Notes On Criminal Law I by Prof. Modesto Ticman Jr.

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™
BAR REVIEW NOTES AND CASES ON

CRIMINAL LAW
(Basic Principles and Criminal Law 1)
By: Prof. MODESTO A. TICMAN, JR.
Part I
Basic Principles
1. Significant Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws.
1.1 No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
1.2 Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment inflicted.
1.3 No person shall be imprisoned for debt.
1.4 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
1.4.1 An ex post facto law is one which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done
which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it
was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law
which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation
of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful
protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of
the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation
of a person to his disadvantage. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241)
1.4.2 A bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular
group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of
individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element,
the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be
imposed, is the most essential. (Misolas vs. Panga, 181 SCRA 648)
2. Characteristics of Philippine Criminal Laws.
2.1 GENERALITY – Philippine penal laws binding upon all persons who live or sojourn within the
Philippine territory.
2.1.1 Exceptions: those exempt from criminal prosecution by virtue of – [a] the
universally-accepted principles of Public International Law, such as sovereigns,
heads of states, ambassadors, charge d’ affaires; [b] treaties and treaty stipulations; and [c] laws
of preferential application.
2.2 TERRITORIALITY – Philippine penal laws undertake to punish crimes committed within the
Philippine territory.
2.2.1 Exceptions: [a] crimes committed on board a Philippine registered vessel or aircraft
cruising on international waters or airspace; [b] crimes involving counterfeiting or forging of
coins or currency notes or introduction thereof into the Philippines; [c] crimes
committed by public officers while in the exercise of their functions; [d] crimes against
national security and the laws of nations under Arts. 114-123 of the RPC; and [e] violations of
certain provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (R.A. No. 11479).
2.2.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: Treaties and laws of preferential application.
2.3 PROSPECTIVITY – Philippine penal laws cannot make an act punishable which when
committed are not yet so. They cannot be given retroactive effect.
Notes on Criminal Law I for Jurists Bar Review Center by Prof. Modesto Ticman Jr. Copying, dissemination, storage, use, modification, uploading and
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2.3.1 Exception: Those which establish conditions that are favorable or lenient
to the accused.
For as long as a penal law is favorable to the accused, it shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity
comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. The
accused shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has
already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence.
(Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 05 December 2018)
Penal laws are laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for
their violation. While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime or provide a penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation
component of our correctional system, its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to
the crime. (Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, et al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al., G.R. No. 212719, 25 June 2019)
2.3.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: [a] habitual delinquents; or [b] if made

expressly inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of action.
3. Interpretation of Penal Laws.
3.1 Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. If
the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute
were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice. The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual. It is this
philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental
principles in our Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. (People vs. Bon, 506 SCRA 168)
3.2 If the statute admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a
party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. (People vs. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, 12 March 2018)
4. Mistake of Fact.
4.1 Mistake of fact is the misapprehension of facts on the part of the accused. It is an absolutory
cause. It
Requisites: [1] the act would have been LAWFUL had the facts been as the accused
believed them to be;
[2] the INTENTION of the accused was lawful; and
[3] the mistake was WITHOUT fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused.
4.2 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of
the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief
of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense
requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to
commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (Yapyuco
vs. Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA 420)
5. Motive vs. Intent.
5.1 Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. It is not an element
of a crime. As such, it need not be proven by the prosecution EXCEPT when – [a] the identity of accused is in
dispute; [b] there is a need in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic versions of the killing; [c] the
evidence is merely circumstantial.
5.2 Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect a definite result. It is an element of a
crime, except for culpable felonies, and thus, must be proven by the prosecution.
6. Mala in se vs. mala prohibita.
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6.1 Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would not
be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the
intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita,
the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act
is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita
crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder
under R.A. No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent
immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se, - on the
contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Dungo vs. People, 761 SCRA 375)
6.2 When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. (Mabunot vs. People, 803 SCRA 349)
7. Entrapment vs. Instigation.
7.1 In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would-be defendant into the
commission of the offense and become co-principals themselves. (People vs. Pacis, 384 SCRA 696)
7.2 There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while
in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the
nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea
and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and
suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. (Chang vs. People, 496 SCRA 321) The legal effects of
entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. (People vs. Sta. Maria, 519 SCRA 621).
8. Alibi as a defense.
8.1 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of
access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that
he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed. (People vs. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855, 29 March 2017; People vs. Llobera, G.R. No. 203066, 05 August 2015).
9. Corpus Delicti.
9.1 Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and offenses. Corpus delicti has been defined as
the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to
a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. Corpus delicti refers to the specific
injury or loss sustained. It is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimonies of eyewitnesses. In its
legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with
the use of unlicensed firearms, or to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. (People vs. Obedo, 403 SCRA 431; Rieta
vs. People, 436 SCRA 273)
9.2 The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the
firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and
that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. (Sayco vs. People, 547
SCRA 368)
9.3 In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the charred
remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally caused. (People vs. Gonzales, 560 SCRA 419)
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9.4 In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost
by felonious taking. (Zapanta vs. People, 694 SCRA 25)
9.5 In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself. The corpus
delicti is established by proof that the identity and integrity of the prohibited or regulated drug seized or confiscated from the accused
has been preserved; hence, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug to prove its
case against the accused. The prosecution can only forestall any doubts on the identity of the dangerous drug seized from the accused
to that which was presented before the trial court if it establishes an unbroken chain of custody over the seized item. (People vs. Asjali,
G.R. No. 216430, 03 September 2018)
10. Conspiracy.
10.1 Conspiracy to commit a crime is not punishable unless there is a law that specifically provides a
penalty therefor. However, if the crime subject of the conspiracy has actually been committed, it shall be
deemed absorbed in the crime and shall become a manner of incurring criminal liability. In such case, all
persons who may have participated therein shall be held equally liable regardless of the extent, nature or
degree of their participation.
10.2 Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up.
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. (People vs. Vasquez, 430 SCRA 52)
10.2 It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof that the malefactors have acted
in concert and in pursuance of the common objectives. Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy since it is by its nature often
planned in utmost secrecy and it can seldom be proved by direct evidence. (People vs. Yu, 428 SCRA 437)
10.3 There is an implied conspiracy when two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. In other words, there must be unity of
purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective. (People vs. Bermudo, G.R. No. 225322, 04 July 2018)
10.4 To hold one as a co principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he performed an overt act in pursuance
of or in furtherance of the conspiracy, although the acts performed might have been distinct and separate. This overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting a moral ascendance over the other co-conspirators by moving them
to execute or implement the criminal plan. (People vs, Raguro, G.R. No. 224301, 30 July 2019)
10.5 Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy. There must evidence of
actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. Knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of
the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People vs. Escobal, G.R. No. 206292, 11 October
2017)
Part II
Revised Penal Code – Book 1
11. Praeter intentionem.
11.1 Any person may be held liable for an intentional felony although the wrong done is not intended
by him, if:
1. he has committed an intentional felony;
2. the wrong done or injury caused is the direct, natural or logical consequence of the felony
committed;
or
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if the intentional felony committed is the proximate cause of the injury or damage incurred by the
victim.
Notes: (a) Although the accused may be held guilty of the offense which he did not intend to commit, he
may however be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of “no intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed” under par. 3 of Art. 13 of the RPC. (b) If the accused has performed an act which does not
constitute an intentional felony but which, through his negligence or imprudence, has resulted to the
death of or infliction of physical injuries upon the victim, he may be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence/Negligence resulting to Homicide/Physical Injuries, a culpable felony.
11.2 Proximate cause is the causal connection between the felonious act and the resultant injury, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause. “Efficient intervening cause”: [a] deliberate act of the offended party; or [b] an active force based on an
act or fact absolutely foreign from the criminal act. The following pre-existing conditions may not be efficient intervening causes: [i]
pathological condition of the victim; [ii] predisposition of the offended party; [iii] physical condition of the offended party; [iv] concomitant
or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors; or [v] the conditions supervening the felonious act such as
tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene. (Quinto vs. Andres, 453 SCRA 511)
12. Impossible crimes.
12.1 In impossible crimes, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be in impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would
apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act, (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from
the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty. (Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52)
13. Stages of execution.
13.1 The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed. (Macapagal-
Arroyo vs. Sandiganbayan, 797 SCRA 241)
13.2 The elements of a frustrated felony as the following:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;

2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. (People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424)
13.3 Stages of execution in Homicide cases.

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1. Consummated Homicide: if the victim dies or is killed.
2. If the intended victim survives, the accused is guilty thereof either in its attempted or frustrated stage only.
2.1 Frustrated Homicide. The accused is deemed to have performed all acts of execution which would have produced
the felony of Homicide, etc. if the wound sustained by the victim is fatal or mortal, which could have caused his
instantaneous death where it not for a cause independent of the offender’s will, say, timely medical intervention.
2.2 Attempted Homicide. The accused has not performed all the acts of execution where the wound inflicted on the
victim is not fatal or mortal, or even if the latter has not incurred any injury.
3. In attempted and frustrated homicide, there must always be intent to kill. Otherwise, the accused may be held
guilty of physical injuries or other lesser offenses only. However, the accused may be held liable for Homicide, Infanticide or
Parricide, even absent intent to kill, if the death of the victim resulted under the circumstances referred to in Art. 4, par. 1 of
the RPC. In Murder in whatever stage, intent to kill is essential. (Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers,
Vol. III, 2021 ed., pp. 191-192)
13.4 Theft or Robbery has no frustrated stage. They are either attempted or consummated. It is already
produced upon the “taking of personal property of another xxx.” There was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the
mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner is enough to constitute the crime in its
consummated stage. (Valenzuela vs. People, 525 SCRA 306)
13.5 There is no frustrated stage in Rape; it is either attempted or consummated. For its consummation, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. It is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed. (People vs. Orita, 184 SCRA 114)
14. Justifying circumstances.
14.1 Self-defense. The elements of self-defense are: (1) that the victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting
to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense be not the proximate and
immediate cause of the victim’s aggression. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded (People
vs. Asis, 634 SCRA 491)
14.2 Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a
person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing,
manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real peril. (Manaban vs. CA, 494 SCRA 503)
14.3 A mere threatening or intimidating attitude or an exchange of insulting words and invectives between the accused
and victim, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, unless coupled with physical assault.
(People vs. CA and Tangan, 352 SCRA 599)
14.4 The unlawful aggression must be continuing or must have been existing at the time the defense is made. Once
unlawful aggression ceases, the one making the defense no longer has any right to injure, much less kill the victim. (People vs. San
Juan, 386 SCRA 400; People vs. Dijan, 383 SCRA 15)
14.5 In defense of property rights, unlawful aggression as an element thereof need not be coupled with an attack
upon the person making such defense. (People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389)
14.6 The means employed to repel the unlawful aggression must be reasonable and necessary. It does not imply
material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is a rational equivalence, considering
certain factors, such as: the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than
reason, that moves or impels the defense. The proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but upon the
imminent danger of such injury. (Velasquez vs. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017).
14.7 When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense,
the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough
that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and
should immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not
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given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not
proximate and immediate to the act of aggression. (Urbano vs. People, 576 SCRA 826)
14.8 State of necessity. The infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall
one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to
avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to another may be
minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self, then such course should be taken. (People vs. Punzalan, 687 SCRA 675)
14.9 If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not
applicable. For the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the
negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. (Ty vs. People, 439 SCRA 220)
14.10 Fulfillment of duty. The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a
right or office rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and
(b) the injury caused, or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. (Mamangun vs. People, 514 SCRA 44)
14.11 Obedience to order. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) an
order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to
carry out said order is lawful. (Ambil vs. Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA 576).
14.12 Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not
liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332)
14. Exempting circumstances.
14.1 Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., when the
accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or
there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not
lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in
language and conduct. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and
clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts. (People vs. Umawid, 725 SCRA 597)
14.2 Age of the offender/child in conflict with the law as a circumstance which may affect his
criminal liability.
Age Extenuating Circumstance

15 years or below (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344) Exempting
Over 15 years but under 18 years, who acted Exempting
without discernment. (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344)
Over 15 years but under 18 years, who acted Privileged Mitigating
with discernment. (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344)
Under 18 years (for the crimes of prostitution [Art.
202, RPC], mendicancy [PD 1563] and sniffing
Exempting
rugby [PD 1619]), with or without discernment.
(Sec. 58, R.A. 9344)
Over 18 years but under 70 years Full responsibility
Over 70 years (Art. 13 [2], RPC) Generic Mitigating
(Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., p. 199)
14.3 The existence of Accident must be proved by the appellant to the satisfaction of the court. For this to be properly
appreciated in appellant’s favor, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care;
(2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury. The accused
must convincingly prove the presence of these elements in order to benefit from the exempting circumstance of accident. (People vs.
Latosa, 621 SCRA 586)
14.4 Irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused
for escape or self-defense in equal combat. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury, is insufficient. (People vs.
Dequina, 640 SCRA 111; People vs. Licayan, 764 SCRA 227). Additionally, the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to,
that committed.
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15. Mitigating circumstances.
15.1 No intent to commit so grave a wrong. In homicide cases, the determination of the real
intention of the offender may be based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted
and the manner it is inflicted. In other cases, the utterances and/or demeanor of the accused, before, during
or after the commission of the crime may be considered. This circumstance is always appreciated in favor of
the accused if he incurs criminal liability for an offense which he does not intend to commit under par. 1 of Art.
4 of the RPC (praeter intentionem).
15.2 Threats and provocation. Before the same can be appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) That
the provocation or threat must be sufficient or proportionate to the crime committed and adequate to arouse one to its commission; (2)
That the provocation or threat must originate from the offended party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate to the
commission of the crime by the person provoked. (People vs. Beltran, 503 SCRA 715).
15.3 The threat must not be offensively and positively strong, i.e., such is not accompanied by an act
manifesting the intention of the victim of making good of his threat. Otherwise, the threat may constitute
unlawful aggression that could give rise to self-defense.
15.4 Vindication of a grave offense. For such to be credited, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) that
there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees; and (2) that the felony is committed in vindication of such grave
offense. (Napone vs. People, G.R. No. 193085, 29 November 2017)
15.5 A lapse of time is allowed between the grave offense and the vindication if the influence thereof,
by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until the moment crime was
committed.
15.6 Passion or obfuscation. For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an
unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed
within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused’s mind; and
that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. To be entitled to this
mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (1) There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such condition of mind; (2) the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. (People vs. Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220;
People vs. Cuasay, 569 SCRA 870)
15.7 Provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if
these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance xxx and not as
two separate mitigating circumstances. (Romera vs. People, 434 SCRA 467)
15.8 Voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur:
1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent, and 3)
the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of
the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and
the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them. (People vs. Casta, 565 SCRA 341) If none of these
two (2) reasons impelled the accused to surrender, because his surrender was obviously motivated more by an intention to insure his
safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous. (Belbis vs. People, 685 SCRA 518)
15.9 The filing of information and/or the issuance of warrant will not automatically make the surrender involuntary.
Despite the pendency of an arrest warrant, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders,
depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up, such as, if immediately upon learning that a warrant for his
arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, he surrendered to the authorities. (De Vera vs. De Vera, 584
SCRA 506)
15.10 Confession of guilt. To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the accused must have voluntarily
confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. The following requirements must
therefore concur: (1) the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before
a competent court trying the case; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
(People vs. Montinola, 360 SCRA 631). To be voluntary, the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged. People vs. Dawaton, 389
SCRA 277).
Page 8 of 17
15.11 Similar and analogous circumstances. Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, restitution
(Malversation, Theft, Robbery and Estafa) should be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the
two circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present
even though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering
that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the accused, it is proper to consider it as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused. (Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, 672 SCRA 270)
16. Aggravating Circumstances.
16.1 Abuse of Public Position. To appreciate this aggravating circumstance, the public officer must use the
influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter
is presented in the inquiry “Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime?” (People vs. Villamor, 373 SCRA 254) If the
accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. (People vs. Amion,
353 SCRA 410)
16.2 In contempt of or with insult to public authorities. The requisites of this circumstance are: (1) the
public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not the person against whom the crime is committed. (People vs.
De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397)
16.3 Disregard of Age or Sex. Anent the circumstance of age, there must be a showing that the malefactor
deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. Neither could disregard of respect due to sex be appreciated if the
offender did not manifest any intention to offend or disregard the sex of the victim. In other words, killing a woman is not attended by
the aggravating circumstance if the offender did not manifest any specific insult or disrespect towards the offended party’s sex. (People
vs. Taboga, 376 SCRA 500)
16.4 Dwelling. It Includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof, including the staircase of
the house and its terrace. (People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823). It may also mean temporary dwelling; it may be aggravating even if the
victim was not the owner of the house where the crime was committed, be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, as what the law
seeks to protect is the sanctity of the home. (People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104)
16.5 It is not aggravating if the offended party has given provocation, which must be sufficient, and have immediately
preceded the commission of the crime (People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823); if the building where the crime was committed was NOT
solely, entirely and exclusively used for dwelling purposes (People vs. Taño, 331 SCRA 448); when both offender and offended party
reside in the same house; and In Robbery with use of force upon things and Trespass to dwelling, because it is inherent in both
crimes.
16.6 Abuse of confidence. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence
between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to
commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of
the offended party’s belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. (People vs. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679)
16.7 Nighttime, Band, or Uninhabited Place. By and of itself, nighttime (band or uninhabited place) is not an
aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of
by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender’s immunity from capture. (People vs. Silva, 387 SCRA
77). In default of any showing that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused, the fact
that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. To be aggravating, this circumstance must concur with
the intent or design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the darkness of night. (People vs. Balais, 565
SCRA 555).
16.8 “Aid of armed men”. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the
commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-
conspirators. (People vs. Enojas, 718 SCRA 313)
16.9 Distinctions among the forms of repetition.
Recidivism Habituality Quasi-Recidivism Habitual Delinquency

(Reiteracion)
Accused was previously convicted by final judgment of (a) crime/s and
is convicted anew of another.
Offense/s which the Offense of which the Offenses which the
Offense which the accused was previously accused was previously accused was previously
accused was previously convicted and for which
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convicted of and of punished for and of which he is serving sentence is convicted of (which
which he is convicted he is convicted anew need punished under the RPC should be robbery, theft,
anew must be not be embraced under the or SPL, while the offense serious/less serious PI,
embraced under the same Title of the RPC; that he commits while estafa or falsification) and
same Title of the RPC. both offenses however serving sentence therefor of which he is convicted
must be punished under must be punished under anew must be punished
the RPC. the RPC. under the RPC.
Previous conviction by Service of sentence is Previous conviction by Previous conviction by
final judgment is required. final judgment is enough. final judgment is enough.
enough.
Within 10 years from
No period between No period between No period between release or last conviction
previous and last previous and last previous and last for robbery, xxx, accused
convictions. convictions. convictions. was found guilty thereof,
a third time or oftener.
Generic Agg. Circ. Generic Agg. Circ. Special Agg. Circ. Extra-ordinary Agg. Circ.
Can be offset by Mit. C. Can be offset by Mit. C. Not offset by Mit. C. Not offset by Mit. C.
If not offset by MC, If not offset by MC, serves Serves to increase
serves to increase to increase penalty to penalty to maximum Additional penalty is
penalty to maximum maximum period. period. imposed.
period.
Always an Agg. Circ. Not always an Agg. Circ. Always an Agg. Circ. Additional penalty is
always imposed.
(Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., pp. 210-211)
16.10 Price, reward or promise. The accused had used money or other valuable consideration for
the purpose of inducing another to perform a criminal act. It is not aggravating if the person supposedly
induced had other personal reasons to commit the crime or if he would have nonetheless committed the crime
with or without such price, reward, or of its offer or promise.
16.11 By means of fire, poison, inundation, explosion, and other artifice involving great waste
or ruin. If the offender, with intent to kill, kills another by means of fire or explosion, he is guilty of Murder. But
if the offender, absent intent to kill, destroys a property by means of fire or explosion and as a result, a person
dies or is killed, he is guilty of Arson with Homicide (a special complex crime) or Destruction with Homicide
(ordinary complex crime), as the case may be.
16.11 Evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to
reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of the will if he desired to hearken to
its warning. (People vs. Dimacuha, G.R. No. 191060, 02 February 2015; People vs. Cirbeto, G.R. No. 231359, 08 February 2018).
16.12 Evident premeditation may not be appreciated if the attack was the result of rising tempers or made in the heat of
anger (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, 11 January 2018) as well as if the victim is different from that intended unless if it is
shown that the accused was determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance.
(People vs. Ventura, 433 SCRA 389)
16.13 Abuse of superior strength/Means to weaken defense. They may be taken as one and the same
aggravating circumstance. Employment of means to weaken the defense is, at the very least, subsumed under the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In determining whether the qualifying circumstance of employing means to weaken the
defense is present, the Court is guided by the same standard in determining the presence of abuse of superior strength, i.e., notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor's and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. (People vs. Maron, G.R. No. 232339, 20 November
2019)
16.14 Abuse of superior strength is appreciated whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
his aggressors, and the latter took advantage of such inequality to facilitate the commission of the crime. To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim was not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of
superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. It is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural
strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense,
although not annulling it. (People vs. Pagapulaan, G.R. No. 216936, 29 July 2019).
Page 10 of 17
16.15 An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself. (People vs. Enojo, G.R. No. 240231, 27 November 2019)
16.16 Treachery. It is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make In turn, its elements are: (1) employment of means, method or manner of execution
which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim; and (2) deliberate adoption of
such means, method or manner of execution. In other words, the means of attack, consciously adopted by the assailant, rendered the
victim defenseless. (People vs, Bermudo, G.R. No. 225322, 04 July 2018). It is not enough that the attack was "sudden,"
"unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." (People vs. Bagabay, G.R. No. 236297, 17 October 2018)
16.17 There can be no treachery when the victim was "forewarned of the danger he was in," "put on guard," or otherwise
"could anticipate aggression from the assailant" as when "the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the
accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former." (People vs. Jaurigue, G.R. No.
232380, 04 September 2019)
16.18 Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person. What is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The essence of treachery
lies on the deliberate, swift, and unexpected attack on the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim, leaving the latter no chance to
resist or escape. (People vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 224289, 14 August 2019)
16.19 Cruelty. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in making their victim suffer
slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the consummation of the criminal act. (People vs. Catian,
374 SCRA 514). The crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were
fatal. For cruelty to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the
victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not
proof of cruelty. (Simangan vs. People, 434 SCRA 38).
17. Alternative Circumstances.
They are those which must be taken into consideration as (generic) aggravating or (generic)
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission.
They are: (1) Relationship, (2) Intoxication, and (3) Degree of instruction and education.
17.1 Intoxication. It is the consumption of such quantity of any alcoholic beverage as to blur
one’s reason and deprive him of certain degree of control.
17.2 It is mitigating if it is not habitual and not intentional, i.e., not subsequent to the plan to
commit a crime; it is aggravating if it is habitual or intentional, i.e., subsequent to the plan to commit a
crime.
18. Persons Criminally Liable.
18.1 As to the Degree of Participation.
PRINCIPALS ACCOMPLICES ACCESSORIES

Conspirators NOT conspirators NOT conspirators
Participate before, during Participate before or during Participate after the
or after the commission of the commission of the crime. commission of the crime.
the crime.
May be liable for May be liable forMay be liable for
consummated, frustrated consummated, frustrated and consummated and
and attempted felonies. attempted felonies. frustrated felonies only.
May be liable for Grave, May be liable for Grave, Less May be liable for Grave
Less Grave and Light Grave and Light Felonies. and Less Grave Felonies
Felonies. only.
Penalty: that prescribed by Penalty: one (1) degree lower Penalty: two (2) degrees
law for the offense. than that prescribed by law lower than that prescribed
for principals. by law for principals.
Page 11 of 17
18.2 Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if
the following requisites are present: [a] they participated in the criminal resolution and [b] they carried out their plan and personally
took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. (People vs. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528)
18.3 Even if there is no conspiracy, one is criminally liable as principal by direct participation if he performs overt acts
which produce the crime. It is sufficient if said acts contributed to the accomplishment of the crime and thus is liable therefor by reason
of his individual and separate overt criminal acts. (People vs. Cabareño, 349 SCRA 297)
18.4 The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires [a] that the inducement be made with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and [b] that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the
material executor. Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words of
advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. (Ambagan, Jr. vs. People, G.R.
Nos. 204481-82, 14 October 2015; People vs. Batin, 539 SCRA 272)
18.5 To be regarded as an accomplice, it must be shown that (i) he knew the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, and concurred with the latter in his purpose; (ii) he cooperated in the execution by previous or simultaneous acts, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (iii) his acts bore a direct relation
with the acts done by the principal. (Gurro vs. People, G.R. Nos. 224562 and 237216, September 18, 2018). An accomplice needs to
have had both knowledge of and participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in
conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design. (People vs.
Tolentino, 380 SCRA 171).
18.6 Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has
reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in
its accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are
acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. (People vs. Pilola, 405 SCRA 134).
18.7 Conspirators vs. Accomplices. Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and
agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such
course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to
cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do
not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators
are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
(People vs. Salvador, 695 SCRA 660)
18.8 Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the commission of the
crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of three
modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape
of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To
convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2)
subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes. (People vs. Tolentino, 380 SCRA 171).
19. Multiple Offenses.
19.1 Complex crimes under Art. 48 of the RPC, as distinguished from special complex crimes
and continuous crimes.
Ordinary Complex Crimes Special Complex Crimes or Continued or Continuous

Composite Crimes Crimes
Two or more crimes are actually committed, yet, in the eyes of the law, they constitute only one crime. Thus,
only one penalty is imposed.
They result from (1) a single act
constituting 2 or more grave or They result from different acts or They result from different acts or a
less grave felonies [compound that one offense may not be series of acts but all arising from
crimes]; or (2) the commission of necessary for the commission of one criminal resolution.
an offense as a necessary means another crime.
Page 12 of 17
of committing another crime
[complex crime proper].
The combination of the offenses
is not specified but generalized, The composition of the offenses The composition of which is not
i.e., grave and/or less grave, or is fixed by law. specified by law; 2 or more
one offense being the necessary violations of the same penal
means to commit the other. provision.
The penalty is that corresponding
to the more/most serious offense, The penalty is specific, i.e., that The penalty is specific, i.e., that
to be imposed in the maximum which is prescribed by law. which is prescribed by law for the
period. offense.
Light felonies are treated as a
separate offense, except in quasi- Light felonies are absorbed. N/A
delicts.
Applicable to crimes under the Applicable to crimes under the Applicable to crimes under the
RPC. RPC and SPL. RPC and SPL.
Examples: RPC – Theft of 2 or
Examples: Multiple murder, Direct Examples: RPC – Robbery more personal properties from the
Assault w/Homicide, Forcible w/Homicide, Rape w/ Homicide, same place and at the same
Abduction w/Rape, Theft thru Kidnapping w/Rape; SPL – period; SPL – viol. of Sec. 3 (e),
Falsification of Commercial Carnapping w/ Homicide (R.A. R.A. 3019 [Santiago vs.
Document. 10883) Garchitorena: favoring 32
unqualified aliens with the benefits
of the Alien Legalization Program]
19.2 Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that
purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense. (People vs. Sanidad, 402 SCRA
381)
19.3 In forcible abduction with rape, forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of
rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and
considered independently of the forcible abduction. (People vs. Garcia, 378 SCRA 266)
19.4 There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, because the immediate effect of
falsification of private document is the same as that of estafa. The falsification of a private document cannot be said to be a means to
commit estafa, because the fraudulent gain obtained through deceit in estafa, in the commission of which a private document was
falsified, is nothing more nor less than the very damage caused by the falsification of such document. (L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal
Code-Criminal Law, Book II, 2021 ed., p. 292). If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the
proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper
crime to be charged is estafa. (Batulanon vs. People, 502 SCRA 35)
19.5 In Quasi-delicts, light felonies are not treated and punished as offenses separate from grave and less grave felonies.
(Ivler vs. San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191)
20. Preventive imprisonment (Art. 29, RPC)
20.1 It is detention of the accused while being prosecuted for a crime, either because he is charged
of a non-bailable offense or if bailable, he cannot put up the required bail.
20.2 The period during which the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment may be
deducted from the penalty to which he is sentenced, as follows: [a] FULL TIME of preventive imprisonment, if
the detention prisoner agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, unless - (a) he is a recidivist, or has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime,
and (b) when, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence, he has failed to surrender voluntarily,
OR [b] 4/5 of the period of preventive imprisonment, if he does not agree in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
21. Penalties.
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21.1 Although reclusion perpetua has a definite duration, it remains to be an indivisible penalty and, when it is the
prescribed penalty, should be imposed in its entirety without a fixed period for its duration, regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime. In prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, its duration in
years need not be specified. (People vs. Zacarias, 375 SCRA 278)
21.2 Order of payment of pecuniary liabilities: [1] Reparation of the damage caused, [2]
Indemnification of consequential damages, [3] FINE, [4] Cost of the proceedings.
21.3 Subsidiary imprisonment. In case failure to pay FINE, the convict shall be subjected to
subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage
rate in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court.
21.4 Limitations: [1] if the penalty is prision correccional, arresto mayor or arresto menor and FINE,
the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 1/3 of the sentence and in no case shall it continue for more
than one year; [2] if the penalty is FINE only: not more than 6 months for grave or less grave felony; [3] no
subsidiary imprisonment if the penalty is prison mayor or higher; and [4] if the judgment of conviction did not provide
subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. (People vs. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, 10 January 2018)
21.5 Indeterminate Sentence Law (IS Law); Disqualified offenders: {1} those convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment (and reclusion perpetua, as it is equated as
synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the IS Law. [People vs. Enriquez, 465 SCRA 407]) {2} if the
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year; {3} those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason; {4} those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; {5}
those convicted of piracy; {6} those who are habitual delinquents; {7} those have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence; and {8} those who have violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them.
21.6 Rules on the application of the IS Law.
21.6.1 RPC - Maximum term: the appropriate period of the prescribed

penalty, after appreciating mitigating and/or aggravating
circumstance/s, if any;
Minimum term: within the range of the penalty next lower
to the prescribed penalty.
21.6.2 SPL - Maximum term: not to exceed the prescribed penalty;

Minimum term: not less than the prescribed penalty.
21.7 In both cases, it is mandatory that the minimum and maximum terms be specified. “The need for specifying the
minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and
to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his
behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record.” (Luy vs. People, 805 SCRA 710)
21.8 When an offense is defined in a special law, but the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the
RPC, the legal effects under the system of penalties relative to the Code would necessarily apply to the special law. (People vs.
Padlan, G.R. No. 214880, 06 September 2017).
22. Service of Sentence.
22.1 In case the offender is sentenced to suffer multiple penalties, they may be served
SIMULTANEOUSLY, if the nature of the penalty permits it, such as perpetual and temporary disqualifications,
suspension, destierro, public censure, fine, and bond to keep the peace, civil interdiction, and confiscation and
payment of costs. Otherwise, they are to be served SUCCESSIVELY, in the order of the penalties’ severity,
with the most severe penalty to be served first.
22.2 Limitation: the maximum duration shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed, which shall not exceed 40 years.
22.3 Probation Law; Disqualified offenders: {1} those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than 6 years; {2} those convicted of any crime against the national security; {3} those
previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than 6 months and 1
day and/or a fine of more than ₱1,000.00; and {4} those who are once on probation
Page 14 of 17
22.4 The application for probation must be [i] in writing and filed with the [ii] court which rendered
judgment [iii] within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal (15 days).
22.5 Probation may be granted whether the sentence is imprisonment or fine (for subsidiary
imprisonment).
22.6 The filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of right to appeal. Reasons: (1) Appeal
and Probation are mutually exclusive remedies as they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. The application for probation is
an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction [Almero vs. People, 718 SCRA
698]; (2) Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the
accused has applied for probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976, as
amended), which in part provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there
was no more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of an application
for probation. [Vicoy vs. People, 383 SCRA 707]
22.7 Gen. Rule: No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the accused has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Exception: When a judgment imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed, and such

judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty.
Exception to the exception: Where there are several accused where some have taken further
appeal (and obtained a modified judgment, i.e., from non-probationable to probationable
penalty), the other accused (who did not appeal) may, upon application, be granted probation.
23. Total Extinction of Criminal Liability.
23.1 Effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities:
“1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in sensa strictiore."
“2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability 'may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a. Law
b. Contracts
c. Quasi-contracts
d. xxx
e. Quasi-delicts
“3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
“4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.”
(People vs. Monroyo, G.R. No. 223708, 09 October 2019)
23.2 Prescription of crimes. The period of prescription starts to run from the date of the discovery
of the crime by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. It is interrupted by the filing of the – {a}
complaint (with the prosecutor’s office for purposes of inquest or preliminary investigation), or {b} information
(only in those cases governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure or those where direct filing is allowed
[Jadewell Parking Systems vs. Lidua, 706 SCRA 724]). Unless the offender is absent from the Philippines, it
commences to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted
or is unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him and for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Page 15 of 17
23.3 Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall “commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, xxx.” In People v. Reyes, this Court has declared that
registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. (Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA
881)
23.4 Prescription of penalties. The period of prescription begins to run only when the convict
evades the service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. It is interrupted if the convict,
before the expiration of the period – (a) surrenders, (b) is captured, (c) goes to foreign country with which the
Philippines has no extradition treaty, or (d) commits another crime (other than Evasion of Service of Sentence
under Art. 157, RPC).
23.5 Prescription of penalties applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. One who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
(Pangan vs. Gatbalite, 449 SCRA 144; Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo and People, 394 SCRA 221)
23.6 Marriage of the offended woman under Art. 344. Felonies wherein valid marriage between the
offended woman and offender extinguishes the criminal liability are: (a) Acts of lasciviousness [Art. 336], (b)
Consented Acts of lasciviousness [Art. 339], (c) Qualified Seduction [Art. 337], (d) Simple Seduction [Art. 338],
(e) Forcible Abduction [Art. 342], and (f) Consented Abduction [Art. 343] and (g) Rape [Arts. 266-A and 266-B,
in relation to Art, 266-C]. Except in Rape, the extinction of criminal action and liability by virtue of marriage
extends to the co-principals, accomplices, and accessories.
23.7 Absolute Pardon vs. Amnesty. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation
of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is
granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and
for that reason it does ‘not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,’ and it ‘in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence’ (Article 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense. (People vs. Patriarca, 341 SCRA 464)
24. Partial extinction of criminal liability.
24.1 Conditional pardon. It is akin to absolute pardon, except that it: (a) has conditions that need to
be complied with; (b) must be accepted by grantee; and (c) is revocable. Violation of conditions of such
pardon is dealt with under Art. 159, RPC.
24.2 Commutation of sentence. An act of Chief Executive of reducing the degree of the penalty
inflicted upon the convict, by decreasing the length of imprisonment or the amount of fine.
24.3 Good conduct time allowances (GCTA). These are deductions from the term of the sentence
for good behavior and for study, teaching or mentoring service rendered, while undergoing preventive
imprisonment or serving sentence.
24.4 Special Time Allowance for Loyalty (STAL). This entitles a convict to a 2/5 or 1/5 deduction,
as the case may be, from his original sentence, if he stays in the penal facility on the occasion of disorder, or
after having left the facility on such occasion, returns thereto within 48 hours following proclamation of the
Chief Executive announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe. (Art. 98, as amended by R.A.
No. 10592). If the convict does not return within the time allowed, he shall suffer an increase of 1/5 of the
remaining term of sentence, not to exceed 6 months. (Art. 158, RPC).
24.5 Parole. It relates to the suspension of the sentence and release of a convict after serving the
minimum penalty, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended, as authorized by the
Board of Pardons and Parole. (Sec. 5, Act No. 4103).
Page 16 of 17
25. Subsidiary Civil Liability.
25.1 Proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, proprietors of

establishments are civilly liable for: (a) crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation
of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by their
employees; and/or (b) restitution of goods taken through robbery or theft from guests lodging therein, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have: [i] notified in advance the establishment,
of the deposit of such goods therein; and [ii] followed the directions which it may have given the guests with
respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. However, proprietors incur no civil liability in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the establishment's employees.
25.1 Employers. The subsidiary civil liability of employer is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the
award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the
purpose of [1] the existence of an employer-employee relationship; [2] that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; [3] that
the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties not
necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and [4] that said employee is insolvent. (Basilio vs. Court of
Appeals, 328 SCRA 341). The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s
liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced xxx, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of
the judgment. (Calang and Philtranco vs. People, 626 SCRA 679)
25.1.1 Employers are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in
substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People, 427
SCRA 526)
25.1.2 Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense on the part of the
employer and may not free the latter from subsidiary liability for the employee’s civil liability in a criminal action.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed written into the
judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer (Pangonorom and MMTC vs. People, 455 SCRA 211),
as it is deemed written therein.
- ooo0ooo -
Page 17 of 17

Notes On Criminal Law I by Prof. Modesto Ticman Jr.

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Notes On Criminal Law I by Prof. Modesto Ticman Jr.

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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

BAR REVIEW NOTES AND CASES ON

1. Significant Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws.

2. Characteristics of Philippine Criminal Laws.

2.2.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: Treaties and laws of preferential application.

2.3.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: [a] habitual delinquents; or [b] if made

3. Interpretation of Penal Laws.

5. Motive vs. Intent.

6. Mala in se vs. mala prohibita.

7. Entrapment vs. Instigation.

11. Praeter intentionem.

1. he has committed an intentional felony;

12. Impossible crimes.

13. Stages of execution.

13.1 The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

13.2 The elements of a frustrated felony as the following:

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;

13.3 Stages of execution in Homicide cases.

14. Justifying circumstances.

14. Exempting circumstances.

Age Extenuating Circumstance

15. Mitigating circumstances.

16. Aggravating Circumstances.

16.9 Distinctions among the forms of repetition.

Recidivism Habituality Quasi-Recidivism Habitual Delinquency

17. Alternative Circumstances.

18. Persons Criminally Liable.

18.1 As to the Degree of Participation.

PRINCIPALS ACCOMPLICES ACCESSORIES

19. Multiple Offenses.

Ordinary Complex Crimes Special Complex Crimes or Continued or Continuous

20. Preventive imprisonment (Art. 29, RPC)

21.6 Rules on the application of the IS Law.

21.6.1 RPC - Maximum term: the appropriate period of the prescribed

21.6.2 SPL - Maximum term: not to exceed the prescribed penalty;

22. Service of Sentence.

Exception: When a judgment imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed, and such

23. Total Extinction of Criminal Liability.

23.1 Effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities:

24. Partial extinction of criminal liability.

25.1 Proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, proprietors of

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