Indian Political Science Association

BHUTAN LOOKS OUTWARDS: ITS SEARCH FOR IDENTITY

Author(s): A.G. NAIDU
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 4 (October - December 1986),
pp. 533-545
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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 BHUTAN LOOKS OUTWARDS: ITS
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY
A.G. NAIDU

The problems of small nations situated between the two big neigh
bours are unique. Their problems get more aggravated when their b
neighbours are ranged against each other. Bhutan's problems are
the more acute considering the fact that it is a land-locked country w
cultural and ethnic similarities with both India and China. Bhutan is

bordered on the North by Tibet on the West, South and East by Indian
states of Sikkim, West Bengal and Assam respectively. The two big
neighbours, China and India, which are situated to the North and South
of Bhutan respectively are very vital in geopolitical termi to Bhutan.1
The dilemma of Bhutan and its search for an identity can be analysed
in this context.

Historical Background

Bhutan has a cultural and ethnic mix up. While the people of
South Bhutan have some similarities with the people and tribes of
India's North-eastern region, those who Jive in the Western parts of
Bhutan are of a different stock. They are mostly from Tibet who have
migrated to Bhutan several centuries ago. On the other hand those
who migrated from Nepal in the last couple of centuries are residing in
Eastern parts. But the immigrants from Nepal got mixed up in the
Eastern region with the tribes of North-East India. Thus there is a large
immigration into Bhutan from India's North Eastern region, Nepal and
Tibet. Along with them the immigrants also brought their own reli-
gion, language and culture.

Inspite of its close ethnic and cultural identity with both India and
Tibet, Bhutan maintained a distinct character of its own over the

The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 4, October - December, 1986.

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534 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

years. Maintenance of separate identity for herself was considered very

important to preserve Bhutan as a nation. Certainly, Bhutan as an
independent nation cannot survive if its cultural identity gets submerged
in the dominant cultures of its neighbours.

Bhutan was ruled by the Kings of Kamrup (the present Assam)

until the middle of the 7th Century A. D. In the 8th Century
a Buddhist monk by name Guru Padmasambhava from Nalanda
in India brought Buddhism to Bhutan. Guru Padmasambhava con-
verted many Bhutanese into Buddhist faith and also brought the warring
tribes of Bhutan into Buddhist fold. Later the Tibetan Lamas who
came to Bhutan were primarily responsible for the large scale conversion
of Bhutanese into Buddhism. By the end of the 16th Century the Tibe-
tan Lamas established a complete sway over Bhutan and ultimately
Bhutanese have come to look upon Lhasa as their spiritual head-quar-
ters.

The entry of Buddhism heralded a new era in Bhutanese history.

Buddhism not only brought cultural identity among the peoples of
Bhutan, but it also played a significant roie in the evolution of Bhutan
as a nation-state. But it was not until the 17th century that Bhutan
came under one political authority. As fratricidal struggles continued
among different tribal chiefs, in 1616 Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal,
an important tribal chief, brought the entire country under his control
subduing all others. Namgyal declared himself as the spiritual as well
as the temporal head of Bhutan.

Bhutan, after emerging as a nation state, remained isolated for

centuries. Like any other new state Bhutan also followed a policy of
isolationism ever since it attained nationhood. Bhutanese concern for
political stability and separate identity was the most compelling reason
for their policy of isolationism. This, however, was broken by the ad-
vent of British rule in India.

In 1757 when Bengal came under the control of East India Com-
pany, Bhutan was an extensive territory which included parts of Dar«
jeeling and Jalpaiguri. However, British did not come into contact with
Bhutan until 1772 when Bhutanese invaded Cooch-Behar and kidnap-
ped the Raja as prisoner. The British who were anxious to establish
trade routes to Tibet through Bhutan interfered on behalf of Raja of

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 BHUTAN LOOKS OUTWARDS : ITS SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 535

Cooch-Behar and a treaty of peace was concluded between East India

Company and Bhutan on April 25, J 774. 2

As Assam came under the sway of the East India Company in 1826,
British interest in Bhutan increased. The Bhutanese used to raid the

plains of India through several entrances in Bengal and Assam and

kidnap villagers for sale in Bhutan as slaves. Therefore East India
Company decided to negotiate a settlement with Bhutan to prevent fur-
ther raids into its territory. As the negotiations failed the British annex-
ed several entrances called "duars" from Bhutan into Assam and

Bengal and declared war on Bhutan. As a result Bhutan was forced t

sign the treaty of Sinchula on November 1 1, 1865. 3

The treaty of Sinchula brought Bhutan under the control of British,

ßy this treaty all "duars" were ceded to British. Bhutan also lost
nearly 2750 square miles of territory to British. Apart from the loss
territory, Bhutan also lost its right of independent action since un
the treaty it has to refer all its disputes with Sikkim and Cooch Beh
to British arbitration.

In 1910 the Chinese Governor of Sech wan occupied Lhasa and laid
claims to Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. As a counter to Chinese moves,
the British decided to revise the treaty of Sinchula and place the rela-
tions between Bhutan and India on a firm footing. As a result the
treaty of Punakha was signed on January 8, 1910. According to the
treaty the British Government undertook not to interfere in the internal
administration of Bhutan, while Bhutanese Government agreed to be
guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external
relations.4 Thus, the treaty of Punakha not only regulated Bhutanese
foreign relations but it also stopped the growth of Chinese influence in
Bhutan and brought it into closer cooperative relations with the Govern-
ment of India.

Indo- Bhutanese Treaty of 1949

Subsequent to Indian independence Indo-Bhutanese relations were

guided by the Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949. This treaty was intended
to replace the imperial relationship that existed between British India
and Bhutan. In the very first article of treaty it is stated that there
should be perpetual peace and friendship between India and Bhutan.

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536 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

In the Article 2, while India assured not to interfere in the internal

administration of Bhutan, on its part Bhutan agreed to be guided by the
advice of the government of India in its external relations. If differ-
ences arise in the observance of this provision the recourse is to article 9
of the treaty. According to this article, Governments of India and
Bhutan will enter into negotiations if they have any differences of
opinion and if negotiations fail the matter shall be referred to a tribunal
consisting of three persons-a nominee of the Government of India, a
nominee of the Government of Bhutan, and a judge of the High Court,
or Supreme Court of India to be chosen by the Government of Bhutan
who shall be the chairman.

Thus, Article 2 is the most important part of the treaty that governs
the relations between the two countries. Since it is difficult to strictly
separate internal policy from its external relations, India is expected to
give due consideration to the interests of Bhutan while tendering any
advice.

While Article 3 provides for increase in . compensation which

British used to pay under the earlier treaties, Article 4 allowed the
transfer of Dewangiri territory of 32 square miles to Bhutan. Article 5
grants free trade and commerce between the two countries. Under
this article, India agrees to grant Bhutan every facility for carriage by
land and water of its products throughout India. Article 6 allows
Bhutan to import arms and ammunition through India- with the
assistance and approval of India-necessary for the strength and welfare
of Bhutan. While Article 7 guarantees Indian citizens in Bhutan of
equal justice with Bhutanese and vice versa, Article 8 provides for
extradition of criminals mutually. As already stated Article 9 evolves
a mechanism for negotiations and arbitration, while Article 10 declared
that the treaty will be in force in perpetuity unless it is terminated or
modified by mutual consent.5

The Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949 has been the guiding factor in

the relations between the two countries. While British treated Bhutan

as a vassal state and followed a policy that suited its imperial interests,
India since Independence regarded Bhutan as an independent state.
However, Bhutan has not been free from apprehensions towards India.
It was afraid that India also might follow an expansionist policy like
British. Therefore, Thimpu was very wary of its external contacts.

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 BHUTAN LOOKS OUTWARDS : ITS SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 537

But Bhutan could not keep itself aloof for ever. While the winds
of change were blowing everywhere, Bhutan cannot remain un-
affected. In early fifties, Bhutan under the leadership of the young
King Jigme Dorje Wangchuk initiated a process of modernisation
heralding a new phase in the history of Bhutan.
The China Factor

While modernisation is taking place in Bhutan, however slow it

might be, certain developments in its neighbourhood have deeply
affected her. The first important event that sent shock waves were the
developments in Tibet-the spiritual headquarters for Bhutan. Towards
the end of 1950 China occupied Tibet. Subsequently China ruthlessly
crushed a rebellion in Tibet and consequently Dalailama had to flee
Tibet and seek asylum in India. This has greatly affected the
Bhutanese morale.

While China occupied Tibet and crushed rebellion there India

remained a silent spectator. This has not certainly enhanced India's
prestige in the eyes of its small neighbours. The second important
development that had affected relations between India and Bhutan was
the political developments in Nepal. In early 1950s democracy receiv-
ed a severe setback in Nepal. King Mahendra of Nepal suspended
all democratic institutions and assumed unlimited powers. Most of the
leaders of Nepalese Congress including Prime Minister B.P. Koirala
were jailed. These developments were viewed with concern in India.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian leaders denounced
the trampelling of democracy in that country and openly advocated a
return to "democratic rule". Nepal considered Indian stance as an
interference in their internal affairs. Indian attitude was denounced
as a flagrant violation of international law and that of Nehru's own
five principles, viz.. Panchsheel. These developments had their spill-
over effects on the neighbouring countries. The small neighbours of
I ndia did not like New Delhi's interference in their internal affairs.
Nehru's professions of democracy also did not carry much conviction
with them. While the Indian leader gave lessons to Nepal on demo-
cracy some of his closest associates in International politics at that time
were the dictators like Sukarno, Nasser, Nkrumah and Tito.

In 1962 the border dispute which was simmering between India

and China for sometime developed into a major armed conflict between
11

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538 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

the two countries. China not only crossed the so called McMohan line
but it also ran over the Indian defense positions all along the Northern
borders. The humiliating defeat India suffered at the hands of China
dealt a severe blow to India's prestige in the region. Nehru's policy of
non-alignment was in shambles. As a result of the Sino-Indian con-
flict, China emerged as the dominant power of the region who was in a
position to influence the course of events in South Asia.

These developments no doubt influenced the thinking of theBhuta-

nese elite. Bhutan's paramount consideration was its security. Be-
cause of its land-locked nature and small size it was very conscious of
its limitations and the lurking dangers posed- to its security. Any
development in its neighbourhood which might directly or indirectly
affect its security was viewed with anxiety in that country. Thus
Bhutan perceived new threats to its security. The common boundary
with China as a result of Tibet's annexation, had posed new security
problems to Bhutan. China had claimed over 200 square miles of
Bhutanese territory as part of Tibet. The new situation, the kind of
which was not visualized earlier, exposed Bhutan to new security
problems.

China's claim to Himalayan territories is nothing new. China

considered Bhutan along with Nepal and Sikkim as one of its lost
territories. China also toyed with the idea of forming a Himalayan
confederation of all Mongol peoples under its guidance. As India's
capacity to perform the role of protector of the small nations in the
region declined, Bhutan thought of new options to preserve its
independence.

Bhutan s Entry into U.N.

Under the circumstances India sponsored Bhutan for U.N. member-

ship. In 1971 Bhutan became a member of the United Nations.
Unlike Sikkim, Bhutan has long been considered an independent state
by India. Therefore India was not averse to Bhutan joining the world
organisation and playing its legitimate role in international affairs
within the framework of the Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949. Secondly
India was also very apprehensive of China's moves against Bhutan.
The events in Tibet leading to its annexation by China were very much
in the minds of the policy-makers both in India and Bhutan. As many

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 BHUTAN LOOKS OUTWARDS : ITS SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 539

felt at that time, had Tibet been a member of the U.N. China would
not have occupied that country so brazenly. In any case Chinese
occupation of Tibet provided the backdrop to Bhutan's entry into
the U.N.

India's decision to sponsor Bhutan for U.N. membership was

hailed by Bhutan. Although since 1949, Indo-Bhutanese relations are
broadly guided by the treaty of 1949, India has allowed Bhutan to
assert its sovereignty. With Bhutan's entry into U.N.,. its sovereignty
is just not a formality but a reality.

Sikkim Episode

But the political developments in Sikkim during 1973-74, which

led to its annexation by India, deeply disturbed Bhutan. The Bhuta-
nese authorities apprehended similar developments in their country also
and began to doubt India's intentions in the region. In the mean time
plots were discovered in Bhutan against the new King and Bhutanese
authorities suspected India's hand in the sinister moves. In April 1974,
the Bhutanese government extended invitations for closer relations to the
U.S., Soviet Union, China, France, U.K. and several other countries
without prior consultations with the Government of India. In November
1974, Bhutan announced that it would open offices in London, Paris,
Bonn and New York to issue visas. The Indian Government, fearing
big power involvement in Bhutan, moved quickly to reassure Bhutan of
its commitment to preserve the integrity and independence of Bhutan.
In December 1974, the King of Bhutan visited India and in a joint
statement the King of Bhutan and the Prime Minister of India reitera-
ted their resolve to hold regular consultations and coordinate their
efforts to further the mutual interests of the peoples of both the coun-
tries.* Thus, the mutual misgivings seemingly disappeared towards the
end of 1974 at least temporarily.

The Sikkim episode, however, convinced the Bhutanese that the

security of their country was their business and henceforth they began
to evolve a strategy of their own. Under the circumstances, Bhutan
can either maintain equi-distance between India and China or follow the
example of Nepal playing China card. The latter option of course was
loaded with some dangerous consquences. There is yet another option
i.e., without drawing unnecessary parallel with Sikkim, Bhutan can try

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540 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

to evolve a policy whereby the focus will be on the positive aspects of

the relations. At the same time Bhutan may try to develop relations
with other countries including China with which Bhutan has a common
border.

While Bhutanese became very apprehensive of India's intentions in

the region, Sikkim episode had placed India very much on the defen-
sive. China became very hostile to India and even began to claim some
parts of Bhutan as its territory. In a way Bhutan was drawn into an
open border dispute with China. China while labelling India as ''hege-
monist0 power offered a "model" relationship with Bhutan which was
different from that of India's. According to China, Indian attitude
was only a legacy of her imperial interests and the Indo-Bhutanese
treaty of 1949 that provided special relationship, between India and
Bhutan came in the way of Bhutan exercising its free and self deter-
mined policy.7 Thus, China made fervent efforts to wean Bhutan away
from India.

Against this background Bhutan has developed some new ideas.

Since early 1970s, particularly after the coronation of the present King
Jigme Singye Wang Chuk in 1974, the Bhutanese have been seeking for
a greater elbow room in the conduct of its foreign relations. As a logi-
cal extension of their desire, the ruling elite in Bhutan started interpre-
ting the treaty of 1949 to suit their convenience. According to them,
it was not obligatory on their part to seek India's advice on every
foreign policy matter, and even where such advice is sought it is not
binding on Bhutan. This has been the unilateral interpretation of the
Indo-Bhutan treaty.

Bhutan Negotiates with China

In accordance with this interpretation the Royal Government of

Bhutan has been desiring for a dialogue with China. Bhutan has a 470
kilometers long undemarcated border with Tibet. The Chinese occu-
pation of Tibet has been worrying Bhutan. When a small country such
as Bhutan has an undemarcated border with a big country like China,
it is not in the interest of the small country to leave the border unde-
marcated. The border with Tibet is in the district of Ha and in the
Chumhi valley, near Nathu La in Sikkim. One need not anticipate any
major problem to arrive at a mutually acceptable border since there is

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 BHUTAN LOOKS OUTWARDS I ITS SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 54 1

no history of border dispute as such. Nor there is any legacy of bitter-

ness or conflict between the two countries. However in early September
1979, a large number of Tibetan graziers came deep inside Bhutan and
some of them were carrying arms also. Following this incident, the
government of Bhutan had protested to China through the Chinese
embassy in New Delhi against the graziers, activities. Secondly, there
was the issue of Tibetan refugees. The Bhutan assembly had decided
to expel 400 Tibetan refugees who had refused to accept Bhutanese citi-
zenship. Bhutan also suspected the loyalty of about 2,300 Tibetans who
had already accepted the citizenship, since they too wanted to go back
spurning the offer of citizenship. Against this background the Bhuta-
nese desire for greater elbow room in the conduct of its foreign affairs
acquires significance. The Royal Government's desire for an opening
to China should be viewed in this perspective.

In 1984 Bhutan sent its delegation to China to hold talks on the

border demarcation. In 1985 the Chinese delegation paid a return visit
to Bhutan. According to the Chinese news agency Xinhua, the two
rounds of official talks on the boundary question held between the two
sides had proceeded smoothly and complete trust had been established
between them.8 The third round of boundary talks concluded in Bei-
jing in June 1986. The recent talks seemed to have been held in a
"cordial and friendly" atmosphere. The Chinese side expressed the
hope that the Sino-Bhutanese boundary question would be settled satis-
factorily through friendly consultations in line with the principles of
"equality, mutual benefit and accommodation". The Chinese Prime
Minister Zhao Ziyang also assured Bhutan that Beijing would not inter-
fere in Thimpu's internal affairs and vowed to maitain a peaceful and
friendly border.'*

Although there is not much of a dispute over the traditional border,

Beijing is perhaps trying to use the talks as a spring board for more
direct political relations withThimpu. Secondly, Chinese may be inte-
rested in the establishment of diplomatic mission initially, followed by
increased contacts through border trade and exchanges of religious
visits. If Bhutan allows China open an embassy, it would give Beijing
a political presence for the first time in the Himalayan Kingdom.

What is significant is, Bhutan even without seeking India's advice

or even consulting India announced its decision on direct Sino-Bhuta-

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542 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

nese talks on border demarcation. The King of Bhutan, Jigme Singye

Wangchuk also emphasised Bhutan's need for talks with China- as
essential for her security. However, he acknowledged that the
Bhutanese authorities would require India's help to prepare their case
on the border question and added that negotiations with China would be
conducted with "close understanding" of the Government of India.10
Perhaps he had in mind the article 2 of the 1949 treaty, when he spoke
of "close understanding" instead of "close consultations". These deve-
lopments are significant in the sense that Bhutan had sought to acquire
some kind of freedom in the conduct of its external relations. Hence-
forth the Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949 will not come in the way of
Bhutan pursuing an independent course in foreign relations.

Towards an independent role in foreign affairs

Bhutan had taken another important step towards an independent

role in foreign affairs. At Havana non-aligned summit conference
Bhutan differed with India on Kampuchean issue. This attitude
became more conspicuous when at the U.N.General Assembly Bhutan
voted against India's amendment seeking to commend to the world body
the non-aligned formula of keeping the Kampuchean seat vacant rather
than allowing it to be occupied by the representatives of the ousted Pol
Pot regime.11

Bhutan also expanded its diplomatic connections. In 1979 Thimpu

established diplomatic relations with Singapore and Hongkong. In
1983 Bhutan formalised its relations with Nepal. In 1985 it opened
resident diplomatic missions in Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Nether-
lands and the European economic community.

Apart from striving for an independent role in the conduct of its

external relations, Bhutan also diversified its economic and commercial
relations with other countries. In recent years Bhutan rapidly expan-
ded its contacts with the outside world and began to look beyond India
for economic assistance. When Bhutan launched its first five year plan
in 1961 India was the sole aid giver. Until 1971, .Bhutan's economic
dependence on India was almost total. But India no longer enjoys this
position. Today Bhutan gets only 42 per cent of its aid from India and
the rest from countries like Japan, Australia and other international
and multilateral agencies. For the first time the world bank has pro-

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 BHUTAN LOOKS OUTWARDS I ITS SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 543

vided $ 3 million as credit to Bhutan.12 Bhutan also started drawing

experts from Europe, America and International organisations like
World Bank for developmental purposes. However, India is still the
major trading partner of Bhutan accounting for 94 percent of its trade.
Bhutan also entered into trade agreements with Bangladesh, Nepal,
Singapore and Hongkong. It also signed new trade agreement with
India. The new trade agreement with India allowed Bhutan to have
trade links with other countries permitting the latter to. sell its commo-
dities if India was not in a position to buy them. In a way Bhutan's
dependence on India eased to some extent.

But the most significant development has been the formation of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SA ARC). In August 1983,
Bhutan along with six other nations of the South Asia region, - Bangla-
desh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka - sponsored this
regional economic grouping to promote cooperation among the member
nations in the economic field. This organisation modelled on the lines
of the European Economic community (EEC) was intended to promote
intraregional trade and better utilisation of manpower resources in the
region. The SAARC was formally inaugurated in December, 1985 at
Dhaka and its charter envisaged organised economic, social and tech-
nical cooperation among its members in order to contribute significan-
tly to their notional and collective self-reliance. The SAARC marks
a step forward in the evolution of regional cooperation among the
seven nation members. For Bhutan particularly, the SAARC provides
another platform to project its independent personality on the basis of
political equality. In its anxiety to play an independent role in foreign
affairs, Thimpu recently played host to India and Sri Lanka for hold-
ing talks on ethnic problem in the Island. These developments have
certainly enhanced the prestige of Bhutan in the region. On a lesser
plane, the inauguration of an independent airline called, Druk Air
Service by Bhutan also acquires significance. This will facilitate the
growth of tourism in Bhutan and also expose the Himalayan Kingdom
to the outside world. Thus, Bhutan which initiated an independent
course in foreign affairs in 1970s has further moved along the road in
the subsequent decade.

Bhutan's change of strategy may be due to more than one reason.

Apart from its desire to develop an independent personality of its own,

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544 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SGIENGE

Bhutan might have been guided by some practical considerations.

Though, both India and China were perceived as potential threats to its
security by Bhutan, the developments in Tibet in 1950s and in Sikkim
in 1970s have perhaps convinced Bhutanese of the need to maintain
a balance between the two big neighbours. The ruling circles in Bhu-
tan might have also felt that it was difficult to survive in an hostile
environment.

While Bhutan asserted itself in the conduct of its foreign relations,

India also reconciled to the changed circumstances on the belief that
Bhutan may not be able to cause any harm to its security. Like natio-
nal goals, relations among nations also change depending upon the cir-
cumstances. Even the closest of the allies at times develop different
perceptions of their security needs and hence pursue different policies.
After all national self-interest is the criteria on which any country's
foreign policy is based. Although Bhutan's dilemma has not been re-
solved, it has been able to break the shackles and move outwards. May
be in the long run Bhutan's "new look policy" will resolve to some
extent India's predicament. After Sikkim episode Indian policy had
acquired some degree of sophistication in its policy towards its Himala-
yan neighbours. By over-reacting towards Bhutan, India does not want
to provoke China. If Bhutan can take care of herself it should be fine
with India. This will also to some extent relieve India of its additional
responsibility of protecting Bhutan. It is in India's interest that Bhutan
should remain a buffer state without allowing any outside power to
meddle in its affairs. Perhaps both India's as well as China interests
will be served if Bhutan can stabilise itself as an independent nation

What is important in the relations between the two friendly coun-

tries is that one should not work against the interests of the other. So long
as Bhutan follows a policy of enlightened self-interest without causing
any harm to India's security needs in the region, New Delhi should not
put any obstacles in the way of Bhutan pursuing an independent policy.
Taking geopolitical and geostrategic interests of both the countries
into consideration one cannot but conclude that India and Bhutan
have a common interest in promoting stability in the region.

There is no denying the fact that Indo-Bhutanese relations have

entered into a new phase and they reflect a shared desire for consolida-

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 BHUTAN LOOKS OUTWARDS.* ITS SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 545

tion of the special relationship between the two countries consistent

with their sovereign status and national interests. Both sides naturally
would like to strengthen the traditional links between the two countries
in a true spirit of good neighbourliness and mutual interdependence.
Inspite of occasional irritations and conflicts of interests that sour
Indo-Bhutanese relations, the government of India has been attaching
considerable importance to the consolidation and expansion of Indo-
Bhutanese cooperation so that it could serve as a model relationship
for emulation by other countries of the region.18

NOTES

1. Bhutan, one of the Himalayan Kingdoms, situated al

the Southern slopes of Himalayan ranges lies between 26.5 an
degrees latitude and between 88 and 92 degrees longitude. It
area of 18,000 square miles with an estimated population of
million, see Hasrat, B. History of Bhutan, Education Department,
Government of Bhutan, Thimpu, 1980, p. 4.

2. Ibid. i pp. 108-125.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., pp. 108-122.

5. Ibid., p. 129.
6. The Times of India, December 23, 1974.
7. Peoples Daily , December 23, 1974
8. Narain, K.V., "Bhutan ready to send team for talks with
China", The Hindu , April 17, 1986.
9. Ibid., June 16, 1987.
10. The Times of India, September 27, 1979; Also see The Times
of India, November 26, 1979.
11. The Times of India, September 27, 1979.
12. Statesman , July 20, 1983; Also see Asian Recorder , Vol. XXIX,
No. 50, 1983, p. 17501.
13. Reddy, G.K. "Indo-Bhutanese talks begin on cordial note"
The Hindu , May 27, 1986.

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