WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM?

Consequentialism is a kind of utilitarianism. According to consequentialism, an act's moral

rightness or wrongness is determined by the consequences it causes. Actions and inactions
whose negative repercussions exceed the positive outcomes are regarded morally wrong,
whereas actions and inactions whose positive consequences outweigh the negative
consequences are deemed morally acceptable, according to consequentialist principles. On
utilitarian criteria, acts and inactions that benefit a small number of people while harming a
larger number of people are morally wrong, whereas actions and inactions that damage fewer
individuals while benefiting a larger number of people are morally good.

Benefit and damage may be defined in a variety of ways; for utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), they are defined in terms of happiness and
misery, as well as pleasure and pain. Actions and inactions that cause less pain or misery and
more pleasure or happiness than accessible alternative actions and inactions are regarded
morally acceptable, whereas actions and inactions that cause more pain or unhappiness and
less pleasure or happiness are deemed morally wrong. Although pleasure and happiness
might have various meanings, they shall be considered as synonyms in this chapter.

The focus of utilitarians is how to improve net utility. Their moral philosophy is founded on
the utility principle, which argues that "the ethically appropriate action is the activity that
provides the greatest benefit" (Driver 2014). The ethically incorrect action is one that causes
the greatest good to be reduced. For example, a utilitarian might argue that even if some
armed robbers robbed a bank, as long as more people benefit from the robbery (say, in a
Robin Hood-like manner, the robbers generously shared the money with many people) than
suffer from the robbery (say, only the billionaire who owns the bank will bear the cost of the
loss), the heist is morally right rather than morally wrong. And, according to this utilitarian
assumption, if the theft causes more people to suffer while fewer people profit, the heist is
ethically wrong.

It is clear from the preceding explanation of utilitarianism that it is opposed to deontology,

which is a moral theory that states that we have specific responsibilities or obligations as
moral agents, and that these duties or obligations are codified in terms of laws (see Chapter
6). Rule utilitarianism is a variation of utilitarianism that establishes rules for assessing the
utility of acts and inactions (see the next part of the chapter for a detailed explanation). The
distinction between a utilitarian rule and a deontological rule is that rule utilitarians believe
that following the rule is right because the rule will create the greatest good if generally
accepted and obeyed. According to deontologists, the moral rightness or wrongness of our
activities is not determined by the outcomes of our actions, whether they be good or bad. It is
whether we behave or fail to act in line with our obligation or responsibilities that defines
their moral rightness or wrongness (where our duty is based on rules that are not themselves
justified by the consequences of their being widely accepted and followed).

SOME VARIETIES (OR TYPES) OF UTILITARIANISM

The utilitarianism described above is a broad definition. However, many varieties of

utilitarianism may be distinguished. First, "actual consequence utilitarians" and "foreseeable
consequence utilitarians" may be distinguished. The former evaluates the moral rightness and
wrongness of acts based on their actual outcomes, while the latter evaluates the moral
rightness and wrongness of actions based on the activities' predictable effects. With the
following example, J. J. C. Smart (1920-2012) illustrates the logic behind this distinction:
Assume you've just saved someone from drowning. You were trying to help a drowning
person in good faith, but it just so happened that the individual went on to become a mass
killer. Actual consequence utilitarians would argue that saving the individual was ethically
wrong in retrospect since he or she had become a mass killer. However, predictable
consequence utilitarians would argue that since it could not be predicted that the individual
would become a mass killer in the future (i.e., in foresight), the act of saving them was
ethically good (Smart 1973, 49). Furthermore, they may have turned out to be a "saint," such
as Nelson Mandela or Martin Luther King Jr., in which case real consequence utilitarians
would judge the conduct to be ethically justified.

The difference between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism is a second distinction we
might draw. Act utilitarianism focuses on individual activities and claims that we should
assess them using the utility principle. As a result, act utilitarians believe that the action that
creates the greatest utility is the morally correct activity. However, this may seem to be hard
to do in reality since we would be ethically obligated to assess the repercussions of
everything we do that has the potential to affect other people and choose the one with the best
result. To address this issue, rule utilitarianism focuses on basic sorts of activities and
determines whether they often lead to good or poor outcomes. For them, ordinary moral
principles have this meaning: they are generalisations of the normal outcomes of our
activities. For example, if theft often has negative repercussions, a rule utilitarian would
regard stealing to be immoral in general. [1]

As a result, rule utilitarians claim to be able to reinterpret discussions of rights, justice, and
fair treatment in terms of the utility principle, saying that the logic for any such rules is that
they typically contribute to increased wellbeing for all parties involved. We can ask whether
utilitarianism can even address the idea that individuals have rights and need to be treated
justly and fairly, since in crucial circumstances, people's rights and well-being can be
sacrificed as long as this seems to promote overall utility.

Utilitarianism, particularly act utilitarianism, seems to imply that the life of the obese stranger
should be sacrificed, regardless of whatever seeming right to life he may have. A rule
utilitarian, on the other hand, would argue that, since murdering innocent people to rescue
others is not normally the greatest result, we should be extremely cautious about making such
a choice in this circumstance. This is particularly true in this case, since everything relies on
our estimation of what may stop the trolley, despite the fact that the result is much too unclear
to justify such a significant choice. If nothing else, rule utilitarians' focus on universal
principles might serve as a reminder not to dismiss the idea that the goals may justify the
means.

Whether or whether this reaction is acceptable has been hotly discussed in the context of this
well-known case, as well as several variants. This leads us to our last point concerning
utilitarianism: if it is ultimately a convincing and rational moral philosophy.

IS UTILITARIANISM PERSUASIVE AND REASONABLE?

First and foremost, let us consider the concept of utility as the underlying basis of morality,
i.e., the argument that what is ethically correct is just what leads to a better end. It is,
according to John Stuart Mill, because "each individual, so far as he thinks it to be
achievable, wishes his own pleasure" (Mill [1861] 1879, Ch. 4). Mill derives the utility
principle from this argument, which is founded on three criteria: desirability, exhaustiveness,
and impartiality. That is, pleasure is desirable as a goal in and of itself; it is the only thing that
is (exhaustiveness); and no one person's happiness is really more or less desirable than
anybody else's (impartiality) (see Macleod 2017).

Mill defends desirability by stating, "The only evidence that a thing is seen can be presented
is that people really perceive it." People hearing a sound is the sole evidence that it exists, as
are other sources of human knowledge. Similarly, the only proof that something is desirable
is if people genuinely want it. (Ch. 4 in Mill [1861] 1879)

Mill does not claim that other things, other from happiness, are not sought as such;
nevertheless, although other things may seem to be desired, happiness is the only thing that is
really desired, since whatever else we desire, we do it because obtaining it will make us
happy. Finally, Mill argues for impartiality by claiming that equal levels of pleasure are
equally desirable, whether experienced by the same person or by different people. "Each
individual's pleasure is a good to that person, and the general happiness, hence, a good to the
aggregate of all people," Mill said (Mill [1861] 1879, Ch. 4). However, we may question if
this last argument is genuinely acceptable. Is Mill truly demonstrating that we should respect
everyone's pleasure as equally valuable, or is he merely asserting it?

Assume Mill's reasoning is correct, and the concept of utility is the foundation of morality.
According to utilitarianism, we should assess the predicted utility that will arise from our
acts, as well as how it will effect ourselves and others, to the best of our abilities, and use that
as the foundation for moral appraisal of our choices. But then there's the question of how to
measure utility. There are two separate but linked challenges here: how can I compare
various sorts of pleasure and pain, benefit or damage that I could feel, and how can I compare
my benefit to your benefit on some neutral scale of comparison? Bentham famously stated
that there was a single universal scale that could objectively measure all benefits and
disadvantages based on intensity, length, certainty/uncertainty, closeness, fecundity, purity,
and extent. And he proposed a "felicific calculus" based on this as a technique of objectively
assessing any two joys we may experience (Bentham [1789] 1907).

First and foremost, let us consider the concept of utility as the underlying basis of morality,
i.e., the argument that what is ethically correct is just what leads to a better end. It is,
according to John Stuart Mill, because "each individual, so far as he thinks it to be
achievable, wishes his own pleasure" (Mill [1861] 1879, Ch. 4). Mill derives the utility
principle from this argument, which is founded on three criteria: desirability, exhaustiveness,
and impartiality. That is, pleasure is desirable as a goal in and of itself; it is the only thing that
is (exhaustiveness); and no one person's happiness is really more or less desirable than
anybody else's (impartiality) (see Macleod 2017).

Mill defends desirability by stating, "The only evidence that a thing is seen can be presented
is that people really perceive it." People hearing a sound is the sole evidence that it exists, as
are other sources of human knowledge. Similarly, the only proof that something is desirable
is if people genuinely want it. (Ch. 4 in Mill [1861] 1879)

Mill does not claim that other things, other from happiness, are not sought as such;
nevertheless, although other things may seem to be desired, happiness is the only thing that is
really desired, since whatever else we desire, we do it because obtaining it will make us
happy. Finally, Mill argues for impartiality by claiming that equal levels of pleasure are
equally desirable, whether experienced by the same person or by different people. "Each
individual's pleasure is a good to that person, and the general happiness, hence, a good to the
aggregate of all people," Mill said (Mill [1861] 1879, Ch. 4). However, we may question if
this last argument is genuinely acceptable. Is Mill truly demonstrating that we should respect
everyone's pleasure as equally valuable, or is he merely asserting it?

Assume Mill's reasoning is correct, and the concept of utility is the foundation of morality.
According to utilitarianism, we should assess the predicted utility that will arise from our
acts, as well as how it will effect ourselves and others, to the best of our abilities, and use that
as the foundation for moral appraisal of our choices. But then there's the question of how to
measure utility. There are two separate but linked challenges here: how can I compare
various sorts of pleasure and pain, benefit or damage that I could feel, and how can I compare
my benefit to your benefit on some neutral scale of comparison? Bentham famously stated
that there was a single universal scale that could objectively measure all benefits and
disadvantages based on intensity, length, certainty/uncertainty, closeness, fecundity, purity,
and extent. And he proposed a "felicific calculus" based on this as a technique of objectively
assessing any two joys we may experience (Bentham [1789] 1907).

CONCLUSION

Let us wrap up by returning to the original question: can the goals justify the
means? I said that the answer to this issue is yes, as far as utilitarianism is
concerned. For utilitarians, the response is reasonable and correct; nevertheless,
it is improbable for many others, and particularly incorrect for deontologists. As
we've shown in this chapter, utilitarianism is less convincing and rational when
examined closely than it looks when seen from afar.