empirical and
objective circumstances] did this change come about?' but: 'Why [for what
purpose] would I, given that I know how to use this particular linguistic
system and that I find myself in such-and-such historical circumstances,
change A into B, give up element C , or create element D?'] (Coseriu 1 974 :
1 77)
A teleological explanation, in other words, deals with purposes and

motives, rather than with causes and universal laws . This recognition
allows for a specification of the particular position of the human
sciences, in contrast with the causally explanatory character of the
natural sciences .
GewiB erlaubt der Notwendigkeitscharakter der naturwissenschaftlichen

Gesetze die praktische Aufgabe, 'vorherzusehen ' , das heifit, das Allgemeine
auf das Besondere anzuwenden; doch keine Wissenschaft erlaubt, das den
Individuen Eigentiimliche vom Allgemeinen abzuleiten. In den Human
wissenschaften ist es zudem nur moglich zu sagen, was unter bestimmten
Bedingungen geschehen kann oder zu geschehen pflegt, nicht jedoch, ob es
geschehen wird oder nicht, da das Geschehen selbst von der Freiheit und
nicht von einer aufieren Notwendigkeit abhangt. [Undoubtedly, the
inevitability of the laws of the natural sciences allows for the practical task of
'predicting' , that is to say, of applying the general to the specific. No
scientific endeavour, however, allows one to deduce what is specific and
characteristic for individuals from what is general. In the human sciences,
then, it is only possible to say what might happen, or will usually happen,
under specific circumstances, but not if it is going to happen or not, because
whether it will happen depends on freedom, not external necessity . ]
(C oseriu 1 974 : 2 04 )
Even though this quotation may perhaps somewhat overstate the

possible impact of the individual language user's freedom (invisible
hand processes are likely to attenuate an individual's influence) , it
adequately indicates why taking a deductive model of causation as
one ' s starting-point might well amount to something of a category
mistake . It would entail using a model of causation and explanation
that deals with an entirely different class of facts . Ultimately, says
Coseriu , the impossibility of applying the causally deductive type of
explanation is not an indication of the methodological poverty of
linguistics; rather, it follows directly from the nature of the object of
the linguistic enquiry itself. Because a language lives only through
the linguistic activities of its users, linguistics deals with purposive
actions rather than blind causality, and its method of explanation
should be chosen accordingly.
Po/ysemization and Isomorp hic Principle 153
It becomes clear, in other words, that the observation that was

made above with regard to the predictability of linguistic changes
(and , specifically, with regard to the mutual strength of competing
motives of change, such as a tendency towards prototypicality on the
one hand, and the isomorphic principle on the other) ties in with the
choice of a teleological form of explanation that was made in the
previous chapter. At the same time, it can now be seen that this very
preference for a teleological approach implicitly correlates with a
particular conception of the nature of language, and with a specific
methodological view of linguistics as a human science . The question
arises, then, whether this connection can be made more explicit.
What is the conception of natural language underlying diachronic
semantics? What does this entail for the methodological position of
linguistic semantics, seen against the background of the distinction
between the natural sciences and the human sciences? And what
does prototypicality have to do with all this? These are the questions
that will be tackled more systematically in the following chapter.
Notes to Chap ter 4

I. The overall line of reasoning followed here was first sketched in
Geeraerts ( 1 98 5 c ) .
2. An investigation of his examples, which are partly taken from authors
such as Eylenbosch ( 1 962 , 1 966) and Willemyns ( 1 966) , is all the more
important since his treatment of polysemic clashes features prominently
in Raimo Anttila's well-known introduction to historical linguistics
( r 97 2: 1 8 1-4) . A more detailed discussion of Goossens's analysis of
avoidance of polysemy is presented in Geeraerts ( 1 986a) . Although all of
the examples of avoidance of polysemy discussed in t his section involve
geographical variation, cases of polysemiophobia have been identified
that are situated within a single language variety. Leys ( 1 995), for
instance, attributes the changes in the meaning of the Dutch particle te
to avoidance of polysemy (within standard Dutch, without any
intervening geographical factors).
3- The example was originally described by Willemyns ( 1 966) .
4. Notice, incidentally, that the senses involved are etymologically related,
having a common origin in the notion 'germ' ; this is why the example is
a case of etymological polysemy rather than homonymy.
5. The fact that Goossens has not drawn the attention to this regular zigzag
configurat10n is probably due to the fact that he has not represented his
examples in the way they are analysed in the tables and figures in this
chapter. The schematic representation used here allows one t o consider
both the semasiological and the onomasiological aspects of the

examples, whereas Goossens is more narrowly concerned with the
semasiological analysis of the polysemic items.
6. There are two straightforward cases of the zigzag pattern represented in
Fig. 4 . 4 . The cases in question are the kruid example, taken from
Eylenbosch ( 1 962), and the trog example, taken from Eylenbosch
( 1 966) . Next to these regular zigzag cases, the vacellum example, which
is based on a study done by Pee et al. ( 1 957), shows how the zigzag
pattern can be complicated by additional geographical divisions.
Further, there are some examples that have to be classified as unclear
cases. The Italian guercio and cercare examples brought to the fore by
Jaberg ( 1 936) as cases of polysemiophobia are rejected by Goossens
himself, so we need not bother about them . The German Wagner
example, which Goossens points out in Bellmann ( 1 96 1 ) , is impossible
to judge adequately because not all of the relevant data for a combined
semasiological and onomasiological analysis are available. The same
more or less holds for the lopig case (Goossens 1 962) . This example is
like the zigzag pattern, except for the presence of heet in the border area.
Because the onomasiological data are not completely available, however,
this case too is difficult to asses s . Finally, there is the blekken example
(Goossens 1 962), for which a clear picture cannot be drawn, but which
can be analysed on the basis of tendencies at work in the different areas .
These tendencies obey the principles of polysemization and iso
morphism. In particular, blekken has a tendency to name the shallow
ploughing of a field in the right-hand area and the breaking up of a
pasture in the left-hand area; in the border area where blekken has
disappeared, there is a marked tendency for both concepts to be
subsumed under the general concept 'to plough' and to be expressed
periphrastically. In this respect, the blekken example is probably a valid
though rather complicated example of prototype formation; in any case,
it clearly demonstrates the importance of taking conceptual reorganiza
tions in the border area into account, a fact that generally does not
receive the full attention of the structuralist theoreticians. The details of
all of these examples are presented in Geeraerts ( 1 986a ) .
7. T h e data a r e taken fr o m Htiing ( 1 9 5 8 ) , supplemented with data from
dialect dictionaries.
8 . Concernmg the background of this terminology, see Haiman's ( 1 980)
classification of t ypes o f iconicity, and see also De Pater and Van
Langendonck ( 1 98 9 ) . The concept of 'diagrammatic' iconicity ultimately
goes back to Charles Saunders Peirce's subdivision of iconic signs into
icons based on images, on metaphors, or on diagrams. Iconic signs
based on images include cases of sound symbolism and onomatopoeia.
While metaphors obviously illustrate the second class, iconic phenomena
based on 'diagrams' involve an isomorphic relationship between the
organization of the linguistic sign and components of the idea it

represents. Describing events in their chronological order, for i nstance,
is an example of diagrammatic iconicity: the order in which things
happened is reflected by the order in which they are mentioned. The
type of isomorphism at play in homonymic conflicts involves the idea
that multiplicity of meanmgs may be diagrammaticality reflected by a
multiplicity of lexical form s, and similarly in the case of semantic
univocality; hence the catch-phrase 'one form , one meaning' to describe
this type of isomorphism .
9. See E . R . Williams ( 1 94 4: 3-38) or Ullmann ( 1 962 : 1 80-- 8 ) fo r an
overview.
IO. The restrictions invoked to explain the absence of therapeutic changes
may be of a formal nature (e . g . the distinction m gender between the
Dutch het portier 'the carriage door' and de portier 'the janitor') or of a
semantic nature (the homonymy between sun and son is not likely to
cause confusion). In the case of a lexical therapy, the substitutive item
may be formally unrelated to the original homonym (as in Gillieron's
faisan and vicaire), but it may also happen that formal variants of the
homonymic form ensure the required lexical distinctness (cf. Ullmann
1 96 2 : 1 8 5 on noyer, and nier) .
11. The case-study was published separately as Geeraerts ( 1 99ob ) .
12. See Franck e t al. ( 1 936) .
13. See De Vries and De Tollenaere ( 1 97 1 ) .
14. The proto-Germanic sequence o f semivowels au1 i s resolved either as
auj, as in the case of dooien, or as awi, as in douwen. The same
bifurcation is illustrated by the presence, in Gothic, of the past tense
tawida next to the infinitive taujan. The WNT entry for verduwen and
verdouwen erroneously mentions that verduwen is historically a strong
verb, while verdouwen is a weak one . Both verbs, in fact, belong to the
weak conjugation, but in some dialects there are secondary strong forms
i n the case of verduwen .
15. Strictly speaking, quotation (2) is ambiguous between a transitive and
an intransitive reading. In the intransitive reading ('cause the foodstuffs
to digest ' ) , the foodstuffs are the subject of the embedded verb. In the
transitive reading ('cause x to digest the foodstuffs'), object raising has
applied. Given the overall absence of references to human beings in the
set of co-ordinated verb phrases in (2), the intransitive reading may be
preferred .
16. The distinctive feature of the figures of speech i n (25) and (26) involves
the fact that both the literal and the figurative reading of the metaphor
are vividly present. On one level, the phrase dat u zelfs de steenen opslikt,
die hij u te verduwen geeft in (25) receives a metaphorical interpretation:
'that you even put up with the worst things that he presents to you ' . On
another level, a literal reading is not excluded: 'that you even stomach
the stones that he gives you to diges t ' . The point of contact between
the two levels is obviously the conventional polysemy of verduwen 'to
diges t ' . This kind of compositionally t ransparent metaphor has not
received a lot of attention in the semantic literature, but see Geeraerts
( 1 99 5 ) for a model that may help to describe the semantic pattern
involved .
1 7 . I n a number o f cases , this assimilation is forced-it is not achieved
wholeheartedly . This is particularly the case when the verb is
accompanied by the auxiliary 'have to' . Verduwen can then be found
translated by 'to endure, to stand, to bear'
1 8 . Full references to the dictionaries mentioned in the figure may be found
in Claes and Bakema ( 1 99 5 ) .
1 9 . I n work that is currently i n progress, Stefan Grondelaers investigates an
example of what appears to be a case of ongoing conceptual merger in
the realm of grammatical particles (see Grondelaers 1 993). I n particular,
he shows how the Dutch particle er derives from two etymologically
distinct sources (the deictic locative expression daer and the genitive
form haer). Although the two categories seem to have gravitated towards
each other, they do not yet seem to have merged completely.
5
Prototype Theory as a Scientific

Paradigm
I N an attempt to highlight the importance of background assump

tions in scientific research, Thomas Kuhn ( 1 962) introduced the
notion of 'paradigm' into the philosophy of science : a paradigm is a
set of assumptions, representational mechanisms , values, symbolic
formats, and typical problems with exemplary solutions that
together determine the research programme in a specific scientific
field. In this chapter, I shall consider the question to what extent the
application of prototype theory to diachronic semantics can be
considered a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense . The analysis will
proceed in two step s. First, it needs to be established that prototype
theory does indeed constitute a set of assumptions that influences (if
not determines) how the historical linguist sees things, and even
what he is prepared to consider a linguistic fact . Second, the exact
nature of this paradigm will have to be specified by comparing it
with other conceptions of lexical semantics . This second step
naturally leads to an investigation of the hermeneutic character of
lexical semantics.
5. 1 KNOWLEDGE FROM UNCERTAINTY
B y the end o f the nineteenth century, the majority o f physicists were

convinced of the existence of an ether: an odourles s , colourless, and
tasteless substance that filled the universe and that functioned as the
material bearer of waves of light. If light is a wave, it indeed requires
a medium through which its waves are transported, j ust as the
waves of the sea move through the material medium that is water. A
body like the earth, then, that moved through the ether would
inevitably cause an ether wind: the ether particles in front of the
body would be pressed together, while behind it an area with
1 57
Prototype Theory as a Paradigm
lowered pressure would be formed. Scientists actually tried to

measure this ether wind experimentally: a light wave moving in the
same direction as the earth would get on more slowly than a light
wave that went along with the ether wind, because the former would
have to overcome the resistance of the tightly packed ether particles
in front of the moving earth .
In 1 8 8 1 this idea was put to an experimental test by Michelson and
Morley, but unfortunately, it appeared that the beam of light that
was sent out in the same direction as the earth did not go faster than
the one that shone in the opposite direction . But perhaps the
experimental equipment used had not been sophisticated enough?
The experiment was repeated in I 8 8 7 with more accurate instruments
and with a truly ingenious design, but this did not bring the
expected results either. Our present-day layman's knowledge of
physics is sufficient to tell us the reason why : we all know that the
speed of light is invariable. But at the time science was not yet
sufficiently advanced to have discovered this: we all know now
that the speed of light is constant, but that assumption as such is
neither self-evident nor empirically obvious. Only in 1 905 , in fact,
did Einstein proclaim the non-existence of the ether wind together
with the invariability of the speed of light. 1
This story is interesting because of its methodological structure .
When an experiment fails, two courses can be followed : either you
assume that there is something wrong with the observational
apparatus with which the experiment was carried out , or you assume
that the theoretical assumptions of the experiment should be
subjected to severe criticism. In the former case there is uncertainty
concerning the actual result of the experiment. The experiment is
considered undecided, and it is assumed that the uncertainty can be
ironed out by using more refined experimental techniques. In the
latter case the experiment is recognized as an actual rejection of an
hypothesis . Michelson and Morley, by their repeated endeavours to
make the experimental environment fit better to measure the
existence of an ether and the presence of an ether wind, followed the
first tack. Einstein, on the other hand , took the opposite course, by
taking Michelson's and Morley' s experimental failure as a straight
forward rejection of the hypothesis that there existed an ether.
The existence of these alternative ways of dealing with negative
experimental results also implies that theoretical presuppositions
define what is a theoretically relevant fact : if one sticks to the
Prototype Theory as a Paradigm 1 59
existence of an ether wind, then the experiment simply does not give
an acceptable observation; owing to the presumed problems with
the experimental design, no theoretically interpretable fact at all is
observed. If, on the other hand, one starts from the presupposition
that there is no ether wind at all , the experiment produces a clear
result. The question how long the first position can be maintained
after repeated failures can be left open here: the crucial point to see is
that observational results do not exist as such, but that ' the facts'
depend at least partly on the intensity with which one cherishes
certain theoretical concepts---0 r , conversely, on the degree to which
one may be ready to give up such concepts. Of the utmost
importance here is the notion of a 'theory of interpretation' as the
embodiment of the view that there are no bare facts : facts only
become facts through the intervention of background assumptions
and interpretative principles .
This notion is part and parcel of Kuhn's conception of scientific
paradigms . Apparent counter-evidence with regard to a paradigmatic
theory is not simply accepted as such, but may merely be considered
an indication of a problem that will be solved when the theory is
developed further. Rather than leading to an immediate rejection of the

existing theory, counter-evidence (if it is not simply disregarded as
based on irrelevant experiments) leads to the attempt to explain away
or solve the problems in the framework of the existing paradigm.
Paradigmatic theories are given credit; they are given time to solve
puzzles that arise .
If we apply this conception of scientific research to diachronic
lexical semantics, we may formulate the following insight: the views
that researchers hold with regard to the structure of lexical categories
will in part determine the theory of interpretation that they work
with, and, accordingly, their interpretation of the historical material
will at least be partly influenced by the model of the semantic
structure of linguistic categories that they hold . In particular, an
adherence to prototype theory stimulates seeing things that otherwise
remain unnoticed, or, at least, that would otherwise be more readily
discarded as irrelevant. The diachronic semanticist who starts from
the prototypical conception of meaning will be able to give a positive
interpretation to a number of cases that, considered superficially,
only show a lack of information . That which is a non-observation for
one approach turns out to be an interesting fact for the other;
uncertainty and indecision for one is knowledge for the other .
1 60 Prototype Theory as a Paradigm
We have, in fact , already encountered one case in which a

difference in interpretative attitude made a crucial difference in
judging the available historical material . In our discussion of
semantic polygenesis in Section 2 . 3 , an exceptionally long period
between the successive attestations of a particular meaning in the
corpus was attributed not to the defective character of the corpus,
but rather t o the fact that the two illustrations of the reading in
question came into being on independent grounds as a consequence
of the flexibility that characterizes prototypical categories .
In addition to this polygenetic example, another case will be
discussed presently: the fact that a meaning attested in the primary
historical sources of a specific period is not found in contemporaneous
dictionaries can be interpreted either as negligence on the part of the
lexicographer, or as an indication of the peripheral, non-salient
character of that meaning m the whole of the prototypical category.
First, however, I shall have a brief look at semantic polygenesis
again, in order to clearly spell out the structure of the argument . 2
In Section 2 . 3 , I introduced the term 'semantic polygenesis' to
indicate the phenomenon that a meaning can arise at different
moments and on independent grounds in the history of a word, with
a remarkable chronological gap between the moments or periods
when it appears. An example of this can be found in the following
quotations.
( 1 ) Daermet steeck i c k <lien opsteker in mijn storte . M e t dien horte dat

ich mi verniele. [With this, I stick the knife in my throa t . I thrust it
so that I destroy myself. ] (Mariken van Nieumeghen , ed. Beuken;
c . 1 500)
(2) Had ik de allerminste aanleiding gegeeven! Ik vernielde myzelf; met

zulk een schurk moest de aarde niet belast zyn. [If I had given even
the slightest cause (for a certain allegation) ! I would destroy myself; the
earth should not be burdened with such a scoundre l . ] (Wolff e n
Deken , Leev. 2. 1 88 ; 1 784)
Vemielen 'to destroy' can be used with the meanmg 'to kill' until
the nineteenth century and can be applied to persons as well as to
animals . A reflexive use like that in ( 1 ) and (2), where the general
meaning 'to kill' receives the specification 'to commit suicide' , is rare
in the Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal (WND material :
quotations ( 1 ) and (2) are the only ones occurring in the entire WNT
corpus . The temporal gap of about three centuries between both
Prototype Theory as a Paradigm 161
attestations o f the meaning 'to commit suicide' can be looked a t in

two ways.
On the one hand , if these and similar cases are considered
illustrations of semantic polygenesis, then the two quotations
originated independently of each other. The existence of the
meaning 'to commit suicide' in the history of vernielen is then taken
to be discontinuous : the meaning arose incidentally a couple of times
as an incidental or marginal extension of the non-reflexive meaning
'to kill ' , which is continuously transmitted .
As opposed to this approach, there is the view that the meaning in
question actually has a history of continuous transmission in the
actual life of the language , but that this continuous history is attested
discontinuously in the texts that have come down to us. No actual
gap is responsible for the observed discontinuity, but the dis
continuity is due to the defectiveness of the available textual sources.
The corpus of available attestations is defective simply because the
meaning is rare in the texts that survived from the Early New Dutch
period.
The difference between the two interpretations can also be
formulated in terms of language acquisition . Does a person always
have to learn how to use the word vernielen in the meaning 'to
commit suicide' , or may he sometimes invent that usage by applying
a rule of reflexivization and semantic specialization to the reading 'to
kill'? The continuity hypothesis presumes that a language user learns
the word from other language users through a continuous process of
transmission . The polygenetic interpretation , on the contrary, holds
that language users are able to coin this meaning incidentally by a
creative process of meaning change, which takes its starting-point in
the meaning 'to kill' . The cliff erence boils down to a distinction
between convention and innovation . 3
It should be pointed out that the polygenetic interpretation does
not necessarily exclude the possibility of a defective corpus. It is
quite possible that vernielen was used more frequently in the
meaning 'to commit suicide' than is evidenced by the scanty
quotations available, but that the actual instances of use were not so
frequent that they entailed a continuous existence (and a continuous
presence in the sources) . In this respect, we may conceive of the
WNT corpus as a random sample in the statistical sense . If it is
assumed that the corpus is by and large a representative sample of
actual language use, then the frequencies of the WNT attestations
for a particular meaning are, so to speak, not absolute but relative

frequencie s. The fact that the frequency with which 'to commit
suicide' is attested in the material lags far behind the corpus
frequency of 'to kill' may then be interpreted as an indication of the
discontinuous , incidental character of this reading. The real
frequency of the investigated reading remains so low that the
hypothesis of an incidental and individual innovation remains more
plausible than the hypothesis of a conventional transfer from one
speaker to another.
Now, the choice between the two interpretations will be influenced
(though not necessarily determined in any strict sense) by the views
that one holds on the structure of polysemous words. On the one
hand, a polygenetic interpretation becomes plausible within a
prototypical framework, which holds that lexical concepts are also
synchronously flexible. The flexible applicability of lexical categories
forms an essential characteristic of their structure at each moment of
their history (and not just during the transition from one diachronic
period to the other). Typical of this synchronous dynamism, in fact,
is the emergence of incidental readings in the range of application of
a word, together with the fact that one and the same reading may
emerge at different moments and on independent grounds. In short,
in a prototypical conception of meaning the more salient readings are
those that are conventionally handed down from generation to
generation, while other readings may at any moment be creatively
and independently based on these transmitted readings.
On the other hand, the non-polygenetic interpretation can be
associated with the 'conduit metaphor' that Michael Reddy ( 1 979)
has identified as one of the most important sources of our folk theory
of language. Indeed, the metaphor that verbal communication
implies the physical transfer of thoughts lies at the basis of a large
number of metalinguistic utterances in everyday language use. Here
are some of Reddy's illustrations:
• It is very difficult to put this concept into words
• Your concepts come across beautifully
• Jane gives away all her best ideas
• His words carry little in the way of recognizable meaning
• I missed that idea in the sentence completely
• I just want to throw out some new ideas for you folks
• You have to absorb Plato's ideas a little at a time.
These conduit metaphors are in accordance with the conception

that the structure of polysemous words consists of clearly delimited
pieces of information : it is , so to speak, precisely these bits of
meaning that are deposited in verbal trolleys and that are transported
to the receiver of the message. At the same time, the image supports
a non-polygenetic interpretation of the temporal gap between
quotations ( 1 ) and (2) . Because the transmission of fixed meanings
plays a central part in the metaphorical image, it is a natural move to
consider the transmission of meanings the normal case in the
historical development of the lexicon as well.
The important point in all this is the methodological movement
we go through with the alternative interpretation of the data . That
which in one case is no more than a mere lack of information (the
absence of attestations) becomes in the other a positive symptom of
the flexibility of word meanings . The prototypical structure of word
meanings functions as an interpretative principle that turns a gap in
the corpus into a plausible fact . The non-polygenetic interpretation
mimics Michelson and Morley's stance: even if we do not find
attestations of reflexive vernielen in the period intervening between
( 1 ) and (2), regardless of how hard we try, we still believe that there
must hav(;! been a continuous transmission of the reading in
question . If we do not observe the reading in question between 1 500
and the end of the eighteenth century, that is basically because our
observ at i o n al instrument (the corpus we use) is defective. The
polygenetic interpretation takes the radically opposite position:
within a particular theoretical framework, the absence of attestations
is not an undecided experiment, but a theoretically plausible
consequence of one of the structural characteristics of lexical
categories. 4
Let us now turn to a second example of the hermeneutic influence
of a prototype-theoretical conception of semantic structure on the
interpretation of diachronic data . I shall compare 'realistic' corpus
data on nineteenth-century Dutch with the contemporary lexico
graphical descriptions of the language . From one point of view, the
nineteenth-century dictionaries will appear to be deficient in their
coverage of the actual situation such as it appears in the corpus.
From another point of view, however, this very deficiency receives a
theoretically plausible interpretation as an introspective indication of
prototypicality effects .
Apart from vernielen, there is another word in Dutch that roughly
means 'to destroy' , namely vernietigen . Though these near-synonyms

exhibit some degree of phonetic similarity, their origin is quite
diverse . Vernielen is the older word. It is already to be found in
Middle Dutch, and it is formed by means of the common verb
forming prefix ver- and the adjective niel. Only a few examples of niel
survive, but it probably meant 'down to the ground' . Etymologically ,
then, vernielen means ' to throw down to the ground, to tear down' .
Vernietigen , on the other hand , makes its first appearance in the
sixteenth century; it is formed by means of the same prefix ver- and
the adjective nietig, which is itself a derivation from the negation
particle niet (English not) and the suffix -ig (which corresponds with
English -y) . Vernietigen gradually replaces a third form, vernieten,
which is a straightforward derivation from niet with ver-, and which
became extinct by the end of the seventeenth century. Vernietigen
literally means ' to annihilate , to bring to naught' . In the following , a
period of 1 20 years in the history of the two verbs will be considered,
ranging roughly from 1 790 to 1 9 r n . In the light of the history of
culture , this periodization seems quite justified ; we more or less
envisage the cultural period from the French Revolution up to the
First World War : the nineteenth century in the broadest sense .
(3) Dat huis was . . . evenmin als de naburige, tegen de verwoestende

veeten <lier tijd bestand . Reeds onder den zoon en opvolger des
stichters werd het . . . tot den grond toe vernield. [Like the
neighbouring ones, this house did not withstand the destructive
quarrels of the age. Already under the son of the founder, it was
demolished down to the ground . ] (Veegens, Hist. Stud. 2 . 2 8 2;
1 869)
(4) Alleen zijn de vroegere kruisvensters door vensterramen van
nieuweren trant vervangen en hebben de vrijheidsmannen van 1 79 5
. . . h e t wapen des stichters i n d e n voorgevel m e t ruwe hand
vernietigd. [Only, the earlier cross-windows have been replaced by
windows in a newer style, and in 1 795 . . . the freedom fighters
demolished the founder's arms in the fa�ade with their rough
hands . ] (Veegens, Hist. Stud. I . 1 2 5 ; 1 864)
(5) Er gaat dan stroom op den daarvoor gevormden zijweg over, waarbij
genoeg warmte ontwikkeld wordt om de draadwindingen i n zeer
korten tijd te vernielen. [Electric current is then transferred to the
diversion that has been construed to that end , in which case enough
warmth is produced to destroy the coils of the wire in a very short
time.] (Van Cappelle, Electr. 2 1 4 ; 1 908)
(6) Zonder deze voorzorg z o u h e t draadje door de enorme hitte van den
gloeidraad vernietigd worden. [Without this precaution, the wire

would be destroyed by the enormous heat of the filament . ] (Van
Cappelle , Electr. 295 ; 1 908)
(7) Hoeveel het wild vernielt wordt door een Engelschman zeer goed
uiteengezet bij gelegenheid van een' aanval op de bescherming die
het wild aldaar . . . geniet. [How much is destroyed by game is aptly
expressed by a certain Englishman on the occasion of an attack on the
protection these animals enjoy in his country . ] (Volksvlijt 1 7 5 ;
1 8 72)
(8) Bij het vernietigen van de onkruiden door het bewerken dient op
hunne voortplanting en ontwikkeling te worden gelet. [When
destroying weeds by cultivating the land, one should bear in mind
their reproduction and development . ] (Reinders, Landb . I . 309;
1 8 92)
(9) W e i w a t hamer! Wordt door zulke sentimenteele zotternyen niet a l
de inwendige kracht vernield? [ B y golly! Does n o t such sentimental
foolishness destroy all our inner strength?] (Wolff en Deken,
Blank. 3. 220 ; 1 789)
( 10 ) Ste! mij niet zo hoog, zei ze onthutst, ik zou daaraan niet
beantwoorden; ik zou uw ideaal vemietigen . [Do not put me on such
a pedestal, she said disconcertedly, I would not live up to that; I
would destroy your ideal . ] (Vosmaer, Amaz. 1 7 5 ; 1 8 80)
(1 1) De bergstroom in zijn grammen loop Verscheurt zijn zoom,
verdrinkt de dalen: Alzoo vernielt Gij 's Menschen hoop ! [The
mountain stream in its angry course rends its banks, drowns the
valleys: t hus, Thou destroyest the hope of Man ! ] (Ten Kate, Job
5 3 ; 1 86 5 )
( 1 2) Dit toeval vernietigde o n s geheele plan . [This coincidence annihilated
our entire plan . ] (Haafner, Ceilon 103 ; 1 8 1 0)
( 1 3) Mij gedenkt ook nog <lat Nicolaas Gaal . . . mij placht te verhalen
. . . dat de oude man om deze ontstolen eer zich zoo ontstelde en
vergramde, dat het ook scheen dat hij dezen <lief we! had willen
vernielen. [ I still remember that Nicolas Gaal was fond of telling me
that the old man got so angry and upset about this stolen honour,
that it seemed that he would have liked to kill that thief. ] (Fruin,
Geschr. I . 1 74 ; 1 8 8 8 )
( 1 4) Intusschen heeft de Godin d e Natuur besloten nu v o o r a l t i j d d e
Drijvende Eilanden en a l h u n inwoners te vernietigen. [Meanwhile,
the goddess Nature has decided to destroy the Floating Islands
and all their inhabitants once and for all . ] (Quack, Soc . 1 . 2 4 6 ;
1875)
( 1 5) D e beroerte, die haar zwakke levenskrachten i n een half uur tijds
vemielde, had reeds in het eerste oogenblik haar spraak verlamd.
[The stroke that destroyed her weak life force in half an hour had
from the first moment paralysed her speech . ] (Beets, C . 0 . 206 ;

1 840)
( 1 6) Hy moet rusten. Zulke driften vernietigen het sterkste gestel. [He has
to take a res t. Such passions undermine the strongest constitution . )
(Wolff e n Deken , Leev. I . 290; 1 784)
( 1 7) De vrouwen, L us, zijn zonen, al de anderen bleven stom, vernield
van ontsteltenis, op hun stoelen genageld . [The women, Lus, his
sons , all the others remained silent, destroyed by disconcertedness,
nailed to their chairs . ] (Buysse, Neef Perseyn 4 5 ; 1 893)
( l 8) Toen . . . antwoordde zij langzaam met een doffe stem, als vernietigd
door haar eigene woorden: 'Ja, indien het nog mogelijk is' . [Then
she answered slowly, in a dull voice, as if struck down by her own
words: 'Yes, if it is still possible . ' ] (Buysse, Mea Culpa 68; 1 896)
( 1 9) De uitslag van den stryd was ditmael hem niet gunstig: geheel zyn
leger werd vernield of uiteen geslagen. [This time, the result of the
battle was not favourable to him : his entire army was destroyed or
dispersed . ) (Conscience, Gesch. v. Belgiii l l o ; 1 845)
(20) H e t gansch leger d e r Turken was vernietigd ! [The entire army of the
Turks was destroyed ! ) (Conscience, Gesch. v. Belgiii 3 5 2 ; 1 84 5 )
The set of quotations (3) to (20) shows that vernielen and

vernietigen can be used indiscriminately with the same range of
application. The quotations are presented in pair-wise fashion, a
quotation featuring vernielen being followed by a similar one
featuring vernietigen . Each pair of quotations gives examples of one
particular kind of usage . The semantic correspondences are charted
in Table 5 . 1 .
The examples should be studied from two points of view. On the
one hand, the question has to be asked whether vernielen and
vernietigen exhibit any syntagmatic differences , that is, differences in
their collocational properties. On the other hand, the question arises
whether they are paradigmatically different, that is, whether they
exhibit purely conceptual differences. Syntagmatically, we not only
see that both words can be used by the same author in the same
context without noticeable differences, as in (3) and (4), (5) and (6),
( 1 7) and ( 1 8) , and ( 1 9) and (20), but also that the range of application
of each word can be divided into three identical major groups, which
can , moreover, be subdivided along parallel lines . There is a set of
readings in which the words are used with regard to concrete,
material objects; a set in which they are used with regard to abstract
object s; and a set in which they are used with regard to persons.
Within the first set, frequently occurring applications relate to
buildings, other human artefacts, and natural objects , in particular

plants and crops. With regard to the abstract readings , we can
distinguish between the annihilation of the existence of certain
abstract objects as such , and cases in which the realization or
fulfilment of certain abstract notions that contain an aspect of
expectation or intention with regard to the future is prevented. With
regard to persons, ( 1 3) and ( 1 4) express their death as such; ( 1 5 ) and
( 1 6) , and ( 1 7 ) and ( 1 8 ) , indicate how someone's bodily or mental
health, respectively, are undermined . The quotations ( 1 9) and (20)
express how armies are beaten; this application is half-way between
the abstract group (the armies cease to exist as functional entities)
and the personal group (individual soldiers are killed).
The existence of analogous subdivisions within each of the major
groups suggests that the syntagmatic equivalence of vernielen and
vernietigen is not a coincidence, but that it is an essential part of their
relationship . Furthermore, the examples also show that there is a
paradigmatic, strictly conceptual equivalence between the two; not
only do they have the same collocational properties, but they also
TABLE 5 . I Systematic correspondences between the uses of vernielen and

vernietigen in nineteenth-century Dutch: breakdown of quotations (3)--( 20)
Ve rn ie le n Vernietigen
With regard to concrete things :

To demolish (parts of) buildings (3) (4 )
To destroy other human artefacts (5 ) (6 )
To destroy natural objects (7) (8)
With regard to abstract things :
To annihilate existing situations, (9) ( I O)
characteristics , etc .
To prevent the execution of plan s , (11) ( 1 2)
intentions , etc.
With regard to persons :
To kill someone ( 1 3) ( 1 4)
To undermine someone's physical health (1 5) ( 1 6)
To undermine someone's psychological ( 1 7) (18)
well-being
To defeat groups of armed men or armies ( 1 9) (20)
appear to express the same concepts in the same contexts . 5 As a

preliminary step , notice that the concept 'to destroy' not only
appears as the notion 'to annihilate the existence of someone or
something, to cause someone or something to disappear out of
existence ' , but that it also exhibits the weaker nuance 'to undermine
someone or something with regard to some aspect of his existence'
(without a complete destruction or a complete removal out of
existence being implied) . The distinction can easily be discovered
within the personal group . In ( 1 3) and ( 1 4) a person is killed, taken
out of existence, while in ( 1 7) and ( 1 8) someone' s existence is
undermined from one point of view or another, but not entirely
annihilated . Likewise , we can see that within the abstract group, (9)
and ( 1 0) signify the suppression of the existence of some abstract
things as such , whereas in ( I I ) and ( 1 2 ) plans, hopes, and
expectations are undermined with regard to their realization and
fulfilment: the plan as such is not removed (at least not to begin
with), but it is reduced to ineffectiveness and futility. In short, both
vernielen and vernietigen express the notions of complete destruction
and partial damage, that is to say, the complete removal out of
existence of something or someone, and the less drastic undermining
in some respect, of the existence of people or objects. According to
the syntagmatic context, these notions receive further specifications .
For instance, with regard to persons, complete destruction means
killing, but with regard to concrete things, destruction signifies
material demolition, and so on. 6
On the basis of the foregoing observations, one might be tempted
to conclude that the semantic structure of vernielen and vernietigen in
nineteenth-century Dutch is completely identical: both syntagmatic
ally and paradigmatically, they have the same range of application.
However, a number of facts testify that the words have different
prototypical structures, that is, that they have different conce ptual
centres. There are two sets of facts to be considered: corpus-based
facts relating to the way in which both words are used in our corpus
of quotations, 7 and introspective facts relating to the way in which
the words are perceived by the speakers of the language . In general,
consideration of these facts will lead to the conclusion that the
abstract cases are central within the structure of vernietigen, and that
the material uses are central in the case of vernielen . As such , each
verb has a different semantic structure in spite of the fact that the
elements of these structures appear to be the same.
Five observations support the prototypical hypothesis . In the first

place, the abstract group is quantitatively more prominent within
the structure of vernietigen than the material set, while the reverse is
true of vernielen, in which the material group is the most frequently
occurring one . In both case s, the major group is represented by
approximately three times as many quotations as the less central
group . (This observation is based on the entire set of nineteenth
century quotations for vernielen and vernietigen that are found in the
WNT corpu s. It cannot be derived from Table 5 . 1 , which gives an
overview of the different readings for which both verbs occur, but
which says nothing about the frequencies of those readings . )
I n the second place, different nuances play a central role within
the core of each concept, whereas those nuances are not particularly
important within the corresponding group in the other concept.
Thus, the destruction of buildings and other human constructions is
prominent within the material use of vernielen, but is only rarely
present within the material group of vernietigen. Within the structure
vernielen as a whole, demolishing buildings is the single most
frequently represented kind of usage, but within the structure of
vernietigen it is merely one among many equally important nuances
of the material set . In the same way, the central, abstract group
within the structure of vernietigen is itself centred round uses relating
to the dissolution, the cancellation, the annulment of agreements ,
commitments, engagemen ts, obligations, permission s , righ ts, and so
on, and of the laws, orders, contracts, etc . in which they are
contained and through which they come into existence. Whereas
vernielen only rarely exhibits this kind of usage, it is the most
frequently occurring reading within the abstract group of vernietigen
as well as within that word as a whole.
In the third place , the differences in centrality show up in the fact
that the prominent readings exhibit specifications and particular
nuances that they do not have when they are peripheral within the
structure of the lexical item. Thu s, the material group of vernielen
contains a metonymical extension of the application with regard to
plants and crops, towards a reading in which the fields and gardens
where these plants and crops grow appear as the direct object of the
verb . Likewise, the application with regard to buildings receives a
figurative extension towards a reading with regard to an allegorical
'wall' that separates two people. These extensions are probably not
impossible within the concrete subset of vernietigen, but the fact that
they do not appear there is statistically interesting: it indicates that

the concrete group is more productive in the case of vernielen than in
the case of vernietigen .
Conversely , the abstract group has nuances and additional
specifications in the case of vernietigen that are lacking in the same
group with vernielen, although it is quite easy to imagine that they
would in fact occur there. For example, vernietigen has a fairly large
set of applications in which social movements, mstitution s , activitie s,
and so on are abolished, one quotation in which i t is said that railway
transport destroys distances (obviously, distances do not disappear
as such-they are only functionally overcome), and one quotation in
which a philosopher is said to destroy the soul (again, the soul is not
destroyed as such, but the idea that the soul exists is metonymically
abolished by the philosopher in question) . None of these extensions
of the abstract use of the concept 'to destroy' can be found in the case
of vernielen, which is indicative of the fact that the abstract use is less
prominent in the latter verb than in the semantic structure of
vernietigen.
In the fourth place, the internal structure of the set of personal
applications (which is prominent in neither of the verbs) reflects the
differences in prototypical structure between the two verbs. To
begin with, notice that the personal group contains concrete as well
as abstract readings; to kill someone is clearly more concrete than to
undermine someone's psychological well-being or his social position.
If we then have a look at the mutual relationship between the
abstract and the concrete subgroups of the set involving persons, we
find that the abstract subgroup is proportionally dominant in the
case of vernietigen, whereas the reverse is true in the case of vernielen.
Also, we find that extensions of the concrete subgroup of the
personal application with regard to living beings other than people or
with regard to personifications are not as strongly present in the case
of vernietigen as in the case of vernielen . 8
And finally, the differences in prototype structure can be derived
mdirectly from the nominalizations of both verbs. Both vernietiging
and vernieling have the verbal reading 'the fact , the act , or the
process of destroying or being destroyed' , but only vernieling
exhibits the metonymical extension towards the concept expressing
the result of that process or that act, that is , the concrete damage that
issues from it. In the latter case, the word is typically used in the
plural: vernielingen more or less equals the notion 'damage ' .
I n general, these facts o f linguistic usage clearly favour the

hypothesis that the abstract instantiations of the concept ' to destroy'
are prototypical within the structure of vernietigen, whereas the
concrete readings are prominent in the case of vernielen . Taking into
account that each central group is itself concentrated round a
dominant kind of usage, it seems plausible to say that the latter is the
prototypical reading for each of the verbs in question.
It should, furthermore, be noted that these prototypical pheno
mena seem to be connected with the etymology of the words . On the
one hand, the abstract prototype of vernietigen may well be
connected with the abstract character of the words niet 'not' and
nietig 'null and void, insignificant' on which it is based . Moreover,
the common phrase nietig verklaren 'to declare (something) to be null
and void, dissolve, annul (something)' corresponds pretty closely
to the central notion within the abstract group of vernietigen. On
the other hand, the centrality of the use with regard to buildings in
the structure of vernielen seems to correspond to the etymological
meaning 'to tear down, to throw to the ground' that I pointed to
above as the original meaning of the verb .
The facts of actual linguistic usage, i n short, reveal that vernielen
and vernietigen in nineteenth-century Dutch differ not with regard to
their range of application as a whole, but rather with regard to the
internal structure of that range of application : their ranges of
application are centred round different core readings . 9 Next, we can
consider the question whether additional evidence may be found to
support this analysis. In particular, could an analysis based on
introspective evidence rather than observed language use yield the
same results? Is there any introspective evidence in favour of the
prototypicality hypothesis?
But how could an introspective method be used at all with regard
to historical material? There are no nineteenth-century speakers of
Dutch around to be asked what they think is the meaning of
particular words, so how are we going to get introspective
judgements at all? The fact is that we do have information on how
the nineteenth-century speakers of Dutch perceived the near
synonyms that we are investigating, namely in the form of
contemporaneous synonym dictionaries . Synonym dictionaries (at
least the older ones) are notoriously unreliable as descriptions of
actual patterns of usage; most of the time, the compilers of synonym
dictionaries rationalize away the actual identity of words by
imposing distinctions that cannot be discovered in the actual facts of

usage. However, these rationalizations need not always have
proceeded out of the blue: it seems quite plausible that they were
guided by the introspective j udgements of the compilers. So, if we
wish to know something of the introspective insights of the
nineteenth-century speakers of Dutch, we can have a look at the
synonym dictionaries of that time to see whether the distinctions
they make between vernielen and vernietigen (however inadequate as a
picture of the complete set of possible kinds of usage) do indeed
reflect the differences in prototypical structure of the two words.
And indeed, t h e nineteenth-century synonym dictionaries of
Dutch do distinguish b�tween vernielen and vernietigen along lines
that fit into our hypothesis. On the one hand, there are those that
draw the line syntagmatically, such as Weiland and Landre ( 1 825 ) ,
who state that vernielen can only b e used with regard t o 'lighamelijke
dingen' (material things), whereas vernietigen is more widely used , in
particular also with regard to 'menschelijke instellingen' (human
institutions). De Beer ( 1 89 7 ) expresses an analogous point of view.
On the other hand, there are those that describe the distinction
along paradigmatic lines, so that there would be an actual notional
difference between the verbs in question, rather than merely a
distinction in selectional restrictions . Whereas vernietigen is defined
as 'to bring to naught, to annihilate ' , vernielen is defined as 'to
damage, to smash to pieces, to tear down ' . In this sense, vernietigen
implies a complete annihilation, whereas there may be some pieces
left of the original object in the case of vernielen . It is easy to see that
this paradigmatic point of view, which can be found among others in
Pluim ( 1 894) , is connected with the previous , syntagmatic one: it is
precisely because vernielen relates to material things that the notion
of remaining debris comes to the fore . Likewise, a complete
annihilation (in which the original objects disappear completely) is
less likely in the material world of concrete objects, so that the
restriction of vernietigen to abstract objects will tend to be related to
the notion of complete annihilation. This is in fact done by Weiland
and Landre ( 1 82 5 ) , though not all proponents of the paradigmatic
distinction adhere to the syntagmatic distinction. For instance, De
Flines ( 1 8 1 0) mentions that vernietigen can in fact be used with
regard to material objects , but that there is a difference from
vernielen in the degree of damage achieved .
By and large, these views faithfully reflect the insight into the
prototypical structure of vernielen and vernietigen that we have gained

by considering the actual facts of linguistic usage. Syntagmatically,
the synonym dictionaries recognize that the material context is more
important for vernielen , whereas abstract objects are predominant in
the case of vernietigen . Paradigmatically , this is reflected by the fact
that vernielen carries overtones of material destruction and damage
(think of the relationship between the prototypical usage of vernielen
with regard to buildings, and the definitions of that word that bring
to the fore the act of smashing and demolishing things), whereas
vernietigen calls forth the idea of complete annihilation (as it were,
wiping something off the face of the earth). As such, the obstinate
efforts of the compilers of synonym dictionaries to find semantic
differences among near-synonyms seem to be not entirely gratuitous .
To the extent that they try to capture the characteristics of the most
salient kinds of usage of both lexical concepts, they strengthen our
hypothesis about the differences in prototypical structure among the
verb s.
A t this point, th e methodological structure o f the argumentation
presented in the foregoing pages has to be made explicit. Crucially,
lexicographical data that are seemingly at odds with the facts of
actual usage were reinterpreted as evidence of the prototypical
structures of the verbs . At face value, in fact, the views expressed in
the synonym dictionaries seem unreliable : the facts that could be
observed in the primary material reveal that vernietigen as well as
vernielen do in fact occur in those readings that the dictionaries
exclusively reserve for either of the verb s . At first sight, then, we
may be inclined to regard the opinions of the dictionaries as illusory.
However, a reinterpretation against a prototypical background
allows us once more to transform the apparent absence of reliable
information into plausible fact s. We have done so by looking into
detail at the primary material and by tracing the degree of salience of
the different readings . There are sound indications that vernielen and
vernietigen have a different prototypical structure, in the sense that in
vernielen the readings involving concrete objects are central and in
vernietigen those involving abstract things are central. This insight
into the prototypical structure of vernielen and vernietigen renders
the lexicographical data interpretable. What the lexicographers
apparently try to do is to express how the verbs differ in their central
meanings. From the uses that are typical within each verb, they
extrapolate the abstract reading 'to annihilate, to cause to not exist'
for vernietigen and the concrete reading 'to destroy, to break, to

damage' for vernielen .
In short, a prototypical conception of meaning allows us to
interpret seemingly unreliable facts or non-facts as interesting data
that are theoretically perfectly plausible. The thought underlying
this (re)interpretation is that the nineteenth-century compilers of
synonym dictionaries do not base their judgements on a corpus
based enquiry into actual language use, but on their introspective
knowledge of word meanings. Such an mtrospective method is likely
to yield distortions with regard to actual usage, as not all readings of
a word have the same psychological salience. For a conception of
meaning that does not take into account differences in salience
between the readings of a word, it is not so obvious that a
lexicographer, during his introspective activity, perceives some
meanings and forgets others. However, if one accepts that differences
in salience form an integral part of the structure of word meanings, it
is logical that the more salient meanings surface more easily into the
introspective consciousness than other, less salient readings.
Admittedly, the interpretation suggested by a prototype
theoretical approach is not necessarily exclusive for prototype
theory: invoking a distinction between introspective knowledge and
observational knowledge of actual usage is not precluded in
alternative theories . In a prototypical model, however, it receives a
more natural position, to the extent that differences of cognitive
salience get an integrated and natural place in the semantic structure
ascribed to lexical categories . For a non-prototypical approach
differences in salience are non-structural data; they have nothing to
do with the structure of word meaning itself (which consists of
equally important, clearly delimited senses), but merely with the use
that is made of the structurally important entitie s. Such a distinc
tion between competence-related structural data and performance
related usage data is rejected by the cognitive approach: the
performative data pertaining to frequency and salience are considered
structurally important because they reflect something of the
distinction between central and peripheral instances of proto
typically organized categories . Hence, interpretative strategies or
introspective observations that are based on so-called non-structural
data are more easily incorporated into a prototype-theoretical
approach.
Ultimately, a researcher who starts from a prototype-theoretical
point of view perceives things that his opponent does not, or at least ,
perceives certain things more easily, and less freely discards them as
irrelevant. The prototypical conception of meaning, in short,
conforms to what we expect of a theoretical paradigm in linguistics :
i t i s a view o n language phenomena. 1 0
5 . 2 L E X I C A L S E M A N T I C S AS A
GEIS TES WISSENS CllA F T
I n the previous section a s well a s i n Chapter 3 , the concept of

interpretation plays a crucial role . On the one hand, we have seen in
Section 3 . 4 that the functional explanation of prototypicality as a
structural feature of the language resides at least partly in the fact
that conceptual categories function as interpretative frameworks t hat
determine how we experience reality. The fact that slightly deviant
nuances may be developed within a particular concept indicates that
conceptual categories are interpretative principles for dealing with
the changing conditions of the world. The structural incorporation
of slightly differing cases under the cover of an existing conceptual
model demonstrates the constitutive role of existing knowledge in
the acquisition and development of knowledge : new knowledge
takes on its actual form through the integration of new data with
extant models . Because new experiences are interpreted in th e light
of old knowledge, even if they do not conform rigidly to the
categories constituting the latter, existing knowledge functions as an
expectational pattern. The prototype-based structure of conceptual
categories , in short, mirrors their interpretative epistemological role .
On the other hand, prototype theory itself, as an abstract, high
level description of this epistemological function, is an interpretative
theory, as I argued in the previous section. This double importance
of the concept of interpretation forces me to go one step further in
my methodological analysis of the prototype-theoretical approach .
What kind of endeavour is prototype theory so that the concept of
interpretation is invested with such crucial importance? And how do
the two ways in which the concept of interpretation plays a role in
the prototype-theoretical approach interact with each other? Proto
type theory not only describes the interpretative processes and
structures underlying natural language use, it does so on an
interpretative basis. Could there not be a tension, then, between the
interpretative object of research and the interpretative method of

enquiry ?
As a first step towards an answer, we have to look back to the end
of Section 1 . 3 , where it was suggested that there is a close
relationship between pre-structuralist historical semantics and
cognitive semantics--doser , to be more precise, than between either
of them and structuralist semantics . 1 1 We may now try to be more
specific about this correspondence . Three fundamental points may
be mentioned with regard to which pre-structuralist lexical semantics
and cognitive semantics correspond to each other .
In the first place, of course, the pre-structuralist interest in
semantic change is mirrored by the cognitive interest in the semantic
flexibility of linguistic categories . Admittedly, the older tradition
was almost exclusively concerned with historical change, while the
present approach is j ust as interested in synchronic flexibility as in
diachronic developments . But they share the basic recognition that
languages are in a state of fundamental flux, precisely because of
their epistemological function . By contrast, the structuralist theories
that are situated chronologically between the older forms of
diachronic semantics and the present-day cognitive approaches
tended to assume a much stricter distinction between diachrony and
synchrony , with synchronic stability rather than flexible change as
the basic phenomenon.
Heinz Kronasser , whose Handbuch der Semasiologie of 1 9 5 2 is a
detailed overview of the older tradition, sums up the link between
synchronic flexibility (polysemy), diachronic flexibility (semantic
change) , and the epistemological status of language as follows :
Eine Idealsprache , in der jedes Ding, Ereignis, Gefohl , jede Beziehung und
Situation, kurzurn jede einfache oder zusarnrnengesetzte Gegebenheit der
inneren und iiufieren Welt ihre eigene und nur for sie zuliissige Bezeichnung
hiitte , kann es nicht geben ; sind <loch die Gegebenheiten . . . in ihrer Anzahl
unendlich, wiihrend die Anzahl der einzelsprachlichen Worter endlich ist .
. . . Der Preis for eine Idealsprache rnit sernantisch irnrner unveriinderlichen
und ganz eindeutigen Lautsyrnbolen ware ihre Unverstiindlichkeit, weil
niernand die Anzahl der Worter irn Gediichtnis behalten konnte. Bedeutungs
wandel und Polysernie sind dernnach Folgen des Bernilhens , ja des
Zwanges , die Unendlichkeit der Gegebenheiten rnit einer endlichen Anzahl
lautlicher Syrnbole zu bewiiltigen . [An ideal language , in which every object,
event , feeling, every relationship and every situation , in short any simple or
complex thing of the inner or the outer world were to have its own
denomination , applicable only to that particular thing, cannot exist . The
things to be named , in fact , are infinite in number , while the number of

words of any specific language is restricted . . . The price for an ideal
language with semantically constant and univocal word forms would be
unintelligibility , because nobody could remember the number of words .
Change of meaning and polysemy are therefore the result of the intention , or
rather the necessity, to grasp the infiniteness of experience with a finite
number of forms . ] (Kronasser 1 9 5 2 : 83-4)
In the second place, both approaches accept the psychological

aspects of meaning without hesitation . Without in any way ignoring
the social aspects of language (as a cultural phenomenon, language is
inevitably also a social fact), the mental substrate of all linguistic
activity is recognized as an inalienable part of an adequate
conception of language . At the beginning of his Griechische
Bedeutungslehre of 1 8 8 8 , Max Hecht sums up the disciplinary
position of historical semantics in the following words.
I nsofern sie [die historische Bedeutungslehre] zugunsten der Lexikographie

die Bedeutungen in zeitlicher Folge ordnet und im Interesse der Etymologie
die Gesetze der Bedeutungsiinderung aufstellt, hat sie sprachwissen
schaftlichen Wert . Soweit sie aber diese Gesetze aus der Natur des Geistes
herleitet und eine Geschichte der Vorstellungen gibt-Bedeutungen sind
Vorstellungen-, fallt sie in das Gebiet der empirischen Psychologie.
[(Semantics) is linguistically valuable to the extent that it chronologically
classifies meanings in the interest of lexicography, and writes down the laws
of semantic change in the interest of etymology . To the extent , however,
that it derives these laws from the nature of the mind and that it writes a
history of mental representations-meanings are mental representations
it falls within the realm of empirical psychology . ] (Hecht 1 8 8 8 : 5 )
Although there exists a lot of variation in the nature and the degree
of the psychologism of the pre-structuralist tradition, 1 2 the passage
from Hecht adequately illustrates the unreserved acceptance of the
psychological aspects of language that is typical of the older forms of
semantics . By contrast , Leo Weisgerber ( 1 927) , in a vigorously
polemical article that is properly to be regarded as the first
theoretical statement of structural semantics, precisely blames Hecht
for relegating semantics to the realm of psychology . Treating
meanings as psychological Vorstellungen , says Weisgerber , entails
that meanings cannot be studied autonomously, as a proper part of
linguistic structure . This structuralist desire for an autonomous
approach to linguistic semantics is then again discarded by cognitive
semantics in favour of a conceptualist approach in which the study of
linguistic structure is required to be in accordance with what is

known about cognitive processing in genera l . 1 3
I n the third place, i t i s a n immediate consequence o f the rejection
of a n autonomous approach that neither the older historical nor the
cognitive tradition imposes a strict distinction between encyclopaedic
and purely semantic data in lexical analyse s . One could say, in a
sense, that the distinction has not yet gained wide currency in pre
structuralist semantics , whereas it is no longer generally accepted in
contemporary lexical semantics .
Summarizing, the affinity between pre-structuralist historical
semantics and post-structuralist cognitive semantics resides in at
least three characteristi c s : the interest in semantic change and
semantic flexibility as such, the unmitigated acceptance of the
importance of the psychological aspects of language, and the absence
of any attempt to maintain a strict distinction between senses
(deemed to belong to the only structurally relevant level of
meaning), and (individual, psychological) encyclopaedic concept s .
But is there a deep-seated reason for this affinity between t h e pre
structuralist tradition of diachronic research and the cognitive ,
prototype-theoretical approach that was sketched in the previous
pages ? Indeed there is. The methodological link between pre
structuralist and post-structuralist lexical semantics signals the return
of hermeneutics to lexical semantics . From a very general point of view ,
hermeneutics is the 'theory of interpretation' , a methodological
reflection o n the principles underlying interpretative activities
concerned with literary products, works of art, juridical texts, and so
o n . It is, in fact , from the sources of biblical exegesis and philological
scholarship that hermeneutics as a theoretical enterprise came into
being in the course of the nineteenth century. The connection
between philological research and hermeneutics as an epistemological
theory is a methodological one, in the sense that the problems of
textual criticism that are central within the nineteenth-century
philological tradition exemplify the interpretative methodology of
hermeneutics . The connection is also a personal one, in the sense
that leading philologists like August Boeckh were among those who
gave the hermeneutical enterprise its theoretical formulation (see
Boeckh 1 8 7 7 ) .
M o r e specifically, hermeneutics is a philosophical tradition ,
inaugurated by Wilhelm Dilthey at the end of the last century,
that takes interpretation to be the basic methodological concept of
the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) . Dilthey's explicit aim

was to provide the human sciences with a philosophical under
standing of their methodological basis that could be set off against
the positivist self-understanding of the natural sciences. Simplify
ingly, Dilthey ' s views consist of a characterization of the subject
matter of the human science s , and of a characterization of their
method. The products of the human mind that constitute the
subject-matter of the human sciences are the expression of an inner
experienc e , an understanding of life in terms of the mtellect, the
wil l , and the emotions that all human beings posses s . The method of
the human sciences, in return, consists of an interpretative attempt
to recover the original experience behind the expressions . In this
sense, the logic of the human sciences is fundamentally different
from that of the natural sciences: whereas the latter are based on
Erkliirung (positivistic explanation in terms of immutable laws of
nature), the former are based on Verstehen (understanding of lived
experience through its expressions ) . The following quote from
Dilthey's late work Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geistes
wissenschaften summarizes his position:
Wir konnen jetzt <lurch ganz klare Merkmale die Geisteswissenschaften

abgrenzen von den Naturwissenschafte n . Diese liegen in dem dargelegten
Verhalten des Geistes, <lurch welches im Unterschiede von dem naturwissen
schaftlichen Erkennen der Gegenstand der Geisteswissenschaften gebildet
wird. Die Menschheit ware, aufgefaBt in Wahrnehmung und Erkennen, fiir
uns eine physische Tatsache, und sie ware als solche nur dem naturwissen
schaftlichen Erkennen zuganglich. Als Gegenstand der Geisteswissen
schaften entsteht sie aber nur, sofern menschliche Zustande erlebt werden,
sofern sie in LebensauBerungen zum Ausdruck gelangen und sofern diese
Ausdriicke verstanden werden. [We can now delineate the human sciences
with regard to the natural sciences on the basis of very clear characteristics.
These characteristics are based in the mental attitude that we have sketched,
through which the object of the human sciences is constituted differently
from that of the natural sciences. If mankind were to be considered only in
terms of perception and cognition, it could only be known in terms of the
natural sciences. By contrast, it becomes the object of the human sciences
only to the extent that human situations are experienced, that they receive
an expression in the form of manifestations of !if e, and that these expressions
are understood . ] (Dilthey 1 92 7 : 86)
Interestingly, Dilthey explicitly mentions the study of language as

the epitome of the hermeneutic enterprise:
Das kunstmaBige Verstehen dauernd fixierter LebensauBerungen nennen

wir A uslegung. Da nun das geistige Leben nur in der Sprache seinen
vollstiindigen, erschopfenden und darum eine obj ektive Auffassung
ermoglichenden Ausdruck finder, so vollendet sich die Auslegung in der
Interpretation der in der Schrift enthaltenen Reste menschlichen Daseins .
Diese Kunst ist die Grundlage der Philologie . Und die Wissenschaft dieser
Kunst ist die Hermeneutik . [The artificial understanding of permanently
fixed expressions of life is called interpretation . And because it is only in
language that the life of the spirit receives an expression that is complete and
exhaustive , and that may therefore be considered from an objective point of
view , the process of interpretation culminates in the analysis of those relics
of human life that are laid down in writing. This ability is the basis of
philology . And the science of this interpretative ability is hermeneutics . ]
( 1 927: 2 1 7)
What , then , is the common denominator behind Diltheian

hermeneutics, pre-structuralist diachronic semantics, and post
structuralist cognitive semantics, as exemplified by a prototype
theoretical conception of semantic structure ? Why can we say that
the connection between late nineteenth-century historical semantics
and late twentieth-century cognitive semantics rests on their
common hermeneutic orientation ? The crucial factor , it would seem,
is an emphasis on lived experience . We have just seen that the
experiential character of the human sciences is explicitly recognized
in the Diltheian definition of hermeneutics . But the importance of
experience is no less explicit in cognitive semantics: in the works of
George Lakoff ( 1 987) and Mark Johnson ( 1 987), the philosophical
position of cognitive semantics is characterized in terms of experi
entialism , a position defined by Lakoff ( 1 98 7 : p. xvi) as involving
the view 'that meaningful thought and reason essentially concern the
nature of the organism doing the thinking-including the nature of
its body , its interaction in its environment, its social character, and
so on' . 1 4 Now , taking the experientially embodied nature of
language as our starting-point, the various links that connect
pre-structuralist and post-structuralist semantics fall neatly into
place .
First, because experience is a mental phenomenon , linguistics has
an obvious psychological orientation . This is not to say that the
experiences that are being expressed are always and only highly
personal phenomena . Rather , human experience is also a cultural
phenomenon , and products of human life such as systems of laws,
rituals , and everyday conventions clearly embody the historically

transmitted experience of cultures rather than just individuals-but
even then, the cultural message would cease to exist if it were not
incorporated into the personal experience of individuals . In this
sense, because the basic subject-matter of the human sciences
involves personal experience, the individual and the individual' s
psyche, rather than supra-individual structures, are the starting
point for the analysis .
Second , human experience i s historical . While the fundamental
laws of the physical world do not change over time, 15 human activity
is evolutionarily open and historically dependent on the specific
circumstances in which people live . Individuals and cultures have a
history, an accumulation of experience that influences their further
experiences and their way of expressing them . In this sense, the
interest of pre-structuralist and post-structuralist semantics in the
diachrony of language is a natural consequence of the historicity of
the human experience that the hermeneutical conception considers
to be the core subject-matter of the human sciences.
And third , because the language that expresses experience is not a
separate realm of reality, the methodology of linguistics is just as
encyclopaedic as human experience itself. While the experience that
is being expressed is an encompassing phenomenon in which
feelings, thoughts, memories , expectations, etc . come together, the
interpretative methodology of the human sciences will ideally be an
interdisciplinary fusion of historical, psychological, anthropological,
and linguistic research .
From various angles, then, cognitive semantics in general and
prototype theory in particular constitute a return to a hermeneutical
conception of semantics--a recognition that parallels Raimo Anttila's
remarks about the return of philology to historical linguistics ( 1 98 8 ,
1 992) . But the same awareness also raises critical points.
First, let us start from the insight that prototype theory involves
categories seen as expectational patterns with regard to novel
experiences . Now , if existing categories influence the way in which
we experience new situations (an influence that is precisely revealed
by the presence of marginal, slightly deviant cases in the proto
typically organized structure of a category), the question arises to
what extent our own theoretical views might not themselves be
influenced by previously established conceptualizations . Seen from
this point of view, a 'paradigmatic' conception of cognition
encompasses both the structure of common-sense knowledge (as

embodied in everyday language concepts) and the structure of
sophisticated knowledge (as embodied in scientific theories); or, it
encompasses prototype theory as a lexical-semantic theory, and the
paradigmatic theory of science represented by Thomas Kuhn ( l 962 ) ,
Imre Lakatos ( 1 970) , and Paul Feyerabend ( 1 97 5 ) .
As soon as this connection is established, however, questions
about the objectivity of semantics arise. If not only our thinking as
such, but also our thinking about thinking, is influenced by pre
existing conceptualizations that function as interpretational
schemata, what kind of a scientific enterprise is semantics? If it not
only deals with the way in which the speakers of a language construct
interpretations for the expressions they encounter, but if it itself
imposes interpretations on its subject-matter, what claims to
objectivity can it make? At t his point, a tension is revealed between
the two forms of interpretation mentioned at the beginning of this
section. The paradigmatically hermeneutic nature of prototype
semantics, so to speak, backfires : it is a theory about interpretative
processes in natural language, but, at the same time, it functions
itself as an interpretative paradigm. How then can it establish its
superiority with regard to alternatives ? 1 6
Second, there i s a n unclarity i n Lakoffs well-known insistence
( 1 9 8 7 : p t . n) that linguistic semantics of a cognitive persuasion is
essentially non-objectivist. Is this merely a characterization of the
subject-matter of semantics, or does it also pertain to its method? On
the one hand, Lakofrs discussion only mentions objectivist and non
objectivist alternatives with regard to the object of the linguistic
description. On the other hand, if the non-objectivist position is a
general characterization of human cognition (as Lakoff seems to
imply), how can it establish its own superiority except by the
existence of some kind of objective method? Or conversely, if its
claim to superiority does not paradoxically rest on an implicitly
assumed objective knowledge of the objective world (of the mind),
what is it based on?
And third, the question about objectivism follows from the
'hermeneutic' parentage of cognitive semantics . As we saw earlier,
the concept of interpretation is, in the Diltheian framework, the
crucial factor that distinguishes the human sciences from the natural
sciences . The object of the human sciences is constituted by the
exteriorizations and expressions of lived experience: not only works
of art and literary texts, but also , for instance, the social and cultural
institutions that embody the life of a community . The method of the
human sciences, on the other hand, is based on interpretation: on
understandingly recovering the experience behind the expressions .
But can this process o f recovery b e concluded i n an objective
fashion? Does it lead to certainty? Can we be sure that our
interpretations are correct? Can we truthfully determine the original
experience and the authentic intention behind the expressions?
At this point, a particular tension within Dilthey's work becomes
apparent . 17 On the one hand, Dilthey's attempt to place the human
sciences on as secure and as respectable a footing as the natural
sciences induces him to stress the objectivity of the human science s.
In his text 'Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik' ( 1 9 1 3/ 1 96 1 ) , for
instance, he reacts against the danger o f 'romantic arbitrariness' in
the conception of the hermeneutical enterprise; if the hermeneutic
act is a re-enactment of an original creative act, objective standards
for assessing the success of an interpretation may be hard to come
by . Conversely, if hermeneutics is modelled on the example
provided by biblical (and, generally, philological) textual exegesis ,
interpretative rules can indeed be found (such as those described by
Boeckh 1 877). Again, note that the 'historical-linguistic' connection
of hermeneutics is quite outspoken at this point. In a passage
following the one quoted above, Dilthey emphasizes the importance
of subjecting the hermeneutic al , i nt erpret at i ve enterprise to critical
scrutiny :
Mit der Auslegung der auf uns gekommenen Reste ist innerlich und
notwendig die Kritik derselben verbunden. Sie entsteht aus den Schwierig
keiten, welche die Auslegung bietet Auslegung und Kritik haben im
geschichtlichen Verlauf immer neue Hilfsmittel zur Losung ihrer Aufgabe
entwickelt, wie die naturwissenschaftliche Forschung immer neue Ver
feinerungen des Experiments Sie hat immer die Sicherheit des
Verstehens gegeniiber der historischen Skepsis und der subjektiven Willkiir
verteidigt. [Criticism of the relics that have come down to us is intimately
and necessarily associated with their mterpetation . It follows from the
difficulties that the process of interpretation may encounter The
interpretative and critical approaches have, in the course of history,
continuously developed new tools for fulfilling their tasks, just as research in
the natural sciences leads to ever more refined experiments Against
historical scepticism and subjective arbitrariness, hermeneutics has always
defended the certainty of the interpretative understanding . ] ( 1 92 7 : 2 1 5-
1 6)
Along these lines, hermeneutics as the 'science of interpretation'

has a universalist tendency: it will try to develop a general theory of
interpretation, a universally applicable interpretative methodology
that specifies the criteria for correct interpretations :
Gegenwiirtig mufi die Hermeneutik ein Verhiiltnis z u der allgemeinen
erkenntnistheoretischen Aufgabe aufsuchen, die Moglichkeit eines Wissens
vom Zusammenhang der geschichtlichen Welt darzutun und die Mittel zu
seiner Verwirklichung aufzufinden. Die grundlegende Bedeutung des
Verstehens ist aufgekliirt worden; und es gilt von den logischen Formen des
Verstehens aufwiirts den erreichbaren Grad von Allgemeingiiltigkeit in ihm
zu bestimmen. [At this moment, hermeneutics has to look for a connection
with the general epistemological task of establishing the possibility of
knowledge of the structure of the historical world and of finding means to
effectuate such knowledge . The fundamental importance of understanding
has been established; the point now is to discover, in an upward movement
starting from the logical forms of understanding, the degree of generality
and universal validity that may be attained. ] ( 1 927: 2 1 8)
On the other hand, however, Dilthey's emphasis on the historicity

of human experience introduces a note of relativism into his views.
While nature is governed b y the necessity o f natural laws, human life
is governed by purposive action and conscious effort; the realm par
excellence of human life is the unfolding of history. As such, can
there be a general interpretative method that universally spans the
entire range of the history of mankind, disregarding the historical
differences between the objects of its interpretative activities ? Can all
historical products be interpreted on the same basis? More import
antly still, if mankind in general is caught in history, can interpreters
free themselves from their own historical background when con
fronting products from the past? Dilthey expresses the historicity
of interpretation as follows: 'Was aus dem Leben des Tages
entspringt, steht unter der Macht seiner Interessen. Was bestiindig
der Vergiinglichkeit anheimfii l lt, <lessen Bedeutung ist auch von der
Stunde bestimmt [What arises from the life of the day is subject to
the power of its interests . What continuously falls prey to
transitoriness is also determined by the moment]' ( 1 92 7: 206-7 ) .
In Dilthey's own work, the tension between t h e claim t o
universality implied by the search fo r objectivity and the relativist
tendency suggested by the emphasis on historicity is far from
resolved. In the later development of hermeneutics, however, the
non-universalist , non-objectivist tendency becomes most prominent,
most clearly so in the developmental line leading from Martin

Heidegger to Hans-Georg Gadamer on the one hand and to Jacques
Derrida on the other . Philosophical questions about objectivity and
ultimate interpretability are, to be sure, not restricted to the
hermeneutic tradition. For one thing, there is the (relatively recent)
interest in epistemological relativity within the analytical tradition of
philosophy-witness such authors as Hilary Putnam ( 1 988), Nelson
Goodman ( 1 978), and Willard V. 0. Quine ( 1 990) . For another,
there is the Peircean, pragmatist position, as in the work of Richard
Rorty ( 1 980) . These connections need not be further explored here .
For our present purposes , it suffices to see that the epistemological
issue of objectivity and interpretability crucially affects diachronic
lexical semantics: if the shift from structural approaches in lexical
semantics to cognitive approaches does indeed signal a return to the
hermeneutic concerns of pre-structuralist diachronic semantics, the
basic methodological question of the hermeneutic tradition-whether
the interpretative act that is the methodological basis of semantics
can be accomplished objectively-also reappears with unprecedented
force .
The question, surely, cannot be settled here, and, in this sense,
the conclusion to our exploration of a prototype-theoretical concep
tion of semantic change is an open-ended one. One specific
consequence of the entire issue may be spelled out, though . The
fundamental importance of the objectivity question derives not just
from the fact that it involves a topic that has been central to the
debates in philosophy and the theory of science of the last few
centuries, but also from the fact that it suggests what the programme
for the future development of lexical semantics could be: the
development of prototype theory leads naturally to a systematic
investigation of the methodological and epistemological basis of
semantics as an interpretative enterprise .
Notes to Chapter 5
l . Many details and technicalities have been left out in this story . For a full
accoun t, see Gardner ( 1 962 ) .
2 . T h e overall line o f argumentation i n this section repeats the reasoning
in Geeraerts ( 1 9 9 1 ) . The contrastive analysis of the near-synonyms
vernielen and vernietigen was first presented in Geeraerts ( 1 98 5e) and ,
more succinctly, in Geeraerts ( 1 988b).
3 . Note that the development of vernielen cannot be reduced to a mere

syntactic process of reflexivization: because the reading ' to commit
suicide intentionally' is not identical with the reading 'to kill oneself
unintentionally ' , a semantic process of specialization comes on top of
the syntactic compositionality of the construction. Reflexivization as a
syntactic process could at most yield the reading 'to kill oneself, either
on purpose or by acciden t ' . The further step towards the reading 'to
commit suicide' requires a process of semantic specialization comple
menting the syntactic reflexivization .
4. This does not imply, to be sure, complete methodological licence. As
discussed in Section 2 . 3 , the polygenetic interpretation becomes
plausible only when a number of precautions are taken into account: the
corpus as a whole has to be representatively constituted, and the time
gap between the polygenetic instances has to be considerable.
5 . The distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic meaning is used
here for purposes of analysis only ; it does not imply any particular view
with regard to the theoretical relation between the two aspects of lexical
meaning and particularly with regard to the question whether selectional
restrictions are always an automatic consequence of a concept's
paradigmatic characteristic s .
6 . F o r t h e sake o f completeness it should be added that the equivalence o f
vernielen and vernietigen i s less straightforward i n present-day Dutch
than i t is in 1 9th-century Dutc h . Some of the quotations discussed here
are now felt to be rather awkward; in particular, it would be difficult to
use vernielen with regard to persons .
7. Needless to say , the corpus is larger than the eighteen illustrations given
in (3)-(20 ). The corpus as a whole consists of all the quotations available
in the W NT materials for vemielen and vernietigen (see Geeraerts 1 98 5 e ) .
8. I t should be added t h a t these observations have to b e considered with
more care than the previously mentioned points, since there is a general
tendency, throughout the centuries covered by the WNT material, to
remove the personal application from the structure of vernielen . There
are relatively fewer personal applications in the structure of 1 9th
century vernielen than in the structure of either 1 9th-century vernietigen
or 1 6th-century vernielen . As has already been mentioned, it is even
more difficult to use vernielen with regard to persons in present-day
Dutch . I n any case, the 1 9th-century material does seem to show that
the material subgroup of the personal application of vernielen is more
resistant to the tendency in question than the abstract subgroup, as can
be predicted from our centrality hypothesis.
9. The situation described with regard to vernielen and vernietigen
resembles the relationship described by MacLaury ( 1 99 5 ) as 'co
extension' . In his study of colour terms, two items are coextensive if
they have roughly the same referential range, but have different focal
areas . Characteristically , the range of one of the two items is broader

and more centrally focused, while the other is narrower and somewhat
skewed towards a more peripheral focus. This additional characteristic
of coextension is less easy to apply to our example, but probably,
vernielen would be the more marginal term, given that the abstract
nature of the prototype of vernietigen marks it as the more encompassing
term . MacLaury ( 1 992) further sees coextension as one particular stage
in a developmental process going from near-synonymy over coextension
to inclusion and further to complementation . Inclusion obtains when
the smallest coextensive range retracts towards its focus , so that only the
other item covers the original range. When this other item too retracts
towards its focus , two separate categories result that may only overlap at
their edge s . The evolution from the 1 9 th-century situation to the
present-day relation of vernielen and vernietigen confirms that the
coextensive situation has not subsisted, and that both categories have
tended to retract towards their focal areas. It is doubtful, however,
whether a situation of inclusion has obtained somewhere between the
1 9th-century situation and the present moment. More generally , the
developmental patterns of synonymous terms will have to be examined
on a larger scale outside the lexical field of colour terms. A good
starting-point may be found in synonymy resulting from borrowing.
Dekeyser ( 1 99 1 , 1 99 5 ) , for instance, examines how the introduction of
Romance Joans in Middle English may lead to Joss of the prototypical
meaning of their English counterparts . From a somewhat different
perspective , this also implies exploring the consequences of proto
typicality for the theory of linguistic borrowing: could a model be
developed that classifies the various ways in which the prototypical
structures of loan words and their near-synonymous counterparts may
interact?
I O . If this implies that prototype theory is a Kuhnian paradigm in the
epistemological sense of providing a theoretical perspective that
determines what is a relevant fact, it should be noted that prototype
theory is not a Kuhnian paradigm in the sociological sense. It does not
dominate Jexicology in the way that Kuhn considers natural in a phase
of 'normal science' . Diachronic semantics, and theoretical Jexicology at
large , is characterized by the presence of a number of competing
approaches . The cognitive approach has been gaining in popularity , but
it exists alongside other approaches, such as various forms of
structuralist theories .
I I . The periodization presupposed here distinguishes between three main
periods in the history of semantics: the pre-st ructuralist period of
traditional historical semantics, the structuralist period (including
neostructuralist approaches such as Katzian componential analysis),
and the contemporary period, in which logical approaches and cognitive
approaches coexist (with the logical approaches being less important for
lexical semantics) . This periodization is merely taken for granted here;
it is presented in detail in Geeraerts ( 1 986c), and more succinctly in
Geeraerts ( 1 988a) and ( 1 994b )
.
1 2 . S e e Nerlich ( 1 992) a n d Knobloch ( 1 987) on the psychological perspect

ive of the pre-structuralist school of historical semantics . It may be
useful to point out that 1 9th-century psychology sometimes makes a
distinction between Begriff ('concept' in an abstract, neutral sense) and
Vorstellung ( 'concept' as a mental entity, a mental representation ) .
Hecht's u s e of Vorstellung rather than Begnff thus further underlines his
psycholog1cal approac h .
1 3 . A practical consequence o f t h e psychological approach i s t h e fact that
experimental psychological research may have an influence on linguistic
conceptions of categorial structure. Taking the cognitive nature of
language seriously entails taking psychological studies of meaning
seriously. As such , it is possible to identify major psychological
influences on the older historical and the cognitive research programmes.
The latter's conception of categorial structure has to a large extent been
shaped by Rosch's experimental work on prototy�� semantics, whereas
the former has been profoundly influenced by Wilhelm Wundt's
apperceptionalist psychology (Wundt 1 900 ). It is true, though, that
Wundt's views were not generally accepted by the semanticists of the
pre-structuralist period, but even when they are systematically criticized
(as in Marty 1 90 8 ) , the tendency is rather to substitute another
psychological conception for Wundt's than to abandon the psychological
outlook as a whole . I n addition, the structuralist rejection of the
psychological perspective of the older tradition should not be over
generalized either. A t least some structurally minded linguists, like
Sapir, did not eschew questions about the psychological relation
between language and reality .
1 4 . There i s , however, n o explicit reference t o the hermeneutical tradition.
I t may be useful to point out that (owing to a deficient confrontation
with the history of the disciplines involved) the novelty of the cognitive,
prototype-theoretical approach to natural language semantics has
sometimes been overstated, particularly in some of the earliest
formulations of the new approac h . As far as linguistic semantics is
concerned, for instance, the correspondence between cognitive
semantics and the pre-structuralist tradition of historical semantics
appears to have escaped the attention of the American founding fathers
of the cognitive approach. As far as philosophy is concerned, the so
called 'non-Aristotelian' character of prototype theory may be taken as
an example. From the earliest formulations of prototype theory in the
work of Eleanor Rosch onward, the prototype approach was presented
as contrasting with the 'Aristotelian' conception that categories can be
defined in terms of necessary and sufficient attributes. However, this

insistence on the 'non-Aristotelian' nature of prototype semantics paints
a rather incomplete picture of Aristotle's thought (see Kanellos 1 994,
and cf. Geeraerts 1 98 3 a , n. 3 ) .
l 5 . This statement obviously has t o b e attenuated somewhat in t h e light o f
recent cosmological theories stating that t h e laws o f nature, s o t o speak,

only came into existence in the first few seconds after the origmal big
bang (see Hawking 1 98 8 ) . For all practical purposes, however, the
traditional timelessness o f the laws of the physical world remains a
suitable point of comparison with the human sciences .
1 6 . The background of this dialectical switch is explored in detail in
Geeraerts ( 1 98 5 a ) .
1 7 . T h e tension has been noted by various authors. S e e , among others,
Diwald ( 1 96 3 ) . Particularly influential in the history of hermeneutics
has been Gadamer's discussion ( 1 97 2 : 226 ) . Ricoeur ( 1 97 5 ) is an
excellent survey of the history of hermeneutics that takes the tension
within Dilthey' s views as the starting-point for an overview of the
development of hermeneutic s .
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IN DEX
Aij mer K . 3 0 cognitive semantics , introduction 8- I o

Allan K . I I9 relationship c o ocher approaches
ameliorative change of meaning 94 , 26--<) ; see also scruccuralisc semantics ;
99- I OO pre-scruccuralisc semantics
analogical change o f meaning 94, I 00--2 Coleman L. 4, I 2
see also ellipsis ; semantic borrowing componential analysis I , 34-40
Andersen H. 82 conceptual reorganization I 27-30, I 3 I
Anscacc T. 30 see also merger , conceptual
Anttila R . I 5 3 , I 8 I contiguity versus similarity 96
Aris code I 8 8 --<) core versus periphery
avoidance of homonymy see typicality , degrees
see homonymiphobia Coseriu E. I 2 I , I 5 I -2
avoidance of polysemy Craig C . 2 8
see polysemiophobia Croft W . I 2o
Crowley T. 3
culcural models I O
Bakema P. I 56
bakken 7 2 , 7 5
Dahlgren K . I I 9
Bartsch R . I 2 I
Darmescecer A. 27
Bellmann G . I 54
De Beer T. 1 72
Boeckh A. I 7 8 , I 8 3
De Flines Q. I 72
Brea! M . 2 7 , I I I
De Mey M . 7
Brown C . 2 8
De Pacer W. r o , 1 5 4
Bru ner J . I I 4
De Saussure F. 8 6 , I I 2
Burridge K . I I 9
De Tollenaere F. I55
Bybee J . I , 8 3
D e Vries J . I 5 5
definition , absence of classical I I , I 3- I 5 ,
calei;on 2 3 , 25
see legging(s) Dekeyser X . 30, I 8 7
Carnoy A. 27 denotational meaning , definition I 8
Casad E. 7, 30 types o f changes 94- 1 02
category , definition 20 see also analogical change of meaning;
causes of lexical change <)0-- 3 , I 02- I 2 , metaphor ; metonymy ; general
I 50-3 ization , semantic; speciali za tion ,
see also efficiency ; expressivic y ; semantic
explanation of lexical change Derrida J I 8 5
centrality Dik S . 69-7 9 , 8 2
see cypicalicy, degrees Dilchey W . I 7 8-8 5 , 1 89
Claes F. I 5 6 Dirven R. 9, 30, I 20
Clarke D. 30 Diwald H. I 89
cognitive linguistic s , overview 6-- I o Donegan P. 1 I 6
204 Index
Dressler W. 1 22 Gadamer H . G . 1 8 5 , 1 8 9
Dubois D . 2 8 Gardner M . 1 8 5
Geeraercs D . 4 , 5 , 8 , 2 9 , 30, 7 9 , 8 1 , 8 2 ,
efficiency 9 2 , I 05-8 , 1 1 2- 1 9 , 1 2 5 1 1 9 , 1 20 , 1 22 , 1 5 3 , 1 54 , 1 5 5 , 1 5 6 , 1 8 5 ,
see also causes of lexical change ; 1 86 , 1 8 8 , 1 8 9
explanation of lexical change ; Geiger R . 7, 2 8
flexibility; forcicion processes; generalization , semantic 68-7 9 , 94 ,
iconici cy; isomorphism; leni tion 9 5 --6 , 1 2 8
processes ; transparency Gillieron J . 92-3 , I 05 , w8 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 5 ,
ellipsis 86 1 30 , 1 5 5
encyclopaedic versus semantic meaning glas 7 2 , 74-5 , 77
8, 1 9 , 2 5-6 , 68-79 Goldberg A . 9
see also subsets i n semantic change Goodman N . 1 8 5
entrenchment Goossens J . 1 2 1 , 1 2 3-30, 1 3 2 , 1 5 3-4
see onomasiology , salience effects Goossens L. 30, 1 20
epistemology Goyvaerrs D . 1 20
see hermeneutics; prococypicali c y , grammacicalizacion 1
epistemological role; proco Grondelaers 0. 8 1
cypicalicy, philosophical back Grondelaers S . 1 5 6
ground; paradigmatic theory of Guiraud P. 1 20
science
Erdmann K. 0. 27, 3 � 1 Haiman J . I O , 1 54
euphemism 99 Hawking S . 1 8 9
Evans N. 30 Hecht M . 1 7 7 , 1 8 8
experiencialism 1 80 Heescermans H. 79
explanation of lexical change 1 5�3 Heidegger M . 185
see also causes of lexical change ; Heider E . R . 2 8
functionalis m , in diachronic Heine B . I . 1 22
semantics; teleological explanations hermeneutics 1 5 7 , 1 7 8-8 5
expressi vicy 92 , I 05-8 see also in cerprecacion , theory of
see also causes of lexical change; heukel 1 27-<J
explanation of lexical change hiscory of semantics 26-9 , 1 1 �2
extensional level of semasiological see also cognitive semantics;
structure , definition 1 8 scruccuralisc seman tics; pre
Eylenbosch E . 1 5 3 , 1 5 4 scruccuralisc semantics
Hoing H. 1 54
family resemblance 1 1 , 1 5- 1 6 , 2 3-4 , 6 1 Holland B . I O , 28
see also radial sec homonymic clashes
Fauconnier G. IO see homonymiphobia
Feyerabend P . 1 2 1 , 1 8 2 homonymiphobia 92- 3 , I 0 5 , 1 2 3-5 3
Fillmore C . 9 Hopper P. 1
flexibility 40 , 64 , 1 1 3- 1 5 , 1 1 8 Hughes G. 1 19
forcicion processes 1 1 6- 1 7 ; in che lexicon Hiining M . 1 2 1
1 18 Husserl E . 1 1 4
see also iconicicy; isomorphic hyperbole 99-- I OO
principle; transparency
fox 75-6 iconicicy 1 0 , 1 1 8
frame semantics 9 implicacure, conven tionalizacion of 8 2-3
Franck ] . 1 5 5 indeterminacy
Fritz G. 1 see vagueness
fruit 1 3- 1 6 inductive generalization 68-79
functionalism , i n diachronic semantics intensional level of semasiological
8 7 , 9 1 -2 , 1 03- 1 2 structure , definition 1 8
Index 205
interpretation , versus explanation 1 79 MacLaury R . 9 , 1 8 6-7

theory of 1 5 9-74 marginal nuances
see also hermeneutics see flexibility; semantics polygenesis;
in trospection 1 7 1 -2 , 1 74 vagueness
invis ible hand processes t o8-<), I 5 I , Marty A. 27, 1 8 8
1 52 McArthur T. 1 20
isomorphic principle 1 0 5-6 , r r r - 1 2 , r r 8 , McMahon A. 3
1 24-5 3 meat 77-8
see also conceptual reorganization ; Medin D. 28
homonymiphobia ; lexical loss ; Meillet A. 70, 8 7 , 8 9-<) 3 , r r 9
lexical reorganization ; merger, Melis L. 30
conceptual; polysemiophobia mental spaces r o
merger, conceptual 1 3 1-50
Mervis C. r r , 1 2 , 2 8
J aberg K. 1 54
metaphor 9 , 7 5 --0 , 8 6 , 94, 97-8
Johnson M . 3 , 7 , 8 , 9, 97-8 , 1 80
see also contiguity versus similari ty
metonymy 7 1 -4 , 86, 94, 9�7
Kanellos I. r 88 see also contiguity versus similari ty
Katz J . 1 8 7 Moerdijk A. 4 1 , 79, 8 1
Kay P. 12 morphological polygenesis 66
keesl 1 2 5-6 , 1 29
Keller R. 1 08 Nagel E. 103, r 12, 1 2 1
Kemmer S . 1 22 natural lexicology r r 7
Kinay E. r see also lenition processes, in the
Kleiber G. 2 8 , 2 9 lexicon ; forti ti on processes , in the
Kleparski G . r, r 1 9 lexicon
Knobloch C . 1 8 8 Natural Phonology I 1 � 1 9
Konig E. 8 3 necessary and sufficient attributes
Korn 1 3 0-- r see definition , absence of classical
Kovecses Z. r o Neisser U . 2 8
Kronasser H . 1 7�7 neologism 3 3 , 4 1
kruipen 69-70, 72-3 Nerlich B . 30, 1 8 8
Kuhn T. r r 4 , 1 2 1 , 1 5 7 , 1 5 9 , 1 8 2 , 1 8 7 Niki foridou K . 30
non-denotational meaning, definition 1 8
Labov W . 1 09 types of changes 94, 98- 1 00
Lakatos I. r r 4, 1 2 1 , 1 82 see also ameliorative change of
Lakoff G. 3, 7, 8, 9, 2 9 , 97-8 , 1 80 , 1 82 meaning; euphemism; hyperbole;
Landre W. 1 72 pejorative change of meaning
Langacker R. 7, 9, 2 8 , 1 22 nuance, definition 20
Lass R. 151 Nuessel F. 1 20
legging(s) 3 3-47
Lehmann W. r , 3, 70 obj ectivism 1 8 2-5
Leh rer A . L :=: 2 0 one form one mearung
leni t io n processes r r � r 7 ; i n the lexicon see isomorphism
r r8 onomasiology 27, 43-7 , 8 9 , 94- 5
Lewandowska-Tomasczcyk B . r 22 versus semasiology I 7
lexical loss 1 2�3 1 salience effects 44-5
lexical reorganization 1 3 1 , 5 0 types of changes 95
lexicography 5 Overbergh B . 7 9
Leys 0. 153
Lieb H . H . 1 20 Paprocce W . 9
Lipka L. r paradigmatic theory of science 1 5 7 , 1 7 5 ,
Liidtke H. 2 8 1 82
2o6 Index
Paul H . 2 7 , 7 7 , 8 2 onomasiology , salience effects

P ee W . 1 5 4 Sapir E. 1 88
Peirce C. S . 8 2 , 1 5 4 , 1 8 5 Sappan R. 1 19
pe j orative change o f meaning 94, Schwarz M . 7
99- 1 00 semantic borrowing 89
perspeccival nature o f meaning 8 semantic change , classification 84- 1 1 9
Piaget J . I I 4 due co linguistic conservatism 8 5 ,
Pluim T. 1 72 8 7-8
polysemiophobia 1 2 3-5 3 due to linguistic innovation 8 5 , 8 7-8
polysem y , definition 1 8 due to social factors 90, ! 09- 1 1
tendency co increase 1 2 3 involving emotive factors 90
see also defini tion , absence o f classical; regularity 1
family resemblance; flexibility; see also causes of lexical change;
polysemiophobia; radial sec denotational meaning , types of
popular etymology 86 changes; explanation of lexical
Posner R . 2 9 change ; functionalism, in diachronic
predic tabili t y 1 5 0-3 semantics; non- denotational
pre- scruccu ralisc semantics 27, I I 0- 1 , meaning , types of changes
1 7� 8 , 1 8 0 semantic field 1
prototypicality 9 and passim semantic polygenesis 24, 60, 62-8 ,
diachronic effects 2 3--6 1 6o-2
func tional explanation 1 1 3-1 5 semasiology, definition 1 7
epistemological role I I 0- 1 4 , 1 7 5 sense , definition 1 8
interpretative character 1 1 4 , 1 6 3 , versus reading 20
1 75 , 1 8 1 Smith E. 2 8
philosophical background 1 8 Q-92 specialization , semantic 77-8 , 9 4 , 9 5 --6
prototypicality o f 2 1 Sperber H . 8 7 , 89-9 3 , 1 1 9
types 1 0-2 3 S tampe D . I I 6 , 1 22
see also definition , absence of classical ; Stern G . 2 7 , I I O, 1 1 9
encyclopaedic versus semantic scruccu ralisc semantics 27, u - 1 2 , 1 7�8
meaning; family resemblance; subsets in semantic change 68-79
flexibili t y ; radial set; typicality , Sweetser E . 1 , 9, 28
degrees; vagueness synonymy 1 2 9 , 1 7 2-3
psyc holexicology 1 1
Putnam H. 185
Talmy L. 7
Taylor J . 9, 2 8 , 2 9
Quine W . V . 0 . 1 8 5
teleological explanations 1 03-1 8 , 1 5 0- 3
Quinn N . r n , 2 8
Tournier J . 1 20
transfer of names 8 5--6
Radden G . 7
transfer of senses 86
radial sec I I , 24, 47--62
transparency rn6 , I I 7- 1 8
see also family resemblance
Traugon E . 1 , 8 3
reading, definition 20
tros 1 3 3
Reddy M. 1 62
Tsohatzidis S . 28
referential level of semasiological
Tuggy D. 29
struccure , definition 1 8
Turner M . 9
Ricoeur P. 1 89
typicality , degrees I I , 1 2- 1 3 , 2 3-4 ,
Rorty R . 1 8 5
3 2-43
Rosch E . I I , 12, 1 3 , 2 8 , I I 2, 1 8 8
Tyvaerc J. 28
Rudzka-Ostyn B . 7 , 2 8 , 30
salienc e , definition 20 uizweiden I 3 3

see a lso typicality, degrees ; Ullman S . 7 0 , 84-9 3 , 1 1 9 , 1 5 5
Index 207
vagueness I I , I 2- I 3 , 2 3 - 5 , 60, I I 5 Voyles J. I

versus polysemy I S
see also semantic polygenesis Warren B. 83
Van Langendonck W. r o , I 5 4 Weiland P. 1 72
verdouwen I 3 5-50 Weisgerber L. 27, I 2 l , 1 7 7
verduisteren 63-5 , 8 I wekken, 67-8
verduwen I 3 5- 5 0 Werth P . I
vergraven 6 6 Wierzbicka A. l 36-- 6 , 28
vergrijpen 4 7-6 2 , So- I Willemyns R. 1 5 3
vergulden 67-8, 8 I Williams E . R . 1 5 5
vernachten 67-8 Williams J . l
vernielen 1 60- 1 , 1 64-73, I 8 6 winkel 7 2 , 76-7
vernieligen I64-7 3 , I 8 6 Winters M. 30
verweerd I 3 3 Witkowski S . 28
Von der Gabelentz G. 1 22 Wittgenstein L. 1 2 , 61
Von Humboldt W. 121 Wundr W . 27, 1 8 8

Dirk Geeraerts - Diachronic Prototype Semantics - A Contribution To Historical Lexicology-Clarendon Press (1997) PDF

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Dirk Geeraerts - Diachronic Prototype Semantics - A Contribution To Historical Lexicology-Clarendon Press (1997) PDF

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Introduction

IN a survey of diachronic semantics published some twenty years

correlated with specific descriptive characteristics of lexical-semantic

pre-structuralist historical semantics that dominated the scene of

linguistics. The expected familiarity does not, however, go beyond

Cognitive Semantics and

W I T H the birth of cognitive semantics, new ideas from the field of

I . I I N T R O D UCI N G CO G N I T IV E L I N GUI S T ICS

Cognitive linguistics is an approach to the analysis of natural

Cognitive linguistics is the study of language in its cogmt1ve

It is crucial to note that cognitive linguistics is not a single theory

structures are studied in their relationship to their cultural environ­

This section describes the scope of the concept 'prototypicality'. In

assumes that categories are logical bounded entities, membership in which is

The theory originated in the mid-r97os with Eleanor Rosch's

By prototypes of categories we have generally meant the clearest cases of

New trends in categorization research have brought into investigation and

For further illustration, let us consider a category that is a typical

typically different. Second, category membership is not the same

(<i) Eating them uncooked makes one feel good.

general when taken separately), the other features are introduced by

semantic description of frnit demarcate various subsets from within

that the characteristics enumerated here are prototypicality effects

analysis , senses are represented by definitions . On a further level of

and 'the result or effect of something' . Distinctions among the

sometimes be useful to replace sense with a term that is less theory­

the members of a category; they observe, respectively, that not all

may be less important than is suggested by the tradition of

N o n -eq u a l ity ( a ) D i ffe r e n ces o f ( j3 ) C l u ste r i n g of

FIG. 1 . 1 . Four types of prototypicality effects

requirement that definitions take the form o f a set o f necessary

I.3 HYPOTHESES ABOUT SEMASIOLOGICAL CHANGE

A s fa r a s historical semantics i s concerned, w e can now turn each o f

( �) By stressing the extensional non-equality of lexical-semantic

Because actual examples corroborating these hypotheses will only be

consist of variations on that type of referent. The further the

several points i n time that are separated b y a considerable period, we

ABCDE in any psychologically or intuitively important interpretation,

comparison will be taken up again in Section 5 . 2.) The cognitive­

relatively little attention to phenomena such as the clustered nature

l. The correlation between synchronous polysemy and diachronic change

6. The classification of types of prototypicality effects presented here was

whether proper names have a sense .

boundaries o f words are vague, unclear, indeterminate. The situation is,

The Prototypical Characteristics of

IN the previous chapter , I identified four prototype-theoretical

2.1 MODULATIONS OF CO RE CASES

I n what follow s , a case-study will b e presented that exemplifies the

o f hypothesis (�), b u t will also suggest that the concept o f salience

category 'legging' is determined, and next, all the alternative names

T A B L E 2 . r The componential system used in the compilation of the legging

Feature Descriptive condition

is worn by a woman (S f) . The determination of the prototype is

straightforward: not only is < 3 I I u f> the single most attested

'"""·-----·-1--- ·----+------- --1--- 1

Fm. 2 . I . The semasiological range of application of the category

-----J=��=-=�=- =���-----·- ,_ L=2,3

FIG. 2 . 2 . The semasiological range of application of the category

between these alternative items involves geographic variables,

nu ifl l?) 31121f(3)

32111f (8) 32121f(1)

FrG . 2 . 3 . The semasiological range of application of the cateogory

features used in the description of the garments . For reasons of

structures are studied in their relationship to their cultural environ

sometimes be useful to replace sense with a term that is less theory

comparison will be taken up again in Section 5 . 2.) The cognitive

-----J=��=-=�=- =��-----·- ,_ L=2,3

I n the previous section w e encountered innovations in the semasio