The Pakistan of Post 9/11

On 11th of September 2001, the United States of America was hit by the deadliest
terrorist attack since its inception. Nineteen terrorists, associated with Al-Qaeda, hijacked four
commercial airplanes, which were to fly from the east coast to California. Two of the planes
were flown into the Twin Towers of World Trade center, causing them to collapse. Another
plane was flown into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Department of Defense, while, the
fourth, enroute to Washington DC, miraculously fell short of its target when the passengers and
crew counterattacked. In total, the attack killed 2977 people, the single largest loss of life from a
foreign attack on American soil. Immediately after the attack, Bush administration designated
Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda, operating from within Afghanistan, as the culprits. Eventually,
through the ‘Bush doctrine’, it was decided that America would make no distinction between the
terrorists and those who harbor them. Pakistan, owing to its geo-strategic position, was to face
the biggest dilemma in the form of War on Terror. This portion therefore, enlists the major
impacts of War on Terror on Pakistan, in general, and on KPK in specific.

 The then US intelligence Director, Richard Armitage threatens President Musharaf

should he chose to not cooperate, “Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to
the Stone Age.” (US threatened to Bomb Pak to Stone Age, The Economic Times, Sep
23, 2006).
 The end of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan, in the wake of 9/11, induced a fear in
Pakistani policy makers of loosing Afghanistan to the pro-Indian Northern alliance
(Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy: Impact on FATA, Zarmina Baloch, 2016). This
primarily motivated Pakistani establishment to clandestinely perpetuate its support for
certain groups within Afghanistan, notwithstanding international pressure, in turn, giving
way to terrorism in Pakistan’s own domain.
 Start of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. 18 worshippers in a church massacred in Eastern
Pakistan on 28 October 2001. ( Christian Massacred in Pakistan, BBC NEWS, Sunday 28
October, 2001). Then Interior minister Moinuddin’s elder brother was shot dead on 21st
December 2001. The minister was very vocal against extremist organizations. (Pak
interior minister’s brother shot dead, Times of India, 21 December 2001).
 123 billion dollars is the total amount of losses suffered by Pakistan since 9/11 ( Dawn,
Nasir Jamal, published May 26, 2017). These losses were incurred in the shape of lost
exports, compensation to victims of terrorist attacks, rehabilitation of the people
displaced because of terrorism, destruction of economic and social infrastructure, decline
in foreign direct investment, reduction in industrial output, lower tax collection and cost
of uncertainty.
 War-related violence has killed 65,000 people in Pakistan in the last 17 (2001-2018)
years, including 23,000 civilians, 9,000 security personnel and 90 American contractors,
says a report released by Brown’s University. The rest of the casualties were anti-
government fighters. (Dawn, Anwar Iqbal, Published November 10 , 2018).
  Not only did WOT effected economy and the human resource, but, the social fabric too.
Religious polarization, the rise of militant gatherings and the disintegration of customary
social and political administration structures in tribal territories was also evident (War on
Terror and its Impacts on Pakistani society, Journal of Pakistan Vision, volume. 20, No.2,
2019).
 Tourism sector also got a severe hit in the post-9/11 period. The occupancy rate of hotels
reduced from 60% to 40% in 2007-08. According to Pakistan Association for Tourism’s
statistical report, before 9/11 incident, 1 million tourists on the average used to visit
Pakistan annually but after the occurrence of terrorism, it dropped to 10,000. Before the
attack on WTC, 20 to 25 thousand people on the average had visited Gilgit- Baltistan,
after 9/11 their strength remained only 5 to 10 thousands. Just in swat, a loss of 60 billion
Rs was recorded in the period from 2007-2009. Moreover, during this period, Pakistan
was ranked 113th out of 130 countries, in terms of tourism. (Asifa Khalid, Impact of
terrorism on the economy of Pakistan, Pakistan Vision, Vol.21,1).

Implications of WOT on KPK

 KPK area: 101,741 square kilometers. (Boundary with Afghanistan: Erstwhile Tribal
areas namely, South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Khyber Agency, Bajaur Agency and
Mohmand Agency).
 According to a statement by Mumhammad Ishaq, former Vice President of SCCI (Sahad
Chamber of Commerce and Industry), KP had 2,254 industrial sectors, of which 1,653
were closed between July 2007 and January 2010, giving way to mass unemployement.
SCCI estimated that KP’s infrastructure had been damaged, with losses amounting to
US$35 billion.
 The US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan and in KPK by the Pakistani Army gave rise to
popular resentment and hatred in KPK and especially among the Pashtun population
against the army and the Musharraf regime. (Implications of war on terror for Pakistan,
KPK, Manzoor Ahmed, Journal of Critical Globalisation Issues 3 (2010)).
 According to a survey conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), about
18% of Pakistani Madrassas had affiliations with Jihadi and sectarian groups; 78%
students of these madrassas were against Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror and 81%
were against military operations in tribal areas; and 20% of the students considered the
current insurgency a direct reaction to Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror (Rana, 2009).
(Implications of war on terror for Pakistan, KPK, Manzoor Ahmed, Journal of Critical
Globalisation Issues 3 (2010)).0
 Human loss as a result of terrorism in KPK, from 2008 to 2013: (Jamal et al, 2002, Socio-
Economic Implications Of Terrorism On Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: A Case Study Of ANP
Era (2008-2013)

Year Total Attacks Suicide IED attacks Casualties Injured

 attacks
2008 1009 32 2201 1735
2009 1137 51 5497 5000+
2010 459 33 836
2011 521 27 820 1684
2012 456 18 401 1081
2013 499 706
A total of 4072 militant attacks occurred in KPK between 200 and 2013, killing 5183
people and injuring 11693.

 MMA ( Muttahida majlis e amal) was formed in 2002, in response to the US invasion of
Afghanistan and the subsequent US-Pakistan partnership. In its manifesto, the MMA
proclaimed the ambition to get rid of the influence of external powers in foreign policy
decision making and to exert moral, political and diplomatic support to the people of
Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Chechnya (Khan, 2002).
 The terrorist and counter-terrorist actions in the tribal areas had badly hampered the
educational system of this area, which was already facing high illiteracy rates. According
to governmental statistics the literacy rate in FATA was 17% (Government of Pakistan,
2009). In Swat about 188 girls’ and 97 boys’ schools had been destroyed by the militants
and persistent uncertainty stopped students from attending educational institutions (Shah,
 2008). (Implications of war on terror for Pakistan, KPK, Manzoor Ahmed, Journal of
Critical Globalization Issues 3 (2010)).
 Following the operations against the militants, a large number of people fled from their
homes and took refuge in the Districts of Mardan, Swabi, Nowshera, Tank and Dera
Ismail Khan. The National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) had registered
approximately 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), of which 96% were
registered in KPK (UNOCHA Report, 2009). By the end of 2009, the total number of
IDPs from the South Waziristan area was about 428,000.

Suicide Attacks, Post-9/11 in Pakistan

 Between 2001 and 2011, when Islamabad partnered with Washington to combat the
Taliban and al-Qaeda, there have been 335 suicide bombings in Pakistan. Before 2001,
there was one. (Shaken by increase in attacks since 2001, many Pakistanis fault U.S.,
Karim Bulliard, The Washington Post, September 26, 2011).

Yearly data of suicide attacks between 2001 and 2012: (M.S.A Malik et al, 2015 ,
Identification of Risk Factors Generating Terrorism in Pakistan)

Table form of the above Graph:

 In 2006, 657 terrorist attacks, including 41 of a sectarian nature, took place, leaving 907
people dead and 1,543 others injured according to Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
security report.
 Table :

S.No Year Suicide Attacks Casualties

Foreign assistance to Pakistan, Post 9/11
 Symington and Pressler sanctions, which were placed on Pakistan in October 1990 in
relation to nuclear nonproliferation, denying Pakistan of economic and military
assistance, were intact till George Bust was elected to office elected to office. (Pakistan-
US relations after 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective, Zamir Akram, 2002)
 Upon the commencement of formal cooperation between Pakistan and the US under the
banner of War on terror, the later agreed to immediately write off a part of Pakistan’s
debt and provided $600 million as economic aid and $177 million as military and security
assistance for 2002. And, in 2003, the Bush administration decided to give off $3 billion
in military and economic assistance.( Z. Ahmed & A.H Kharral, Pak-US relations post
9/11: Impact of aid, irritants and regimes in Pakistan (2001-2013), Journal of politics and
international studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, January –June 2015, pp.14– 23).

Post 9/11, the key areas for US assistance were military and economic. Military assistance is
classified in the following way:

 Coalition Support Fund: From 2001 to 2008, nearly $6 billion had been transferred
under the Coalition Support Funds program to Pakistan. This represents greater than 50
percent of the U.S.'s total support to Pakistan and its people since 9/11, and until 2008..
(OVERSIGHT OF U.S. COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS TO PAKISTAN, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of The House Of
epresentatives US, June 24, 2008 ).
 Pakistan’s Counter insurgency capability Funds (PCCF): This fund was designed to
aid Pakistan in carrying out counter insurgency in Pakistan. From 2009-2011, 1100
million dollars were given to Pakistan under this banner. (Akbar Zaidi, Who benefits
from US aid to Pakistan, CARNEIGI, September 2011).
 Foreign Military Financing: This fund comprises of grants and loans to acquire military
hardware. This is dedicated to those states which are important for United States’
regional goals. Pakistan acquires obsolete US military hardware through this fund.
(SASSI, 2011, pp. 2-3).
Impact of Afghan Refugees on Pakistan, KPK in specific
The phases of the movement of Afghan refugees into Pakistan since 1970 ( Borthakur, A.
(2017). AFGHAN REFUGEES: THE IMPACT ON PAKISTAN. Asian Affairs, 48(3), 488–509)
 After the coup of Mohammad Daud in 1973, 2000 loyalists of the ousted regime sought
asylum in Pakistan.
 By 1996, 2 million Afghan refugees were living in Pakistan, owing to the Taliban
takeover and the deteriorating economic conditions.
 According to a data collected by the UNHCR in 2020, 1.3 million registered Afghans,
0.89 million Afghan citizen card holders and 0.5 million unregistered Afghans were
living in Pakistan. (UNHCR)
 UNHCR and the Government of Pakistan conducted a census of Afghan
population in Pakistan in 2002. That found 3,049,268 Afghans are living in Pakistan,
in which 42% are living in camps and 58% are living in urban areas. Moreover,
among these 81% of the Afghans were Pashtuns, with much smaller percentages of
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups (Census of Afghans in Pakistan,
2005).

 According to the same report, many more Afghans migrated to Pakistan in the post 9/11
period, which were periodically relocated to their homes by the UNHCR upon the
cessation of crises.

 In an article, published in Tribune on July 18th 2021 by Shahbaz Rana, titled “ Hosting
700000 Afghans will cost $2.2 billion for 3 years”, it is stated that there are currently
1.44 million registered Afghan refugees, including 840,000 Afghan citizen card holders
having non-refugee status and 770,000 undocumented Afghan nationals in Pakistan.

 According to a 2022 UNHCR report, published on its website

“reporting.unhcr.org/Pakistan”, the total number of Refugees and other related factions is
as follows: 1.5 million refugees, 98898 IDPs, 24729 asylum seekers and 27748 of other
related categories.
 Let us examine the impacts of such colossal refugee movement into Pakistani territory,
on the internal security situation, political, societal and economic condition of Pakistan:

Impact on Internal security condition

 The ramifications of the Afghan war in Pakistan include the growth of various Islamic
groups that have been implicated in the running feuds between Sunni and Shi’i
organizations, ethnic strife, the talibanisation of Pakistani society, the drug Mafia
operating in Pakistan and the smuggling network of small arms and ammunitions which
poses a threat to state security in the long run (South Asia Terrorism Portal Report on
Pakistan; http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/pakistan/backgrounders/index.html.).
 According to William (1994), when the Afghans took refuge in Pakistan, the arms, both
heavy and light, became common and soon everyone could approach these. Because of
the weaponization of Pakistani society, the law and order situation soon became the most
horrible and the government lost its influence in safeguarding the people from criminals,
 religious extremists and political target killers. The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa began
business of illegal weapons; therefore, Kalashnikov became a prominent fraction of
Pakhtun culture. ( M.J.U Mulk et al, Impact of Afghan Refugees on Security Situation of
Pakistan, Pakistan Journal of Society, Language and Education, Jan 2020).
 In 1957, there were just about 150 schools or Madrasehs based on sectarian lines
functioning in the country. But now the number exceeds 5,500, with nearly 4,500 having
come into existence after 1980. (South Asia Terrorism Portal Report on Pakistan;
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/pakistan/backgrounders/index.html.).
 The 2017-2018 Pakistan Education Statistics survey reported a total of 31,115 madrassas
operating in the country, with a total enrolment of 4.099 million and employing 0.179
million teachers (NEMIS et al., 2021, p. 41).
 Gul (2009) said in his research work that Talibanization flourished the culture of
terrorism in Pakistan which includes attacks on armed forces by Tehreek E Taliban
Pakistan (TTP); target killing of religious, political and civil society celebrities, scholars
and doctors; demolishing schools, offices of NGOs and bridges; and suicide attacks in
mosques and other sacred places. So far more than 35000 Pakistanis have been killed in
different terrorist incidents after 9/11, which include 5000 soldiers. In 2008 alone, 2113
attacks by militants and insurgents had been reported, killing 2913 people and injuring
another 5824. (J.U. Mulk et al, 2020, Impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan, Pakistan
Journal of Education, Society and Language).
 It is alleged that more than 80% of the crimes in KPK and the erstwhile tribal regions, are
committed by the Afghans, owing to their weak financial backgrounds. Christine Roehrs,
‘The Refugee Dilemma: Afghans in Pakistan Between Expulsion and Failing Aid
Schemes’. Afghanistan Analysist Network 2015). However, a recent report of KPK right
to Information Act on crime statistics states that the impact of Afghan refugees on the
criminalization of Pakistani society is exaggerated. It further states that between 2014 and
2016, just over one percent of all major crime prosecutions involved Afghans. (The
Dawn, 15 January 2017; http://www.dawn.com/news/1308486/kp-prosecutiondata-gives-
lie-to-claims-against-afghan-refugees).
 Afghans are also often held responsible for the hard-line interpretation of Islam in the
frontier provinces of Pakistan. Instead of the easy-going traditionalist practices of Islam
that used to characterize the regions of FATA, KPK and Baluchistan, the western
provinces of Pakistan are becoming known for their social conservatism and assertive
Islam. (Mohammad A. Qadeer, Pakistan: Social and Cultural transformation in a Muslim
Nation. New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 84.)

Impact of Afghan Refugees on the Demography of Pakistan

 According to the UNHCR 2015–16 report, along with 1.5 million registered Afghan
refugees, currently there are approximately 1 million unregistered Afghan refugees, most
of them in KPK, who do not have proper documentation for staying in Pakistan. Pakistan
 still has 76 refugee villages with more than 1.5 million registered refugees. Sixty-five of
these villages are in KPK and FATA and there are ten in Balochistan, one in Punjab and
none in Sindh. However, more than a million of these registered refugees – almost 67 per
cent – reside outside these villages. Of the total number of refugees, 62 per cent or nearly
1 million Afghan refugees live in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 20 per cent in Balochistan, 11
per cent in Punjab, four per cent in Sindh, two per cent in Islamabad and less than one per
cent in Azad Kashmir. (Borthakur, A. (2017). AFGHAN REFUGEES: THE IMPACT
ON PAKISTAN. Asian Affairs, 48(3), 488–509).
 However, the demographic changes due to the arrival of Afghan refugees are principally
apparent in the provincial capitals and the cities of Peshawar, Karachi and Quetta.
According to the Afghan Consulate’s Refugee and Prisoners section, in 2015 there were
more than 66,700 registered Afghan refugees in Karachi in addition to the 250,000
unregistered ones. (Rabia Ali, ‘Afghans in Pakistan: Their Home and Heart Belong
Here’. The Express Tribune, 2 March, 2015; http://tribune.com.pk/story/846384/afghans-
in-pakistantheir-home-and-heart-belong-here/)
 The huge influx of refugees from Afghanistan may not have disturbed the overall ethnic
make-up of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but the linguistic preponderance of Pashto over
languages like Hindko is quite evident – Peshawar, traditionally a predominantly Hindko-
speaking town, has been swamped with speakers of Pashto. (Kingshuk Chatterjee,
‘Pakistan and Afghanistan: Of Instability and Umbilical Ties’, in Kingshuk Chatterjee
(Ed.), Pakistan and Afghanistan: The (In)stability Factor In India’s Neighbourhood. New
Delhi: KW Publisher, 2013, p. 43.)
 The demographic growth put tremendous strain on Pakistan’s resources, especially on its
provision of basic civic amenities to its citizens. The demographic changes have also
resulted in the growth of ethnic tensions between the communities. In 1947, Sindhis were
60 per cent of Karachi’s total population, but now they are no more than 7 per cent20 and
the city is dominated by the Mohajirs and the Pakhtuns. The same story applies to the
province of Balochistan. The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, has stated that
Afghan refugees, as a proportion of the population, are larger than the combined total of
the three indigenous ethnic groups of Baloch, Brahui and Pakhtuns. (Muhammad Shayan
Lakdawalla, op. cit.)

Impact of Afghan Refugees on the Economy of Pakistan

 The presence of a great number of Afghan refugees created a larger demand for goods
and supply which ultimately generated inflation in some parts of the country. Most
importantly, the presence of Afghan refugees created more unemployment opportunities
in labor markets of Pakistan as the refugees worked in low wage situations with
maximum time (Grare & Maley, 2011). However, Afghan labor migration has proved
beneficial for Pakistan in the form of labor, remittances and businesses.
Source: Baloch, A., Shah, S. Z., Noor, Z. M., & Lacheheb, M. (2017). The Economic Effect
of Refugee Crises on Neighboring Host Countries: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan.

 The above graph, taken from UNHCR official reporting site, shows the grant that US
periodically gave to Pakistan as a refugee support fund.

 Military Operations in FATA

After 9/11, it became technically impossible for the proscribed groups to maneuver inside
Afghanistan. This lead to the mass movement of various such groups into Pakistani territory,
settling themselves in the erstwhile tribal regions of Pakistan, primarily due to its proximity to
Afghanistan, but more importantly, due to the absence of a commanding and organized
governing framework. As a result, the armed forces of Pakistan, under pressure from the US, had
to initiate military operations in the erstwhile FATA regions to eradicate the presence of these
malicious elements which were not only hurting The US’s interests, but also wrecking havoc in
and around Pakistan’s major cities. This portion lists the details of those operations in a timely
order.

 Operation Al-Mizaan (Justice) June 2002 (Irum Khalid & M. Iqbal Roy, Pakistan’s
Military Operations: the Counter terrorism Strategy (2001-2013) Prospects and
Implications, JRSP, Vol. 53, No. 2, July-December, 2016):
Major focus: South Waziristan
Objectives:
 1. To clear the area of militants, extremists and the jihadists especially of those
international militants who had threatened Pakistan’s security, solidarity and
sovereign status.
2. Capturing the masterminds of terrorist organizations who were attempting to
deepen their roots in FATA and PATA regions.
3. A fatwa was issued by Ayman al Zawahiri against Gen Pervez Musharaf for
his support of NATO forces. Hence, Musharraf had a personal agenda to clear
South Waziristan of such elements.

Deployments:

70,000 – 80,000 troops (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 46).

Grants: $ 2 Billion per Year from the US for Operation Al-Mizaan

Major Units:

Two division Headquarters, Eight Brigade Headquarters, 20

Infantry Battalions, Six Engineer battalions, One Special Service Group
Battalion, Two Signal Battalions, 39 FC Wings.

Infiltration: Early 2002

Achievements:

1. The operation Al-Mizan could not acquire its determined results as

the foreign militants didn’t vacate the area, whereas a strong
resistance from tribesmen like Ahmedzai Wazir’s and others has been
faced by the government of Pakistan. (International Crisis Group,
2006, p. 14 & Gates Roy, 2014, pp. 125- 130).
2. June 2004: US and Pakistani intelligence asserted of a gathering of
200 Chechens, Uzbeks and some Arabs, with a gathering of several
hundred locals in the Shakai Valley. On June 10, the government
deployed 10,000 personnel, along with US trained special operations
task force and frontier corps men. 50 militants were killed while 4
soldiers were martyred and 12 injured. An IED factory, along with a
major propaganda base was partially destroyed. The haul from a large
underground cellar in one of the compounds included two truckloads
of TV sets, computers, laptops, disks, tape recorders, and tapes (Seth
G Jones & C Christine Fair, Counter insurgency in Pakistan, page
50).
 3. Pakistan military, police, and intelligence services did capture or kill
several senior al Qa’ida leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad,
Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Abu Zubaidah, and Abu Talha al-Pakistani.

Result

However, Operation Al Mizan ultimately failed to clear South

Waziristan of foreign militants. With the aid of foreigners, local militant
groups made significant inroads in usurping the power of tribal maliks
and increasing the importance of mullahs who espoused a Taliban
worldview. In addition, Pakistan’s operations were not sustained over
time. Pakistani efforts were marked by sweeps, searches, and occasional
bloody battles, but none of these employed enough forces to hold
territory. Further, the government’s initiatives were hindered by religious
conservative parties operating in the tribal areas. These groups
considered the Pakistani government’s efforts against al Qa’ida and other
militants to be an “American war. (Seth G Jones & C Christine Fair,
Counter insurgency in Pakistan, page 50).

Operation Kalosha, March 2004 (Wana) : (Irum Khalid & M. Iqbal Roy, Pakistan’s
Military Operations: the Counter terrorism Strategy (2001-2013) Prospects and Implications,
JRSP, Vol. 53, No. 2, July-December, 2016)

Background:

In January 2004, Pakistan army camps in Wana, the largest town of South
Waziristan, were fired upon by rockets from three sides. Furthermore, rocket attacks were also
carried out on army camps in bajaur district and Shulama. A search and destroy mission was
carried out in response to the attacks, which came to be known as “Operation Kalosha”. (Asif
Hell, 2010, p. 36 & Tankel, 2015, pp. 31-36). Operation Kalosha ( Kalosha is a village in Wana)
was in principle, a part of the larger operation Al-mizaan.

Troops Deployment:

1. 700 initially, but later on the numbers increased to 7000.

Frontier Corps and XI Corps were deployed under the
command of Lt Gen Muhammad Safdar Hussain.
2. The operation also involved more than a dozen Cobra
helicopters and Pakistan Air Force fighter jets.
Objectives:

1. A 13 day cordon-and-search effort across a 36 km square area west of

Wana.
2. To locate and destroy foreign fighters (Al-Qaida) who were allegedly
being harbored by militant commanders such as Nek Mohammad Wazir,
Noor-ul-Islam, Haji Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas, and Maulvi Abdul
Aziz.

Developments:

On March 16, Frontier Corps forces surrounded the three fortresslike

houses of Nek Mohammad Wazir, Haji Mohammad Sharif, and Noor-ul-
Islam in Kalosha village, 15 km west of Wana. At 6:30 am, they burst in.
Militants from the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe had thrown a siege around the
Frontier Corps’ outer cordon, and fighting ensued. By the end of the day, 15
Frontier Corps and one Pakistan Army soldiers had been killed, and 14 others
had been taken hostage. The militants also immobilized, destroyed, or burned
roughly a dozen army trucks, as well as pickups, armored personnel carriers,
and light artillery. Pakistani forces also faced tough resistance in the villages
of Dzha Ghundai, Shin Warsak, and Karikot. The cordon drawn around
Kalosha and the surrounding villages failed to retard the mobility of militants,
some of whom dispersed through a network of tunnels (M. Ilyas Khan, “Who
Are These People?” The Herald (Karachi), April 2004, pp. 60–68)
Achievements and after math of the Operation:

1. Pakistani forces killed a number of local and foreign fighters,

disrupted a major al Qa’ida command and control center, and
raided a network of tunnels containing sophisticated electronic
equipment and supplies.
2. The operation also triggered attacks against Pakistan Army and
Frontier Corps bases in such places as Shah Alam, Bermal,
Sarwekai, Angoor Adda, Laddha, Tiarza, and Wana (Khan,
“Spiraling Into Chaos,” pp. 34–36). Some locals were enraged at
Pakistan’s scorched earth tactics; the Pakistan Army demolished
a number of houses and used private residences as fortifications
and barracks. As one local lamented, “the army took away
everything from my house: jewelry, clothes, toiletries, even
pillow covers and shoe polish. (Mahsud, “Caught in the
Crossfire,” pp. 66–67).
Operation Zalzala 24 January 2008: (Chapter Title: Pakistani Operations against Militants
Book Title: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Book Author(s): Seth G. Jones and C. Christine
Fair, page 56)

Background:

In February 2005, the government of Pakistan signed a peace deal with Baitullah
Mehsud, which came to be known as the “ Sararogha Agreement”. The army had agreed to
evacuate Mehsud’s area and leave only the Frontier Corps to man the five forts there. Mehsud
and his tribesmen were also compensated for human and material loss (Ismail Khan, “Why the
Waziristan Deal Is a Hard Sell,” Dawn (Karachi), October 14, 2006). Eventually however,
tension grew between Mehsud and the security forces. In May 2007, security forces raided
foreign fighter training camps in Zarga Khel. In August the same year, over 200 security forces
were abducted in South Waziristan. Additionally, Pakistani intelligence agencies were
clandestinely supporting Mullah Nazir, a bitter rival of Baitullah Mehsud. Then, in July 2007, as
a result of the Lal Masjid operation (Operation Silence), a series of relentless suicide bombing
campaign was initiated by Mehsud and his allied militants. Moreover, according to US and
Pakistani intelligence reports, Mehsud’s network was also allegedly held responsible for the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 (Joby Warrick, “CIA Places Blame for Bhutto
Assassination,” Washington Post, January 18, 2008, p. A01). The final blow to the peace deal
was the capture of Sararogha fort by militants which resulted in the martyrdom of several
security forces (“Militants Overrun Pakistan Fort,” BBC News, January 17, 2008. Also see
“Pakistani Troops ‘Flee Border Post,’” Al Jazeera, January 17, 2008)

Troops Deployment:

  The operation was led by Pakistan Army's 14th Infantry Division (normally stationed
in Okara and assigned to II Corps) as it was supported by 20th Mountaineering
Brigade. Major-General Tariq Khan, General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 14th
Infantry Division served the Operation's Officer Commanding.

Developments:

 In January 2008, the Pakistan Army began dropping leaflets urging locals in South
Waziristan to vacate the area as the government prepared to launch Operation
Zalzala.
 On 24th of January, in an attempt to capture/kill Mehsud and his network, security
forces attacked the house of Qari Hussain Mehsud who was believed to be leading a
campaign of suicide attacks. His house in Kotkai was destroyed but he himself
 escaped (Taliban Chief Ideologist Survives ‘Zalzala,’” Daily Times (Lahore), May 26,
2008).
 During the operation, the army employed infantry, artillery, tanks, bulldozers, and
fighter jets and used a range of more-sophisticated equipment to try to disrupt
insurgent responses, including electronic jamming devices to thwart improvised
explosive devices ()Taliban Chief Ideologist Survives ‘Zalzala’”; Iqbal Khattak,
“Army in Waziristan Better Equipped, More Relaxed,” Daily Times (Lahore), May
21, 2008).

Operation Sherdil (2008) (Chapter Title: Pakistani Operations against Militants Book Title:
Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Book Author(s): Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, page 56)

 Target: Bajaur Agency

 Background: In March 2007, a senior ISI official along with his two subordinates and
two tribesmen were ambushed and killed in Bajaur Agency (Anwarullah Khan, “ISI
Official, Three Others Killed in Bajaur Ambush,” Dawn (Karachi), March 28, 2007). In
September of the same year, a bus carrying ISI officials was targeted. Furthermore, in
November that year, two back to back attacks targeted the heart of military establishment
at Rawalpindi. One bomber drove a car packed with explosives into a bus carrying up to
90 ISI employees, and a second attacker blew himself up after driving his car into a
checkpoint outside the army headquarters. By early 2008, local militants led by such
individuals as Qari Zia Rahman, had pushed government-supported tribal forces, referred
to as levees, out of their checkpoints at Loe Sam. By June, they had destroyed more than
half of the 72 checkpoints in Bajaur and disrupted the civilian government by conducting
suicide bombings against officials and robbing a major bank. On September 9, 2008,
Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps units launched Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur, not long
after a Pakistani security convoy was ambushed by local militants in Loe Sam. (Mukhtar
A. Khan, “A Profile of Militant Groups in Bajaur Tribal Agency,” Terrorism Monitor,
Vol. 7, No. 6, March 19, 2009, p. 1)
 Deployments: Pakistan employed a brigade headquarters, four infantry battalions, one
squadron, the headquarters of the Bajaur Scouts, and seven Frontier Corps wings.
 Commanders: Under the control of XI Corps Commander General Hussain, assisted by
FC commander General Khan.
Troop movements:

 Ground forces moved southwest from Torghundai through such towns as Alizai,
Khar, Loe Sam, and Nawagai, since Pakistani intelligence assessments indicated
that several of these villages, including Loe Sam, had become major hubs of
militant activities.
 Developments:
 In the village of Loe Sam, Pakistani forces discovered an extensive
tunnel system and razed virtually every house connected to a
tunnel.
 By early December 2008, over 1,000 militants and 63 security
officials had been killed.
 Pakistani forces were successful in clearing a range of key villages
and arteries in Bajaur, especially along the main north-south
corridor. They found tunnel complexes used for hiding people and
storing materials, such as weapons, ammunition, radio frequency
 lists, guerrilla warfare manuals, propaganda, and bomb-making
instructions. (Anthony Lloyd, “Captured Battle Plan Shows
Strength and Training of Taleban Forces,” The Times (London),
November 11, 2008.)
 To facilitate army and Frontier Corps efforts, Pakistani
commanders sought the aid of local tribes to help secure major
roads, some of whom created lashkars (local defense forces). In
addition, on November 4 and 5, Pakistani authorities dropped
leaflets in some areas of Mohmand Agency calling for people to
follow the example of tribes in Bajaur, Darra Adam Khel, and
Orakzai, and to raise lashkars against militants.
 The Salarzai tribe was one of the first to raise a lashkar against
militants, as was the Utmankhel tribe. But the Salarzai suffered a
serious blow on November 6, when a tribal jirga in the area was
attacked and more than 20 people were killed, including several of
the tribe’s senior leaders. Four Charmang tribal elders were
beheaded by militants while returning home from a tribal jirga.

Operation Rah e Haq (First phase: November 2007, Second phase: July 2008, Third phase:
January 2009): (Chapter Title: Pakistani Operations against Militants Book Title:
Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Book Author(s): Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, page 56)

 Targetted region: Swat, KPK

 Background: the TNSM ( Tehrik e Nifaaz e Sharyat Muhammadi), a militant group led
by Sufi Mohammad, had been steadily building military and political power in Swat,
under the banner of Mullah Fazlullah.
 First phase deployments: Local police led cordonand-search operations to clear militants
operating in the valley.
 However, TNSM troops gradually reinfiltrated key cities. TNSM
militants controlled several key areas around Mingora and, in July,
surrounded a security post and abducted 29 police and paramilitary
forces.
 Second phase deployments: Two division headquarters, five brigades, 17 infantry
battalions, five artillery regiments, and aviation assets (including Mi-17s, Bell 412s, and
Cobra helicopters).