The International Criminal Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia Trial PDF

IT-04-74-T 54751
D54751 - D54501
18 September 2009 SF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Case No. IT-04-74-T

Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER III
Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Presiding

Judge Arpad Prandler
Judge Stefan Trechsel
Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua
Registrar: Mr. John Hocking
Filed: 18 September 2009
THE PROSECUTOR
v.
JADRANKO PRLIĆ
BRUNO STOJIĆ
SLOBODAN PRALJAK
MILIVOJ PETKOVIĆ
VALENTIN ĆORIĆ
BERISLAV PUŠIĆ
PUBLIC
_______________________________________________________
REDACTED VERSION OF “MILIVOJ PETKOVIC’S AND SLOBODAN

PRALJAK’S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF COLONEL
MILAN GORJANC”, FILED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2009
________________________________________________________
The Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for Jadranko Prlić Counsel for Milivoj Petković
Mr. Kenneth Scott Mr. Michael G. Karnavas Ms. Vesna Alaburić
Mr. Douglas Stringer Ms. Suzana Tomanović Mr. Nicholas Stewart QC
Counsel for Bruno Stojić Counsel for Valentin Čorić
Ms. Senka Nožica Ms. Dijana Tomašegović Tomić
Mr. Karim Khan Mr. Drazen Plavec
Counsel for Slobodan Counsel for Berislav Pušić
Praljak Mr. Fahrudin Ibrišimović
Mr. Božidar Kovačić Mr. Roger Sahota
Ms. Nika Pinter
Case No. IT-04-74-T Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, et al 18 September 2009

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-2-
REDACTED VERSION OF “MILIVOJ PETKOVIC’S AND SLOBODAN

PRALJAK’S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF COLONEL
MILAN GORJANC”, FILED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2009
1. The Petkovic and Praljak Defences hereby submit the public redacted version of the
report of their expert military witness Colonel Milan Gorjanc, entitled “The Doctrine
of All-people’s Defence and Other Military Topics Relevant to Military Actions
During the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (“the Gorjanc Report”), which was filed
on 1 September 2009.
2. The redacted version of the Gorjanc Report in the BCS language is attached as Annex
A and the English translation of the report as Annex B of this filing.
3. The Curriculum Vitae of the Colonel Milan Gorjanc, including the bibliography, is
provided in the BCS and English language in Annex C of this filing.
4. Mr.Milan Gorjanc is common witness for the Petković and Praljak Defences, as
indicated in their respective 65 ter (G) lists, submitted on March 31 2008. The
Defences agreed that Mr.Gorjanc would testify during the Petković Defence case.
Word count: 324

18 September 2009
Respectfully submitted by,
________________________
Vesna Alaburić
Lead counsel for Milivoj Petković
_____________________
Božidar Kovačić
Lead counsel for Slobodan Praljak
Case No. IT-04-74-T Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, et al 18 September 2009

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ANNEX A
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MILAN GORJANC
IZVJEŠTAJ VOJNOG EKSPERTA
DOKTRINA OPĆENARODNE OBRANE

I DRUGA VOJNA PITANJA RELEVANTNA
ZA POSTUPANJE VOJSKE TIJEKOM RATA U
BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI
Ljubljana, srpanj 2009.
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SADRŽAJ
1. UVOD 4
2. VOJNA KARIJERA 5
3. KVALIFIKACIJE ZA EKSPERTNOG SVJEDOKA O VOJNIM

TEMAMA 7
4. RATNA ARMIJA 8
4.1. Pojam i način stvaranja ratne armije 8
4.2. Kako se oblikuje ratna armija ako prethodno nije postojala mirnodopska 10
4.3. Što je to (a) manevarska, a što (b) teritorijalna komponenta ratne armije 12
4.4. Da li pretežnost teritorijalne komponente u armiji ukazuje na
njezin obrambeni karakter? 14
4.5. Kako se osigurava logistička potpora ratnoj armiji 15
4.6. Kako se popunjavaju gubici i stvaraju nove postrojbe 16
4.7. Što je to smjenska vojska i kakve su posljedice smjenskog
ratovanja na disciplinu vojnika 17
4.8. Kakav je odnos izmeñu civilne vlasti i vojnih postrojbi tijekom rata 18
5. JUGOSLAVENSKA DOKTRINA OPĆENARODNE OBRANE

I DRUŠTVENE SAMOZAŠTITE 21
6. PRIMJENA DOKTRINE OPĆENARODNE OBRANE

U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 30
6.1. Ustav i drugi propisi Bosne i Hercegovine 30
6.1.1. Ustav 30
6.1.2. Uredba o obrani 30
6.1.2.1. Obrana zemlje je pravo i dužnost grañana 30
6.1.2.2. Vojna obrana, radna obveza, civilna obrana,
služba motrenja i dojavljivanja 32
6.1.2.3. Obučavanje i osposobljavanje za obranu 36
6.1.2.4. Obavještajna djelatnost grañana 36
6.1.3. Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oružanim snagama R BiH 38
6.1.3.1 Sastav oružanih snaga 38
6.1.3.2. Armija je udarna obrambena snaga 39
6.1.3.3 Mobilizacija 40
6.1.3.4. Vojna obveza 41
6.1.3.5. Zaključak 43
6.2. Odluke i zapovijedi 45
6.3. Djelovanje u pozadini neprijatelja s osloncem na staovništvo 50
7. MUSLIMANSKI VOJNICI HVO KAO SIGURNOSNI PROBLEM 53
8. VOJNO ZNAČENJE SREDIŠNJE BOSNE I

SJEVERNE HERCEGOVINE 58
8.1. Zemljopisno definiranje prostora 58
8.2. Značenje tog prostora u planovima obrane SFR Jugoslavije 59
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8.3. Značenje tog prostora u vrijeme raspada SFR Jugoslavije 61

8.4. Značenje tog prostora u početnom razdoblju rata od sredine
1992. do konca 1993. 65
8.5. Komunikacije i promet tijekom 1992. i 1993. godine 75
8.6. Zaključak 80
9. JE LI POSTOJALA OPSADA MOSTARA? 81
10. SITUACIJA KAD JE JEDNA DRŽAVA NAPADNUTA ILI

UGROŽENA S TERITORIJA DRUGE DRŽAVE 88
11. VOJNO ZNAČENJE BHS POJMOVA «ASANACIJA» I

«ČIŠĆENJE» TERENA 91
12. PREDPODČINJAVANJE: ZNAČENJE I PROBLEMI 94
13. «OPERATIVNI I NASTAVNI POSLOVI» 97
14. «ŠTABNI POSLOVI» ZA POTREBE VRHOVNOG

ZAPOVJEDNIKA 100
15. VOJNE OPERACIJE STRATEŠKE, OPERATIVNE

I TAKTIČKE RAZINE 102
16. AKTIVNA, UPORNA I ODSUTNA OBRANA 105
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1. UVOD
1. Branitelji generala Slobodana Praljka i Milivoja Petkovića obratili su mi se upitom da

li bih Sudu, s obzirom na svoje vojno obrazovanje i dugogodišnju vojnu karijeru,
mogao objasniti odreñena vojna pitanja važna za pravilno utvrñenje odgovornosti za
zločine počinjene u Bosni i Hercegovini u periodu 1992.-94. godina. Upit se posebice
odnosio na:
- organiziranje i funkcioniranje ad hoc ratne armije,
- jugoslavensku vojnu doktrinu općenarodne obrane i ulogu svakog grañanina u
obrani zemlje,
- vojno značenje područja Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine.
Objašnjeno mi je da se od mene ne očekuje ekspertno izvješće činjenične naravi, ali da
će biti zatraženo stručno mišljenje o odreñenim dogañajima pod pretpostavkom da su
točni podaci sadržani u dokumentima koji će mi biti predočeni. Rečeno mi je da bi se
ovaj dio mojeg rada posebice odnosio na vrijeme i uzroke kad su se vojnici HVO
muslimanske nacionalnosti počeli smatrati opasnošću za sigurnost Hrvatske zajednice
Herceg-Bosna, te na ciljeve ofanzivnih djelovanja Armije R BiH s obzirom na
teritorije osvojene u borbama protiv HVO i pravce borbenih djelovanja.
2. U pripremi ovog izvješća surañivao sam s obranama generala Praljka i Petkovića

prvenstveno u pogledu prikupljanja potrebne dokumentacije i preciziranja pitanja koja
će biti obuhvaćena izvješćem. Sva obrazloženja i mišljenja sadržana u ovom izvješću
isključivo su moja i nitko na mene nije utjecao da mišljenje promijenim.
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2. VOJNA KARIJERA
3. Nakon završene gimnazije u Celju (Slovenija), otišao sam na Vojnu akademiju u

Beograd (Srbija). Vojne studije sam nastavio u Sarajevu (BiH) na smjeru pješaštvo.
Vojnu akademiju sam završio 1965. godine sa odličnim uspjehom kao IV. u rangu.
Prvo službeno mjesto mi je bio Knin (Hrvatska) gdje sam bio zapovjednik pješačke
čete. Nakon godinu dana premješten sam u Benkovac (Hrvatska), gdje sam bio
zapovjednik čete u nastavnom središtu za obuku desetnika za potrebe tadašnje 4.
armijske oblasti. Samo godinu dana kasnije 1967. godine po potrebi službe otišao sam
u Sarajevo (BiH) za nastavnika taktike na Vojnoj akademiji, smjer pješaštva. U
meñuvremenu sam studirao na Političkoj školi JNA kao izvanredni slušatelj, koju
sam završio u decembru 1967 sa odličnim uspjehom kao prvi potporučnik u historiji
škole. U Sarajevu sam studirao političke nauke kao izvanredni student na Fakultetu
političkih znanosti. Položio sam sve ispite i stekao uvjete za upis u 3. godinu. Radi
odlaska na dalje vojno školovanje prekinuo sam studije na civilnom univerzitetu. Kao
nastavnik u Vojnoj akademiji bio sam do 1972. godine kada sam otišao na dalje vojno
školovanje u Zapovjedno-stožernu akademiju u Beograd (Srbija) koju sam završio
1974. godine sa odličnim uspjehom kao IV. u rangu. Za vrijeme studija na
Zapovjedno-stožernoj akademiji slušao sam i predavanja iz vojno-političkih znanosti
na magistarskom studiju na Fakultetu političkih nauka u Beogradu.
4. Službu sam produžio u Postojni (Slovenija) kao obavještajni časnik u zapovjedništvu

divizije. Nakon toga postavljen sam za zapovjednika pješačke bojne u Postojni. Tu
sam dužnost obnašao 2 godine. 1977. godine postao sam načelnik stožera pješačke
pukovnije u Postojni. 1980. godine premješten sam u Novo mesto (Slovenija) za
zapovjednika pješačke pukovnije kao najmlañi zapovjednik u činu majora. Sljedeće
godine postavljen sam za zapovjednika motorizirane brigade u Ajdovščini (Slovenija).
gdje sam bio do 1986. godine. Usporedo sa zapovijedanjem brigadom završio sam i
najviše vojne studije na Školi narodne obrane u Beogradu (Srbija) kao izvanredni
slušatelj sa odličnim uspjehom kao III. u rangu 1983. godine S obzirom da sam do tada
u svojoj vojnoj karijeri bio samo na zapovjednim, stožernim i nastavničkim
dužnostima, moji su nadreñeni ocijenili da mi je za dalje napredovanje potrebna i
vojno-politička dužnost. Tako sam postao zamjenik zapovjednika divizije za politička
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pitanja u Postojni (Slovenija). Istovremeno sam predložen i izabran u Centralni

komitet SKJ. 1988. godine sam postavljen za načelnika stožera 37. korpusa u Užicu
(Srbija) na mjesto generalmajora. U čin generalmajora trebao sam biti unaprijeñen 22.
decembra 1991. godine. Položio sam praktični dio ispita i teoretski rad mi je bio
prihvaćen od strane mentora. 1990. godine završio sam i Viši tečaj općenarodne
obrane koji je bio najviši oblik vojno-političkog osposobljavanja istaknutih civilnih
političkih rukovoditelja iz cijele tadašnje Jugoslavije.
5. Izbijanjem oružanog sukoba u Sloveniji izmeñu JNA i TO Slovenije u lipnju 1991.

godine po svom zahtjevu napustio sam službu u JNA (nisam dezertirao) u kolovozu
1991. godine i pridružio se TO Slovenije kao načelnik odjeljenja za obuku i
osposobljavanje u tadašnjem Republičkom stožeru TO (generalštabu) u Ljubljani na
položaju brigadira. 1993. godine iz političkih razloga premješten sam u Centar za
strateške studije kao savjetnik za doktrinarna pitanja i pitanja oružanih sukoba na
teritoriji nekadašnje Jugoslavije. 1995. godine postavljen sam za direktora toga Centra
na položaju brigadira. Tu sam dužnost obnašao veoma kratko vrijeme, jer su me već u
jesen iste godine postavili za direktora Centra vojnih škola Slovenske vojske u
Ljubljani (Slovenija) na položaju brigadira. Na toj sam dužnosti bio sve do
umirovljenja u svibnju 1999. godine. Pored voñenja i oblikovanja vojnog školstva
Slovenske vojske bio sam i predavač taktike i operatike na Zapovjedno-stožernoj školi
Slovenske vojske.
6. Za svoj rad odlikovan sam 6 puta, više puta pohvaljivan i nagrañivan. Sve moje
službene ocjene od strane nadreñenih starješina bile su odlične – «naročito se ističe».
Tri sam puta prijevremeno unapreñivan (u čin kapetana, majora i pukovnika). 1984.
godine primio sam najvišu nagradu oružanih snaga Jugoslavije za rukovoñenje i
zapovijedanje „22. decembar“. Za uspješnu suradnju mojih postrojbi sa stanovništvom
i pomoći u izgradnji civilne infrastrukture dobio sam više priznanja civilnih vlasti,
meñi njima i najviše nagrade općina Ajdovščina, Nova Gorica i Črnomelj.
7. Mada sam bio gotovo 10 godina na službenom položaju generala na 4 različite

dužnosti u 2 vojske u taj čin nisam unaprijeñen iz isključivo političkih razloga.
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3. KVALIFIKACIJE ZA EKSPERTNOG SVJEDOKA O VOJNIM

TEMAMA
8. Moje kvalifikacije za svjedočenje u ovom procesu su sljedeće:

− sveobuhvatno vojno obrazovanje na svim vojnim školama u nekadašnjoj SRFJ,
− dopunsko vojno-političko obrazovanje u Političkoj školi JNA, Fakulteti političkih
znanosti u Sarajevu – dodiplomske studije i Fakulteti političkih znanosti u
Beogradu – magistarski studij,
− nastavnička praksa uz izučavanje teorije u Vojnoj akademiji u Sarajevu (5 godina)
i na Zapovjedno-stožernoj školi SV (4 godine),
− povremena predavanja na Fakultetu društvenih znanosti – katedra znanosti iz
odbrane u Ljubljani,
− rad u svojstvu analitičara oružanih sukoba na Balkanu, posebice u nekadašnjoj
Jugoslaviji u razdoblju 1991-1999, za potrebe ministarstva obrane Slovenije,
− zapaženo komentiranje oružanih sukoba na Balkanu i u svetu na obje televizijske
kuće u Sloveniji (TV Slovenija i POP TV) u razdoblju 1994-2003,
− obiman opus rasprava, analiza, komentara i članaka u nacionalnim medijima, u
medijima država na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije i mnogim svjetskim medijima
(bibliografija u prilogu ovog izvještaja),
− izučavanje vojnih doktrina mnogih država i izrada prijedloga obrambene doktrine
Slovenske vojske 1994. godine,
− bogata i uspješna praksa zapovijedanja postrojbama JNA na različitim razinama od
čete do korpusa,
− veoma dobro poznavanje geografije, običaja i povijesti prostora nekadašnje
Jugoslavije, posebice Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine, Srbije i Slovenije,
− osobno poznavanje mnogih osoba na rukovodećim političkim i vojnim dužnostima
u državama na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije, posebice u BiH,
− prisutnost u najvišem političkom i partijskom vodstvu u svojstvu člana CK SKJ i
izvorno upoznavanje sa zbivanjima u nekadašnoj Jugoslaviji pred raspad 1991.
godine.
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4. RATNA ARMIJA
4.1. Pojam i način stvaranja ratne armije
9. Ratna armija predstavlja svezu vojske i drugih čimbenika u njenoj potpori, vojnog
naoružanja i opreme uvrštenog u vojne postrojbe, nabave, proizvodnje i distribucije
svih potreba za vodjenje oružane borbe, život i rad vojnih postrojbi te općih i
političkih ciljeva države, nacije ili političke skupine. Ratnu armiju čine odrasle i
sposobne osobe koje su prošle odgovarujuću vojnu naobrazbu i obuku za izvršavanje
općih i posebnih zadaća u boju u okviru postrojbi različitih razina. Takodjer se u ratnu
armiju ubrajaju i osobe koje izvršavaju zadaće logističke i druge potpore postrojbi
ratne armije, a nisu neposredno uvrštene u vojne postrojbe. Svaki pojedinac pripadnik
ratne armije mora imati odgovarajuću opremu za boj i zaštitu, pri čemu je najvažnije
osobno oružje. Kolektivno oružje i oprema namijenjena je na uporabi unutar postrojbi
i udružuje se na različitim višim razinama vojnog udruživanja radi učinkovitog
bojevanja odnosno vodjenja rata.
10. Država i vrhovno zapovjedništvo već u miru priprema ratnu armiju. U tu pripremu se
ubraja:
− planiranje ratne popune i evidencija ljudskog potencijala za rasporedjivanje u ratne
postrojbe i za izvršavanje radne obaveze, materijalnih resursa za vodjenje rata i
preživljavanje te rad pučanstva u ratnim uvjetima;
− organiziranje i izvodjenje vojne naobrazbe i strukovnog osposobljavanja novaka,
pričuvnih vojnika, mirnodopskih postrojbi i pričuvnih postrojbi, školovanja i
strukovnog usposobljavanja aktivnih profesionalnih časnika i dočasnika, stožera i
zapovjedništava;
− planiranje i izvodjenje proizvodnje, nabave, distribucije i čuvanja naoružanja i
druge vojne opreme za popunu postrojbi ratne armije i vodjenje rata;
− planiranje i izvodjenje radova na pripremi i uredjenju teritorije za vodjenje rata, pri
čemu je težište na uspostavi sigurnog višekanalnog sustava ratnih komunikacija
izmedju zapovjedništava različitih razina, izgradnji putnih i drugih transportnih
komunikacija te izgradnji objekata za zaštitu zapovjedništava, vitalnih sustava
naoružanja kao i objekata za zaštitu pučanstva;
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− pripremu cjelokupnog pučanstva i materijalnih mogućnosti društva za vodjenje

rata i u tome je težište na psihološko-propagandnoj pripremi osoblja ratnih
postrojbi, pučanstva i psihološkom utjecaju na volju i svijest protivnika.
11. Ratna armija u načelu se sastoji iz mirnodopskog jedra odnosno postrojbi koje su
oblikovane u miru radi obuke novaka i pričuvnog sastava, odnosno za odvraćanje od
agresivnih namjera protivnika. Mirnodopsko jedro odnosno profesionalni sastav
predstavlja temelj oblikovanja ratne armije. U miru su oblikovane skupine za vodjenje
i zapovjedanje na različitim razinama od Vrhovnog zapovjedništva pa sve do najnižih
postrojbi. Sastav i veličina mirnodopskih postrojbi i zapovjedništava u načelu je bitno
manji od ratnog sastava. Neke mirnodopske postrojbe se dopunjavaju manjim brojem
pričuvnih vojnika, neke većinom, a najviše ratnih postrojbi se oblikuje uglavnom od
pričuvnih vojnika. Narastanjem razine ratne opasnosti države ili vladajuća elita
povećavaju mirnodopsko jedro dopunom mirnodopskih postrojbi pričuvnim sastavom
i oblikovanjem novih nižih postrojbi iz pričuve.
12. Ovisno o vremenu do početka rata pričuvni sastav i cjelokupne postrojbe izvode
dopunsku obuku od vojnika pa sve do vojnih vježbi na operativnoj razini. Zapovjedni
sustav je posve uspostavljen na najvišim razinama zapovijedanja – razini vrhovnog
zapovjedanja, operativno-strategijskih sastava i združenih taktičkih postrojbi. Sustav
komuniciranja, nadzora i uskladjivanja u potrebitom stupnju početnog razdoblja rata je
organiziran i djelatan. Zapovjedništva različitih razina dopunjavaju se časnicima i
drugim osobljem iz pričuvnog sastava. Ovisno o razini zapovjedanja popuna se vrši
aktivnim profesionalnim strukovno izobraženim časnicima, a u manjem dijelu i
časnicima iz pričuvnog sastava sa temeljnom časničkom vojnom naobrazbom i
dodatnim usposobljavanjem na kraćim kursevima i vojnim vježbama pričuvnog
sastava u miru. Na najviše zapovjedne i stožerne dužnosti u načelu se postavljaju
strukovno i moralno najsposobniji časnici sa bogatim iskustvom u miru i na vojnim
vježbama.
13. Ratna armija se u načelu oblikuje neposredno pred izbijanje rata, izuzetno se oblikuje
odmah nakon početka agresije. Država s agresivnim namjerama da napadne na drugu
državu u načelu oblikuje ratnu armiju stanovito duže vrijeme pred početak agresije
koje može trajati i do nekoliko mjeseci. Države koje su prisiljene da se brane od
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agresije u načelu oblikuju ratnu armiju nekoliko dana pred samu agresiju ili to čine već
u uvjetima bojevanja i vojne te političke nadmoći protivnika.
4.2. Kako se oblikuje ratna armija ako prethodno nije postojala mirnodopska
14. Posve drugačije je oblikovanje ratne armije u uvjetima nepostojanja države,

mirnodopskog jedra oružane sile i ratnih pričuva, nepomirljivih antagonizama izmedju
vodećih i utjecajnih političkih ili ideoloških skupina, posebice u medjuetničkim,
medjureligijskim i medjurasnim sukobima. Tako se ratna armija oblikuje u uvjetima
gradjanskog rata, narodno-oslobodilačkih ratova i medjuetničkih, medjureligijskih ili
medjurasnih oružanih sukoba.
15. Najmanje jedna strana u sukobu ili obje istodobno oblikuju ratnu armiju u izuzetno
složenim uvjetima. Ne postoji mirnodopsko jedro oružane sile, već je ono u obliku
manjih u pravilu tajnih oružanih skupina koje se obučavaju uglavnom tajno, u veoma
kratkom vremenu, u lošim uvjetima i s nedostatnim sredstvima za obuku. I prije
početka izbijanja oružanog sukoba, a zasigurno početkom sukoba, ove skupine mogu
izvoditi manja oružana dejstva u vidu terorističkih ili diverzantskih akcija. Uspešnost i
odjek tih akcija u javnosti, posebice medju neangažiranim pripadnicima skupine u
sukobu, značajno utječu na narastanje oružanih skupina. Tijekom bojnih dejstava te se
skupine oblikuju u vojne postrojbe sve viših razina. Najčešće te postrojbe dobivaju
nazive najmanje za stupanj viši od običajne jačine tih postrojbi1. Mnoge se manje
postrojbe oblikuju posve stihijno na lokalnoj razini, često van zapovjednog sustava i
njihovo bojno djelovanje često nije vodjeno s više razine zapovijedanja.
16. Početkom ratnog sukoba postrojbe su uglavnom vezane za uži teritorij s kojeg su
popunjene ljudstvom. Proširenjem bojnih dejstava iskazuje se potreba za prijenos
bojevanja na područja gdje ne postoje oružane skupine i tako se oblikuje manevarski
dio ratne armije, koji sve više narasta i postaje nosilac bojnih dejstava. Teritorijalna
komponenta se s vremenom smanjuje u korist manevarske.
1
Skupina do 300-400 vojnika dobiva naziv brigada, dok toliki broj vojnika predstavlja oslabljenu bojnu.
Ti su nazivi temeljeni na propagandnim zahtjevima i poradi utjecaja na moral oružanih skupina i drugih
pripadnika skupina u sukobu.
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17. Prije izbijanja oružanog sukoba ne postoji zapovjedni sustav koji bi objedinjavao
pojedine oružane skupine. Zapovijedanje oružanim skupinama temelji se uglavnom na
osobnom poznanstvu i zajedničkom političkom ili terorističkom djelovanju prije
oružanog sukoba. Najčešće zapovjednici skupina nemaju vojne naobrazbe, a vojno
znanje i iskustvo stječu uglavnom tijekom bojevanja. Tijekom oružanog sukoba
narastanjem postrojbi pristižu i ljudi s vojnim obrazovanjem.
18. U slučaju raspada prijašnje države ili neuspjeha državne vojske i politike, na stranu
pobunjene skupine pristupaju obrazovani časnici aktivnog, a još više pričuvnog
sastava. Oni postaju prije svega pomoćnicima zapovjednika ili stožernim časnicima, a
faktički su planeri ratnih operacija. Tijekom oružanog sukoba organizira se i posebna
naobrazba zapovjednog osoblja van postrojbi, na tečajevima i školama. Na zapovjedne
dužnosti se postavljaju ljudi s ugledom u okolini i unutar postrojbe, ali se dogadja da
se na odgovorne dužnosti postavljaju i ljudi upitnog morala i stručnih mogućnosti ili
pojedinci zbog njihove stranačka pripadnosti. Sustav veza, nadzora i uskladjivanja
uspostavlja se tijekom bojnih dejstava. Početkom oblikovanja postrojbi različitih
razina medjusobne veze, uskladjivanje i nadzor jako su otežani, zapravo nemogući.
19. Logistička potpora je posve neorganizirana i stihijna. Opskrba oružjem, steljivom i

drugim bojnim potrebama najčešće je iz ratnog plijena, oduzimanjem od suprotne
strane. Prije izbijanja oružanog sukoba tajne oružane skupine opskrbljuje se ilegalnom
nabavom na crnom tržištu, iz privatnih pričuva prošlih ratova, ilegalnom obrtnom
proizvodnjom i oduzimanjem (krañom) od suprotne strane. Tijekom proširivanja
ratnog sukoba i narastanjem medjunarodne političke i moralne podpore logistička
podpora je sve bolje organizirana, kako nabavom i pomoći iz inozemstva tako i
vlastitom proizvodnjom u industrijskim objektima. Na redovitost opskrbe utječe
sigurnost opskrbnih putova, pa radi kontrole tih puteva strane u sukobu u pravilu vode
namjenske operacije većih razmjera.
20. Političke stranke ili politički pokret, posebice prevladajući, imaju odlučujući utjecaj na
vodjenje rata. Pojedine političke skupine oblikuju svoje postrojbe koje se ne
podčinjavaju jedinstvenom vrhovnom zapovijedanju. Te postrojbe izvode bojna
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dejstva u skladu s parcijalnim interesima političkog vodstva. Dogadja se da se

pojedine postrojbe sukobe u odbrani vlastitih parcijalnih političkih interesa.
21. U većini ad hoc oblikovanih armija u neorganiziranim državama značajan utjecaj

imaju ideološka i religiozna uvjerenja pripadnika skupine u sukobu, odnosno
predstavnici stranačke ili religijske hijerarhije. Ova uvjerenja se koriste radi jačanja
morala vlastitih postrojbi, a i utjecaja na smanjenje morala protivnika. Često mogu na
nižim razinama zapovijedanja biti zloupotrebljena i prouzrokovati neželjeno ponašanje
pojedinaca i pojedinih postrojbi u odnosu na protivnika2.
4.3. Što je to manevarska, a što teritorijalna komponenta ratne armije
22. U većini suvremenih armija ratnu armiju tvore dvije komponente – manevarska i
teritorijalna. Manevarska komponenta namijenjena je za vodjenje vojnih operacija na
cjelokupnom teritoriju države, pa čak i na teritoriju protivnika. Manevarske jedinice
izvode borbena dejstva na težištu vojnih operacija protiv najjačeg protivnika i po
potrebi se angažiraju u bilo kojem dijelu državnog teritorija. Ovaj dio ratne armije u
pravilu čine najsposobniji vojnici mlañih godišta. Teritorijalna komponenta je
namijenjena uglavnom za nadzor i zaštitu unutarnjeg dijela državne teritorije. Izuzetno
se može angažirati u vojnim operacijama na bojišnici kao pomoćna snaga manevarskoj
komponenti. Čine je vojni obveznici starijih godišta. Izuzetno se manevarska
komponenta popunjava vojnicima iz teritorijalne komponente.
23. Za izvodjenje bojnih operacija cjelokupni teritorij države podijeljen je na vojno-

teritorijalne cjeline ovisno o veličini države. Na tim vojno-teritorijalnim područjima
oblikuju se pojedini strategijski ili operativni sastavi i njihove niže ratne postrojbe.
Niže vojno-teritorijalne razine oblikovane su u načelu kao isključivo teritorijalne vojne
ustanove sa zapovjedništvima manjeg sastava i postrojbama samo teritorijalne
komponente. Te niže razine vojno-teritorijalnog organizovanja ne mogu imati
nikakvog zapovjednog utjecaja na postrojbe manevarske komponente i namijenjene su
2
U povijesti poznati su križarski pohodi kršćana iz zapadne Evrope prema istočnim predjelima koji su
obilovali zločninima u ime vjere, dok u suvremenom razdoblju takovu religijsku zaslijepljenost izkazuju
postrojbe nekih ratnih armija na Bliskom Istoku u vidu pozivanja na vjerski rat – »džihad«.
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uglavnom njihovoj logističkoj potpori dok te postrojbe borave na njihovoj teritoriji.

Vojno-teritorijalna zapovjedništva na operativnoj razini mogu zapovijedati svojim i
pridodatim postrojbama manevarske komponente u bojnim dejstvima u svom području
odgovornosti. Na zahjev više razine zapovijedanja obvezatne su uputiti svoje postrojbe
u sastav drugog vojno-teritorijalnog zapovjedništva operativne razine i van svog
matičnog teritorija. Posve pokretljive na cjelokupnoj ratnoj prostoriji su združene
taktičke postrojbe ranga divizije i brigade, dok su postrojbe teritorijalne komponente
gotovo uvijek vezane za matični teritorij i oblikovane su u vodove, satnije i bojne
odnosno pukovnije.
24. Vojno-teritorijalna zapovjedništva na operativnoj razini u gotovo svim suvremenim

armijama imaju približno jednake odgovornosti i zadaće:
− planiraju, uskladjuju, zapovijedaju i nadziru izvršenje zadaća podčinjenih postrojbi
u pripremi i izvoñenju bojnih dejstava;
− prihvaćaju i privremeno uvršćuju u svoj sastav dodijeljene postrojbe iz drugih
operativnih sastava za izvršavanje odredjenih konkretnih vojnih operacija, pri tome
preuzimaju punu odgovornost za djelovanje tih postrojbi;
− obvezatne su na zahtjev više razine zapovijedanja uputiti svoje postrojbe u sastav
drugih operativnih sastava uz potrebne i propisane materijalne pričuve, ali u toj
situaciji posve gube zapovjednu ulogu i mogu pratiti izvršavanje bojnih i drugih
zadaća samo preko zapovjedništva kome su postrojbe pridate;
− pridate postrojbe koje su u organskom sastavu više razine zapovijedanja a
privremeno su pridate pojedinim nižim operativnim sastavima posve se podreñuju
novom privremenom zapovjedništvu, pri čemu više zapovjedništvo ostvaruje ulogu
zapovijedanja i nadzora isključivo preko privremenog nižeg zapovjedništva,
moguće strukovne upute na izvršenje zadaće mogu upućivati isključivo preko
privremenog zapovjedništva uz angažovanje strukovnog stožernog organa tog
zapovjedništva;
− na području odgovornosti organizuju i odgovorna su za sve vojne aktivnosti, dok
aktivnost u potpori bojnih operacija van neposredne bojišnice dužna su uskladjivati
sa odgovarajućim civilnim vlastima i organima, pri čemu vojne aktivnosti imaju
puni prioritet, posebice u neposrednom izvodjenju bojnih djejstava.
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4.4. Da li pretežnost teritorijalne komponente u armiji ukazuje na njezin obrambeni

karakter
25. Gotovo sve suvremene države organiziraju obranu nacionalne teritorije posebno
organiziranim djelom oružanih snaga, čije su temeljne značajke u sljedećem:
− ovisno od stupnja ugroženosti države ili nacije odnosno raspoloživih materijalnih i
ljudskih resursa te su snage veće ili manje u odnosu na manevarske snage;
− manje države sa oskudnim materijalnim resursima u načelu organiziraju brojno
veće postrojbe teritorijalne komponente;
− ratne armije koje se organiziraju bez mirnodopske osnove (ad hoc) u početku
nastajanja uglavnom imaju temeljne značajke teritorijalne komponente;
− temeljna zadaća teritorijalne komponente je prije svega obrana nacionalne
teritorije;
− teritorijalna komponenta ratne armije organizirana je na teritorijalnom principu,
postrojbe sačinjavaju u načelu mještani jednog sela, grada, općine ili užeg
upravnog područja;
− postrojbe teritorijalne komponente u načelu su organizirane i opremljene za zadaće
osiguranja objekata i stanovništva, za izradu i postavljanje fortifikacijskih
prepreka, za obranu od napada iz zračnog prostora;
− postrojbe teritorijalne komponente opremljene su uglavnom lakšim oružjem,
izuzetno mogu u njihovom sustavu biti oklopna oruña, kraće vrijeme ili za
konkretnu bojnu zadaću;
− teritorijalnu komponentu sačinjava u načelu velik broj manjih postrojbi koje
povezuje uglavnom ideja i težnja obrane svoga doma ili uže okoline, zapovijedanje
tom velikom broju manjih postrojbi je izuzetno teško kako zbog veće meñusobne
udaljenosti, različitosti zadaća, različitog stupnja izravne ugroženosti i nedostatka
tehničkih sredstava komuniciranja;
− povezivanje manjih taktičkih postrojbi (vod, satnija, bojna) u više taktičke
postrojbe (brigada, divizija, korpus) ne znači i stvaranje združenih taktičkih ili
operativnih sastava koje bi bile jednake bojne vrijednosti kao ovakvi sastavi
manevarskog dijela, te su postrojbe i dalje popunjene ljudstvom na užem
teritorijalnom principu i ne mogu zaprimiti potrebnu meñusobnu koheziju – bojnu i
moralnu čvrstinu;
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− postrojbe teritorijalne komponente svoje zadaće u obrani teritorije izvršavaju u

načelu nadzorom teritorije i osiguranjem značajnih objekata infrastrukture i organa
vlasti. U slučaju izravnog napada protivnika obranu izvode manjim ofenzivnih
akcijama u vidu zasjeda, prepada, napada na manje dijelove protivničkih snaga,
izuzetno izvode organiziranu obranu sa fortifikacijskim ureñenjem obrambenih
položaja;
− ofenzivne akcije širih razmjera nemoguće je izvoditi sa postrojbama teritorijalne
komponente bez prethodne temeljite obuke od pojedinca do postrojbe na
operativnoj razini3.
26. Kao zaključak slijedi da država, nacija ili politička skupina koja organizira svoju ratnu
armiju pretežito na teritorijalnom principu i bojna djelovanja izvodi uglavnom sa
postrojbama teritorijalne komponente u biti je obrambena vojska.
4.5. Kako se osigurava logistička potpora ratnoj armiji
27. Logistička potpora ratne armije je u načelu posve centralizirana, posebice popuna
ljudstvom, naoružanjem i bojnim potrebama. U tom cilju se već u miru izvode
odgovarajuće pripreme za proizvodnju, nabavku i distribuciju naoružanja i bojnih
potreba. Tijekom rata opskrba bojnim potrebama u načelu ide preko sustava
zapovijedanja. Nova sredstva iz proizvodnje ili nabave stižu u centralna skladišta
3
Zapovjedništvo 3. korpusa ABiH u travnju 1993 namjerava organizirati sa svim postrojbama korpusa i
općinskih štabova u zoni radi osposobljavanja za ofenzivna djelovanja širih razmjera što se može zaključiti iz
nareñenja za organizaciju logorovanja:
»odlučio sam, na dostignutim linijama organizovati odsudnu odbranu uz ispoljavanje
maksimalne inicijative i izvoñenje aktivnih dejstava ispred p/k (prednji kraj, engl. forward edge of
battle area – prii. M.G.) i u dubini rasporeda neprijateljskih snaga i u zonama brigada i OG
organizovati logorovanja i izvodenje BOiV-a, s ciljem angažujući glavne snage za izvoñenje odbrane i
aktivna dejstva nanositi četnicima što veće gubitke u živoj sili i MTS i ne dozvoliti preuzimanje
inicijative i ostvarivanje taktičkog i operativnog iznenañenja i na taj način izvršiti operativno
obmanjivanje, skrivajući naše namjere i pripreme za izvoñenje ofenzivnih dejstava (podvukao M.G.),
a sa pomoćnim snagama organizovati logorovanje sa zadatkom izvoñenja BOiV, jačanja psiho-fizičke
izdržljivosti boraca, starješina, komandi i jedinica, uzajamnog povjerenja i drugarske solidarnosti i
borbene gotovosti u cjelini…
U bližem zadatku izvoditi odbranu i aktivna dejstva i organizovati logorovanja i obuku na
njim, a u sljedećem izvršiti operativni razvoj i prihvat snaga koje učestvuju u napadnoj
operaciji.(podvukao M.G.).“
„...a izvoñenjem logorovanja podići b/g (borbenu spremnost – prim. M.G.) na što veći nivo i
biti u spremnosti za prihvat i sadejstvo jedinicama i sastavima koji učestvuju u napadnoj operaciji.“
4D 01473 Odluka komandanta 3. korpusa broj 01/1049-1 od 04.04.1993
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vrhovnog zapovijedanja. Mogu se distribuirati neposredno iz proizvodnje ili

inozemstva do združenih taktičkih postrojbi samo po odobrenju strukovnih organa
vrhovnog zapovijedanja. Izuzetno se mogu niža zapovjedništva opskrbljivati
neposredno iz ratnog plijena ili neposrednom nabavom na teritoriji boravka, ako bojna
dejstva protivnika naruše ustaljeni lanac opskrbe.
28. Bitno drugačija je logistička potpora u ratnoj armiji koja se oblikuje bez mirnodopskih
priprema. U početnom razdoblju se opskrba bojnim potrebama (streljivo, oružje,
rezervni dijelovi) organizira iz zaplijenjenih sredstava i pričuva protivnika,
improviziranom proizvodnjom u tajnim radionicama i tajnom nabavkom u
inozemstvu. Stvaranjem slobodnih teritorija i zauzećem protivnikovih proizvodnih
kapaciteta organizira se redovita proizvodnja i organizirana distribucija. Stjecanjem
političkog priznanja otvaraju se kanali za logističku potporu iz trećih zemalja. Hranom
i drugim intendantskim potrebama takva ratna armja opskrbljuje se uglavnom iz
mjesnih izvora. Pri tome imaju vojno-teritorijalna zapovjedništva izuzetnu ulogu.
29. Liječenje ranjenih i oboljelih vojnika načelno se organizira u sanitetskim ustanova

unutar postrojbe. Izuzetno se upućuju u civilne zdravstvene ustanove, gdje se oblikuju
posebni odjeli za vojne osobe koji su pod nadzorom zdravstvenog osoblja na vojnoj
obvezi. Ovo osoblje na neposrednoj je vezi sa sanitetskim organima postrojbi odnosno
vojno-teritorijalnog zapovjedništva i o stanju izlječenja obvezatno je izvještavati
zapovjedništvo postrojbe. Odmor ljudstva iz postrojbi manevarske komponente vrši se
organizirano unutar postrojbe u vojarnama, privremenim boravišnim objektima i
logorištima u zoni bojnih dejstava. Samo manji dio moguće je privremeno pustiti na
odmor kod porodica u vrijeme bez bojnih dejstava, da pri tome ne bude narušena bojna
spremnost postrojbe. Sanitetska opskrba postrojbi teritorijalne komponente zasniva se
uglavnom na civilnim mogućnostima.
4.6. Kako se popunjavaju gubici i stvaraju nove postrojbe
30. Popuna ljudstvom zbog gubitaka vrši se na teritorijalnom principu uz dopuštenje više
razine zapovijedanja. Posebice je osjetljiva popuna dragovoljcima bez odgovarajuće
vojne naobrazbe i provjere sigurnosne odnosno moralne podobnosti. Popuna
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časnicima vrši se sa nerasporedjenim pričuvnim časnicima, uzdizanjem i

unapredjivanjem nižih časnika koji su se osobito istakli u boju i zapovijedanju nižim
postrojbama i koji su se očitovali potrebitim strukovnim i moralnim osobinama za
novu razinu zapovijedanja. Usposobljavanje novih časnika i u toku rata izvodi se u
vojnim učilištima, kraćim tečajevima na različitim razinama zapovijedanja i
neposredno uz rad u stožerima.
31. Nove postrojbe ratne armije se oblikuju pozivom na vojnu službu nerasporeñenih
obveznika iz pričuve, rasporeñivanjem novaka koji su završili temeljnu vojnu
naobrazbu i posebnim središtima i po skraćenom programu te dragovoljcima sa
završenom minimalnom vojnom obukom. Zapovjedno osoblje prerasporeñuje se i
promiče iz ranije oblikovanih postrojbi, a manji postotak mogu činiti i časnici izravno
iz vojnih škola.
4.7. Što je to smjenska vojska i kakve su posljedice smjenskog ratovanja na disciplinu

vojnika
32. U milicijskim vojskama oblikovanim na užem teritorijalnom području poznato je

takozvano „ratovanje na smjenu“. Naime, 1/3 ljudstva nalazi se u bojnom dodiru s
protivnom stranom na bojišnici, 1/3 nalazi se na okupu u vojarnama ili pogodnim
objektima za smještaj, u spremnosti za brzu intervenciju ka bojišnici, dok se 1/3 nalazi
na odmaranju u kućama u krugu obitelji i na obavljaju nužnih kućnih poslova.
33. Takav oblik angažiranja postrojbi moguć je u sljedećim uvjetima:

- kada intenzitet bojeva nije visok, na bojišnici vlada zatišje i snage obje strane su
iscrpljene,
- kada i protivnička strana primjenjuje istovjetan način bojevanja,
- kada vremenski uvjeti i mogućnosti smještaja na bojišnici nisu primjereni za
odmor i boravak ljudstva na otvorenom,
- kada nema mogućnosti redovite smjene angažiranih postrojbi sa postrojbama iz
drugih sredina,
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- kada je u obrani svoje teritorije angažiran najveći dio radno sposobnog

stanovništva kojeg dobar dio mora u isto vrijeme obavljati i aktivnosti na opskrbi
obitelji i uže zajednice.
34. Dobre strane sustava:

- ljudstvo se organizirano odmara u okruženju obitelji i prijatelja što znatno
doprinosi kako višem moralu vojnika tako obitelji i uže društvene okoline,
- odmaranje se vrši u znatno povoljnijim uvjetima redovite ishrane, higijenske
opskrbe i smještaja,
- psihičko i fizičko naprezanje vojnika je znatno manje,
- troškovi opskrbe vojnika su manji kako na bojišnici tako u zaleñu,
- moguće je angažiranje ljudstva na odmoru u slučaju potrebe i van operacijskog
područja matične postrojbe i za osiguranje objekata opće društvene infrastrukture
na teritoriji.
35. Loše strane sustava:

- postrojba je na okupu samo povremeno, u slučaju intenzivnijih bojeva,
- postrojba nije u cjelini uvježbana za izvršavanje većih i težih zadaća,
- potrebno je znatno više vremena za prikupljanje i pokretanje postrojbe van
matičnog područja,
- veoma teško je prikupiti ljudstvo na odmoru prije vremena odreñenog za
prikupljanje i smjenu,
- gotovo nemoguće je uspostaviti organiziran nadzor nad ljudstvom na odmoru, što
je razlog vojničkoj i grañanskoj nedisciplini u smislu kršenja vojničkih pravila i
prekršaja po civilnoj regulativi, pa čak i počinjenja krivičnih djela.
4.8. Kakav je odnos izmeñu civilne vlasti i vojnih postrojbi tijekom rata
36. Odnos vojnih zapovjedništava i organa civilne, političke vlasti reguliran je sustavno
zakonima i pravilnicima još u miru. Civilna vlast organizira vojsku, rukovodi vojskom
putem vrhovnog zapovijedanja, kontrolira vojsku raznovrsnim sredstvima
demokratske procedure, te definira političke i strateške ciljeve vojnih aktivnosti.
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37. Odnos civilne vlasti i vojnih zapovjednika u ratu bitno se razlikuje ovisno o tome da li
se rat odvija na vlastitom teritoriju ili na teritoriju druge države. U slučaju da se rat
izvodi na vlastitom teritoriju, gdje postoje legalni organi civilne vlasti i druge ustanove
i strukture civilne vlasti, taj je odnos temeljen na dosljednom poštovanju mirnodopske
zakonske regulative, koja može biti privremeno promijenjena dok traje rat. Te
privremene promjene takoñer mogu izvršiti samo legalno izabrani predstavnici najviše
državne vlasti ili ustavom odredjeni organi vlasti. Vojni zapovjednici mogu predlagati
odredjene izmjene postojećih zakona i propisa, ali ih usvajaju isključivo nosioci
legalne civilne vlasti. Samo u izuzetnim okolnostima vojni zapovjednici mogu za
kraće vrijeme i na užoj teritoriji privremeno donositi zapovjedi koje zadiru u civilnu
sferu. O tome su, meñutim, obvezatni u što kraćem vremenu obavijestiti nadredjenog
zapovjednika odnosno predstavnike civilne vlasti na tom području.
38. Na drugoj strani nosioci civilne vlasti nemaju nikakvih ovlasti unutar vojnih postrojbi.
Moguće zahtjeve prema pojedinim vojnim zapovjedništvima mogu upućivati izravno
preko organa za suradnju i uskladjivanje ili putem viših organa civilne vlasti i
zakonodavnih odnosno upravno izvršnih organa na državnoj razini. Opskrbu vojnih
postrojbi iz teritorijalnih izvora mogu odobriti samo po zahtjevu višeg organa civilne
vlasti ili u neposrednom dogovoru sa zapovjedništvom združene taktičke postrojbe kao
najnižoj razini takovog uskladjivanja. Viša razina civilne vlasti obvezatna je nižoj
refundirati u naturi ili novčano tako dogovorenu opskrbu. Odnos vojnih
zapovjedništava i civilnih vlasti odnos je pune suradnje i koordinacije te medjusobnog
poštovanja i razumijevanja.
39. Bitno je drugačija situacija ako vojne jedinice izvode bojna dejstva van vlastitog
teritorija i osvoje teritorij na kojem su dotad djelovali organi civilne vlasti izabrani
odnosno imenovani od protivne strane. Takva se situacija naziva okupacijom, pri čemu
nije bitno da li se radi o povratu kontrole nad vlastitim, ranije izgubljenim teritorijem,
ili o osvajanju teritorija koji pripada drugoj državi. Zapovjednik operativnog sastava
jedini je predstavnik svoje države (sada okupacione sile) na novoosvojenom teritoriju.
On je tzv.vojni guverner i preuzima sve ovlasti civilne vlasti. Ako protivnička civilna
vlast suradjuje i ne bojkotira opravdane zahtjeve, vojni je zapovjednik i dalje
obvezatan na suradnju i uskladjivanje. Ako, meñutim, protivnička civilna vlast ne
iskazuje spremnost na suradnju, zapovjednik može suspendirati takve organe civilne
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vlasti, pa čak i privremeno imenovati nove. U slučaju da oružane sile bojnim

djelovanjem ponovo zauzmu (oslobode) dio teritorije na kome je protivna strana
odmah nakon osvajanja uspostavila svoju prethodnu okupacionu vlast, tada ovlasti
zapovjednika izuzetno kratko traju i njihova je dužnost da što prije uspostave ili
prijašnji sustav vlasti (prije okupacije) ili pomognu uspostaviti novu vlast, dovodeći sa
sobom legalno izabrane ili od strane zakonodavnog tijela imenovane nosioce vlasti, pri
čemu moraju uključiti i pojedine nosioce vlasti iz razdoblja okupacije koji su lojalni
oslobodilačkoj vlasti, pogotovo ako je osloboñeni dio teritorije nacionalno, vjerski i
ideološki mješovit ili antagonističan.
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5. JUGOSLAVENSKA DOKTRINA OPĆENARODNE OBRANE I

DRUŠTVENE SAMOZAŠTITE
40. Za potpunije razumijevanje ratnih dogadjanja u nekadašnjoj Jugoslaviji, posebice BiH,

potrebno je poznavati zakone i druge propise, odnosno na njima utemeljenu praksu
oružanih snaga SFR Jugoslavije. Riječ je o doktrini općenarodne obrane i društvene
samozaštite (ONO i DSZ), koja se dosta razlikuje od pravila voñenja rata suvremenih
zapadnih armija. Oblikovanje oružanih snaga pojedinih osamostaljenih republika biše
Jugoslavije, kao i nacionalnih skupina u BiH, kasnije i na Kosovu, obilovalo je
praksom doktrine ONO i DSZ.
41. Oružane snage SFRJ u biti oblikovane su u skladu sa suvremenim gledištima većine
suvremenih armija. Medjutim, meñunarodno okruženje odredjivalo je i mnoge
specifičnosti oblikovanja ratne armije i vodenja rata. Naime, politički nesvrstana
Titova Jugoslavija nalazila se u potpunom okruženju država koje su pripadale ili
NATO paktu odnosno kapitalističkom sistemu ili Varšavskom paktu odnosno
ortodoksnom komunističkom sistemu4. Tome je pogodovala i unutarnja ideologija
permanentnog vanjskog i unutrašnjeg neprijatelja, što je bila izlika za jednopartijski
ideološki režim i unutarnju represiju. Istovremeno je strah od mnoštva neprijatelja bio
nekakov kohezivni elemenat višenacionalne i višereligijske države s različitim
historijskim i kulturnim korjenima. Tako su cjelokupni napori države i vladajuće
komunističke partije bili usmjereni na angažiranje svekolikog ljudskog i materijalnog
potencijala u obrani države i političkog sustava. Svaki gradjanin bio je obvezatan da u
skladu sa svojim mogućnostima i ulogom u državnom i političkom sustavu
maksimalno doprinosi učinkovitoj obrani. Prema Ustavu iz 1974. godine nitko nije
imao pravo potpisati i priznati kapitulaciju vojske i države, otpor se trebao nastaviti i u
uvjetima potpune okupacije države i propasti vojske.
42. Oružane snage SFRJ bile su sastavljene od Jugoslovenske narodne armije (JNA) kao
manevarske komponente i Teritorijalne obrane (TO) kao prostorne komponente, koja
4
Jugoslavija bila je okružena »BRIGAMA« (engl. troubles, njem. Sorgen, fr. soucis). Početna slova
susjednih država daju riječ »brigama« - Bugarska, Rumunjska, Italija, Grčka, Austrija, Madjarska, Albanija.
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je bila najširi oblik organiziranog oružanog općenarodnog otpora5. Svim postrojbama i

operativno-strategijskim sastavima JNA, kao i operativno-strategijskim sastavima TO,
zapovijedalo je Vrhovno zapovjedništvo kojeg je činilo Predsjedništvo SFRJ – po
jedan izabrani predstavnik svake republike i pokrajine. Stručnu potporu činio je Štab
Vrhovne komande, u koji je u ratnom stanju ulazilo savezno ministarstvo obrane
(Savezni sekretarijat narodne odbrane – SSNO). Njemu su bila podredjena vojišta kao
vojno-teritorijalna zapovjedništva, čije se zone odgovornosti nisu podudarala sa
političko-teritorijalnom podjelom države6. Ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzračna obrana
bili su takodjer pod neposrednim zapovjedništvom Vrhovnog zapovjedništva. Ratna
mornarica i obrana priobalnog dijela (Istra, Hrvatsko Primorje, Dalmacija, Boka
Kotorska i crnogorska obala) bila je pod zapovjedništvom Vojnopomorske oblasti koja
je opet bila podredjena vrhovnom zapovijedanju. Vrhovnom zapovjedništvu bili su
podredjeni i Republički stožeri TO kao vojno-teritorijalna zapovjedništva republika.
43. Združene taktičke postrojbe i operativni strategijski sastavi JNA imali su zakonski
precizno odredjene ovlasti i način koordinacije sa civilnim vlastima u zoni
odgovornosti. Taj sustav bio je već pred rat u Sloveniji posve narušen da bi se
raspadom JNA u proljeće 1992. godine posve srušio. Zapovjednici postrojbi JNA
svoje zahtjeve prema civilnim vlastima i za potrebe vodjenja boja na odredjenoj
teritoriji mogli su uputiti izravno ili preko pretpostavljenog zapovjedništva.
Uskladjivanje zadaća vršili su zakonom predvidjeni političko-izvršni organi na svim
razinama političko-administrativnog organiziranja od mjesne zajednice preko općine i
ratnih kotara do republičkih izvršnih vijeća (vlada). To su bili Odbori na ONO i DSZ
koje su sačinjavali nosioci izvršne vlasti odredjene društveno-političke zajednice, dok
im je na čelu bio predsjednik mjesne zajednice, općine, ratnog kotara ili
Predsjedništvo republike.
5
1D02976 Ustav SFRJ iz 1974., čl.240.
6
1. vojište sa sjedištem u Beogradu obuhvatalo je gotovo cijelu Bosnu i Hercegovinu, istočni dio
Hrvatske (Slavoniju), Vojvodinu, središnju Srbiju i Crnu Goru, zapravo preko 40 % nacionalne teritorije. Do
korjenitih promjena došlo je početkom 1990. godine kada su ukinute armijske oblasti, čije su se zone
odgovornosti u velikom dijelu podudarale sa republičkim granicama. Tako su svoja vojno-teritorijalna
zapovjedništva izgubile Slovenija, BiH, Makedonija i Crna Gora, dok je Hrvatska podijeljena u tri vojišta (5. sa
sjedištem u Zagrebu, 1. sa sjedištem u Beogradu i Vojno pomorsku oblast sa sjedištem u Splitu)
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44. Poseban izraz »ostvarivanja vodećeg utjecaja SK u području obrane« bili su komiteti
za ONO i DSZ. Komiteti za ONO i DSZ bili su oblikovani na svim razinama
državnog odnosno administrativnog sustava - od mjesne zajednice odnosno poduzeća
do zaključno s republikom. Zakon i drugi popratni dokumenti predvidjeli su da je
predsjednik odnosno rukovoditelj tih komiteta predsjednik ili sekretar partijske
organizacije na toj razini partijskog organizovanja. Njemu su kao članovi komiteta bili
podreñeni i legalno izabrani rukovoditelji državnih odnosno administrativnih organa
kao i drugih političkih ili društvenih organizacija. Zapovjednik stožera TO,
zapovjednik policije i čak zapovjednik postrojbe JNA7 na tom području bili su
takodjer članovi komiteta, i pored svoje posebne linije zapovijedanja. Kao članovi tih
komiteta bili su obvezatni prihvatiti i izvršiti zadaće tog komiteta.
45. Ti su komiteti bili oblikovani kao političko i koordinacijsko tijelo za rukovodjenje

obranom na odredjenom području i prije svega morali bi osiguravati djelovanje organa
i ustanova civilne obrane. Medjutim, zakon, a još više popratni propisi, dali su im
ovlasti u području zapovijedanja oružanim bojem u slučaju izravne ugroženosti i
napadaja protivnika. Tako je u Smernicama za obranu SFRJ od agresije, kao
temeljnim dokumentom obrambene doktrine, zapisano: »Ako nadležni organi (stožer
TO, p.a.) nisu u mogućnosti da izvršavaju poslove i zadatke iz ONO i DSZ, komiteti
za ONO i DSZ preduzimaju aktivnosti i mere da se ti organi osposobe i nastave rad, a
kada okolnosti to nalažu, sami organizuju opštenarodni otpor i njim rukovode na
svom području (p.a)«.8 U ratu u slučaju prisilnog ostajanja neke postrojbe JNA u
okruženju odnosno po protivniku zauzetom području ona se morala podrediti tom
komitetu.
46. Teritorijalna obrana bila je organizirana na posve specifičan način, koji druge
suvremene vojske nisu poznavale. TO na saveznoj razini nije imala zapovjednog
organa, imala je samo koordinativno tijelo u svojstvu Uprave Glavnog štaba za TO i
pomoćnika načelnika GŠ za TO. Zapovjednici republičkih štabova TO bili su članovi
Vojnog savjeta kao najvišeg savjetodavnog organa saveznog ministra obrane. Oni su
7
Potčinjavanje postrojbe JNA komitetu za ONO i DSZ bilo je iznimnim situacijama kada se ta postrojba
našla na većoj dubini privremeno zauzete teritorije odnosno u dubljoj pozadini okupiranog područja odnosno kad
je postrojba JNA bila pridodata većoj postrojbi TO.
8
Smernice za odbranu SFRJ od agresije, Predsedništvo SFRJ, Beograd, srpnja 1983, str. 32.
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linijom zapovijedanja bili podredjeni republičkim predsjedništvima, kao najvišem

organu političke vlasti u republici. Sustav zapovijedanja TO odvijao se dvostrukom
linijom: prvo, linijom zapovijedanja klasične vojne organizacije od zapovjednika
republičkog stožera preko zonskih stožera, općinskih i stožera većih mjesnih zajednica
do taktičkih postrojbi. Druga linija bila je političko-izvršna preko odbora za ONO i
DSZ, gdje je predsjednik općine bio u odredjenom smislu i nadredjen zapovjedniku
stožera TO. Predsjednik komiteta za ONO i DSZ, koji je istovremeno bio sekretar
komiteta SK na svojoj razini partijskog organiziranja, imao je najčešće odlučujući
utjecaj, naročito u pogledu postavljenja i promicanja zapovjednih i stožernih časnika.
47. Unutar TO postojale su postrojbe manevarske i prostorne komponente. Manevarske

postrojbe bile su organizirane u brigade, a dvije i više brigada i samostalnih odreda
privremeno su bili organizirani čak u operativne grupe. Njima su u načelu zapovijedali
štabovi zona, pokrajina, zajednica općina ratnih kotara, ovisno o unutarnjoj
organizaciji u pojedinim republikama. Izuzetno je republički štab preuzimao izravno
zapovijedanje operativnom grupom, pogotovo ako je u njenom sastavu bila i združena
taktička postrojba JNA. Prostornu komponentu sačinjavali su vodovi i čete na razini
mjesne zajednice, namjenski odredi vodnog ili četnog sastava (pješački, jurišni,
protuoklopni, protudesantni, protudiverzantski, pomorski) na razini općina, odredi
bataljunskog sastava na razini zone ili zajednice općina. Unutar TO na pojedinim
razinama zapovijedanja bile su oblikovane i postrojbe bojne potpore (za vatrenu
potporu, inženjersku potporu, protuzračnu obranu, za protuoklopni boj, postrojbe za
izvidjanje i postrojbe vojne policije).
48. Stožeri TO oblikovali su i postrojbe za logističku potporu. U načelu su se stožeri TO

opskrbljivali iz pričuva društveno-političke zajednice, javnih poduzeća za opskrbu,
transportnih i gradjevnih poduzeća. Sanitetska opskrba bila je posve oslonjena na
civilnu zdravstvenu organizaciju. U ratnim uvjetima zaposjedanja većeg dijela
teritorija društveno-političke zajednice odnosno republike predvidjeno je bilo
oblikovanje posebnih logističkih baza na teško dostupnim područjima odnosno na
slobodnom teritoriju. U tim bazama su društveno-političke zajednice organizirale
vlastitu proizvodnju oružja u vidu improvizacija, popravka oštećenog i zaplijenjenog
oružja, te izravnu nabavku izvana.
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49. Opskrba postrojbi i stožera TO bila je centralizirana iz skladišta i pričuva JNA.

Medjutim, stožeri TO od općinskih pa naviše morali su imati i vlastite pričuve
materijalnih sredstava. Financiranje nabave oružja i vojne opreme bilo je u nadležnosti
stožera TO, a financijska sredstva su osigurale u svojim budžetima društveno-političke
zajednice. Federacija nije osiguravala nikakva financijska sredstva za potrebe
republika, niti su republike organizirale nekakve medjusobne solidarnosne fondove.
Medjutim, unutar republika često su pojedine bogatije općine solidarno izdvajale dio
financijskih sredstava za opremanje i djelovanje TO siromašnijih općina9. U ratnim
uvjetima je opskrba oružjem i bojnim potrebama bila takodjer centralizirana i iz
saveznih pričuva, tekuće ratne proizvodnje, nabave iz inozemstva i savezničke pomoći
kao i ratnog plijena. Republičkim vlastima bilo je dozvoljeno da u ratnim uvjetima
same nabavljaju oružje i vojnu oprema iz inozemstva, šta su neke iskoristile u vrijeme
izravno pred rat (Slovenija i Hrvatska, djelomično i muslimanske snage u BiH –
Patriotska liga i Zelene beretke).
50. Štabovi TO nisu imali nikakvih ovlasti upravljanja i organiziranja aktivnosti u domeni
civilne vlasti. Nadzor pučanstva i prometa u njihovoj zoni odgovornosti u načelu su
izvršavali civilna policija svojim mirnodopskim i mobiliziranim pričuvnim sastavom i
druge zakonom predvidjene ustanove10. Istraživanje kriminalnih i drugih aktivnosti
izvršavali su istražni organi pravosudja. Unutar postrojbi TO su ove radnje izvodili
organi službe sigurnosti i vojne policije za pripadnike TO, pri čemu su suradjivali s
odgovarajućim civilnim organima.
51. Prostorne postrojbe u načelu nisu izvodile bojna dejstvovanja van teritorije općine ili
kotara. Svoje područje napuštale su uglavnom prisilno usljed dejstva protivnika. Samo
u slučaju izravne opasnosti mogli su viši stožeri privremeno okupljati općinske
postrojbe za bojno dejstvovanje na širem području.
9
U Sloveniji je sredinom 80-tih godina prigranična općina Tolmin bila prisiljena republičkim planom
opremanja njene TO izdvajati preko 2% svoga društvenog prihoda, dok je zakonom bilo predvidjeno do 0,5%, na
drugoj strani općina Centar u gradu Ljubljana izdvajala je svega 0,12 % ostvarenog prihoda.
10
U Sloveniji je na temelju iskustva iz narodnooslobodilačkog rata 1941.-45. oblikovana posebna
organizacija za zaštitu objekata, pučanstva i materijalnih dobara, koja je bila djelomično naoružana lakim
pješačkim oružjem i bez vojne uniforme uz obvezatnu vidnu oznaku. Ta se organizacija zvala Narodna zaštita i
bila je pod zapovjedništvom sekretarijata unutarnjih poslova općine te je tijesno suradjivala sa općinskim
stožerom TO. U pripremama za osamostaljenje ta je organizacija postala zametak oružane sile Slovenije jer su
stožeri TO još bili pod nadzorom JNA i njoj vjernih časnika.
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52. Takodjer postrojbe TO nisu mogle biti podreñene višim postrojbama JNA čija je zona
odgovornosti zauzimala i područje općine. Zapovjednici JNA su morali uskladjivati
boravak i dejstvo postrojbi TO u svojoj zoni odgovornosti preko nadležnog štaba TO.
Izuzetno su postrojbe TO mogle biti podredjene postrojbi JNA po zapovjedi
republičkog štaba TO. U slučaju prinudnog ili planskog ostajanja postrojbe JNA na
području koje je zauzeo protivnik, ona se je morala podčiniti štabu TO. U slučaju
zajedničkog bojnog djelovanja postrojbi JNA i TO uskladjivanje operacija vršili su
nadreñeni štabovi i zapovjedništva, ili su oblikovali privremeno zajedničko
zapovjedništvo, sastavljeno od časnika štaba TO i zapovjedništva postrojbe JNA.
53. Pravo države na samoobranu bilo je u Jugoslaviju prenijeto na sve njezine grañane
(kao i sve organizacije i organe), koji su po Ustavu i zakonu imali neprikosnoveno i
neotuñivo pravo i dužnost braniti zemlju11. Nitko nije imao pravo spriječiti grañane da
se bore protiv neprijatelja koji napada zemlju12, a svaki grañanin koji je s oružjem ili
na drugi način učestvovao u otporu protiv napadača smatrao se pripadnikom oružanih
snaga SFR Jugoslavije13. Prema tome, posjedovanje i korištenje oružja nije bilo jedini
kriterij utvrñivanja pripadništva jugoslavenskim oružanim snagama. Svaki grañanin,
koji je na bilo koji način sudjelovao u otporu protiv napadača, smatrao se pripadnikom
oružanih snaga.
54. Zakonom je općenarodna obrana definirana kao jedinstven sistem organiziranja,

pripremanja i aktivnog učešća grañana i pravnih osoba u:
− odvraćanju i sprečavanju agresije i drugih opasnosti za zemlju,
− oružanoj borbi i drugim oblicima općenarodnog otpora i
− izvršavanju drugih zadataka radi obrane neovisnosti, suvereniteta i teritorijalne
cjelokupnosti Jugoslavije i njezinog društvenog ureñenja.14
11
1D02976 Ustav SFRJ 1974., čl. 237.
12
1D02976 Ustav SFRJ 1974., čl. 238.
13
1D02976 Ustav SFRJ 1974., čl. 240.
4D01470 Zakon o opštenarodnoj odbrani, «Službeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., čl. 91., sadržavao
je istovjetnu odredbu, da je pripadnik oružanih snaga i svaki grañanin koji s oružjem ili na drugi način sudjeluje
u otporu protiv neprijatelja.
14
4D01470 Zakon o opštenarodnoj odbrani, «Službeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., čl. 3.
26
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55. U općenarodnoj obrani oružana borba predstavlja odlučujući oblik suprostavljanja

agresiji. Oružana borba i svi drugi oblici općenarodnog otpora predstavljaju
jedinstvo.15 U slučaju napada na zemlju svi jugoslavenski grañani, kao i štabovi,
komande i drugi organi, bili su dužni odmah, ne čekajući poziv ili zapovijed,
izvršavati svoja prava i dužnosti u pogledu obrane zemlje i postupati prema planu
odbrane i svom ratnom rasporedu.16
56. Grañani su imali pravo i dužnost:

− organizirati i sudjelovati u organiziranju, pripremanju i ostvarivanju općenarodne
obrane;
− obučavati se za općenarodnu obranu i za izvršavanje zadataka u ratu, u slučaju
neposredne ratne opasnosti ili drugih izvanrednih situacija;
− sudjelovati u oružanoj borbi i drugim oblicima općenarodnog otpora;
− sudjelovati u zaštiti i spašavanju stanovništva i materijalnih dobara od ratnih
razaranja i drugih opasnosti;
− sudjelovati u izvršavanju drugih zadataka od interesa za obranu zemlje.17
57. Zakon definira da su sljedeća prava i dužnosti grañana osnovna:

− izvršavanje vojne obveze,
− sudjelovanje u civilnoj zaštiti,
− obučavanje za općenarodnu obranu,
− izvršavanje radne obveze,
− izvršavanje materijalne obveze.18
58. Jedinice i ustanove JNA i TO popunjavaju se ljudstvom stalnog i rezervnog sastava

oružanih snaga19. Stalni sastav sačinjavaju vojnici, pitomci, aktivne vojne osobe i
grañanske osobe na službi u oružanim snagama20, a rezervni sastav čine vojni
obveznici koji su odslužili vojni rok, vojni obveznici koji su regulirali obvezu služenja
15
16
17
18
19
4D01470 Zakon o opštenarodnoj odbrani, «Službeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., čl.118.
20
4D01472 Zakon o službi u oružanim snagama, «Službeni list SFRJ 7/1985., čl.9.
27
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vojnog roka na drugačiji način i žene-vojni obveznici21. Obveza služenja u rezervnom

sastavu za muškarce nastaje od dana otpuštanja sa služenja vojnog roka, odnosno od
dana kad je obveza služenja vojnog roka regulirana na drugi način, i traje do kraja
kalendarske godine u kojoj vojni obveznik navršava 60 godina života.22 O svim
vojnim obveznicima voñena je evidencija prema njihova prebivališta.23
59. Jedinice i ustanove JNA i TO mogu se popunjavati i dobrovoljcima. Dobrovoljci su

osobe koje nemaju vojnu obvezu, a primaju se u oružane snage na vlastiti zahtjev.24 U
nekim republikama (Slovenija) organizirani su i dobrovoljci koji još nisu odslužili
vojni rok i nisu napunili 19 godina starosti. U omladinske dobrovoljačke postrojbe TO
primljeni su sa 16 godina starosti. Učestvovali su u obuci postrojbi TO i pored vojne
obuke po programu srednjoškolske naobrazbe. Istaknutiji dobrovoljci omladinci mogli
su steći i vojničke činove25.
60. Mobilizacija se izvršava u slučaju napada na zemlju, nesporedne ratne opasnosti ili
drugih izvanrednih prilika. Mobilizacijom oružane snage prelaze iz mirnodopske
organizacije i stanja na ratnu organizaciju i stanje spremnosti za voñenje
općenarodnog obrambenog rata. Mobilizacija može biti opća ili djelomična, javna ili
tajna.26
61. U doktrini općenarodne obrane veliko se značenje pridaje samozaštiti. Samozaštita je

skup aktivnosti, mjera i postupaka koje poduzimaju grañani i drugi pravni subjekti radi
zaštite interesa općenarodne obrane od svih oblika neprijateljske aktivnosti koji mogu
štetiti tim interesima. Posebice je u tom kontekstu značajno pravovremeno otkrivanje i
spriječavanje djelatnosti koje mogu nanijeti štetu interesima obrane i sigurnosti
zemlje.27
21
4D01472 Zakon o službi u oružanim snagama, «Službeni list SFRJ 7/1985., čl.10. i
4D01471 Zakon o vojnoj obvezi, «Službeni list» broj 64/1985., čl.47.
22
23
24
25
Aktualni političar slovenskog osamostaljenja, ministar obrane iz razdoblja oružanog sukoba JNA sa TO
Slovenije J. Janša, dobio je čin mlañeg vodnika (corporal) kao omladinac dobrovoljac i zato je odbio služiti vojni
rok u JNA odnosno stažiranje u JNA po programu studija obrambenih znanosti.
26
27
4D01470 Zakon o opštenarodnoj odbrani, «Službeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., čl.173. i 174.
28
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62. Prema tome, u slučaju napada na zemlju svi vojni obveznici dužni su odmah, ne
čekajući poziv ili zapovijed, izvršavati svoja prava i dužnosti u pogledu obrane zemlje
i postupati prema planu odbrane i svom ratnom rasporedu. Isto tako, ako je proglašena
opća mobilizacija, svi vojni obveznici iz rezervnog sastava dužni su stupiti u oružane
snage i započeti s izvršavanjem svojih vojnih dužnosti. U takvim okolnostima svaki
vojno sposobni muškarac postaje pripadnikom jugoslavenskih oružanih snaga i ima
pravo i dužnost sudjelovati u obrani zemlje. Ako nije zatečen u otvorenoj oružanoj
borbi, neprijatelj treba te vojno sposobne muškarce smatrati potencijalnim borcima, jer
su u nekoj drugoj situaciji mogli biti zatečeni s oružjem u ruci.28
28
4D01492 Gavro Perazic, knjiga: Ustavnopoliticki i meñunarodnopravni status odbrane i
oružanih snaga, Beograd 1976, stranice 200 - 201
29
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6. PRIMJENA DOKTRINE OPĆENARODNE OBRANE U BOSNI I

HERCEGOVINI
63. Doktrina općenarodne obrane, odnosno koncept naoružanog naroda, bio je primijenjen
u Bosni i Hercegovini 90-tih godina. To je vidljivo u propisima o obrani zemlje, ali i
nizu vojnih dokumenata, koji ukazuju na jedinstvo armije i stanovništva u borbi za
osloboñenje zemlje.
6.1. Ustav i drugi propisi Bosne i Hercegovine
6.1.1. Ustav
64. Ustav Republike Bosne i Hercegovine29 definira da oružane snage BiH čini Armija
Republike. U slučaju rata oružane snage, pored Armije, čine i policija i naoružani
sastavi koji se stavljaju pod jedinstvenu komandu oružanih snaga Republike i čine
jedinstvenu cjelinu (čl.162. st.2.). Svaki grañanin koji s oružjem ili na drugi način
sudjeluje u otporu protiv agresora pripadnik je oružanih snaga Republike (čl. 162.
st.3.). Ova je odredba izravno preuzeta iz Ustava SFRJ koji je propisivao da je «svaki
grañanin koji s oružjem ili na drugi način učestvuje u otporu protiv napadača
pripadnik je oružanih snaga SFRJ.»30 Za pravilno utvrñenje da li je netko pripadnik
oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine nije, prema tome, bitno samo to da li u rukama
ima oružje ili ne. Bitno je da li grañanin na bilo koji način sudjeluje u otporu protiv
agresora. Dakle, oružani i neoružani otpor agresoru su izjednačeni, pa se pripadnikom
oružanih snaga BiH smatra svaki grañanin koji sudjeluje u otporu protiv agresora.
6.1.2. Uredba o obrani31
6.1.2.1. Obrana zemlje je pravo i dužnost grañana
65. Na sjednici održanoj 14. maja 1992. godine, Predsjedništvo RBiH donijelo je Uredbu
sa zakonskom snagom o obrani, kojom su ureñeni sistem i organizacija obrane, prava i
29
1D01236 Ustav Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, pročišćeni tekst, 1993.
30
1D02976 Ustav SFRJ iz 1974., čl.240/3
31
4D00408 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o obrani RBiH
30
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dužnosti Republike, općina, poduzeća i drugih pravnih osoba, zatim vojna obrana i
civilna obrana, inspekcijski nadzor, financiranje i druga pitanja važna za obranu
Republike (čl.1.st.1.). To je, zapravo, bio ranije važeći republički Zakon o narodnoj
odbrani, koji je inoviran sukladno normama suvremenih demokratskih političkih
sustava.
66. Utvrñeno je da Republika preko nadležnih ministarstava i drugih republičkih organa u

oblasti obrane rukovodi narodnim otporom u ratu (čl.5. al.3.), što pokazuje da je
Predsjedništvo BiH usvojilo doktrinu narodne obrane, odnosno narodnog otpora u
ratu, koja je bila osnovna karakteristika obrambenog sustava bivše Jugoslavije.
67. I ova Uredba zadržava pravnu kvalifikaciju iz prijašnjeg jugoslavenskog sustava o

„pravima i dužnostima“ grañana u obrani zemlje, pa stoga utvrñuje pravo i dužnost
grañana da:
− izvršavaju vojnu obvezu,
− izvršavaju radnu obvezu,
− izvršavaju materijalnu obavezu,
− učestvuju u civilnoj zaštiti
− obučavaju se za obranu (čl.46.).
68. Neizvršenje pojedinih obveza u obrani zemlje bilo je sankcionirano kao krivično djelo,
odnosno prekršaj.
69. Osim spomenutih, grañani su po Uredbi imali sljedeća prava i dužnosti:

− da budu rasporeñeni u oružanim snagama, civilnoj zaštiti, službi promatranja i
obavještavanja, jedinicama veze rukovoñenja i kriptozaštite, državnim organima,
poduzećima i drugim pravnim osobama ili na drugim zadacima obrane;
− da se odazovu pozivu nadležnog organa, poduzeća ili druge pravne osobe za
vršenje obveza u oblasti obrane;
− da daju podatke značajne za obranu koje saznaju ili primijete i najhitnije dostave
centru za obavještavanje ili državnim organima;
− da daju potrebne podatke za voñenje evidencije u oblasti obrane. (Čl.47.)
31
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6.1.2.2. Vojna obrana, radna obveza, civilna obrana, služba motrenja i dojavljivanja
70. Vojna obrana je najširi oblik organiziranja i pripremanja grañana za oružanu borbu, a
obuhvaća: organiziranje, pripremanje, razvoj i rukovoñenje oružanim snagama,
popunu oružanih snaga ljudstvom i materijalno-tehničkim sredstvima, poslove i
zadatke vojne obveze, evidenciju, regrutiranje, popunu, osposobljavanje grañana za
voñenje oružane borbe i mobilizaciju (čl.62.). Radi organiziranja i pripremanja
grañana za voñenje oružane borbe organiziraju se oružane snage (čl.63.).
71. Rasporeñivanjem ljudstva i materijalnih sredstava u oružane snage, rezervnu policiju,

civilnu zaštitu, službu osmatranja i obavještavanja, organe društveno-političkih
zajednica, poduzeća i druge organizacije i pravne osobe osigurava se učešće svih
snaga i sredstava na teritoriji Republike na način da se najpotpunije iskoriste stručne i
druge sposobnosti grañana za potrebe obrane (čl.66.). Pojedinac, na primjer, može biti
rasporeñen u neku vojnu jedinicu ili u poduzeće koje proizvodi municiju ovisno o
njegovim znanjima i stručnim kvalifikacijama, na temelju kojih nadležna državna
služba procjenjuje na kojim će zadaćama taj pojedinac dati najveći doprinos
potrebama obrane zemlje.
72. Radnoj obavezi podlijegali su svi radno sposobni grañani s navršenih 15 godina
starosti. Radna obaveza izvršavala se u organima državne uprave, poduzećima i
drugim pravnim licima i obavljanjem povremenih radova za potrebe obrane, a
uvoñena je u slučaju rata ili izvanrednog stanja (čl.48.). Sa stajališta učešća grañana
BiH u obrani odnosno doprinosa nenaoružanih grañana izravnoj obrani oružanih
snaga svakako treba utvrditi značenje pojma „obavljanje povremenih radova za
potrebe obrane“. Povremeni radovi za potrebe obrane predstavljaju angažiranje
grañana pod radnom obavezom na izvoñenju fortifikacijskih radova kao što su izrada
rovova i skloništa za ljudstvo i borbena sredstva postrojbi oružanih snaga, izrada
različitih prepreka na bojišnici i na putovima, priprema grañe i drugog materijala za
fortifikacijske radove, izgradnja privremenih vojnih putova odnosno popravak
postojećih za uredno komuniciranje vojnih vozila. Tako zapovjednik 3. korpusa
Armije BiH u svom nareñenju za angažiranje postrojbi radne obaveze precizno
32
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odreñuje zadaće podčinjenih postrojbi u svezi sa postrojbama radne obaveze32. To isto

stoji i u nareñenju Zapovjedništva 3. korpusa za angažiranje postrojbi radne obaveze
za inženjerijsku potporu bojnog djelovanja korpusa, u kojem se nareñuje: „Održavanje
puteva u zoni odgovornosti brigade vršiti sopstvenim snagama uz pomoć mjesnih
zajednica na terenu.“33 Takoñer zapovjednik 4. korpusa Armije BiH posredno
potvrñuje da su bile postrojbe radne obaveze angažirane na radovima inženjerijske
potpore u zonama bojnog djelovanja: „Jedinice radne obaveze angažovane na
inžinjerijskom obezbjeñenju u zonama b/d dovoditi najkraćim putevima...“34
73. Takoñer je radna obaveza obuhvaćala i izvršavanje zadaća opskrbe vojnih postrojbi
kako na bojišnici tako i na odmaranju u dubini bojišnice u vidu pripreme ili izrade
objekata za smještaj, pripremu, dostavu i podjelu hrane, liječenje i njegu ranjenih i
oboljelih, sahranjivanje poginulih i asanaciju bojišnice. Najizravnije su grañani u
radnoj obavezi doprinijeli dostavom streljiva i bojnih sredstava izravno na borbene
položaje na bojišnici. Ovu zadaću su uglavnom izvršavali mlañi ili stariji muškarci.
74. Poradi organiziranog izvoñenja radova za potrebe obrane u mobilizacijskim planovima

bile su predviñene namjenske postrojbe – radne skupine, vodovi i čete na razini sela,
mjesne zajednice i općine. Radne postrojbe mogle su biti opće koje su pružale
isključivo fizičku radnu snagu i upotrebljavale uglavnom ručni alat ili lakše mašine
(motorne pile) ili lakša transportna sredstva (ručna kolica, zaprežna kola, manji
traktori). Za obimnije fortifikacijske radove oblikovale su se i specijalizirane radne
skupine ili vodovi, koji su upotrebljavali težu grañevinsku mehanizaciju i transportna
sredstva. Za dostavu streljiva i borbenih sredstava pa su se oformile tovarne ili
traktorske skupine. Ovakve skupine i postrojbe su se oblikovale i ad hoc, sukladno
odlukama vojnih zapovjednika i okolnostima na bojišnici35.
32
4D01494 Order issued by Enver Hadzihasanovic and forwarded by Ramiz Dugalic to
Municipal Defence Staff Bugojno, G. Vakuf, D. Vakuf, Zepce, Zavidovici..., re:engagement of work obligation
units, ref: 05/633-2, Zenica, 01 March 1993
33
4D01474 Naredjenje za inž. obezbedjenje komande 3. korpusa, str. pov. broj: 02/136-1 od
21.03.1993.godine
34
4D01487 Order issued by Arif Pasalic to the 4th Corps-all units, re: enforcement of security
measures, ref: 01-3039/93, Mostar, 14 April 1993
35
U opsjednutom Sarajevu neki su lokalni zapovjednici odvodili na kopanje rovova na bojišnici civile
izravno iz vozila gradskog prometa ili sa ulice.
33
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75. Dopunama Uredbe o obrani od 23. aprila 1993. godine36 utvrñeno je da grañani koji se
po osnovi radne obveze angažiraju u jedinicama radne obveze imaju pravo na novčanu
naknadu. Visinu naknade utvrñuje izvršni odbor općine ako se jedinica radne obveze
angažira u vršenju poslova i zadataka za potrebe oružanih snaga. Za jedinice radne
obveze koje se angažiraju na radovima od značenja za obranu u državnom organu,
poduzeću ili drugoj pravnoj osobi, visinu naknade utvrñuju institucije za koje se
radove izvode. (Čl.126b.)
76. Civilna obrana je najširi oblik organiziranja, pripremanja i osposobljavanja grañana,

organa, poduzeća i drugih pravnih osoba za: (i) učešće u neoružanom otporu i (ii)
zaštitu i spašavanje ljudi i materijalnih dobara od posljedica ratnih djelovanja,
elementarnih nepogoda i drugih nesreća (čl.70.).
77. Civilna obrana sastoji se od:

− civilne zaštite,
− službe promatranja i obavještavanja,
− veze rukovoñenja i kriptozaštite, osim za potrebe zapovijedanja oružanim
snagama,
− planiranja i obuka, osim obuke pripadnika oružanih snaga,
− obrambene i zaštitne priprema organa, poduzeća i drugih pravnih osoba. (Čl.71.)
78. Civilna zaštita se organizira, priprema i provodi kao sistem zaštite i spašavanja ljudi,
materijalnih i kulturnih dobara od ratnih razaranja, elementarnih nepogoda, tehničko-
tehnoloških i drugih nesreća i opasnosti miru i ratu (čl.72.). Obavezi služenja u
civilnoj zaštiti podlijegali su svi grañani od navršene 18. pa do 60. godine starosti
muškarci, odnosno 55 godine žene (čl.50.st.1.). Zadaće civilne zaštite nisu bitno
promijenjene u odnosu na mirnodopsko stanje, samo se u vrijeme rata zadaci znatno
povećavaju po obimu i složenosti. Izvršavanjem tih zadaća posredno se doprinosi i
uspješnosti oružane obrane, posebice u smislu jačanja morala i općeg raspoloženja
kako vojnika na bojišnici tako i svih grañana pa i u ratom nezahvaćenim predjelima.
Nekadašnja doktrina općenarodne obrane predvidjela je angažiranje snaga i sredstava
civilne zaštite i za potrebe izravne oružane borbe. Vatrogasne postrojbe gasile su
36
1D01238 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom
snagom o obrani, 23. april 1993.
34
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požare u naseljima pa čak u šumskim predjelima za vrijeme izvoñenja borbi kako bi

postrojbe oružanih snaga mogle opstati na predviñenim položajima. Sanitetske
postrojbe su pružale hitnu pomoć ranjenim vojnicima na bojišnici i evakuirale ih u
civilne zdravstvene ustanove. Specijalizirane postrojbe za detekciju i otklanjanje
posljedica NHB djelovanja protivnika u zahvatu bojišnice posve su se uvezivale u
sustav djelovanja ovih postrojbi oružanih snaga i obavezne su bile dostavljati podatke
koje su prikupili svojim snagama i sredstvima. Zaštitom i evakuacijom obitelji vojnika
najizravnije su utjecale na njihov moral, kao i na odlučnost izvoñenja borbenih
djelovanja.
79. Koliko su značajne bile snage i sredstva civilne zaštite za obranu može se zaključiti i
iz Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama uredbe sa zakonskom
snagom o obrani37 , koja propisuje da se „za vrijeme ratnog stanja, pripadnici civilne
zaštite (štabova i jedinica) u pogledu prava i dužnosti u svemu izjednačuju sa
pripadnicima oružanih snaga“ (čl.3.).
80. Obaveza služenja u službi motrenja i dojavljivanja organizirana je već u miru, dok za
vrijeme rata dobiva složenije zadaće u funkciji obrane:
„Služba osmatranja i obavještavanja u Republici osigurava praćenje i
otkrivanje svih vrsta opasnosti od ratnih dejstava...“ (Čl.91. st.2.)
Težišna zadaća ove službe svakako je motrenje zračnog prostora i pravovremena
dojava naleta zrakoplova i drugih letjelica za napad iz zračnog prostora. Sustav
zračnog motrenja i dojavljivanja civilne sfere posve je bio uvezan u takav sustav
oružanih snaga. Razmjena podataka bila je obavezna za oba sustava. Faktički je bio
civilni motrilački sustav nadopuna a u nekim situacijama i jedini sustav motrenja
zračnog prostora za potrebe pojedinih postrojbi oružanih snaga. Meñutim, organi te
službe svakako će primijetiti i nadolazak kopnenih snaga protivnika, posebice
ubačenih dijelova i skupina, kao i djelovanje topništva i druge aktivnosti suprotne
strane. Posve je razumljivo da će o tome dojaviti nadreñenim organima i stožerima
civilne zaštite i državnih organa, a ovisno od situacije i blizine bojišnice dojaviti će
izravno zapovjedništvima oružanih snaga. Time ova posve civilna služba postaje
obavještajni organ oružanih snaga i izravno je u funkciji oružane borbe.
37
4D01348 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama uredbe sa zakonskom
snagom o obrani, 19. oktobra 1992., Službeni list Armije BiH, broj 1/1992.
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81. Na razini mjesne zajednice ili većeg naselja organizirane su osmatračnice sa stalnom
posadom do 2-3 osobe i odgovarajućim sredstvima veze. Na značajnijim pravcima i
objektima organiziraju se osmatračke postaje sa stalnom posadom od 5-6 osoba. U
svrhu dopune sustava motrenja postavljali su se i osmatrači, koji su dojavljivali
opasnost priručnim sredstvima i optičkim signalima. Te su motrilačke posade činili
starije ili mlañe osobe oba spola, koje nisu bile rasporeñene u postrojbe oružanih snaga
ili postrojbe civilne zaštite. Sustav motrenja i dojavljivanja u ratnim uvjetima i u
zahvatu bojišnice posve je u funkciji uspješnog izvoñenja oružane borbe.
6.1.2.3. Obučavanje i osposobljavanje za obranu
82. Jedna od obaveza grañana BiH bila je obučavanje i osposobljavanje za oružanu

borbu. U članku 99. Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o obrani utvrñuju se pravo i
dužnost obučavanja i osposobljavanja za oružanu borbu: „Radi stjecanja stručnih
znanja i vještina za vojnu (podvukao M.G.) i civilnu obranu, grañani imaju pravo i
dužnost da se obučavaju i osposobljavaju za obranu.“ S obzirom da je i ova obaveza
istovremeno pravo i dužnost, ne mogu je grañani svojevoljno izbjeći, a da pri tome ne
podliježu zakonskoj (krivičnoj ili prekršajnoj) odgovornosti i moralnoj osudi bliže i
šire društvene okoline. U članku 51. spomenuta Uredba propisuje:
„Pravo i dužnost obučavanja za obranu imaju, pod uvjetima propisanim
zakonom, grañani od navršenih 15 do navršenih 60 godina života (muškarci),
55 godina života (žene) ako su sposobni za pohañanje obuke...“
6.1.2.4. Obavještajna djelatnost grañana
83. Grañani BiH su bili obavezni izvršavati obavještajnu djelatnost za potrebe

oružanog otpora. Prema članku 47. stav 3 Uredbe o obrani grañani BiH imaju i pravo
i dužnost da: „3. daju podatke značajne za obranu koje saznaju ili primijete i najhitnije
dostave centru za obavještavanje ili državnim organima.“
84. Ovo je posebna obaveza kojoj podliježu svi grañani bez obzira na starost i spol
odnosno svoju ulogu i opću zadaću u sustavu obrane ili društvenog života uopće.
Podaci iz centara za obavještavanje izravno su dostavljani zapovjedništvima oružanih
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snaga i bili su sukladno značenju i važnosti upotrebljavani u funkciji oružane borbe. U

dikciji „državnim organima“ grañani su bili obavezni dojavljivati svoja zapažanja
izravno zapovjedništvima oružanih snaga kao državnim organima.
85. U obrambenom sustavu nekadašnje Jugoslavije postojala je služba prikupljanja

obavještajnih i sigurnosnih podataka organizirana preko posebne organizacije
povjerljivih osoba izravno na terenu zvanom Mjesna izviñačko-obavještajna služba
(MIOS). U svakom naselju ili u blizini značajnih objekata angažirani su pojedini
povjerljivi grañani na prikupljanju značajnih podataka o protivniku ili njegovim
suradnicima. Ta se služba smjela aktivirati samo u ratu, meñutim pojedini djelatnici
vojne službe sigurnosti su koristili ove ratne suradnike za prikupljanje aktualnih
sigurnosnih podataka u miru, posebice u područjima gdje je bilo već proturežimskih
reakcija i nacionalističkih ispada većeg broja grañana. Krajem 80-tih godina ta je
služba ukinuta, meñutim njeno aktiviranje bilo je predviñeno u ratu. Suradnici se nisu
pridobivali i pripremali za obavještajni rad u miru, već isključivo u ratu. U suštini,
djelovanje ove službe išlo je posredstvom civilnih organa i struktura unutarnjih
poslova i dobiveni podaci su vojnim službama dostavljani obrañeni i u potrebnom
obimu. Ipak, vojni obavještajci i djelatnici vojne sigurnosne službe organizirali su
svoje ljude i kanale. Grañani su u tom radu sudjelovali u smislu prava i dužnosti te
moralnih osjećaja. Ovi povjerljivi grañani koji su bili u izravnoj vezi sa vojnim
obavještajcima nižeg ranga su na prikupljanju podataka angažirali druge stanovnike u
mjestu - susjede, roñake, starije osobe, žene, pa i djecu. Istovjetno djelovanje Armije
BiH potvrñuje, meñu ostalim, naredba zapovjednika 3. korpusa Armije BiH za
intenziviranje obavještajne djelatnosti upućena podreñenim obavještajnim organima u
brigadama. U vezi s prikupljanjem obavještajnih podataka Hadžihasanović nareñuje
„kao poseban zadatak imati uvezivanje sa našim strukturama i simpatizerima na
privremeno okupiranoj teritoriji».38
38
4D01475 Nareñenje za intenziviranje obavještajne djelatnosti komande 3. korpusa, str. pov.
broj: 10/887-2 od 23.03.1993. godine
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6.1.3. Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oružanim snagama R BiH39
86. Predsjedništvo RBiH donijelo Uredbu sa zakonskom snagom o oružanim snagama

Republike Bosne i Hercegovine na sjednici održanoj 20. maja 1992. godine.
6.1.3.1 Sastav oružanih snaga
87. Uredba utvrñuje da oružane snage RBiH čini Armija Republike, a u slučaju rata i
policija i naoružani sastavi koji se stavljaju pod jedinstvenu komandu oružanih snaga
Republike. Pod naoružanim sastavima podrazumijevaju se radnici koji rade na
poslovima fizičkog osiguranja u poduzećima i drugim pravnim osobama, radnici
carinske službe i drugih pograničnih organa (čl.2.).
88. Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom

snagom o oružanim snagama RBIH40 od 18. jula 1992. godine Predsjedništvo RBiH
proširilo je pojam oružanih snaga RBiH tako da se pripadnicima oružanih snaga
smatraju i naoružane formacije koje su se samoorganizirale ili organizirale u ilegalne
vojne jedinice pod raznim nazivima u snage otpora protiv fašističke okupacije Bosne i
Hercegovine od strane tzv. Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, bivše Jugoslavenske
narodne armije, Srpske demokratske stranke i drugih neprijateljskih snaga, u vremenu
od 30. aprila 1991. do 15. aprila 1992. godine (čl.1.). Koje se od spomenutih oružanih
formacija smatraju pripadnicima oružanih snaga RBiH utvrñuje Predsjedništvo RBiH
posebnom odlukom (čl.2.).
89. U kolovozu 1992. Predsjedništvo RBiH ponovno mijenja definiciju pojma oružanih
snaga iz Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o oružanim snagama, tako da od tada oružane
snage čini Armija Republike, a njezin sastavni dio čine postrojbe HVO i drugi
naoružani sastavi koji se stave pod jedinstvenu komandu Armije. Za vrijeme ratnog
stanja, osim Armije, oružane snage čine policija, jedinice fizičkog osiguranja poduzeća
39
4D00409 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oružanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
40
snagom o oružanim snagama RBiH
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i drugih pravnih osoba, jedinice carinske službe i drugi pogranični organi koji se
pretpodčine pod jedinstvenu komandu oružanih snaga.41
6.1.3.2. Armija je udarna obrambena snaga
90. Armija se organizira, osposobljava i priprema u miru za voñenje svih oblika oružane
borbe i borbenih djelovanja, kao udarna obrambena snaga Republike, sa zadatkom da
spriječi agresiju i drugu opasnost za Republiku, da vodi oružanu borbu protiv
neprijatelja i sudjeluje u zaštiti i spašavanju stanovništva i materijalnih dobara u ratu,
omogućujući time mobilizaciju svih obrambenih snaga Republike (čl.3.)42. Armija,
dakle, nije jedina, nego je udarna obrambena snaga, pa nije pravilno Armiju BiH
postovjetiti s ukupnim obrambenim snagama BiH.
91. Armija se organizira u mirdnodopske i ratne jedinice i ustanove. Mirnodopske jedinice

i ustanove popunjavaju se kadrovima na profesionalnom radu u Armiji i vojnim
obveznicima, koji po osnovi vojne obveze služe vojni rok. Ratne jedinice i ustanove
popunjavaju se vojnim obveznicima iz rezervnog sastava, koji su odslužili vojni rok ili
su na drugi način osposobljeni za izvršavanje zadataka i dužnosti na koje su
rasporeñeni. (Čl. 4.)
92. U ratu ili u slučaju izvanrednog stanja jedinice, ustanove i komande Armije
popunjavaju se ljudstvom stalnog i ratnog sastava Armije (čl.16.st.1.). Drugim
riječima, u slučaju rata Armiju čine kadrovi na profesionalnom radu u Armiji i vojni
obveznici na odsluženju vojnog roka, te vojni obveznici iz rezervnog sastava, koji su
odslužili vojni rok.
93. Armija se može popunjavati i drugim osobama (čl.16. st.2.), koje ne podliježu vojnoj
obvezi, ali su primljene u Armiju na vlastiti zahtjev (čl.16. st.3.). Te se osobe u
pogledu prava i obveza izjednačuju s vojnim licima odnosno vojnim obveznicima
(čl.16. st.5.), ovisno o statusu u vojnoj hijerarhiji.
41
4D00410 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama o dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom
snagom o oružanim snagama R BiH, 06.08.1992.
42
4D00409 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oružanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
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94. Pojam vojnih lica definiran je Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o službi u Armiji
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine43, koja je objavljena 1. augusta 1992. godine. Vojna
lica su: (i) aktivna vojna lica, (ii) vojnici i (iii) lica u rezervnom sastavu dok se nalaze
na vojnoj dužnosti u Armiji (čl.3. st.1.) odnosno, drugim riječima, vojnici u rezervi
kad su na vojnoj službi u Armiji (čl.86. st.1.).
95. Aktivna vojna lica su podoficiri, oficiri i generali (čl.3.st.2.), a vojnici i lica u
rezervnom sastavu stupaju na službu u Armiju na osnovi vojne obveze (čl.4. st.2.).
Stalni sastav Armije čine aktivna vojna lica, vojnici, radnici u službi i grañani na radu
u Armiji (čl.8.), a rezervni sastav Armije čine osobe koje po propisima o vojnoj obvezi
podliježu obvezi služenja u rezervnom sastavu Armije.44
96. Važno je napomenuti kako i Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o službi u Armiji RBiH
razlikuje pojam pripadnika Armije od pojma pripadnika oružanih snaga, pa tako u
odredbama o zdravstvenoj zaštiti utvrñuje prava pripadnika Armije, a to su u ratu
prava pripadnika oružanih snaga (čl.60.). Treba, dakle, imati na umu da je pojam
pripadnika oružanih snaga BiH u ratu širi od pojma pripadnika Armije BiH.
97. To dokazuje i odredba Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o obrani po kojoj se

pripadnicima oružanih snaga smatraju i grañani koja se za vrijeme rata ili neposredne
ratne opasnosti, po osnovi vojne obveze, u organizaciji organa uprave za narodnu
obranu, angažiraju na vršenju kurirsko-pozivarskih poslova radi provoñenja
mobilizacije i drugih zadataka za potrebe oružanih snaga i druge potrebe obrane (čl.
126c.)45.
6.1.3.3 Mobilizacija
98. U slučaju izvanrednog stanja ili izvršenog napada na Republiku vrši se mobilizacija
grañana, oružanih snaga i drugih nosilaca obrane i materijalnih sredstava za potrebe
43
4D00412 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o službi u Armiji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
44
4D00412 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o službi u Armiji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
45
snagom o obrani, 23. aprila 1993.
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obrane (čl.20. st.1.). Ovom je odredbom, dakle, definirano da nosioci obrane u BiH
jesu: 1. grañani; 2. oružane snage; 3. drugi nosioci obrane.
99. Mobilizacija može biti opća ili djelomična. Opća mobilizacija Armije i drugih nosilaca
obrane obuhvaća sve ratne jedinice i ustanove, a djelomična samo odreñene jedinice i
ustanove Armije (čl.22.).
6.1.3.4. Vojna obveza
100. Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o vojnoj obvezi46, koju je Predsjedništvo RBiH

donijelo na sjednici održanoj 1. augusta 1992. godine, utvrñeno je da je vojna obveza
neotuñivo pravo i dužnost grañana RBiH na obranu domovine, očuvanje njezine
slobode, nezavisnosti, suvereniteta, teritorijalne cjelokupnosti i Ustavom utvrñenog
društvenog ureñenja (čl.1.st.1.). Izvršavanjem vojne obveze grañani se pripremaju,
obučavaju i organiziraju za: (i) voñenje oružane borbe; (ii) vršenje drugih dužnosti u
oružanim snagama i (iii) sudjelovanje u drugim oblicima općenarodnog otpora
(čl.1.st.2.).
101. Iako se u Uredbi ne spominje pravo grañana na oružani otpor kao posebno pravo, što
je bila pravna norma svojstvena nekadašnjoj jugoslavenskoj doktrini općenarodne
obrane, nesporno je i u Bosni i Hercegovini bilo priznato pravo i obveza svih grañana
da sudjeluju u oružanoj borbi i drugim oblicima općenarodnog otpora. Osim
participacije u oružanim snagama BiH i drugim organiziranim oblicima oružanog i
civilnog otpora, to je svakako podrazumijevalo i svaki drugi oblik otpora kojim su se
neprijatelju nanosili gubici i uzrokovala materijalne šteta, oružjem ili bilo kojim
drugim sredstvima.
102. Vojna obveza, kako je propisano Uredbom, sastoji se od tri obveze: (i) regrutne
obveze, (ii) obveze služenja vojnog roka i (iii) obveze služenja u rezervnom sastavu
(čl.4. st.1.). Regrutnoj obvezi podliježu svi državljani RBiH, a obvezi služenja vojnog
roka i obvezi služenja u rezervnom sastavu samo oni državljani koji su sposobni za
vojnu službu (čl.4. st.3.), s tim što žene ne podliježu regrutnoj obvezi, ni obvezi
46
4D01030 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o vojnoj obvezi
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služenja vojnog roka, već se mogu dobrovoljno prijaviti radi vojne obuke (čl.5.).
Vojna obveza muškaraca prestaje s navršenih 60 godina života, a žena s navršenih 50
godina života (čl.7. st.1.).
103. Vojni obveznik postaje vojna osoba stupanjem u vojnu jedinicu, odnosno ustanovu
oružanih snaga, a prestaje biti vojna osoba otpuštanjem iz vojne jedinice odnosno
ustanove (čl.10.st.1.). Vojni obveznik se za vrijeme izvršenja vojne obveze po pozivu
nadležnog organa izjednačava s vojnom osobom u pogledu prava i dužnosti od polaska
iz stana do povratka u stan u mjestu prebivališta odnosno boravišta (čl.10.st.2.).
104. Regrutna obveza nastaje početkom kalendarske godine u kojoj državljanin BiH
navršava 17 godina, dakle s navršenih 16 godina (čl.11.st.2.), a provodi se u
kalendarskoj godini u kojoj regrut navršava 18 godina (čl.13.st.1.). U slučaju
neposredne ratne opasnosti ili ratnog stanja Predsjedništvo RBiH može narediti da se
regrutiraju i osobe koje su navršile 16 godina (čl.13.st.3.).
105. Regruti koji su ocijenjeni sposobnima za vojnu službu upućuju se na služenje vojnog
roka u pravilu u kalendarskoj godini u kojoj navršavaju 19 godina (čl.20.st.1.), ali za
vrijeme ratnog stanja ili u slučaju nesporedne ratne opasnosti Predsjedništvo RBiH
može narediti da se na služenje vojnog roka upute i regruti koji su navršili 17 godina
(čl.10.st.5.)
106. Vojnik ima pravo na redovno i drugo odsustvo tijekom služenja vojnog roka (čl.36.
st.2.). Iako Uredba ne sadrži odredbu o statusu vojnika na odsustvu, nesporno je da
odustvo ne mijenja status vojnika, tako da odlaskom na odsustvo osoba koja služi
vojni rok ne gubi status vojnika.
107. Osoba koja odsluži vojni rok otpušta se iz Armije RBiH i postaje vojnik u rezervi
(čl.36.st.1.).
108. Obvezi služenja u rezervnom sastavu podliježu vojni obveznici koji su odslužili vojni
rok ili su na drugi način regulirali obvezu služenja vojnog roka, te žene koje imaju
spremu za obavljanje stručnih i tehničkih službi u Armiji RBIH ili su u miru obučene
za ratne dužnosti u oružanim snagama (čl.41.) U slučaju rata ili neposredne ratne
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opasnosti obveza služenja u rezervnom sastavu izvršava se stupanjem u oružane snage

i izršavanjem odreñenih vojnih dužnosti (čl.43.st.1.).
109. Osobe u rezervnom sastavu mogu imati ratni raspored u neku vojnu jedinicu ili
ustanovu (čl. 47.st.1.), a mogu imati i raspored izvan oružanih snaga (čl. 44.st.3.), npr.
obveza rada u nekom poduzeću ili ustanovi od važnosti za obranu zemlje.
110. Jedinice, ustanove i štabovi oružanih snaga obvezani su Uredbom da po službenoj

dužnosti u roku od 15 dana svim vojnim obveznicima – regrutima i osobama u
rezervnom sastavu izdaju uvjerenja o datumu pristupanja oružanim snagama
Republike, s naznakom da li je vojni obveznik dobrovoljno pristupio ili je mobiliziran
u oružane snage i na kojoj formacijskoj dužnosti se nalazio (čl.72.st.4.). Status vojnika
priznaje se vojnim obveznicima – regrutima i osobama u rezervnom sastavu koja su
bila angažirana na radnoj obvezi u jedinicama, ustanovama i štabovima oružanih snaga
Republike (čl.72.st.5.).
111. Iz ovih odredbi jasno proizlazi da se nakon opće javne mobilizacije svi vojni obveznici
(regruti i osobe u rezervnom sastavu), dakle muškarci s navršenih 18 godina, a u
slučaju rata na temelju odluke Predsjedništva RBiH i oni s navršenih 16 godina, pa do
60 godina starosti, smatraju osobama koje su pristupile oružanim snagama RBiH.
112. Odredba po kojoj vojni rok traje šest mjeseci (čl.19. st.1.) dopunjena je 18. jula 1993.
Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom
snagom o vojnoj obvezi47, tako da se za vrijeme ratnog stanja vojnik koji je odslužio
vojni rok prevodi u rezervni sastav i zadržava u Armiji odnosno oružanim snagama do
donošenja odluke o ukidanju-prestanku ratnog stanja u Republici (čl.4.).
6.1.3.5. Zaključak
113. Svi grañani BiH prema pravnoj regulativi imali su pravo i dužnost da sudjeluju u
obrani zemlje odnosno izravno doprinose njenoj uspješnosti raznim djelatnostima, bez
obzira na spol, starost i status u društvu. Faktički je cjelokupno stanovništvo bilo
47
snagom o vojnoj obvezi
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stavljeno u funkciju oružane borbe. U slučaju neizvršavanja zadaća grañani su bili

podvrgnuti krivičnoj i prekršajnoj odgovornosti.
114. Svi vojno sposobni muškarci, od 16 do 60 godina starosti u slučaju rata ili neposredne
ratne opasnosti, bili su pripadnici aktivnog ili rezervnog sastava oružanih snaga BiH.
Iznimno, ako su nadležni organi utvrdili da bi njihov doprinos obrani zemlje bio veći
njihovim angažiranjem na radu u nekom državnom organu, poduzeću ili nekoj drugoj
pravnoj osobi, ili u raznim oblicima civilnog obrane, muškarac vojno sposobne dobi
nije bio rasporeñen u oružane snage BiH već je svoj doprinos obrani zemlje dao radom
u toj instituciji odnosno sudjelovanjem u neoružanim, civilnim oblicima otpora
agresoru.
115. Podsjetimo da su neoružani, civilni oblici otpora bili u izravnoj funkciji oružane borbe,
a sastojali su se od sljedećih zadaća:
(i) u okviru radne obaveze
- povremeno su izvodili različite zemljane (fortifikacijske) radove za
potrebe oružanih postrojbi,
- osiguravali su ishranu, smještaj i drugu opskrbu pojedinaca i postrojbi
oružanih snaga,
- zbrinjavali, liječili i njegovali oboljele i ranjene pripadnike oružanih
snaga,
- prenosili ili prevozili su borbene potrebe – streljivo i drugu opremu za
oružane postrojbe;
(ii) u postrojbama civilne zaštite:
- otklanjali su posljedice borbenih djelovanja protivnika – gašenje požara
u naseljima, uklanjanje ruševina na putovima,
- zbrinjavanje povrijeñenih vojnika,
- ukopavanje poginulih,
- izvoñenje evakuacije obitelji vojnika i drugih žitelja u blizini bojišnice;
(iii) u okviru službe motrenja i obavještavanja:
- dojavljivali nalet protivničkih letjelica u zračnom prostoru
- motrili i obavještavali o pokretima protivničkih snaga kopnom,
posebice ubačenih i diverzantskih postrojbi
(iv) u sustavu obučavanja i osposobljavanja za obranu:
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- stjecali su znanja i vještine u rukovanju osobnim oružjem i postupcima

sa ubojnim sredstvima,
- uvježbavali se u postupcima pojedinca i manje skupine u borbi,
- osposobljavali su se u izradi objekata i primjeni priručnih i mjesnih
sredstava za osobnu i kolektivnu zaštitu u uvjetima oružane borbe;
(v) u sustavu opće obavještajne djelatnosti:
- u okviru svoje redovne civilne djelatnosti neprekidno su prikupljali
podatke o protivniku i dostavljali ih nadležnim državnim organima ili
izravno oružanim postrojbama,
- povremeno su upućivani prema protivniku s namjerom prikupljanja
podataka o njegovim snagama za potrebe vlastitih oružanih postrojbi.
6.2. Odluke i zapovijedi
116. Predsjedništvo RBIH donijelo je na sjednici 8. aprila 1992. Uredbu o ukidanju

dosadašnjeg Republičkog štaba teritorijalne odbrane i obrazovanju Štaba teritorijalne
odbrane Republike Bosne i Hercegovine48. Time je stvorena pravna osnova za
utemeljenje oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine kao samostalne, od Jugoslavenske
armije i sistema obrane SFRJ, nezavisne vojske. Iako je zadržan termin «teritorijalna
obrana» valja naglasiti da se ne radi o konceptu teritorijalne obrane bivše Jugoslavije
koja je uz JNA bila dio oružanih snaga SFR Jugoslavije, već da se radi o nazivu nove
organizacije oružanih snaga BiH.
117. Sljedeći dan, 9. aprila 1992. Predsjedništvo RBiH donijelo je Odluku o objedinjavanju
svih naoružanih snaga na teritoriji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine49, po kojoj su se svi
naoružani sastavi i pojedinci, osim snaga JNA i snaga MUP-a, bili dužni prijaviti
općinskim, okružnim i Gradskom štabu teritorijalne odbrane radi stavljanja pod
jedinstvenu komandi. Grupe i pojedinci koji se ne prijave i ne evidentiraju do 15.
aprila smatrat će se paravojnim formacijama. /Stoga se 15. aprila smatra danom
48
4D00414 Uredba o ukidanju dosadašnjeg Republičkog štaba teritorijalne odbrane i obrazovanju
Štaba teritorijalne odbrane Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
49
4D00411 Odluka o objedinjavanju svih naoružanih snaga na teritoriji Republike Bosne i
Hercegovine, Predsjedništvo RBIH, 9. aprila 1992.
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formiranja Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine.50/ Naredbom predsjednika

Predsjedništva RBiH Alije Izetbegovića od 23. juna 1992. promijenjen je naziv
«Teritorijalna odbrana Republike Bosne i Hercegovine» u naziv «Armija Republike
Bosne i Hercegovine» i organizirane su oružane snage RBiH,51 a 4. jula 1992. godine
Predsjedništvo RBiH donijelo je Odluku o organizaciji oružanih snaga Republike
Bosne i Hercegovine52. Odluka je stupila na snagu danom donošenja, a s tim danom su
formirane oružane snage i Armija RBiH (točka IX.).
118. Neposredna ratna opasnost na teritoriju Bosne i Hercegovine bila je proglašena

odlukom Predsjedništva RBiH od 9. aprila 1992. godine53. Na sjednici održanoj 20.
juna 1992. godine Predsjedništvo RBiH donijelo je Odluku o proglašenju ratnog
stanja54 zbog, kako se navodi u uvodnom dijelu odluke, agresije na Bosnu i
Hercegovinu od strane Republike Srbije, Republike Crne Gore, Jugoslavenske armije i
terorista Srpske demokratske stranke. Cilj je proglašenja ratnog stanja da se omogući
efikasnije angažiranje svih ljudskih i materijalnih potencijala u domovini i inozemstvu
radi oslobañanja Republike od agresora, uspostave narušenog pravnog poretka i
stvaranja uvjeta za povratak prognanog stanovništva (točka 1.). Agresor je do tog
trenutka bio okupirao 70% teritorija države Bosne i Hercegovine. Oružane snage
Bosne i Hercegovine ovlaštene su ovom Odlukom da poduzmu potrebne mjere na
organiziranju općenarodnog otpora radi ostvarivanja postavljenih ciljeva.
119. Istoga dana, 20. juna 1992. godine, Predsjedništvo RBiH donijelo je Naredbu o
proglašenju opšte javne mobilizacije na teritoriji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine55.
Nareñena je opća javna mobilizacija svih vojnih obveznika od 18 do 55 godina starosti
i utvrñena njihova obveza da se s vojnom opremom i osobnim naoružanjem odmah
jave u najbližu jedinicu Teritorijalne odbrane (točka I.). Nareñena je, nadalje, opća
javna mobilizacija svih ostalih radno sposobnih grañana (muškaraca od 18 do 65
godina starosti, a žena od 18 do 55 godina starosti) i utvrñena njihova obveza da se
50
4D 00409 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oružanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine,
čl. 36.
51
4D00404 Naredba Alije Izetbegovića od 23. juna 1992.
52
4D00403 Odluka o organizaciji Oružanih snaga Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Predsjedništvo
RBIH, 4. jula 1992.
53
P00150 Odluka Predsjedništva RBIH o proglašenju neposredne ratne opasnosti
54
P00274 Odluka o proglašenju ratnog stanja
55
4D01164 Naredba o proglašenju opšte javne mobilizacije na teritoriji Republike Bosne i
Hercegovine
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jave u jedinice civilne zaštite, koje će u skladu s Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o

odbrani otpočeti s izvršavanjem zadataka u obrani zemlje (točka II.). Od tog trenutka
svi vojno sposobni muškarci postaju pripadnici oružanih snaga BiH. Razumljivo je da
zbog nedostatka naoružanja i opreme, kao i početnih problema u osnivanju i
organiziranju ratne armije BiH nisu svi vojno sposobni muškarci, vojni obveznici,
mogli biti aktivno angažirani u oružanim snagama. Oni koji nisu bili odmah aktivno
uključeni u borbena djelovanja, bili su rezervna vojska ili su obavljali druge zadaće
važne za obranu zemlje.
120. Jedinstvo stanovništva i oružanih snaga u obrani zemlje posebno je naglašeno već u
Direktivi za odbranu suvereniteta i nezavisnosti Republike Bosne i Hercegovine56,
koju je Štab Teritorijalne odbrane RBiH izdao 12. aprila 1992.:
«2. Snage TO RBiH i naoružano stanovništvo objedinjeni pod jedinstvenom
komandom ŠTO RBIH, nastavljaju dalje omasovljavanje, konsolidaciju i
uspješnu odbranu na čitavoj teritoriji Republike ...»
Odlučeno je «odmah izvršiti mobilizaciju cjelokupnog sastava TO RBiH», a prvu
etapu odbrambene operacije treba izvesti uz «masovan oružan otpor grañana» (t. 4).
121. Na sjednici 26. juna 1992. godine održanoj u Sarajevu Predsjedništvo Republike
Bosne i Hercegovine usvojilo je platformu za svoje djelovanje u ratnim uvjetima57.
Dijelovi Platforme važni su za pravilno razumijevanje općenarodnog karaktera otpora
agresiji koja je otvoreno započela neposredno nakon uspostave nezavisnosti Bosne i
Hercegovine.
«5. Politička osnova opštenarodnog odbrambenog rata
Pravo na život, mir i slobodu čini temelj ljudskih prava u civlizovanom
svijetu. Otpor agresoru organizovaće se i voditi kao opštenarodna
odbrambena borba svih grañana i svih naroda za osloboñenje Bosne i
Hercegovine. /.../
6. Apel svim patriotskim snagama
Ova platforma je poziv svim grañanima i svim narodima u Bosni i
Hercegovini da se aktivno uključe u patriotski front borbe za suzbijanje
56
4D01727 Direktiva za odbranu suvereniteta i nezavisnosti RBiH, Štab Teritorijalne odbrane
RBiH, 12. aprila 1992.
57
1D00942 Platforma za djelovanje Predsjedništva RBiH u ratnim uvjetima
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agresije i uspostavljanje mira i slobode, reda i zakonitosti na cijeloj državnoj

teritoriji Republike. /.../ (bold by MG)
122. Štab Vrhovne komande OS RBiH izdao je 10. septembra 1992. godine Direktivu58,
koja je iznimno važna za pravilno razumijevanje uloge i značaja stanovništva u obrani
Bosne i Hercegovine. Jednim od sadržaja oružane borbe definirana je diverzantska i
protudiverzantska borba:
«Neprekidno izvoditi masovna diverzantska dejstva u pozadini agresora, na
sprečavanju dovoñenja svježih snaga i snabdjevanju, nanoseći agresoru što
više gubitaka. U prvoj etapi borbenih dejstava težište imati na rušenju
mostova, tunela, tjesnaca i drugih objekata na komunikacijama koje iz doline
r.Drina i r.Lim izvode ka Sarajevu i Tuzli. /.../ U drugoj etapi još više
intenzivirati diverzantska dejstva, sa težištem na komunikacijama.» (točka VI.)
Stanovništvo ima veliku ulogu i u pogledu «obavještajnoj obezbjeñenja»:
«U drugoj etapi, težište usmjeriti na prikupljanje podataka o neprijatelju u
rejonima koncentracije i na pravcima angažovanja jedinica u ofanzivnim
dejstvima. Na zadacima obavještajnog obezbjeñenja angažovati obavještajne
organe i izviñačke jedinice, snage MUP-a i stanovništvo.» (točka VII.)
Oslonac na stanovništvo u intendantskom osiguranju vojnih postrojbi (ishrana,
kupanje i slično) bilo je takoñer značajan doprinos uspješnom izvršenju zadaća
oružanih snaga. O tome aspektu doprinosa grañanstva obrani zemlje govori se u točki
VII., podtočka Pozadinsko obezbjeñenje.
123. Komanda 4. korpusa ABIH sastavila je početkom 1993. Uputstvo za izgrañivanje i

jačanje borbenog morala Armije RBiH.59 I u tom se dokumentu naglašava jedinstvo
Armije i naroda kao značajan faktor izgradnje i jačanja borbenog morala:
«Poseban značaj za izgradnju i jačanje borbenog morala ima jedinstvo Armije
i naroda, zasnovano na tradicijama BiH i naroda. Ono se razvija i učvršćuje
kroz oblike zajedničkih priprema naroda i Armije za odbranu zemlje i ispoljava
se u: zajedničkom aktivnom i povezanom učešću u odbrambenom ratu; stručnoj
pomoći pripadnika Armije društveno-političkim zajednicama, organizacijama i
58
4D01240 Direktiva Štaba Vrhovne komande OS RBiH, 10. septembra 1992.
59
4D01603 Uputstvo za izgrañivanje borbenog morala Armije RBiH, 1. veljače 1993.
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radnim kolektivima u pripremi i voñenju rata, angažovanju jedinica i

pripadnika Armije u odbrani života i imovine grañana, i svestranim naporima
i pomoći naroda Armiji, izraženim u njenom materijalnom obezbjeñenju,
zbrinjavanju ranjenika i bolesnika, prikupljanju informacija o neprijatelju,
otkrivanju i onemogućavanju neprijateljevih agenata, provokatora i
diverzanata na terenu, obezbjeñivanju značajnih objekata i izvora
snabdijevanja, učešću u fortifikacijskom ureñenju teritorije i u drugim
aktivnostima.»
124. U Prijedlogu mjera na organizovanju opštenarodnog oslobodilačkog rata60 od 27. maja

1993., načelnik Štaba Vrhovne komande OS R BiH Sefer Halilović, «podržavajući
stav svoje Vrhovne komande i Predsjednika Predsjedništva o neprihvatljivosti
ponuñenog plana /VOPP/, naglašava:
«Radikalan zaokret u stavu velikih sila naspram agresije na RBiH jasno
dokazuje da se odbrana države i naroda mora organizovati i voditi osloncem
na vlastite snage. U odnosu na dosadašnje stanje i ponašanje, to
podrazumijeva definitivno razbijanje iluzija o eventualnoj spoljnoj vojnoj
intervenciji kao presudnom faktoru zaustavljanja agresije na R BiH i suštinski
prelazak na ratni model, koji podrazumijeva maksimalnu mobilizaciju svih
segmenata i potencijala države radi njenog opstanka. /.../
Imajući u vidu sve spomenute elemente i faktore, Štab Vrhovne komande OS
BiH predlaže Predsjedništvu slijedeće:
- da se u ovom presudnom trenutku mobilišu i ujedine sve političke
snage, stranke, udruženja, pokreti i grañani u patriotski front i da se, umjesto
dosadašnje strategije žrtve i traženja pomoći izvana na toj osnovi, snažan
borbeni moral gradi osloncem na sopstvene snage i pružanju podrške Armiji
BiH u borbi za odbranu suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta naše zemlje i
spasu naroda od novih pogroma. /.../»
60
4D00766 Štab Vrhovne komande OS R BiH: Prijedlog mjera na organizovanju opštenarodnog
oslobodilačkog rata, 27.05.1993.
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6.3. Djelovanje u pozadini neprijatelja s osloncem na stanovništvo
125. Prema jugoslavenskoj doktrini općenarodne obrane jedan od temeljnih oblika oružane
borbe jest i borba u pozadini protivnika, odnosno na teritoriji koju protivnik smatra
zauzetom i okupiranom. Ovaj otpor u načelu izvodile su posebne postrojbe jakosti od
skupine vojnika do brigada. Način borbenog djelovanja bio je gerilski, koji je mogao
prerasti u borbena djelovanja širih razmjera, zapravo u partizanski oblik oružane
borbe. Ove postrojbe mogle su biti u pozadinu protivnika ubačene (infiltrirane) preko
crte bojišnice ili su se oblikovale od nerasporeñenog stanovništva koje je ostalo na
zauzetom teritoriju. Ove snage u načelu su izvodile masovne akcije manjih razmjera
na cjelokupnom teritoriju u vidu diverzija, zasjeda na putovima, vatrenim prepadima
po snagama protivnika, zauzimanjem manjih mjesta ili manjih područja. Meta napada
ovih snaga su trebali biti i nosioci okupacione vlasti i pojedini simpatizeri okupacionih
vlasti iz redova domaćeg stanovništva. Ove akcije su mogle u odreñenim slučajevima
poprimiti i značajke terorističkih akata. Cilj ovih djelovanja je u suštini bio nanošenje
gubitaka živoj sili, štete materijalnim sredstvima, razvlačenje snaga u prostoru,
umanjenje morala protivnoj strani i podizanje morala vlastitim snagama i stanovništvu.
126. Temeljni preduvjet ovakvom načinu oružane borbe je oslonac na stanovništvo u smislu
zbrinjavanja i opskrbe pripadnika oružanih postrojbi, prikupljanja obavještajnih
podataka, popune postrojbi novim vojnicima, osiguranje tajnosti boravka i kretanja
oružanih skupina. Bez potpore stanovništva ovakav način oružane borbe nema
mogućnosti za dugotrajnu i uspješnu borbu. Upravo zbog te potpore stanovništva
obrana se smatra narodnom, odnosno otpor općenarodnim, kako je to zapisano u
propisima Bosne i Hercegovine ( i drugih zemalja bivše Jugoslavije).
127. Dokumenti Armije BiH spomenuti u odjeljku 6.2. potvrñuju da je stanovništvo bilo
važan oslonac borbenog djelovanja Armije i ostvarivanja njezinih borbenih planova.
Potvrñuju to i brojni drugi dokumenti, od kojih kao primjere spominjem sljedeće:
(i) načelnik bezbjednosti 42. brdske brigade 4. Korpusa ABiH u svojoj procjeni
bezbjednosne situacije od 16. aprila 1993. predlaže i sljedeće mjere: (i) da se u
selima s muslimanskim stanovništvom uvedu straže i ostvari puna kontrola
sela; (ii) da se preko organa civilne vlasti ostvari kontakt sa svim pripadnicima
muslimanskog stanovništva i zahtijeva puno angažiranje u obrani njihovim
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domova; (iii) da se svi Muslimani pripadnici HVO pozovu da se stave na stranu

svog naroda61;
(ii) u dokumentu s nazivom «Prijedlog mjera bezbjednosti» od 18. aprila 1993.
načelnik bezbjednosti 42. brdske brigade ABiH meñu ostalim predlaže da se:
(i) preko organa civilne vlasti ostvari suradnja sa stanovništvom Dubrava i
Stoca i (ii) «uspostavi suradnja s našim borcima u HVO»62;
(iii) komandant 42. brdske brigade ABiH Bajro Pizović 18. aprila 1993. u naredbi
pripreme za borbena dejstva brigade meñu ostalim nareñuje da organ za moral
izradi plan informiranja stanovništva na teritoriju opština Mostar, Čapljina i
Stolac, te vojnika Muslimana koji se nalaze u postrojbama HVO pomenutih
opština»63;
(iv) u izvještaju o stanju i dogañanjima u 42. brigadu ABiH, koji je 2. maja 1993.
komandant 4. Korpusa ABiH Arif Pašalić dostavio Štabu Vrhovne komande
oružanih snaga BiH, opisuje se razmještaj brigade, pa se uz ostalo ističe kako je
«ljudstvo koje se nije nalazilo na prvoj liniji odbrane prema agresoru bilo
smješteno po svojim kućama». Uz opis zadataka koje je dobilo «ljudstvo iz
HVO Čapljina» /misli se na vojnike HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti – op.
MG/, Pašalić izvještava da su «sela maksimalno obezbijeñena i uvezana
kurirskom vezom».64
128. Angažiranje civila za potrebe oružane borbe bilo je kompleksno, često i izravno u
funkciji voñenja oružane borbe. Postrojbe Armije BiH uglavnom bile su smještene u
naseljima u blizini bojišnice i radi rasterećenja vojnika za osiguranje naselja, postrojbi
na odmaranju i stanovništva angažirani su svi sposobni mještani. To izmeñu ostalog
potvrñuje i nareñenje komande 306. brdske brigade 3. korpusa Armije BiH za
osiguranje sela: „U mjestima stanovanja (smještaja postrojbi brigade – primjedba
M.G.) za obezbjeñenje sela angažovati svo sposobno stanovništvo. Sve vojne
obveznike bez obzira dali su u radnoj obavezi...“ 65
61
4D00033 Načelnik bezbjednosti 42. brdske brigade 4. Korpusa ABiH, Procjena bezbjednosne
situacije, 16. April 1993.
62
4D00034 Načelnik bezbjednosti 42. brdske brigade 4. Korpusa ABiH, Prijedlog mjera
bezbjednosti, 18. April 1993.
63
4D00035 Komandant 42.brdske brigade, Naredba priprema za borbena dejstva brigade, 18. april
1993.
64
4D00036 Komandant 4. Korpusa ABiH Arif Pašalić, Izvještaj, 2. maja 1993.
65
4D01476 Nareñenje za obezbjeñenje seoskih područja, komanda 306. bbr, broj 02/165-1 od
31.01.1993.godine
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129. U naredbi za napad komandant 7. motorizirane brdske brigade ABiH Asim Koričić
takoñer naglašava mogućnost da se «tokom dejstva ima neprekidna ... uvezanost s
mjesnim stanovništvom»66.
130. Diverzantske borbene aktivnosti bile su konstanta ratovanja Armije BiH. Kao primjer
se navode diverzantske akcije Armije BiH poduzete sredinom jula 1993. na širem
području Stoca, zbog kojih je dva dana bio blokiran promet na području Dubravske
visoravni i odgoñen početak operacije HVO poznat pod nazivom JUG.67
66
2D00473 Zapovijest za napad, komandant Asim Koričić
67
Te se diverzantske akcije Armije BiH spominju u brojnim dokumentima, meñu ostalim u:
- 4D00462 (Official record of Salko Habida's Statement no: 02-4/3-06/4-03-226/93, 14 July 1993,
Capljina, signed by Ivica Kraljevic),
- 4D00910 (Official record issued by Ivica Kraljevic about statement given by Musair Klaric, ref: 02-4/3-
06/4-03-229/93, 15 July 1993),
- 4D01044 (Information issued by Nedjeljko Obradovic to HVO General Staff Mostar, re: situation in the
area of responsibility of 'Knez Domagoj'' Brigade, ref: 1100-01-93-31, 16 July 1993)
- 4D01096 (Official memo of statement given by Admir Cavra issued by Ivica Kraljevic, ref: 02-4/3-
06/4-03-241/93, 19 July 1993)
- 4D01101 (Report on questioning issued by Bosko Buntic, re: statement given by Becir Suta, ref: 02-
4/3-06/4-03-234/93, 17 July 1993)
- 4D01730 (Exhibit from Hadzihasanovic case(P692); Analysis of the combat experience of forces in the
3rd Corps area of responsibility issued by Enver Hadzhasanovic to the Supreme Command Staff of the
Armed Forces)
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7. MUSLIMANSKI VOJNICI HVO KAO SIGURNOSNI PROBLEM
131. Postavljeno mi je pitanje da li bi se u trenutku eskalacije sukoba izmeñu HVO i ABiH,

pod pretpostavkom postojanja odreñenih okolnosti, muslimanski vojnici HVO mogli
opravdano smatrati sigurnosnim problemom.
Trenutak eskalacije sukoba definiran je kao sredina 1993. godine, preciznije 30. juna,
do kada je ABIH:
- ostvarila kontrolu na području Konjica, a snage HVO i hrvatsko stanovništvo bili
izolirani u dvije enklave (jedna na prostoru sela Turija, Zabrñe i Zaslivlje, a druga
na području Kostajnice),68
- presjekla komunikaciju izmeñu Kiseljaka i Busovače, čime je započet proces
stvaranja malih hrvatskih enklava na prostoru Srednje Bosne,69
- u junu stekla potpunu kontrolu nad područjem Travnika,70
- u junu stekla potpunu kontrolu na području Kaknja.71
Okolnost koja se smatra pretpostavkom postavljenog mi pitanja jest napad na HVO

koji je 30. juna 1993. Armija BiH izvela u suradnji s vojnicima HVO muslimanske
nacionalnosti. Tim je napadom Armija BiH stekla kontrolu nad vojarnom HVO
«Tihomir Mišić», područjem Bijelog Polja, Vrapčića i drugih mjesta na prostoru koji
se proteže na oko 26 km sjeverno od Mostara.72 Tom je akcijom uspostavljena
komunikacija Mostar-Jablanica, čime su stvorene pretpostavke da se jedinice ABIH na
području Mostara povežu s jedinicama iz drugih dijelova zemlje, te da se uredno
opskrbljuju naoružanjem, municijom i drugim potrepštinama.73 Otprije poznati ciljevi i
68
4D01216 Map of Mostar, Jablanica and Konic area, re: situation till 30 June 1993
69
4D00561 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina; situation in March-April 1993
70
4D00562 Map of BiH, situation in June 1993
71
4D00562 Map of BiH, situation in June 1993
72
4D01216 Map of Mostar, Jablanica and Konic area, re: situation till 30 June 1993
4D00622 Map of the Mostar region; situation after 30 June 1993
IC01005 Situation in Mostar region after 30 June 1993
IC01006 Situation in Mostar region after 30 June 1993
73
Komunikaciju izmeñu Mostara i Jablanice dokazuju, na primjer, sljedeći dokumenti:
- 4D00768 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the 4th and 6th Corps Command, ref:1/297-72, Sarajevo, 27
July 1993;
- 4D00545 Excerpt from the book Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia, Esad Sejtanic, June
2005.
- 2D01389 Information on the combat activities in the area of responsibility of the 1, 2 3, 4, 5 and
6 corps of the BH army
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planovi Armije BiH za stjecanje potpune kontrole teritorija na pravcu Jablanica-

Mostar-Neum, koje je tadašnji načelnik Glavnog stožera Vrhovne komande Armije S.
Halilović predložio na zajedničkoj sjednici Predsjedništva, Vlade i parlamentarnih
stranaka 10. ožujka 1993. godine, bili su na korak do ostvarenja.74
«6. Obijezbediti da luka Ploče i put Ploče – Mostar – Sarajevo – Zenica, bude u
neprekidnoj funkciji za potrebe države BiH. Ako je nužno, za ovo angažovati
meñunarodne snage, a po potrebi i našim snagama taj prostor osigurati
(podvukao M.G.).«
132. Odmah po izbijanju sukoba u BiH u redove HVO stupio je znatan broj pripadnika
muslimanske nacionalnosti, posebice u Mostaru. Naime, zajednički cilj borbe protiv
srpske agresije i nepostojanje organizirane obrane od strane Muslimana bili su temeljni
razlozi uključivanja Muslimana u postrojbe HVO. Organiziranjem Armije BiH čije su
postrojbe sačinjavali gotovo posve pripadnici muslimanske narodnosti otpočele su
tenzije izmeñu postrojbi Armije BiH i HVO. Oružani sukobi izmeñu postrojbi Armije
BiH i HVO izbili su koncem oktobra 1992. u Prozoru i u januaru 1993. u Gornjem
Vakufu i dijelovima Srednje Bosne, a zaustavljeni su relativno brzo nakon izbijanja.
Otvoreni sukobi širih razmjera započeli su krajem marta 1993. u Konjicu, a potom
sredinom aprila 1993. na širem području konjičke općine i u Središnjoj Bosni.
Vrhunac sukoba bio je 30. juna 1993. kada su snage Armije BiH zauzele vojarnu HVO
„Tihomir Mišić“ u sjevernom dijelu Mostara, te područje od oko 26 km sjeverno od
Mostara u pravcu Jablanice, čime su se spojile snage 4. i 6. korpusa Armije BiH.
133. Gubitak kontrole nad iznimno važnim područjem na lijevoj obali Neretve sjeverno od
Mostara bilo je samo po sebi alarmantno za vlasti Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna,
jer je prijetila realna opasnost od potpunog gubitka kontrole nad Mostarom i
teritorijem prema moru.75 Činjenica da je Armija BiH osvojila tako strateški važno
područje zahvaljujući i izdaju vojnika HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti, osnovano je
ukazala na opasnost da HVO zbog istih razloga izgubi kontrolu i nad drugim
područjima koja su branile postrojbe HVO u kojima je bilo vojnika muslimanske
74
3D02648 S. Halilović, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 151 (e-court stranice BCS p. 65,
ET p. 45)
75
P03038 Signed and stamped Proclamation by Jadranko PRLIC, Croatian Defence Council
President, and Bruno STOJIC, HVO Defence Department Head, re: Muslim offensive against Croat in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Number: 02-1-765/93
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nacionalnosti. Ranija upozorenja na sigurnosnu opasnost od velikog postotka

muslimanskih vojnika u pojedinim postrojbama HVO, kojima očigledno dotad nitko
nije pridavao veće značenje, pokazala su se osnovanima.76
134. I dokumenti ABiH o suradnji s muslimanskim vojnicima u HVO-u, uputama da ostanu

u HVO radi izvoñenja odreñenih akcija77, kao i druga saznanja o suradnji vojnika
HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti sa zapovjednicima i vojnicima Armije BiH, otprije
poznata pojedinih službama Herceg-Bosne, dobila su u novim okolnostima dodatno
značenje. Iz mnogih dokumenata Armije BiH razvidno je da su najviši rukovodioci
Armije BiH intenzivno radili na novačenju pripadnika HVO muslimanske
nacionalnosti u redove Armije BiH i istovremeno na njih računali kao unutarnjega
saveznika u predstojećem oružanom sukobu, što se na kraju zbilo u Mostaru 30. juna
1993. godine u povodu napada na vojarnu „Tihomir Mišić“ i područje sjeverno od
istočnog Mostara. Tako je, na primjer, sugerirao načelnik uprave vojne sigurnosti
76
P01438 Signed and stamped report issued by Nojko MARINOVIC to Miljenko LASIC re: Croatian
Defence Council 1st Brigade. Ref. 3155-01-01-93-1.
P02223 Signed and stamped document from the Chief of HVO Security and Information Service
Stjepan Radic Brigade Safety Report for 07-05-93. Ref:No.09-1029/93
P02231 Handwritten report by Ivica PUSIC, assistant for HVO Security and Information Service, to the
commander of the Croatian Defence Council 3rd Brigade, re. security situation in the Croatian
Defence Council 3rd Brigade area of responsibility
4D00920 Report for period from 09.05 - 13.05. 1993 issued by SIS (Information and Security Service)
3rd HVO Brigade, Mostar, 13 May 1993
P02562 Stamped Report re: Order Ref. No: 01-3159/93 dated 27.05.1993 of JIH Zone of Operations,
signed by Marinko BOSNJAK. Ref: 02-1023-2/93.
2D01379 Report on the work of the security intelligence service in the period from January till June 1993
by Ivica Lucic
P03355 Report on the number of Defence Departments for the period January to June 1993. Ref. 02-1/1-
84/93.
P04699 Report on activities of the Croatian Defence Council HZHB for the period January to June 1993
77
4D01461 Defence Department, SIS, Official Note of Informative Talk, No 19-3-22. 19 September 1992
4D00469 Official record issued by Ivica Kraljevic regarding situation and relations between Croats and
Muslims in Stolac Municipality. No: 02-4/03-6/2-10-21/93, 30 March 1993.
4D00033 Security situation valuation, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade, 16 April 1993, no
06-1019/93, signed by Huso Maric
4D00034 Security measures proposition, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd mountain Brigade, 18 April 1993,
no: 06-186/93, signed by Huso Maric
4D00035 Order on preparation for brigade combat operations, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain
Brigade,18 April 1993, no: 01-1025/93, signed by Bajro Pizovic
4D00036 Report about conditions and events in 42nd Mountain Brigade, Mostar, 02 May 1993, no: 01-
3573/93, signed by Arif Pasalic
4D00568 Tasks issued by Fikret Muslimovic to the Chief of the Military Security Service, Command of
the 4th Corps, ref: 03/35-68, Sarajevo, 16 April 1993
4D00473 Response from Bajro Pizovic addressed to Command of Knez Domagoj Brigade, Ref:01-
1024/93, 18 April 1993
2D00281 No. 01/213, Command of Brigade "Bregava", The analysis of our forces combat experiences;
signed by Commander Mr. Bajro Pizovic
2D00288 No. 03/35-68, SUBJECT: Assignments, Armed Forces Supreme Command Headquarters
Security Department; Head Fikret Muslimovic
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Armije BiH F. Muslimović, čovjek od izuzetnog povjerenja predsjednika

Predsjedništva BiH A. Izetbegovića, u zadaćama svome podčinjenom organu u stožeru
4. korpusa:78
„To zbog toga što je realno očekivati dalje zaoštravanje odnosa pa čak i opštu
vojnu konfrontaciju Armije RBiH i HVO. Veoma je bitno da se za takvu
situaciju maksimalno pasiviziraju Muslimani koji se nalaze u HVO i da se utiče
na njihov prelazak iz HVO u Armiju RBiH.“
135. Poslije izbijanja oružanog sukoba izmeñu Armije BiH i HVO u travnju 1993. godine
zapovjednik 42. brigade „Bregava“ usmeno je izdao zapovjed podčinjenim
zapovjednicima:79
„..izvršeno je uvezivanje sa našim ljudima u HVO-u...
...Ljudstvo (Muslimani, prim. M.G.) iz HVO Čapljina ima zadatak da zauzme s.
Tasovčiće s ciljem da ne dozvoli dovoñenje snaga iz pravca Metković.
− sela (muslimanska, prim. M.G.) su maksimalno obezbijeñena i uvezana
kurirskom vezom,
− zauzimanje grada Stolac sa našim snagama u HVO-u,
− zauzimanje punktova i s. Prenj, Nakovanj i Aladinići.
− kontrola mosta na r. Bregava u s. Prenj i sprečavanje uvoñenja snaga HVO
iz pravca Kruševo- Prenj i Svitava – Prenj
− zatvoriti put prema s. Drinovac i s.Kruševo
− MB 60 i 82 mm postavljeni za dejstvo prema HVO,
− lanseru dati ciljevi i na desnoj obali Neretve.»
136. U kontekstu spomenute zapovjedi je i prijedlog mjera koji je načelnik bezbjednosti 42.
brigade Armije BiH predložio svom zapovjedniku:80
„u selima sa muslimanskim narodom uvesti straže i ostvariti punu kontrolu
sela:
78
2D00288 No. 03/35-68, SUBJECT: Assignments, Armed Forces Supreme Command
Headquarters Security Department; Head Fikret Muslimovic
79
4D00036 Report about conditions and events in 42nd Mountain Brigade, Mostar, 02 May 1993, no: 01-
3573/93, signed by Arif Pasalic
80
4D00033 Security situation valuation, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade, 16 April 1993, no
06-1019/93, signed by Huso Maric
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− preko organa civilne vlasti ostvariti kontakt sa svim pripadnicima

muslimanskog stanovništva i zahtjevati puno angažovanje u odbrani svojih
domova;
− pozvati sve Muslimane, pripadnike HVO-a da se stave na stranu svog
naroda.»
137. Na širem području Čapljine i Stoca u martu 1993. je formiran i odred ABiH Čapljina
od isključivo pripadnika muslimanske nacionalnosti. S obzirom da je u postrojbama
HVO na tom području bio velik broj pripadnika muslimanske nacionalnosti koji je
izražavao želju za prelazak u spomenuti odred rečeno im je “da su oni nama (Armiji
BiH) potrebniji i tamo gdje se nalaze.“81 Kako je prelazak bio moguć samo uz
pristanak zapovjedništava HVO to su mnogi pripadnici HVO muslimanske
nacionalnosti samovoljno napuštali postrojbe HVO i prešli u postrojbe Armije BiH što
se vidi iz zahtjeva zapovjednika 1. brigade „Knez Domagoj“ zapovjedniku 42. brigade
„Bregava“ da mu dostavi na uvid suglasnosti za prelazak većeg broja vojnika pri čemu
izražava sumnju da su dezertirali82.
138. Moje je mišljenje da je pod opisanim pretpostavkama osnovano i s vojnog stajališta

potpuno opravdano smatrati da postoji opasnost od novih izdaja od strane vojnika
HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti i da HVO zbog toga može izgubiti kontrolu i nad
drugim područjima. Svaki vojni zapovjednik mora u takvim okolnostima donijeti
zapovijed da se prema vlastitim vojnicima nacionalnosti protivničke strane poduzmu
mjere praćenja ponašanja u boju, nedostupnosti do povjerljivih informacija,
neupućivanja na značajne bojne zadaće, uključujući i drastičnu mjeru razoružanja i
izolacije u slučaju pojedinačnog neadekvatnog ponašanja, a u slučaju neadekvatnog
ponašanja (dezertiranja, kolektivnog otkazivanja poslušnosti) većeg broja pripadnika
nacionalnosti protivničke strane mogu se te mjere poduzeti prema većini odnosno svim
pripadnicima nacionalnosti protivničke strane u vlastitim redovima. Samo tako je
moguće spriječiti gubitke u vlastitim redovima, poraz i gubitak vlastite teritorije.
81
4D01477 Formiranje odreda »Čapljina« u Čapljini – izvještaj komandi 4. korpusa, odred
Čapljina od 15.03.1993
82
4D01478 Dostavljanje suglasnosti na uvid i kontrolu, - zahtjev, Prva brigada HVO »Knez
Domagoj«, broj 1100-01-01-93-220 od 16.03.1993
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8. VOJNO ZNAČENJE SREDIŠNJE BOSNE I SJEVERNE

HERCEGOVINE
139. Postavljeno mi je pitanje da li se stjecanje kontrole Armije BiH nad područjem

Konjica, Novog Travnika, Fojnice, Bugojna, Kaknja i Vareša, te nad područjem od
Jablanice do Mostara i južnije prema Jadranskom moru tijekom 1993. godine može
protumačiti kao planirano osvajanje komunikacijski i privredno značajnih teritorija, te
da li je taj prostor imao neko posebno značenje u koncepcijama obrane SFR
Jugoslavije.
8.1. Zemljopisno definiranje prostora
140. Prostor Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine obuhvaća središnji dio Bosne i
Hercegovine koga možemo omeñiti planinskim masivima Borja – Ravan – Zvijezda –
Ozren – Romanija – Jahorina – Bjelašnica – Prenj – Velež – Mostarsko blato - Trtla -
Cincar – Vitorog – Lisina – Čemernica odnosno teritoriju nekadašnjih općina Jajce,
Donji Vakuf, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Zenica, Žepče,
Busovača, Fojnica, Kreševo, Kiseljak, Visoko, Kakanj, Vareš, Breza, Ilijaš, Hadžići,
Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, Sarajevo u cIjelosti i sjeverne dijelove općina Livno,
Tomislavgrad, Posušje, Široki brijeg i Mostar kao i južne predjele općina Skender
Vakuf, Kotor Varoš, Teslić i Tešanj.
141. Geografski se prostorija može definirati i gornjim i srednjim tokom rijeka Bosne i
Vrbasa koje od dinarskog razvoña teku prema sjeveru i pripadaju savskom
(crnomorskom) slivu i slivu rijeke Neretve, koja se ulijeva u Jadransko more. Reljef
prostorije je pretežito planinski sa više visokih planinskih masiva meñu kojim se
istiću planine Vlašić (1933m), Bjelašnica (2067m), Jahorina (1916m), Vranica
(2110m), Bitovnja (1700m), Prenj (2155m), Velež (1969m), Čabulja (1776m),
Čvrsnica (2228m), Vran (2074m), Raduša (1956m). Planinski masivi su ispresijecani
dubokim dolinama, mjestimice i klisurama. Izmeñu planinskih masiva protežu se
široka polja i udoline od koji su najveći Uskoplje (središnji tok Vrbasa), Lašvanska
dolina (izmeñu Travnika i Viteza), dolina rijeke Lepenice i središnjeg toka rijeke
Fojnice kod Kiseljaka, dolina rijeke Usore sa širom prostorijom općina Teslić i Tešanj,
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Sarajevsko polje donjeg toka rijeka Miljacke i Željeznice te izvorišta rijeke Bosne. Na
širem području nalaze se i najveća kraška polja na balkanskom poluotoku Kupreško,
Šuičko, Duvanjsko, Mostarsko blato.
142. Najveće rijeke teku smjerom jug – sjever (Bosna i Vrbas) odnosno sjever – jug
(Neretva). Njihove pritoke uglavnom teku smjerom zapad – istok (Lašva, Usora na
Bosni) i (Trebižat na Neretvi). Dolinama rijeka vode i glavni komunikacijski pravci iz
Panonske nizine do Jadranskog mora. Dinarsko razvoñe predstavlja najveću prepreku
brzom prometu, pri čemu su najznačajniji planinski prijelazi Ivan sedlo (959m) na
smjeru Sarajevo – Mostar, Makljen (1123m) na smjeru Jajce – Jablanica – Mostar,
Kupreška vrata (1348m) na putu Bugojno – Livno. Izmeñu sliva rijeke Vrbas i rijeke
Bosna vodi put preko prijevoja Komar (927m).
143. Ukupna površina područja Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine obuhvaća oko
16.000 km2 odnosno skoro 1/3 teritorije BiH. Prosječna nadmorska visina iznosi preko
800 m. Planinski predjeli uglavnom su pokriveni visokom šumom, dok su nizinski
dijelovi, kotline i polja uglavnom obradiva.
8.2. Značenje toga prostora u planovima obrane SFR Jugoslavije
144. Vanjska politika tadašnje Jugoslavije je zagovarala aktivnu neutralnost – nesvrstanost,

što se na unutarnjem planu odražavalo na neprekidnom održavanju napetosti i prijetnje
agresije oba vodeća svjetska bloka. Na tom temelju je oblikovana i obrambena
doktrina tzv. općenarodne obrane i društvene samozaštite, čije su glavne odrednice:
oslonac na vlastite snage, sudjelovanje cjelokupnog ljudskog potencijala u oružanom
boju, partizansko i gerilsko ratovanje i stvaranje permanentne slobodne teritorije u
brdovitom dijelu Jugoslavije, tzv. bastiona obrane83 koji je obuhvaćao područje
dijelova Hrvatske (brdovito područje nekadašnje «Republike Srpske Krajine» bez
dijela u Slavoniji), cjelokupnu BiH bez Posavine i Semberije, Crnu Goru i zapadnu
Srbiju. U tom bastionu je središnje mjesto zauzimala upravo Središnja Bosna i
Sjeverna Hercegovina.
83
4D01486 Karta, Obrambeni bastion SFRJ
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145. Zbog toga je u Središnjoj Bosni koncentrirana velika vojna moć nekadašnjih oružanih
snaga, napose JNA, koja se manifestirala u slijedećem:
− na području Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine84 je izgrañeno mnogo
objekata vojne industrije85, u kojima se proizvodilo teško naoružanje (»Bratstvo«
– Novi Travnik), eksploziv i baruti (»Slobodan Princip – Seljo« – Vitez), municija,
mine, upaljači i lako protuoklopno oružje (»Slavko Rodić« – Bugojno), popravak i
održavanje telekomunikacijskih ureñaja (»Remontni zavod« – Travnik), odjeća i
obuća (»Borac« - Travnik);
− mada područje Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine nije bilo neposredno
ugroženo mogućim ratnim djelovanjima u početnoj fazi rata, tu su bile locirane
znatne snage JNA: 1 mehanizirana brigada, 2 motorizirane brigade, 1 brdska
brigada, 2 partizanske (lake pješačke) brigade, 3 topničke pukovnije, 1
protuoklopna topnička pukovnija, 1 raketna pukovnija PZO), a i snage TO:86 6
okružnih stožera, 30 općinskih stožera, 13 brigada TO (laka pješačka);
− na tom području je bio i veći broj skladišta87 ratnih pričuva postrojbi, operativnih
sustava i vrhovnog zapovjedništva, mnoge ratne pričuve su se nalazile i unutar
poduzeća vojne industrije; ukupno je bilo 13 tehničkih skladišta u kojima su bile
smještene velike količine municije, naoružanja i drugih tehničkih sredstava,
− relativno veliki broj stanovnika u Središnjoj Bosni predstavljao je izvor popune
postrojbi na drugim vojištima, posebno sjeverozapadnom, kako u smislu
upućivanja manjih grupa za popunu ili oblikovanja kompletnih novih postrojbi
tako i upućivanja na bojišnicu izvan Središnje Bosne;
− preko Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine vodile su najznačajnije
prometnice koje su omogućavale relativno sigurnu opskrbu operativno-
strategijskih grupacija i manevar snagama na perifernim vojištima u slučaju
84
U nekadašnjoj Jugoslaviji bila su 3 značajna vojnoindustrijska regiona – dolina Lašve (Travnik, Novi
Travnik, Vitez) okolina Sarajeva (Vogošća, Stup, Pale, Konjic) i Zapadna Srbija (Užice, Lučani, Čačak,
Valjevo). Sva tri regiona su u slučaju potrebe bila samodostatna.
85
4D01485 Karta, Vojna industrija Središnje Bosne
86
4D01484 Karta, Lokacija ratnih jedinica JNA i TO u Središnjoj Bosni
87
4D01491 Karta, Lokacija logističkih ustanova
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zauzimanja ravničarskog dijela Jugoslavije sjeverno od Save88. Radiorelejno

čvorište na Vlašiću bilo je jedno najznačajnijih u sustavu radiorelejnih veza JNA.
146. U vrijeme Titove Jugoslavije Središnja Bosna i Sjeverna Hercegovina imaju posebno
značenje za cjelokupnu tadašnju jugoslavensku državu. To je područje bilo središnji
dio obrambenog bastiona i posljednji oslonac postojanja države u slučaju invazije.
8.3. Značenje toga prostora u vrijeme raspada SFR Jugoslavije
147. Teritorij BiH bio je do 1989. godine gotovo u cjelini u zoni odgovornosti tadašnje 7.
armijske oblasti sa zapovjedništvom u Sarajevu. Od 1987. godine pa do kraja 1988.
godine 7. armijska oblast je rasformirana i područje BiH podijeljeno je manjim
dijelom (Cazinska krajina) u 5. vojište sa sjedištem u Zagrebu, a najvećim dijelom pod
1. vojište sa sjedištem u Beogradu. 1. vojište je pored teritorija većeg dijela BiH
obuhvaćalo područje Slavonije u Hrvatskoj, Vojvodine i sjevernog dijela Srbije i cijelu
Crnu Goru. To znakovito ukazuje na težnju jugoslavenskog Generalštaba da spoji sve
teritorije na koje pretendira velikosrpska politika. Zapadne granice beogradskog
vojišta gotovo u cjelini poklapaju se za zapadnom granicom tzv. Velike Srbije.
148. Poprište prvih pokušaja oružane intervencije protiv težnji za osamostaljenjem i

odcjepljenjem od jugoslavenske zajednice bila je Središnja Bosna i Sjeverna
Hercegovina. Tako je u ožujku 1991. godine upućena na Kupres oklopna bojna iz
sastava 325. oklopne brigade iz Banjaluke koju su sačinjavali vojnici na služenju
vojnog roka. Svakog mjeseca su se posade smjenjivale iz sastava drugih oklopnih
brigada. Ova je bojna imala zadaću intervenirati u Zapadnoj Hercegovini ili Dalmaciji
odnosno sačuvati prostoriju Kupreške visoravni za dolazak većih operativnih
postrojbi. Poslije velikih prohrvatskih demonstracija u Splitu u kojima je poginuo
vojnik JNA, JNA u BiH i u Dalmaciji pripremala se za moguću vojnu intervenciju.
Tako je u svibnju 1991. godine propao pokušaj proboja mehanizirane kolone iz
Mostara prema Širokom brijegu koju su zaustavili nenaoružani mještani sela Prolog.
88
U tom kontekstu je izgradjen i kabalski komunikacioni sistem „Central“ duž cijele nekadašnje
Jugoslavije, koji je povezivao Strumicu u Makedoniji (kao najudaljeniju jugoistočnu tačku) preko Središnje
Bosne sa Postojnom u Sloveniji (kao najudaljeniju sjeverozapadnu točku)
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Ova je kolona poslije nekoliko dana stigla na Kupres uz političku intervenciju iz

Sarajeva.
149. Sve ove aktivnosti JNA na tom prostoru bile su u svojstvu uvodnih proigravanja
scenarija iz veljače 1991. godine, kada je Generalštab OS SFRJ usvojio novi plan
obrane u slučaju agresije sa Zapada, tzv. plan »S-2«89. Plan je predviñao obranu od
agresije zemalja NATO, zapravo je bio plan angažiranja snaga JNA u intervenciji
prema Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji. Faktički je plan intervencije središnjih snaga JNA iz
Srbije i BiH razrañen od 1. do 3. jula 1991., poslije prvog neuspjelog primirja u
Sloveniji. Plan je poslije Brijunskog sastanka 8. jula 1991. godine napušten, da bi ga
modificirali koncem jula, a ostvarili djelomice sredinom septembra. Središnja Bosna i
skoro cijela Hercegovina bile su sada u zoni odgovornosti 4. korpusa sa sjedištem u
Sarajevu.
150. Za područje Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine posebice je značajna uloga i

zadaća 37. korpusa JNA90, čija je temeljna zadaća u obje varijante ratnog plana bila
obrana Zapadne Srbije, od rijeke Kolubare na sjeveru do Metohije na jugu, rijeke
Drine na zapadu i rijeke Ibar na istoku. U veljači 1991. godine promijenjen je plan
obrane od invazije NATO pakta, zona obrane posve je izmijenjena i 37. korpusu
dodijeljena je zona u slivu rijeke Neretve i na području Zapadne Hercegovine,91 koju
je u ranijim planovima imao 4. korpus – sarajevski.
151. Na temelju tog plana je u vrijeme prvog prekida vatre u oružanom sukobu u Sloveniji
razrañen, u punoj tajnosti, uz angažiranje isključivo najpouzdanijih oficira iz komandi
korpusa, novi plan smirivanja i intervencije prema Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji odnosno
Hrvatima u BiH, ali taj plan nije doživio temeljitu razradu a ni ostvarenje. Novi plan92
je razrañen za 37. korpus koncem jula 1991. godine i temeljne značajke tog plana su
bile slijedeće:
89
Plan obrane od napada sa Istoka (Varšavskog pakta) »S-1« napušten je već u 1990. godini kao suvišan,
Generalštab je procijenio da Jugoslaviji ne prijeti agresija sa Istoka, šta je bilo posve opravdano poslije
»perestrojke« u Sovjetskom Savezu i pada Berlinskog zida.
90
Autor je u to vrijeme bio načelnik štaba korpusa ujedno zamjenik zapovjednika. Taj je plan primio iz
zapovjedništva vojišta iz Beograda. Kritički ga je modificirao i prilagodio uvjetima moguće bojišnice u Zapadnoj
Hercegovini.
91
4D01483 Karta, Plan intervencije JNA u Zapadnoj Hercegovini i Dalmaciji
92
Razradom ovog plana rukovodio je autor kao načelnik štaba 37. korpusa izravno pred odlazak iz JNA.
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− poslije mobilizacije istih postrojbi korpus maršira pravcem: Kraljevo – Užice –

Višegrad – Foča – Gacko – Nevesinje – Mostar;
− glavnina snaga se razmješta na širem području Nevesinja u spremnosti za
intervenciju ka Mostaru i Metkoviću, dok 10. mehanizirana brigada drži šire
područje grada Mostara;
− zadaća korpusa je bila da spriječi zauzeće grada Mostara i zadrži komunikacije
prema moru i ne dozvoli tada još udruženim hrvatskim i bošnjačkim snagama
zauzimanje lijeve obale rijeke Neretve od Jablanice do mora i izolira hrvatske
snaga na širem dubrovačkom području.
152. Plan je djelomice ostvaren u septembru 1991. godine, ali su se postrojbe iz Srbije
ubrzo povukle u Srbiju93. Kasnije su taj plan ostvarivali s postrojbama nekadašnjeg 13.
korpusa (riječkog) i 2. korpusa (titogradskog). Postrojbe su popunjene rezervistima iz
Istočne Hercegovine i zapadnog dijela Crne Gore.
153. Iz svih planova angažiranja 37. korpusa u Središnjoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini
može se zaključiti da je vojni vrh JNA planirao oružanu intervenciju prema Hrvatima
u Dalmaciji i Zapadnoj Hercegovini. To potvrñuju neke indicije i stavovi:
− marš cjelokupnih snaga korpusa kroz Središnju Bosnu na Kuprešku visoravan
imao je za cilj zaplašiti Hrvate u Središnjoj Bosni i ohrabriti Srbe i Muslimane u
Istočnoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini;
− razmještaj glavnine korpusnih snaga na Kupreškoj visoravni osigurao je nesmetan
boravak i obuku postrojbi u okruženju stanovništva pretežito srpske i muslimanske
nacionalnosti;
− sa Kupreške visoravni vode kvalitetni putovi prema Splitu, prema Imotskom i dalje
ka Makarskoj, prema Ljubuškom i dalje ka Metkoviću, prema Posušju i dalje ka
Mostaru i moguće je relativno brzo intervenirati u središnjoj Dalmaciji;
− razmještajem logističkih postrojbi osigurali bi se objekti vojne industrije u
Bugojnu, Travniku i Novom Travniku;
93
Rezervisti topničke pukovnije iz Valjeva (oko 700) koncem septembra 1991. ukrcali su se u vučna
vozila, ostavili orudja i osobno oružje i otišli domovima u Srbiju.
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− korpusna rezerva jakosti borbene grupe s područja Donjeg Vakufa mogla je brzo
intervenirati ka Travniku i Lašvanskoj dolini odnosno preko Makljena u srednji tok
rijeke Neretve ka Jablanici i dalje ka Mostaru;
− neposjedanje obrambenih zona, neizvoñenje fortifikacijskih radova i pripreme
položaja prije početka invazije, kao i odsustvo potpore vojišnog topništva i
zrakoplovnih snaga u vrijeme invazije i neangažiranje snaga Teritorijalne obrane,
koja je tada bila popunjena pretežito Hrvatima, ukazuje da je taj plan zapravo bio
plan intervencije prema neposlušnim Hrvatima u središnjoj Dalmaciji i Zapadnoj
Hercegovini i plan zastrašivanja Hrvata u Središnjoj Bosni i Sjevernoj
Hercegovini.
154. Autoru ovog rada je iz osobnih saznanja poznato da su se poslije okončanja oružanog
sukoba u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj, postrojbe JNA iz ove dvije republike povukle
uglavnom na prostor BiH94.
155. Prema tome, uoči raspada Jugoslavije područje Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne
Hercegovine bilo je, zapravo, svojevrsno polazište za intervenciju prema središnjoj
Dalmaciji i Zapadnoj Hercegovini. U intervenciji su trebale učestvovati postrojbe koje
su uglavnom sačinjavali Srbi iz Srbije i Istočne Hercegovine, a djelomično i Crnogorci
i dio pouzdanih Muslimana iz Istočne Hercegovine. Angažiranje 37. korpusa JNA iz
Srbije trebalo je, osim intervencije prema Hrvatima, imati učinak zastrašivanja Hrvata
i Muslimana u Središnjoj Bosni odnosno ohrabrivanja Srba u velikim gradovima
Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine. Takoñer je jedan od ciljeva bio osigurati
nesmetan rad vojne industrije na tom prostoru i nesmetano komuniciranje u
unutrašnjosti Jugoslavije ka srednjem dijelu Jadranskog mora. U konačnici, cilj je bio i
održanje obrambenog bastiona s juga, što se kasnije ispostavilo kao obrana područja
naseljenih Srbima odnosno od posebnog interesa za Srbe u BiH.
94
Ove postrojbe su sačinjavali isključivo časnici srpske, crnogorske, muslimanske nacionalnosti, jer
časnici slovenske, hrvatske i albanske nacionalnostri su većinom napustili JNA prilikom oružanog sukoba u
Sloveniji. Vojnici na služenju vojnog roka su uglavnom otpušteni kućama ili premješteni na dalje služenje u
svojim republikama. Od oružja i opreme uspjeli su izvući manji dio. Tek dolaskom u BiH su se ove postrojbe
djelimično popunile pričuvnim vojnicima srpske nacionalnosti iz BiH. Ove postrojbe nisu predstavljale značajnu
vojnu snagu.
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8.4. Značenje tog prostora u početnom razdoblju rata od sredine 1992. do konca
1993.
156. Na području Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine nakon 2. svjetskog rata bivša
Jugoslavija razmjestila je značajne proizvodne kapacitete za proizvodnju naoružanja i
vojne opreme. Ti su objekti bili pred izbijanje rata u BiH opremljeni suvremenim
strojevima i u njima je bio zaposlen veliki broj vrhunskih stručnjaka. Najveći dio tih
poduzeća imao je i vlastite razvojne odjele.
157. Pregled kapaciteta vojne industrije u Središnjoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini95
1. Naziv Lokacija Proizvodi Zaposl.

2. »Slavko Rodić« Bugojno topnički i minobacački upaljači 3.450
ručne bombe
mine i sredstva za zaprečavanje
topničke kapsule
3. »Borac« Travnik Uniforme, čizme i druga osobna
oprema za vojnike
4. Elektrotehnični Travnik popravak sredstava za veze i drugih
remontni zavod elektroničkih sredstava i sklopova
5. »Bratstvo« Novi Travnik minobacači 60-120 mm 1.450
topnička oruña od 90-155 mm
višecjevni bacači raketa 128-260 mm
različita hidraulika
6. »Slobodan Princip – Vitez nitroglicerinski i raketni baruti 780
Seljo« eksplozivi
7. Željezara Zenica specijalni odljevci
8. »Pretis« Vogošća topnička municija 4.700
raketni projektili
aviobombe
95
Podaci o vojnoj industriji dobiveni su po knjizi prof. dr. Aleksandra Stamatovića »Vojna privreda druge
Jugoslavije (1945.-1991.), izdanje VIZ, Beograd 2001. godine. A. Stamatović je bio general JNA i pomoćnik
saveznog sekretara za obranu za vojnoprivredni sektor, poslije umirovljenja bio je redovni profesor beogradskog
univerziteta.
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laka prijenosna protuoklopna oružja

9. »Zrak« Sarajevo dvogledi, nišanske sprave, 2.150
daljinomjeri
optički i elektronički sklopovi za
sisteme navoñenja raketnog oružja i
sistema upravljanja ognjem
10. »Bosnalijek« Sarajevo lijekovi i drugi sanitetski potrošni
materijal za vojne potrebe
medicinska oprema
11. »Famos« Hrasnica gusjenička oklopna vozila, 1.200
specijalne transmisije za tenkove i
teška vozila
12. »Igman« Konjic municija za lako pješačko oružje 1.350
svih kalibara od 4,5 do 14,5 mm
13. Tehnički remontni Hadžići popravak tehničkih sredstava KoV: 700
zavod (pješačko i topničko oružje, oklopna i
gusjenička vozila, motorna vozila,
sredstva za veze)
izrada rezervnih dijelova za strojeve i
motorna vozila
14. »Soko« Mostar bojni zrakoplovi G-4, Kraguj, Orao 2.630
laki helikopter Gazela
15. Zavod za remont Koran popravak inženjerijskih strojeva i
inženjerijskih (Pale) naprava
sredstava i opreme
16. Zrakoplovni zavod Rajlovac popravak klipnih i turbomlaznih
»Orao« zrakoplova,
proizvodnja turbomlaznih motora
17. »Energoinvest« Sarajevo sanitetski kompleti
IRCA
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158. U drugoj polovini 70-tih godina dalje u BiH izgrañuju se mnoga manja industrijska
poduzeća u potpori namjenske vojne industrije. U gotovo svakom općinskom sjedištu
ili većem mjestu izgrañeni su manji pogoni. Nosioci izgradnje i razvoja ovih poduzeća
bila su tri velika industrijska kompleksa u BiH. Najznačajniji je bio »Energoinvest«,
koji je udruživao tvornice za proizvodnju strojne i druge opreme za energetska
postrojenja. Njegovi proizvodni kapaciteti razmješteni su uglavnom oko Sarajeva i u
Posavini. Na području Hercegovine takav je industrijski gigant bio »Soko« Mostar, s
mnoštvom tvornica od Posušja do Trebinja. Vojna industrija je u najvećem dijelu bila
udružena u sustav UNIS (Udružena namjenska industrija Sarajevo), sa sjedištem u
Sarajevu. UNIS-ovi proizvodni kapaciteti bili su razmješteni uglavnom u središnjoj
Bosni kao manji pogoni ili podružnice većih tvornica namjenske vojne industrije.
159. U toku raspada Jugoslavije JNA je uspjela znatan dio kadrova (srpske nacionalnosti i
časnika JNA tehničke naobrazbe) i opreme za proizvodnju pravovremeno prenijeti na
sigurnija mjesta u Srbiji ili na teritorij BiH pod vlašću Srba (Republika Srpska). Na
primjer, Zrakoplovni remontni zavod »Orao« u Rajlovcu kraj Sarajeva u početku je
bio premješten u Bijeljinu (Republika Srpska), a zatim u Pančevo (Srbija). Meñutim,
kadrovi bošnjačke i hrvatske nacionalnosti u najvećem su broju ostali u mjestima u
blizini lokacije tvornica i priključili su se političkim pokretima svojih naroda.
Istovremeno je u pogonima namjenske industrije ostalo mnogo strojeva i opreme za
proizvodnju, sirovina i polusirovina, pa i nedovršenih proizvoda, posebice težeg
oružja.
160. Oružane formacije Bošnjaka i Hrvata u BiH u vrijeme stvaranja (1992. – 1993.)
nabavljale su oružje, streljivo i drugu vojnu opremu na tri osnovna načina:
a/ od Republike Hrvatske, koja je i HVO i ABiH opskrbljivala opremom,
naoružanjem i streljivom, te na druge načine pomagala stvaranje i borbeno
djelovanje tih oružanih formacija;
b/ nabavkom ilegalnim kanalima, jer je na snazi bio embargo UN na uvoz oružja
u države bivše Jugoslavije, i dopremom preko Slovenije i Hrvatske;
c/ preuzimanjem opreme i naoružanja iz skladišta, tvornica i objekata JNA, koje
JNA pri povlačenju nije uspjela preseliti na teritorij pod kontrolom Srba;
d/ vlastitom proizvodnjom u preuzetim objektima namjenske proizvodnje
streljiva, oružja i eksploziva;
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e/ improviziranom proizvodnjom u obrtnim radionicama
161. Bošnjačka i hrvatska strana su pokušavale stvoriti i vlastitu proizvodnju oružja i

streljiva. Koliko je značenje proizvodnji za vojne potrebe pridavala bošnjačka strana
može se znakovito uočiti već u temeljnim dokumentima s vojnog savjetovanja
zapovjednika i visokih časnika Patriotske lige96 7. i 8. februara 1992. godine u selu
Mehurići na periferiji Lašvanske doline u blizini Travnika. Osnova za raspravu bio je
dokument »Zadaci RVŠ«, koji je koncem 1991. godine razradio jedan od inicijatora
Patriotske lige, kasniji načelnik Glavnog štaba Armije BiH Sefer Halilović, i kojeg je
tada razaslao svim štabovima na terenu. U tom je dokumentu zapisano97:
»6. U referatu posebno obraditi namjensku-vojnu industriju, vrstu proizvodnje
i objasniti kakve su naše pozicije i plan.
7. Obraditi kakve su mogućnosti male privrede na proizvodnji formacijskih i
priručnih sredstava (bombe, mine, itd.) uz odgovarajuću dokumentaciju.
8. Mogućnosti uskladištenja i čuvanja većih količina oružja i MES98.
162. Na tom je vojnom savjetovanju usvojena i »Direktiva za odbranu suvereniteta«, u

kojoj je u točki 4. zapisano slijedeće99:
»…Odreñenim snagama, brzim i energičnim prepadnim dejstvima zauzeti
skladišta i magacine municije, MES-a i naoružanja JA, blokirati
kasarne…Glavne snage imati u Centralnoj Bosni, a pomoćne u cazinsko-
prijedorskom i regionu Tuzle (podvukao M.G.).«
163. Realizirajući ovu Direktivu bošnjačka strana otpočela je proizvodnju za vojne potrebe
u tri faze. U prvoj fazi je bila proizvodnja priručnih sredstava, popravak zaplijenjenog
oružja, konstruiranje i proizvodnja improviziranih ubojnih sredstava i oružja odnosno
kako to opet Halilović piše100:
96
Patriotska liga zametak je kasnije Armije BiH. To je u stvari bila vojna organizacija bošnjačkog naroda
koju su oblikovali i organizirali uglavnom nekadašnji aktivni časnici JNA bošnjačke nacionalnosti. U vrijeme
formiranja i spomenutog savjetovanja ona je bila izvan Teritorijalne obrane, koja je u to vrijeme bila jedina
vojna organizacija Republike BiH (JNA je, naime, bila jugoslavenska vojna organizacija, a teritorijalne obrane
su bile organizirane u republikama bivše Jugoslavije).
97
3D02648 S. Halilović, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 164 i 165
(e-court stranice BCS 68-69 i ET 49-50)
98
MES - minsko-eksplozivnih sredstva
99
3D02648 S. Halilović, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 168
(e-court stranice BCS 70 i ET 53)
100
4D01488 S. Halilović, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94
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»Diljem bosanske države na stotinu mjesta počinje kućna vojna proizvodnja.

Niko ne pita od čega i kako: svaka ideja preko noći postala je stvarnost. U
vrijeme ratno, sve je više no dobro došlo, naročito kada smo izolovani sa dvije
strane – od dva agresora.«
164. Druga je faza bila već organizirana proizvodnja u tvornicama gdje su se ranije
proizvodili proizvodi široke potrošnje101.
»Tako su nastale vojne fabrike i tamo gdje nisu nikad bile – u Bihaću,
Travniku, Zenici, Tuzli, Tešnju i drugim gradovima, čak i u Srebrenici… U
Sarajevu je formirana brigada Centra namjenske proizvodnje … u kojoj su
okupili impozantan broj vojnih stručnjaka.«
165. Treća faza vojne proizvodnje otpočinje koncem oktobra 1992. godine kada se pri
Ministarstvu privrede i energetike oblikuje sektor za namjensku proizvodnju. Ova je
proizvodnja bila posve organizirana na temelju nekadašnje vojne industrije, posebice u
Središnjoj Bosni102.
»Do tada smo proizvodili ručne bombe, tromblone, zapaljive smjese i ono što
su inače mogle proizvoditi vojne fabrike u Konjicu, Goraždu, Bugojnu,
Travniku, Novom Travniku i sarajevskom Zraku.«
166. Kolike je razmjere imala ova donekle improvizirana proizvodnja opet kazuje S.
Halilović103:
»Samo u prvoj godinu i po rata (od travnja 1992. do listopada 1993. – prim.
M.G.), u okupiranom Sarajevu je proizvedeno oko 25.000 minobacačkih i
drugih artiljerijskih projektila, a bombi i tromblona više od 200.000 komada.«
167. Nakon povlačenja JNA s teritorija BiH pod nadzorom Muslimana i Hrvata u aprilu i
maju 1992. godine104, snage Armije BiH zauzele su najznačajnija postrojenja vojne
101
102
103
104
Vrhovna komanda donijela je odluku o povlačenju postrojbi JNA iz BiH 4. svibnja sa rokom izvršenja
19. svibnja 1992. godine. Faktički je 2.armija otpočela je povlačenje sa teritorije BiH već u travnju demontažom
vojne industrije, raseljavanjem skladišta i ratnih pričuva, stvarno povlačenje postrojbi otpočelo je u maju kada su
paravojne snage Muslimana izvršile teške zločine u Sarajevu i Tuzli. Najveći dio naoružanja, opreme i drugih
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industrije u BiH. Bošnjaci su zauzeli tvornice namjenske proizvodnje «Zrak» i

«Bosnalijek» u Sarajevu, «Famos» u Hrasnici, «Slavko Rodić» u Bugojnu, «Borac» i
«Tehnički remontni zavod» u Travniku, «Bratstvo» u Novom Travniku. Tvornica
pješačkog streljiva u Konjicu posve je bila u rukama Armije BiH i faktički je
kontinuirano proizvodila. Tvornica u Goraždu proizvodila je nitroglicerinske barute,
različite kapsule i malokalibarsko streljivo. Posebice je bila značajna tvornica težeg
oružja u Novom Travniku, koju su ABiH i HVO zauzeli zajedno prvih dana rata i u
njoj zatekli znatne količine nedovršenih topničkih oruña.
168. U rukama HVO ostale su tvornice eksploziva «Slobodan Princip – Seljo» u Vitezu i
posve ispražnjene tvorničke hale tvornice zrakoplova «Soko» u Mostaru. Proizvodnju
je nastavila samo tvornica u Vitezu, dok proizvodnju zrakoplova nije bilo moguće
organizirati jer su jugoslavenske vlasti demontirale i odvezle u Srbiju najveći dio
strojeva i repromaterijala.
169. Prema procjeni vrijednosti vojne industrije prije rata, Muslimani su zadržali objekata i
opreme u vrijednosti 1,844.300.000 USD105. K tome treba dodati i vrijednost objekata
zrakoplovnog remontnog zavoda »Orao« u Rajlovcu pokraj Sarajeva, iz kojeg je
opremu i reprodukcijski materijal JNA premjestila na teritoriju RS i dalje preselila u
Srbiju. Hrvati su uspjeli zadržati vojne industrije faktički u vrijednosti 713.900.000
USD, jer vrijednost tvornice zrakoplova «Soko» posve je zanemariva s obzirom da je
JNA iza sebe ostavila prazne tvorničke dvorane.
170. Proizvodnja je bila moguća u skladu s raspoloživim zalihama reprodukcijskog

materijala i energijom. U novembru 1992. godine muslimanska strana otpočinje
proizvodnju artiljerijskih granata, ali je glavni problem bio nedostatak eksploziva
(podvukao M.G.). Preko 200.000 različitih vrsta artiljerijske municije čekalo je
eksploziv106, što je čak mnogo više od broja granata traženih u zahtjevu od 7. travnja
sredstava JNA je predala novonastaloj vojsci Republike Srpske. Takoñer su gotovo svi pripadnici JNA (vojnici,
dočasnici, časnici i grañanska lica na službi u JNA) porijeklom iz BiH prestupili u Vojsku RS. Faktički JNA se i
nije povukla iz BiH, već se samo povukla sa područja pod nadzorom Muslimana i Hrvata. Mnoge postrojbe JNA
koje su se ranije povukle sa teritorije Slovenije i Hrvatske u BiH i bile su popunjene pričuvnim osobljem srpske
nacionalnosti samo su se preimenovale u postrojbe Vojske RS. Na području Istočne Hercegovine ostale su neke
postrojbe Podgoričkog korpusa sve do decembra 1992. godine.
105
Vojnoindustrijski kompleks SFRJ, S. Kovačev, Z. Matijaščić, J. Petrović, Polemos 9, Zagreb, UDK:
355.1(497.1):338:341.2
106
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1993107. Tvrdnja načelnika Glavnog štaba Armije BiH S. Halilovića izrečena na

vojnom savjetovanju 21. i 22. augusta 1993.108 znakovito govori o ciljevima
Muslimana u rano proljeće iste godine:
„Da bi zaokružili vojnu industriju, nama je potrebno riješiti dva problema:
hitno zauzeti tvornicu eksploziva u Vitezu i planirati i izvršiti operaciju
Žunovnice109, kao značajnog skladišta repromaterijala i naravno, municije.“
171. Gotovo svakodnevno je Štab Vrhovne komande (ranije Glavni štab Armije BiH)
zahtijevao od Predsjedništva i Vlade BiH potporu u smislu nabave reprodukcijskog
materijala, posebice eksploziva za nastavak proizvodnje streljiva. Tako 5. februara
1993. godine predlaže izmeñu ostalog110:
»Što prije osiguraju potrebne količine municije, lijekova, sanitetskog materijala za
Armiju BiH. To podrazumijeva i otvaranje koridora kroz Hercegovinu i centralnu
Bosnu pod kontrolom HVO (podvukao M.G.).«
172. Tako opet Štab Vrhovne komande upućuje Vladi R BiH i Ministarstvu obrane 2. marta
1993. informaciju o kritičnoj situaciji u voñenju oružane borbe111:
»Naročito kritična sa sredstvima za POB (protuoklopnu borbu), pješadijske municije
kalibra, 7,9 mm, 7,62 mm i 5,54 mm, te artiljerijska municija kalibra 120-155 mm.
Sadašnje rezerve svedene su na 0,5 b/k (borbenog kompleta)…
Zaključak: kritično je stanje snabdjevenosti municijom Armije BiH.«
173. Mjesec dana kasnije, 7. aprila 1993. godine opet Štab Vrhovne komande uputio je
Predsjedništvu i Vladi R BiH te Ministarstvu obrane zahtjev za nabavku materijalno-
tehničkih sredstava u kojem traži112
»Izračunate količine municije za pješadijsko naoružanje 3 b/k…
4. Metak 7,62 mm x 39 78,000.000
107
108
109
Žunovnica je mjesto u blizini Hadžića gdje je bio kompleks skladišta JNA i u kome su bila uskladištena
uglavnom ubojna sredstva. Širu okolinu Hadžića i pomenuta skladišta držali su Srbi.
110
111
112
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28. Granata za haubicu 122 mm 1.500

31. Tenkovska granata 100 mm 13.000
…
174. Na sjednici Predsjedništva RBiH, održanoj 25. marta 1993. godine načelnik Štaba
Vrhovne komande S. Halilović zapao je u žestok verbalni duel s članom
Predsjedništva Konjicijom kada je oštrim rječnikom zamjerio Predsjedništvu:113
»I, osigurajte municiju, mi ćemo sve vratiti u tri dana…
…zadnja minimalna količina municije nam je došla 15. novembra 1992.
godine…
…vi niste, kao država, ništa osigurali…«
175. Nekoliko dana kasnije je S. Halilović na sjednici Predsjedništva RBiH od 10. marta
1993. godine predložio:114
»6. Obezbijediti da luka Ploče i put Ploče – Mostar – Sarajevo – Zenica, bude
u neprekidnoj funkciji za potrebe države BiH. Ako je nužno, za ovo angažovati
meñunarodne snage, a po potrebi i našim snagama taj prostor osigurati.«
176. U gotovo isto vrijeme je predsjednik Predsjedništva RBiH Alija Izetbegović na

sarajevskoj TV izjavio115:
„Uspjeli smo dokopati se 30.000 pušaka i strojnica, 20 milijuna metaka,
37.000 mina, 46.000 protutenkovskih raketa, 20.000 ručnih granata, 90.000
vojnih uniformi i 120.000 pari čizama.“
177. Ova tvrdnja svakako je u koliziji sa zahtjevom Štaba Vrhovne komande o osiguranju 3
b/k /borbena kompleta/ streljiva. Naime, Bošnjaci svakako u dvadesetak dana nisu
uspjeli potrošiti tolike količine streljiva. Izjava A. Izetbegovića je najvjerojatnije bila
političko-propagandnog značenja u smislu zastrašivanja protivne strane i iznuñivanja
pregovora odnosno otvaranja putova opskrbe, posebice hrvatske. Zacijelo su Bošnjaci
113
114
115
P08632 Lord David OWEN, knjiga: Balkanska Odiseja, str. 127(e-court str. BCS 162 i ET 83)
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i pored pojačanog nadzora prometa i tereta prokrijumčarili znatne količine streljiva,

oružja i vojne opreme. Sefer Halilović o tome piše:116
»Grupa u Glavnom štabu (kasnije Štab VK) na čelu sa Mirzom Pinjom i
Raifom Džigalom razradila je način ubacivanja repromaterijala u BiH: već
smo imali ogromno iskustvo, mjesecima smo ubacivali municiju iz Visokog u
bocama za kiseonik, kasnije kad je to otkriveno, preko četničke teritorije
prenosili smo naoružanje, municiju i repromaterijal u kontejnerima za
humanitarnu pomoć.«
178. Zanimljiva je i činjenica da su Bošnjaci kupovali streljivo i kod svojih protivnika.

Tako opet S. Halilović kazuje117:
»Istodobno, nešto malo naoružanja i oko milion i po metaka kupili smo od
četnika i ustaša…
…Bilo je to koncem aprila 1993. godine.«
179. Autoru je u aprilu 1994. godine u vrijeme privatne posjete u Ljubljani nekadašnji
načelnik stožera 5. korpusa Ramiz Duraković ispričao kako je on osobno pakirao
streljivo u vreće s brašnom i kontejnere s prehrambenim artiklima u Zagrebu, koji su
zatim upućivani u opkoljenu Cazinsku krajinu kao humanitarna pomoć.
180. Drugi visoki zapovjednik Armije BiH M. Alagić, koji je zapovijedao Operativnom
grupom »Bosanska krajina«, koja je bila razmještena u Lašvanskoj dolini, zapisao je:
118
»Crno tržište cvjetalo je – tamo je bilo i municije i hrane…

…donio sam odluku da se ide na trgovinu sa četnicima na prostoru
Meokrnja119…«
181. Muslimani su uspjeli i pored velikih poteškoća u proljeće 1993. nabaviti izvjesne
količine streljiva za lakše oružje, ali najvjerojatnije nisu uspjeli nabaviti veće količine
topničkog streljiva. Istodobno, bilo je izrañeno preko 25.000 komada topničkih granata
116
117
118
3D02638 N. Latić i Z. Isaković, Rat u Srednjoj Bosni, Ratna sjećanja generala Alagića, BEMUST,
Zenica 1997,str. 32(E-court stranice BCS 15, ET 8)
119
Meokrnje je planina sjeveroistočno oko 20 km od Travnika tada na crti dodira muslimanskih i srpskih
snaga. Nalazi se na šumskom putu koji je tada povezivao Travnik i Kotor Varoš.
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bez eksplozivnog i barutnog punjenja. Taj se materijal mogao nabaviti samo u tvornici
«Slobodan Princip – Seljo« u Vitezu, koja je bila pod kontrolom HVO.
182. Bošnjačko vodstvo nije imalo jedinstveni stav o stvaranju uvjeta za rad vlastite vojne
industrije. To, naime, potvrñuje odgovor zamjenika ministra obrane Hasana Čengića
načelniku Glavnog štaba ABiH Seferu Haliloviću na njegovo inzistiranje za vlastitom
proizvodnjom streljiva:120
«To što vi radite, to se ne isplati. Mnogo je jeftinije kupovati municiju i oružje
vani, nego to proizvoditi u Bosni.»
183. Da je u bošnjačka strana imala znatan broj stručnjaka vojne industrije svjedoči i
činjenica da su poslali veću skupinu u Iran već u 1993. godini, gdje su organizirali i
upravljali obnovom i modernizacijom 1200 iranskih tenkova T-55 sovjetske
proizvodnje na zapadne tehničke standarde. U tom velikom i isplativom poslu pored
BiH (osoblje iz Remontnog zavoda Hadžići) sudjelovali su i Slovenija (Remontni
zavod Bregana i Iskra – Fotona iz Ljubljane) te Srbija (Remontni zavod Čačak)121. U
tom se poslu spominje tadašnji zamjenik ministra obrane u Vladi R BiH Hasan
Čengić.
184. Iz naprijed iznijetog mogu se izvući slijedeći zaključci:

− Armija BiH nije imala dovoljno streljiva za sve vrste oružja, posebice pješačko i
minobacačko,
− središnji sustav logističke potpore Armije BiH nije bio djelotvoran,
− zbog oskudice u sirovinama i reprodukcijskom materijalu, posebice eksplozivu za
punjenje topničkog streljiva i nitroglicerinskih baruta, u zauzetim objektima i
postrojenjima vojne industrije nije bila moguća proizvodnja streljiva za potrebe
Armije BiH,
− puteve opskrbe iz Hrvatske, koji su vodili preko Sjeverne Hercegovine i Središnje
Bosne, kontrolirao je HVO, što je išlo na ruku središnjim bošnjačkim političkim
vlastima koje su se svjetskoj javnosti mogle prikazati kao žrtva koja se ne može
naoružati,
120
121
4D01493 “Nacional“, naslov: Amerikanci zele spriječiti modernizaciju 1200 ruskih tenkova T-55
koje u Iranu obnavljaju bosnjacki inženjeri, 13 studeni 1996
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− pomanjkanje redovite opskrbe streljivom umanjivalo je borbene mogućnosti

Armije BiH.
8.5. Komunikacije i promet tijekom 1992. i 1993. godine122
185. Na području Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine sijeku se najznačajniji prometni

pravci koji iz Panonske nizine vode ka Jadranskom moru odnosno iz Središnje Evrope
ka istočnom i južnom dijelu Balkanskog poluotoka i dalje prema Aziji. Svi se ti pravci
sijeku na prostoru Središnje Bosne.
186. Upravni pravac Banjaluka – Jajce – Bugojno –Gornji Vakuf – Prozor - Jablanica
– Mostar (broj 1) vodi dolinom rijeke Vrbasa preko prijevoja Makljen i dalje dolinom
rijeke Rame i rijeke Neretve. Zbog granatiranja Vojske Republike Srpske promet na
dijelu glavne prometnice Jablanica-Mostar bio je nesiguran, pa je preusmjeren kod
Prozora na pravac s.Rumboci-s.Orašac-Lipa-Tomislavgrad-Livno-Hrvatska. Manja
vozila mogla su se koristiti i alternativnim pravcem Jablanica-Sovići-Blidinje-Posušje.
Dionicu puta Prozor-Orašac-Lipa preko Vran planine izgradila je grañevinska
operativa HVO ujesen 1992. godine. Dio puta Banja Luka-Jajce-Donji Vakuf bio je
pod stalnim nadzorom srpske vojske, a preostali dio puta kontrolirali su Hrvati i
Muslimani.
187. Upravni pravac Žepče – Zenica – Vitez – Novi Travnik – Bugojno – G. Vakuf –
Prozor-Rumboci-Orašac-Lipa- Tomislavgrad-Hrvatska nazvan je »put spasa«.
Ovaj pravac sadrži ranije spomenuti pravac koji je bio pod kontrolom Hrvata i
Muslimana (od Bugojna, preko Livna, do Hrvatske). Postojao je i kraći alternativni
pravac za dionicu od Novog Travnika do Gornjeg Vakufa, koji je većim dijelom bio
makadamski i uzak, ali se ipak često koristio. Postojao je i sporedni put na dijelu Novi
Travnik – Gornji Vakuf koji je vodio preko visoravni i prijevoja Rostovo (1025 m)
koji je asfaltiran iz pravca Novog Travnika, a od Rostova do G. Vakufa je
makadamski i uzak. U drugoj polovini 1992. godine u turističkim objektima na
Rostovu bio je centar za obuku diverzantskih postrojbi Armije BiH.
122
4D01482 Map, Roads of the traffic Muslim and Croats during the war 1992-1993
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188. Upravni pravac Doboj – Zenica – Kakanj – Visoko- Sarajevo – Tarčin - Ivan Sedlo
– Konjic – Jablanica – Mostar – Metković (u Hrvatskoj) vodi dolinom rijeke Bosne
preko Sarajevskog polja, dolinom rječice Zujevina preko Ivan Sedla i od Konjica dalje
dolinom rijeke Neretve, te se kod Jablanice spaja s pravcem br.1. Ovim pravcem, kao i
pravcem broj 1, vodi kvalitetna cesta s asfaltiranom podlogom širine 7-8 m. Zbog
blokade Sarajeva ovaj je pravac preusmjeren na dionici Visoko-Kiseljak-Kreševo-
Tarčin. Dionica Kreševo-Tarčin je dorañeni šumski put. Kako su Srbi kontrolirali
područje Doboja i okoline Sarajeva, Muslimani i Hrvati su, dakle, koristili pravac
Zenica-Kakanj-Visoko-Kiseljak-Kreševo-Tarčin-Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar-Metković.
189. Na spomenuti upravni pravac tijekom rata je uspostavljen novi cestovni koridor:
Kakanj-Vareš-Rijeka-Ribnica-Busovača-Tuzla. Najveći dio pravca vodi šumskim
putovima, promet je bio otežan, naročito zimi, ali je to bio jedini pravac za opskrbu
stanovnika u tuzlanskoj regiji i južnom dijelu Posavine.
190. Izmeñu Kiseljaka i Jablanice postojao je cestovni pravac: Kiseljak – Fojnica –

Dusina – Neretvica – Ostrožac koji je bio ograničenih mogućnosti prometovanja
zbog uskog kolovoza, makadamske podloge i uske klisuraste doline rječica Gvozdanke
i Neretvice. Taj je put bio najvećim dijelom bio pod kontrolom Armije BiH, posebice
kada su Bošnjaci u lipnju 1993. zauzeli Fojnicu i protjerali Hrvate s područja Dusine.
191. Rokadni pravac Travnik – Lašva – Kakanj – Vareš, a obilaznim pravcem Busovača-
Kiseljak-Visoko-Podlugovi-Breza-Vareš, je glavni putni pravac u središnjoj Bosni u
smjeru zapad-istok. Pravac je na više mjesta bio pod kontrolom ABiH, odnosno HVO.
Nakon incidenata na tom pravcu od jeseni 1992. godine, ABiH i HVO otvoreno su se
sukobili u drugoj polovici 1993. godine.
192. Kako je prijevoj Komar bio neprekidno u rukama Vojske RS komuniciranje izmeñu
Uskopaljske kotline i Lašvanske doline moguće je bilo u cestom Bugojno – Novi
Travnik koja je cijelo vrijeme bila pod nadzorom bošnjačkih snaga.
193. Prometovanje cestama u Središnjoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini bio je jako otežano
za sve strane u sukobu, posebice za bošnjačku i hrvatsku stranu. Za Bošnjake bilo je
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otvaranje prometnica ka Hercegovini od životnog značenja i morali su ih otvoriti svim

mogućim sredstvima, čak i po cijenu oružanog sukoba sa Hrvatima. U odnosu na
Republiku Hrvatsku i HZ-HB bi Hrvati Središnje Bosne i Tuzlanske regije
najvjerojatnije bili nekakvi taoci. To se može razumjeti iz riječi zapovjednika OG
»Bosanska krajina« M. Alagića čija je zona odgovornosti bila upravo Lašvanska
dolina kada je pripremao operaciju zauzimanja Viteza i progona Hrvata iz Središnje
Bosne123:
»Mene je konkretno mučilo pitanje: kud sa civilima ako uñem u Vitez? Da li
stvoriti uvjete za predaju, ili omogućiti njihovo kretanje prema jugozapadu,
bila je druga dilema. I treća varijanta bila je držati ih u okruženju i pritiskati
kako nam priticanja iz Hrvatske ne bi sasvim prestala (podvukao M.G.).
Gledajući ukupnu situaciju opredijelili smo se za ovu posljednju procjenu i,
umjesto da oslobodimo Vitez, ostavili smo ga da nam služi kao strategijski
ventil za opskrbljivanje drugih dijelova Bosne (podvukao M.G.).«
194. Otvaranje unutarnjih prometnica bilo je takoñer veoma značajno za Hrvate. U tom
kontekstu trebalo je otvoriti blokade i odstraniti nadzorne točke kod Kačuna i
Bilalovca i na Rostovu. Naime, blokadom prometa prekinuta je redovita opskrba i
komuniciranje izmeñu pojedinih dijelova hrvatske enklave u Središnjoj Bosni, a
takoñer i redovita opskrba iz zaleña Hercegovine čime bi se povezali Hrvati u
području Kreševa, Dusine i Kiseljaka s područjem Busovače, pa zatim s područjem
Vitez – Novi Travnik i zatim dalje ka Bugojnu i G. Vakufu. Ova je prometnica bila
značajna i za opskrbu postrojbi HVO u odbrani Bugojna, kao i za manevar pričuvama
odnosno mobilnim snagama ka ugroženim hrvatskim naseljima unutar Lašvansko-
lepeničke doline.
195. Nije bilo političke volje na najvišem nivou na obadvije strane da se prometovanje
uspostavi pregovorima i suradnjom. Štab Vrhovne komande Armije BiH je 5. februara
1993. godine uputio Predsjedništvu R BiH zahtjev za energičnijim angažiranjem u
123
3D02638 N. Latić i Z. Isaković, Rat u Srednjoj Bosni, Ratna sjećanja generala Alagića,
BEMUST, Zenica 1997, str. 26, (e-court stranice BCS 12, ET 7)
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rješavanju složene vojne situacije, gdje se gotovo imperativno i ucjenjivački zahtijeva

da se124:
»…Što prije obezbijede potrebne količine municije, lijekova, sanitetskog
materijala i hrane za potrebe Armije BiH. To podrazumijeva i otvaranje
koridora kroz Hercegovinu i centralnu Bosnu pod kontrolom HVO
(podvukao M.G.).
Preduzimanjem gore navedenih mjera obijezbedit će se Armiji BiH povoljni

uslovi za odbranu i proširenje slobodne teritorije (podvukao M.G.). U
protivnom, Armija BiH neće odgovarati za moguće negativne posljedice.«
196. Ponovo 2. marta 1993. godine Štab vrhovne komande Armije BiH uputio je Vladi BiH
i Ministarstvu obrane informaciju o kritičnoj situaciji u voñenju oružane borbe u
kojem okrivljuje ove organe vlasti za eventualni neuspjeh i poraz postrojbi Armije
BiH125:
»Organi ministarstva obrane i Vlade R BiH nadležni su i odgovorni za
nabavku i dostavu naoružanja i vojne opreme u logističke centre Armije BiH.
Činjenica je da se u logističkom centru Armije BiH ne nalaze potrebna
sredstva za uspješno voñenje oružane borbe i da nemamo nikakvih podataka
šta su Ministarstvo obrane i Vlada RBiH učinili po ovom pitanju i da je
uspješnost oružane borbe zavisna i od raspoloživog naoružanja i municije.
Evidentno je da će za eventualan neuspjeh u borbi sa agresorom, punu
odgovornost snositi i nadležni organi Ministarstva obrane i Vlade RBiH.
(podvukao M.G.)«
197. Tako je 10. marta 1993. godine načelnik Štaba Vrhovne komande S. Halilović na
zajedničkoj sjednici Predsjedništva, Vlade i parlamentarnih stranaka iznio prijedlog126:
4. Sa Republikom Hrvatskom, na političkom planu, konačno razriješiti
najvažnije pitanje, a to je logistika za potrebe R BiH, odnosno oružanih snaga.
124
125
126
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5. Na meñunarodnom planu animirati sve prijateljske zemlje da izvrše pritisak

na Republiku Hrvatsku da odustane od podrške »Herceg-Bosni« i raditi
aktivno na njenom dokidanju.
6. Obijezbediti da luka Ploče i put Ploče – Mostar – Sarajevo – Zenica, bude u
neprekidnoj funkciji za potrebe države BiH. Ako je nužno, za ovo angažovati
meñunarodne snage, a po potrebi i našim snagama taj prostor osigurati.«
198. U daljem izlaganju je S. Halilović upozorava prisutne127:

»…pošto zahtjevi za vaše aktivnije angažovanje koje smo mi poslali prema
Vladi i Predsjedništvu, do sada nisu došli na dnevni red, da vas kratko
podsjetim na njih, da vas i ovom prilikom zamolim da ih što prije ozbiljno
uzmete u razmatranje…Meñutim, mišljenja smo da na sadašnju, veoma složenu
situaciju na ratištima i problemima koji se javljaju u organizovanom
suprotstavljanju agresoru RBiH, Predsjedništvo i vlada, vlast u općinama, ne
reaguju organizovano i dovoljno energično, što može dovesti do negativnih
posljedica sa neslućenim razmjerama (podvukao M.G.).«
199. Mogu se izvući sljedeći zaključci:

− glavne cestovne veze su bile posve prekinute zbog fizičkog zauzeća i nadzora
Vojske RS,
− dio cestovnih prometnica bio je pod povremenim ognjem topništva Vojske RS,
posebice cesta Novi Travnik – Bugojno i Čapljina-Mostar-Jablanica,
− djelomični nadzor Armije BiH i HVO nad pojedinim dionicama temeljnih
cestovnih pravaca prouzrokovao je česte prekide prometovanja na više dana i
otvaranje prometovanja zahtijevalo je česta pregovaranja posredstvom
UNPROFOR,
− uspostavljanje nadzornih točaka na značajnijim raskršćima od strane pripadnika
Armije BiH i HVO prouzročilo je mnoge tenzije i ozbiljne incidente koji su često
prerasli u oružane sukobe128,
− poseban problem je predstavljalo prometovanje u zimi 1992/1993 zbog visokog
snijega,
127
4D01489 S. Halilović, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str .152
128
4D01479 Humanitarni konvoji UNHCR su od Zagreba do Sarajeva morali proći 90 cestovnih
nadzornih točaka i na svakoj voditi pregovore. - www.unhcr.ba/publications/state_refugees_bih.pdf
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− obje strane spremale su se da uporabe oružje i oružanu silu jedne protiv druge radi
otvaranja prometnica i uspostave prometovanja odnosno opskrbe svojih vojski i
stanovništva.
8.6. Zaključak
200. S obzirom na gospodarsko i prometno značenje Središnje Bosne i Sjeverne

Hercegovine vojno bi bilo opravdano da Armija BiH:
(i) osigura potpunu kontrolu nad područjem Konjica koje je iznimno važno zbog
sljedećih okolnosti:
1/ u zaleñu je Sarajeva i stoga iznimno važno za pripreme i izvoñenje bilo
kakve vojne operacije osloboñenja Sarajeva;
2/ zbog blizine Sarajeva, vojne infrastrukture iz vremena Jugoslavije i
komunikacijskih pravaca područje Konjica bilo je najpovoljnije za
smještaj vojnog zapovjedništva koje bi rukovodilo vojnim operacijama;
3/ Konjic je bio najvažnija komunikacijska točka na pravcu Sarajevo-
Jablanica-Mostar-Jadransko more;
4/ u Konjicu je postojala tvornica IGMAN, u kojoj se proizvodila municija
za lako pješačko oružje;
(ii) osvoji Vitez i iznimno važnu tvornicu eksploziva u tom gradu koristi za
potrebe vlastitog naoružanja;
(iii) ostvari punu kontrolu nad gradovima u kojima se nalaze značajni objekti vojne
industrije – Bugojno, Travnik, Novi Travnik;
(iv) ostvari punu kontrolu nad komunikacijskim pravcem iz Srednje Bosne preko
Jablanice i Mostara do Jadranskog mora i tako osigura uvjete za kontinuirano i
nesmetano opskrbu.
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9. JE LI POSTOJALA OPSADA MOSTARA?
201. Postavljeno mi je pitanje da li se s vojnog aspekta može smatrati da je Istočni Mostar

poslije 30. juna 1993. godine bio pod opsadom ako je (a) pod kontrolom Armije BiH
bilo područje od oko 50 km na lijevoj obali Neretve (dio sjeverno a dio južno od
Istočnog Mostara)129 i ako je (b) postojala komunikacija Jablanica-Istočni Mostar (s
tim što je nekoliko kilometara bila planinska staza), putem koje je jedinicama Armije
BiH u Istočnom Mostaru i okolnim područjima pristizala pomoć i putem koje je
Armiji BiH dostavljano oružje i municija, a kojom je i civilno stanovništvo moglo
otići prema Jablanici.
202. Spomenute (a) i (b) pretpostavke potvrñuju sljedeći dokumenti:

(i) Informacija Štaba Vrhovne komande OS BiH o toku borbenih dejstava na
teritoriji R BiH za period od 24 sata dana 30.06.1993., u kojoj se navodi da je
Armija BiH «zauzela važna uporišta i to: Sjeverni Logor, Raštane, Vrapčiće,
Bijelo Polje, Salakovac i Rošci. Pored ostalog u našim rukama se nalaze sve
HE na Neretvi, izuzev HE Čapljina. /.../ Prema izvještaju komande 4.K.
jedinice ovog korpusa su se jučer spojile sa snagama 6. Korpusa, što će imati
pozitivan uticaj na dalji tok b/d.»130 (Napomena M.G. – zona odgovornosti 4.
korpus ABiH je mostarsko područje, a 6. korpusa područje Jablanice i
Konjica.);
(ii) Nareñenje komandanta ABiH Rasima Delića od 27. jula 1993. kojom se Namik
Džanković upućuje na teritorij zone odgovornosti 4. i 6. korpusa131;
(iii) UNPROFOR press release od 21. augusta 1993. u kojem se navodi kako je
zapovjednik ABiH u Mostaru Sulejman Budaković izjavio da će pristati na
prekid vatre, ali da se mora zadržati koridor prema Jablanici132;
(iv) [Redigirano]133;
129
Prikazano na dokumentima 4D00625, IC01005, IC01006
130
2D01389 Informacija Štaba Vrhovne komande OS BiH o toku borbenih dejstava na teritoriji R
BiH za period od 24 sata dana 30.06.1993, br. 02/1-182 od 01.07.1993.
131
4D00768 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the 4th and 6th Corps Command, ref:1/297-72,
Sarajevo, 27 July 1993
132
P03858 UNPROFOR Operational updates and press releases for the period 16 Aug 93 to 22
Aug 93.
133
[Redigirano]
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(v) Naredba zamjenika komandanta Štaba Vrhovne komande OS RBiH Stjepana

Šibera od 4. septembra 1993. u kojoj se uvodno ocjenjuje da je «ekstremno
krilo HVO i HV» spremno za ofanzivu na pravcu Prozor-Jablanica, te da bi
time bio blokiran pravac Mostar-Jablanica-Sarajevo134;
(vi) Nareñenje načelnika Glavnog štaba Vrhovne komande ABiH Sefera Halilovića
od 6. septembra 1993., u kojem se spominje angažiranje izviñačko-
diverzantske brigade «Zulfikar» «na pravcu s.Vrdi-s.Goranci prema Mostaru»,
a zapovjedniku te jedinice nareñuje da zajedno s direktorom poduzeća
Hidroelektrane na Neretvi regulira način i vrijeme puštanja nivoa vode iz jezera
HE Salakovac135;
(vii) Dokument zapovjednika 4. korpusa ABiH Arifa Pašalića od 7. septembra 1993.
u kojem se navodi da u zonu odgovornosti 4. korpusa, dakle na područje
Mostara, trebaju po dogovoru biti upućene 1-2 čete iz sastava 7. muslimanske
brigade 3.korpusa Armije RBiH136;
(viii) Izvještaj načelnika štaba 4. korpusa ABiH od 14. oktobra 1993. o stanju u zoni
odgovornosti Operativne grupe Sjever-1 sadrži podatke o vojnim jedinicama i
njihovim položajima sjeverno od Istočnog Mostara. Meñu ostalim se navodi da
«veliki problem komandi OG predstavlja transport civilnog stanovništva i
ostalih koji maršuju u pravcu sjevera i juga», a da su «veliki problemi u
transportu ranjenika i ostalog za grad». «Velik je problem oko snabdijevanja
ove jedinice hljebom zbog toga što se moraju drva za pekaru voziti u Mostar, a
hljeb iz Mostara za Bijelo Polje dok istovremeno u Vrapčićima postoji pekara
koja bi uz male popravke mogla da funkcioniše», navodi se u izvještaju. Veći
dio izvještaja posvećen je problemu nadležnosti nad tovarnim vodom koji je
korišten za prijevoz robe na planinskom dijelu puta Mostar-Jablanica, a
spominje se da se «prilikom transporta nafte koja kapa po konjima javljaju
velike rane i izbacuju /konji/ iz stroja».137
134
4D00780 Signed and stamped order issued by Stjepan Siber to the 6th Corps Command, re:
measures for stabilization of defence, ref: 02/1075-1, Sarajevo, 04 September 1993
135
3D 00939 Command issued by Sefer Halilović, 6 September 1993
136
3D 00932 EXHIBIT FROM HALILOVIC, REPLY/REPORT SIGNED BY ARIF PASALIC,
No. 838-06 od 7. septembra 1993.
137
4D00179 Signed and stamped report issued by Esad Ramic, re: situation found during
inspection of responsibility zone of Operational Group 'NORTH-1', ref: 03-81/93, 14 October 1993
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(ix) Zapovijest za napad zapovjednika brigade «Zulfikar» Ališpage Zulfikara od 11.

septembra 1993. u kojoj se iznosi ocjena da su «agresorske snage dijela HVO i
HV» dobile zadatak da «doñu u posjed HE na slivu Neretve»138;
(x) Naredba zapovjednika Štaba Vrhovne komande ABiH Rasima Delića od 12.
septembra 1993. u kojoj se spominju planirana borbena dejstva u pravcu
Prozora i Mostara139;
(xi) Prijedlog borbenih djelovanja na frontu od Gornjeg Vakufa do Mostara, koji je
20. septembra 1993. sastavila ekipa u sastavu Sefer Halilović, Vehbija Karić,
Rifat Bilajac i Zićro Suljević140;
(xii) Odgovor načelnika GS ABiH Sefera Halilovića zapovjedniku Rasimu Deliću
na njegov upit od 25. septembra 1993. (u vezi s telegramom Arifa Pašalića), u
kojem se uz ostalo navodi da je «poslao 4 nareñenja – čak i molbe da doñe
helikopter zbog teških ranjenika i prebacivanja jedne čete u rejon Bijelog
polja», te da je nakon intervencije Halilovića i Delića «četa jačine 150 ljudi
prebačena u Bijelo Polje radi pomoći Mostaru»141 ;
(xiii) Nareñenje zapovjednika 4. korpusa ABiH Arifa Pašalića od 25. septembra
1993. iz kojeg je vidljivo da područje sjeverno i južno od Istočnog Mostara
drže pod kontrolom jedinice ABiH, da istočni dio cijelog tog područja pod
kontrolom drži Vojska Republike Srpske («četnici»), a da HVO («ustaše») drži
pod kontrolom zapadni dio toga područja142;
(xiv) [Redigirano]143;
138
3D02155 HAL-1-208, ORDER TO ATTACK ISSUED BY ALISPAGO ZULFIKAR,
OPERATION DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS VRDI 93
139
4D01113 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the Chief of Supreme Command Staff and to the
Commander of the 6th Corps Command, re: reexamine the decision regarding planned combat actions towards
Prozor and Mostar, ref: 01/47-245, 12 September 1993
140
3D00737 HAL-1-203, EXHIBIT FROM HALILOVIC CASE, REPORT OF THE
INSPECTION TEAM, HALILOVIC, KARICBILAJAC, SULJEVIC, 20 September 1993
141
4D00798 Telegram with explanation to Arif Pasalic and Rasim Delic issued by Sefer Halilovic,
re: document no. 337 of 25 september 1993
142
4D00711 Order issued by Arif Pasalic, re: reorganization for the purpose of forming the
Operative Groups for conducting combat activities, ref:03-09/93, 25 September 1993
143
[Redigirano]
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(xv) Naredba komandanta 4. korpusa ABiH Sulejmana Budakovića od 19.

decembra 1993. u kojoj se uvodno spominju obavještajni podaci o pripremama
HVO za napad na Drežnicu, sa ciljem presijecanja komunikacije Mostar-
Jablanica144;
(xvi) izvadak iz knjige Esada Šejtanića «Na ognjenim vratima Hercegovine» u
kojem ovaj zapovjednik ABiH u Mostaru ističe: «Situacija u gradu i okolini je
bila sve teža. Glad je ozbiljno harala na sve strane. Ono malo hrane što je iz
Jablanice preko Glogova ulazilo u Mostar, dijelilo se na kapaljku, i ponovo je
veliki broj stanovnika želio otići za Jablanicu i dalje za Bosnu. Represivnim
mjerama, nažalost, spriječili smo isticanje stanovništva, i smanjili smo svaki
pokret na najnužniju mjeru».145
(xvii) Izvješće SPABAT-a od 19. jula 1993. da je UNHCR Metković otkazao sve
konvoje humanitarne pomoći zato što je HVO inzistirao da bude informiran o
postotku pomoći koja se dodjeljuje stanovništvu svake od sukobljenih strana146;
203. Za pojašnjenje moguće opsade Mostara od strane HVO potrebno je utvrditi temeljne
značajke suvremene vojne opsade. Pri tome ćemo se poslužiti pravilima voñenja
oružanog boja u urbanim sredinama po načelima američke vojske, koja u biti nisu
ništa drugačija od opštih načela drugih suvremenih vojski.
204. Definicija opsade147: Opsada je pojam koji označava vojnu operaciju osvajanja grada
ili drugog mjesta opkoljavanjem i blokiranjem komunikacija i opskrbe, koje može, ali
ne mora biti praćeno artiljerijskim napadima i bombardiranjem. Time se vojska
protivne strane prisiljava na predaju ili njene vlasti na političke ustupke. Takoñer se
opsadom mogu vezivati protivničke snage i time im spriječiti angažiranje na drugim
pravcima odnosno osigurati vlastite snage na drugim pravcima.
144
4D00720 Signed and stamped order issued by Sulejman Budakovic, re: taking measures for
combat readiness, ref: 03-641, 19 December 1993
145
4D00545 Excerpt from the book Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia, Esad Sejtanic,
June 2005
146
P03547 UNPROFOR HQ BH Kiseljak daily infsum for 19 July 1993
147
To surround a city or enemy army, cutting off supplies, in order to force surrender.
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205. Temeljno načelo opsade ili blokade je potpuna izolacija okruženih protivničkih snaga
od drugih vlastitih snaga izvana, što pretpostavlja da napadač nadzire i sprečava bilo
kakav kontakt sa snagama izvan blokade. U suvremenoj vojnoj teoriji izolacija može
biti:
− fizička – zaposjedanjem čvrstog obruča oko opkoljenih protivničkih snaga,
vatrenim djelovanjem topništva i zrakoplovstva u slučaju pomanjkanja snaga ili
nedostupnosti dijela obruča i neprekidnim i odlučnim nadzorom područja blokade i
šireg područja;
− elektronska – ofenzivnim informatičkim djelovanjem u vidu intenzivnog
ometanja elektronskih sredstava veza, elektronskih sredstava javnog informiranja
(TV, radio, telefon, internet), intenzivnim praćenjem elektronskih sredstava
protivničke strane;
− psihološka – s djelovanjem civilnih poslova, bojnim djelovanjem, elektronskim
djelovanjem, posebice obmanama i propagandnim i psihološkim djelovanjem na
moral pojedinaca i okruženih postrojbi u cjelini, te neprijateljski raspoloženog
stanovništva u okruženju i van njega uz istovremeno ohrabrivanje stanovništva
naklonjenog napadaču.
206. Takoñer treba imati u vidu i mnoge činjenice u eventualnoj opsadi Istočnog Mostara
od strane HVO. U kom je stupnju bila ostvarena fizička blokada Istočnog Mostara od
strane HVO može se ustvrditi kroz nekoliko činjenica:
- grad Istočni Mostar nije bio blokiran, jer je cijeli prostor na području lijeve
obale Neretve sjeverno i južno od grada bio pod kontrolom Armije BiH, i to u
dužini od oko 50 km (od Jablanice do Bune);
- Podveležje, odnosno područje istočno od Istočnog Mostara držala je pod
kontrolom Vojska Republike Srpske;
- HVO je pod svojom kontrolom imao područje zapadno od položaja Armije
BiH.
Ove nesporne činjenice potvrñuju da Istočni Mostar nije bio u okruženju jedinica
HVO, odnosno da HVO nije fizički blokirao Istočni Mostar.
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207. Opskrba bojnim potrebama (oružjem, streljivom) nije bila prekinuta tako da je Armija
BiH ne samo držala položaje na crti razdvajanja uspostavljenoj još u aprilu 1993.
godine, nego je i izvodila borbene akcije većih razmjera.
208. Kritična je bila opskrba brojnog stanovništva (mještani i izbjeglice) životnim

namirnicama. Zahvaljujući mogućnosti proizvodnje hrane na područjima sjeverno i
južno od Istočnog Mostara, dopremi hrane iz pravca Jablanice i aktivnostima
humanitarnih organizacija Istočni Mostar nije ostao bez hrane. Veći zastoj u opskrbi
od strane UNHCR i meñunarodnih organizacijama trajao je oko mjesec i i pol dana u
ljeto 1993. godine.
209. Prema tvrdnjama uprave gradskog vodova opskrba vodom bila je dostupna i
stanovnicima u istočnom dijelu Mostara preko nekoliko improviziranih vodova sa
smanjenim kapacitetom. Na smanjenje dovoda vode utjecala su bojna djelovanja obje
strane, zastarjelost vodovodne mreže i naprava i smanjene količine na izvorištima radi
visokih ljetnih vrućina i nedostatka padavina148.
210. Takoñer je istočni dio Mostara bio opskrbljen i električnom energijom jer su
hidrocentrale na Neretvi proizvodile isključivo za potrebe Muslimana, dok su
dalekovodi prema Mostaru išli lijevom obalom Neretve. Iz pojedinih dokumenata
spomenutih u paragrafu 202. vidljivo je da su hidrocentrale bile pod kontrolom Armije
BiH.
211. U pogledu radijskih i televizijskih programa situacija se nije promijenila u odnosu na

1992. godinu, kada je Vojska Republike Srpske uništila repetitor na Veležu i time
onemogućila praćenje programa Radio-televizije Sarajevo, s tim što su radijski
programi bili dostupni na srednjem valnom opsegu. Lokalni mediji koje su osnovale
muslimanske vlasti nesmetano su djelovali.149
148
3D00723 Izvješće o stanju vodopskrbe u razdoblju 1992.-1994, Vodovod d.o.o
P02611 Stamped request re: Solution of water supply system on the left bank of the city of
Mostar, addressed to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and THW,
signed by Arif Pasalic. Ref: 01-11/93
1D01569 Report on the problems re: damaged pipeline at Studenac water spring
1D01567 Report on the problems in the water supply in the city of Mostar
149
2D00448 Arif Pasalic speech on the War radio BiH on June 30th. 1993 at 11.00
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212. Stacionarne kablirane telefonske linije bile su u prekidu radi oštećenja mostova na
rijeci Bijeloj i Neretvi kod Aleksin Hana. Zapovjedništva ABiH su raspolagala
satelitskim mobilnim vezama.150 Zapovjedništva unutar istočnog dijela Mostara imala
su pouzdane meñusobne radio veze. Takoñer je zapovjedništvo 4. korpusa sa štabom
Vrhovne komande komuniciralo bez poteškoća izazvanih djelovanjem HVO.151
213. Iako su se obje strane koristile propagandom za ostvarenje svojih ciljeva, ne može se
reći da je se HVO koristio mjerama psihološke izolacije koje bi bile usmjerene kako
prema pripadnicima Armije BiH tako i prema stanovništvu.
214. Iz navedenih činjenica se može zaključiti da istočni dio Mostara u smislu suvremene
vojne teorije nije bio pod opsadom:
- grad Istočni Mostar imao je slobodu komunikaciji sa širim prostorom sjeverno i
južno od grada,
− Muslimani su imali otvoren put prema svojoj strani u centru BiH,
− s istočne strane iz Podveležja Muslimanima nije prijetila oružana opasnost jer su
taj dio bojišnice držali Srbi koji su u to vrijeme prekinuli oružana djelovanja prema
Muslimanima,
− opskrba bojnim potrebama bila je otežana, ali ne i onemogućena,
− opskrba stanovništva istočnog Mostara bila je otežana, ali nije bila u potpunosti
prekinuta.
150
3D01836 IL-2-387, REQUEST SENT BY SALIM SABIC TO MR. HADZIOSMANOVIC
RE:STELLITE PHONE INSTALLED IN THE OFFICES OF THE MOSTAR MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE
SDA
151
3D02591 R68-3-191, SPECIAL REPORT FROM 21 SEPTEMBER 1993 BY APOLLO ON
ZUKA AND ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC CONVERSATION
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10. SITUACIJA KAD JE JEDNA DRŽAVA NAPADNUTA ILI

UGROŽENA S TERITORIJA DRUGE DRŽAVE
215. Postavljeno mi je pitanje da li je Republika Hrvatska s vojnog aspekta imala pravo

uputiti svoje vojne jedinice na teritorij Bosne i Hercegovine radi obrane svoga
teritorija od JNA i kasnije vojske Republike Srpske, koje su napadale Dubrovnik i
druge gradove na hrvatskoj obali s teritorija BiH.152
216. U članku 51 Povelje UN zapisano je da svaka država ima prirodno pravo na

samoodbranu sve dok Vijeće sigurnosti UN ne poduzme drugačije učinkovite mjere
smirivanja sukoba odnosno odvraćanja i prekida agresije. Nijedna rezolucije Vijeća
sigurnosti o ratu u bivšoj Jugoslaviji nije se odnosila na konkretan slučaj oružanih
djelovanja u južnoj Hrvatskoj – šire područje Dubrovnika i jugoistočnoj Hercegovini.
Shodno Povelji UN Hrvatska je imala prirodno pravo na samoobranu u slučaju
upada snaga tadašnje SRJ na njenu teritoriju i oduprijeti se zauzimanju tog prostora,
rušenju naselja (Čepikuće, Cavtat, Dubrovnik) i progonu nesrpskog stanovništva
(Hrvata i Muslimana).
Ništa u ovoj Povelji ne umanjuje prirodno pravo na individualnu ili

kolektivnu odbranu u slučaju oružanog napada na člana Ujedinjenih nacija
dok Vijeće sigurnosti ne preduzme mjere potrebne za očuvanje mira i
sigurnosti u svijetu. O mjerama koje preduzmu članovi koristeći se ovim
pravom na samoodbranu biće odmah obaviješteno Vijeće sigurnosti i ove
mjere ni na koji način neće dovesti u pitanje ovlasti i odgovornosti Vijeća da u
skladu sa ovom Poveljom preduzme u svako doba akciju koju smatra nužnom u
cilju obezbjeñivanja i održanja mira i sigurnosti u svijetu.
217. Washingtonski ugovor koji je pravni temelj NATO-a predviña mogućnost kolektivne
obrane u slučaju napada na jednu od članica, što stoji u članku 5:
Potpisnice smatraju da se oružani napad na jednu ili više njih, u Europi ili
Sjevernoj Americi, treba smatrati napadom na sve njih i zato se slažu da će u
slučaju takvog oružanog napada, svaka od njih, pozivajući se na pravo
152
Takvo djelovanje HV spominje se, meñu ostalim, u dokumentu 4D01240: Direktiva Štaba Vrhovne
komande oružanih snaga RBiH od 10.09.1992.
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individualne ili zajedničke samoobrane iz članka 51. Povelje Ujedinjenih

Naroda, pomoći potpisnici ili potpisnicama koje su napadnute, poduzimajući
odmah, same i u skladu s drugim potpisnicama, korake koji se smatraju
potrebnima, uključujući uporabu oružane sile, da bi povratile i održale
sigurnost Sjevernoatlantskog područja.
Svaki takav oružani napad i mjere poduzete kao rezultat tog napada moraju se
odmah prijaviti Vijeću sigurnosti. Takve mjere moraju se zaustaviti kada
Vijeće sigurnosti poduzme mjere potrebne za ponovnu uspostavu i održavanje
meñunarodnog mira i sigurnosti.
218. U suvremenoj praksi poslije 2. svjetskog rata ova odredba često je korištena za vojnu
intervenciju prema mnogim zemljama koje nisu ni napale neku od članica NATO
pakta, ali su svojim političkim djelovanjem odnosno upotrebom svoje oružane snage
ugrozile političke, ekonomske ili vojne interese neke od članica, u pravilu ponajviše
SAD kao vodeće članice. Vojne intervencije izvedene su izvan matične teritorije bilo
koje od članica odnosno van teritorije koja se opredjeljuje u članku 7. Takav je slučaj
u ratovima u Hrvatskoj (bombardiranje aerodroma Udbina 1994.), u ratu u BiH
(bombardiranje objekata i pripadnika VRS u BiH 1995.), u ratu u SRJ (zračni napadi
na Srbiju 1999. godine).
219. Ustav Republike Hrvatske propisivao je člankom 7. da oružane snage štite suverenitet
i neovisnost Republike Hrvatske, te brane njenu teritorijalnu cjelovitost.153
220. Svaka država ima pravo braniti se od napada na njezinu teritoriju i njezino
stanovništvo. To pravo na samoobranu uključuje i eliminiranje izvora napadačkih
akcija. Ako se bojeva oruña i vojne jedinice koje vrše napad nalaze na teritoriju druge
države, tada napadnuta država ima pravo izvesti napad na područje na kojem se nalazi
neprijateljska vojska.
221. Šire područje Dubrovnika od delte Neretve do Prevlake bilo je napadnuto od strane
Vojske Jugoslavije, čije su postrojbe bile popunjene pričuvnim sastavom iz Crne Gore
i Istočne Hercegovine, a djelomice iz Srbije (37. užički korpus). Polazna osnovica tim
153
1D02912 Ustav Republike Hrvatske, 22. decembar 1990.
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snagama bila je teritorija Republike BiH pod jurisdikcijom Republike Srpske (šire
zaleñe Popova Polja i Nevesinjskog Polja). Mada su progoni muslimanskog i
hrvatskog stanovništva počeli već prije dolaska postrojbi Vojske Jugoslavije, njihovim
dolaskom došlo je do masovnog progona tog stanovništva. Odmah po dolasku ove su
snage SRJ izvršile oružani prepad na zaleñe Dubrovnika.
222. Ustavna obaveza RH i prirodno pravo na samoobranu po meñunarodnom ratnom

pravu bile su pravni temelj ofenzive hrvatskih snaga iz dubine državne teritorije. Kada
su invazijske snage bile protjerane sa teritorije RH, opasnost po državu još nije bila
otklonjena. Načela ratovanja nalažu da se protivnik mora progoniti ili do uništenja ili
do kapitulacije ili do postizanja političkog sporazuma u vidu primirja sve dok postoji
opasnost za državu. Taj je progon nastavljen i na teritoriju R BiH. Ulazak jedinica HV
na teritoriju R BiH bio je nužan i s aspekta taktičkog operativnog položaja u smislu
učinkovite obrane osloboñenog područja dubrovačkog zaleña. Svako zaustavljanje HV
na granicama Hrvatske štetilo bi interesima kako same Hrvatske (plitka obrana) kao i
interesima R BiH - hrvatskom i muslimanskom narodu u Hercegovini koji su bili
neposredno ugroženi u Mostaru i donjem toku rijeke Neretve.
223. HV je bila dužna i imala prirodno pravo da protjera invazijske snage SRJ sa svoje
teritorije i da ulaskom na teritoriju susjedne BiH spriječi mogući ponovni napad.
Napad na snage Vojske RS posve je opravdan jer su te snage bile saveznik snagama
Vojske Jugoslavije i omogućile im stacioniranje na svojoj teritoriji.
224. Sa vojnog aspekta je bojno djelovanje HV u jugoistočnoj Hercegovini bio posve

opravdano i nužno.
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11. VOJNO ZNAČENJE BHS POJMOVA «ASANACIJA» I «ČIŠĆENJE»

TERENA
225. Postavljen mi je upit o značenju pojma «asanacija» i «čišćenje» terena, koji se koriste
u brojnim dokumentima HVO i Armije BiH.154
226. Asanacija bojišnice predstavlja organizirano poduzimanje mjera radi uklanjanja

posmrtnih ostataka poginulih pripadnika vojske obiju strana i civila, poginulih
domaćih i divljih životinja, bioloških otpadaka i drugih mogućih izvorišta zaraznih
bolesti na bojišnici ili u naseljima155.
227. Termin asanacija bojišnice specifičan je u jugoslavenskoj vojnoj terminologiji i druge

ga armije kao takvog ne poznaju, meñutim gotovo sve suvremene armije poduzimaju
ove mjere i angažiraju na tome logističke organe.
228. Načelno se odreñuju posebne postrojbe za izvršenje asanacije bojišnice i udružuju u

ekipe ili odrede. Ove privremene sastave formira zapovjednik čija je postrojba nosilac
bojnog djelovanja na odreñenom području. U slučaju visokog intenziteta bojevanja,
kada imaju vojne postrojbe visok tempo pokreta, asanaciju bojišnice mogu preuzeti i
posebne postrojbe koje oblikuje vojno-teritorijalno zapovjedništvo, pri čemu se
angažiraju specijalizirane ili ad hoc formirane skupine od pripadnika teritorijalne
komponente vojske i postrojbi civilne zaštite.
229. Skupine odnosno odrede za asanaciju bojišta sačinjavaju sanitetski organi (vojni ili
civilni) radi odreñivanja uzroka smrti, veterinarski organi radi odreñivanja uzroka
uginuća domaćih i divljih životinja i mogućih zarazni životinjskih bolesti, personalni
organi radi odreñivanja identiteta poginulih, inženjerijska postrojba sa strojevima za
zemljane radove odnosno izradu masovnih grobnica, svećenici religija većeg dijela
poginulih, fizička radna snaga.
154
Na primjer, u dokumentu 4D01240: Direktiva Štaba Vrhovne komande oružanih snaga RBiH od
10.09.1992., govori se o asanaciji bojišta.
155
Vojna enciklopedija – 2. izdanje, tom I, str. 266, Beograd 1970
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230. Asanacija terena obvezno se provodi nakon vojnih akcija. Ako pripadnici vojne
jedinice koja se nalazi na terenu na kojem treba izvršiti čišćenje trebaju biti angažirani
na nekom borbenom zadatku, poslove čišćenja mogu obaviti jedinice civilne zaštite.
231. Čišćenje terena je pojam koji označava detaljan pregled bojišnice prije boja, tijekom
boja i po završetku boja i obuhvaća detaljan pregled zone odgovornosti, uklanjanje
prirodnih i umjetnih objekata i predmeta koji bi mogli značajno utjecati na voñenje
boja odnosno boravka postrojbi u zoni odgovornosti. Čišćenje terena je širi pojam od
pojma asanacija bojišnice, pri čemu je ovaj pojam samo jedan, ali najznačajniji dio.
232. Prije boja čišćenje terena obuhvaća detaljan pregled, uklanjanje niskog raslinja i
drveća ispred prednje obrambene linije svake postrojbe, uklanjanja mogućih prepreka
na pravcima kretanja uzmicanja i protunapada. Temeljito se pregledaju i očiste
izvorišta pitke vode, odnosno označavaju se sa zabranom upotrebe. Prije boja čišćenje
terena izvode u načelu postrojbe koje organiziraju obranu.
233. Čišćenje terena nakon boja je zadaća postrojbe koja zaposjedne odgovarajući teren
zauzimanjem u boju, prispijećem nakon boja ili po posebnoj zapovjedi. Čišćenje
terena nakon boja mogu izvoditi vojne postrojbe, postrojbe vojno-teritorijalnih
zapovjedništava i postrojbe civilne zaštite. U načelu se oblikuju kombinirane ekipe ili
odredi i sačinjavaju ih inženjerijske postrojbe sa odgovarajućim grañevnim strojevima
i specijalnim kompletima, postrojbe NBC zaštite, specijalizirane ekipe civilnih
ustanova infrastrukture (elektro, vodovod, telefonija i dr.) i radna snaga.
234. Čišćenje terena nakon boja obuhvaća: raščišćavanje i uklanjanje ruševina, najnužniji
popravak putova i drugih objekata infrastrukture, pronalaženje, obilježavanje i
uklanjanje neeksplodiranih eksplozivnih tijela (topničkih granata, avionskih bombi,
mina), pronalaženje, obilježavanje i razminiranje vlastitih i protivničkih minskih
polja, prikupljanje zaostale, odbačene vojne opreme i naoružanja, NBC
dekontaminacija predmeta, objekata i zemljišta, pregled izvorišta pitke vode i
spriječavanje suvišnog otjecanja iz oštećenih vodova i rezervoara, pregled i
isključivanje izvora napajanja električnom energijom, pregled objekata i naprava koje
bi mogle prouzročiti naknadne štete i žrtve (brane vodnih akumulacija i sl.). Težište je
na pronalaženju, obilježavanju i uklanjanju neeksplodiranih eksplozivnih tijela i
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minskih polja. Ovaj pojam uključuje i čišćenje terena od zaostalih pripadnika

neprijateljske vojske (zarobljavanjem, ranjavanjem ili ubijanjem, ovisno o otporu koji
pružaju). Oni mogu ostati na zauzetom prostoru, jer se usljed dinamike boja nisu
uspjeli pravovremeno izvući sa glavninom snaga ili su planski ostavljeni radi
usporavanja snaga napadača svojim otporom, odnosno držanjem značajnih objekata.
Mogu biti naoružani i u vojnim odorama, a mogu se pojedinci i presvući u civilno
odijelo radi izbjegavanja zarobljavanja ili ilegalnog djelovanja. Ovaj aspekt vojnog
pojma čišćenje (clear up, clean up) terena poznat je i pod engleskim pojmom «mop
up» ili «mopping up» operacija.
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12. PREDPODČINJAVANJE: ZNAČENJE I PROBLEMI
235. Postavljeno mi je pitanje o značenju pojma «predpodčinjavanje» i o vrstama

predpodčinjavanja.
236. Vojne postrojbe načelno su organizirane i oblikovane tako da mogu većinu bojnih
zadaća izvršavati samostalno bez ojačanja dugim postrojbama. Meñutim, suvremeno
bojevanje obiluje specifičnostima u smislu različitosti protivnika (oružje, oprema,
osposobljenost), posebnosti zemljišta (planina, šuma, kras, grad) i vremenskih uvjeta
(zima, ljeto, padavine). Bojno oblikovanje – formiranje bojnog rasporeda ovisno je i
od konkretne bojne zadaće koja može zahtijevati posebne snage ojačanja i bojne
potpore.
237. Udruživanje različitih postrojbi u namjensku postrojbu za izvršenje odreñene bojne

zadaće načelno počinje na razini bataljuna, izuzetno na razini čete. Ovo udruživanje
može biti u smislu pridavanja odnosno ojačanja ili u smislu oblikovanja posebne bojne
skupine u vidu borbene (BG), taktičke (TG) ili operativne grupa (OG). Osnovica za
oblikovanje privremenih sastava je organska postrojba – za BG bataljun ili četa, za TG
pukovnija ili brigada, za OG brigada ili divizija.
238. Postrojbe ojačanja ili pridavanja su u organskom sastavu neke druge postrojbe iste
razine ili u organskom sastavu postrojbi koje su neposredno podreñene postrojbi više
razine. Ove postrojbe su posebno u odnosu na postrojbu koja čini osnovicu
oblikovanja. Ovaj odnos naziva se u jugoslavenskoj vojnoj terminologiji
predpodčinjavanje. U terminologiji vojske SAD ovakvo udruživanje za izvršenje
konkretne bojne zadaće naziva se Task Forces.
239. Predpodčinjavanje može se definirati kao podreñivanje postrojbe niže razine iz

organskog sastava druge postrojbe iste ili više razine zapovjedništvu postrojbe koja je
nosilac izvršenja konkretne bojne zadaće.
240. Predpodčinjavanje načelno je ograničeno po bojnoj zadaći (izvršenje zadaće u cijelosti

ili dijela odnosno faze), po vremenu (za izvršenje konkretne bojne zadaće ili za
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vrijeme drugih nebojnih radnji ili do opoziva), po mjestu (u izravnom sastavu ili na
odvojenom mjestu) i po statusu zapovijedanja (potpuno ili djelomice).
241. U odnosu na bojnu zadaću predpodčinjavanje oklopne postrojbe pješačkoj kao nosiocu
zadaće može biti za izvršenje napada u cjelini ili samo za eksploataciju uspjeha po
proboju. U odnosu na vrijeme može biti neka postrojba predpodčinjena samo za
trajanje izvoñenja obrane ili i za vrijeme uzmaka i povlačenja i prijelaza na nove
obrambene položaje. Predpodčinjavanje se može završiti i po opozivu od strane
nadreñenog zapovjedništva. Predpodčinjena postrojba može bojno djelovati izravno u
sastavu više postrojbe kojoj se predpodčinjava ili djeluje na izdvojenom pravcu
odnosno čak iz pozadine protivnika. Prema statusu zapovijedanja može postrojba biti
predpodčinjena u cijelosti ili samo disciplinski, logistički i dr.
242. Predpodčinjavanje zapovijeda zapovjednik nadreñene postrojbe kako u smislu

postrojbe koja prima tako i u smislu postrojbe koja daje predpodčinjenu postrojbu. O
tome svojom zapovjedi obavještava oba podreñena zapovjednika, pri čemu precizno
regulira meñusobne odnose, način i vrijeme predpodčinjavanja. Zapovjednik
podreñene postrojbe prenosi svojoj postrojbi koja se predpodčinjava odluku višeg
zapovjednika o predpodčinjavanju. Takoñer mora poduzeti sve mjere popune
ljudstvom, oružjem i bojnim i drugim potrebama u skladu sa normama i postrojbu
predati u punoj bojnoj spremnosti. Po zapovjedi nadreñenog zapovjednika ili na
zahtjev zapovjednika koji prima postrojbu može uputiti stručne časnike iz svoga
zapovjedništva za pomoć, ali ne i za zapovijedanje.
243. Zapovjed predpodčinjavanja precizno definira meñusobne odnose, trajanje i način

predpodčinjavanja. Zapovjednik predpodčinjene postrojbe u svemu je podreñen
novom zapovjedniku, ukoliko nije drugačije precizirano. U smislu bojne upotrebe
predpodčinjena postrojba u načelu je posve podreñena novom zapovjedniku i ima isti
status i obaveze kao postrojbe iz organskog sastava. Zapovjednik postrojbe koja prima
predpodčinjavanje ne smije ni u kom smislu činiti razlike i prekomjerno opterećivati
predpodčinjenu postrojbu. Niti smije zapovjednik predpodčinjene postrojbe zahtijevati
poseban status ili olakšice. Za vrijeme predpodčinjavanja veza sa matičnom
postrojbom ide isključivo preko zapovjedništva postrojbe koja je primila
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predpodčinjavanje. Eventualni izravni kanali mimo znanja i odobrenja novog

zapovjednika smatraju se težim oblikom kršenja vojne discipline.
244. Predpodčinjavanjem se mijenja nadreñeni zapovjednik predpodčinjene vojne jedinice.

Zapovjednik kojem je vojna jedinica predpodčinjena preuzima sva prava i obveze
nadreñenog zapovjednika tijekom predpodčinjavanja, odnosno za odreñeni zadatak
ako se radi o djelomičnom predpodčinjavanju.
245. Ako je tijekom predpodčinjavanja pripadnik predpodčinjene vojne postrojbe

povrijedio neko pravilo vojne stege, o njegovoj odgovornosti odlučuje zapovjednik
postrojbe, odnosno ustanove u kojoj se počinitelj nalazi u doba kad se utvrñuje
njegova stegovna odgovornost.156
246. U uvjetima ratovanja na smjenu, kakav je slučaj bio kod sve tri zaraćene strane u ratu
u BiH, često je dolazilo do predpodčinjavanja postrojbi ranga čete ili bataljuna. Kako
su te postrojbe bile popunjavane na teritorijalnom principu iz jedne općine ili uže
sredine, a predpodčinjene zapovjedništvu postrojbe iz posve druge sredine, dolazilo je
do težih povreda odnosa subordinacije. Bojna spremnost predpodčinjenih postrojbi
nije bila poznata novom zapovjedništvu i zadavane su im veće i zahtjevnije zadaće
prema njihovim mogućnostima.
247. Predpodčinjavanje je složena vojna radnja i zato je treba izbjegavati. Posebice je

složena ako se predpodčinjavanjem oblikuju nove privremene postrojbe iz više viših
postrojbi i oblikuje i novo privremeno zapovjedništvo. Predpodčinjavanje odnosno
oblikovanje bojnih skupina bataljunske razine načelno treba oblikovati iz postrojbi iste
brigade ili pukovnije.
156
Tako, na primjer, Propisnik o vojnoj stezi HZHB (P00293) u članku 20. propisuje:
«Odlučivanje o odgovornosti za stegovnu pogrešku učinjenu u prijašnjoj vojnoj jedinici odnosno vojnoj
ustanovi (u daljnjem tekstu: 'jedinica, odnosno ustanova'), u ovlasti je zapovjednika jedinice, odnosno ustanove u
kojoj se počinitelj nalazi u doba kad se utvrñuje njegova stegovna odgovornost.
Časnik koji je po odredbama stavka 1. ovog članka izrekao stegovnu mjeru, o tome izvješćuje
zapovjednika prijašnje jedinice odnosno ustanove počinitelja.»
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13. «OPERATIVNI I NASTAVNI POSLOVI»
248. U intervjuu objavljenom u HRVATSKOM VOJNIKU broj 10 od 24.04.1992. tadašnji

predsjednik RH dr.Franjo Tuñman je rekao: «.... Glavni stožer je samo dio
Ministarstva obrane za operativne i nastavne poslove, isto tako kao što postoji,
primjerice, IPD služba, Vojna policija, Kontraobavještajna služba itd. Sve su to
sastavni djelovi Ministarstva u cjelini. U demokratskom društvu, kakav mi danas
izgrañujemo u Hrvatskoj, za izgradnju oružanih snaga u cjelini odgovoran je ministar
obrane Vladi, Saboru i predsjedniku Republike.»157 Zatraženo je da objasnim pojam
«operativnih i nastavnih poslova».
249. Svaka postrojba od bataljuna naviše ima svoj stožer (staff). Sastav i broj uposlenih
časnika ovisi od veličine postrojbe. Unutar svakog stožera nalazi se operativni časnik
ili operativni odsjek ili operativni odjeljak ovisno od veličine postrojbe. Unutar
stožera operativni organ načelno je najbrojniji i predstavlja okosnicu zapovjedništva
U armiji SAD ovaj organ naziva se u Stožerna skupina za usklañivanje
(Coordinating staff group). U svim armijama ova skupina je najznačajniji
zapovjednikov organ pomoći u donošenju odluka, njihovom provoñenju i u
zapovijedanju i upravljanju postrojbom. Izravno je podreñen načelniku stožera.
Načelno ovaj organ obavlja dvije vrste najznačajnijih štabnih poslova –
osposobljavanje (training) i planiranje bojnog djelovanja (Operations and plans).
Pored toga je odgovoran sa razvoj i osuvremenjivanje postrojbe (Force development
and modernization), za stožerno planiranje i nadzor (Staff planning and supervision)
i usklañivanje stožernih poslova posebne stožerne skupine (Coordination of staff
responsibility for the special staff officers). U stožernoj organizaciji JNA ove
posljednje funkcije bile su obuhvaćene u pojmu operativni poslovi, dok je funkcija
osposobljavanja nazvana nastavni poslovi.
250. Operativni poslovi u užem smislu riječi obuhvaćaju pripremu, planiranje,

usklañivanje, praćenje i analizu bojnog djelovanja. Širi opis ovih poslova sadrži ove
radnje i postupke:
157
4D01330 - HRVATSKI VOJNIK br. 10 od 24.04.1992., intervju s dr.Franjom Tuñmanom
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− priprema, usklañivanje, provjeravanje, izrada i dostava planova i zapovjedi i

drugih nareñenja za sve stožerne odjeljke,
− planiranje, usklañivanje i nadzor vježbi,
− učešće u izboru ciljeva (targeting),
− pregled planova podreñenih postrojbi,
− usklañivanje bojnog djelovanja sa drugim stožerima,
− pregled cjelokupnog plana i zapovjedi radi potpunog usklañivanja i kompletiranja,
− posmatranje bojnog djelovanja,
− osiguranje uvjeta bojne potpore,
− usklañivanje upotrebe postrojbe za uspostavu civilne vlasti,
− usklañivanje sa obavještajnim organom u izradi priloga po izviñanju i odreñivanju
prioriteta obavještajnog djelovanja i preporuka za upotrebu tehničkih sredstava,
− integriranje ognjene potpore u cjelokupno bojno djelovanje,
− planiranje pokreta postrojbi: izbor pravaca kretanja, odreñivanje prioriteta,
odreñivanje odmora, izrada zapovjedi za pokret,
− planiranje i rasporeñivanje raspoloživog vremena,
− planiranje, podjela i odreñivanje mjesta za dostavu i privremeno skladištenje
streljiva,
− predviñanje mogućih gubitaka u ljudstvu i oružju i predlaganje mjera za
spriječavanje i popunu,
− suradnja sa obavještajnim organom i organom za usklañivanje vatrene potpore u
provoñenju plana bojnog djelovanja i predlaganje dopuna ili promjena početnog
plana,
− predlaganje lokacije zapovjednih mjesta,
− predlaganje oblikovanja bojnog rasporeda i grupiranja snaga odnosno
predpodčinjavanja.
251. Nastavni poslovi obuhvaćaju planiranje, organiziranje i izvoñenje obuke vojnika,

časnika, zapovjedništava i postrojbi u cjelini:
− izrada plana i programa obuke u zapovjedništvima i postrojbama,
− priprema i nadzor izvršenja osposobljavanja u podreñenim postrojbama,
− priprema naputaka i priručnika za osposobljavanje,
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− planiranje, priprema, organizacija i izvoñenje pokaznih i drugih vježbi za

zapovjedne časnike i zapovjedništva,
− učešće u oblikovanju i osposobljavanju posebnih postrojbi i postrojbi za izvršenje
za konkretne bojne zadaće,
− koordinacija u planiranju i izvoñenju osposobljavanja sa drugim organima u
stožeru i sa podreñenim zapovjedništvima.
− stvaranje povoljnih uvjeta za osposobljavanje – planiranje materijalnih sredstava i
izgradnja nastavnih objekata,
− organizacija i voñenje unutarnjih oblika osposobljavanja - škola, tečajeva i dr.,
− planiranje i izvršenje nadzora osposobljavanja, provjeravanje i ocjenjivanje,
− održavanje bojne spremnosti svake podreñene postrojbe,
− voñenje evidencije osposobljavanja i izvješćivanje nareñenih zapovjedništava,
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14. «ŠTABNI POSLOVI» ZA POTREBE VRHOVNOG ZAPOVJEDNIKA
252. U Uredbi o oružanim snagama HZHB utvrñeno je da se radi obavljanja štabnih i

drugih stručnih poslova za potrebe Predsjedništva HZHB u Odjelu obrane osniva
Glavni stožer.158 Zatraženo je da objasnim pojam «štabnih i drugih stručnih poslova».
253. Generalštab u miru je stručni organ Ministarstva obrane, a preko njega i vrhovnog
zapovjednika za pripremu oružanih snaga za obranu zemlje i drugih državnih organa i
ustanova koje imaju udio u oružanoj obrani zemlje, dok je odnos u ratu dosta različit u
nekim zemljama. U državama parlamentarne demokracije sa izraženom ulogom
izvršne vlasti i manjom ulogom predsjednika, generalštab je izravno podreñen
ministarstvu obrane i sa vrhovnim zapovjednikom komunicira posredstvom odnosno
sa odobrenjem ministra. U zemljama gdje je predsjednik države dominantan nosilac
vlasti i istovremeno i prvi čovjek izvršne vlasti taj je odnos izravniji – predsjednik
može i smije komunicirati sa generalštabom izravno uz asistenciju ministarstva
obrane. U država autokratskog oblika vladavine generalštab je izravno podreñen
predsjedniku kao vrhovnom zapovjedniku.
254. U SFRJ bio je generalštab stručni – operativni organ ministarstva obrane koje je bilo i
vrhovni štab obrane i izravno podčinjen vrhovnom zapovjedništvu odnosno
Predsjedništvu SFRJ kao nosiocu suvereniteta. U ratu vlada nije imala nikakvih
izravnih ingerencija prema ministarstvu obrane odnosno prema generalštabu.
255. U miru generalštab za potrebe vrhovnog zapovijedanja izvršava operativno-planske

poslove u domeni izgradnje, pripreme i upotrebe oružanih snaga, u skladu sa vojno-
političkim ciljevima zemlje.
256. U ratu većina generalštabova postaje štab vrhovne komande i kao takav:
− prati i proučava situaciju na ratištima i vojištima,
− priprema i provodi odluke (planove, nareñenja, direktive i naputke) za izvoñenje
operacija i bojnog djelovanja,
− nadzire realizaciju direktiva vrhovnog zapovijedanja,
158
4D00521 Uredba o oružanim snagama HZHB, 17.10.1992, čl. 11.
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− analizira i uopćava ratna i bojna iskustva i saznanja iz domene ratne doktrine,

organizacije, zapovijedanja, uporabe i djelovanja vidova i rodova oružanih snaga,
− priprema prijedloge i usklañuje izvršenje popune gubitaka, uvoñenje novih oružja i
opreme.
257. U svim vojskama generalštab nema ovlasti izravnog zapovijedanja operativno-

strategijskim ili operativnim sastavima. Za odreñene manje značajne zadaće može
vrhovno zapovjedništvo prenijeti svoje ovlasti i na generalštab.
258. Zadaće gotovo svih glavnih stožera (generalstaff) u gotovo svim državama su jednaki i
obuhvaćaju djelatnosti u miru i u ratu.
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15. VOJNE OPERACIJE STRATEŠKE, OPERATIVNE I TAKTIČKE

RAZINE
259. Postavljeno mi je pitanje o značenju pojma «vojna operacija» i zatraženo da objasnim

razliku izmeñu vojnih operacija na strateškoj, operativnoj i taktičkoj razini.
260. U rječniku Ministarstva obrane SAD Operacija je vojna akcija ili vršenje strateške,
operativne ili taktičke radnje odnosno radnje vojnih službi, obuke ili administrativne
službe. Postoji i druga definicija – operacija je izvoñenje boja uključujući pokret,
opskrbu, napad, obranu i manevar radi postizanja ciljeva borbe ili bitke.
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational,
tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.
The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack,
defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or
campaign.
261. Prema Vojnoj enciklopediji JNA Operacija kao borbena djelatnost označava
cjelokupnost uporednih (jednovremenih) i uzastopnih dejstava, koja se izvode
koordinirano, organizovano i po jedinstvenoj zamisli i planu, na jedinstvenom prostoru
i u odreñenom vremenskom razdoblju radi postizanja operativnih ili strategijskih
ciljeva.
262. Prema američkom tumačenju pojam operacija označava svaku vojnu radnju bez obzira
na cilj, vrstu snaga koje je izvode i razinu zapovijedanja. Po jugoslavenskom
tumačenju pojam operacija izražava vojnu radnju združenih sastava vojske na široj
prostoriji u dužem vremenskom razdoblju i na stretegijskoj ili operativnoj razini
zapovijedanja. Na taktičkoj razini zapovijedanja vojne aktivnosti nazivaju se borbom
ili bojem.
263. Obzirom da su časnici u vojskama i ratovima na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije završili

vojne škole uglavnom u JNA u daljem će biti pojašnjeni pojmovi operacije na
strateškoj i operativnoj razini.
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264. Operacija na operativnoj razini je skup borbi i bojeva više združenih taktičkih
postrojbi (pukovnija, brigada, divizija), podržanih taktičkim postrojbama
(pukovnijama, brigadama) avijacije ili mornarice (u priobalnom pojasu), topništva,
topničko-raketnih postrojbi protuzračne obrane, inžinjerstva i drugih rodova vojske.
Ova operacija se izvodi u trajanju od 4-10 dana izuzetno i više dana u 2-3 faze. U
odnosu na prostor ona se organizira i izvodi na ograničenom dijelu državne teritorije i
zavisno od veličine angažiranih snaga i vrste operacije (napadna ili obrambena) može
obuhvatiti prostoriju od 100 – 500 km2 . Ponekad se mogu borbe i bojevi voditi i
odvojeno po prostoru, u različito vrijeme sa pojedinim združenim taktičkim
postrojbama, ali po jedinstvenoj zamisli i jedinstvenom cilju. Takve operacije izvode
ojačani formacijski operativni sastavi (korpus ili armija) ili privremeno oblikovani
sastavi u vidu Operativne grupe (1-3 divizije ili 3-5 brigada) kada se oblikuje i
posebno zapovjedništvo samo za zapovijedanje u odreñenoj operaciji. Operacijska
zona obuhvata prostor zadržavanja vlastitih i protivničkih snaga, pri čemu protivničke
snage mogu biti združene taktičke ili operativne razine.
265. U ratu u BiH kao primjer operacije na operativnoj razini može biti operacija Neretva-
93 koju je poduzela Armija BiH na prostoru sjeverne Hercegovine.
266. Strategijska operacija je skup operacija na operativnoj razini i bojeva koje izvode
operativno-strategijski sastavi po jedinstvenoj zamisli vrhovnog zapovijedanja i sa
ciljem postizanja odlučujućeg rješenja u nekoj od faza rata. Ove operacije izvode
armije ili grupe armija kopnenih snaga koje mogu biti podržane operativnim sastavima
zrakoplovstva (1-2 divizije borbenih zrakoplova, 1-2 pukovnije lovačkih zrakoplova,
do divizije PZO) korpus i mornarice u priobalnom pojasu (1-2 TG borbenih brodova,
1-2 brigade pomorskog pješaštva).
267. Strategijska operacija traje duže vremena, od 1 i više mjeseci, i obuhvaća znatan dio
ratišta odnosno državne teritorije, pa čak i teritorije napadačeve države odnosno
države koja daje napadaču svoju teritoriju kao polaznu osnovicu za voñenje rata.
268. Strategijska operacija se odvija u više etapa, pri čemu 1-2 etape čine 1-3 operacije
operativne razine.
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269. Velike sile i velike vojske mogu izvoditi i strategijske operacije u kojima su nosioci
bojnog djelovanja samo snage zrakoplovstva (napad NATO-a na SRJ 1999.) ili samo
mornarice odnosno kombinirano uz minimalno učešće snaga kopnene vojske.
270. Na taktičkoj razini bojna djelovanja nazivaju se bojem, koga izvode združene taktičke
postrojbe (brigada, divizija, ojačana taktička grupa) po jedinstvenoj zamisli za kraće
vrijeme i traju 2-3 dana. Boj može biti samostalan ili u sklopu izvoñenja jedne od faza
operacije na operativnoj razini.
271. U ratu u BiH kao primjer strategijske operacije je oslobañanje jugozapadnog dijela
BiH 1995. godine, pri čemu su sudjelovale udružene snage 5. i 7. korpusa Armije BiH,
3 gardijske brigade HVO i 3 gardijske brigade i dio snaga Operativne zone Split
Hrvatske vojske. Operacija je izvedene u dvije operacije na operativnoj razini –
operacija Maestral i operacija Južni potez.
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16. AKTIVNA, UPORNA I ODSUTNA OBRANA
272. U dokumentima HVO i Armije BiH često se koriste pojmovi: aktivna, uporna i
odsudna obrana, pa je od mene zatraženo da objasnim te pojmove.
273. Obrana159 je vid bojnog djelovanja gdje se kombinacijom vatre, aktivnih djelovanja i
vještim korištenjem zemljišta i učinkovitim manevrom lomi, odbija, zadržava ili
usporava napad protivnika. Cilj odbrane može biti:
− nanošenje gubitaka nadmoćnijem protivniku,
− zadržavanje, usporavanje ili potpuno zaustavljanje protivnika u napadu,
− očuvanje odreñenih objekata i zemljišnih prostorija.
− dobitak u vremenu,
− čuvanje vlastitih snaga od prekomjernih gubitaka.
274. Obrana može imati različit stupanj upornosti, žilavosti i pokretljivosti i može biti više
ili manje odsudna, ili više ili manje zadržavajuća.
275. Priručnik američke kopnene vojske obrambenu operaciju definira kao160:

„Vojska se brani dok ne postigne dovoljno snage za napad. Obrana pobjeñuje
neprijateljski napad, kupuje vrijeme, čuva snage ili stvara povoljne uvjete za
prelazak u napad. Samo obranom se normalno ne postiže konačno rješenje.
Njena je svrha stvaranje uvjeta za protunapad koji omogućava da snage
postignu inicijativu. Mada se često očekivani rezultati postižu samo napadom,
ponekad je potrebno se i braniti za odreñeno vrijeme. Zapovjednici
organiziraju obranu da dobiju na vremenu, zadrže zemljište, olakšaju druga
bojna djelovanja, vezuju neprijatelja i umanjuju njegove mogućnosti.“
(Army forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Defensive
operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop
conditions favorable for offensive operations. Alone, defensive operations
159
Vojna enciklopedija, tom 6, str. 251c, Beograd 1973
160
4D01481 Article from GlobalSecurity.org, re: Defensive Operations,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch8.htm#par3
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normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a

counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Although
offensive operations are usually required to achieve decisive results, it is often
necessary, even advisable at times, to defend. Commanders defend to buy time,
hold terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy, or erode enemy
resources).
276. Po američkim gledištima obrana može biti pokretna (mobile defense), pri čemu
branilac mora postići veću pokretljivost protivnika i zadaje mu poraz vatrom i
manevrom jakih snaga. Za ovaj tip odbrane karakteristično je da su pozicijskoj obrani
(ukopani i utvrñeni) manji dijelovi, a da glavninu snaga predstavljaju pokretljive snage
za protunapad uz jaku vatrenu potporu. Takoñer može obrana biti organizirana kao
obrana područja (area defense), gdje branilac sa različitim stupnjem upornosti brani
odreñeni objekt ili zonu. U tom slučaju glavninu obrambenih snaga predstavljaju
dobro načelno utvrñene pješačke postrojbe, dok su manje oklopne ili mehanizirane
postrojbe namijenjene za izvoñenje manjih protunapada. Držanje objekta ili zona može
biti za odreñeno vrijeme ili do pristizanja snaga za napad ili za uredno i pravovremeno
povlačenje glavnih snaga. Odbrana područja može biti i u okruženju od strane
protivnika. Poseban tip obrane je i obrana unazad (retrograde), koja se izvodi kao
izvlačenje (withdrawal) ili zadržavanje (delay) ili povlačenje (retirement). U
jugosloveskoj vojnoj terminologiji ovaj tip obrane naziva se i odstupanjem i
obuhvaćao je dvije faze – izvlačenje i povlačenje.
277. Kada usporedimo jugoslavensko i američko poimanje obrane možemo zaključiti da u

biti nema značajnih razlika.
278. Odsudna obrana znači odluku zapovjednika da se odreñeni objekti ili položaji zadrže
do izvršenja opće bojne zadaće odnosno zadaće više postrojbe po svaku cijenu uz
najveće gubitke i u uvjetima potpunog okruženja. Bez odobrenja nadreñenog
zapovjednika se obrambeni položaji ne smiju napustiti niti se postrojba smije predati.
Primjer takve obrane u povijesti ratovanja je odbrana industrijske zone Staljingrada od
strane Crvene armije u zimu 1942/43. godinu.
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279. Termini aktivna i uporna odbrana ne označavaju tip obrane, to su zapravo temeljne
značajke obrane. Svaka obrana mora biti aktivna u smislu preuzimanja inicijative iz
ruku napadača, prisiljavanja napadača da mijenja početne odluke, da modificira napad.
Aktivnost se postiže protunapadima (counterattack), ispadima (spoiling attack),
bojnim djelovanjem manjih snaga u pozadini napadača (ubačene, planski ostavljene ili
okružene snage), djelovanjem topništva i zrakoplovstva, dopunskim zaprečivanjem,
poduzimanjem neočekivanih postupaka (iznenadno izvlačenje) i drugo. Upornost
znači ustrajanje u držanju objekata, položaja ili zone, što se postiže utvrñivanjem,
zaprečivanjem, aktivnim djelovanjima, hrabrošću pojedinaca i postrojbe u cijelosti i
mjerama psihološkog bojevanja.
280. Odsudna obrana pretpostavlja krajnju upornost i aktivnost manjim snagama za kraće
vrijeme i na kraćoj razdaljini. Naime, protunapadi su namijenjeni uglavnom
rasterećenju vlastitih snaga i razvlačenju napadačevih snaga sa težišta napada. U
odsudnoj obrani aktivna djelovanja poduzimaju susjedne postrojbe i postrojbe više
razine zapovijedanja.
281. U zadržavajućoj obrani težište je na aktivnosti dok je upornost u smislu držanja

objekata i položaja manje izražena. Termini aktivna i uporna obrana, kao što je već
rečeno, izražavaju samo postupanje u obrani, ali ne i tip obrane.
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ANNEX B
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MILAN GORJANC
MILITARY EXPERT REPORT
THE DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE’S DEFENCE

AND OTHER MILITARY TOPICS RELEVANT
TO MILITARY ACTIONS DURING THE WAR
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Ljubljana, July 2009
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 4
2. MILITARY CAREER 5
3. QUALIFICATIONS AS AN EXPERT WITNESS ON 8

MILITARY SUBJECTS
4. WARTIME ARMY 10
4.1. Concept of wartime army and method of creation 10
4.2. How is a wartime army formed when no peacetime army exists? 12
4.3. What are (a) the manoeuvre component and
(b) the territorial component of a wartime army? 15
4.4. Does the dominance of the territorial component in an army
point to its defensive character? 17
4.5. How is logistics support for a wartime army ensured? 19
4.6. How are losses compensated and new units created? 20
4.7. What is a shift army and what are the consequences of shift
combat on the discipline of soldiers? 21
4.8. What is the relationship between the civilian authorities
and military units during war? 22
5. YUGOSLAV DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE’S DEFENCE

AND SOCIAL SELF-PROTECTION 25
6. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE’S

DEFENCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 35
6.1. Constitution and Laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina 35
6.1.1. Constitution 35
6.1.2. Decree Law on defence 35
6.1.2.1. Defence of the country is a right and obligation of citizens 35
6.1.2.2. Military defence, labour service, civilian defence and
observation and reporting service 37
6.1.2.3. Training and acquiring of skills for defence 42
6.1.2.4. Intelligence activities by citizens 43
6.1.3. Decree law on the armed forces of the RBH 44
6.1.3.1. Composition of the armed forces 45
6.1.3.2. The Army is the strike defence force 46
6.1.3.3. Mobilisation 48
6.1.3.4. Compulsory military service 48
6.1.3.5. Conclusion 51
6.2. Decisions and orders 53
6.3. Operations behind enemy lines relying on the population 59
7. HVO MUSLIM SOLDIERS AS A SECURITY PROBLEM 62
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8. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF CENTRAL BOSNIA AND

NORTHERN HERZEGOVINA 68
8.1. Geographic definition of the territory 68
8.2. The significance of that territory in defence plans of
the former SFR Yugoslavia 70
8.3. The significance of that territory at the time of the collapse of
8.4. the SFR Yugoslavia 71
8.4. The significance of that territory in the initial period of the
war from mid-1992 to late 1993 76
8.5. Routes and traffic during 1992 and 1993 87
8.6. Conclusion 93
9. WAS MOSTAR BESIEGED? 95
10. POSITION WHERE A STATE IS ATTACKED OR

THREATENED FROM THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER
STATE 103
11. MILITARY MEANING OF THE BCS TERMS “ASANACIJA”

AND “ČIŠĆENJE” 107
12. RESUBORDINATION: MEANING AND DIFFICULTIES 110
13. “OPERATIONS AND TRAINING” 114
14. “STAFF AFFAIRS” FOR THE NEEDS OF THE SUPREME

COMMANDER 117
15. MILITARY OPERATIONS AT THE STRATEGIC,

OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS 119
16. ACTIVE, PERSISTENT AND DECISIVE DEFENCE 122
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1. INTRODUCTION
1. The defence teams of Generals Slobodan PRALJAK and Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

asked me whether I could explain to the Tribunal, in view of my military
education and long military career, certain military matters important for
properly establishing responsibility for crimes committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1992-1994. The request referred in particular to the following:
- The organisation and functioning of an ad hoc wartime army.
- The Yugoslav military doctrine of all-people’s defence and the role of each
citizen in the defence of the country.
- The military significance of the area of Central Bosnia and Northern
Herzegovina.
I was told that I was not expected to produce an expert report of a factual
nature, but that an expert opinion would be requested about certain events on
the assumption that information contained in documents that would be shown
to me is correct. I was told that this part of my work would especially refer to
the period when HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ soldiers of Muslim
ethnicity were started to be seen as a threat to the security of the Croatian
Community of Herceg-Bosna and the causes of this, as well as the goals of
offensive operations by the RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Army
taking into account the territory captured in battles against the HVO and the
axes of combat operations.
2. While preparing this report, I cooperated with the defence teams of Generals
PRALJAK and PETKOVIĆ primarily with regard to gathering the necessary
documentation and specifying the issues covered in the report. All
explanations and opinions presented in this report are solely mine and nobody
has influenced me to change my opinions.
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2. MILITARY CAREER
3. After finishing grammar school in Celje (Slovenia), I went to the Military

Academy in Belgrade (Serbia). I continued military studies in Sarajevo (BH),
specialisation infantry. I graduated from the Military Academy in 1965 with
excellent marks and 4th in my class. My first official post was in Knin
(Croatia), where I was commander of an infantry company. After one year, I
was transferred to Benkovac (Croatia), where I was a company commander at
a school centre for lance corporals serving the needs of the then 4th Army
District. Just one year later, in 1967, I transferred to Sarajevo (BH) as required
by the service to teach tactics at the Military Academy, specialisation infantry.
Meanwhile, I studied part-time at the JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/
Political School, which I finished in December 1967 with excellent marks as
the first 2nd lieutenant in the history of the school. I studied political sciences
part-time in Sarajevo at the Faculty of Political Sciences. I passed all exams
and met the conditions to enrol in the 3rd year. In order to continue to pursue
military studies, I stopped my studies at the civilian university. I was a lecturer
at the Military Academy until 1972 when I continued my military education at
the Command Staff Academy in Belgrade (Serbia), from which I graduated
in 1974 with excellent marks (4th in my class). During my studies at the
Command Staff Academy, I also attended lectures in military political
sciences at the master’s programme of the Faculty of Political Sciences in
Belgrade.
4. I continued my service in Postojna (Slovenia) as an intelligence officer at

division command. After that I was appointed commander of an infantry
battalion in Postojna. I performed that duty for two years. In 1977, I became
chief of staff of an infantry regiment in Postojna. In 1980, I was transferred to
Novo mesto (Slovenia) to be commander of an infantry regiment, as the
youngest commander with the rank of major. The following year, I was
appointed commander of a motorised brigade in Ajdovščina (Slovenia), where
I stayed until 1986. At the same time as commanding a brigade, I also
completed advanced military studies at the School of People’s Defence in
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Belgrade (Serbia) as a part-time student with excellent marks as 3rd in class in

1983. Since I had only performed command, staff and teaching duties until
then in my military career, my superiors thought that a military political duty
was also necessary for further promotion. That is how I became division
deputy commander for political affairs in Postojna (Slovenija). At the same
time, I was nominated and chosen for the Central Committee of the SKJ
/League of Communists of Yugoslavia/. In 1988, I was appointed chief of staff
of the 37th Corps in Užice (Serbia), a post for a major general. I was due to be
promoted to the rank of major general on 22 December 1991. I passed the
practical part of the exam and my theoretical paper was accepted by the
mentor. In 1990, I also completed the Advanced Course of All-People’s
Defence, which was the most advanced form of military political training of
prominent civilian political leaders from the entire Yugoslavia.
5. When an armed conflict broke out in Slovenia between the JNA and the TO
/Territorial Defence/ in June 1991, I quit service in the JNA at my own request
(I did not desert) in August 1991 and joined the TO of Slovenia as the chief of
the training department in the then Republican TO Staff (General Staff) in
Ljubljana in the rank of brigadier. In 1993, I was transferred for political
reasons to the Centre for Strategic Studies as an advisor for doctrinal matters
and military conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In 1995 I was
appointed director of that centre in the rank of brigadier. I performed that duty
for a very short time, because already in the autumn of that year, they
appointed me director of the Military Schools Centre of the Slovenian Army
/SV/ in Ljubljana (Slovenia) in the rank of brigadier. I remained at that post
until retirement in May 1999. In addition to managing and shaping military
education in the Slovenian Army, I also taught tactics and operations at the
Command Staff School of the Slovenian Army.
6. I was decorated six times for my work, and commended and rewarded several
times. All of my official appraisals by superior officers were excellent –
“excels”. I got early promotions on three occasions (to the ranks of captain,
major and colonel). In 1984, I received the highest award of the armed forces
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of Yugoslavia for command and control – “the 22nd of December”. I received

acknowledgments on several occasions from civilian authorities for successful
cooperation between my troops and the population in building civilian
infrastructure, including the most prestigious awards of the municipalities of
Ajdovščina, Nova Gorica and Črnomelj.
7. Although I spent almost ten years at the level of a general at four different
posts in two armies, I was never promoted to that rank, solely for political
reasons.
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3. QUALIFICATIONS AS AN EXPERT WITNESS ON MILITARY

SUBJECTS
8. My qualifications for testifying in this trial are the following:

- Comprehensive military education at all military schools in the former
SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/.
- Additional military political education at the JNA Political Schools, the
Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo – pre-degree studies and the
Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade – master’s studies.
- Teaching practice and studies of theory at the Military Academy in
Sarajevo (five years) and at the Command Staff School of the SV.
- Occasional lectures at the Faculty of Social Sciences – Defence Science
Department in Ljubljana.
- Work as an analyst of armed conflicts in the Balkans, especially in the
former Yugoslavia in the period from 1991 to 1999, for the needs of the
Ministry of Defence of Slovenia.
- Well-regarded commentary on the armed conflicts in the Balkans and the
world for both TV stations in Slovenia (TV Slovenia and POP TV) in the
period from 1994 to 2003.
- A large volume of discussions, analyses, editorials and articles in the
national media, media of the countries in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia and many international media (bibliography is attached to this
report).
- Research of the military doctrines of many states and the preparation of a
proposal for the defence doctrine of the Slovenian Army in 1994.
- Varied and successful career in commanding JNA units at different levels
from company to corps.
- A very good knowledge of the geography, traditions and history of the
regions of the former Yugoslavia, especially Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia.
- Personal knowledge of many persons in political and military leadership
positions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, especially in BH.
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- Presence in the highest political and party leaderships as a member of the

CK SKJ /Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia/
and first-hand knowledge of the events in the Yugoslavia before the
breakup in 1991.
9
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4. WARTIME ARMY
4.1. Concept of wartime army and method of creation
9. A wartime army is the conjunction of the army and other factors supporting it,
military weapons and equipment assigned to military units, the procurement,
production and distribution of all necessities required for waging armed
combat, the life and work of military units, and the general and political goals
of a country, nation or political group. A wartime army is made up of adult
and able persons who have received the appropriate military education and
training in order to perform general and specific tasks in combat within units
at different levels. A wartime army also includes persons performing various
logistics or other support tasks for the wartime army, but who are not directly
incorporated in military units. Each individual member of a wartime army
must have adequate equipment for combat and protection, where small arms
are the most important. Collective weapons and equipment intended for use
within units are grouped at various higher levels of military organisation in
order to wage war effectively.
10. The state and the supreme leadership prepare the wartime army in peacetime
already. This preparation includes the following:
- Planning of wartime mobilisation and registration of human resources for
assignment to war units and for labour service, and material resources for
waging war and for the survival and work of the population in war
conditions.
- Organisation and conduct of military education and specialised training of
recruits, reserve soldiers, peacetime units and reserve units, and the
education and specialised training of active professional commissioned
and non-commissioned officers, staffs and commands.
- Planning and execution of the production, procurement, distribution and
storage of weapons and other military equipment for replenishing units of
the wartime army and for waging war.
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- Planning and conduct of work to prepare and organise the territory for
waging war, with a focus on establishing a secure multichannel system of
war communications between commands at different levels, building roads
and other communications, and building facilities for protecting commands
and critical weapons system, as well as the population.
- Preparation of the entire population and material resources of society for
waging war. The focus here is on psychological and propaganda
preparation of the personnel of war units and the population, and
psychological influence on the will and awareness of the opponent.
11. The wartime army generally consists of a peacetime core, or, rather, units
formed in peacetime in order to train recruits and the reserve force, and to
deter opponents from any aggressive intentions. The peacetime core, or, rather,
the professional force, is the basis for forming the wartime army. Command
and control groups are formed in peacetime at different levels, from the
supreme command to the lowest-level units. The composition and strength of
peacetime units and commands are generally much smaller than the wartime
composition. Some peacetime units are supplemented by a small number of
reserve soldiers, some with a majority, and most war units are formed mostly
from reserve soldiers. As the threat of war grows, states or ruling elites
increase the peacetime core by supplementing peacetime units with reserve
forces and establishing new lower-level units from the reserve force.
12. Depending on the time until the beginning of war, reserve forces and entire
units carry out additional training from soldier level to military exercises at the
operational level. The command system is fully established at the highest
command levels – the level of the supreme command, operational and strategic
forces and joint tactical units. The communication, control and coordination
system is organised and active at the required level in the initial stage of the
war. Commands at different levels are reinforced by reserve officers and other
personnel. Depending on the command level, recruitment covers active
professional officers with specialised education, and to a smaller extent also
reserve officers with a basic officer military education and additional training
11
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at short courses and military exercises of reserve forces in peacetime.
13. A wartime army is generally formed right before the outbreak of war, and
exceptionally right after the beginning of aggression. A state with aggressive
intentions to attack another state generally forms a wartime army a certain
longer time before the beginning of aggression, up to several months. States
forced to defend themselves against aggression generally form a wartime army
several days before aggression or do that in circumstances of combat and the
enemy’s military and political superiority.
4.2. How is a wartime army formed when no peacetime army exists?
14. A wartime army is formed in a completely different way when there is no state
peacetime core of the armed forces or war reserves, and when there is
irreconcilable antagonism between leading and influential political or
ideological groups, especially in interethnic, interreligious and interracial
conflicts. A wartime army is then formed in conditions of a civil war, war of
national liberation and interethnic, interreligious and interracial conflicts.
15. At least one party to the conflict or both form a wartime army in exceptionally
complex conditions. There is no peacetime core of the armed forces, but rather
a number of small, usually secret armed groups which are mostly trained in
secret, in a very short time, in poor conditions and with insufficient training
equipment. Even before the start of an armed conflict, and certainly at the
beginning of a conflict, these groups can carry out small armed operations in
the form of terrorist or sabotage action. The success and public response to
these operations, especially among group members who are not engaged in the
conflict, have a significant impact on the growth of armed groups. During
combat operations those groups grow into military units at increasingly higher
levels. Those units usually get names which are at least one level higher than
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usual for units of that strength.1 Many smaller units are formed entirely
spontaneously at the local level, often outside the command system, and their
combat activities are often not directed by higher command levels.
16. At the beginning of an armed conflict, units are mostly tied to the territory
from which their members are recruited. With the spreading of combat
operations, the need arises to expand combat operations to areas where there
are no combat groups and the mobile component of the wartime army is
formed, which continues to grow and becomes the key element in combat
operations. The territorial component gradually becomes smaller to the benefit
of the mobile component.
17. Before the outbreak of an armed conflict, there is no command system which
could integrate individual armed groups. Command over armed groups is
mostly based on personal relations and common political or terrorist activities
before the armed conflict. Commanders of groups usually have no military
education, and they acquire military knowledge and experience mostly in
combat. During a military conflict, as units grow people with military
education also arrive.
18. In the case of a collapse of the state or the failure of the state army or politics,
educated active, or, more commonly, reserve officers join the rebel group.
They become primarily assistant commanders or staff officers, and in practice
they plan combat operations. During an armed conflict, special education of
command personnel is also organised outside units, at courses and schools.
People who command respect in the area and in the units are appointed to
command posts, but there are also instances when people of questionable
ethics and skill are appointed to senior positions, or individuals with party
connections. The communication, control and coordination system is
established during combat operations. At the beginning of the forming of units
at different levels, communication, coordination and control are very difficult,
1
A group of up to 300-400 soldiers is called a brigade, while that number of soldiers represents
a weakened battalion. Those names stem from propaganda needs and the need to influence the morale
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in fact impossible.
19. Logistics support is totally disorganised and spontaneous. Supplies of

weapons, ammunition and other ordnance mostly come from war booty, by
capturing it from the opposing side. Before the beginning of an armed conflict,
armed groups equip themselves through illegal procurement on the black
market, from private reserves from previous wars, illegal production and
confiscation (theft) from the opposing side. As the war spreads and
international political and moral support grows, logistics support becomes
increasingly well organised, both through procurement and aid from abroad
and through own production in industrial plants. The regularity of supplies is
affected by the security of supply routes, so the warring sides usually wage
dedicated large-scale operations in order to gain control of those routes.
20. Political parties or a political movement, especially those that are dominant,
have a decisive impact on the waging of war. Some political groups form their
own units, which are not subordinated to the integrated supreme command.
Those units carry out combat operations in line with the partial interests of the
political leadership. Individual units sometimes clash in defence of their partial
political interests.
21. In most ad hoc armies in unorganised states, ideological and religious beliefs
of the members of groups involved in the conflict, especially members of a
party or religious hierarchy, have a significant effect. These beliefs are used in
order to strengthen the morale of own units, and to weaken the morale of the
enemy. They can often be abused at lower command levels and cause
unwanted behaviour by individuals and individual units toward the enemy2.
of armed groups and other members of groups in the conflict.

2
Well-known in history are the Crusades by Christians from Western Europe toward eastern
regions that abounded in crimes in the name of religion, while in modern times, such religious zeal is
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4.3. What are (a) the manoeuvre component and (b) the territorial component
of a wartime army?
22. In most modern armies, the wartime army is formed by two components – the
mobile and the territorial. The manoeuvre component is intended for carrying
out military operations in the entire territory of the state, even in enemy
territory. Manoeuvre units carry out combat operations at the point of main
effort of military operations against the strongest opponent and are deployed in
any part of the state territory as needed. This part of the wartime army is
generally composed of the most capable younger soldiers. The territorial
component is intended for controlling and protecting the interior of the state
territory. In exceptional cases, it can be used in military operations at the front
as an auxiliary force for the manoeuvre component. It is composed of older
conscripts. In exceptional cases, soldiers from the territorial component are
recruited into the manoeuvre component.
23. For the purpose of carrying out combat operations, the entire territory of the
state is divided into military territorial districts, depending on the size of the
country. Individual strategic or operational districts and their lower-level war
units are formed in these military territorial areas. Lower military territorial
levels are generally formed as exclusively territorial military entities with
smaller commands and units belonging only to the territorial component.
These lower levels of military territorial organisations cannot have any
command responsibility for units in the manoeuvre component and are mostly
intended for providing logistics support for these units while they are in their
territory. Military territorial commands at the operational level can command
their own and attached units from the manoeuvre component in combat
operations in their area of responsibility. At the request of a higher command
level they must send their units to join another military territorial command at
the operational level outside their own territory. Joint tactical units of division
and brigade level are fully mobile in the entire theatre of war. By contrast,
demonstrated by the units of some wartime armies in the Middle East when they call for a religious war
– “the jihad”.
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units in the territorial component are almost always tied to their own territory
and are formed into platoons, companies and battalions or regiments.
24. Military territorial commands at the operational level in almost all modern
armies have broadly the same responsibilities and tasks:
- Planning, coordinating, commanding and supervising the execution of

tasks of subordinate units in the preparation and conduct of combat
operations.
- Accepting and occasionally incorporating attached units from other task
forces for the purpose of carrying out specific concrete military operations,
when they assume full responsibility for the activities of these units.
- At the request of higher command levels, they must send their units to
other task forces along with the necessary and prescribed material reserves,
but in that situation they completely lose their command role and can
follow the execution of combat and other tasks only through the
commands to which the units are attached.
- Attached units which are part of the establishments of higher-level
commands, but are occasionally attached to individual lower-level task
forces, are fully subordinated to the new temporary command; the higher-
level command exercises the command and control role exclusively
through the temporary lower-level command, and they may submit any
specialised instructions for the execution of tasks exclusively through the
temporary command with the engagement of the specialised staff organ of
that command.
- They organise and are responsible for all military activities in the area of
responsibility, and they must coordinate activities in support of combat
operations away from the front with the appropriate civilian authorities and
organs; military activities have full priority in this, especially in the
conduct of combat operations.
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4.4. Does the dominance of the territorial component in an army point to its
defensive character?
25. Almost all modern states organise the defence of their national territory using
a specially organised part of the armed forces, which has the following basic
characteristics:
- Depending on the degree of threat to the state or nation, or, rather, the
available material and human resources, those forces are larger or smaller
than manoeuvre forces.
- Small states with limited material resources generally organise numerically
stronger units in the territorial component.
- Wartime armies which are organised without a peacetime basis (ad hoc) at
the beginning of their formation mostly have the basic characteristics of
the territorial component.
- The basic task of the territorial component is primarily the defence of
national territory.
- The territorial component of the wartime army is organised on the
territorial principle, and units are generally made up of the inhabitants of
one village, town, municipality or basic administrative unit.
- Units of the territorial component are generally organised and equipped for
tasks of securing facilities and the population, for building and erecting
fortified obstacles, and for defence from air attacks.
- Units of the territorial component are equipped mostly with light arms, and
in exceptional circumstances, they can also have armoured equipment for a
short period of time or for a concrete combat task.
- The territorial component is generally made up of a large number of small
units which are mostly bound by the idea and desire to defend their homes
or immediate surroundings; commanding this large number of small units
is very difficult because of the large distance between them, difference of
tasks, different degrees of direct threat and lack of technical means of
communication.
- Integration of small tactical units (platoon, company, battalion) into larger
tactical units (brigade, division, corps) does not represent the creation of
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joint tactical units or task forces, which would have equal combat value,
because these units are still manned on a territorial principle and cannot
acquire the necessary cohesion – combative and morale firmness.
- Units of the territorial component execute their tasks in the defence of the
territory in principle by controlling the territory and securing important
infrastructure features and organs of the authorities. In the event of a direct
enemy attack, they mount a defence with small offensive operations in the
form of ambushes, raids, attacks on small parts of enemy forces, and
exceptionally they mount an organised defence and fortify defensive
positions.
- It is impossible to carry out large-scale offensive operations with units of
the territorial component without previous thorough training from the
individual to the unit at the operational level3.
26. It follows as a conclusion that a state, nation or political group which organises
a wartime army mainly on the territorial principle and carries out combat
operations mostly using units of the territorial component is essentially a
defensive army.
3
In April 1993, the Command of the ABH 3rd Corps intended to organise training for all corps
units and municipal staffs in its zone for large-scale offensive operations, which may be concluded
from the order to organise a camping:
“I have decided to organise decisive defence on all lines attained; show maximum
initiative and carry out active operations in front of the p/k (forward line, English: forward
edge of battle area –note by M.G.) and in the rear of the enemy combat formation; in the
zones of brigades and OGs /operations groups/ organise camping and BOiV /combat training
and exercises/ with the following goal: by engaging main forces for defence and active
operations, inflict the largest possible losses in personnel and MTS /materiel and technical
equipment/ on the Chetniks and do not allow them to take initiative and achieve tactical and
operational surprise, thus achieving operational deception and concealing our intentions
and preparations for offensive operations (underlined by M.G.), and with auxiliary forces
organise camping with the task of conducting BOiV, strengthening the mental and physical
stamina of fighters, officers, commands and units, mutual trust and solidarity among
comrades and combat readiness in entirety…
In the immediate task, carry out defence and active operations and organise camping
and training, and in the next task, carry out operational deployment and reception of forces
taking part in the attack operation (underlined by M.G.).”
“…by carrying out camping raise b/g (combat readiness – note by M.G.) to the
highest degree possible and be at the ready to receive and coordinate with units and
formations taking part in the attack operation.”
4D01473 Decision of the commander of the 3rd Corps, number 01/1049-1 of 4 April
1993.
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4.5. How is logistics support for the wartime army ensured?
27. Logistics support for the wartime army, especially recruitment and
replenishment with weapons and combat supplies is generally fully
centralised. For that purpose, the appropriate measures for the production,
procurement and distribution of weapons and combat supplies are carried out
already in peacetime. During the war, replenishment with combat supplies
generally goes through the command system. New supplies from production or
procurement arrive at central depots of the supreme command. They can be
distributed directly from production or from abroad to joint tactical units only
with the approval of specialised organs of the supreme command. Lower-level
commands can be supplied exceptionally from war booty or by direct
procurement in the deployment area if enemy combat operations undermine
the regular supply chain.
28. Logistics support in a wartime army which is formed without peacetime

preparations is significantly different. In the initial period, replenishment with
combat supplies (ammunition, weapons, spare parts) is organised from
equipment and reserves captured from the enemy, improvised production in
secret workshops and secret procurement from abroad. With the creation of
free territories and capture of enemy manufacturing facilities, regular
production and organised distribution is organised. With political recognition,
channels for logistics support from third countries are created. Such a wartime
army mostly obtains food and other quartermaster necessities from local
sources. Military territorial commands have a significant role in this.
29. Medical treatment of wounded and sick soldiers is generally organised in

medical institutions inside the unit. In exceptional cases, they are sent to
civilian health institutions, where special departments for military personnel
are created that are under the supervision of conscripted medical personnel.
These personnel are in direct contact with the medical organs of units, or,
rather, the military territorial command, and must report to the unit command
on the medical condition. Rest and recuperation for personnel from units of the
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manoeuvre component is organised in the units, in barracks, temporary

accommodation premises and campsites in the zone of combat operations. It is
possible to release only a small part on leave with their families during period
without combat operations without undermining the combat readiness of the
unit. Medical support for units of the territorial component is based mostly on
civilian resources.
4.6. How are losses compensated and new units created?
30. Recruitment of personnel due to losses is based on the territorial principle with
the approval of the superior command. Recruitment of volunteers without
adequate military training and a background check of their security or moral
suitability is especially sensitive. Recruitment of officers is carried out from
among unassigned reserve officers and by promoting junior officers who have
excelled in combat and command of lower-level units and who have
demonstrated specialist and ethical traits required for the new command level.
Training of new officers is also carried out during the war in military schools,
at short courses for various command levels and through hands-on work in
staffs.
31. New units of the wartime army are formed by calling up for military services
unassigned conscripts from the reserve, assigning recruits who have completed
basic military training in special centres according to a shortened programme
and volunteers who have completed minimal military training. Command
personnel are reassigned and promoted from units formed earlier, and a small
share can be made up of officers straight out of military schools.
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4.7. What is a shift army and what are the consequences of shift combat on the
discipline of soldiers?
32. In militia armies formed in a narrow territorial area, the so-called “shift war” is
well known. One third of personnel are in combat contact with the enemy at
the front, one third are in barracks or suitable accommodation premises, ready
for rapid intervention at the front, and one third are resting at home with their
families and carrying out the necessary household tasks.
33. This kind of engagement of units is possible in the following conditions:

- When the intensity of combat is not high, there is a lull at the front and the
forces of both sides are exhausted.
- When the enemy uses the same type of combat.
- When weather conditions and accommodation possibilities at the front are
not suitable for rest and accommodation in the open.
- When there are no possibilities for regular replacement of engaged units
with units from other areas.
- When the majority of the working-age population is engaged in defending
their territory and a large number of them must carry out activities to
support their families and community at the same time.
34. Advantages of the system:

- Personnel rest in an organised way with their families and friends, which
significantly contributes to higher morale among soldiers and their families
and the community.
- Rest takes place in significantly better conditions with regular food,
hygiene and accommodation.
- The mental and physical strain suffered by soldiers is much lower.
- The costs of supplies for soldiers are smaller, both at the front and in the
rear.
- If necessary, it is also possible to deploy personnel who are resting outside
the operations area of their own unit and use them for the protection of
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general infrastructure facilities in the territory.
35. Disadvantages of the system:

- The unit is assembled only occasionally, in the event of intense combat.
- The unit is not fully trained to carry out large-scale and difficult tasks.
- It takes much more time to assemble and transfer the units outside its own
area.
- It is very difficult to assemble personnel who are resting before the time
specified for assembly and rotation.
- It is almost impossible to establish organised supervision of personnel who
are resting, which is a cause for military and civilian indiscipline in the
form of violations of military rules and offenses against civilian
regulations, and even crimes.
4.8. What is the relationship between the civilian authorities and military
units during war?
36. Relations between military commands and the civilian political authorities are
already regulated in accordance with the laws and rules in peacetime. The
civilian authorities organise the army, direct the army through the supreme
command, control the army by using various means of democratic procedure,
and define the political and strategic goals of military activities.
37. Relations between the civilian authorities and military commanders in war
vary significantly depending on whether the war is taking place in own
territory or in the territory of another state. When the war is taking place in
own territory, these relations are based on consistent adherence to peacetime
legal provisions, which may be changed temporarily while the war is ongoing.
These temporary changes can be made only by the legally elected
representatives of the highest state authorities or by organs of the authorities
prescribed by the Constitution and laws. Military commanders may propose
certain amendments to existing laws and regulation, but they are adopted
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exclusively by the legal civilian authorities. Only in exceptional circumstances

can military commanders temporarily issue orders, for a short period of time
and in a restricted territory, which interfere in the civilian domain. However,
they must notify the superior commander, or representatives of the civilian
authorities, as soon as possible.
38. On the other hand, representatives of the civilian authorities have no authority
in military units. They can deliver any requests to individual military
commands directly through organs for cooperation and coordination or
through higher-level organs of the civilian authorities and legislative or
executive organs at the state level. They can approve supplies for military
units from territorial sources only at the request of a higher-level organ of the
civilian authorities or in direct agreement with the command of a joint tactical
unit as the lowest level of such coordination. The higher-level civilian
authorities must refund the lower-level authorities in goods or money for any
supplies agreed in this way. Relations between military commands and civilian
authorities are characterised by full cooperation and coordination and mutual
respect and understanding.
39. The situation is significantly different if military units are carrying out combat
operations outside their own territory and capture territory in which the
civilian authorities elected or appointed by the opposing side were previously
active. This situation is called an occupation, and it is irrelevant whether
control is regained of own, earlier lost territory, or whether territory belonging
to another state is conquered. The task force commander is the only
representative of his state (now an occupying power) in the newly-captured
territory. He is the so-called military governor and takes over all powers of the
civilian authorities. If the enemy civilian authorities cooperate and do not
boycott justified requests, the military commander still has the obligation to
cooperate and coordinate. If, however, the enemy civilian authorities do not
demonstrate readiness for cooperation, the commander may suspend such
civilian authorities, and even temporarily appoint new ones. If the armed
forces recapture (liberate) in combat part of the territory in which the enemy
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had established their occupation authorities immediately after capturing it, the
powers of the commander last for a very short time and their duty is to restore
as soon as possible either the previous authorities (from before the occupation)
or help establish new authorities, bringing with them representatives of the
authorities who are legally elected or appointed by the legislative branch. In
doing this, they must also include individual representatives of the authorities
from the period of occupation who are loyal to the liberating authorities,
especially if the liberated territory is ethnically, religiously or ideologically
mixed or antagonistic.
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5. YUGOSLAV DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE’S DEFENCE AND SOCIAL

SELF-PROTECTION
40. In order to gain a more complete understanding of war events in the former
Yugoslavia, especially in BH, it is necessary to be familiar with the laws and
other regulations, or, rather, the practice of the armed forces of the SFR
/Socialist Federative Republic/ of Yugoslavia that is based on them. The
subject is the doctrine of All-people’s Defence and Social Self-protection
(ONO i DSZ), which differs significantly from the rules of waging war of
modern western armies. The forming of the armed forces of individual
independent republics of the former Yugoslavia, as well as ethnic groups in
BH, and later in Kosovo as well, was abundant in the practice of the doctrine
of ONO i DSZ.
41. The armed forces of SFR Yugoslavia were essentially formed in accordance
with the modern principles of most modern armies. However, the international
environment also determined many specific characteristics in the forming of a
wartime army and the waging of war. Politically non-aligned, Tito’s
Yugoslavia was completely surrounded by states which belonged either to the
NATO pact and the Capitalist system or the Warsaw pact and orthodox
Communist system4. This was also influenced by an internal ideology of a
permanent internal and external enemy, which was an excuse for a single-party
ideological regime and internal repression. At the same time, fear from a
multitude of enemies was also a kind of cohesive element in a multi-ethnic and
multi-religious state with different historical and cultural roots. Thus, the
overall efforts of the state and ruling Communist party were aimed at engaging
all human and material resources in defence of the state and the political
system. Each citizen was obliged to contribute to the maximum to effective
defence in accordance with his capabilities and his role in the state and
political system. According to the 1974 Constitution, nobody had the right to
sign or recognise the capitulation of the army or state, and resistance was
25
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supposed to continue even in conditions of a total occupation of the state and

destruction of the army.
42. The armed forces of the SFRY consisted of the Yugoslav People’s Army
(JNA) as the manoeuvre component and the Territorial Defence (TO) as the
territorially based component, which was the broadest form of organised all-
people’s defence5. All units and operational and strategic forces of the JNA, as
well as operational and strategic forces of the TO, were under the command of
the Supreme Command, which consisted of the SFRY Presidency – with one
elected representative from each republic and province. Specialised support
was provided by the Supreme Command Staff, which during a state of war
included the federal ministry of defence (Federal Secretariat of National
Defence – SSNO). Subordinated to it were theatres of war, in the form of
military territorial commands, whose areas of responsibility did not correspond
to the administrative division of the country.6 The air force and anti-aircraft
defence were also under the direct command of the Supreme Command. The
navy and defence of the coast (Istria, Hrvatsko Primorje /Croatian Seaside/,
Dalmatia, Boka Kotorska and the Montenegrian coast) were under the
command of the Naval District, which was subordinated itself to the Supreme
Command. Republican TO staffs as well as the military territorial commands
of the republic were also subordinated to the Supreme Command.
43. Joint tactical units and operational and strategic forces of the JNA had legally
prescribed powers and manner of coordination with the civilian authorities in
their areas of responsibility. That system was already completely undermined
before the war in Slovenia, and with the break-up of the JNA in the spring
4
Yugoslavia was surrounded by “BRIGAMA” (in English troubles, in German sorgen, in
French soucis) /as printed/. The first letters of the names of neighbouring countries form the word
“brigama” – Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Greece, Austria, Hungary and Albania.
5
1D 02976, SFRY Constitution from 1974, Article 240.
6
The 1st Theatre of War based in Belgrade covered almost all of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
eastern parts of Croatia (Slavonia), Vojvodina, Central Serbia and Montenegro, in effect about 40% of
state territory. Thorough changes took place at the beginning of 1990, when army districts, whose areas
of responsibility largely corresponded to the borders of the republics, were abolished. Slovenia, BH,
Macedonia and Montenegro thus lost their military territorial commands, while Croatia was divided
into three theatres of war (the 5th based in Zagreb, the 1st based in Belgrade and the Naval District
based in Split).
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1992, it collapsed fully. Commanders of JNA units could submit their requests
to civilian authorities and for the needs of conducting combat operations in a
certain territory directly or through the superior command. Tasks were
coordinated by legally prescribed political and executive organs at all levels of
political and administrative organisation, from local communes through
municipalities and wartime districts, to republican executive councils
(governments). These were Committees for ONO i DSZ which were made up
of representatives of the executive authorities of a local commune,
municipality, wartime district or presidency of the republic.
44. Committees for ONO i DSZ were a special expression of “the exercising of
the leading role of the SK /League of Communist/ in the area of defence”.
Committees for ONO i DSZ were formed at all levels of the state and
administrative system – from the local commune and the company to the
republic. The law and accompanying documents envisaged that the presidents
or chairmen of these committees were the presidents or secretaries of the party
organisation at that level of party organisation. Subordinated to it, as
committee members, were legally elected heads of state and administrative
organs, as well as other political and social organisations. The commander of
the TO staff, the police commander and even the commander of the JNA7 unit
in that area were also committee members, in addition to their separate chain
of command. As members of these committees, they were obliged to accept
and carry out tasks assigned by this committee.
45. These committees were formed as a political and coordination body with the
task of commanding defence in a certain area, and their primary task is to
protect the activities of civilian defence organs and institutions. However, the
law, and accompanying regulations even more so, gave them powers of
command in armed combat in the event of an imminent threat or enemy attack.
Thus, the Guidelines for Defending the SFRY from Aggression, as the basic
document of defensive doctrine, state the following: “If the competent organs
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(TO staff, author’s note) are not able to carry out ONO and DSZ duties and
tasks, committees for ONO i DSZ shall carry out activities and take measures
to activate these organs and allow them to continue their work, and when the
circumstances require, they organise themselves all-people’s resistance and
command it in their area (author’s emphasis)”8 During war, if a JNA unit
was surrounded, or stranded in an area captured by the enemy, it had to
subordinate itself to that committee.
46. The Territorial Defence was organised in a very specific way, which other
modern armies did not know. The TO had no command organ at the federal
level, other than a coordination body in the form of a GŠ /General Staff/
Administration for the TO and an Assistant Chief of the GŠ for the TO.
Commanders of TO republican staffs were members of the Military Council as
the highest advisory organ of the federal minister of defence. In their chains of
command they were subordinated to republican presidencies, as the highest
organs of political authority in the republics. The TO command system had a
dual chain: first, a chain of command of a classic military organisation from
commander of the republican staff to zone staffs and the staffs of
municipalities and large local communes to tactical units. The second chain
was the political executive through committees for ONO i DSZ, where the
president of the municipality was in a certain sense superior to the commander
of the TO staff. The president of the committee for ONO i DSZ, who was in
the same time the secretary of the SK /League of Communist/ committee at his
level of party organisation, usually had a decisive influence, especially with
respect to granting commissions and promotions to command and staff
officers.
47. Within the TO there were units of both the manoeuvre and the territorially
based component. Manoeuvre units were organised into brigades, and two or
7
JNA units were subordinated to the Committee for ONO i DSZ in exceptional situations when that
unit ends a long way inside temporarily occupied territory, or in the depth of occupied territory, or
when an JNA unit is attached to a large TO unit.
8
Guidelines for Defending the SFRY from Aggression, SFRY Presidency, Belgrade, July 1983, page
32.
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more brigades and independent detachments were temporarily organised even

into operations groups. They were generally commanded by the staffs of
zones, provinces and communities of municipalities of war districts,
depending on the internal organisation in individual republics. In exceptional
cases, the republican staff assumed direct command of an operations group,
especially if it also included a JNA joint tactical unit. The territorially based
component was made up of platoons and companies at the level of the local
commune, dedicated detachments of platoon or company composition
(infantry, assault, anti-armour, anti-landing, anti-sabotage, naval) at the level
of municipalities and detachments of battalion composition at the level of a
zone or community of municipalities. Combat support units (for fire support,
engineering support, anti-aircraft support and anti-armour combat, as well as
reconnaissance and military police units) were also formed in the TO at certain
command levels.
48. TO staffs also formed logistics support units. TO staffs were generally
supplied from the reserves of the socio-political community, public supply
companies and transport and construction companies. Medical support fully
relied on civilian health organisations. In wartime conditions when a large part
of the territory of a socio-political community or republic was occupied, it was
envisaged that special logistics bases would be formed in inaccessible areas
and in free territory. Socio-political communities organised in these bases their
own manufacture of weapons by improvising, repairing damaged and captured
weapons and procuring them from elsewhere.
49. Supplies for TO units and staffs were sourced centrally from JNA depots and
reserves. However, TO staffs from municipal to higher levels also had to have
their own reserves of materiel. TO staffs were responsible for financing the
procurement of weapons and military equipment, and socio-political
communities’ ensured funds in their budgets. The Federation did not ensure
any funds for the needs of the republics, nor did the republics organise any
mutual solidarity funds. However, within republics certain richer
municipalities often allocated out of solidarity some funds for the equipment
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and functioning of the TOs of poorer municipalities9. In wartime conditions,

supply of weapons and combat equipment was also centralised and came from
federal reserves, current wartime production, procurement from abroad and
help from allies, as well as war booty. Republican authorities were allowed in
wartime conditions to procure weapons and military equipment from abroad,
which some of them took advantage of just before the war (Slovenia and
Croatia, and partly the Muslim forces in BH – the Patriotic League and the
Green Berets).
50. TO Staffs had no powers of administration and organisation of activities in the

domain of the civilian authorities. Control of traffic and the population in their
zones of responsibility were generally performed by the civilian police using
their peacetime and mobilised reserve forces and other legally envisaged
institutions10. Crimes and other activities were investigated by investigation
organs of the judiciary. Within TO units, these activities were carried out by
organs of the security service and the military police, and they cooperated with
the relevant civilian organs.
51. Territorially based units generally did not carry out combat operations outside
the territory of their municipality or district. They left their area mostly when
they were forced to by enemy operations. Only in the event of an imminent
threat could higher-level staffs temporarily gather municipal units for combat
operations in a broader area.
52. In addition, TO units could not be subordinated to higher-level JNA units

whose areas of responsibility covered the territory of the municipality. JNA
9
In Slovenia in the mid-80s, the border municipality of Tolmin was forced by the republican
plan to allocate over 2% of its revenues for equipment for its TO, while the law prescribed a maximum
of 0.5%, and on the other hand the municipality of Centar in the City of Ljubljana allocated only 0.12%
of its revenues.
10
Based on the experience of the people’s liberation war of 1941-1945, a special organisation
was formed in Slovenia for the protection of facilities, the population and material goods. It was partly
armed with light infantry weapons with no military uniform and obligatory visible insignia. This
organisation was called the National Protection and it was under the command of the municipal
secretariat of the interior and worked closely with the municipal TO staff. During preparations for
independence, that organisation became the embryo of the armed forces of Slovenia, because TO staffs
were still under the control of the JNA and officers loyal to it.
30
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commanders had to coordinate the stay and operations of TO units in their

areas of responsibility through the competent TO staff. In exceptional cases,
TO units could be subordinated to a JNA unit at the command of the
republican TO staff. If a JNA unit was planned to or forced to remain in an
area captured by the enemy, it had to be subordinated to the TO staff. In the
event of joint combat operations by JNA and TO units, the superior staffs and
commands coordinated operations or formed a temporary joint command
consisting of TO staff officers and the command of the JNA unit.
53. The right of the state to self-defence was transferred in Yugoslavia to all its
citizens (as well as all organisations and organs), which had the inviolable and
inalienable right and duty to defend the country.11 Nobody had the right to
prevent citizens from fighting an enemy who attacked the country12, and each
citizen who participated in the resistance to the enemy with arms or in some
other way was deemed to be a member of the armed forces of the SFR
Yugoslavia13. Therefore, possession and use of weapons was not the only
criterion for determining membership of the Yugoslav armed forces. Each
citizen who participated in any way to the resistance against the enemy was
deemed a member of the armed forces.
54. All-people’s defence was defined by law as a unified system of organisation,

preparation and active participation of citizens and legal entities in:
- Deterrence and prevention of aggression and other threats to the country.
- Armed combat and other forms of all-people’s resistance.
- Execution of other tasks for the purpose of defending the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and its social order.14
11
1D 02976 Constitution of the SFRY, 1974, Article 237.
12
13
4D 01470 Law on All-People’s Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number
21/1982, Article 91, contained the same provision that each citizen who participated in the
resistance to the enemy with a weapon or in any other way was also a member of the armed
forces.
14
21/1982, Article 3.
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55. In all-people’s defence, armed combat was the decisive form of resistance to
aggression. Armed combat and all other forms of all-people’s defence ensure
unity15. In the event of an attack on the country, all Yugoslav citizens, as well
as staffs, commands and other organs, were obliged immediately, without
waiting for a call or command, to exercise their rights and obligations with
regard to the defence of the country, and to act in accordance with the defence
plan and their wartime assignment.16
56. Citizens had the right and the duty:

- Organise and participate in organising, preparing and implementing all-
people’s defence.
- Train for all-people’s defence and for carrying out tasks in war, a state of
imminent threat of war or other emergency situations.
- Participate in armed combat and other forms of all-people’s resistance.
- Participate in the protection and rescue of the population and material
goods from war destruction and other dangers.
- Participate in carrying out other tasks of interest for the defence of the
country.17
57. The law defines the following basic rights and obligations of citizens:
- Military service.
- Participation in the civilian protection.
- Training for all-people’s defence.
- Work obligation.
- Requisition of resources.18
58. JNA and TO units and institutions recruit personnel from the regular force and
the reserve of the armed forces.19 The active force is made up of soldiers,
15
21/1982, Article 10.
16
21/1982, Article 9.
17
21/1982, Article 13.
18
21/1982, Article 17.
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cadets, active military personnel and civilians serving in the armed forces20,
and the reserve force is made up of conscripts who have completed their
compulsory military service, conscripts who have fulfilled the obligation to
perform compulsory military service in a different way and female
conscripts21. For men the obligation to serve in the reserve begins on the day
when they are released from compulsory military service, or from the day
when the obligation to perform compulsory military service is fulfilled in a
different way, and lasts until the calendar year in which the conscript turns 60
years of age.22 Records of all conscripts were kept in accordance with their
place of residence.23
59. JNA and TO units and institutions can also recruit volunteers. Volunteers are
persons who do not have a military obligation and are admitted to the armed
forces at their own request.24 In some republics (Slovenia), volunteers who had
not yet completed compulsory military service and had not turned 19 were also
admitted. They were admitted to youth volunteer units of the TO at the age of
16. They took part in the training of TO units in addition to military training
according to the secondary school curriculum. Successful young volunteers
could also receive junior non-commissioned officer ranks25.
19
21/1982, Article 118.
20
4D 01472 Law on Service in the Armed Forces, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number
7/1985, Article 9.
21
4D 01472 Law on Service in the Armed Forces, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number
7/1985Article 10. and
4D 01471 Law on Compulsory Military Service, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number
64/1985, Article 47
22
64/1985, Article 48.
23
64/1985, Article 69.
24
21/1985, Article 119.
25
J. JANŠA, an active politician when Slovenia gained independence and defence minister in
the period of armed conflict between the JNA and the TO of Slovenia, received the rank of corporal as
a youth volunteer and thus refused to perform compulsory military service in the JNA and an internship
in the JNA pursuant to the curriculum of the defence science studies.
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60. Mobilisation is carried out in the event of an attack on a country, an imminent

threat of war or other emergency circumstances. When they are mobilised, the
armed forces move from a peacetime organisation and state to a wartime
organisation and state of readiness for waging an all-people’s defensive war.
Mobilisation can be general or partial, public or secret.26
61. In the doctrine of all-people’s defence, great significance is attributed to self-

protection. Self-protection is a set of activities, measures and procedures
carried out by citizens and other legal entities in order to protect the interests
of all-people’s defence from all forms of enemy activities which may damage
those interests. In that context, timely detection and prevention of activities
which may damage the defence interests and the security of the country is
especially significant.27
62. Therefore, in the event of an attack on the country, all conscripts must
immediately, not waiting for a call or an order, exercise their rights and
obligations with respect to the defence of the country and act in accordance
with the defence plan and their wartime assignment. Likewise, if a general
mobilisation is declared, all conscripts from reserve forces must join the armed
forces and start to carry out their military duties. In these circumstances, each
male fit for military service becomes a member of the Yugoslav armed forces
and has the right and duty to participate in the defence of the country. If he is
not found in open armed combat, the enemy should consider these men fit for
military service as potential fighters, because in a different situation they could
have been found bearing weapons.28
26
21/1985, Article 8.
27
21/1985, Articles 173 and 174.
28
4D01492 Gavro Perazic’s book: Statute of Defence an Armed Forces in Constitution
and International Law, Beograd 1976, pages 200-201
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6. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE’S DEFENCE IN

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
63. The doctrine of all-people’s defence, or, rather, the concept of an armed
people, was applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the nineties. That is visible
in regulations on the defence of the country, but also in a number of military
documents, which point to the unity of the army and the population in the fight
to liberate the country.
6.1. Constitution and Laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina
6.1.1. Constitution
64. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina29 prescribes that the armed forces
of BH are made up of the Army of the Republic. In the event of war, in
addition to the Army, the armed forces also consist of the police and armed
units, which are put under the unified command of the armed forces of the
Republic and constitute a unified whole (Article 162, paragraph 2). Every
citizen who with arms or otherwise participates in resistance to an aggressor
shall be considered a member of the armed forces of the Republic (Article 162,
paragraph 3). This provision was taken directly from the Constitution of the
SFRY which prescribed that “any citizen who with arms or otherwise
participates in resistance to an aggressor shall be considered a member of the
armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.30 For properly
ascertaining whether someone is a member of the armed forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it is not, therefore, only important whether he bears a weapon or
not. The important thing is whether the citizen is participating in any way in
resistance to an aggressor. Armed and unarmed resistance to an aggressor are
29
1D01236 Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, revised text, 1993.
30
1D02976 1974 SFRY Constitution, Article 240/3
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thus made equal, so each citizen who takes part in resistance to the aggressor
is deemed to be a member of the armed forces of BH.
6.1.2. Decree Law on defence31
6.1.2.1. Defence of the country is a right and obligation of citizens
65. At a session held on 14 May 1992, the RBH Presidency adopted a decree law
on defence, which regulated the system and organisation of defence, the rights
and obligations of the Republic, municipalities, companies and other legal
entities, military defence and civilian defence, inspection, funding and other
matters important for the defence of the Republic (Article 1, paragraph 1).
That was in fact the earlier SRBiH Law on National Defence, which was
modernised in accordance with the standards of modern democratic political
systems.
66. It was defined that the Republic, through the competent ministries and other
republican organs in the area of defence, controls the national resistance in war
(Article 5, subparagraph 3), which shows that the BH Presidency adopted the
doctrine of national defence, or, rather national resistance in war, which was
the main characteristic of the defence system of the former Yugoslavia.
67. This decree also retains the legal qualification from the previous Yugoslav
system on “the rights and obligations” of citizens in the defence of the country,
and so it defined the rights and obligations of citizens to:
- Perform compulsory military service.
- Perform compulsory work.
- Comply with the requisition of resources.
- Participate in civilian protection.
- Train for defence (Article 46).
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68. Failure to carry out parts of duties in the defence of the country was sanctioned
as a crime or misdemeanour.
69. In addition to those mentioned above, according to the decree, citizens had the
following rights and obligations:
- To be assigned to the armed forces, civilian protection, monitoring and
information service, control communication and cryptographic protection
units, state organs, companies and other legal entities, or other defence
tasks.
- To respond to a call-up by the competent organ, company or other legal
entity to perform duties in the area of defence.
- To provide information of significance for defence that they obtain or
observe, and submit it as soon as possible to the information centre or state
organs.
- To provide the necessary data for the purpose of keeping records in the
area of defence. (Article 47)
6.1.2.2. Military defence, compulsory labour service, civilian defence and observation
and reporting service
70. Military defence is the broadest form of organisation and preparation of

citizens for armed combat: organisation, preparation, mobilisation and control
of the armed forces, recruitment of personnel into the armed forces and
replenishment with materiel and technical equipment, duties and tasks of
compulsory military service, registration, recruitment, replenishment, training
of citizens for armed combat and mobilisation (Article 62). In order to
organise and prepare citizens for armed combat, armed forces are organised
(Article 63).
71. Assigning personnel and materiel to the armed forces, police reserves, the
civilian protection, the monitoring and information service, organs of socio-
31
4D00408 Decree law on defence of the RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/.
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political communities, companies and other organisations and legal entities,

ensures participation of all forces and resources in the territory of the Republic
and the fullest use of specialised and other capabilities of citizens for defence
needs (Article 66). An individual, for instance, can be assigned to a military
unit or company producing ammunition, depending on his knowledge and
professional qualifications, based on which the competent state service
assesses the tasks on which that individual will contribute the most to the
defence needs of the country.
72. All citizens capable of working who have turned 15 were subject to the
compulsory labour service. This labour service could be fulfilled in state
administration organs, companies and other legal entities and by carrying out
occasional work for defence needs, and it was introduced in the event of a war
or state of emergency (Article 48). With respect to the participation of BH
citizens in the defence, or, rather, the contribution of unarmed citizens to
direct defence by the armed forces, it is necessary to determine the meaning of
the concept of “carrying out occasional work for defence needs”. Occasional
work for defence needs means the engagement of citizens who were subject to
the compulsory labour service on building fortifications, such as trenches and
shelters for personnel and combat operations of units of the armed forces,
erecting various obstacles on the battlefield and roads, preparing construction
and other material for fortifications and building temporary military roads, or
repairing existing ones to allow unimpeded movement of military vehicles.
Thus, in his order for engagement of labour service units, the commander of
the 3rd Corps of the BH Army defined precisely the tasks of the subordinated
units in connection with the labour service units. 32 The same is also contained
in the order of the Command of the 3rd Corps of the BH Army for engagement
of labour service units for engineering support of the Corps’ combat
operations, by which it was ordered: “Maintaining roads in the area of
responsibility of the brigade is to be carried out by own forces with the
32
4D01494 Order issued by Enver Hadzihasanovic and forwarded by Ramiz Dugalic to
Municipal Defence Staff Bugojno, G. Vakuf, D. Vakuf, Zepce, Zavidovici..., re:engagement of work
obligation units, ref: 05/633-2, Zenica, 01 March 1993
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assistance of local communities in the field.”33 The commander of the 4th

Corps of the BH Army also confirmed indirectly that labour service units were
engaged in engineering support work in areas of combat operations: “Labour
service units engaged for engineering support in areas of combat operations to
be transported using the shortest roads available…”34
73. Compulsory labour service also included tasks of supplying military units,
both on the battlefield and during rest in the rear, in the form of preparing or
building accommodation facilities, preparing, delivering and distributing food,
providing medical treatment and care for the wounded and sick, burying the
dead and clearing up the terrain. Citizens under the labour service gave the
most direct contribution by delivering ammunition and ordnance directly to
combat positions on the battlefield. This task was mostly performed by young
or elderly men.
74. For the purpose of carrying out organised work for defence needs,
mobilisation plans envisaged special purposes units – work groups, platoons
and companies at the level of villages, local communities and municipalities.
Labour service units could be general, which would provide only physical
strength and use mostly manual tools or light machines (chainsaws) or light
transportation vehicles (wheelbarrows, animal-drawn carts, small tractors).
Specialised work groups or platoons, which used heavy construction machines
and means of transportation, were used for larger fortification work.
Transportation or tractor groups were formed for the delivery of ammunition
and combat equipment. These groups and units were also formed ad hoc, in
accordance with the decisions of military commanders and circumstances on
the battlefield35.
33
4D01474 Order for engineering support of the Command of the 3rd Corps, strictly
confidential no. 02/136-1 of 21 March 1993.
34
4D01487 Order issued by Arif Pasalic to the 4th Corps-all units, re: enforcement of
security measures, ref: 01-3039/93, Mostar, 14 April 1993
35
In besieged Sarajevo some local commanders took civilians to dig trenches directly from
public transportation vehicles or from the street.
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75. Amendments to the decree on defence of 23 April 199336 prescribed that

citizens who are engaged in labour service units on the basis of a work
obligation are entitled to financial compensation. The amount of compensation
is determined by the municipal executive committee if a work obligation unit
is engaged in carrying out work and tasks for the needs of the armed forces.
For labour service units engaged in work of significance for defence in a state
organ, company or other legal entity, the amount of compensation is
determined by the institutions for which the work is carried out. (Article 126b)
76. Civil defence is the broadest form of organisation, preparation and training of
citizens, organs, companies and other legal entities for: (i) participation in
unarmed resistance and (ii) protection and rescue of people and material goods
from the consequences of war destruction, natural disasters and other disasters
(Article 70).
77. Civil defence consists of:

- Civilian protection.
- The monitoring and information service.
- Control communications and cryptographic protection, except for the
needs of command of the armed forces.
- Planning and training, except for the training of members of the armed
forces.
- Defence and protection preparations of organs, companies and other legal
entities. (Article 71)
78. The civilian protection is organised, prepared and implemented as a system for
the protection and rescue of people and material and cultural goods from war
destruction, natural disasters, technical and technological disasters and other
disasters and dangers in peace and war (Article 72). All citizens between the
ages of 18 and 60 for men and 55 for women had the obligation to serve in the
civilian protection (Article 50, paragraph 1). The tasks of the civilian
protection do not change significantly compared to peacetime, but in wartime
36
1D01238 Decree law on amendments to the decree law on defence, 23 April 1993.
40
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the volume and complexity of tasks increases significantly. Execution of these

tasks indirectly contributes to the success of armed defence, especially with
regard to boosting morale and the general spirit of soldiers on the battlefield
and all citizens, even in areas not engulfed in war. The earlier doctrine of all-
people’s defence also envisaged the engagement of civilian protection forces
and equipment for the needs of direct armed combat. Fire brigades fought fires
in inhabited areas and even in forests during combat so that units of the armed
forces could stay at the planned positions. Medical units provided first aid to
wounded soldiers on the battlefield and evacuated them to civilian medical
institutions. Specialised units for the detection and removal of the
consequences of NHB /nuclear-chemical-biological/ operations by the enemy
in the general area of the battlefield were completely integrated in the
operations systems of these units of the armed forces and were obliged to
submit information which they gathered using their forces and equipment. By
protecting and evacuating the families of soldiers, they influenced their morale
in the most direct way, as well as their will to carry out combat operations.
79. The extent to which civilian protection forces and equipment were important
for defence can also be determined from the decree law on amendments to the
decree law on defence,37 which prescribes that “during a state of war, members
of the civilian protection (staffs and units) are equal in all respects to members
of the armed forces with regard to their rights and obligations” (Article 3).
80. The duty to serve in the monitoring and information service is established
already in peacetime, and in war it gets more complex tasks for the purposes
of defence:
“The monitoring and information service in the Republic ensures the
monitoring and detection of all types of danger caused by war
activities…” (Article 91, paragraph 2)
The primary task of this service is to monitor the airspace and report promptly
on flights of aeroplanes and other aircraft attacking from the airspace. The air
37
4D01348 Decree law on amendments to the decree law on defence u referencing je
drugacije, 19 October 1992, Official Gazette of the BH Army, number 1/1992.
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surveillance and warning system of the civilian sphere was fully integrated in
that system of the armed forces. Exchange of information was mandatory for
both systems. The civilian surveillance system was in practice a
supplementary, and in some cases the only air surveillance system for the
needs of some units of the armed forces. However, the organs of that service
would certainly also notice the advance of enemy ground forces, especially
inserted elements and groups, as well as artillery attacks and other enemy
activities. It is fully understandable that they would inform of this the
competent organs of the civilian protection and state organs, and depending on
the situation and the proximity of the battlefield, they would also notify
directly commands of the armed forces. This purely civilian service thus
becomes an intelligence organ of the armed forces and directly serves the
purposes of armed combat.
81. Observation posts with permanent crews of up to two or three persons and the
appropriate means of communication are established at the level of a local
commune or large inhabited area. On important axes and features, observation
posts with permanent crews of five to six persons are organised. Observers,
who reported danger using portable equipment and optical signals, were also
deployed in order to supplement the monitoring system. These monitoring
crews consisted of elderly or young persons of both sexes who were not
assigned to units of the armed forces or civilian protection units. The
monitoring and information system in wartime and in the general area of the
battlefield completely serves the purposes of armed combat.
6.1.2.3. Training and acquiring of skills for defence
82. One of the obligations of BH citizens was training and acquiring of skills
for armed combat. Article 99 of the decree law on defence prescribes rights
and obligations with regard to training and acquiring of skills for armed
combat: “In order to acquire professional knowledge and skills for military
(underlined by M.G.) and civilian defence, citizens have the right and duty to
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train and acquire skills for defence.” Since this obligation is also
simultaneously a right and a duty, citizens cannot avoid it of their own will
without being subject to legal (criminal or misdemeanour) responsibility and
moral condemnation by the local or broader community. Article 51 of the
decree prescribes:
“Citizens between the ages of 15 and 60 (men), and 55 (women), have
the right and duty to train for defence, under the conditions prescribed
by law, if they are fit for training…”
6.1.2.4. Intelligence activities by citizens
83. BH citizens had the duty to perform intelligence activities for the needs of
armed resistance. According to Article 47, paragraph 3, of the decree on
defence, BH citizens also have the right and duty to: “3. Provide any
information of importance for defence that they find out or observe and submit
it urgently to the information centre or state organs.”
84. This is a special obligation to which all citizens are subject regardless of their
age and sex, or their role and general task in the defence system or society in
general. Information from information centres was submitted directly to
commands of the armed forces and was used for the purposes of armed combat
in accordance with their significance and importance. In their reports to “state
organs”, citizens were obliged to report their observations directly to
commands of the armed forces as state organs.
85. In the defence system of the former Yugoslavia, there was a service for
gathering intelligence and security information that was organised through a
special organisation of trustworthy persons in the field that was called the
Local Reconnaissance and Intelligence Service (MIOS). Individual
trustworthy citizens were engaged in each inhabited area or in the vicinity of
important installations on gathering information on the enemy or his
collaborators. That service could be activated only in war, but individual
43
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officers of the military security service used these wartime collaborators for
gathering current security-related information in peacetime, especially in areas
where there were anti-regime reactions or nationalistic incidents involving a
large number of citizens. In the late eighties, that service was abolished, but its
activation was envisaged in wartime. Collaborators were not recruited and
prepared for intelligence work in peacetime, only in war. In essence, the
activities of this service were carried out through civilian organs and internal
affairs structures, and the gathered information was submitted to military
services in a processed form and to the extent necessary. Nevertheless, military
intelligence officers and military security service officers organised their own
people and channels. Citizens participated in that work in view of their rights
and obligations and moral attitudes. These trustworthy citizens who were in
direct contact with lower-level intelligence officers engaged other residents in
their places – neighbours, relatives, elderly persons, women, and even
children, for information gathering. Equal behaviour by the BH Army is
confirmed, among other things, by an order of the commander of the BH
Army 3rd Corps to intensify intelligence activities that was submitted to
subordinate intelligence organs in brigades. With regard to the gathering of
intelligence information, HADŽIHASANOVIĆ ordered: “a special task is to
link up with our structures and sympathisers in temporarily occupied
territory”.38
6.1.3. Decree law on the armed forces of the RBH39
86. The RBH Presidency adopted a decree law on the armed forces of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at a session held on 20 May 1992.
38
4D01475 Order to intensify intelligence activities of the 3rd Corps Command, strictly
confidential number: 10/887-2 of 23 March 1993.
39
4D00409 Decree Law on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
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6.1.3.1. Composition of the armed forces
87. The decree prescribes that the armed forces of the RBH are made up of the
Army of the Republic, and in the event of war, also by the police and armed
forces which are placed under a unified command of the armed forces of the
Republic. Armed forces are security personnel in companies and other legal
entities and the personnel of the customs service and other border organs
(Article 2).
88. With the decree law on amendments to the decree law on the armed forces of
the RBH40 of 18 July 1992, the RBH Presidency expanded the concept of the
armed forces of the RBH so that self-organised armed formations or those
organised into illegal military units under different names as part of the forces
resisting the fascist occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the so-called
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav People’s Army, the
Serbian Democratic Party and other enemy forces, between 30 April 1991 and
15 April 1992, were also considered to be members of the armed forces
(Article 1). The RBH Presidency determines by a special decision which of the
above-mentioned armed formations are considered to be members of the RBH
armed forces (Article 2).
89. In August 1992, the RBH Presidency again changed the definition of the
concept of armed forces in the decree law on the armed forces, so from that
moment on, the armed forces consisted of the Army of the Republic, and its
components were HVO units and other armed groups which put themselves
under the unified command of the Army. During a state of war, in addition to
the Army, the armed forces consist of the police, physical security units of
companies and other legal entities, customs service units and other border
organs who resubordinate themselves under the unified command of the armed
forces.41
40
1D01240 Decree Law on Amendments to the Decree Law on the Armed Forces of
the RBH.
41
4D00410 Decree law on amendments to the decree law on the armed forces of the
RBH, 6 August 1992.
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6.1.3.2. The Army is the strike defence force
90. The Army is organised, trained and prepared in peacetime to conduct all forms
of armed combat and combat operations, as the strike defence force of the
Republic, with the task of preventing aggression and other danger to the
republic, to conduct armed combat against the enemy and participate in the
protection and rescue of the population and material goods in war, enabling
thus the mobilisation of all defence forces of the Republic (Article 3).42 The
Army, therefore, is not the only, but is rather the strike defence force, so it is
not correct to equate the BH Army with the entire defence forces of BH.
91. The Army is organised into peacetime and wartime units and institutions.
Peacetime units and institutions are manned by personnel working
professionally in the Army and conscripts who perform compulsory military
service. Wartime units and institutions are manned by conscripts from the
reserve, who have completed compulsory military service or have been trained
in other ways for the tasks and duties to which they are assigned. (Article 4)
92. In war or a state of emergency, Army units, institutions and commands are
manned by personnel from the active and wartime forces of the Army (Article
16, paragraph 1). In other words, in the event of a war, the Army is made up of
personnel working professionally in the army and conscripts performing
compulsory military service, as well as conscripts from the reserve who have
completed compulsory military service.
93. The Army can also be manned by other persons (Article 16, paragraph 2) who
are not liable for military service, but have been admitted to the Army at their
own request (Article 16, paragraph 3). Those persons have the same rights and
obligations as military personnel and conscripts (Article 16, paragraph 5),
depending on their status in the military hierarchy.
42
Herzegovina.
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94. The concept of military personnel is defined by the decree law on service in
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina43, which was published
on 1 August 1992. Military personnel are: (i) active military personnel, (ii)
soldiers and (iii) reserve personnel while they are on duty in the Army (Article
3, paragraph 1), or, in other words, reserve soldiers while they are serving in
the Army (Article 86, paragraph 1).
95. Active military personnel are non-commissioned officer, officers and generals
(Article 3, paragraph 2), while privates and reserve personnel perform
compulsory military service in the Army (Article 4, paragraph 2). The Army
regular force is made up of active military personnel, soldiers, workers
employed by the Army and civilians working in the Army (Article 8), while
the Army reserve is made up of persons who are liable for service in the Army
reserve based on regulations on compulsory military service.44
96. It is important to observe that the Decree law on service in the RBH Army
distinguishes between the term members of the Army and the term members of
the armed forces, so provisions on health care prescribe the rights of Army
members, and in wartime these are the rights of members of the armed forces
(Article 60). It is necessary, therefore, to bear in mind that the term member of
the armed forces of BH in wartime is broader than the concept of member of
the BH Army.
97. This is also confirmed by the Decree law on defence according to which
citizens who are engaged during war or an imminent threat of war, pursuant to
their obligation for compulsory military service, through organs of the national
defence administration, on courier call-up tasks for the purpose of carrying out
a mobilisation and other tasks for the needs of the armed forces and other
43
4D00412 Decree law on service in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
44
4D00412 Decree law on service in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
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defence needs, are also considered to be members of the armed forces (Article
126c)45.
6.1.3.3. Mobilization
98. In the event of a state of emergency or an attack on the Republic, citizens, the
armed forces and other defence elements and materiel for defence needs are
mobilised (Article 20, paragraph 1). This provision, therefore, defines the
following elements of defence in BH: 1. citizens, 2. the armed forces, 3. other
defence elements.
99. Mobilisation can be general or partial. A general mobilisation of the Army and
other defence elements includes all wartime units and institutions, and a partial
one includes only individual Army units and institutions (Article 22).
6.1.3.4. Compulsory military service
100. The Decree law on compulsory military service46, which was adopted by the
RBH Presidency at a session held on 1 August 1992, prescribed that
compulsory service was an inalienable right and duty of RBH citizens to
defend the homeland, protect its freedom, independence, sovereignty,
territorial integrity and constitutionally defined social order (Article 1,
paragraph 1). By performing compulsory military service, citizens are
prepared, trained and organised for: (i) armed combat, (ii) other duties in the
armed forces, (iii) participation in other forms of all-people’s resistance
(Article 1, paragraph 2).
101. Although the decree does not mention the right of citizens to armed resistance
as a specific right, which was a legal norm that was typical of the former
45
1D01238 Decree law on amendments to the decree law on defence, 23 April 1993.
46
4D01030 Decree Law on Compulsory Military Service.
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Yugoslav doctrine of all-people’s defence, there is no doubt that Bosnia and

Herzegovina also recognised the right and duty of all citizens to take part in
armed combat and other forms of all-people’s resistance. Apart from
participation in the armed forces of BH and other organised forms of armed
and civilian resistance, this also included any other form of resistance which
inflicted losses on the enemy and caused material damage, using weapons or
any other means.
102. Compulsory military service, as prescribed by the decree, consists of three

duties: (i) compulsory recruitment, (ii) compulsory military service, and (iii)
compulsory service in the reserve (Article 4, paragraph 1). All RBH citizens
are liable for recruitment, but only those citizens who are fit for military
service are liable for compulsory military service and service in the reserve
(Article 4, paragraph 3). Women are not liable for recruitment or compulsory
military service, but can volunteer for military training (Article 5).
Compulsory military service for men ends when they turn 60, and for women
when they turn 50 (Article 7, paragraph 1).
103. Conscripts become military personnel when they join a military unit or
institutions of the armed forces, and they stop being military personnel when
they are discharged from a military unit or institution (Article 10, paragraph
1). During compulsory military service pursuant to a call-up by a competent
organ, conscripts are equal to military personnel with regard to their rights and
obligations, from the moment of departure from home until they return home
in their places of residence (Article 10, paragraph 2).
104. Compulsory recruitment starts at the beginning of the calendar year in which a
BH citizen turns 17, therefore, at the age of 16 (Article 11, paragraph 2), and is
carried out in the calendar year in which the recruit turns 18 (Article 13,
paragraph 1). In the event of an imminent threat of war or a state of war, the
RBH Presidency can order the recruitment of persons who have turned 16
(Article 13, paragraph 3).
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105. Recruits who are judged to be fit for military service are sent to perform
compulsory military service in the calendar year in which they turn 19 (Article
20, paragraph 1), but during a state of war or an imminent threat of war, the
RBH Presidency can order persons who have turned 17 to be sent to perform
compulsory military service (Article 10, paragraph 5).
106. A soldier is entitled to regular and other leave while performing compulsory
military service (Article 36, paragraph 2). Although the decree does not
contain a provision on the status of soldiers on leave, there is no doubt that
leave does not change the soldier’s status, so a person performing compulsory
military service does not lose the status of soldier by going on leave.
107. A person who completes compulsory military service is discharged from the
RBH Army and becomes a reserve soldier (Article 36, paragraph 1).
108. Conscripts who have completed compulsory military service or have fulfilled
their obligation to perform compulsory military service in a different way, as
well as women who are qualified for performing professional or technical
services in the RBH Army or have been trained in peacetime for wartime
duties in the armed forces, are liable for service in the reserve (Article 41). In
the event of war or an imminent threat of war, compulsory service in the
reserve is performed by joining the armed forces and performing specific
military duties (Article 43, paragraph 1).
109. Reserve personnel can have a wartime assignment in a military units or

institution (Article 47, paragraph 1), but they can also have an assignment
outside the armed forces (Article 44, paragraph 3), for instance, the obligation
to work in a company or institution of interest for defence of the country.
110. Units, institutions and staffs of the armed forces are obliged pursuant to the
decree to issue ex officio within 15 days certificates on the date of joining the
armed forces of the Republic to all conscripts – recruits and reserve personnel,
indication whether the conscript volunteers or was mobilised into the armed
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forces and which establishment posts he occupied (Article 72, paragraph 4).
The status of soldier is granted to conscripts – recruits and reserve personnel
engaged on work obligation in units, institutions and staffs of the armed forces
of the Republic (Article 72, paragraph 5).
111. It follows clearly from these provisions that after a general public
mobilisation, all conscripts (recruits and reserve personnel), therefore men
who have turned 18, or, in the event of war and pursuant to a decision by the
RBH Presidency, those who have turned 16 as well, until the age of 60, are
considered to be persons who have joined the armed forces of the RBH.
112. The provision according to which compulsory military service lasts six months
(Article 19, paragraph 1) was amended on 18 July 1993. The Decree law on
amendments to the Decree law on compulsory military service47, so during a
state of war, a soldier who has completed compulsory military service is
transferred to the reserve and retained in the Army or the armed forces until a
decision is adopted to end the state of war in the Republic (Article 4).
6.1.3.5. Conclusion
113. Pursuant to legal regulations, all BH citizens had the right and duty to
participate in the defence of the country, or, rather, to contribute directly to its
success through various activities, regardless of their sex, age or status in
society. In practice the entire population served the purposes of armed combat.
If they failed to carry out their tasks, citizens were subject to criminal and
misdemeanour responsibility.
114. In the event of war or an imminent threat of war, all men liable for military
service from the ages of 16 to 60 were members of the active or reserve force
of the armed forces of BH. In exceptional cases, if the competent organs
47
1D01243 Decree law on amendments to the decree law on compulsory military
service.
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determined that their contribution to the defence of the country would be

greater if they worked in a state organ, company or other legal entity, or in
various forms of civil defence, a man of military age was not assigned to the
armed forces of BH, but rather contributed to the defence of the country by
working in that institution, or by participating in unarmed, civilian forms of
resistance to the aggressor.
115. Let us reiterate that unarmed, civilian forms of resistance directly served the
purposes of armed combat, and consisted of the following tasks:
(i) as part of work obligation:
- Occasionally they carried out various (fortification) work for the
needs of the armed forces.
- They provided food, accommodation and other supplies to
individuals and units of the armed forces.
- They sheltered, cared for and treated sick and wounded members of
the armed forces.
- They carried out or transported combat supplies – ammunition and
other equipment for armed units.
(ii) in civilian protection units:
- They dealt with the effects of enemy combat operations – fighting
fires in inhabited areas, removing rubble on roads.
- They took care of wounded soldiers.
- They buried the dead.
- They evacuated the families of soldiers and other residents in the
vicinity of the battlefield.
(iii) in the monitoring and information service:
- They reported flights of enemy aircraft in the airspace.
- They monitored and reported movement of enemy forces on land,
especially inserted and sabotage units.
(iv) in the system of training and acquiring skills for defence:
- They acquired knowledge and skills in handling personal arms and
procedures for handling ammunition and explosives.
- They practiced individual and group combat procedures.
52
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- They acquired skills in building /combat/ features and using

makeshift and local means of personal and collective protection in
conditions of combat operations.
(v) in the system of general intelligence activities:
- During their regular civilian activities, they gathered continuously
information on the enemy and submitted them to the competent
state organs or directly to armed units.
- They were sent occasionally toward the enemy with the intention
of gathering information on his forces for the needs of own armed
units.
6.2. Decisions and orders
116. At a session held on 8 April 1992, the RBH Presidency adopted a decree to
abolish the previous republican territorial defence staff and establish the
Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina48. This
creates the legal basis for establishing the armed forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as an independent army, separate from the Yugoslav Army and
the defence system of the SFRY. Although the term “territorial defence” was
retained, it is necessary to stress that this was not the same concept of the
territorial defence of the former Yugoslavia, which, together with the JNA,
was part of the armed forces of the SFR Yugoslavia, but rather the name of the
new organisation of armed forces of BH.
117. Next day, on 9 April 1992, the RBH Presidency issued a Decision on the
Integration of all Armed Forces on the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina49 according to which all armed units and individuals, with the
exception of JNA and MUP forces were obliged to report to municipal, district
and the City staff of territorial defence in order to be put under a unified
48
4D00414 Decree to abolish the previous republican territorial defence staff and
establish the Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
49
4D00411 Decision on the Integration of all Armed Forces on the Territory of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Presidency of the RBH, 9 April 1992.
53
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command. Groups and individuals who do not report and register by 15 April
will be considered paramilitary formations (for this reason 15 April is
considered to be the day of establishment of the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina50). Pursuant to an order of RBH President Alija
IZETBEGOVIĆ of 23 June 1992, the name “Territorial Defence of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” was changed to “Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and the armed forces of the RBH were
organised,51 and on 4 July 1992, the RBH Presidency adopted a decision to
organise the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina52. The
decision entered into force on the day of its adoption, and on that day the
armed forces and the RBH Army were formed (item IX).
118. A state of imminent threat of war was declared in the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina by a decision of the RBH Presidency of 9 April 199253. At a
session held on 20 June 1992, the RBH Presidency adopted a decision to
declare a state of war54 because of, as stated in the introduction, the aggression
on Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of
Montenegro, the Yugoslav Army and the terrorists of the Serbian Democratic
Party. The goal of declaring a state of war was to enable more effective
engagement of all human and material resources in the homeland and abroad
in order to liberate the Republic from the aggressor, restore the rule of law and
create conditions for the return of displaced persons (item 1). The aggressor
had already occupied 70% of the territory of the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina by that time. The armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina were authorised by this decision to undertake the necessary
measures to organise all-people’s resistance in order to achieve the set goals.
50
Herzegovina, Article 36.
51
4D00404 Order, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, 23 June 1992.
52
4D00403 Decision to organise the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, RBH Presidency, 4 July 1992.
53
P00150 Decision of the RBH Presidency to declare an imminent threat of war.
54
P00274 Decision to declare a state of war.
54
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119. That same day, 20 June 1992, the RBH Presidency issued an order to declare a
general public mobilisation in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina55. A general public mobilisation of all conscripts between the
ages 18 to 55 was ordered and they were obliged immediately to report with
military equipment and small arms to the nearest Territorial Defence unit (item
I.). Furthermore, a general public mobilisation of all other able-bodied citizens
(men of 18 to 65 years of age and women of 18 to 55 years of age) was
ordered and they were obliged to report to civilian protection units, which
would start to carry out tasks in the defence of the country in accordance with
the decree law on defence (item II.). From that moment on, all men became
members of the armed forces of BH. It is understandable that due to a shortage
of weapons and equipment, as well as initial problems in establishing and
organising a BH wartime army, not all men fit for military service and
conscripts could be actively engaged in the armed forces. Those who were not
immediately actively engaged in combat operations were in the reserve or
performed other tasks important for the defence of the country.
120. Unity of the population and the armed forces in the defence of the country is
specifically stressed already in the Directive on the Defence of the Sovereignty
and Independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina56, which was
issued by the Staff of the Territorial Defence of the RBH on 12 April 1992:
“2. Forces of the RBH TO and armed civilians united under single
command of the RBH ŠTO /Territorial Defence Staff/, continue to
spread, consolidate and successfully defend the whole Republic…”
It was decided to “immediately carry out a mobilisation of all forces of the

RBH TO”, and the first stage of the defence operation was supposed to be
carried out with “mass armed resistance by citizens” (item 4).
55
4D01164 Order to declare a general public mobilisation in the territory of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
56
4D1727 Directive on the Defence of the Sovereignty and Independence of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Staff of the Territorial Defence of the RBH, 12 April 1992.
55
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121. At a session held on 26 June 1992 in Sarajevo, the Presidency of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a platform for its activities in wartime
conditions57. Parts of the platform are important for properly understanding the
all-people’s character of resistance to aggression, which started openly
immediately after the Bosnia and Herzegovina established independence.
“5. Political basis for all-people’s defence war
The right to life, peace and freedom is the foundation of human
rights in the civilised world. Resistance to the aggressor shall be
organised and carried out as an all-people’s defensive struggle by all
citizens and all peoples for the liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(…)
6. Appeal to all patriotic forces
This platform is a call to all citizens and peoples in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to take part actively in the patriotic front of the struggle
to repel the aggression and establish peace and freedom, order and the
rule of law in the whole state territory of the Republic. (…) (bold by
MG)
122. The Supreme Command Staff of the OS /Armed Forces/ of the RBH issued on
10 September 1992 a directive58, which is exceptionally important to
understand the role and significance of the population in the defence of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Sabotage and anti-sabotage operations were defined as one
of the elements of armed combat:
“Continuously carry out sabotage operations in the aggressor’s rear
and prevent him from bringing in fresh forces and supplies, inflicting
as many losses on the enemy as possible. In the first stage of combat
operations, focus on destroying bridges, tunnels, canyons and other
features on roads leading from the valley of the River Drina and the
River Lim to Sarajevo and Tuzla. /…/ In the second stage, intensify
further sabotage operations, focusing on roads.” (Item VI)
57
1D00942 Platform for the activities of the RBH Presidency in wartime conditions.
56
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The population also has a big role with regard to “intelligence support”:
“In the second stage, focus on gathering information on the enemy in
areas of concentration and on axes of engagement of units in offensive
operations. Engage intelligence organs and reconnaissance units,
MUP forces and the population on intelligence support tasks.” (Item
VII)
Reliance on the population in quartermaster support for military units (food,
bathing, etc.) was also a significant contribution to the successful execution of
the tasks of the armed forces. Item VII, sub-item Logistics Support, talks about
this aspect of the contribution of the population.
123. The Command of the 4th Corps of the ABH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
prepared at the beginning of 1993 The instructions for building and
strengthening the combat morale of the RBH Army59. This document also
emphasises the unity of the Army and the people as an important factor in
building and strengthening combat morale:
“Unity of the Army and the people, based on the traditions of BH and
the people, is of special significance for building and strengthening
combat morale. It is developed and reinforced through forms of joint
preparations of the people and the Army for the defence of the country,
and is manifested in: joint active and interconnected participation in
the defence war; expert assistance by Army members to socio-political
communities, organisations and work collectives in the preparation
and waging of war; engagement of Army units and members in the
defence of the lives and property of citizens; and comprehensive
efforts and assistance by the people to the Army, expressed in
material support, care for the wounded and sick, gathering of
information on the enemy, detection and disabling of enemy agents,
provocateurs and saboteurs in the field, protection of significant
58
4D01240 Directive of the Supreme Command Staff of the OS of the RBH, 10
September 1992.
59
4D01603 Instructions for building the combat morale of the RBH Army, 1 February
1993
57
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features and supply sources, participation in fortifying the territory

and other activities.”
124. In a proposal of measures for organising an all-people’s war of liberation60 of

27 May 1993, the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff of the OS of the
RBH, Sefer HALILOVIĆ, “in support of the position of his Supreme
Command and the President of the Presidency regarding the unacceptability of
the offered plan (VOPP /Vance-Owen Peace Plan)”, stressed:
“The radical u-turn in the position of the great powers with regard to
the aggression against the RBH clearly proves that the defence of the
state and the people must be organised and carried out relying on own
forces. Compared to the current situation and behaviour, this means a
definitive crushing of illusions on any external military intervention as
a decisive factor in stopping the aggression against the RBH and a
fundamental transition to a war mode, which means maximum
mobilisation of all segments and resources of the country in order for
it to survive. (…)
Bearing in mind all of the above-mentioned elements and factors, the
Supreme Command Staff of the OS of BH proposes the following to the
Presidency:
- At this crucial moment, to mobilise and unite all political forces,
parties, associations, movements and citizens into a patriotic front
and, instead of the current strategy of victimhood and asking for help
abroad on that basis, build strong combat morale by relying on own
forces and providing support for the BH Army in the defence of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country and the salvation of
the people from new pogroms . (…)”
60
4D00766 Supreme Command Staff of the OS of the RBH: Proposal of measures for
organising an all-people’s war of liberation, 27 May 1993.
58
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6.3. Operations behind enemy lines relying on the population
125. According to the Yugoslav doctrine of all-people’s defence, one of the primary
forms of armed combat is combat behind enemy lines, or, rather, in territory
which the enemy considered to be occupied. This resistance was generally
carried out by units the strength of a group of soldiers to brigades. The Combat
operations were guerrilla style and could grow into larger-scale combat
operations, or indeed into a partisan form of armed combat. These units could
be inserted behind enemy lines (infiltrated) across the frontline or were formed
from among unassigned residents who stayed behind enemy lines. These
forces generally carried out numerous smaller-scale operations in the entire
territory in the form of sabotages, ambushes on roads, shooting raids on enemy
forces and conquests of small places or small areas. The targets of these
attacks were supposed to be representatives of the occupying authorities and
individual sympathisers of the occupying authorities in the local population.
These operations could also assume the characteristics of terrorist acts in some
cases. The objective of these operation was essentially to inflict losses in
manpower, destroy materiel, stretch forces in the territory, undermine the
enemy’s morale and boost the morale of own forces and the population.
126. The fundamental precondition for this kind of armed combat was to rely on the
population to take care of and provides supplies to members of the armed
forces, gather intelligence information, provide new soldiers for units and
ensure secrecy with regard to the stay and movement of armed groups.
Without the support of the population this kind of armed combat has no
possibilities for long-term and successful combat. It is precisely because of
this support by the population that defence is considered to be all-people’s, or,
rather, resistance is all-people’s, as stated in the regulations of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (and other countries of the former Yugoslavia).
127. The documents of the BH Army mentioned in section 6.2. confirm that the
population was an important pillar for the Army’s combat operations and
59
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achievement of its combat plans. Numerous other documents also confirm

that, and I will mentioned just the following as examples:
(i) The Chief of Security of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the 4th ABH Corps,
in his assessment of the security situation on 16 April 1993, also proposes
the following measures: (i) to introduce guards in villages with a Muslim
population and establish full control of villages; (ii) to make contact
through the civilian authorities with all members of the Muslim population
and request full engagement in the defence of their homes; (iii) to call on
all Muslim members of the HVO to join the side of their people61.
(ii) In a document called “Proposed Security Measures” of 18 April 1993, the
Chief of Security of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the 4th ABH Corps,
among other things, also proposes: (i) to establish cooperation through the
civilian authorities with the populations of Dubrave and Stolac, and (ii) “to
establish cooperation with our fighters in the HVO”62.
(iii)The Commander of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the ABH 4th Corps,
Bajro PIZOVIĆ, on 18 April 1993, in an order on combat operations of the
brigade, among other things ordered the organ for morale to prepare a plan
for informing the population in the territories of the municipalities of
Mostar, Čapljina and Stolac, as well as Muslim soldiers in the HVO units
of these municipalities63.
(iv) In a report on the situation and events in the ABH 42nd Brigade, which the
Commander of the ABH 4th Corps, Arif PAŠALIĆ, submitted to the
Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces of BH on 2 May 1993, he
described how the brigade was accommodated, and among other things, he
stressed that “troops who were not at the front line of defence facing the
aggressor were staying at their homes”. In addition to a description of tasks
received by “men from the Čapljina HVO” (the reference is to HVO
soldiers of Muslim ethnicity – remark by MG), PAŠALIĆ reports that
61
4D00033 Chief of Security, 42nd Mountain Brigade, ABH 4th Corps, Assessment of
the Security Situation, 16 April 1993.
62
4D00034 Chief of Security of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the ABH 4th Corps,
Proposed Security Measures, 18 April 1993.
63
4D00035 Commander, 42nd Mountain Brigade, ABH 4th Corps, Order, Preparation for
Brigade Combat Operations, 18 April 1993.
60
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“villages have maximum security and are linked by courier”.64
128. The engagement of civilians for the needs of armed combat was complex,
frequent and directly served the purposes of the conduct of armed combat. BH
Army units had accommodation in inhabited areas near the battlefield and in
order to lessen the burden on soldiers, all able-bodied villagers were engaged
for providing security for inhabited areas, units that were resting and the
population. This is also confirmed by an order of the Command of the 306th
Mountain Brigade of the BH Army 3rd Corps to provide security in villages:
“Involve all able-bodied residents to secure the villages in which they live (in
which brigade units are staying – note by M.G.). Engage all conscripts,
regardless of whether they have work obligation …”65
129. In an order to attack, the Commander of the ABH 7th Motorised Mountain
Brigade, Asim KORIČIĆ, also stressed the possibility “during combat
operations to achieve constant … connection with the local population”66.
130. Sabotage combat operations were a constant feature of warfare by the BH

Army. One example are sabotage operations by the BH Army in mid-July
1993 in the general area of Stolac, due to which traffic was blocked for two
days in the area of the Dubrave plateau and the beginning of the HVO
operation known as SOUTH was postponed.67
64
4D00036 ABH 4th Corps Commander, Arif PAŠALIĆ, Report, 2 May 1993.
65
4D01476 Order, Securing rural areas, No. 02/165-1, 306th bbr /Mountain Brigade/
Command, 31 January 1993.
66
2D 00473 Command for attack, Commander Asim KORIČIĆ.
67
These sabotage operations by the BH Army are mentioned in numerous documents, including:
- 4D 00462 (Official record of Salko Habida's Statement no: 02-4/3-06/4-03-226/93, 14 July
1993, Capljina, signed by Ivica Kraljevic).
- 4D 00910 (Official record issued by Ivica Kraljevic about statement given by Musair Klaric,
ref: 02-4/3-06/4-03-229/93, 15 July 1993).
- 4D 01044 (Information issued by Nedjeljko Obradovic to HVO General Staff Mostar, re:
situation in the area of responsibility of 'Knez Domagoj'' Brigade, ref: 1100-01-93-31, 16 July
1993).
- 4D 01096 (Official memo of statement given by Admir Cavra issued by Ivica Kraljevic, ref: 02-
4/3-06/4-03-241/93, 19 July 1993).
- 4D 01101 (Report on questioning issued by Bosko Buntic, re: statement given by Becir Suta,
ref: 02-4/3-06/4-03-234/93, 17 July 1993).
61
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7. HVO MUSLIM SOLDIERS AS A SECURITY PROBLEM
131. I was asked whether Muslim soldiers of the HVO could justifiably be
considered a security problem when the conflict between the HVO and the
ABH escalated, assuming the existence of certain circumstances.
The moment when the conflict escalated is defined as the middle of 1993, or
more precisely 30 June, by which time the ABH:
a) Established control of the Konjic area, and HVO forces and the Croatian
population were isolated in two enclaves (one in the area of the villages of
Turija, Zabrñe and Zaslivlje, and the other in the Kostajnica area).68
b) Cut the road between Kiseljak and Busovača, thereby beginning the
process of creating small Croatian enclaves in the area of Central Bosnia.69
c) Established full control of Travnik in June.70
d) Established full control of Kakanj in June.71
An occurrence that is considered to be an assumption for the question is the

attack on the HVO carried out by the BH Army on 30 June 1993 in
cooperation with HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity. With this attack, the BH
Army gained control of the Tihomir Mišić HVO barracks, the area of Bijelo
Polje, Vrapčići and other places in an area stretching for 26 kilometres north
of Mostar.72 This action established communication between Mostar and
Jablanica, which created the preconditions for ABH units in the Mostar area to
link up with units from other parts of the country, and to receive regular
supplies of weapons, ammunition and other necessities.73 Previously known
- 4D 01730 (Exhibit from Hadzihasanovic case(P692); Analysis of the combat experience of

forces in the 3rd Corps area of responsibility issued by Enver Hadzhasanovic to the Supreme
Command Staff of the Armed Forces).
68
4D 01216 Map of Mostar, Jablanica and Konic area, re: situation till 30 June 1993.
69
4D 00561 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina; situation in March-April 1993.
70
4D 00562 Map of BiH, situation in June 1993.
71
4D 00562 Map of BiH, situation in June 1993.
72
4D 01216 Map of Mostar, Jablanica and Konic area, re: situation till 30 June 1993.
4D 00622 Map of the Mostar region; situation after 30 June 1993.
IC 1005 Situation in Mostar region after 30 June 1993.
IC 1006 Situation in Mostar region after 30 June 1993.
73
Communication between Mostar and Jablanica is substantiated, for instance, by the following
documents:
62
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BH Army goals and plans to gain full control of the territory on the Jablanica-
Mostar-Neum axis, proposed by the then Chief of the Main Staff of the Army
Supreme Command, S. HALILOVIĆ, at a joint session of the Presidency,
Government and parliamentary parties on 10 March 1993, were one step
away.74
“6. Make sure that the port of Ploče and the Ploče – Mostar – Sarajevo
– Zenica road are in continuous operation for the needs of the state of
BH. If necessary, engage international forces for this, and also use our
own forces as necessary to secure that area (underlined by M.G.).”
132. Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict in BH, a significant number of
Muslims joined HVO ranks, especially in Mostar. The common goal in the
fight against the Serbian aggression and the nonexistence of organised defence
by Muslims were the basic reasons for Muslims to join HVO units. With the
organisation of the BH Army, the units of which consisted almost exclusively
of Muslims, tensions appeared between BH Army and HVO units. Armed
clashes between BH Army and HVO units broke out at the end of October
1992 in Prozor and in January 1993 in Gornji Vakug and parts of Central
Bosnia, but they were ended a relatively short time after they started. Open
clashes of larger proportions started at the end of March 1993 in Konjic and
then in mid-April 1993 in the general area of Konjic Municipality and in
Central Bosnia. The conflict culminated on 30 June 1993 when BH Army
forces captured the HVO Tihomir Mašić barracks in the northern part of
Mostar, and an area of around 26 kilometres north of Mostar in the direction of
Jablanica, thereby linking up the forces of the 4th and 6th Corps of the BH
- 4D 00768 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the 4th and 6th Corps Command, ref:1/297-72,
Sarajevo, 27 July 1993.
- 4D 00545 Excerpt from the book Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia, Esad
Sejtanic, June 2005.
- 2D 01389 Information on the combat activities in the area of responsibility of the 1, 2
3, 4, 5 and 6 corps of the BH army.
74
3D02648 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo, 1997, page 151.
63
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Army.
133. Loss of control over an exceptionally important area on the left bank of the
Neretva north of Mostar was in itself alarming for the authorities of the
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, because there was a real threat of a
total loss of control over Mostar and the territory toward the coast.75 The fact
that the BH Army captured a strategically important area owing also to
betrayal by HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity, justifiably highlighted the
danger that the HVO could lose control for the same reason over other areas
defended by HVO units which had soldiers of Muslim ethnicity. Earlier
warnings of a security threat posed by the large number of Muslim soldiers in
some HVO units, which were obviously not considered important by anyone
until then, turned out to be justified.76
134. ABH documents on cooperation with Muslim soldiers in the HVO,

instructions to stay in the HVO in order to carry out certain operations77, as
75
P 03038 Signed and stamped Proclamation by Jadranko PRLIC, Croatian Defence
Council President, and Bruno STOJIC, HVO Defence Department Head, re: Muslim offensive
against Croat in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Number: 02-1-765/93.
76
P01438 Signed and stamped report issued by Nojko MARINOVIC to Miljenko LASIC re:
Croatian Defence Council 1st Brigade. Ref. 3155-01-01-93-1.
P02223 Signed and stamped document from the Chief of HVO Security and Information
Service Stjepan Radic Brigade Safety Report for 07-05-93. Ref:No.09-1029/93
P02231 Handwritten report by Ivica PUSIC, assistant for HVO Security and Information
Service, to the commander of the Croatian Defence Council 3rd Brigade, re. security
situation in the Croatian Defence Council 3rd Brigade area of responsibility
4D00920 Report for period from 09.05 - 13.05. 1993 issued by SIS (Information and Security
Service) 3rd HVO Brigade, Mostar, 13 May 1993
P02562 Stamped Report re: Order Ref. No: 01-3159/93 dated 27.05.1993 of JIH Zone of
Operations, signed by Marinko BOSNJAK. Ref: 02-1023-2/93.
2D01379 Report on the work of the security intelligence service in the period from January till
June 1993 by Ivica Lucic
P03355 Report on the number of Defence Departments for the period January to June 1993.
Ref. 02-1/1-84/93.
P04699 Report on activities of the Croatian Defence Council HZHB for the period January to
June 1993
77
4D 01461 Defence Department, SIS, Official Note of Informative Talk, No 19-3-22.
19 September 1992
4D 00469 Official record issued by Ivica Kraljevic regarding situation and relations
between Croats and Muslims in Stolac Municipality. No: 02-4/03-6/2-10-21/93, 30 March
1993.
4D 00033 Security situation valuation, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain
Brigade, 16 April 1993, no 06-1019/93, signed by Huso Maric.
4D 00034 Security measures proposition, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd mountain
Brigade, 18 April 1993, no: 06-186/93, signed by Huso Maric.
64
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well as other information on cooperation between HVO soldiers of Muslim

ethnicity with BH Army commanders and soldiers, known to some services of
Herceg-Bosna even earlier, gained in significance in the new circumstances. It
is visible in many BH Army documents that the most senior BH Army
commanders worked intensely to recruit HVO members of Muslim ethnicity
into the BH Army and at the same time counted on them as an internal ally in
the upcoming armed conflict, which eventually took place in Mostar on 30
June 1993 with the attack on the Tihomir Mišić barracks and the area north of
East Mostar. This if, for example, what the Chief of the Military Security
Administration of the BH Army, F. MUSLIMOVIĆ, a man in whom the
President of the BH Presidency, A. IZETBEGOVIĆ, had exceptional
confidence, suggested in tasks issued to his subordinate organ in the 4th Corps
Staff:78
“This is because it is realistic to expect a further deterioration of
relations and even a general military confrontation between ARBiH
and HVO. It is very important for such a situation to make Muslims
within HVO as passive as possible and to influence their transfer from
the HVO to the ARBiH.”
135. After the start of the armed conflict between the BH Army and the HVO in
April 1993, the Commander of the Bregava 42nd Brigade issued an oral order
to subordinate commanders:79
“…linking up with our men in the HVO was carried out;
4D 00035 Order on preparation for brigade combat operations, Army RBiH, 4th corps,
42nd Mountain Brigade,18 April 1993, no: 01-1025/93, signed by Bajro Pizovic.
4D 00036 Report about conditions and events in 42nd Mountain Brigade, Mostar, 02
May 1993, no: 01-3573/93, signed by Arif Pasalic.
4D 00568 Tasks issued by Fikret Muslimovic to the Chief of the Military Security
Service, Command of the 4th Corps, ref: 03/35-68, Sarajevo, 16 April 1993.
4D 00473 Response from Bajro Pizovic addressed to Command of Knez Domagoj
Brigade, Ref:01-1024/93, 18 April 1993.
2D 00281 No. 01/213, Command of Brigade “Bregava”, The analysis of our forces
combat experiences; signed by Commander Mr. Bajro Pizovic.
2D 00288 No. 03/35-68, SUBJECT: Assignments, Armed Forces Supreme Command
Headquarters Security Department; Head Fikret Muslimovic.
78
2D 00288 No. 03/35-68, SUBJECT: Assignments, Armed Forces Supreme Command
Headquarters Security Department; Head Fikret Muslimovic.
79
4D 00036 Report about conditions and events in 42nd Mountain Brigade, Mostar, 02
May 1993, no: 01-3573/93, signed by Arif Pasalic.
65
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- Men (Muslims, note by M.G.) from the Capljina HVO have the task of
taking Tasovčići village and the bridge in Capljna in order to prevent
troops being brought from the direction of Metković
- villages (Muslim, note by M.G.) have maximum security and are
linked by courier
- seize the town of Stolac with our people in the HVO
- seize the checkpoints in the villages of Prenj, Nakovanj and Aladinići
- watch the bridge over the Bregava river in the village of Prenj and
prevent HVO forces being brought in from the Kruševo — Prenj and
Svitava — Prenj directions
- close the road/s/ towards Drinavac village and Kruševo village
- MB /mortar/ 60 and 82 positioned for action against the HVO
- also give launcher targets on the right bank of the Neretva”
136. Within the context of this order is also a proposal of measures which the Chief
of Security of the BH Army 42nd Brigade proposed to his commander:80
“introduce a guard in the villages with a Muslim population, and

establish full control of the village.
- establish contact with all members of the Muslim population through
the organs of the civilian authorities, and request their full engagement
in the defence of their homes;
- call upon all Muslim members of the HVO to place themselves on the
side of their people.”
137. In the general area of Čapljina and Stolac, the Čapljina detachment of the
ABH was established in March 1993 consisting exclusively of Muslim
members. Considering that HVO units in that area included a large number of
Muslims who expressed their desire to transfer to this detachment, they were
told that “we (the BH Army) need them more were they are”.81 Since transfer
80
4D 00033 Security situation valuation, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade, 16
April 1993, no 06-1019/93, signed by Huso Maric.
81
4D 01477 Establishment of the Čapljina detachment in Čapljina – report to the 4th Corps
Command, Čapljina detachment, 15 March 1993.
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was possible only with the approval of the HVO command, many HVO
members of Muslim ethnicity abandoned wilfully HVO units and crossed to
BH Army units, which is visible in a request by the commander of the Knez
Domagoj 1st Brigade to the commander of the Bregava 42nd Brigade to submit
to him approvals for the transfer of a large number of soldiers, where he
expresses his doubts that they deserted82.
138. It is my opinion that under the described assumptions it is reasonable and from
a military point of view completely justified to believe that there was a danger
of new betrayals by HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity and that the HVO could
lose control of other areas as well because of that. In these conditions, every
military commander must issue an order on measures to monitor the conduct
in battle of his own soldiers of the same ethnicity as the opposing side, restrict
access to confidential information, and not send them on important combat
missions, including the drastic measure of disarming and isolation in the event
of individual inadequate conduct, and in the event of inadequate conduct
(desertion, collective disobedience) by a large number of personnel of the
same ethnicity as the opposing side, those measures can be undertaken against
the majority, or, rather, all personnel in own ranks who are of the same
ethnicity as the opposing side. This is the only way to prevent losses in own
ranks, defeat and loss of own territory.
82
4D 01478 Submission of approval for insight and control, Request, 1st HVO Brigade Knez
Domagoj, number 1100-01-01-93-220, 16 March 1993.
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8. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF CENTRAL BOSNIA AND

NORTHERN HERZEGOVINA
139. I was asked whether the BH Army’s gaining of control over the areas of
Konjic, Novi Travnik, Fojnica, Bugojno, Kakanj and Vareš, and over the area
from Jablanica to Mostar and further south toward the Adriatic Sea in the
course of the year 1993 could be interpreted as a planned conquest of roads
and economically important territories, and whether that territory had any
special significance in the defence concepts of the SFR Yugoslavia.
8.1. Geographic definition of the area
140. The territories of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina cover the central
part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we can delineate by the mountain
ranges of Borja – Ravan – Zvijezda – Ozren – Romanija – Jahorina –
Bjelašnica – Prenj – Velež – Mostarsko blato – Trtla – Cincar – Vitorog –
Lisina – Čemernica, or, rather, the territory of the former municipalities of
Jajce, Donji Vakuf, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez,
Zenica, Žepče, Busovača, Fojnica, Kreševo, Kiseljak, Visoko, Kakanj, Vareš,
Breza, Ilijaš, Hadžići, Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, all of Sarajevo, and the
northern parts of the municipalities of Livno, Tomislavgrad, Posušje, Široki
brijeg and Mostar, as well as the southern areas of the municipalities of
Skender Vakuf, Kotor Varoš, Teslić and Tešanj.
141. The territory can also be defined geographically by the upper and middle
courses of the Rivers Bosna and Vrbas, which flow north from the Dinaric
drainage divide and belong to the Sava (Black Sea) basin, and the basin of the
River Neretva, which flows into the Adriatic Sea. The landscape is
predominantly mountainous with several high mountain ranges, including
Mounts Vlašić (1933 m), Bjelašnica (2067 m), Jahorina (1916 m), Vranica
(2110 m), Bitovnja (1700 m), Prenj (2155 m), Velež (1969 m), Čabulja (1776
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m), Čvrsnica (2228 m ), Vran (2074 m) and Raduša (1956 m). The mountain
ranges are crisscrossed by deep valleys, even canyons in some places. Between
the mountain ranges are wide fields and valleys, of which the largest are
Uskoplje (the middle course of Vrbas), the Lašva valley (between Travnik and
Vitez), the valley of the River Lepenica and the middle course of the River
Fojnica near Kiseljak, the valley of the River Usora with the general areas of
the municipalities Teslić and Tešanj, the Sarajevo valley with the lower
courses of the Rivers Miljacka and Željeznica and the source of the River
Bosna. In the general area are also the largest karst valleys on the Balkan
peninsula – the Kupres, Šuica and Duvno valleys and Mostarsko blato.
142. The largest rivers flow from south to north (Bosna and Vrbas) and north to
south (Neretva). Their tributaries mostly flow from west to east (Lašva and
Usora into the Bosna) and (Trebižat into the Neretva). The main roads from
the Pannonian Plain to the Adriatic Sea also follow the valleys of rivers. The
Dinaric rdrianage divide is the greatest obstacle to fast movement and the most
significant mountain passes are Ivan sedlo (959 m) on the Sarajevo – Mostar
route, Makljen (1123 m) on the Jajce – Jablanica – Mostar route and Kupreška
vrata (1348) on the Bugojno – Livno road. Between the basins of the River
Vrbas and the River Bosna there is a road passing via the Komar pass (927 m).
143. The total surface area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina is about
16,000 km2 or almost one third of the territory of BH. The average altitude is
over 800 m. Mountain regions are mostly covered by tall forests, while the
lowlands, valleys and plains are mostly arable land.
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8.2. The significance of that area in defence plans of the former SFR
Yugoslavia
144. The foreign policy of the then Yugoslavia advocated active neutrality, or non-
alignment, which was reflected internally in continuous tension and the threat
of aggression by both leading international blocs. This was the basis for
formulating the defensive doctrine of so-called all-people’s defence and social
self-protection, which had the following main characteristics: reliance on own
forces, participation of all human resources in armed combat, partisan and
guerrilla warfare and the creation of a permanent free territory in the hilly
central part of Yugoslavia, the so-called defence bastion83 which covered parts
of Croatia (the hilly areas of the former “Republic of Serbian Krajina” without
the part in Slavonia), all of BH without the Posavina and Semberija,
Montenegro and Western Serbia. In this bastion, Central Bosnia and Northern
Herzegovina occupied the central part.
145. This is why the former armed forces, especially the JNA, concentrated great
military power, which was manifested in the following:
- In the area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina84 many military
industrial plants85 were built and heavy weapons were manufactured
there (Bratstvo in Novi Travnik), explosives and gunpowder (Slobodan
Princip – Seljo in Vitez), ammunition, mines, fuses and light anti-armour
weapons (Slavko Rodić in Bugojno), repair and maintenance of
telecommunication equipment (Repair and Maintenance Depot in
Travnik), clothing and footwear (Borac in Travnik).
- Although the area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina was not
directly threatened by possible military operations in the initial phase of a
war, significant JNA forces were concentrated there: one mechanised
brigade, two motorised brigades, one mountain brigade, two partisan (light
infantry) brigades, three artillery regiments, one anti-armour artillery
83
4D01486 Map, Defence Bastion of the SFRY.
84
In the former Yugoslavia, there were three significant military industrial regions – the Lašva
valley (Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez), the surroundings of Sarajevo (Vogošća, Stup, Pale, Konjic) and
Western Serbia (Užice, Lučani, Čačak, Valjevo). All three regions were self-reliant if necessary.
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regiment, one rocket regiment of PZO (anti-aircraft defence), as well as

TO forces86: six district staffs, 30 municipal staffs, 13 TO brigades (light
infantry).
- In that areas, there was also a large number of depots87 of war reserves of
units, operational systems and the supreme command. Many war reserves
were also located in companies of the military industry. There were 13
technical depots in total in which large quantities of ammunition, weapons
and other technical equipment were stored.
- Major roads went through Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina,
ensuring relatively safe supplies for operational and strategic groups and
manoeuvre of forces on peripheral battlefields if the flat parts of
Yugoslavia north of the Sava were captured88. The radio relay hub on
Vlašić was one of the most important ones in the JNA system of radio
relay communications.
146. At the time of Tito’s Yugoslavia, Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina
had special significance for the entire then Yugoslav state. That area was the
central part of the defence bastion and the last support for the existence of the
state in the event of an invasion.
8.3. The significance of the area at the time of the collapse of the SFR
Yugoslavia
147. Until 1989, the territory of BH was almost fully in the area of responsibility of
the then 7th Army District with a command in Sarajevo. From 1987 until the
end of 1988, the 7th Army District was dissolved and the territory of BH was
divided so that a small part (the Cazin Krajina) was assigned to the 5th Theatre
85
4D01485 Map, Military Industry of Central Bosnia.
86
4D01484 Map, Locations of JNA and TO War Units in Central Bosnia.
87
4D01491 Map, Locations of Logistics Institutes.
88
In that context, the cable communication system “Central” was built along the whole length of
the former Yugoslavia, linking Strumica in Macedonia (as the furthest south-eastern point) via Central
Bosnia with Postojna in Slovenia (as the furthest north-western point).
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of Operations with headquarters in Zagreb, and most of the territory was in the
1st Theatre of Operations with headquarters in Belgrade. In addition to most of
the territory of BH, the 1st Theatre also included the areas of Slavonia in
Croatia, Vojvodina and the northern part of Serbia, and all of Montenegro.
This is indicative of the desire of the Yugoslav General Staff to connect all
territories to which the policy of Greater Serbia aspired. The western border of
the Belgrade theatre almost fully matched the western border of the so-called
Greater Serbia.
148. Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina were the venue of the first attempts
at armed intervention against aspirations for independence and cessation from
the Yugoslav community. In March 1991, for instance, an armoured battalion
from the 325th Armoured Brigade from Banja Luka, consisting of soldiers
performing compulsory military service, was sent to Kupres. Each month,
crews were rotated from other armoured brigades. This battalion had the task
to intervene in Wetern Herzegovina or Dalmatia, or, rather, to retain the area
of the Kupres plateau until the arrival of larger operational units. After large
pro-Croatian demonstrations in Split, in which a JNA soldier was killed, the
JNA prepared for possible military intervention in BH and Dalmatia. In May
1991, for instance, an attempt by a mechanised convoy to pass from Mostar
toward Široki Brijeg failed when it was stopped by unarmed residents of the
village of Prolog. After several days, this convoy arrived in Kupres following
political intervention from Sarajevo.
149. All of these JNA activities in that area were parts of the initial rehearsals of a
scenario dating from February 1991, when the General Staff of the OS of the
SFRY adopted a new plan of defence in the event of aggression by the West,
the so-called plan S-289. The plan envisaged defence from an aggression by
NATO countries, but in reality it was a plan of engagement of JNA forces for
intervention toward Croatia and Slovenia. The plan of intervention by core
89
The plan of defence against an attack from the east (the Warsaw Pact) “S-1” was abandoned
already in 1990 as redundant. The General Staff assessed that Yugoslavia was not threatened by
aggression from the east, which was entirely justified after the perestroika in the Soviet Union and the
fall of the Berlin wall.
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JNA forces form Serbia and BH was drawn up between 1 and 3 July 1991,
after the first unsuccessful ceasefire in Slovenia. After the Brijuni meeting on
8 July 1991, the plan was abandoned, and then they modified it at the end of
July and partly implemented in mid September. Central Bosnia and almost all
of Herzegovina were now in the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps with
headquarters in Sarajevo.
150. For the area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina, the role and task of
the 37th JNA Corps was especially significant90. Its primary task in both
variants of the war plan was to defend Serbia, from the River Kolubara in the
north to Metohija in the south, the River Drina in the west to the River Ibar in
the East. In February 1991, the plan of defence from an invasion by the NATO
pact changed, the defence zone was completely altered and the 37th Corps was
assigned a zone in the basin of the River Neretva and the area of Western
Herzegovina91, which had belonged to the Sarajevo 4th Corps in earlier plans.
151. Based on that plan, at the time of the first ceasefire in the armed conflict in
Slovenia, a new plan for pacification and intervention toward Croatia and
Slovenia and the Croats in BH was drawn up in complete secrecy, with the
engagement of only the most reliable officers from corps commands, but that
plan was not completed and implemented. A new plan92 was drawn up for the
37th Corps in later July 1991 and the basic characteristics of that plan were the
following:
- After the mobilisation of these forces, the corps is to march along the
route: Kraljevo – Užice – Višegrad – Foča – Gacko – Nevesinje – Mostar.
- The main forces is to be deployed in the general area of Nevesinje in
readiness for intervention toward Mostar and Metković, while the 10th
Mechanised Brigade is to control the general area of the city of Mostar.
90
At that time, the author was corps chief of staff and concurrently deputy commander. He
received that plan from the theatre of operations command in Belgrade. He modified it critically and
adapted it to the conditions of any battlefield in Western Herzegovina.
91
4D01483 Map, JNA Plan of Intervention in Western Herzegovina and Dalmatia.
92
The author managed the elaboration of this plan as the chief of staff of the 37th Corps
immediately before his departure from the JNA.
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- The Corps’s task was to prevent the capture of the city of Mostar and to
retain roads leading to the coast and not allow the then still united Croatian
and Bosniak forces to capture the left bank of the River Neretva from
Jablanica to the sea, and to isolated Croatian forces in the general
Dubrovnik area.
152. The plan was partly implemented in September 1991, but the units from Serbia
soon withdrew to Serbia93. They implemented this plan later with units of the
former (Rijeka) 13th Corps and the (Titograd) 2nd Corps. Reservists from
Eastern Herzegovina and the western part of Montenegro were recruited into
the units.
153. From all of the plans of engagement of the 37th Corps in Central Bosnia and
Northern Herzegovina, a conclusion can be drawn that the JNA military
leadership planned an armed intervention against the Croats in Dalmatia and
Western Herzegovina. This is confirmed by some indications and viewpoints:
- Marching the entire forces of a corps through Central Bosnia to the Kupres
plateau had the aim of intimidating the Croats in Central Bosnia and
encouraging the Serbs and Muslims in Eastern Bosnia and Northern
Herzegovina.
- Deploying main corps forces on the Kupres plateau ensured unhindered
stay and training of units surrounded by a population of mostly Serbian
and Muslim ethnicity.
- There are good roads leading from the Kupres plateau toward Split,
toward Imotski and on to Makarska, toward Ljubuški and on to Metković,
toward Posušje and on to Mostar, and it is possible to intervene rapidly in
Central Dalmatia.
- Deploying logistics units would secure facilities of the military industry in
Bugojno, Travnik and Novi Travnik.
- The corps reserve the strength of a combat group from the area of Donji
Vakuf could intervene quickly toward Travnik and the Lašva valley, or via
93
At the end of September 1991, reservists from an artillery regiment from Valjevo (about 700)
embarked on trailer vehicles, left the artillery pieces and small arms and went to their homes in Serbia.
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Makljen toward the middle course of the River Neretva, in the direction of
Jablanica and on to Mostar.
- The inexistence of defence zones, failure to carry out fortification work
and prepare positions before the beginning of an invasion, as well as the
absence of support by theatre artillery and air forces at the time of an
invasion and the lack of engagement of the forces of the Territorial
Defence, which was then manned mostly by Croats, indicates that that plan
was actually a plan for an intervention toward disobedient Croats in
Central Dalmatia and Western Herzegovina and a plan to intimidate Croats
in Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina.
154. According to the author’s personal knowledge, after the end of the armed
conflict in Slovenia and Croatia, JNA units from these two republics mostly
withdrew to the area of BH94.
155. Therefore, on the eve of the collapse of Yugoslavia, the area of Central Bosnia
and Northern Herzegovina was a kind of staging ground for intervention
toward Central Dalmatia and Western Herzegovina. The intervention was
supposed to be carried out by units mostly made up of Serbs from Serbia and
Eastern Herzegovina, and partly also Montenegrins and some reliable Muslims
from Eastern Herzegovina. In addition to intervention against the Croats, the
engagement of the JNA 37th Corps from Serbia was also supposed to have an
effect in intimidating Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and encouraging
Serbs in large towns in Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina. One of the
goals was also to ensure the unhindered work of the military industry in that
area and unhindered traffic in the interior of Yugoslavia toward the central part
of the Adriatic Sea. One goal was also ultimately to protect the defensive
bastion from the south, which was later shown to be the defence of areas
inhabited by Serbs or areas of special interest for Serbs in BH.
94
These units consisted exclusively of officers of Serbian, Montenegrin and Muslim ethnicity,
because officers of Slovenian, Croatian and Albanian ethnicity mostly left the JNA during the armed
conflict in Slovenia. Soldiers performing compulsory military service were mostly sent home or
transferred to continue serving in their republics. They managed to withdraw a small part of their
weapons and equipment. Only when they arrived in BH were these units partially filled by reserve
soldiers of Serbian ethnicity from BH. These units were not a significant military force.
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8.4. The significance of that area in the initial period of the war from mid-
1992 to late 1993
156. After World War II, the former Yugoslavia located significant facilities for the
production of weapons and military equipment in the territory of Central
Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina. Before the start of the war in BH, those
facilities were equipped with modern machines and a large number of first-
class experts were employed in them. The majority of those companies had
their own development departments.
157. The following table gives an overview of military industry facilities in Central
Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina95
1. Name Location Products Employees

2. Slavko Rodić Bugojno Artillery and mortar fuses 3,450
Hand grenades
Mines and obstacles
Artillery detonator caps
3. Borac Travnik Uniforms, boots and other personal
equipment for soldiers
4. Electrical repair Travnik Repair of communications
depot equipment and other electronic
equipment and circuits
5. Bratstvo Nov 60-120 mm mortars 1,450
Travnik 90-155 mm artillery weapons
128-260 mm multiple rocket
launchers
Various hydraulics
6. Slobodan Vitez Nitro-glycerine and rocket 780
Princip Seljo gunpowder
95
Data on the military industry were obtained from the Dr. Aleksandar STAMATOVIĆ’s book
“The Military Economy of the Second Yugoslavia (1945-1991), published by VIZ /Military Publishing
House/, Belgrade, 2001. A. STAMATOVIĆ was a JNA general and assistant federal secretary of
defence for the military economic sector, and after retirement full professor at Belgrade Univesrity.
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Explosives
7. Steel plant Zenica Special cast metals
8. Pretis Vogošća Artillery ammunition 4,700
Rockets
Air bombs
Light mobile anti-armour weapons
9. Zrak Sarajevo Binoculars, sights, distance meters 2,150
Optical and electronic circuits for
artillery guidance systems and
Oganj /multiple rocket system 128
mm M-77/ control systems
10. Bosnalijek Sarajevo Medicines and other expendable
medical supplies for military needs
Medical equipment
11. Famos Hrasnica Tracked armoured vehicles 1,200
Special transmissions for tanks and
heavy vehicles
12. Igman Konjic Ammunition for light infantry 1,350
weapons of all calibres from 4.5 to
14.5 mm
13. Maintenance Hadžići Repair of KoV /ground forces/ 700
and repair depot technical equipment (infantry and
artillery weapons, armoured and
tracked vehicles, motor vehicles,
communications equipment)
Production of spare parts for
machines and motor vehicles
14. Soko Mostar G-4, Kraguj and Orao combat 2,630
aircraft
Gazela light helicopter
15. Repair depot for Koran Repair of engineering equipment
engineering (Pale) and devices
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equipment
16. Orao Aircraft Rajlovac Repair of propeller and jet aircraft
Depot Production of jet engines
17. Energoinvest Sarajevo Medical kits
IRCA
158. In the second half of the seventies, many smaller industrial companies were
built in BH to support the special purposes military industry. Small plants
were built in almost every municipal seat or large town. These companies
were built by three large industrial complexes in BH. The most important one
was Energoinvest, which integrated companies for the production of machines
and other equipment for energy facilities. Its production plants were mostly
located around Sarajevo and in the Posavina. In the Herzegovina area, Soko
from Mostar was such an industrial giant with many factories from Posušje to
Trebinje. The military industry was mostly integrated into the UNIS (United
Special Purposes Industry Sarajevo) system, based in Sarajevo. The
production sites of UNIS were located in Central Bosnia as small plants or
branches of larger factories of the special purposes military industry.
159. During the collapse of Yugoslavia, the JNA managed to transfer a significant
number of personnel (of Serbian ethnicity and JNA officers with a technical
education) and production equipment to safe places in Serbia or BH territory
under Serbian control (Republika Srpska). For instance, the Orao Aircraft
Repair Depot in Rajlovac near Sarajevo was first transferred to Bijeljina
(Republika Srpska) and then to Pančevo (Serbia). However, employees of
Bosniak and Croatian ethnicity mostly stayed in places near factory locations
and joined the political movements of their peoples. At the same time, many
machines and equipment for production, raw material and semi-finished
products, even unfinished products, especially heavy weapons, remained in
special purposes industry plants.
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160. During their creation (1992-1993), the armed formations of the Bosniaks and
Croats in BH procured weapons, ammunition and other military equipment in
three primary ways:
a) From the Republic of Croatia, which supplied equipment, weapons and
ammunition to the HVO and the ABH, and assisted in other ways in the
creation and combat activities of those armed formations.
b) By procurement through illegal channels, because a UN arms embargo was
in force for all states of the former Yugoslavia, and transportation through
Slovenia and Croatia.
c) By collecting equipment and weapons from depots, factories and JNA
installations, which the JNA did not manage to transfer to territory
controlled by the Serbs when it withdrew.
d) Through own production of ammunition, weapons and explosives in the
special purposes industry plants that were taken over.
e) By improvised production in small-business workshops.
161. The Bosniak and Croatian sides also tried to start their own production of
weapons and ammunition. The significance attributed to military production
by the Bosniak side can already be observed in key documents from a military
workshop of the commanders and senior officers of the Patriotic League96 on 7
and 8 February 1992 in the village of Mehurići on the periphery of the Lašva
valley near Travnik. The basis for the discussion was a document entitled
“Tasks of the RVŠ /regional military staffs/”, which was drawn up in late 1991
by one of the initiators of the Patriotic League, and later Chief of the Main
Staff of the BH Army, Sefer HALILOVIĆ, which he sent then to all staffs in
the field. That document stated the following97:
96
The Patriotic League is the embryo of the subsequent BH Army. It was in fact the military
organisation of the Bosniac people and was formed and organsised mostly by former JNA active-duty
officers of Muslim ethnicity. At the time of forming and the above-mentioned workshop, it was outside
of the Territorial Defence, which at that time was the only military organisation of the Republic of BH
(the JNA was a Yugoslav military organisation, and territorial defences were organised in the republics
of the former Yugoslavia).
97
3D 02648 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 164 and 165 (e-court
pages BCS 68-69 and ET 49-50).
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“6. Pay special attention in the briefing to the special purposes

military industry and type of production, and explain our positions and
plan.
7. State the possibilities of small enterprises for the production of
establishment and make-shift equipment (hand grenades, mines, etc.),
along with the appropriate documentation.
8. Possibilities for storing and safekeeping large quantities of weapons
and MES /mines and explosives/98.”
162. The “Directive for the defence of sovereignty” was also adopted at that
workshop, and item 4 of it stated the following99:
“…With select forces, fast and vigorous raids, capture JA /Yugoslav
Army/ ammunition, MES and weapon warehouses and depots, seal off
barracks… Keep main forces in Central Bosnia and auxiliary forces
in the Cazin-Prijedor and Tuzla regions (underlined by M.G.).”
163. Implementing this Directive the Bosniak side started production for military
purposes in three phases. The first phase included production of auxiliary
equipment, repair of captured weapons and the construction and production of
makeshift ammunition and explosives and weapons, or as HALILOVIĆ
writes100:
“Throughout the Bosnian state, homemade weapons production
started in a hundred places. Nobody asks from what and how: every
idea became reality overnight. At time of war, everything is more than
welcome, especially when we are isolated on two sides – by two
aggressors.”
164. The second phase already was organised production in factories where general
consumption products used to be made earlier101.
98
MES – mines and explosives.
99
3D 02648 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 168 (e-court pages BCS
70 and ET 53).
100
4D01488 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94
101
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“So military factories appeared where there have never been any – in
Bihać, Travnik, Zenica, Tuzla, Tešanj and other towns, even in
Srebrenica… A brigade of the Centre for Special Purposes Production
was formed in Sarajevo … in which they gathered an impressive
number of military experts.”
165. The third phase of production began at the end of October 1992 when a sector
for special purposes production was formed at the Ministry of the Economy
and Energy. This production was organised completely on the basis of the
earlier production, especially in Central Bosnia102.
“Until then we produced hand grenades, rifle grenades, incendiary
materials and the things that military factories in Konjic, Goražde,
Bugojno, Travnik, Novi Travnik and Zrak in Sarajevo could already
make.”
166. S. HALILOVIĆ again indicates the scale of this somewhat makeshift

production103:
“In the first year and a half of the war alone (from April 1992 to
October 1993 – note by M.G.), about 25,000 mortar shells and other
artillery rounds, and more than 200,000 hand grenades and rifle
grenades, were produced in occupied Sarajevo.”
167. After the withdrawal of the JNA from BH territory under the control of
Muslims and Croats in April and May 1992104, BH Army forces captured the
102
103
104
The Supreme Command adopted a decision to withdraw JNA units from BH on 4 May with a
deadline until 19 May 1992. In practice, the 2nd Amy had already started to withdraw from BH territory
in April by disassembling the military industry and redeploying depots and war reserves, but the real
withdrawal of units started in May when paramilitary forces of the Muslims committed grave crimes in
Sarajevo and Tuzla. The JNA handed over the majority of weapons, equipment and other materiel to
the newly-created army of Republika Srpska /RS/. Almost all JNA members (soldiers, non-
commissioned officers, officers and civilians serving in the JNA) who originated from BH also joined
the RS Army. In practice, the JNA did not even withdraw from BH, but only retreated from areas under
the control of the Muslims and Croats. Many JNA units which had withdrawn earlier from the
territories of Slovenia and Croatia to BH and were manned by reserve personnel of Serbian ethnicity
were just renamed as units of the RS Army. Some units of the POdgorica Corps remained in the area of
Eastern Herzegovina until December 1992.
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most significant plants of the military industry in BH. The Bosniaks captured
the Zrak and Bosnalijek special purposes production factories in Sarajevo,
Famos in Hrasnica, Slavko Rodić in Bugojno, Borac and the Repair and
Maintenance Depot in Travnik and Bratstvo in Novi Travnik. The infantry
ammunition factory in Konjic was fully in the hands of the BH Army and it
worked continuously in practice. The factory in Goražde produced nitro-
glycerine explosive, different kinds of detonating caps and small-calibre
ammunition. The heavy weapons factory in Novi Travnik was especially
important. It was captured by the ABH and the HVO together in the first days
of the war and they found significant numbers of unfinished artillery weapons
there.
168. The Slobodan Princip – Seljo explosives factory in Vitez and the completely
empty factory halls of the Soko aircraft factory in Mostar remained in HVO
hands. Only the factory in Vitez continued production, but it was not possible
to organised the production of airfcraft, because the Yugoslav authorities took
apart and transferred to Serbia most of the machined and semi-finished goods.
169. According to pre-war assessments of the military industry, the Muslims kept
facilities and equipment worth 1,844,300,000 USD105.One should add to this
the value of the facilities of the Orao aircraft repair and maintenance depot in
Rajlovac near Sarajevo, from which the JNA transferred the equipment and
semi-finished goods to RS territory and on to Serbia. The Croats managed to
keep military industry plants worth 713,900,000 USD, because the value of the
Soko aircraft factory was completely negligible considering that the JNA left
behind empty factory halls.
170. Production was possible to the extent that supplies of semi-finished goods and
energy were available. In November 1992, the Muslim side started to produce
artillery shells, but the main problem was a shortage of explosives (underlined
by M.G). Over 200,000 pieces of various types of artillery ammunition were
105
“Military Industrial Complex of the SFRY”, S. KOVAČEV, Z. MATIJAŠČIĆ, J. PETROVIĆ,
Polemos 9, Zagreb, UDK /Universal Decimal Classification/: 355.1(497.1):338:341.2.
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waiting for explosives106, which is even many more shells than requested in a
request dated 7 April 1993107. The following claim presented by the Chief of
the Main Staff of the BH Army, S. HALILOVIĆ, at a military workshop on 21
and 22 August 1993108 is indicative of the goals of the Muslims in the early
spring of that year:
“If we are to get the military industry working properly we have to
resolve two issues: capture the explosives factory in Vitez as a matter
of urgency, and plan and carry out an operation to capture Žunovica,
a significant depot for raw materials and, of course, ammunition.109”
171. The Supreme Command Staff (earlier the Main Staff of the BH Army)
requested support almost every day from the BH Presidency and Government
in procuring semi-finished goods, especially explosives, to continue
manufacturing ammunition. On 5 February 1993, for instance, it proposed the
following110:
“Provide the BH Army with the necessary quantities of ammunition,
medicines, medical supplies and food as soon as possible. This presupposes
the opening up of corridors through Herzegovina and Central Bosnia
under the control of the HVO (underlined by M.G.).”
172. On 2 March 1993, the Supreme Command Staff sent the RBH Government
and the Ministry of Defence a report on the critical situation with regard to
armed combat111:
“the units do not possess the necessary number of assets for POB /anti-
armour combat/, infantry ammunition of 7.9 mm, 7.62 mm and 5.54 mm
106
107
1D 01062 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 212 and 213 (e-court
pages BCS 46-47 and ET 46-47).
108
73 and ET 70).
109
Žunovica is a place near Hadžići where a complex of JNA depots was located and where
ammunition and explosives were mostly stored. The Serbs held the general area of Hadžići and these
depots.
110
1D 01062 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 196 (e-court pages
BCS 30 and ET 31).
111
BCS 31 and ET 32).
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calibres, and 120-155 mm calibre artillery ammunition. The current reserves

have been reduced to 0.5 of a b/k /combat set/...
Conclusion: the situation with regard to ammunition supplies for the BH
Army is critical.”
173. One month later, on 7 April 1993, the Supreme Command Staff again
submitted a request to the RBH Presidency and Government for the
procurement of materiel and technical equipment, in which it requested112:
“The amounts of ammunition for infantry weapons have been
calculated for 3 b/k /combat sets/, as follows:
4. 7.62 x 39 mm round 78,000,000 pieces
28. Shell for 122 mm howitzer 1,500 pieces
31. 100 mm tank shell 13,000 pieces”
174. At a RBH Presidency session held on 25 march 1993, the Chief of the
Supreme Command Staff, S. HALILOVIĆ, entered into a fierce verbal duel
with Presidency member KONJICIJA, when he reprimanded the Presidency
using sharp language113:
“And, provide ammunition, we’ll return everything in three days…
…the last minimal quantity of ammunition came to us on 15 November
1992…
…you, as the state, haven’t provided anything…”
175. Several days later, S. HALILOVIĆ proposed the following at a RBH

Presidency session on 10 March 1993114:
“6. Make sure that the port of Ploče and the Ploče – Mostar –
Sarajevo – Zenica road are in continuous operation for the needs of
the state of BH. If necessary, engage international forces for this, and
also use our own forces as necessary to secure that area.”
112
1D 01062 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 212 and 213(e-
court pages BCS 46-47 and ET 46-47)
113
4D01490 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 197, page 156.
114
3D02648 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 151 (e-court pages
BCS 65 and ET 45).
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176. At almost the same time, President of the RBH Presidency Alija
IZETBEGOVIĆ stated on Sarajevo TV 115:
“We managed to get hold of 30,000 rifles and machine guns, 20
million bullets, 37,000 mines, 46,000 anti-armour rockets, 20,000 hand
grenades, 90,000 military uniforms and 120,000 pairs of boots.”
177. Such a claim is certainly in collision with the request of the Supreme
Command Staff to ensure b/k /combat sets/ of ammunition. The Bosniaks
certainly did not manage to consume that much ammunition in twenty days or
so. A. IZETBEGOVIĆ’s statement probably had political and propaganda
significance in the sense of intimidating the opposing side and forcing
negotiations, or, rather, opening supply routes, especially the Croatian /side/.
The Bosniaks probably did smuggle significant amounts of ammunition,
weapons and military equipment in spite of heightened controls of transports
and cargo. Sefer HALILOVIĆ writes about that:116
“The group in the Main Staff (later VK /Supreme Command/ Staff) led
by Mirza PINJO and Raif DŽIGALO worked out a way to bring raw
materials to BH: we already had enormous experience – for months we
had been sending ammunition from Visoko in oxygen bottles, and later,
when that was discovered, we transferred weapons, ammunition and
raw materials through Chetnik territory in humanitarian aid
containers.”
178. It is also interesting that the Bosniaks purchased ammunition from their
opponents. S. HALILOVIĆ says117:
“At the same time, we bought a small amount of weapons and about a
million and a half bullets from the Chetniks and Ustasha…
…That happened at the end of April 1993.”
115
P08632 Lord David OWEN book: Balkan Odyssey, page 127(e-court pages BCS
162 and ET 83)
116
117
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179. The former Chief of Staff of the 5th Corps, Ramiz DURAKOVIĆ, told the
author in April 1994, during a private visit to Ljubljana, how he had personally
packed ammunition in flour sacks and food containers in Zagreb and that they
were later sent to the surrounded Cazin Krajina as humanitarian aid.
180. Another senior BH Army commander, M. ALAGIĆ, who commanded the

Bosnian Krajina Operations Group, which was deployed in the Lašva valley,
wrote118:
“The black market was flourishing – there was both ammunition and
food there…
…I made the decision to trade with the Chetniks in the area of
Meokrnje 119…”
181. The Muslims succeeded in spite of great difficulties to obtain in the spring of
1993 certain amounts of ammunition for light weapons, but most probably did
not manage to obtain large amounts of artillery shells. At the same time, over
25,000 artillery shells were finished, but had not explosive and gunpowder
charges. That material could only be obtained at the Slobodan Princip – Seljo
factory in Vitez, which was under HVO control.
182. The Bosniak leadership did not have a united position on the creation of
conditions for the work of its own military industry. This is confirmed by the
response of Deputy Minister of Defence Hasan ČENGIĆ to the Chief of the
Main Staff of the ABH, Sefer HALILOVIĆ, when he insisted on own
production of ammunition:120
“What you are doing is not worth it. It is much cheaper to buy
ammunition and weapons abroad than to produce it in Bosnia. ”
118
3D02638 N. LATIĆ and Z. ISAKOVIĆ, “The War in Central Bosnia, War Memoirs
of General Alagić”, BEMUST, Zenica, 1997, page 32(e-court pages BCS 15, ET 8)
119
Meokrnje is a mountain about 20 kilometres north-east of Travnik, then on the front line
separating Muslim and Serbian forces. It is located on a forest road which connected Travnik and Kotor
Varoš at the time.
120
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183. The fact that the Bosniak side had a significant number of military industry
experts is also confirmed by the fact that already in 1993 they sent a large
group to Iran, where they organised and led the refurbishment and
modernisation of 1,200 Iranian T-55 tanks of Soviet make to Western
standards. In addition to BH (personnel from the Hadžići repair and
maintenance depot), Slovenia (Bregana repair and maintenance depot and
Iskra – Fotona from Ljubljana) and Serbia (Čačak repair and maintenance
depot) also took part in this large and profitable job121. Then Deputy Minister
of Defence in the RBH Government Hasan ČENGIĆ is mentioned in this job.
184. The following conclusions can be drawn from the above:

- The BH Army did not have enough ammunition for all types of weapons,
especially infantry and mortar /weapons/.
- The central logistics support system of the BH Army was not effective.
- Due to a shortage of raw materials and semi-finished goods, especially
explosives for artillery shells and nitro-glycerine gunpowder, production
of ammunition for the needs of the BH Army was not possible in the
captured installations and plants of the military industry.
- Supply routes from Croatia, leading through Northern Herzegovina and
Central Bosnia, were controlled by the HVO, which favoured the central
Bosniak political authorities, which could portray themselves as victims
who cannot arm themselves to the international public.
- The absence of regular supplies of ammunition diminished the combat
capabilities of the BH Army.
8.5. Routes and traffic during 1992 and 1993122
185. The most significant routes leading from the Pannonian Plain to the Adriatic
Sea, or, rather, from Central Europe to the eastern and western parts of the
Balkan Peninsula and further on to Asia cross in the area of Central Bosnia
121
4D01493 “NACIONAL”, Headline: Americans want to prevent modernization of 1200
Russian tanks T-55 which Bosniak's engineers are repairing in Iran, 13 November 1996
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and Northern Herzegovina. All of these routes cross in the area of Central
Bosnia.
186. The administrative route Banja Luka – Jajce – Bugojno – Gornji Vakuf –
Prozor – Jablanica – Mostar (number 1) follows the valley of the River
Vrbas via the Makljen mountain pass and continued along the valley of the
River Rama and the River Neretva. Due to shelling by the Army of Republika
Srpska, traffic on part of the Jablanica – Mostar main road was not unsafe, so
it was redirected near Prozor to the route Rumboci village – Orašac village –
Lipa – Tomislavgrad – Livno – Croatia. Small vehicles could also use the
alternative route Jablanica – Sovići – Blidinje – Posušje. The section of the
Prozor – Orašac – Lipa road across Mount Vran was built by HVO
construction units in the autumn of 1992. A section of the Banja Luka – Jajce
– Donji Vakuf road was under continuous control of the Serbian army, and the
remaining parts of the road were controlled by the Croats and Muslims.
187. The administrative route Žepče – Zenica – Vitez – Novi Travnik – Bugojno
– Gornji Vakuf – Prozor – Rumboci – Orašac – Lipa – Tomislavgrad –
Croatia was dubbed the “road of salvation”. This route includes the earlier
mentioned route which was controlled by the Croats and Muslims (from
Bugjno via Livno to Croatia). There was also a shorter alterative route for the
section from Novi Travnik to Gornji Vakuf, which was a narrow dirt road for
the most part, but was often used. There was also a side road on the Novi
Travnik – Gornji Vakuf section, which led via the Rostovo plateau and
mountain pass (1,025 m), which was paved from the direction of Novi
Travnik, but was a narrow dirt road between Rostovo and Gornji Vakuf. In the
second half of 1992, the BH Army had a training centre for sabotage units in
tourist facilities on Rostovo.
188. The administrative route Doboj – Zenica – Kakanj – Visoko – Sarajevo –

Tarčin – Ivan Sedlo – Konjic – Jablanica – Mostar – Metković (in Croatia)
follows the valley of the River Bosna via the Sarajevo valley, the valley of the
122
4D01482 Map, Roads of the traffic Muslim and Croats during the war 1992-1993
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River Zujevina across Ivan Sedlo and from Konjic further on along the valley
of the River Neretva, and neat Jablanica it merges with route 1. Along this
route, as well as route 1, there is a good-quality road with a paved surface
about 7-8 m wide. Due to the blockade of Sarajevo, this route was redirected
on the Visoko - Kiseljak – Kreševo – Tarčin section. The Kreševo – Tarčin
section is an upgraded forest road. Since the Serbs controlled the area of Doboj
and the area around Sarajevo, the Muslims and Croats used the route Zenica-
Kakanj-Visoko-Kiseljak-Kreševo-Tarčin-Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar-Metković.
189. A new road corridor Kakanj – Vareš – Rijeka – Ribnica – Busovača –

Tuzla was established as an extension on the above-mentioned administrative
route. Most of the route follows forest road, traffic was difficult, especially in
wintertime, but that was the only supply route for the population in the Tuzla
region and the southern parts of the Posavina.
190. Between Kiseljak and Jablanica there was a road; Kiseljak – Fojnica –
Dusina – Neretvica – Ostrožac, on which traffic was limited because of a
narrow, metalled surface and narrow canyons of the small rivers Gvozdanka
and Neretvica. That road was mostly under the control of the BH Army,
especially when the Bosniaks captured Fojnica in June 1993 and expelled the
Croats from the Dusina area.
191. The lateral road Travnik – Lašva – Kakanj – Vareš, and the bypass road
Busovača – Kiseljak – Visoko – Podlugovo – Breza – Vareš, were the main
roads in central Bosnia from west to east. The route was controlled alternately
by the ABH and the HVO. After incidents on that route in the autumn of 1992,
the ABH and HVO openly clashed in the second half of 1993.
192. Since the Komar mountain pass was continuously in the hands of the RS
Army, communication between the Uskoplje valley and the Lašva valley was
possible using the Bugojno – Novi Travnik road, which was under the control
of Bosniak forces all the time.
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193. Traffic on all roads in Central Bosnia and Norther Herzegovina was very
difficult for all sides in the conflict, especially the Bosniak and Croatian sides.
For the Bosniaks, opening the roads toward Herzegovina was of crucial
importance and they had to open them using all means available, even at the
cost of armed conflict with the Croats. The Croats of Central Bosnia and the
Tuzla region would probably have been some kind of hostages with regard to
the Repubic of Croatia and the HZ-HB /Croatian Community of Herceg-
Bosna/. This can be understood from the words of the Commander of the
Bosnian Krajina OG /Operations Group/, M. ALAGIĆ, whose area of
responsibility included the Lašva valley when he prepared the operation to
capture Vitez and expel the Croats from Central Bosnia123:
“I for one was bothered by the question: what to do with civilians if we
enter Vitez? Create conditions for surrender, or make it possible for
them to move south-west, that was the second dilemma. And the third
option was to keep them encircled and put pressure on them so that
supplies for us from Croatia would not stop entirely (underlined by
M.G.). In view of the overall situation, we opted for this latter
assessment, and instead of liberating Vitez, we left it to serve as a
strategic valve in order to supply other parts of Bosnia (underlined by
M.G.).”
194. It was also very important for the Croats to open internal routes. In that
context, it was necessary to break the blockades and remove checkpoints near
Kačuni and Bilalovac, and on Rostovo. The blockade of traffic cut regular
supplies and communication between the individual parts of the Croatian
enclave in Central Bosnia, and also regular supplies from the rear in
Herzegovina in order to link up the Croats in the areas of Kreševo, Dusina and
Kiseljak with the area of Busovača and then with the area of Vitez – Novi
Travnik, and after that with Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf. This road was also
significant for supplying HVO units defending Bugojno and for the manoeuvre
of reserves, or, rather, mobile forces toward endangered Croatian villages in
123
3D02638 N. LATIĆ and Z. ISAKOVIĆ, “The War in Central Bosnia, War Memoirs
of General Alagić”, BEMUST, Zenica, 1997, page 26 (e-court pages BCS 12, ET 7).
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the Lašva-Lepenica valley.
195. There was no political will at the highest levels on both sides to establish
communication by means of negotiations and cooperation. The Supreme
Command Staff of the BH Army sent a request to the RBH Presidency on 5
February 1993 for vigorous engagement in order to resolve the complex
military situation, with an almost imperative and blackmailing request to124:
“...Provide the BH Army with the necessary quantities of ammunition,
medicines, medial supplies and food as soon as possible. This
presupposes the opening up of corridors through Herzegovina and
Central Bosnia under the control of the HVO (underlined by M.G.).
If these steps are taken, the BH Army will be provided with more
favourable means to defend and extend the free territory (underlined
by M.G.). Otherwise, the BH Army will not be responsible for possible
negative consequences.”
196. On 2 March 1993, the Supreme Command Staff of the BH Army sent a report
to the BH Government and Ministry of Defence on the critical situation in the
conduct of armed combat in which it accused all organs of the authorities for
possible failure and the defeat of BH Army units125:
“It is the work and the responsibility of the R BH Ministry of Defence
and Government organs to obtain and supply weapons and military
equipment to R BH Army Logistics Centre.
The fact is that there are not sufficient assets in the R BH Army
Logistics Centre to conduct the armed struggle, and we have no
information about what the Ministry of Defence and the R BH
Government have done with regard to this matter, and that the success
of the armed struggle depends on the weapons and ammunition
available. It is obvious that R BH Ministry of Defence and
124
30 and ET 31).
125
BCS 31 and ET 32).
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Government organs will bear full responsibility for any lack of

success in the struggle with the aggressor (underlined by M.G.).”
197. On 10 March 1993, the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, S.

HALILOVIĆ, presented the following proposal at a joint session of the
Presidency, Government and parliamentary parties126:
“4. With the Republic of Croatia, at the political stage, finally settle
the most important issue – logistics for the needs of the RBH, or,
rather, the armed forces.
5. At the international stage, encourage all friendly countries to put
pressure on the Republic of Croatia to abandon its support for
‘Herceg-Bosna’ and work actively to abolish it.
6. Make sure that the port of Ploče and the Ploče – Mostar – Sarajevo
– Zenica road are in continuous operation for the needs of the state of
BH. If necessary, engage international forces for this, and also use our
own forces as necessary to secure that area.”
198. Further in his presentation, S. HALILOVIĆ, warned those present127:

“…since requests for your more active engagement that we have
submitted to the Government and the Presidency have not yet appeared
on the agenda, let me remind you briefly of them, and ask you yet
again to take them into consideration as soon as possible… However,
it is our opinion that the Presidency and the Government, and
municipal authorities, are not reacting in an organised and sufficiently
vigorous manner to the current, very complex situation on the
battlefield and the problems appearing in organised resistance to the
aggressor against the RBH, which may lead to negative consequences
of unforeseen proportions (underlined by M.G.).”
199. The following conclusions can be drawn:
126
3D02648 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 151 (e-court pages
BCS 65 and ET 45).
127
4D01489 S. HALILOVIĆ, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 152.
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- The main roads were completely cut because they were physically
occupied and controlled by the RS Army.
- Some roads were exposed to occasional artillery fire of the RS Army,
especially the Novi Travnik – Bugojno and Čapljina – Mostar – Jablanica
roads.
- Partial control of individual sections of main roads by the BH Army and
the HVO caused frequent traffic interruptions lasting several days and
frequent negotiations with UNPROFOR mediation were required to enable
traffic.
- Setting up of checkpoints at important intersections by members of the BH
Army and the HVO caused much tension and serious incidents which often
grew into armed clashes128.
- Traffic in the winter of 1992/1993 was especially problematic because of
deep snow.
- Both sides were preparing to use arms and armed force against each other
in order to open up roads and establish traffic and supplies for their armies
and population.
8.6. Conclusion
200. In view of the economic and traffic significance of Central Bosnia and
Northern Herzegovina, it would be justified for the BH Army from a military
point of view to:
(i) Secure full control of the Konjic area, which is exceptionally important
because of the following circumstances:
1) It is in Sarajevo’s rear and thus exceptionally important for preparing
and carrying out any military operation to liberate Sarajevo.
2) Due to the vicinity of Sarajevo, the military infrastructure from the
time of Yugoslavia and roads, the Konjic area was the most
128
4D01479 UNHCR humanitarian convoys had to negotiate their way through 90
roadblocks to get from Zagreb to Sarajevo. www.unhcr.ba/publications/state_refugees_bih.pdf
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favourable location for the military command leading combat

operations.
3) Konjic was the most important communication point on the Sarajevo
– Jablanica – Mostar – Adriatic Sea route.
4) Konjic was the location of the IGMAN factory, which produced
ammunition for light infantry weapons.
(ii) Capture Vitez and use the exceptionally important explosives factory in
that town to arm itself.
(iii) Establish full control over town in which important facilities of the
military industry were located – Bugojno, Travnik and Novi Travnik.
(iv) Establish full control over the route leading from Central Bosnia via
Jablanica and Mostar to the Adriatic Sea and thus ensure conditions for
receiving continuous and unhindered supplies.
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9. WAS MOSTAR BESIEGED?
201. I was asked whether East Mostar could be considered to have been besieged
after 30 June 1993 from a military point of view if (a) an area of 50 km on the
left bank of the Neretva (a part north of East Mostar and a part south East
Mostar) was under the control of the BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Army129
and (b) if there was a route between Jablanica and East Mostar (though it was
a mountain trail for several kilometres), over which BH Army units in East
Mostar and surrounding areas received aid and over which weapons and
ammunition arrived for the BH Army, and the civilian population could leave
toward Jablanica.
202. The above-mentioned assumptions (a) and (b) are confirmed by the following
documents:
(i) Report of the Supreme Command Staff of the OS /Armed Forces/ of
BH on combat operations in the territory of the RBH /Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina/ for a period of 24 hours on 30 June 1993,
stating that the BH Army “captured the following important
strongholds: North Camp, Raštane, Vrapčiće, Bijelo Polje, Salakovac i
Rošci. Among other things we have under our control all HE /hydro-
electric powerplants/ on the Neretva river except HE Čapljina. /…/
According to the report of the Command of the 4th Corps, the units of
this Corps linked up with the units of the 6th Corps and that will have
the positive influence on the further combat activities.”130 (Remark by
M.G. – the Mostar area is in the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps
of the ABH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, and the area of
Jablanica and Konjic is in the area of responsibility of the 6th Corps).
129
Shown in documents 4D00625, IC01005, IC01006.
130
2D 01389 Report of the Supreme Command Staff of the OS of BH on combat
operations in the territory of the RBH for a period of 24 hours on 30 June 1993, no. 02/1-182 of 1 July
1993.
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(ii) Order of the ABH Commander Rasim DELIĆ of 27 July 1993 to send
Namik DŽANKOVIĆ to the territory in the areas of responsibility of
the 4th and 6th Corps131.
(iii) UNPROFOR press release of 21 August 1993 stating that the ABH
Commander in Mostar, Sulejman BUDAKOVIĆ, stated that he would
agree to a ceasefire, but that the corridor to Jablanica must be
retained132.
(iv) [Redacted]133.
(v) Order of the Deputy Commander of the Supreme Command Staffa of
the OS of the RBH, Stjepan ŠIBER, of 4 September 1993, with an
introductory assessment that “the extreme wing of the HVO /Croatian
Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/” are ready for an offensive
on the Prozor – Jablanica axis, and that the Mostar – Jablanica –
Sarajevo road would be blocked as a result134.
(vi) Order of the Chief of the Main Staff of the Supreme Command of the
ABH, Sefer HALILOVIĆ, of 6 September 1993, which mentions the
engagement of the Zulfikar reconnaissance and sabotage brigade “on
the Vrdi village – Goranci village axis toward Mostar”, and the
commander of that unit is ordered to regulate how and when to release
water from the lake of the Salakovac HE /hydro-electric power plant/
together with the director of the hydro-electric power plant135.
(vii) Document of the Commander of the ABH 4th Corps, Arif PAŠALIĆ,
of 7 September 1993, which states that one or two companies of the 7th
Muslim Brigade of the 3rd Corps of the RBH Army should be sent as
131
4D 00768 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the 4th and 6th Corps Command, ref:1/297-
72, Sarajevo, 27 July 1993.
132
P 03858 UNPROFOR Operational updates and press releases for the period 16 Aug
93 to 22 Aug 93.
133
[Redacted]
134
4D 00780 Signed and stamped order issued by Stjepan Siber to the 6th Corps
Command, re: measures for stabilization of defence, ref: 02/1075-1, Sarajevo, 04 September 1993.
135
3D 00939 Command issued by Sefer Halilović, 6 September 1993.
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agreed to the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps, therefore the

Mostar area136.
(viii) A report of the Chief of Staff of the ABH 4th Corps of 14 October 1993
on the situation in the area of responsibility of Operations Group
North-1 contains information on military units and their positions north
of East Mostar. Among other things, it states “a big problem for the OG
/Operations Group/ Command is the transport of civilians and others
marching north and south”, and that “there are big problems with the
transport of the wounded and other things for the town”. “There is a big
problem with bread supplies for this unit since firewood for the bakery
has to be transported to Mostar, and bread from Mostar to Bijelo Polje,
while at the same time there is a bakery in Vrapčići that could start
operating after minor reparations,” states the report. A large part of the
report is dedicated to the issue of competence over the transport
platoon used for transporting goods on the mountain section of the
Mostar – Jablanica road, and it mentions that “when petroleum is
transported, it drips on horses, causing large wounds and knocking
them out of action”.137
(ix) Order to attack of the commander of the Zulfikar brigade, Ališpaga
Zulfikar, of 11 September 1993, with the assessment that “the
aggressor forces, including parts of the HVO and HV” have received
the task to “capture HE on the Neretva River.”138.
(x) Order of the Commander of the ABH Supreme Command Staff, Rasim
DELIĆ, of 12 September 1993 mentioning combat operations in the
direction of Prozor and Mostar139.
(xi) Proposal for combat operations on the front from Gornji Vakuf to
Mostar, drawn up on 20 September 1993, by a team consisting of Sefer
136
3D 00932 EXHIBIT FROM HALILOVIC, REPLY/REPORT SIGNED BY
ARIF PASALIC, No. 838-06 of 7 September 1993.
137
4D 00179 Signed and stamped report issued by Esad Ramic, re: situation found during
inspection of responsibility zone of Operational Group 'NORTH-1', ref: 03-81/93, 14 October 1993.
138
3D 02155 HAL-1-208, ORDER TO ATTACK ISSUED BY ALISPAGO ZULFIKAR,
OPERATION DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS VRDI 93.
139
4D 01113 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the Chief of Supreme Command Staff and to
the Commander of the 6th Corps Command, re: reexamine the decision regarding planned combat
actions towards Prozor and Mostar, ref: 01/47-245, 12 September 1993.
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HALILOVIĆ, Vehbija KARIĆ, Rifat BILAJAC and Zićro

140
SULJEVIĆ .
(xii) Reply by the Chief of the GS ABH /Main Staff of the Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina/, Sefer HALILOVIĆ, to Commander Rasim DELIĆ
to his question of 25 September 1993 (with regard to a telegram by Arif
PAŠALIĆ), stating among other things that “I sent 4 orders – even
appeals for a helicopter to come to transport the seriously wounded and
one company to the region of Bijelo Polje.” and that after HALILOVIĆ
and DELIĆ intervened “a company of 150 men was transported to
Bijelo Polje to help Mostar.”141.
(xiii) Order of the Commander of the ABH 4th Corps, Arif PAŠALIĆ, of 25
September 1993, which shows that the areas north and south of East
Mostar are under the control of ABH units, that the eastern part of that
whole area is under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska (“the
Chetniks”) and that the HVO (“the Ustasha”) control the western part
of that area142.
(xiv) [Redacted]143.
(xv) Order of the Commander of the ABH 4th Corps, Sulejman
BUDAKOVIĆ, of 19 December 1993, which presents in the
140
3D 00737 HAL-1-203, EXHIBIT FROM HALILOVIC CASE, REPORT OF THE
INSPECTION TEAM, HALILOVIC, KARICBILAJAC, SULJEVIC, 20 September 1993.
141
4D 00798 Telegram with explanation to Arif Pasalic and Rasim Delic issued by Sefer
Halilovic, re: document no. 337 of 25 September 1993.
142
4D 00711 Order issued by Arif Pasalic, re: reorganization for the purpose of forming
the Operative Groups for conducting combat activities, ref:03-09/93, 25 September 1993.
143
[Redacted]
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introduction intelligence on HVO preparations for an attack on

Drežnica with the goal of cutting the Mostar – Jablanica route144.
(xvi) Extract from a book by Esad ŠEJTANIĆ “Herzegovinians on the Fiery
Gateway of Bosnia” in which this ABH commander in Mostar states:
“The situation in the town and its surroundings was getting worse.
Hunger was raging all around. What little food came to Mostar from
Jablanica via Glogovo was parcelled out, and a large number of people
wanted to leave again for Jablanica and further on for Bosnia. Using
repressive measures, regrettably, we prevented the exodus of the
population and reduced all movement to the minimum.”145
(xvii) SPABAT report of 19 July 1993, stating that the Metković UNHCR
cancelled all humanitarian aid convoys because the HVO insisted on
being informed of the percentage of aid allocated to the population of
each party in the conflict146.
203. To explain a possible siege of Mostar by the HVO it is necessary to determine

the basic characteristics of a modern military siege. In doing that, we will
apply the rules of engagement in urban areas according to the principles of the
US military, which are essentially no different than the general principles of
other modern armies.
204. Definition of a siege147: A siege is a term which indicates a military operation

to capture a city or any other place by surrounding it and blocking
communication and supplies, which may, or may not be accompanied by
artillery attacks and bombardment. The aim is to force the enemy to surrender
or his authorities to make political concessions. The purpose of a siege may
also be to tie up enemy forces and thus prevent their engagement on other
axes, and to protect own forces on other axes.
144
4D 00720 Signed and stamped order issued by Sulejman Budakovic, re: taking
measures for combat readiness, ref: 03-641, 19 December 1993.
145
4D 00545 Excerpt from the book Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia,
Esad Sejtanic, June 2005.
146
P 03547 UNPROFOR HQ BH Kiseljak daily infsum for 19 July 1993.
147
To surround a city or enemy army, cutting off supplies, in order to force surrender.
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205. The basic principle of a siege or blockade is complete isolation of surrounded

enemy forces from other own forces outside, which means that the attacker
controls and prevents all contact with forces outside the blockade. In modern
military theory, an isolation can be:
− Physical – by capturing a firm ring around surrounded enemy forces,
artillery and air fire in the event of a shortage of forces or inaccessibility of
part of the ring, and continuous and persistent control of the blockaded
area and surrounding areas.
− Electronic – by offensive information operations in the form of intensive
jamming of electronic means of communication, electronic media (TV,
radio, telephone, the Internet), and intensive monitoring of enemy
electronic equipment.
− Psychological – with the activities of civilian affairs, combat operations,
electronic operations, especially deceit and propaganda and psychological
operations aimed at the morale of individuals and entire surrounded units,
as well as the hostile population inside and outside the surrounded area,
with simultaneous encouragement of inhabitants who support the attacker.
206. It is also necessary to bear in mind many facts about a possible siege of East
Mostar by the HVO. The degree of physical blockade of East Mostar can be
determined through several facts:
- The city of East Mostar was not blockaded, because the entire area on
the left bank of the River Neretva north and south of the city was under
the control of the BH Army, with a total length of 50 km (from
Jablanica to Buna).
- Podveležje, or, rather, the area east of East Mostar was under the
control of the Army of Republika Srpska.
- The HVO controlled the area west of BH Army positions.
These undisputable facts confirm that East Mostar was not surrounded by
HVO units, or, rather, the HVO did not physically block East Mostar.
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207. Supply of combat materiel (weapons, ammunition) was not cut, so the BH
Army not only held positions at the line of disengagement established already
in April 1993, but also carried out large-scale combat operations.
208. Supplying food for the numerous population (residents and refugees) was
difficult. Owing to the possibility to produce food in areas north and south of
East Mostar, food deliveries from the direction of Jablanica and the activities
of humanitarian organisations, East Mostar was not left without food. A long
interruption in supplies by the UNHCR and international organisations lasted
about a month and a half in the summer of 1993.
209. According to claims by the city water works, water supply was accessible also
to the population of East Mostar through several improvised pipes with a
reduced capacity. The reduction in water supply was caused by combat
operations by both sides, the old age of the water supply network and
equipment and reduced amounts at sources due to high summer temperatures
and the lack of precipitation148.
210. East Mostar also had power supply because hydroelectric power plants on the
Neretva produced power exclusively for the needs of the Muslims, and the
power lines toward Mostar followed the left bank of the Neretva. It is visible
in some documents mentioned in paragraph 203 that the hydroelectric power
plants were controlled by the BH Army.
211. With regard to radio and television programmes, the situation did not change
compared to 1992, when the Army of Republika Srpska destroyed the repeater
on Velež and thus prevented reception of the broadcast of Radio-Television
148
3D00723 Report on the situation with regard to water supply in the period 1992-1994,
Vodovod /Water Works/ d.o.o. /Limited Liability Company/
P02611 Stamped request re: Solution of water supply system on the left bank of the
city of Mostar, addressed to United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and THW, signed by Arif Pasalic. Ref: 01-11/93
1D01569 Report on the problems re: damaged pipeline at Studenac water spring
1D01567 Report on the problems in the water supply in the city of Mostar
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Sarajevo, although radio programmes could be received on medium waves.

Local media founded by the Muslim authorities operated without hindrance.149
212. Stationary cable telephone lines were interrupted because bridges on the River
Bijela and Neretva near Aleksin Han were destroyed. ABH commands had
satellite mobile communications.150 The 4th Corps command also
communicated with the Supreme Command Staff without difficulties caused
by the HVO.151
213. Although both sides used propaganda to achieve their goals, one could not say
that the HVO applied measures of psychological isolation, which would be
directed both toward BH Army members and the population.
214. A conclusion can be drawn from the above-mentioned facts that the eastern
part of Mostar was not besieged in the sense of modern military theory:
- The city of East Mostar had free communication with a larger area north
and south of the city.
− The Muslims had an open route toward their side in the centre of BH.
− There was no armed threat to the Muslims from Podveležje in the east,
because that part of the front was held by the Serbs who had stopped
armed operations against the Muslims.
− Supply of combat materiel was difficult, but not impossible.
− Supply of the population of East Mostar became more difficult, but was
not completely cut.
149
2D00448 Arif Pasalic speech on the War radio BiH on June 30th. 1993 at 11.00
150
3D01836 IL-2-387, REQUEST SENT BY SALIM SABIC TO MR.
HADZIOSMANOVIC RE:STELLITE PHONE INSTALLED IN THE OFFICES OF THE MOSTAR
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE SDA
151
3D02591 R68-3-191, SPECIAL REPORT FROM 21 SEPTEMBER 1993 BY
APOLLO ON ZUKA AND ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC CONVERSATION
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10. POSITION WHERE A STATE IS ATTACKED OR

THREATENED FROM THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER
STATE?
215. I was asked whether from the military point of view the Republic of Croatia
had the right to send its military units to the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to defend its territory from the JNA and later the Army of
Republika Srpska, which attacked Dubrovnik and other towns on the Croatian
coast from the BH territory.152
216. Article 51 of the UN Charter states that each state has the inherent right to self-
defence, until the Security Council has taken other effective measures to
defuse the conflict or deter and end aggression. None of the resolutions of the
Security Council with regard to wars in the former Yugoslavia referred to the
concrete case of armed operations in Southern Croatia – the general area of
Dubrovnik and South-Eastern Herzegovina. Pursuant to the UN Charter
Croatia had the inherent right to self-defence in the event of an attack by
forces of the then FRY /Federal Republic Yugoslavia/ on its territory and to
resist the occupation of that area, the destruction of towns (Čepikuće, Cavtat,
Dubrovnik) and the expulsion of the non-Serbian population (Croats and
Muslims).
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
152
Such action by the HV is mentioned, among other places, in document 4D01240: Directive of
the Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the RBH of 10 September 1992.
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action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore

international peace and security.
217. The Washington Treaty, which is the legal basis for NATO envisages the
possibility of collective defence in the event of an attack against one of the
members, as stated in Article 5:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them
all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall
be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
218. In modern practice after World War II, this provision was often invoked for
the purposes of military intervention against many countries which did not
attack any NATO pact member, but did threaten the political, economic or
military interests of a member, usually the USA as the leading member,
through their political activities or the use of their armed forces. Military
interventions were carried out outside the territories of member states, that is,
outside of the territory defined in Article 7. That was the case in the wars in
Croatia (bombardment of the Udbina airfield in 1994), the war in BH
(bombardment of VRS installations and personnel in BH in 1995), and the war
in the FRY (air attacks on Serbia in 1999).
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219. Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia prescribes that the
armed forces protect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of
Croatia and defend its territorial integrity.153
220. Every state has the right to defend itself from attacks against its territory and
its populations. That right to self-defence includes the elimination of the
sources of attack operations. If weapons and military units carrying out the
attack are in the territory of another state, the attacked state has the right to
launch an attack on the area in which the enemy army is located.
221. The general area of Dubrovnik, from the Neretva delta to Prevlaka, was
attacked by the Yugoslav Army, whose units were manned by reservists from
Montenegro and Eastern Herzegovina, and partly also from Serbia (37th Užice
Corps). The starting line for those forces was the territory of the Republic of
BH under the control of Republika Srpska (the general area in the rear of
Popovo Polje and Nevesinjsko Polje). Although the persecution of the Muslim
and Croatian population started already before the arrival of Yugoslav Army
units, large-scale persecution of that population started with their arrival.
Immediately upon arrival, these forces of the FRY carried out an armed attack
against the hinterland of Dubrovnik.
222. The constitutional obligation of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and inherent

right to self-defence pursuant to international laws of war were the legal basis
for the offensive by Croatian forces from inside its state territory. When the
invading forces were expelled from the territory of the RH, the threat to the
state was not yet removed. The principles of warfare prescribe that as long as
that threat remains the enemy must be pursued until he is destroyed or
capitulates or until a political agreement in the form of a ceasefire is reached.
That pursuit also continued in the territory of the RBH. Entering RBH territory
was also necessary for HV units from the point of view of the tactical and
operational position needed for effective defence of the liberated area in the
rear of Dubrovnik. Stopping the HV at the borders of Croatia would have hurt
153
1D 02912 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 22 December 1990.
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the interests of Croatia (shallow defence) and the interests of the RBH – the
Croatian and Muslim peoples in Herzegovina who were in direct danger in
Mostar and the lower course of the Neretva River.
223. The HV had the duty and inherent right to expel the invading forces of the
FRY from its territory and prevent any new attack by entering the territory of
the neighbouring BH. An attack on the forces of the VRS was entirely justified
because those forces were allied to the forces of the Yugoslav Army and
allowed them to set up bases in its territory.
224. From a military point of view, combat operations by the HV in South-Eastern

Herzegovina were entirely justified and necessary.
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11. MILITARY MEANING OF THE BCS TERMS

“ASANACIJA” AND “ČIŠĆENJE” OF THE TERRAIN
225. I was asked to explain the meaning of the terms “asanacija” and “čišćenje” the
terrain, which are mentioned in numerous documents of the HVO and BH
Army.154
226. Clearing up (“asanacija”) the battlefield are organised measures for the
removal of the remains of dead members of the armies of both sides and
civilians, dead domestic and wild animals, biological waste and other possible
sources of contagious diseases on the battlefield and in inhabited areas155.
227. The term clearing up the battlefield is unique to Yugoslav military terminology
and other armies do not know it as such, but almost all modern armies carry
out these measures and engage logistics organs for that purpose.
228. In general, special units are assigned to clear up the battlefield and are merged
into teams or detachments. These temporary units are formed by the
commander whose unit is carrying out combat operations in an area. In the
event of high-intensity combat operations, when military units have a high
pace of movement, special units which establish a military territorial command
can also take over clearing up of the battlefield, and specialised or ad hoc
groups of members of the territorial component of the army and civilian
protection units are engaged.
229. Groups or detachments for clearing up the battlefield are made up of medical
organs (military or civilian) in order to determine the cause of death,
veterinary organs in order to determine the cause of death of domestic or wild
animals and any contagious animal diseases, personnel organs in order to
identify the dead, an engineering unit with earth digging equipment in order to
154
For instance, in document 4D01240: Directive of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces of the RBH of 10 September 1992, clearing up of the battlefield is mentioned.
155
Military Encyclopaedia – 2nd edition , volume I, page 2666, Belgrade, 1970.
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dig mass graves, priests belonging to the religions of the majority of the dead
and a physical work force.
230. Clearing up of the terrain is always carried out after combat operations. If
members of the military unit located in the area in which clearing up should be
done have to be engaged on a combat task, civilian protection units can carry
out the clearing up.
231. Cleanup (“čišćenje”) of the terrain is a term which means a detailed check
of the battlefield before combat, during combat and after combat, and it
includes a detailed check of the area of responsibility and the removal of
natural and man-made features and items which could significantly affect
combat or the stay of units in the area of responsibility. Cleanup of the terrain
is a broader term than the term clearing up the terrain, where the latter term is
just one, but the most important part.
232. Before combat cleanup of the terrain includes a detailed check, removal of
low-growth vegetation and trees in front of the forward defence line of each
unit and the removal of any obstacles on the axes of movement, retreat and
counterattack. Sources of potable water are thoroughly checked and cleaned,
or marked with signs forbidding use. Before combat, mopping up of the terrain
is generally carried out by units organising defence.
233. Cleanup up the terrain after combat is the task of the unit which occupies an
area by capturing it in combat, arriving after combat or on special orders.
Cleanup up the terrain after combat can be carried out be military units, units
of military territorial commands and civilian protection units. In general,
combined teams or detachments are formed consisting of engineering units
with the appropriate construction machines and special kits, NBC /nuclear-
biological-chemical/ protection units, specialised teams from civilian
infrastructure institutions (power supply, water works, telephone, etc.) and
labour.
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234. Cleanup up after combat includes: clearing and removing rubble, essential
repair of roads and other infrastructure features, finding, marking and
removing unexploded explosive objects (artillery shells, air bombs, mines),
finding, marking and demeaning own and enemy minefields, gathering
leftover or discarded military equipment and weapons, NBC decontamination
of items, features and the ground, examining sources of potable water and
preventing overflowing from damaged pipes and reservoirs, examining and
shutting down power supply sources, examining features and equipment which
could cause subsequent damage and casualties (water reservoir dams, etc.).
The focus is on finding, marking and removing unexploded explosive objects
and minefields. This term also includes the cleaning up of the terrain of the
remaining members of enemy forces (by capturing, wounding or killing,
depending on their resistance). They can remain in the conquered territory,
because due to the dynamics of combat they have not been able to withdraw
with the main forces or have been deliberately left behind to slow down the
attacking forces by their resistance or by safeguarding of important facilities.
They might be armed and in military uniforms or individuals might get into the
civilian cloth in order to avoid capture or perform illegal activities. This aspect
of the military concept of cleanup (“čišćenje”) of the terrain is also known
under the English term of “mop up” or “mopping up” operations.
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12. RESUBORDINATION: MEANING AND DIFFICULTIES
235. I was asked to explain the meaning of the term “resubordination” and the types
of resubordination.
236. Military units are generally organised and formed in such a way that they can
perform most combat tasks independently without reinforcement by other
units. However, modern combat abounds in specifics with respect to the
diversity of enemies (weapons, equipment, capabilities), features of the terrain
(mountains, forests, karst, towns) and weather conditions (winter, summer,
precipitation). Combat disposition also depends on the concrete combat task,
which may require special reinforcements and combat support forces.
237. Combining different units into a special purpose unit for the performance of a
specific combat task generally starts at battalion level, and exceptionally at
company level. This combining can also take the form of attachment or
reinforcement or the formation of a special combat group in the form of a
combat (BG), tactical (TG) or operational group (OG). The basis for forming
temporary units is an organic unit – for a BG it is a battalion or company, for a
TG regiment or brigade and for an OG a brigade or division.
238. Reinforcements or attached units are parts of the organic composition of

another unit of the same level or the organic composition of units which are
directly subordinated to a higher-level unit. These units are separate from the
unit which is the basis for the combined unit. This kind of relationship is called
resubordination in Yugoslav military terminology. In US military
terminology, this merging for the execution of a concrete combat task is called
a task force.
239. Resubordination can be defined as subordination of a lower-level unit from the

organic composition of another unit of the same or higher level to the
command of the unit which is the main force in the execution of a concrete
combat task.
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240. Resubordination is generally limited with regard to combat task (the execution
of an entire combat task or one part or phase), time (for the execution of a
concrete combat task or during other non-combat activities or until revocation)
and place (as a direct part or at a separate location).
241. With regard to a combat task, resubordination of an armoured unit to an

infantry unit as the main force in a task can take place for the purpose of
carrying out an attack in entirety or only for exploiting success in an attack.
With regard to time, a unit can be resubordination just for the duration of
defence or during retreat and withdrawal and the assumption of new defensive
positions. Resubordination can also end after revocation by the superior
command. The resubordinated unit can carry out combat operations as a direct
component of a higher-level unit to which it is resubordinated or operate on a
separate axis or even behind enemy lines. With regard to the status of
command, a unit can be resubordinated fully or just from a disciplinary or
logistics point of view, etc.
242. Resubordination is ordered by the commander of the superior unit both with
regard to the receiving unit and the unit providing the resubordinated unit. He
informs both of subordinated commanders by means of an order, in which he
regulates precisely relations between them and the manner and time of
resubordination. The commander of the subordinate unit conveys the decision
on resubordination of the superior commander to his unit which is to be
resubordinated. He must also undertake all the measures to ensure personnel,
weapons and combat and other material in accordance with the norms, and
hand over the units in full combat readiness. On orders of the superior
commander or at the request of the commander receiving the unit, he can send
skilled officers from his command to provide help, but not to exercise
command.
243. The resubordination command defines precisely mutual relations and the
duration and manner of resubordination. The commander of the resubordinated
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unit is completely subordinated to the new commander and has the same status
and duties as units from the organic composition. The commander of the unit
receiving the resubordinated unit cannot make any differences or put too much
burden on the resubordinated unit. Likewise, the commander of resubordinated
unit cannot request special status or privileges. During resubordination,
communication with the original unit goes exclusively through the command
of the units which received the resubordinated unit. Any direct channels
without the knowledge and approval of the new commander are considered to
be serious violations of military discipline.
244. Resubordination replaces the superior commander of the resubordinated

military unit. The commander to whom the military unit is resubordinated
assumes all rights and duties of the superior commander during the
resubordination, or for a specific task in the case of partial resubordination.
245. If a member of a resubordinated military unit violates a rule of military

discipline during the resubordination, the commander of the unit or institution
to which the perpetrator is assigned at the time when his disciplinary
responsibility is determined decides on his responsibility.156
246. In condition of warfare in shifts, as was the case with all three sides in the war
in BH, units of company or battalion level were often resubordinated. Since
the personnel of these units was recruited based on the territorial principle
from one municipality or a smaller area, and were resubordinated to the
command of a unit from a completely different area, serious violations of the
relationship of resubordination occurred. The combat readiness of
156
Article 20 of the Rules of Military Discipline of the HZHB /Croatian Community of Herceg-
Bosna/ (P 00293), for instance, prescribes the following:
“Establishing liability for a disciplinary error committed in a previous military unit or military
institution, (hereafter called unit, i. e. institution) shall fall within the competence of the commander of
the unit or institution in which the offender finds himself at the time disciplinary liability is decided.
The officer who, in compliance with paragraph 1 of this Article, pronounced a disciplinary
measure shall inform the commander of the offender's previous unit, i. e. institution.”
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resubordinated units was not known to the new command and they were given
larger and more demanding tasks than they were capable of.
247. Resubordination is a complex military action and should be avoided for this
reason. It is especially complex if new temporary units from several higher-
level units are created by resubordination and a new temporary command is
formed. Resubordination or the formation of battalion-level combat groups
should generally be carried out from units of the same brigade or regiment.
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13. “OPERATIONS AND TRAINING”
248. In an interview published in HRVATSKI VOJNIK /Croatian Soldier/, no. 10

of 24 April 1992, then RH President Dr. Franjo TUðMAN stated: “… the
Main Staff was only part of the Ministry of Defence for operations and
training just like, for example, the IPD /information and propaganda service/,
the military police, the counter-intelligence service, etc. They all form part of
the Ministry as a whole. In a democratic society, such as we have today in
Croatia, the Minister of Defence is accountable for the forming of the armed
forces on the whole to the Government, to the Assembly and to the President
of the Republic”.157 I was asked to explain the term “operations and training”.
249. Every unit from battalion level and higher has its staff. The composition and
number of employed officers depends on the size of the unit. Within every
staff there is an operations officer or operations department or operations
section depending on the size of the units. Within the staff the operations
organ is generally the largest one and is the pillar of command. In the US
Army, this organ is called the coordinating staff group. In all armies this group
is the commander’s most significant organ of support in decision making and
implementation and command and control of the unit. It is directly
subordinated to the chief of staff. This organ generally performs two types of
the most important staff activities – training and planning of combat actions
(operations and plans). It is also responsible for force development and
modernization, staff planning and supervision and coordination of staff
responsibility for the special staff officers. In the JNA staff organisation
these latter functions were covered by the term operations, while the function
of training was called training affairs.
250. Operations affairs in the narrow sense of the word include the preparation,
planning, coordination, monitoring and analysis of combat operations. A
157
4D01330 HRVATSKI VOJNIK no. 10 of 24 April 1992, interview with Dr Franjo
TUðMAN
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broader description of these activities includes the following actions and

procedures:
− Preparation, coordination, verification, creation and submission of plans
and commands and other orders for all staff sections.
− Planning, coordination and supervision of exercises.
− Participation in the selection of targets (targeting).
− Examination of the plans of subordinate units.
− Coordination of combat operations with other staffs.
− Examination of the entire plan and order for the purpose full coordination
and completion.
− Observation of combat operations.
− Ensuring conditions for combat support.
− Coordination of the use of the unit for establishing civilian authorities.
− Coordination with the intelligence organ in the preparation of attachments
on reconnaissance, the selection of priorities for intelligence operations
and recommendation on the use of technical equipment.
− Integration of fire support in overall combat operations.
− Planning of unit movement: selection of axes of movements, selection of
priorities, allocation of rest and preparation of orders for movement.
− Planning and allocation of disposable time.
− Planning, assigning and selection of locations for delivery and temporary
storage of ammunition.
− Forecasting of possible losses in manpower and weapons and proposing
measures for prevention and replenishment.
− Cooperation with the intelligence organ and the organ for coordination of
fire support in the execution of the plan of combat operations and
proposing amendments to the initial plan.
− Proposing command locations.
− Proposing combat dispositions and grouping of forces and resubordination.
251. Training affairs include the planning, organisation and implementation of the
training of soldiers, officers, commands and units in entirety:
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− Creation of plans and programmes of training in commands and units.

− Preparation and supervision of the execution of training in subordinate
units.
− Preparation of training instructions and manuals.
− Planning, preparation, organisation and execution of demonstration and
other exercises for commanding officers and commands.
− Participation in the formation and training of special units and units for the
execution of concrete combat tasks.
− Coordination in the planning and execution of training with other organs in
the staff and with subordinate commands.
− Creation of favourable conditions for training – planning of materiel and
construction of training installations.
− Organisation and management of internal forms of training – school,
courses, etc.
− Planning and execution of the supervision of training, examination and
assessment.
− Maintaining the combat readiness of each subordinate unit.
− Maintaining records of training and reporting to superior commands.
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14. “STAFF SERVICES” FOR THE NEEDS OF THE SUPREME

COMMANDER
252. The Decree on the Armed Forces of the HZHB prescribed that for the purposes
of performing staff and other specialised services for the needs of the HZHB
Presidency, a Main Staff would be formed in the Defence Department.158 I was
asked to explain the term “staff and other specialised services”.
253. In peacetime the general staff is a specialised organ of the ministry of defence,
and through it also the supreme commander, for the preparation of the armed
forces and other state organs and institutions which have a role in the armed
defence of the country, while the relationship in wartime is rather different in
some countries. In states with a parliamentary democracy with a prominent
role for the executive branch and a minor role for the president, the general
staff is directly subordinated to the ministry of defence and communicates with
the supreme commander through the minister or with his approval. In states
where the president of the state is the dominant power holder and also the head
of the executive branch that relationship is more direct – the president can and
is allowed to communicate with the general staff directly with the assistance of
the ministry of defence. In autocratic states the general staff is directly
subordinated to the president as the supreme commander.
254. In the SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/, the general staff
was a specialised operational organ of the ministry of defence, which was also
the supreme defence staff and was directly subordinated to the supreme
commander, that is, the SFRY Presidency as the holder of sovereignty. In
wartime the government had no direct powers over the ministry of defence and
the general staff.
255. In peacetime the general staff carries out operational and planning activities
for the needs of the supreme commander in the area of development,
158
4D 00521 Decree on the Armed Forces of the HZHB, 17 October 1992.
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preparation and use of the armed forces, in accordance with the military and
political goals of the country.
256. In wartime most general staffs become supreme command staffs and as such:
− Monitor and analyse the situation on battlefields and in theatres of
operations.
− Prepare and implement decisions (plans, orders, directives and
instructions) for the conduct of operations and combat operations.
− Supervise the implementation of directives of the supreme commander.
− Analyse and generalise war and combat experiences and observations in
the domain of war doctrine, organisation, command, and the use and
operations of combat arms and services of the armed forces.
− Prepare proposals and coordinate replenishment in the event of losses, and
the introduction of new weapons and equipment.
257. In all armies the general staff does not have the authority to directly command
operational and strategic or operational units. The supreme command may
delegate its authority to the general staff for certain less significant tasks.
258. The tasks of almost all main staffs (general staffs) in almost all states are equal
and cover activities in peacetime and wartime.
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15. MILITARY OPERATIONS AT THE STRATEGIC,

OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL
259. I was asked to explain the meaning of the term “military operation” and to
explain the difference between military operations at the strategic, operational
and tactical level.
260. In the vocabulary of the US Department of Defence, an operation is a military

action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training,
or administrative military mission. There is also another definition – an
operation is the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply,
attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or
campaign.
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational,
tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.
The process of carrying on combat, including movement,
supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of
any battle or campaign
261. According to the JNA military encyclopaedia, an operation as a combat

activity covers the totality of parallel (simultaneous) and consecutive actions,
which are carried out in a coordinated and organised way, according to a
single idea and plan, in a single area and during a specific timeframe in order
to achieve operational or strategic goals.
262. According to US interpretations the term operation indicates any military

activity regardless of the goal, type of forces carrying it out and level of
command. According to the Yugoslav interpretation the term operation
indicates military action by joint forces in a large area over a long time period
and at the strategic or operational level of command. At the tactical level of
command, military activities are called engagements or battles.
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263. Bearing in mind that officers in the armies and wars in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia completed military schools mostly in the JNA, the terms
operations at the strategic and operational level will be explained in further
text.
264. An operation at the operational level is a set of engagements and battles of a

number of joint tactical units (regiments, brigades, divisions), supported by
tactical units (regiments, brigades) of the air force or navy (in coastal areas),
artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and rocket units, engineers and other army
branches. This operation is carried out over a period of 4-10 day or
exceptionally over a longer period in 2-3 phases. With regard to area, it is
organised and carried out in a limited part of state territory and depending on
the size of the engaged forces and type of operation (attack or defensive) it can
cover an area of 100 – 500 km2. Battles and combat can sometimes also be
waged in separate areas, at different times by individual tactical units, but
pursuant to a single idea and single goal. Such operations are carried out by
reinforced establishment task forces (a corps or an army) or temporarily
formed units in the form of operations groups (1-3 divisions or 3-5 brigades)
when a special command is formed only for the purpose of command in a
specific operation. The operations zone covers the areas where own and enemy
forces are staying, while enemy forces can be at the joint tactical or
operational level.
265. In the war in BH an example of an operation at the operational level is

Operation Neretva-93 carried out by the BH Army in the area of Northern
Herzegovina.
266. A strategic operation is a set of operations at the operational level and battles
carried out by operational-strategic formations pursuant to a single idea of the
supreme command and with the goal of achieving a decisive outcome in a
particular phase of a war. These operations are carried out by armies or groups
of armies of the ground forces and can be supported by operational air force
formations (1-2 divisions of combat aircraft, 1-2 regiments of fighter aircraft,
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up to a PZO /anti-aircraft defence/ division), corps /as printed/ and navies in

coastal areas (1-2 TG /tactical groups/ of combat ships. 1-2 marine infantry
brigades).
267. A strategic operation lasts longer, from one to several months, and covers a
significant part of the battlefield or state territory, and even the territory of the
enemy state or a state allowing the attacker to use its territory as the starting
line for waging war.
268. A strategic operation proceeds in several phases, where 1-2 phases are made
up of 1-3 operational level operations.
269. The great powers and large armies can carry out strategic operations in which
only the air force carries out combat operations (NATO attack on the FRY in
1999) or the navy, or a joint force with minimal participation by ground forces.
270. At the tactical level, combat operations are called battles, which are carried
out by joint tactical units (brigade, division, reinforced tactical group) pursuant
to a single idea over a short period of time lasting 2-3 days. A battle can be
independent or part of a phase of an operation at the operational level.
271. In the war in BH, an example of a strategic operation is the liberation of the
south-eastern part of BH in 1995 with the participation of the joint forces of
the 5th and 7th Corps of the BH Army, the three HVO guards brigade and three
guards brigades and part of the forces of the Split Operations Zone of the
Croatian Army. The operation was carried out in two operations at the
operational level – Operation Maestral and Operation Južni potez.
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16. ACTIVE, PERSISTENT AND DECISIVE DEFENCE
272. In documents of the HVO and BH Army, the following terms are often used:
active, persistent and decisive defence, so I was asked to explain these terms.
273. Defence159 is a form of battle operation in which a combination of fire, active

operations and skilful use of the terrain and effective manoeuvre is employed
to crush, repel, halt or slow down an enemy attack. Defence may have the
following goals:
− Inflicting losses on a superior enemy.
− Halting, slowing down or completely stopping an attacking enemy.
− Defending certain features and sectors.
− Gaining time.
− Protecting own forces from excessive losses.
274. Defence can have different degrees of persistence, tenacity and mobility, and
can be more or less decisive, or more or less delaying.
275. The US Army manual defines defensive operations as follows160:

(Army forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Defensive operations defeat an
enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive
operations. Alone, defensive operations normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is
to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative.
Although offensive operations are usually required to achieve decisive results, it is often
necessary, even advisable at times, to defend. Commanders defend to buy time, hold terrain,
facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy, or erode enemy resources).
276. According to US viewpoints, defence may be mobile (mobile defence), where

the defender must achieve higher mobility than the enemy and defeats him by
fire and manoeuvre of strong forces. For this type of defence it is typical that
small parts are in positional defence (dug in and fortified), but that the bulk of
the forces are made up of mobile forces ready for a counterattack with strong
159
Military encyclopedia, volume 6, page 251c, Belgrade 1973.
160
4D01481 Article from GlobalSecurity.org, re: Defensive Operations,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch8.htm#par3
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fire support. Defence can also be organised as area defence, where the
defender defends a certain feature or zones with varying degrees of
decisiveness. In this case the bulk of the forces are made up of generally well
fortified infantry units, while small armoured or mechanised units are intended
for launching small counterattacks. Holding on to features or zones is possible
for small periods of time or until attack forces arrive or for an orderly and
timely retreat of the main forces. Area defence may also be organised in
enemy encirclement. A special type of defence is retrograde defence, which is
carried out as a withdrawal or delay or retirement. In Yugoslav military
terminology, this type of defence is also called retreat and included two
phases – withdrawal and retirement.
277. When we compared the Yugoslav and US understating of defence we can

concluded that there are no essential differences.
278. Decisive defence implies a decision by the commander to retain certain

features or positions until the completion of the general combat task or task of
the higher-level unit at any cost with the greatest losses and in conditions of
complete encirclement. Defensive positions may not be abandoned without the
approval of the superior commander and the unit must not surrender. An
example of this kind of defence in the history of warfare is the defence of the
industrial zone of Stalingrad by the Red Army in the winter of 1942/43.
279. The terms active and persistent defence do not mark a type of defence, they
are actually the basic characteristics of defence. Any defence must be active in
the sense of taking initiative from enemy hands, and forcing the enemy to
change initial decisions and modify his attack. Activity is achieved by
counterattacks, spoiling attacks, combat operations by small forces behind
enemy lines (inserted, left behind according to plan or encircled forces),
artillery and aircraft fire, additional barriers, surprise actions (sudden retreat)
and so on. Persistence means perseverance in holding on to features, positions
or zones, which is achieved through fortification, erection of barriers, active
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operations, courage of individuals and the whole unit and psychological

warfare measures.
280. Decisive defence implies utter persistence and activity by small forces for
short periods of time and at small distances. Counterattacks are intended
mostly to reduce the burden on own forces and stretch enemy forces away
from the focal point of the attack. In decisive defence, active operations are
carried out by adjacent units and units at higher command levels.
281. In delaying defence, the focus is on activity while persistence in the sense of
holding on to features and positions is less significant. The terms active and
persistent defence, as already stated, only indicate conduct in defence, but not
the type of defence.
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ANNEX C
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MILAN GORJANC pukovnik (u mirovini)
CURRICULUM VITAE
• Roñen 15. ožujka 1943., Republika Slovenija

• Pohañao JNA Vojnu akademiju, Zapovjedno-stožernu školu, kao i Ratnu školu (škola
narodne obrane), te kratke kurseve o državnoj sigurnosti (obavezni za visoke oficire JNA i
jugoslavenske političare); uvijek uspje.
• Pješadijski oficir tijekom cijele karijere, prvo u JNA (1965- kolovoz1991), a zatim u
Slovenskoj vojsci.
• Studirao na JNA vojnoj akademiji u Beogradu (1962-1964) i Sarajevu (1964–1965);
diplomirao 1965.
• Dvije godine (1965–1967) službovao kao zapovjednik čete u vojnoj oblasti JNA u Splitu
(Knin i Benkovac - Hrvatska).
• Instruktor u JNA vojnoj akademiji u Sarajevu, BiH; podučavao taktiku na razini bataljona
(1967–1972).
• Pohañao Zapovjedno-stožernu JNA u Beogradu, Srbija (1972–1974).
• Obavještajni oficir u štabu motorizirane divizije u Postojni (1974-1975)
• Komandant JNA pješadijskog bataljona u Postojni, Slovenija (1975–1977).
• Služio kao načelnik štaba pješadijskog puka u Postojni, Slovenija (1977-1980)
• Komandant JNA pješadijskog puka u Novom Mestu, Slovenija (1980-1981)
• Komandirao motoriziranom brigadom u Ajdovščini, Slovenija (1981-1986)
• Zamjenik komandanta divizije u Postojni, Slovenija (1986–1988).
• Služio kao načelnik štaba JNA korpusa u Užicu, Srbija (1988–1991, uključujući 10-dnevni
rat u Sloveniji).
• Član Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista na federalnoj razini, kao vojni oficir (1986–
1990).
• Položio ispite i trebao biti imenovan general-majorom JNA, ali nije unaprijeñen zbog rata;
nakon toga oko sedam godina obavljao poslove ranga generala u Slovenskoj vojsci, ali je
imao samo čin pukovnika.
• Napustio JNA i vratio se u Sloveniju u kolovozu 1991.; pridružio se Slovenskoj vojsci
(najviši oficir bivše JNA u Sloveniji).
• U slovenskom Generalštabu bio načelnik za obuku i obrazovanju i neslužbeni savjetnik
slovenskog ministra obrane o pitanjima vojne doctrine (kolovoz 1991-ožujka 1993).
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• Savjetnik načelnika Centra Slovenske vojske za strateške studije o vojnoj doktrini, a kasnije
načelnik Centra (March 1993–September 1995).
• Načelnik Centra Slovenske vojske za vojnu naobrazbu; podučavao strategiju i doktrinu više
razine (1995).
• Službeno posjetio SAD 1994. i 1998.
• Studirao političke nauke u Sarajevu i Beogradu; magistrirao političke nauke na Fakultetu za
društvene nauke Sveučilišta u Ljubljani.
• Proučavao Središnju Bosnu i Sjevernu Hercegovinu: provodio obuku studenata vojne
akademije JNA na tom području; proučavao partizanske operacije u Drugom svjetskom ratu
na tom području.
• Poslije 1994. službeni komentator na TV Sloveniji i POP TV o ratu u BiH i Hrvatskoj, te
napadu NATO na Jugoslaviju, kao i o drugim ratovima u svijetu
• Umirovljen iz aktivne službe u Slovenskoj vojsci u svibnju 1999.
• Sada vojni analitičar.
• Objavio brojne članke u bivšoj Jugoslaviji (bibliografija u annexu).
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BIBLIOGRAFIJA
del o obrambi, Slovenski vojski, Natu in stanju na Balkanu
Objavljeni članki, analize in razprave:
Alternativna informativna mreža (AIM) – pokrovitelj OVSE
1. Jugoslovenski predsednik Milošević u službi Zapada?,

2. Rat je bio besmislen,
3. War gains and loosses,
4. Mnogo generala, malo vojske,
5. Slovenija i Nato, Zašto u paktove?
6. Slovenija i Nato, profesionalizacija – da ili ne?,
7. Slovenija i Nato, pare na videlo
8. Panika ili politika?,
9. Balkan syndrom, Panic or politics,
10.Marionete sa epoletama,
11.Obaveštajne službe – igračka politike,
12.Slovenija i Hrvatska, Kombi se vratio kući,
13.Intelligence agencies, A Toy of Politics,
14.Slovenija i Nato, Obostrana ljubav,
15.Teror novoga terora,
16.Osveta pobednika,
17. Slovenačka vojska,Tenk do tenka, modernizacija,
18.Slovenija za Nato, Drang nach Osten,
19.Slovenija i Nato, Pare na sunce,
20.Etničko čiščenje na slovenački način
21. Ne daj se, Vuče!
22.Izbori u Sloveniji i jugoslovenstvo
SLOVENSKA PANORAMA:
1. Avenija k miru ali slepa ulica maščevanja,
2. Čeri na poti v Nato,
3. Vsi so le grabili pristojnosti zase,
4. Nevarne pasti profesionalne vojske,
5. Nato na razpotju ali na novi poti?,
6. Nato in slovensko gospodarstvo,
7. Sofisticirano etnično čiščenje, ZDA, Evropa in Balkan,
8. Slovenija v luči obrambne politike ZDA,
9. Braniti domovino!
10.Brundanje na Vzhodu
11.Hrvaška - regionalna sila
12.Konec spopada, začetek vojne
13.Opozorila z Vzhoda
14.Razkazovanje mišic z namenom
15.Vojna na Starem kontinentu
16.Zobje in kremplji ruskega medveda
17.Država brez oblasti
18.Generali, na smetišče politike, v dir – marš!
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19.Komedija teče
20.Meje in mejaši
21.Prva eksekucija na haaškem sodišču
22.Sodna farsa se nadaljuje
23.Sonce nad temnim vilajetom
24.Zločin in kazen
25. Bog Mars prihaja na zemljo
26. Pesek v oči
27. Po vojni – mir ali prepir?
28. Podarjena svoboda
29. Poraz sveta v Iraku
30. Prevara in laž, ali politična diverzija?
31. Sramota brez sramu
32. Strele z jasnega neba
33. Alternativa Natu?
34. Besede, besede v prazno, ideja v brezno!
35. Busheva Pirova zmaga
36. Nato in slovensko gospodarstvo
37. Nato in NOB
38. Nato, politika in ljudstvo
39. Ne Natu bo drago kot žafran?
40. Rusija in Nato - » 19+1 = 19:1« ?!
41. S porazom v zmago
42. Širi, širi, kolo vilovito
43. Ves trud zaman
44. Zarečenega kruha se največ poje
45. Demokracija – da, toda za koga?
46. Generala ne bodo več preganjali!
47. Izbrisani – nadloga ali sramota za Slovenijo?
48. Janši podtaknili neresnično zgodbo
49. Neresnice iz poslančevih ust
50. Demokratično sofisticirano etnično čiščenje
51. Na križ z njim!
52. Vijuganje slovenske politike
53. Al Quaida v naših žepih
54. Bav, bav – v lavorju!
55. Denar sveta vladar
56. Depala vas – kraj brez spomina
57. Družinski mentor
58. Janševa privatna vojska
59. Kam, gospodje tovariši?
60. Kje so tiste stezice...?
61. Podalpski »kažin«
62. Policijski ples v maskah
63. Politični igrokaz – tragedija ali komedija
64. Sojenje in obsodbe
65. Velike besede na velikih plakatih
66. Dolarji in pokončna drža - končno
67. Kavboj v globalnem svetu
68. Nafta - sveta vladar
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69. Prijatelji in sovražniki

70. Slovenija v luči obrambne politike ZDA
71. Večna vojna proti terorizmu
72. ZDA in Balkan
73. Dohajanje in prehitevanje z mencanjem
74. Država brez obrambe
75. Modro razmišljanje uniformiranih glav
76. Neozdravljivo bolno vojaško zdravstvo
77. Obramba domovine s peticijo
78. Poročilo, stanje - mavrična pisanica
79. Profesionalna vojska
80. Prostovoljna rezerva nič ne stane
81. Prostovoljno služenje vojaškega roka
82. Regiment po cesti ... več ne gre.
83. S kom in čim braniti domovino
84. Slavje nekega konca
85. Slovenci kremeniti
86. Vlada bo padla!?
87. Rezervisti v tujino, naprej
88. Zlorabljena stroka za politično zavajanje ljudstva
89. Zvest bogu in domovini
DELO:
1. In kdo brani Slovenijo? SP,
2. Vegasta hiša brez načrta, SP,
3. Znanje v mikru – hrabrost v vojni, SP,
4. Žajnci na balkanskem strnišču, SP,
5. Usmili se jih, mati Slovenija
6. Z dežja pod kap
DNEVNIK:
1. Profesionalna vojska – pomanjkljivosti,
2. Generali in politika,
3. Oče vseh bomb je počil
4. Na rob ob dnevu človekovih pravic
5. Nova strategija – strma pot k zmagi, ozka steza za časten umik, drča v poraz?
6. Indijanci na Kosovu
7. Napad na Kosovo
8. Orožje za globoko prodiranje
9. Poraženci v vojni, zmagovalci v miru!
10.Pločevinasti bojevniki
11.Sunek vetra v Zalivu
12.Zavezništvo, neznanje, hlapčevstvo?!
13.Šolta pred Piranskim zalivom
14.Vojaška prisotnost ZDA na Bližnjem Vzhodu
15.Bo »Zmaga-3« poletela proti Evropi?
16.Zmagovita improvizacija
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OBRAMBA:
1. Novosti v obrambnem bojevanju slovenske vojske,
2. Protioklepni boj na ozemlju Slovenije - za napad z oklepnimi silami neugodna dežela,
3. Protioklepni boj na ozemlju Slovenije - S čim se bo "talilo" jeklo,
4. Protioklepni boj na ozemlju Slovenije - Ker tanki ne znajo leteti,
5. Obrambno povezovanje Slovenije - da ali ne?
6. Slovenija - strateško utesnjena država,
7. Vojaška ogroženost Slovenije,
Druge publikacije in časopisi:

1. Udarna moč i manevarska sposobnost partizanske brigade u borbenim dejstvima na brdsko-
planinskom zemljištu u zahvatu fronta, BILTEN GENERALŠTABA, maj 1991
2. Transportni helikopter v obrambi Slovenije, Slovenska vojska 1994
3. Cena za vstop Slovenije v NATO, analiza, Teorija in praksa, april 1994
4. Hrvaška je zavrnila UNPROFOR?, Večer 1995
5. Možnosti oboroženega ogrožanja Slovenije, razprava v DZ RS 1999
6. Kosovo – vžigalna vrvica soda s smodnikom, Razgledi, april 1999
Analize za potrebe ministrstva za obrambo:

1. Razmestitev in bojna pripravljenost enot JLA v Zahodni Srbiji, avgust 1991
2. Možni vojaški cilji ob posredovanju mednarodnih sil v BiH, 1993
3. Organizacijska struktura generalštabov nekaterih evropskih vojska, 1993
4. Primerjalna analiza vojaških zmogljivosti vojska na tleh nekdanje Jugoslavije, 1993
5. Hrvaška in UNPROFOR, januar 1995
6. Mirovna posredovanja v vojnah na tleh Jugoslavije, časovno zaporedje, junij 1993
7. Vzroki za razpad Jugoslavije, april 1994
8. Žrtve in škoda v vojnah na tleh nekdanje Jugoslavije, junij 1993
9. Prognoza razvoja vojaško-politične situacije v BiH, maj 1993
10.Vojaški cilji vojska v BiH, maj 1993
11.Prognoza razvoja vojaško-politične situacije v BiH, marec 1994
12.Prognoza razvoja vojaško-politične situacije v BiH, maj 1994
13.Razmere na bojiščih v BiH in vpliv na politične odločitve, opisna analiza, december 1994
14.Vojaški vidiki razrešitve krize v nekdanji Jugoslaviji, januar 1994
15.Vodenje in poveljevanje v obrambnih subjektih, opisna analiza odnosa subordinacije v 7
evropskih državah, junij 1993
16.Vojaška ogroženost Slovenije, april 1994
17.Sukcesija JLA, kompleksna analiza imetja, december 1992
18.Ocena ogroženosti Slovenije z vojaškimi operacijami, analiza za potrebe RUZR, maj 1995
19.Vsebinska izhodišča za oblikovanje Slovenske vojske
20.Oboroženo ogrožanje Slovenije, januar 2002
Neobjavljene analize in razprave, ki so javno predstavljene in strokovno verificirane:
1. Protivhelikopterska borba kao novi sadržaj oružane borbe

(Izpitna tema za čin generalmajorja, Užice 1991)
2. Specifičnosti napadnih dejstava agresora na strategijskoj dubini privremeno zaposednute
teritorije
3. Uporedna analiza borbenih mogućnosti alpske brigade Italije, lovačke brigade Austrije in
brdske brigade SRN na severoistočnom delu SFRJ
4. Zaključci o operativno-strategijskim problemima odbrane SFRJ
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5. Partizanska divizija v ofenzivnem bojevanju na začasno zasedenem ozemlju na področju

Slovenije,
6. Načela protipartizanskega bojevanja in okupacijski sistem morebitnega agresorja na področju
Slovenije,
7. Korpusna operacija na začasno zasedenem ozemlju na področju Slovenije, diplomska naloga
v ŠNO, 1983
8. Borbena dejstva 15. slovenačke divizije u dubljoj pozadini eprijatelja u toku završnih
operacija JA (Referat na simpoziju Završne operacije JA, Beograd, maja 1985)
9. Razlozi sukoba izmedju Muslimana i Hrvata u Središnjoj Bosni 1992-1993. ekspertiza za
Haaško sodišče, april 2000,
10.Uzroci sukoba izmedju Muslimana i Srba u periodu 1992-1995, ekspertiza za Haaško sodišče,
maj 2001
11.Majhno orožje – grožnja demokraciji – uvodni referat na regionalnem simpoziju o majhnem
orožju pod pokroviteljstvom OVSE
12.Vzroki razpada Jugoslavije, analiza
13. Akterji jugoslovanske krize – kraće biografije ključnih ličnosti (za potrebe FDV Ljubljana=
Izdelava učnih gradiv za štabno in poveljniško usposabljanje

1. Bojevanje protioklepnega odreda SV, 1992
2. Vodenje priprav za obrambo države, Vodenje in poveljevanje, Šola za častnike 1994
3. Bojno načrtovanje, Vodenje in poveljevanje, Šola za častnike 1994
4. Napadno bojevanje taktičnih enot OS Italije, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1995
5. Bojevanje motoriziranega bataljona SV, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1995
6. Obrambno bojevanje brigade SV, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1996
7. Napadno bojevanje brigade SV, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1996
8. Obrambno bojevanje oklepne taktične skupine SV - teze, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1996
9. Napadno bojevanje brigade oklepne taktične skupine - teze, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1996
10.Načela organizacije in izvedbe mirovnih operacij OZN - teze, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1996
11.Organizacija združenih taktičnih enot - teze, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1996
12.Načela napadnega bojevanja Hrvaške vojske, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1998
13.Organizacija operativnih sestav in načela vodenja operacije SV, Poveljniško-štabna šola 1988
14.Napadna operacija korpusa Hrvaške vojske
15.Napadna operacija korpusa za hitre intervence Rusije
16.Taktični znaki NATO v SV - računalniška grafika
54508
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MILAN GORJANC Colonel (Ret.)
CURRICULUM VITAE
• Born 15 March 1943, Republic of Slovenia

• Attended JNA Military Academy, Command and General Staff School, and War College,
short course on national defence (mandatory for high JNA officers and Yugoslav politicians);
always high in class.
• Infantry officer for entire career, first in JNA (1965 to August 1991) then in Slovenian Army.
• Student at JNA military academy in Belgrade (1962-1964) and Sarajevo (1964–1965);
graduated and commissioned in 1965.
• Stationed two years in JNA Split Military District (Knin and Benkovac - Croatia) as
Company Commander (1965–1967).
• Instructor at JNA military academy in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; taught tactics to
battalion level (1967–1972).
• Attended JNA Command and Staff School in Belgrade, Serbia (1972–1974).
• Intelligence officer at headquarters of the motorized division in Postojna (1974-1975)
• Commanded JNA infantry battalion in Postojna, Slovenia (1975–1977).
• Served as chief of staff Infantry regiment in Postojna, Slovenia (1977-1980)
• Commanded JNA infantry regiment in Novo Mesto, Slovenia (1980-1981)
• Commanded motorized brigade in Ajdovščina, Slovenia (1981-1986)
• Deputy division commander in Postojna, Slovenia (1986–1988).
• Served as chief of staff of JNA army corps in Užice, Serbia (1988–1991, including the 10–
day war in Slovenia).
• Member of the Central Committee of Communist Party at Federal level, as a military officer
(1986–1990).
• Took examination and should have become a JNA Major General, but not promoted because
of the war; subsequently served some seven years in positions in the Slovenian Army calling
for rank of a General but held only the rank of Colonel.
• Left JNA and returned to Slovenia in August 1991; entered Slovenian Army (highest ranking
former JNA officer in Slovenia).
• Served as Head of training and education on Slovenian General Staff and unofficial advisor
to the Slovenian MOD on military doctrine (August 1991–March 1993).
• Advisor on doctrine to Chief of the Slovenian Army Center for Strategic Studies and then
became Chief (March 1993–September 1995).
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• Head of Slovenian Army Centre of Military Schools; taught higher level strategy and
doctrine (1995).
• Official visits to the United States in 1994 and 1998
• Studied political science in Sarajevo and Belgrade; awarded MA in Political Science from
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
• Studied Central Bosnia and North Hercegovina: conducted training exercises in the area for
JNA military academy students; has studied World War II partisan operations in the region
• After 1994, official commentator on BiH and Croatian War and NATO attack on Yugoslavia
and other wars in the world on TVS (Slovenian Television) and POP TV.
• Retired from active service in the Slovenian Army in May 1999.
• Now a military analyst.
• Has published many articles in former Yugoslavia (see bibliography)
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Part on the defence, NATO, Slovenian Army and situation in the Balkans
Published articles, reviews and papers:
Alternative Information Network (AIM) – sponsored by Council of Europe
1. Yugoslav President Milosevic in the service of the West?

2. The war was meaningless
3. War gains and losses
4. Many generals, hardly any army
5. Slovenia and NATO. Why into pacts?
6. Slovenia and NATO, professionalisation – yes or no?
7. Slovenia and NATO, show the money
8. Panic or politics?
9. Balkan syndrome, panic or politics?
10. Puppets with epaulets
11. Intelligence agencies – toys of politics (in Slovenian)
12. Slovenia and Croatia, the van returned home
13. Intelligence agencies – toys of politics (in English)
14. Slovenia and NATO, mutual love
15. Terror of the new terror
16. Victor’s revenge
17. Slovenian Army, tank by tank, modernization
18. Slovenia for NATO, Drang nach Osten
19. Slovenia and NATO, show the money (in English)
20. Ethnic cleansing in Slovenian way
21. Don’t give up, Vuk!
22. Elections in Slovenia and Yugoslavhood
SLOVENSKA PANORAMA:
1. Avenue towards peace or blind alley of revenge
2. Ceri on the way to NATO
3. Everybody fought for powers
4. Danger traps of professional Army
5. NATO on the crossroad towards the new road
6. NATO and Slovenian economy
7. Sophisticated ethnic cleansing, USA, Europe and Balkan
8. Slovenia in the light of USA defence policy
9. To defend a homeland!
10. Humming from the West
11. Croatia – regional power
12. End of conflict, the begging of the war
13. Warnings from the West
14. Showing muscles with a reason
15. War in the old continent
16. Teeth and claws of the Russian bear
17. State without power
18. Generals, to the garbage of politics - forward march!
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19. Comedy is going on

20. Borders and border-guards
21. First judgement of the Tribunal in the Hague
22. Judicial farce continues
23. Sun in the kingdom of darkness
24. Crime and punishment
25. God Mars comes to Earth
26. Dust in the eyes
27. After the war – peace or conflict?
28. Freedom given in gift
29. Defeat of the World in Iraq
30. Deception and lie, or political sabotage?
31. Shame without a shame
32. Arrows from the blue sky
33. Alternative to NATO?
34. Words, empty words
35. Bush’s Pyrrhic victory
36. NATO and Slovenian economy
37. NATO and NOB
38. NATO, politics and people
39. No to NATO would be expensive as saffron
40. Russia and NATO – 19 + 1 = 19 : 1
41. Victory out of defeat
42. /can not be translated, verse from the folk poem/
43. All trouble for nothing
44. Promised bread is the most eaten bread
45. Democracy – yes, but for whom?
46. General would not be persecuted any more!
47. Erased - sorrow or shame for Slovenia
48. Untrue story passed off to Jansa
49. Lies from the mouth of parliamentarian
50. Democratic sophisticated ethnic cleansing
51. To the Cross with him!
52. Twisting of Slovenian politics
53. Al Quaida in our pockets
54. Bav, bav – in the wash basin
55. Money rele the world
56. Place without memory
57. Family mentor
58. Jansa’s private army
59. Where are you going gentlemen comrades?
60. Where are those paths …?
61. “Kazin” beneath Alps
62. Police masked ball
63. Political show – tragedy or farce?
64. Trial and judgements
65. Big words on the billboards
66. Upright posture – finally
67. Cowboys in global world
68. Oil – the ruler of the world
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69. Friends and enemies

70. Slovenia in the light of U.S. defense politics
71. Eternal war against terrorism
72. U.S. and Balkans
73. Catching up and overtaking the /mencanjem?/
74. State without defense
75. Wise thinking of uniformed head
76. Ill health of military health care
77. Defence of homeland with petition
78. Report, the state – another /pisanica?/
79. Profesional Army
80. Voluntary reserve costs nothing
81. Voluntary military service
82. Regiment on the road ... no longer the case
83. With whom and with what to defend the homeland
84. Celebration of an end
85. The Cruel Slovenians
86. The government will fall?
87. Reservists abroad, go on
88. Misused profession for political deception of people
89. Faithful to God and to the homeland
DELO /ACT/:
1. And who defends Slovenia?
2. Uneven house without a plan
3. Knowledge in Peace - Honour in War
4. /Žajnci na balkanskem strnišču/
5. Have mercy on them, the mother of Slovenia
6. With the rain under attack
DNEVNIK /JOURNAL/:
1. Professional army - a shortcomings
2. Generals and politicians
3. Father of the bomb burst
4. On the edge on Human Rights Day
5. The new strategy - the way to victory steep, narrow path of honorable
withdrawal, slide into defeat?
6. Indians in Kosovo
7. Attack on Kosovo
8. Weapons for deep penetration
9. Losers in war, victorious in peace!
10.Tin soldiers
11.Gust of wind in the Gulf
12.Alliance, ignorance, /hlapčevstvo?/
13.Solta in front of the Piran Bay
14.U.S. military presence in the Middle East
15.Will "Victory-3" fly to Europe?
16.The winning improvisation
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OBRAMBA /DEFENCE/:
1. News in defensive warfare of Slovenian Army
2. Anti-tank battle in the territory of Slovenia - Unfavorable state for an attack of
armored forces
3. Anti-tank battle in the territory of Slovenia – How to "melt" the steel
4. Anti-tank battle in the territory of Slovenia - As the tanks do not know how to
fly
5. Defense integration of Slovenia - yes or no?
6. Slovenia - strategically confined state
7. The military threat of Slovenia
Other publications and papers:

1. Alliance and manoeuvrability of the partisan brigade in combat operations in
hilly and mountainous land in the front, THE MAIN STAFF NEWSLETTER,
May 1991
2. Transport helicopter in Slovenian Defence, the Slovenian Army 1994
3. Enter Price for Slovenia in NATO, analysis, Theory in Practice, April 1994
4. Croatia has refused UNPROFOR?, 1995 Vecer /Evening/
5. The possibilities of armed threats of Slovenia, the debate in the National
Assembly RS 1999
6. Kosovo - fuses with soda powder, Razgledi /Outlook/, April 1999
Analysis for the Department of Defence:

1. Deployment and combat readiness of the Yugoslav Army units in western
Serbia, in August 1991
2. Possible military targets mediated by the international forces in BiH, 1993
3. The organizational structure of some European military headquarters, 1993
4. Comparative analysis of the military capabilities of the army on the ground of
the former Yugoslavia, 1993
5. Croatia and UNPROFOR, January 1995
6. Peace intervention in the wars on the ground of Yugoslavia, time series, June
1993
7. The reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, April 1994
8. Victims and damage in the wars in former Yugoslavia, in June 1993
9. Prognosis of the development of military-political situation in BiH, May 1993
10.Military objectives in BiH Army, May 1993
11.Prognosis of the development of military-political situation in BiH, March 1994
12.Prognosis of the development of military-political situation in BiH, May 1994
13.The situation on the battlefield in BiH and the impact on policy decisions,
descriptive analysis, December 1994
14.Military aspects of the solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia, January 1994
15.Leadership and command of the defense entities, descriptive analysis of the
relationship Subordination in 7 European countries, June 1993
16.The military threat of Slovenia, April 1994
17.JNA succession, complex analysis of assets, December 1992
18.Threat Assessment of Slovenia in military operations, analysis for the RUZR,
May 1995
19.Content platform for the creation of the Slovenian Armed Forces
20.Armed threat to Slovenia, January 2002
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Unpublished Analysis and Discussions, which have been publicly presented

and professionally verified:
1. Anti-helicopter combat as the new content of armed conflict
(Exam thesis for rank of general major, Uzice 1991)
2. Specificity of attack actions of the aggressor on the strategic depth of
temporarily occupied territory
3. A comparative analysis of combat capabilities of the Italian alpine brigade, the
Austrian hunting brigade and the SRN mountain brigade on the northeaster region
of SFRY
4. Conclusions on operational-strategic problems of SFRY defence
5. Partisan divisions in offensive warfare on the temporarily occupied territory in
Slovenia
6. Issues of antipartisan warfare and systems of potential occupying aggressors in
Slovenia
7. Corpus operation on temporarily occupied territory in Slovenia, graduation
thesis for School of National Defence, 1983
8. Combat actions of the 15th Slovenian division in deeper enemy background
during final operations of the Yugoslav Army (Report at the symposium for final
operation of YA, Beograd, May 1985)
9. Explanations for the Muslim-Croat conflict in Central Bosnia 1992-1993,
expert report for ICTY, April 2000
10. Reasons for the conflict between Muslims and Serbs in the period 1992-1995,
expert report for ICTY, May 2001
11. Small arms – a threat to democracy – Opening report at the regional
symposium on small arms, sponsored by Council of Europe
12. Reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia, an analysis
13. The players in the Yugoslav crisis – short biographies of key persons (for use
of /FDV?/ Ljubljana)
An Assembly of Teaching Materials for Command and Cadre Training:

1. Warfare of the anti-tank unit of SA, 1992
2. Management of preparations for national defence, Management and command,
Officer School 1994
3. Battle planning, Management and command, Officer School 1994
4. Assault warfare of Italian defence tactical units, Command-Headquarters
School 1995
5. Warfare of motorized battalions of SA, Command-Headquarters School 1995
6. Defence combat brigade of SA, Command-Headquarters School 1995
7. Assault combat brigade of SA, Command-Headquarters School 1995
8. Defence of tactical armoured warfare of SA - thesis, Command-Headquarters
School 1996
9. Assault armoured combat brigade tactical group - thesis, Command-
Headquarters School 1996
10. The principles of organization and execution of UN peace operations- thesis,
Command-Headquarters School 1996
11. The United tactical units - thesis, Command-Headquarters School 1996
12. The principles of combat of the Croatian Army, Command-Headquarters
School 1996
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13. Organization structure and operational principles of management of SA

operation, Command-Headquarters School 1996
14. Assault operation of Croatian Army Corps
15. Assault operation corpus for rapid intervention in Russia
16. NATO tactical marks in SA - computer graphics

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IT-04-74-T 54751

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

Case No. IT-04-74-T

Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Presiding

Registrar: Mr. John Hocking

Filed: 18 September 2009

REDACTED VERSION OF “MILIVOJ PETKOVIC’S AND SLOBODAN

Case No. IT-04-74-T Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, et al 18 September 2009

REDACTED VERSION OF “MILIVOJ PETKOVIC’S AND SLOBODAN

Word count: 324

Case No. IT-04-74-T Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, et al 18 September 2009

IZVJEŠTAJ VOJNOG EKSPERTA

DOKTRINA OPĆENARODNE OBRANE

Ljubljana, srpanj 2009.

3. KVALIFIKACIJE ZA EKSPERTNOG SVJEDOKA O VOJNIM

5. JUGOSLAVENSKA DOKTRINA OPĆENARODNE OBRANE

6. PRIMJENA DOKTRINE OPĆENARODNE OBRANE

7. MUSLIMANSKI VOJNICI HVO KAO SIGURNOSNI PROBLEM 53

8. VOJNO ZNAČENJE SREDIŠNJE BOSNE I

8.3. Značenje tog prostora u vrijeme raspada SFR Jugoslavije 61

9. JE LI POSTOJALA OPSADA MOSTARA? 81

10. SITUACIJA KAD JE JEDNA DRŽAVA NAPADNUTA ILI

11. VOJNO ZNAČENJE BHS POJMOVA «ASANACIJA» I

12. PREDPODČINJAVANJE: ZNAČENJE I PROBLEMI 94

13. «OPERATIVNI I NASTAVNI POSLOVI» 97

14. «ŠTABNI POSLOVI» ZA POTREBE VRHOVNOG

15. VOJNE OPERACIJE STRATEŠKE, OPERATIVNE

16. AKTIVNA, UPORNA I ODSUTNA OBRANA 105

1. Branitelji generala Slobodana Praljka i Milivoja Petkovića obratili su mi se upitom da

2. U pripremi ovog izvješća surañivao sam s obranama generala Praljka i Petkovića

3. Nakon završene gimnazije u Celju (Slovenija), otišao sam na Vojnu akademiju u

4. Službu sam produžio u Postojni (Slovenija) kao obavještajni časnik u zapovjedništvu

pitanja u Postojni (Slovenija). Istovremeno sam predložen i izabran u Centralni

5. Izbijanjem oružanog sukoba u Sloveniji izmeñu JNA i TO Slovenije u lipnju 1991.

7. Mada sam bio gotovo 10 godina na službenom položaju generala na 4 različite

3. KVALIFIKACIJE ZA EKSPERTNOG SVJEDOKA O VOJNIM

8. Moje kvalifikacije za svjedočenje u ovom procesu su sljedeće:

4.1. Pojam i način stvaranja ratne armije

− pripremu cjelokupnog pučanstva i materijalnih mogućnosti društva za vodjenje

14. Posve drugačije je oblikovanje ratne armije u uvjetima nepostojanja države,

19. Logistička potpora je posve neorganizirana i stihijna. Opskrba oružjem, steljivom i

dejstva u skladu s parcijalnim interesima političkog vodstva. Dogadja se da se

21. U većini ad hoc oblikovanih armija u neorganiziranim državama značajan utjecaj

4.3. Što je to manevarska, a što teritorijalna komponenta ratne armije

23. Za izvodjenje bojnih operacija cjelokupni teritorij države podijeljen je na vojno-

uglavnom njihovoj logističkoj potpori dok te postrojbe borave na njihovoj teritoriji.

24. Vojno-teritorijalna zapovjedništva na operativnoj razini u gotovo svim suvremenim

4.4. Da li pretežnost teritorijalne komponente u armiji ukazuje na njezin obrambeni

− postrojbe teritorijalne komponente svoje zadaće u obrani teritorije izvršavaju u

4.5. Kako se osigurava logistička potpora ratnoj armiji

vrhovnog zapovijedanja. Mogu se distribuirati neposredno iz proizvodnje ili

29. Liječenje ranjenih i oboljelih vojnika načelno se organizira u sanitetskim ustanova

4.6. Kako se popunjavaju gubici i stvaraju nove postrojbe

časnicima vrši se sa nerasporedjenim pričuvnim časnicima, uzdizanjem i

4.7. Što je to smjenska vojska i kakve su posljedice smjenskog ratovanja na disciplinu

32. U milicijskim vojskama oblikovanim na užem teritorijalnom području poznato je

33. Takav oblik angažiranja postrojbi moguć je u sljedećim uvjetima:

- kada je u obrani svoje teritorije angažiran najveći dio radno sposobnog

34. Dobre strane sustava:

35. Loše strane sustava:

vlasti, pa čak i privremeno imenovati nove. U slučaju da oružane sile bojnim

5. JUGOSLAVENSKA DOKTRINA OPĆENARODNE OBRANE I