JOSE MARIA COLLEGE

Philippine Japan Friendship Highway, Sasa, Davao City

COLLEGE OF LAW

TITLE THREE: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

CHAPTER 4:
1. People v. Sion, G.R. No. 1069617, - Codilla, John
August 11, 1997 Rey
2. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, - Comania, Eryel
July 8, 2010
3. U.S. vs. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, - Coquilla, Paolo
February 1, 1918
4. U.S. vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 13083, - Corbit, Rea Lyza
December 11, 1917
5. People v. Lapitan, G.R. No. 38226, - Cruz, Dorothy
November 17, 1933
6. U.S. vs. Cox, G.R. No. 1406, - Doong, Jimmy
January 6, 1904 Jill
7. U.S. vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649, - Dura, Vanessa
September 6, 1910 Gayle
8. U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R. No. 13658, - Esperat,
November 9, 1918 Renehjane
9. Sarcepuedes vs. People, G.R. No. - Fajardo, Rosalie
L-3857, October 22, 1951 Mae
10. People vs. Renegado, G.R. No. L- - Forro, Danilo Jr.
27031, May 31, 1974
11. People v. Beltran, 138 SCRA 534 - Gosingco, Carlo
12. People v. Dollantes, 151 SCRA - Ladera, Kenneth
592 Claire
13. Rivera v. People, G.R. No. - Lemente, Kia
138553, June 30, 2005 Mae
14. People v. Abalos, July 1996 - Lim, Jasper Jay
15. People v. Acierto, 57 Phil. 614 - Payot, Keely
 Shaye

CHAPTER 6:
16. Curiano v. CFI, G.R. No. L-8104, - Plana,
April 15, 1955 GilveeChardyl
17. Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. - Suaybaguio,
No. 139033, December 18, 2002 Mervin Jay
18. Tanega v. Masakayan, 19 SCRA - Tambuang,
564 Remlane CA II
19. People v. Abilong, 82 Phil 172 - Tanzo, Neresa
20. Torres v. Gonzalez, 152 SCRA 272 Trajano, Jovelyn
21. Evangelista v. People, G.R. No. - Verana-Quibo,
163267, May 5, 2010 Cherry Ann
22. People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742 - Villanueva,
Rosalyn
23. People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 638 - Ancheta, Kevin
Heintzie
24. Valeroso v. People, 546 SCRA -Andamen, Al
450, February 22, 2008 Yasser
25. People v. Avecilla, 351 SCRA 462 Apil, Edzrapil
26. People v. Ladjaalam, 340 SCRA Balbuena, John
617 (2000) Dondi
27. Sison v. People, 666 SCRA -Barrios, Marvien
645(2012)
28. Celino v. C.A., June 29, 2007 Clarion, Manny
Carl
29. Agote v. Judge Lorenzo, July 22, Dagondon, Alyssa
2005 Atrovel
30. Artillero v. Casimiro, 671 SCRA -Duhaylo, Arjay
357

1. John Rey Codilla

People v. Sion|GR No. 109617; Aug. 11, 1997|Davide, Jr.,
J.
by: Codilla, John Rey

Facts:
About evening of Oct. 16, 1991 at Pangasinan, the accused
armed with stones and a bladed weapon willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked and stabbed Fernando Abaoag, inflicting
the victim stabbed wounds which caused his instant death. The
following day, accused Sion presented himself to Kgwd. Lagman
who brought him to the Police Station. In its decision, the
Dagupan RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of murder under Art. 248 of RPC and did not
appreciate the benefit of voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance. The accused appealed before the SC on the
penalty imposed and prayed for the benefit of voluntary
surrender as mitigating circumstance. The appellees disagreed
because Sion surrendered to a mere “Brgy. Kagawad” who is
not a police authority implying that the former is not a person in
authority.

Issue:
Whether or not the Brgy. Kagawad to whom the accused
surrendered is a person in authority.

Ruling:
Yes, Brgy. Kagawad or Sangguniang Barangay member is
considered a person in authority.

Sec. 388 of the 1991 Local Gov’t Code provides that “for
purposes of RPC, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay
members, and members of the lupontagapamayapa… shall be
deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions…” This law
expands the definition of person in authority under Article 152
of RPC.

Therefore, the SC provided the accused the benefit of mitigating

circumstance of voluntary surrender.

2. Eryel Comania
Lydia Gelig vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner Lydia, a public school teacher, assaulted her fellow
teacher Gemma Micarsos while on duty, for calling her son
“sissy”. She slapped and pushed her that caused the latter to
fall and hit the wall divider from which she suffered a contusion.
Gemma also claimed that she bled two days after the incident
which led to an incomplete abortion of her baby which was
found out 42 days after.
The RTC convicted Lydia for a complex crime of direct assault
with unintentional abortion. On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC
ruling and found the herein petitioner guilty of slight physical
injury for the reason that Gemma descended into being a
private citizen and not as person in authority the time that she
engaged with a fight with the petitioner. Unsatisfied, Lydia
impugns the CA ruling before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gemma is considered a person in
authority.

HELD:
Yes, Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class
of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of the Revised
Penal Code, teachers, xxx in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such performance,
shall be deemed persons in authority (as amended by B.P. Blg.
873). On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was
engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is, she
was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after
the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom
to which she was assigned.
Lydia was found guilty of direct assault.

3. Paolo Coquilla
PAOLO B. COQUILLA – JD 1.5 A
CRIMINAL LAW 2
ATTY CAMILLE REMORCOZA

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GELASIOTABIANA and JULIAN CANILLAS,
accused, accused appellant.

G.R. No. L-11847 February 1, 1918

Ponente: STREET, J.:

GelasoTabiana, respondent was given warrant of arrest by

EmillianoCallado and Baltazar Cabilitasan, the defendant told
the latter that he will come in later at municipal building. As
later comes, there was no tabiana seen in the municipal building
so the chief police commanded callado to see tabiana, then as
tabiana is with his friends, the respondent told the police to
show warrant. The latter showed the warrant then the
respondent took the warrant and push the policeman and his
friends.

On the third time, Callado and Leon Cajilig, a policeman was

commanded to return the warrant from defendant and tabiana
should come along. So as the former arrived at the tienda, one
of the defendant’s friends said that if the policeman didn’t have
warrant, he shall be subject for beating. Then the defendant
approached Callado as he hit his breast with his hands with the
policeman grab his wrist, Tabiana resisted with the aid of his
friends hit the back of Callado.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of Direct Assault

HELD

Yes, guilty of resistance and employment of force as the

respondent is subject for arrest. Practically speaking, resistance
from arrest is impossible without the employment of force. An
individual can elude arrest, avoid or evade arrest from an officer
but cannot resist without using such force. The mere fist blow
done by the defendant is a primary indication of being hostile to
the society of the former as he was taken custody by a person
in authority

The defendant also characterized the spirit of aggression

against the authorities or their agents with such employment of
force shall be considered as grave resistance because the
defendant employed such force to resist arrest from a person in
authority.
4. Rea Lyza Corbit
U.S. vs. Cipriano Agustin
G.R. No. 13083
11 December 1917
Rea LyzaCorbit

Facts: Undetermined

Supreme Court case U.S. vs. Gumban (G.R. No. 13658, 09

November 1918) citing the ruling of this case states that it was
not published.

Ruling:

The distinction between an assault and a resistance to

agents of authority lies largely in the amount of the force
employed in each case. A sudden blow given to a policeman
while engaged in effecting an arrest does not constitute assault.

The essential element in assault upon agents of authority

is the force employed. Hence, it is necessary to consider the
circumstances of each case to decide whether the force used
constitutes as such.

5. Dorothy Grace Cruz

Cruz, Dorothy Grace
Direct v Simple Assault
Chapter 4

PEOPLE v LAPITAN
G.R. No. 38226
November 17, 1933
FACTS
 Appellants Luis Lapitan, GuadencioLapitan, and
DalmacioLapitan were charged in the Court of First
Instance with the crime of assault upon an agent of person
in authority.
 On January 29, 1932, Luis and Gaudencio Lapitan who had
a shotgun and bolo, together with DalmacioLapitan
conspiring and aiding one another, criminally attack,
assault, and hit Juan Sambrano, who was then an agent of
authority being a municipal police engaged in the
performance of his official duty when he was acting as
deputy sheriff and was in custody of 52 cavans of palay
placed under his control.
 Sambrano testified that the acting chief of police sent him
to watch the palay when the defendants arrived with carts
and with the intention of taking away the palay. Sambrano
maintained that they had no right to do so without an
order from the court. In the altercation that followed
Dalmacio struck him with his fist, and Luis threatened him
with a gun. The defendants pushed the policeman away
and removed the palay.

ISSUE
Whether or not the offended party, a member of the police force
was lawfully discharging his official duties when he was
assaulted.

HELD
 Under the facts stated in the opinion of the court it was
held that the offended party, a member of the police force
was lawfully discharging the official duties of a deputy
sheriff ex oficio when he was assaulted by the appellants.
  The Solicitor-General maintains that the acts of the
appellants constitute a violation of Art. 148 (Direct
assaults) of the RPC but The Court opined that appellants’
acts do not require the imposition of the severer penalty as
the Solicitor-General had pointed out.
 The Court affirmed the decision appealed from of being
guilty of a violation of Art. 151 (Resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such
person).

6. Jimmy Jill Doong

Name: Jimmy Jill E. Doong

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant, vs.

ROSCOE C. COX, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. 1406 January 6, 1904
Ponente: Torres. J.

Facts:

On May 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed an

information in the Court of First Instance of that province
charging Roscoe C. Cox with the crime of assaulting an officer of
the law. The information alleged that at 9 o'clock on the night of
Tuesday, the 10th of February last, while on duty in General
Hughes Street in the city of Iloilo, the policeman Damaso
Gonzales was approached by three American soldiers. The
accused, who was one of the trio, asked Gonzalez if he wished
to fight, and immediately after, without giving the latter time to
reply, seized him by the throat.Having succeeded, with the aid
of the other two soldiers, in overcoming the policeman, the
accused possessed himself of the club which Gonzalez carried,
and with it struck the latter several blows, causing the wounds
described in the medical statement exhibited. Gonzalez
thereupon shouted for help. Two citizens ran to his aid, at sight
of whom the accused and his two companions took to fight.
 Gonzalez M. Saul, E. J. Saul, the policeman Damaso
Gonzalez, and the police sergeant Pedro Carpio, witnesses for
the prosecution, testified that on the night and in the street
referred to the policeman Gonzalez, who was on patrol duty,
encountered three American soldiers.The policeman who
responded to the calls of Gonzalez was the sergeant Pedro
Carpio, and that he assisted Gonzalez in the struggle resulting
from the effort to arrest the defendant when he attempted to
escape. Captain Ferry and Sergeant Cerera apparently arrived
on the scene as the three men fell to the ground.
The accused pleaded not guilty, but presented no evidence
on his own behalf. The judge below, in view of the fact that the
defendant's attorney admitted the identification of the accused
by the witness C. R. Maun, and the truth of the doctor's
statement that the contusions sustained by Gonzalez were
seven to ten days in healing, rendered judgment on the 8th of
June declaring the defendant guilty of breach of the peace and
condemned him to the payment of a fine of 125 pesetas and
costs. From this decision the prosecution appealed.

Issue

Whether or not Roscoe Cox is guilty of assault.

Held

Yes. The fact fully proven by the evidence in the case that
the defendant, Roscoe C. Cox, without previous provocation or
other justifiable motive, assaulted the policeman Damaso
Gonzalez, who was at the time discharging his duties as such
officer, inflicting upon him injuries more or less serious. The
defendant should therefore be condemned, as author by direct
participation of the crime of assaulting a police officer, to the
penalty of prisioncorreccionalin its minimum and medium
grades, together with the fine provided in the last paragraph of
article 250 of the Penal Code, there having been present in the
commission of the crime none of the four circumstances
mentioned in article 250 above cited. Since the accused was
intoxicated at the time of the commission of the offense, the
sixth mitigating circumstance mentioned in article 9 of the Penal
Code should be considered present. There are no aggravating
circumstances to offset the effects of this mitigating
circumstance, and the penalty should accordingly be fixed in its
minimum grade.

7. Vanessa Gayle Dura

US v. ISAAC SAMONTE
GR No. 5649, Sep 06, 1910
Ponente: TRENT, J.

Facts: Isaac Samonte was charged with criminal attempt

against an agent of the authorities in the Province of Tayabas,
and appealed to the Supreme Court.
At about 8 o'clock on the night of September 6, 1908,
Samonte and Basilio Rabe were together in the house of Barrio
Councilman Demetrio Pandenio and met in the streets
afterwards, where they quarreled. At this moment Rabe called
"police! police!" Gregorio Glindo, a municipal policeman of
Pitogo, being on patrol duty that night in said barrio, hearing
these words went to the scene, arriving just as the offended
party was getting up, and attempted to arrest Samonte, saying
to him: "In the name of the United States, don't move."
Samonte on seeing the policeman and hearing this command,
said: "Don't come near, because I will take your life." As the
policeman was approaching him, Samonte struck him with a
knife but was not hit. On account of this resistance the
policeman could not arrest the Samonte at that time, so he
went immediately to the house of the councilman of that barrio,
Demetrio Pandenio, and reported the matter. Together with and
upon Pandenio's order, the policeman again attempted to arrest
Samonte, but Samonte struck them both with a knife. Samonte
was not arrested on that night on account of this resistance.
He did not lay hands on or touch with his knife either the
policeman or the councilman, but he did refuse to submit
himself to the authorities, and resisted arrest.
Issue: WON the appellant action showed a criminal attempt
against the authorities.

Ruling: Yes. The accused in this case, after an attempt had been
made to arrest him by a duly authorized police officer in the
discharge of his duty as such, offered grave resistance by
refusing to submit himself to arrest and by striking at the
policeman with a knife, thereby attempting personal injury.
Although the policeman was not wounded or touched by the
accused, these facts do not relieve him from criminal
responsibility. The penalty imposed by the court below being in
accordance with the law and the proofs presented, the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs against Isaac Samonte.

8. Renehjane Esperat
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOMEDESGUMBAN, defendant-appellant

[G.R. No. 13658. November 9, 1918.]

Facts:
That on August 13, 1917, in the barrio of Pavia, Jaro Iloilo, the
President of the Municipality, PetroniloGumban received a report
from Gregorio Ismana himself that he had brought the carabao
in the police station in Pavia which is within the quarantine
zone. The brothers Epifanio and NicomedesGumban, went to the
police station and protested there to which they were
confronted by the President himself that what Gregorio Ismana
did was correct and he said that he’d phone the man in-charge
if the carabao COULD NOT be withdrawn from the quarantine
zone. By this statement, Nicomedes just lost it. He insulted the
President and slapped him on the face which struck him by the
left ear.
Lower court decided that NicomedesGumban is guilty of the
crime of assault upon agent of authority and sentenced him 3
years, 4 months and 8 days prisioncorreccional and to pay a
fine of 600 with a corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
From this decision, the defendant file this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in applying Articles 249
(Paragraph 2) and 250 (Paragraph 3) of the Penal Code of the
Philippines.

Held:
No. Article 249 Paragraph 2 says: The offense of assault
(atentado) is committed by… (2) Any person who shall attack,
employ force against, or seriously resist or intimidate, any
person in authority, or the agents of such person, while
engaged in the performance of his official duties, or by reason
of such performance. Article 250 Paragraph 3 says: The penalty
for assaults falling within the next preceding article shall be . . .
when the offense is committed under any of the following
circumstances… (3) When the offenders lay hands upon any
person in authority.
However, the lower court specifically sentenced the accused
with committing the crime of assault to agents of authority
when in fact it should be the person in authority. The
distinction between these two lies within the amount of force.
With this case, it is directed to the person in authority and not
by merely any resistance against the agents of authority and
also the law specifically provides that any offenders lay hands
upon any person in authority shall be held liable. And based on
facts stated, Nicomendes laid a hand to Petronilo and that is a
crime of assault regardless of the force applied.
So the court ruled that the defendant is guilty of the crime of
assault upon the person in authority in accordance with Article
249, paragraph 2, in connection with Article 260, paragraph 3 of
the Penal Code, and, modifying the judgment appealed from,
we hereby sentence the accused to the penalty of 4 years, 2
months, and 1 day of prisioncorreccional, to pay a fine of 625
pesetas, or to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
There was a pardon granted given the situation and the amount
of malice and damaged caused. The sentenced was reduced by
10 months.

Dissenting Opinion: Malcolm, J.

The dissent simply means that the crime committed should be
given less penalty; that there should be an extended ground to
somehow consider the situation and above all these, the dissent
was basing on the Jurisprudence on a case of United States vs.
Tabiana and Canillas ([1918], 37 Phil. Rep., 515), that in view
of the entirely unjustifiable penalties to protect the monarchial
officials, the principle should be broadened so as to
accommodate reasonable contingency.

9. Rosalie Mae Fajardo

Hilarion Sarcepuedes v. The People of the Philippines.
GR. No L-3857. October 22, 1951.

Ponente:Bengzon. J.
By: Rosalie Mae R. Fajardo
Facts: Hilarion Sarcepuedes hit Lucrecia L. Bustamante, a
teacher-nurse, twice on the face with his raincoat and violently
pushed her to the window in the school building which
Bustamante worked. The assault took place because
Bustamante ordered the closing of a pathway which
Sarcepuedes and his wife used to pass in going to and from the
school. The closing of which has angered the petitioner. Hence,
confrontation and criminal employment of force took place.

Contention of the Petitioner: He may not be punished under

Article 148 because the attack was not "on occasion" of
Lucrecia's performance of her official work.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed direct assault.

Ruling: Yes,the petitioner committed direct assault.

At the time of the ill-treatment, Lucrecia L. Bustamante

was about to pierce an earring hole on the ear-lobe of a school
child. Such work was included in her mission of giving treatment
to the school pupils.

Hence, the court ruled that Lucrecia L. Bustamante was

hurt while performing her ordinary Government tasks, the
motive for the aggression then becomes immaterial. She was
pounced (attacked) upon "while engaged in the performance" of
her official duties, within the meaning of Article 148.

10. Danilo Forro Jr.

PEOPLE v. RENEGADO
May 31, 1974 (G.R. No. L-27031)
Facts:
On August 29, 1966, at about 9:30am in Calbayog City, and
within the premises of the TiburcioTancinco Vocational School,
Loreto Renegado armed with a sharp-double bladed weapon,
decided intent to kill with assault upon a person in authority
named Mamerto de Lira, the deceased being at the time a public
school teacher of the Tiburcio Vocational School and therefore a
person in authority, and at the time was in the lawful
performance of his duties as such or on the occasion of such
performance and, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with his weapon Mamerto de Lira, who, as a
result thereof, sustained stab wound on his abdomen which
caused his death.
Issue:
WON Loreto Renegado is guilty of Direct Assault?
Held:
Loreto Renegado is convicted for murder with assault on a
person in authority. A teacher either of a public or of a duly
recognized private school is a person in authority under Art. 152
of the Revised Penal Code. It is clear that Mamerto de Lira was
at the time of his death a teacher of the Tiburcio Memorial
Vocational School run by the national government, he was not
stabbed while in the performance of his duties nor on the
occasion of such performance. The motive of the assault is
determined that assault falls under Art. 148 of the Revised
Penal Code. It, conclude that the impelling motive for the attack
on Mamerto de Lira was the performance by the latter of his
duties as a teacher.

11. Carlo Gosingco

People v. Beltran, 138 SCRA 534
FACTS: Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were
indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct
assault evidence shows that in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto
Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by
the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them, "Oki
niinayo" (Vulva of your mother).
They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After
Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of
Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that
something should be done about it. When they came near the
compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there was a
simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente,
and Mayor also suffered injuries.
Issue: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct
assault.
Held: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in
authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the
time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official
duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the
finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the
double attempted murder with direct assault, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the
aforesaid appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum.
Premeditation is present where there was a lapse of two hours
from the inception to execution.
The existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery was
shown in the simultaneous and sudden firing by the accused on
the newly arrived Mayor's group, without warning. We are
convinced that they employed means, methods or forms which
could have tended directly or insured the accomplishment of
their evil design against the Mayor, with whom they have no
personal grudge, without risk to themselves arising from the
defense which the offended party had made. No one from
herein appellants sustained a scratch as they were really
prepared for the coming Mayor.
With respect to the fourth assigned error, the claim of Delfino
Beltran that he had just acted in self-defense, suffice it to say,
that the one invoking this justifying circumstance must prove
beyond reasonable doubt that all the necessary requisites of
self-defense are present, namely: (1) Unlawful aggression on
the part of the offended party; (2) Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3) Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Delfino Beltran had not proved any one of these. Thus,
his claim of self-defense was properly dismissed by the trial
court.
Regarding the fifth assigned error, considering that Mayor
Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is
a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were
performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in
the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are
guilty of attempted murder with direct assault on the persons of
Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Tolentino is correct. Relative to the
last assigned error, following Our latest ruling in People vs.
Nicolas Canamo, et al., G.R. No. 62043, promulgated on August
13, 1985, We agree with appellants that they should be credited
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as they
in fact presented themselves voluntarily to the authorities.
However, this mitigating circumstance is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation

12. Ladera, Kenneth Claire

 People vs Dollantes

Facts: Due to the approaching fiesta of Brgy. Maglihe, Tayasan,

Negros Oriental, a dance was RULING on the evening of April
21, 1983. While Brgy. Captain Marcos Gabutero was delivering a
speech to start the dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to
the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement
known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife
and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the
people present. The Brgy. Captain approached Pedro Dollantes
and admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance.
However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the
Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm.
Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed
towards the Brgy. Captain, stabbed him at the back and the
other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Brgy. Captain,
who, at that time, was not armed. When the Brgy. Captain fell
to the ground and died, the accused in this case took turns in
kicking his dead body and were dancing around said dead body.
He suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his
body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead
body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who
examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of "Severe
hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds."

The accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Alfredo

Dollantes, LauroDollantes, MonicoDollantes, SidritoLokesia,
MerlandoDollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and
LeoniloVillaester, guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a
person in authority resulting in murder.

Issue: Is the finding of the accused guilty of the crime charged

correct?
Ruling: YES.

The records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of
trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the
dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was therefore
killed while in the performance of his duties.

In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled
that "As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the
laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement
thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter
treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with
assault upon a person in authority."

13. Kia Mae Lemente

Enrique "Totoy" Rivera vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 138553
June 30, 2005

FACTS:

Lt. Leygo is a policeman wearing a police uniform and was

on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first
came upon the truck unloading chicken manure. Because the
unloading of chicken dung was a violation of a municipal
ordinance, he ordered the truck driver to return from where he
came but Rivera, in defiance of such lawful order, commanded
the truck driver to return to the place where the truck was first
intercepted, and on being informed that the same truck had
returned, the policeman had every reason to assume it did
return for the purpose of unloading its cargo chicken dung, and
stopped it from doing so. The police officer tried to arrest Rivera
for violation of the chicken dung ordinance but Rivera punched
Lt. Leygo on his face.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the attack on Lt. Leygo constitutes direct
assault.

RULING:

Yes, there was a direct assault.

Art. 148 provides thatdirect assault may be committed by

any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.

Rivera, in this case, attacked, employed force, and resisted

Lt. Leygo, who is a person in authority engaged in the
performance of his official duty, by punching the latter in his
face.

14. Jasper Jay Lim

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS TIBURCIOABALOS
G. R. NO. 88189, JULY 9, 1996
FACTS:
The Incident transpired during the barangay fiesta near the
house of appellant at the said barangay. On that night while
accused TiburcioAbalos and his father, Police Major
CecilioAbalos, were having heated argument a woman shouted
for help. The victim Police Officer SofronioLabine then appeared
at the scene and asks Major Abalos about what happen. The
victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him.
As Major Abalos leveled his carbine arLabine, accused harriedly
left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three
inches wide, and three feet long from a nearby ford Fiera
Vehicle. He then swiftlt returned and unceremoniously swung
with that wooded piece at Labine from behind, hitting the
policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine
collapsed unconciously in a heap and he later expired from the
severe skull fracture he sustained from the blow. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct
assault with murder.
HELD:
No.There are two modes of committing atendados contra la
autoridad o sus agentes under art. 148 of the RPC. The first is
not true atendado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition,
except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the
second mode is the more common way of committing assault
and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the
attack or the offender is a public officer , or the offender lays
hand upon a person in authority.
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the
elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of
force, or serious intimadation or resistance upon a person in
authority or his Agent., that is, that the accused has the
attention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.
Labine is a Police officer in Catbalogan Samar, an thus was
an agent of a person in authority pursuant to article 152 of the
RPC. There is no dispute that he was in the actual performance
of his duties when he was assaulted by the appellant that is he
was maintaining the peace and order during the fiesta in
Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant Himself testified that he
personally knew that Labine as a policeman, and in Fact Labine
was then wearing his police uniform. These facts should have
sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his
defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the
criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the Law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a
person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex
crime of direct assault with homicide or murder. The killing in
the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by
alevosiathrought treacherous means deliberately adopted by the
vistim struck from behind while he was confronted at the same
time by appellant’s father. The evidence shows that appellant
deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a
piece of wood which he deliberately got for the purpose.

15. Keely Shaye Payot

People of the Philippine Islands vs. Leon Acierto
57 Phil 614. November 28, 1932.

Keely Shaye L. Payot

FACTS:

On March 2, 1931, the offended party, Hipolito Velasco was the

duly appointed postmaster of the Municipality of Bacarra. The
accused-appellant, Leon Acierto, entered to the Velasco’s office
and disturbed him while in the performance of his duty by
taking the roll of money Velasco had been counting. Having
been provoked by the accused, Velasco approached Acierto and
took hold of his left hand to conduct the latter outside. It
degenerated into a real fight when the Acierto hit Velasco in the
right eye, right frontal region, and below the left eye. As a
result, the blows Velasco sustained, he suffered an ecchymosis
in the orbit of the left eye, and another in the frontal region,
which took seven days to heal completely.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Acierto is guilty of the crime of assault upon a

public officer, defined and punished under Art 251 of the Old
Penal Code and in relation to Art. 148 of the RPC?

HELD:

Yes, he is guilty of the crime of assault. Defined and punished in

article 251, in connection with the last paragraph of article 250,
of the old Penal Code. The act constitutes two crimes: assault
upon an agent of authority, defined in article 249, paragraph 2,
and punished in the last paragraph of article 250 of the Penal
Code; and slight physical injuries, defined and punished in
article 587 of the same code.

Under Art. 148 of the RPC, one of the two ways of committing
the crime of direct assaults is, “without public uprising, by
attacking, by employing force, or by seriously intimidating, or
seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of financial duties, or on the
occasion of such performance.”

Hipolito Velasco was an agent of a person in authority, the

postmaster of a municipality, an agent of the Director of Posts,
and in charge of the custody of the Government funds. When he
was attacked, Ancierto herein having laid hands upon him.
Therefore, Ancierto is guilty of the crime of assault upon an
agent of a person in authority.

16. Gilvee Chardyl Plana

Plana, GilveeChardyl M
BL1-5A
Criminal Law II

CASE DIGEST
Curiano vs Court of First Instance
G.R. No. L-8104, April 15, 1955.

Article 157. Evasion of service of sentence

FACTS:

1. PaulinoCuriano was convicted of robbery by the Court of

First Instance of Albay. Petitioner appealed however,
during the pendency of his appeal, he escaped and his
appeal was later on dismissed. He was prosecuted for
evasion of service of sentence and was serving the
corresponding penalty.

2. While petitioner is serving his sentence on the case of

robbery, he escaped again from his place of confinement
and prosecuted again of evasion of service of sentence and
pleaded guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Curiano is liable for Art. 157 Evasion of Service

of sentence when he escape during the pendency of his appeal.

RULING:

No. Curiano is not liable for Article 157. The Solicitor General
agrees with the claim of petitioner that the sentenced imposed
for the first alleged evasion is null and void for the reason that
when he escaped, the decision of the trial court in the robbery
case has not yet become final. If the accused escaped during
the pendency of an appeal and not having become final, he is
not liable for Art.157. This is true even if his appeal was later
dismissed because he had escaped.

Therefore, Curiano is not liable for Article 157 Evasion of service

of sentence during the pendency of his appeal.

17. Mervin Jay Suaybaguio

DEL CASTILLO v TORRECAMPO (394 SCRA 221)
G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002

Facts:
In the evening of the Barangay Election on May 17, 1982
in Barangay Ombao, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines
Sur, the accused unlawfully conducted himself in a disorderly
manner by striking the electric bulb and two kerosene petromax
lamps lighting the room where voting center No. 24 is located
during the counting of the votes plunging the room in complete
darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of
the Board of Election Tellers.
10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violating
the Election Code (whereby he was never apprehended and
remained at large), he filed before the trial court a motion to
quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of
prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. He based his
claims on Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.
However, the Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the said
provision, engaged in judicial legislation when it added the
phrase "by escaping during the term of the sentence" thereto,
so petitioner claims.

Issue:Whether or not the penalty of the crime committed by

Torrecampo already prescribed.

Held: No. The elements in order that the penalty imposed has
prescribed are as follows:
 1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given
himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign
country with which we have no extradition treaty or
committed another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of
time form the date of the evasion of the service of the
sentence by the convict.
It is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed
because the circumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy
the second element, to wit 'That the convict evaded the service
of the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence.'
As a matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute
of his sentence.

18. Remlane CA Tambuang II

ADELAIDATANEGA, petitioner, vs. HON. HONORATO B.
MASAKAYAN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch V, and the Chief of Police of
Quezon City, respondents.
SANCHEZ, J:
Facts: Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City,
petitioner appealed. Found guilty once again by the Court of First
Instance.
Back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, said court, on
January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set
for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was
deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day
and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the
respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for
her arrest, and on March 23, 1965, an alias warrant of arrest.
Petitioner was never arrested.
Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23,
1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that the
penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected
the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the
issuance of another alias warrant of arrest.
Issue: Whether or not the penalty has been prescribed?
Ruling: No, because according to Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code states that one can escape only after he has started service
of sentence. Even under the old law, the court told that Viada
emphasizes, where the penalty consists of imprisonment,
prescription shall only begin to run when he escapes from
confinement.
In this case, the court, ruled that for prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the
culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who —
sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment — was thereafter
never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does
not run in her favor. For the reasons given, the Court resolved to
dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

19. Neresa Tanzo

PEOPLE vs. ABILONG, 82 PHIL 172
FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, Florentino Abilong, the accused, being then a
convict, sentenced and ordered to serve destierro during which
he should not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers
from the City of Manila for attempted robbery, evaded the service
of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him
and commit vagrancy.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the
accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does
not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
RULING:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text
is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase
"sufriendoprivacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is
equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits
destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of
liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case,
Abilong by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to
enter the City of Manila. Under the case of People vs. Samonte,
as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that
a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of
his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when
he enters the prohibited area."
Hence, appellant Abilong is guilty of evasion of service of
Sentence under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish
text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierroby
virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering
the City of Manila, he entered said City.

20. Jovelyn Trajano

JOVELYN M. TRAJANO

TORRES VS. GONZALEZ

 152 SCRA 272

FACTS: 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was

was granted conditional pardon by the president on condition that
he "would not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines". He accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement. In 1982, he was
charged with 20 counts of estafa (pending trial) while in 1985, he
was convicted of sedition (pending appeal). In 1986, Justice
Secretary Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’
pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres thus filed a petition for
habeas corpus before the SC questioning the validity of the arrest
order. He claimed that he did not violate his conditional pardon
since he has not been convicted by final judgment of 20 counts of
estafa nor of the crime of sedition.

ISSUE: Is conviction by final judgment necessary before a

person may be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of
the terms of his condition pardon?

HELD:

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of

a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be
either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it
may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of
violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt
of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor
by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct,
substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be
made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been

conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty
of prison correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
"having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive,
shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is
an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.

21. Cherry Ann Verana-Quibo

Cherry Ann M. Verana-Quibo
BL1.5A

EVANGELISTA V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 163267

FACTS: On January 31, 1996, Teofilo Evangelista was charged

with violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions) after having seized from the
petitioner’s possession unlicensed firearms and ammunitions
while on his way to his flight from Dubai to Manila. Petitioner
claims that his alleged possession of the subject firearms
transpired while he was at the Dubai Airport and his possession
thereof has ceased when he left for the Philippines. Hence, he
could not have committed the crime imputed against him for he
was never in custody and possession of any firearm or
ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over the

case

HELD: Yes. The Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the

case. In order for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

The Customs Declaration Form of the petitioner is evidence

that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the
Philippines. It was also ascertained that he has no license or
authority to possess said firearms.

Since it was shown that petitioner was already in the

Philippines when he was found in possession of the subject
firearms and determined to be without any authority to possess
them, an essential ingredient of the offense, it is beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated and completed
in no other place except the Philippines.

22. Rosalyn Villanueva

VILLANUEVA, ROSALYN D.

PEOPLE VS. MOLINA

G.R NO. 133917, FEBRUARY 19, 2001

FACTS:
A shooting incident happened in San Antonio, Municipality of
Illigan, reportedly between two political factions, resulting the
death of the town Mayor, Sangguniang Bayan member and two
others; and wounding of at least six other persons after a heated
conversation at a funeral wake. The accused Barangay Captain
Verato Molina had a possession of M-14 armalite rifle together
with his 8 men loaded with corresponding ammunitions, without
the necessary license to possess and carry the said firearms and
ammunitions outside their residence issued by the corresponding
government authorities, and which they used in the shooting and
killing of Mayor Bonifacio Uy, Counselor Manaligod, Vargas,
Estrada and serious wounding of Mariano, Figarola, Dela Cruz,
Anciert.
The trial court concluded that the crime committed was multiple
murder and frustrated murder qualified by treachery, abuse of
superior strength and used of armed men. The lower court also
found accused-appellants guilty of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition. Thereupon the conviction by the trial court,
Molina filed Notice of Appeal on several assignment of errors
upon the trial court, two og which are on Multiple Murder and
Multiple Frustrated Murder cases and on illegal possession of
firearms case.
ISSUE:
WON the accused are guilty beyong reasonable doubt in both
cases.
HELD:
NO, the appellant may be held liable only for murder with special
aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed firearms. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellants
for murder of the late Mayor Uy, The Court applies in their favor
R.A 8294, which amended PD No. 1866. Under the new law, the
used of unlicensed weapon in the commission of homicide or
murder is considered simply as an aggravating circumstance and
no longer a separate offense.
23. Kevin Heintzie Ancheta
Kevin Ancheta
G.R. No. 128618. November 16, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
FELICISIMONARVASA, JIMMY ORANIA and MATEO NARVASA,
accused, FELICISIMONARVASA and JIMMY ORANIA appellants
Facts :
On February 6, 1992, Villamor Laderas and Ernesto Nagal,
councilmen of Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan, acting on a
report that there were missing carabaos, pigs and goats, Then
Laderas and Nagal patrolled the area. Along their way, the two
chanced upon the group of FelicimoNarvasa, They were five and
three of them were armed. Jimmy Orania was holding a caliber
.30 U.S. carbine, Mateo Narvasa was armed with an M-16 and
FelicisimoNarvasa was carrying an M-14. On their way home,the
two councilmen met the two policemen, SPO3 Primo Camba and
PO2 Simeon Navora who were on patrol and they reported what
they saw. After walking some distance going to the house of
Narvasa, Gun Fire erupted thereby killing SPO3Camba. The Lower
Court,ruled that appellants may still be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms it held that the homicide was merely an
element of the illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated
form; thus, homicide in the present case was taken into account
not as a separate crime but as an aggravating circumstance
which increased the penalty for the illegal possession of firearms.
Finally, applying People v. Barros to the proven facts, the trial
court imposed upon appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue :
Whether, Narvasa and his Co accused should be convicted only of
homicide, with the special aggravating circumstance of the use of
illegally possessed firearms.

Ruling :
YES, In People v. Molina, the Court en banc explained that RA
8294 considers the use of an unlicensed firearm only an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, Under our
ruling in People vs. Quijada, violation of PD 1866 is an offense
distinct from murder; appellants should perforce be culpable for
two separate offenses, as ruled by the trial court.
Fortunately for appellants, RA 8294 has now amended the said
decree and considers the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as
an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a
separate offense. Under RA 8294, appellants can be held liable
only for homicide and penalized with reclusion temporal. Pursuant
to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, RA 8294 should be given
retroactive effect.
Due to the enactment of RA 8294 which which imposes a lighter
penalty for the crime, the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the
Lower Court is modified, Appellants FelicisimoNarvasa and Jimmy
Orania are to served instead a penalty of reclusion temporal,
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are each
sentenced to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

24. Al Yasser Andamen

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009
 Andamen, Al Yasser U.,

FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco received a Dispatch
Order which directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve
a warrant of arrest against Valeroso in a case of kidnapping with
ransom.After briefing, the team conducted necessary surveillance
on Valeroso’s hideouts. The team proceeded to the Integrated
National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City,
where they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and
his team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, and
bodily searched him. They found a revolver, bearing Serial No.
52315 with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.
Upon verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division, the
subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but to another
person. Valeroso was then charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under P.D. No. 1866 as amended.

On the other hand,SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol Jr. and Adrian

Yusontestified, That On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping
inside a room in the boarding house of his children. He was
awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who
pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the room, tied his
hands and placed him near the faucet, then went back inside,
searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative
came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may
nakuhaakongbarilsaloob!”. Timbol testified also that he issued a
Memorandum Receipt to Valerosodated July 1, 1993 covering the
subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of
Col. Angelito Moreno.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valeroso is held liable for illegal

possession of firearms

HELD: No. After a second look at the evidence presented, The

OSG recommends Valeroso acquittal. The OSG Considers the
testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible. More
importantly, the subject firearm was obtained by the police officer
in violation of his constitutional right. Thus, excluded from the
evidence for prosecution. Lastly, Valeroso could not be convicted
for the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to
posses the gun through the Memorandum of receipt by his
superior.

The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance
of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against
the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the
government.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008

Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and
SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

25. Edzrapil Apil

People vs Avecilla – G.R. No. 117033

Case Digest
Facts:
Rafael Avecilla was charged with the crime of Qualified
Illegal Possession of Firearm.
Avecilla, not authorized by law to possess and carry firearm, have
in his possession a .38 Caliber Revolver Colt (Paltik). While in
possession, Avecilla shot MacarioAfable, Jr. which caused the
death of Macario.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of an unlicensed firearm is an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.
Ruling:
 Yes, when murder or homicide results from the use of
an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer Qualified
Illegal Possession, but murder or homicide. The unlicensed
firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.
R.A No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866, where separate
prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in
order. Instead, the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a
separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating
circumstance.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form,
is committed only where the unlicensed firearm is not used to
commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat.
Avecilla cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with the use
of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating. The said felonies are
not charged in the information. It violates his right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

26. John Dondi Balbuena

BALBUENA, JOHN DONDI C.

People of the Philippines vs. WalpanLadjaalam
G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2020

Principle: if the person is held liable for murder or

homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating
circumstance, but not a separate offense.
Facts: WalpanLadjaalam was charged with four
informations in the Regional Trial Court. First was for maintaining
a den for the use of regulated drugs, second information charged
him with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, the third
information was for multiple attempted murder with direct assault
and the fourth charged him with illegal possession of drugs.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in considering illegal
possession of firearms as a separate offense in this case.(Yes)
Ruling: Section 1 of PD No. 1866 provides that xxx “If
homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.” xxx
A simple reading of the proviso shows that if an unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no
separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if
the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a
separate offence. Since direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide was committed in this case, Ladjaalam can no longer be
held responsible for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover,
since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or
murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance.

27. Marvien Barrios

Sison versus People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 187229 : February 22, 2012

Facts: AAA testified that petitioner pointed a gun at her and

because of such threat submitted herself to his bestial desire; the
gun, as well as the ammunitions, was offered in evidence and
even the accused admitted that he had a gun at the time of the
incident. It was established through the testimony of police
investigator Regundina Sosa that based on petitioner's permit to
carry firearm outside residence, the same had already expired on
January 11, 2003, few months before his apprehension.
Due to this, the court finds ARNELSISON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of P.D. 1866, as
amended by R.A. 8294 and kidnapping with rape.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms.
Held: No, as the accused was convicted with other crime of
kidnapping and rape.
P.D. 1866, as amended by RA 8294, the law governing Illegal
Possession of Firearms provides: SECTION 1. Unlawful
Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or intended to be Used
in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of
prisioncorreccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The law is clear, the accused can be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.” In this case, the petitioner
was convicted of kidnapping and rape.
Hence, petitioner's conviction of Illegal Possession of Firearms
was reversed and set aside.
28. Manny Carl Clarion
Celino v. CA
Facts:
Two separate Information were filed against the petitioner, Angel
Celino: one for violation of the Comelec gun ban; the other, for
Illegal Possession of Firearm under R.A. 8294. After pleading not
guilty to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the latter
contending that he “cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms x xx if he was also charged of having committed another
crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set
of facts x xx.”
Issue:
Whether the mere filing of an information for gun ban
violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal
possession of firearm because of the provision of the law that
"Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the
person arrested."
Ruling:
Ruling against the petitioner, the High Court explained that
he can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no
other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word
“committed” taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the
Constitutional presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a
prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from
successful prosecution or voluntary admission.
Citing the case of People v. Valdez (1999), the Supreme
Court ruled that “all pending cases involving illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other
crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved
x xx.”
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those
enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal
possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal
possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such
other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance
in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat. Conversely, when
the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under
R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm
should continue to be prosecuted.

29. Alyssa Atrovel Dagondon

ALYSSA ATROVEL J DAGONDON
Jan 26, 2021

AGOTE VS JUDGE LORENZO, JULY 22, 2005

FACTS: This is an appeal by way of a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

On or about April 27, 1996, Vicente Agote y Matol was caught

having possession of Illegal Firearms in the City of Manila. He was
subsequently charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms under
PD No. 1866 and violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun
Ban). On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charged and
the two (2) cases were tried jointly. He was both convicted of the
said offenses on May 18, 1999.

On June 6, 1997, RA 8294 was approved into law.

Appellant contends that the law should have a retroactive effect
on his case. However, the RTC denied his motion, saying that Art
4 of the Civil Code states that laws have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.

ISSUES:
1. Whether RA 8294 has retroactive effect since it is favorable to
the appellant since the penalty has been reduced; and
2. Lack of jurisdiction, as the issue is a pure question of law
cognizable by the SC.

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious. The issue is a pure

question of law as the appellant did not question the factual
finding of the court. Rather he questions if RA 8294 has
retroactive effect on his case. Given this, petitioner should have
appealed the trial court’s ruling by way of petition for review on
certiorari to the Supreme Court and not via Court of Appeals.

Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. The

Supreme Court did not give a retroactive effect to his case from
using RA 8294. Rather, the case of illegal possession of firearms
was dismissed while the judgment conviction for violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 was affirmed. The petitioner was
immediately released as he had already served the appropriate
sentence.

30. Arjay Duhaylo

P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, PETITIONER,

VS.
 ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN; BERNABE D. DUSABAN,
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR OF ILOILO; EDITOAGUILLON, BRGY. CAPT.,
BRGY. LANJAGAN, AJUY, ILOILO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 190569
April 25, 2012
SERENO, J.:

FACTS:
Herein respondent, Aguillon, while wobbling and visibly drunk,
was disarmed and arrested by the petitioner, P/INSP Artillero
together with other police officers when he was spotted and
noticed by the latter, openly carrying an M-16 Rifle. Aguillon was
able to present his Firearm License Card, he was not able to
present a PTCFOR. Respondent Brgy. Captain was detained but
later released after posting a cash bond. Petitioner executed a
Joint Affidavit alleging the foregoing facts in support of the filing
of a case for illegal possession of firearm against Aguillon.
Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo City recommended the dismissal of
the case for insufficiency of evidence. Office of the Ombudsman,
through Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy
Ombudsman Casimiro), approved the recommendation of
Provincial ProsectuorDusaban to dismiss the case and further
stated that the evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not
committed the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Aguillon committed the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms.
HELD:
No. Aguillon did not committed the crime as charged. Republic
Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, repealed B.P. 337. It retained the
foregoing provision as reflected in its Section 389 (b), which
provides that Punong Barangay, in the performance of his peace
and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to
possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial
jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and regulations. The
authority of punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm
within their territorial jurisdiction is necessary to enforce their
duty to maintain peace and order within the barangays. Owing to
the similar functions, that is, to keep peace and order, this Court
deems that, like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as
a peace officer that must be discharged 24 hours a day. As a
peace officer, a barangay captain may be called by his
constituents, at any time, to assist in maintaining the peace and
security of his barangay.[50] As long as Aguillon is within his
barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty as a punong
barangay—to maintain peace and order.
Thus, the Court cannot order the prosecutor to file a case against
him since there is no law that penalizes a local chief executive for
imbibing liquor while carrying his firearm. Neither is there any law
that restricts the kind of firearms that punong barangays may
carry in the performance of their peace and order functions.
Unfortunately, it also appears that the term “peace and order
function” has not been adequately defined by law or appropriate
regulations.