1. More needed to be said on explanation. “Any proper answer to a 'Why?

' question[, giving

intellectual satisfaction,] may be said to be an expanation of a sort,” says Braithwaite (1953). Yet,
what is a why question, what counts as a proper answer, and what is intellectual satisfacion? These
questions were not explicitly discussed in the 1950s even though the H-O article is from 1948.
—
2. Conditions for lawhood. Nelson Goodman (1947) and H-O (1948) tried to give conditions for
being a law (or, rather, lawlike, for something's a law only if it's true). They are four. (1) Universal
quantification. What scope? (2) Unrestricted scope. What counts as no restriction? (3) No reference
to particulars. (Any region of spacetime. “All over the Universe, x is Apache pottery only if it's
made by women” seems unrestricted, but it makes reference to the Apache comunity.) Finally, (4)
Only “purely qualitative” predicates. This means that they must not be properties relational to
particulars: lunar, apachian, arctic, and so on and so forth. (Page 13.)

Objective: to distinguish genuine laws from accidental generalizations. Genuine laws explain. The
idea is that (1-4) guarantee three marks of genuine laws: Generality (1-4); Counterfactual support
(what would happen if...); and Modal import (what is and isn't possible?). A potential problem with
“modal import” is that the modal scope is what is physically possible, which may be cashed out in
terms of nomological possibility, which is just circular: what counts as nomos? Though there are
other ways to characterize “physical,” I presume most of them would invalidate our actual laws.
(The laws of physics could be different.)

More specifically, to distinguish (a) accidental generalizations, (b) derived laws, and (c)
fundamental laws. Galileo's law of falling bodies makes reference to Earth, Kepler's law of
planetary motion makes reference to our Solar system. For this, we need things in the actual world
which show something is a law, so that we can know that it is counterfactual support and modal
import. (Page 16.) [See Laws, Modalities, and Counterfactuals, by Hans Reichenbach (1954/1976).]

A) A fundamental lawlike sentence is any purely universal sentence. (Generalized sentence:

quantified. Universal sentence: generalized only with universal. Essentially generalized: universal
not equivanet to molecular sentence. Purely universal: universal without proper names.)
B) A derivative lawlike sentence is any essentially, but not purely, universal sentence. Also, it must
be deducible from some set of fundamental laws.
C) A law is any true sentence that is either a fundamental or a derived law. (In the end, H-O are OK
with pure and essential general statements. They needn't be universal.)
—
3. Explanations may not be arguments. Michael Scriven, Richard Jeffrey, Bas van Fraassen, Peter
Railton, and Wesley Salmon have argued they are not — though Scriven does argue they are rules
of inference! Hempel and Oppenheim, among others, believe they are. (The D-N model for what
explanations are is a schematic argument.) Abduction, in contrast, is certainly an argument.
Explaining and inferring to the best explanation are two distinct activities.
—
4. The D-N model. It says: {T,C} explain E when...
...{T,C} entails E, while neither {T} nor {C} entail E (what explains must be essential to this
actual explanation, even if they are not necessary for the occurence of E necessary for
explanation; chiefly, T must be essential to it);
...T is a potential law (actually, a potential theory, admitting existential generalizations) and
C is (at most) molecular;
...T is a law (actually a theory) and C is true.

A notable feature of the above account is that that which explains (the explanans) is sufficient for
that which is explained (the explanandum). When one comes to functional explanations, such as
explaining the (existence of) the heart in virtue of the function it realizes in a biological machine,
since functions are multiply realizable we have that the heart is in principle substitutable. This
means that what explains (something about the function of pumping blood) is not sufficient for
what is explained (the heart). In fact, it is the reverse: the heart (explanandum) is sufficient for
explaining something about pumping blood (explanans). Note that, above, E is not sufficient for T
or T+C, so that functional explanations go the opposite direction to D-N model explanations. I
would like to disagree with C. G. Hempel here, however. I think the “function → heart” functional
explanation goes like this: “Why does heart exist? Because there must be something which pumps
blood.” (Not sufficient, but explanatory.) Whereas the “heart → function” sufficiency relation goes
like this: “Given that these other factors explain why there must be something that pumps blood,
what actually gets the job done? The heart.” (The heart is not sufficient for the explanans. The fact
that there is a heart is not sufficient for there being the need for pumping blood!) (Page 30.)

My way of understanding this is that questions of why somehing exists must be “contrastive” in
some sense, and this dissolves Hempel's problem with functional explanations. I'll explain myself
via examples. If we ask, “Why is there a heart instead of nothing?”, the answer is that there must
have been something that pumps blood. This is the same answer to the question, “Why is there a
heart instead of something that does not pump blood?” Yet, if we we ask, “Why is there a heart
instead of anything else that pumps blood?”, then we may either answer that the heart is more cost-
effective, or easier to reach through a gradual biological path, or some answer which refers to
contingent (accidental, coincidental) aspects of the heart's phylogeny. In each of these cases, the
explanans is sufficient for the explanandum (heart existence instead of x), and they are functional
explanations.

There are multiple addenda to the above account. For example, it cannot be that verifying C ends up
verifying E. (Suppose C = T → E.) There must be some other logical constraints on C. The material
conditional of classical logic generates dissonances between antecedent and consequent, where the
former is irrelevant to the second, but the conditional is always derivabe: From P, P v Q.
From P v Q, ¬P → Q. Since H-O wished to give a truth-functional formal account of scientific
explanation, their model will imply “irrelevant explanations,” unless something is done. (See
“Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation,” by Kaplan and Montague, 1961.) Here is a fix by
Jaegwon Kim (from his 1963 PhD thesis, I believe): E must not entail any conjunct of the
conjunctive normal form of C. Relevance logics are tailored to avoid precisely the logical
transformations that generate the problems for the D-N model pointed out by K-M 1961. (Page 23.)
—
5. Some problems with Hempel's account. Covering law conceptions of (scientific) explanation are
not the only one there are, and many are skeptical about it, including Railton, van Fraassen, and
Kuhn. Covering law theories state that explanation always involves mentions of law (or, as it is
said, “subsumption under a law”). Historical explanation seems plausibly not to require laws.

Hempel may care little for causal explanations. The H-O 1948 article claims that the D-N model is
the model for causal explanations, but in 1965 Hempel recognized not all instances of D-N are
causal explanations (and it seems he was not concerned about it). Also, there has been immense
doubt about the explanation/prediction symmetry proposed by H-O. Finally, the requirement that the
explanans be literally true is too strong: approximate truth would be enough. It should also be said
that many people now don't believe “fundamental methdological concepts [like] confirmation and
explanation are amenable to formal semantical explication.” (Page 24.)
—
6. Three types of responses were made to the H-O article. First, those who criticized the set of
conditions explanations must satisfy (given in Part I of the article): the deductivism, the empiricism
(I think), the generality, the literal truth, and so on. (Hempel himself provided a great model of
statistical explanation in 1962.) Others accepted it, and criticized the formal explication of these
conditions given in Part III. Finally, others tried to fix it. (There were more. Some criticized
formalization at all. Amongst those, there were ordinary language philosophers who thought
pragmatics was crucial to understanding how explanations work in human inferential ecology.) (See
Nicholas Rescher 1970 for many pragmatic features of scientific explanation, even if he does in the
end endorse abstracting away from those.)
—
7. There is such a thing as formal pragmatics. Bas van Fraassen employs in his account of
explanation. Logical positivsts could not use it, and thus left pragmatics aside (making this or that
comment on how IRL pragmatics shorten discourse, but a fully detailed account of explanation
includes this and that, such as covering laws). Ordinary language philosophers criticized logical
positivists because of that. (Page 36.)
—
8. Facts explaining facts; laws as rules of inference. Michael Scriven and Stephen Toulmin, like
other ordinary language philosophers, believed that laws of nature were not propositions used in
inferences (as in covering law models), but rather the rules of inference themselves. From “this is
silver” one can infer “this expands when heated” through “all metals expand when heated.” This
implies that particular facts can explain particular facts, with the use of lawful rules of inference.
(Pages 36 and 37.) At least Scriven also believed that particular facts can explain particular facts
without there being any law involved. (Page 49.)
—
9. The asymmetry of explanation. These are refutations both of the D-N model of explanation and of
H-O's prediction-explanation symmetry. Note that “prediction” may be retrodiction, or inference to
processes concurrent to our evidence or inferential process. Salmon calls prediction as “inference
from the known to the unknown.”

An example. The law for the period of the pendulum is thus: period = 2pi * sqrt(lenght/gravity), or
T = sqrt[L/g]*2pi. Note that the period T and the gravitational force g may be measured
independently, and constitue C (initial conditions). From this one may derive the length L, yet
surely it is not explained by our knowledge of T and g! As the foregoing case bespeaks, it seems
Law+L+g do explain T, whereas Law+T+g does not explain T, but why is this so? Mr. Sylvain
Bromberger has an account of asymmetries of explanation, explained in pages 44-46.

Some asymmetries of explanation are due to causation being asymmetrical and the explanation in
question being a causal relation. The flagpole example, also due to Bromberger, is a classic: from
the law of rectilinear motion of light (on normal conditions) plus certain initial conditions (flagpole
on flat ground & Sun shining brightly above with angle x), one can derive from flagpole height H
the flapole shadow length L. Seems like a good explanation, right? Yet, one can equally derive from
flagpole shadow legnth L the flagpole height H. From H and L you can even deduce the position of
Sun. Perhaps this always happens when (i) Law + Initial Conditions create bijection between two
variables, and (ii) the two variables are independently verifiable.

Notice that this bijection may have a causal direction, so that predicting one from the other is a
proper explanation, while the reverse prediction is not explanatory. It may reflect a common cause
between two events. The standard example for this is a bijection (hypothesized for an illuminating
thought example) between sudden barometer-reading drops and storms. Neither the sudden drops
explain the storm nor the storm explain the sudden drops. (The storm comes after the sudden drop.)
Correlations between high/low tides and Moon position are also not explanatory, however
predictive. (There is the example of Ptolemaic astronomy being predictive, but we now it to be
false, and it was a good explanation while we thought it to be true.) (Page 47.)

Note: If causal direction is imporant for deciding what is the correct explanation, then what happens
if knowledge about causality comes solely from explanations? Here is an example. Mr. Salmon's
statistical relevance model would, IIRC, partition the population into untreated syphilis, treated
syphilis, and non-syphilic — and he would find out that paresis patients is almost entirely inside the
“untreated syphilis” box, occupying ¼ of it. This is not enough for hailing untreated syphilis as a
(partial) explanation for paresis, for that depends on the direction of causation. Perhaps paresis is
one amongst many causes of syphilis, and it is the sole cause of illness untreatments (perhaps it is
highly contagious and highly obvious, which scares off doctors). So paresis is not in the “treated
syphilis” box because it causes untreatment almost unfailingly, and it is not in the “non-syphilis”
box because it causes syphilis almost unfailingly. This means “untreated syphilis” is not an
explanation of paresis, even if their statistical correlation mean it is a predictor of it. (In fact I think
it is not a predictor, for only ¼th of untreated syphilis patients have paresis.)

There is an easy solution. We know it is untreated syphilis that causes paresis. So the explanation
can be carried out. Yet... what if the only way to know this is abductively, i.e. via explanations?
(This could be the case if the direction of causation was not directly observable, but a fact we would
know theoretically.)
—
10. The D-S model. This model aims to explain a statistical law, and it aims to do so by way of
another statistical law. I do not know if its aim is to explain statistical laws simpliciter, and it
resorted to statistical laws as explanantia by necessity. Examples of statistical laws are those
regulating quantum mechanical systems, or those governing casinos.

This model is very similar to the D-N model. It employs generalizations: “All Fs have a propensity
to be Gs” are purely universal, whereas “A certain proportion of Fs are are Gs” (which can be
expressed as P(G|F) = r), similarly to a pure existential. The covering law, deductive argument
model is also kept, it seems. Finally, many problems are inherited, such as the problem of relevance,
of asymmetry, of classical logic's glitches (“Theory A & Theory B → Theory A” is not explanatory
of Theory A!),1 and so on.
—
11. The I-S model. This model aims to explain particular occurrences which are only made
statistically likely (probable) given the laws and the initial conditions. This is why it is called
inductive. Its distinction from the D-S model is that the D-S model would explain the statistical law
“Iridium decays every so often,” which can be deduced from the statistical laws of the Standard
Model, whereas the I-S model would explain “This Iridium sample has decayed so much in so
much time,” which cannot be so deduced, but only made very likely.

Non-monotonicity (“ambiguity”) of inductive logic. We can construct two inductive arguments (in
fact, two I-S explanations with true premises) which render highly probable opposing statements.
Argument one: P(E|F) = 0.9 and F, therefore E. Argument two: P(E|F&G) = 0.1 and F&G, therefore
¬E. (It is a fact that P(A) = 1 – P(¬A).) We can readily transform this int othe strong inductive
argument for ¬E using P(¬E|F&G) = 0.9. (Inductive logic does no have a weakening principle like
deductive logic does, where p → q |= p&r→q |= p&r&t→q, and so on.)To circumvent this problem,
inductive logicians reject the first argument (which may be an I-S explanation) because it neglects
available evidence / knowledge (G). They say that no relevant available information (which would
change the probabilities) should be ignored, and this is dubbed the requirement of total evidence.
(Page 55.)

The requirement of maximal specificity (RMS). However, in explanations (instead of predictions) we

always know the explanandum. (This is Aristotle's point. We are not trying to provide evidence for
the explanandum. As Hempel puts it, we are trying to assess its nomic expectability, expectability
based on lawful “connecitons,” which serves as an explanation.) Therefore, it is included in our
total evidence. One way I would suggest a fix is to exclude what we want to explain and anything
that is deductively connected with it. (Salmon makes a similar move.) (Page ??.) Mr. Hempel did

1 This is called “the notorious footnote 33” problem.

not choose this path, which is evidence that it does not work. His path was thus. Take the premise
list S, and add to it our total knowledge K. This will just be K. Take a particular to be explained Gi.
We need: (a) S&K → F*i (where F* ⊆ F) and (b) S&K → P(Gx|F*x) = r*. Now suppose we had
only 'a' and 'b'. Then clearly FUG ⊆ F. Yet, since we know Gi, we know for a fact that (FUG)i. The
way Hempel excluded tihs is with a third clause: (c) say that P(Gx|Fx) = r, then {we must have that
r* = r} if and only if {P(Gx|F*x) = r* is not a theorem of probability theory, like P(Gx|FUGx) = 1
or P(Gx|FUHx) = 0.99 would be, where H is the class of items which have a 0.99 chance of being
G}. You see, our inductive argument using S is strong only if it and SU{Total evidence} make the
same statistical prediction. (Recall that S contains a statement of the form P(Gx|Fx) = r.) What this
means is that specifying x's situation without talking about Gx does not change the prediction
in question. This preserves monotonicity. (Pages 56-58.)
—
12. Some counterexamples to both the D-S and the I-S model. Not all explanations are predictions,
not all explanations are laws. Take one counterexample for the prediction/explanation symmetry
thesis advanced by Hempel for the I-S. Michael Scriven has noted that A may frequently or always
be the cause of B, yet even so B is unlikely given A. For instance, a disease or condition called
paresis only occurs when syphilis has been left untreated for too long — but even so, untreated
syphilis only leads to paresis ¼ of the time. (Another interesting case is that event E is made 90%
likely both given P and given Q. From P one may predict E, and from Q one may predict E, but
given E, one cannot use P to explain E unless one is sure that Q is not also the case. Because then Q
may be the correct explanation. My idea!)

Untreated syphilis and paresis seem not to be linked by laws! Yet, the untreated syphilis seems to be
an exaplantion of the paresis condition, but it surely is not a prediction of it! Quite the contrary, in
fact. What defenders of the prediction/explanation symmetry thesis for I-S could argue is that
“untreated syphilis” is only a partial explanation of paresis. (Hempel calls them explanation
sketches.) A complete explanation, by the lights of the I-S model, would contain sufficient
information so that the explanandum has a very high likelihood (but certainty still, otherwise I-S
becomes D-N). Instead of taking the paresis case as a counter-example to Hempel's models, we
should use his models as measures of which explanations are sketchy or complete. (Page 49.)

Salmon's rebuttal is that we can explain unlikely particular facts as well as we can explain likely
ones. The prediction/explanation symmetry thesis is wrong. We can no more and no less explain
why a rigged coin landed heads when it had a predictable 10% of doing so than we can explain why
it landed tails when its predictable chance of doing so was 90%. (For instance, that a coin was
thrown is an explanation for something having fallen tails. I don't know, the paresis case is a better
example.) A counter-argument I would propose is: high-chance events are more robust, and so
we need to explain more contextual factors to explain low-chance events (i.e. why the
robustness failed).
—
13. Statistical relevance models. The ingenious way with which Mr. Wesley Salmon dealt with the
the above problems, such as explaining a low-chance event, was by arguing that explanations
involve statistical considerations that make a difference. If a low-chance event happened when it
had a 10% chance probability under S&R, it will be explained by R to some extent if the event's
probability was lower just under S. Paresis is much less likely without untreated syphilis, so we may
rightly say the latter explains the former, even if (i) paresis has only a ¼ chance under untreated
syphilis and (ii) biological idiosyncrasies of the paresis-patients (and contextual happenstances)
would help complete our explanation. (This is why we have control groups.)

Notice that low-chance events can be predicted with certainty in classical physics: one combines all
the laws of motion, gravitation, electromagnetic interaction, thermodynamics, and so on, with a
perfect (or highly specific) description of the initial conditions of the relevant physical system (or
the whole Universe). The conundrum about “chance” events arises from the fact that, seemingly,
we can explain them using information which does not dispell their probabilistic nature. (My way
of putting it.)
—
14. Explanatoriness and probability. A researcher named Richard Jeffrey (1969) argued that “the
degree of probability conferred upon an explanadum by an explanans is not a measure of the
goodness of the explanation.” (Page 61.)
—
15. The three ways of scientific explanation. “[The epistemic, modal, and ontic conceptions] seem
to me, in retrospect, to have dominated the discussion of scientific explanation from the time of
Aristotle to the present.” (Page 62.)
—
16. Objectively homogeneous relevant partitions. A partition divides a set F to sets such that their
generalized union is the original set F, and the intersection between any two sets is the empty set.
(In English, the partition's cells are exhaustive of F and mutually exclusive.) A partition of F
relevant to “x” will have that no two cells in the partition have the same probability for “x.” Here's
an example of a non-relevant partition of people with strep infection (“F”): (i) treatment with
penicillin & resistant bacteria, (ii) treatment with penicillin & non-resistant bacteria, (iii) non-
treatment with penicillin & resistant bacteria, and (iv) non-treatment with penicillin & non-resistant
bacteria. Clearly, as regards quick recovery (“x”), there is no difference between treatment and non-
treatment for patients with penicillin-resistant bacteria. (Morever, there is no difference between
resistance and non-resistance for untreated patients. So P(ii) = P(iii) = P(iv).)

A relevant partition divides elements into cells according to a statistically relevant criterion. A
relevant partition will be homogenous if and only if it cannot be further relevantly partitioned. This
means that all the factors have been taken into account. This is important to preserve monotonicity.
Finally, a homogeneous relevant partition is objective if and only if its homogeneity is not merely
due to our ignorance of possible further relevant partitionings, but due to the way things are. (Pages
62-65.)

The limitations of screening off (“rendering irrelevant”). Low barometric readings are highly
correlated with storms (in this case, positively). This could lead us astray into thinking that low
barometric readings are explanations, because they are partitions of the world relevant to weather
status. I have not figured out whether this is a (objectively) homogenous relevant partition of the
world for weather status, but I know one think: P(Storm|Barometer) = P(Storm|Barometer &
Atmospheric drop). This means that atmospheric drop screens off barometer as the correct
explanation of the storm. Barometers make no difference. What makes a difference is atmospheric
drop. (Remove the latter and there is no storm. Remove the former and the storm remains
unchanged.) The partition isn't made just in terms of P and not-P, but also in terms of P and Q, such
as urban and rural, male and female, and so on. One must entail the non-other, and the two together
must be exhaustive. Maybe all the coins in the world are contingently biased towards heads or
towards tails, and we could relevantly partition coin tosses in terms of these two types of coins. The
class of unbiased coins will be missing, even thought it would be inside a “not biased towards head”
class.)

There is one problem with this theory. It cannot deal with metaphysical grounding of modally co-
extensive entities. Suppose the laws of physics dictate that there is a perfect correlation between
atmospheric pressure drop, low barometic readings, and storms. Then we can equally screen off
barometer readings (via atmospheric drops) and atmospheric drops (via barometer readings). This is
because P(Storm|Atmospheric drop) = P(Storm|Atmospheric drop & Barometer). We could not
remove barometers and still have the storm, because that would require removing atmospheric
drops, which would end up removing storms. Yet, barometers don't cause storms. They are merely
caused the same thing that causes storms. So their presence is sine qua non. Consider also the
relevation between Socrates and the singleton {Socrates}. (There may be many examples of this in
physics: perfect correlations between particles, processes, fields, changes, energy, mass, and so on.
Yet, the direction goes only one way.)

Another problems arises from events which have a single effect. If we have that A causes B and
only B, then there is no C that can screen off B. It cannot be rendered irrelevant. Let us see...
1. A sometimes/always causes B. A never causes anything else.
2. Also, D sometimes/always causes B. (D irrelevant to A.)
3. Also, E sometimes/always causes A. (E irrelevant to B.)
The partition of the world into B and not-B is relevant to A. — It may not be homogeneous if B has
some cause apart from A. Suppose we further partition using D, so we get BD, B~D, ~BD, and
~B~D. The probability of A is the same in BD and B~D, and the same in ~BD and ~B~D. — It may
be homogenous, but with B screen-offable, if A has a cause (i.e. another predictor which is not an
effect). (It needn't be a cause; it could be something correlated with a cause of A.) We get BE, B~E,
~BE, and ~B~E. If B xor E are perfect predictors of A, then P(BE) = P(B~E) and P(~BE) =
P(~B~E). (If they were both perfect predictors, two of these scenarios would be impossible.) If
neither were perfect predictors, but both had some predictive power, then the B+E partition could be
relevant. (This could be kept even if E were the only cause of A, but didn't always cause A, and A
were the only cause of B. Then B → A → E, and we'd have BE, ~BE, and ~B~E which could be
different. I mean, since I'm postulating the relevance of B and E, problems only arise with perfect
relevance. A decisive factor screens any other factor off. But they may be relevant.)

Consider this. The only cause of barometer drops are atmospheric pressure drops, and the only
cause of atmospheric pressure drops are bomb explosions. Yet, bomb explosions do not always
cause atmospheric pressure drops. This means that, if we are trying to explain atmospheric pressure
drops, we'll have that P(Storm|Barometer) = 100%, whereas P(Storm|Bomb) = 50% and P(Storm|
Barometer & Bomb) = 100%. The bomb is irrelevant. Wow, the S-R model is full of holes!

Probabilistic explanations for B fail when something is 100% correlated with B, but the actual
explanation is not 100% so correlated. (Mr. Hugh Lehman pointed out, in 1972, limitations
similar to the ones I have commented above, and he urged that the solution lie in taking causal
relations into account. See Salmon p. 106.)
—
17. Coin-tosses? Check his coin-toss example on Page 67. I have conisently disagreed that coin
tosses are good examples. I'm not sure that partitioning all coin tosses into head-biased and tail-
biased coins actually enhance our understanding or our explanation of particular coin tosses and, if
they do, they're explanatory of the coin's having landed on the biased side but not of its having
landed on the opposite side. The moral is that negatively correlated partitions call for
explanation of why robustness fails. One having paresis after “being sick and untreated with
penicillin” is an explanation, for “being sick and untreated with penicillin” is statistically relevant to
having paresis. We could improve our explanation with specifications of why a ¼ event occurred
even given this partition. Yet, one having landed tails after “being biased towards heads,” which is a
partition that lowers the probability of landed tails, yields no explanation. All we are left for a
possible explaantion would be a specification that explains why a 1/10 event occurred given this
partition. When a positively correlated partition is lacking for explanation, we must appeal to an
explanation of the high probability (robustness) failing.
—
18. Reference class problem: which class to choose in assigning probabilities? A perfect
specification of a reference class, that is, a homogeneous reference class, would (in a deterministic
scenario) give unity probability to any event. This means that a homogeneous reference class
requirement would boil I-S explanations down to D-N explanations, and explanations with
inhomogeneous reference classes would merely be incomplete D-N explanations (which are subject
to the danger of non-monotonicity). However, in an indeterministic scenario, a homogeneous
reference class (which can be further relevantly partitioned) will not (always) yield unity probabilty,
and so I-S explanations remain. There really is no D-N explanation of why a particular C-14 atom
decayed. There is no relevant partitioning of all C-14 atoms in respect to decayment.

Consider the example of rolling dice. There is this statistical law that any die throw has a 1/6 chance
of landing on any of its specific faces; and so it has 1/6 probability of landing with one of 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, and 6 facing up. Yet, when it comes to any given die throw I assert there is a path from perfect
unespecificity about the initial conditions of the die throw, to perfect specificity about it. Partition it
between the classes of 1º, 2º, …, 90º angle die throws in respect to a parallel line across the ground.
Then partition it between the classes of 0, 0.1, 0.2, …, π, π+0.1, …, 2π, … of angular velocity in
each of the three axes (measured in radians). Further partition it in terms of the Navier-Stokes
equation which (hopefully uniquely) describes the air turbulence of the room (taking air density and
viscosity into account). Then, partition it in terms of the position of the die in the room. Further
partitions include room size, gravitational field, texture of the soil, the many directions of
momentum, and die composition. After perfectly specifying this class, assuming the classical
physics we used can predict the future uniquely (i.e. is deterministic), then this is a D-N
explanation. I-S explanations would be incomplete D-N explanations.

So what? Wouldn't they be explanations all the same, but incomplete and lacking? (Probably due to
our ignorance, so that we would have epistemically homogeneous partitions.
—
19. True explanations and the non-epistemic world of facts. Mr. Coffa wishes to argue that
accepting epistemic relativization of inductive explanations, as detailed in the above section, is
tantamount to the claim that there no true inductive explanations. Mr. Hempel accepts this, but he
fails to conclude that “the concept of I-S explanation relative to K functions as a placebo which can
only calm the intellectual anxieties of the uncautious user,” as Mr. Coffa puts it (1974:155, apud.
Salmon p. 72). The reason is that there not being true inductive explanations entail that there is no
non-epistemic fact, “no things going on in the non-epistemic world of facts,” which can be said to
be “(non-deterministically) responsible for the occurrence of the explanandum event” in the sense
appropriate for (inductive) explanations. (Non-deterministically, yet perhaps still nomically
responsible.) This being so, inductive explanations are merely psychological.
—
20. Science as mechanism, not explanation prediction. Better yet: understanding mechanisms, not
events. Nicholas Rescher presents, in 1963, four “discrete state systems” in each of which it is,
respectively, possible to predict but not retrodict, impossible to predict but not retrodict, possible
both to predict and to retrodict, and finally impossible both to predict and to retrodict. He argues
that, in some of these systems, we may not be able to explain / predict / retrodict a particular
occurrence, but we understand perfectly how the system works anyway. We know the statistical
laws which govern its functioning. We know its mechanism. Yet, particular events cannot be
understood. The purpose of science is understanding mechanisms, and not the particular events
brought about by such mechanisms. (Think of a stochastic mechanism.)
—
21. Scientific explanation as unification. “[S]cience increases our understanding of the world by
reducing the total number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given. A
world with fewer independent phenomena is, other things equal, more comprehensible than one
with more.” (Michael Friedman, 1974, pp. 14-15, apud. Salmon pp. 94-95. The whole quotation is
great.) Adiante, na pa´gina 101, o senhor Salmon diz: “In the fifth decade, Philip Kitcher articulates
his version of the unification theory [of scientific explanation] in Kitcher and Salmon (1989).”

Yet, there is this whole problem with counting the number of phenomena. There is also the problem
with specifying what are valid unifications and what are not. Could we say a gerrymandered
conjunction of every known regularity is a unification of all known phenomena, and thus the most
explanatory theory we know? Of course not! Yet, sometimes gobbling up independently acceptable
laws are necessary for explanation: we unite both the kinetic theory of gases and the first law of
thermodynamics to explain the adiabatic expansion of ideal gases, and we unite thermodynamics,
electromagnetism, and acoustics to explain thunderclaps. We must characterize good explanations
involving independently acceptable laws without accepting irrelevancies in our explananda.
—
22. Salmon's four objections to explanations as argument. His first question is: why are
irrelevancies in the premises irrelevant to both deductive and inductive argument (given all
relevancies are included), yet they are fatal to explanations? Consider explaining the dissolution of
salt in a cup of holy water by mentioning salt dissolves in holy water — with the pragmatic
implication that there is any relevance to the fact that it is holy water! (Perhaps this is just a
pragmatic problem for explanations.)

His second question is: isn't it impossible to give (inductive) arguments for low probability events,
while it is possible to explain them?

His third question is: how can temporal asymmetries be fatal to explanations, but problematic
neither to deductive nor to inductive arguments? Consider how retrodiction can be just as fine an
argument as prediction, yet explanations in terms of later events are not adequate for a very large
class of events. (Few events admit of teleological explanation. Are there other explanation that
appeal to future states to explain past states?)
—
23. Carnap's inductive logic. It was developed in a 1950 “monumental work” named Logical
Foundations of Probability, with an update in 1962. One of its interesting features is that there is no
proposed criterion for the acceptance of a sentence. For no r (except perhaps r = 1) do we have any
mention of accepting H when: {P(H|E) = r , E , E contains all relevance evidence} [r]||- H. See
Salmon page 105. This creates problems for I-S explanations, and for the very notion of an
inductive argument. (Here's another argument against explanations being arguments!)
—
24. Weird explication of causality. See section 3.7 of Mr. Salmon's book. It does merit re-reading,
for I have not understood it very well. (Note: Bertrand Russell's solution to Zeno's paradox is called
at-at theory of motion. You recall it from Emiliano's seminar.) My view of causality is that is a
fundamental feature of a reality which we posit for theoretical and explanatory purposes. It exists at
the lowest levels of reality as necessary connexions (but then again, I should know more about
whether there is such a thing as quantum causation), and at the higher levels we have partial,
probabilistic causation, which works with ceteris paribus clauses.
—
25. Making teleological explanations rigorous. A fellow named Larry Wright developed in 1976,
just inside the initial boom of the philosophy of biology (with Morton Beckner's 1968 work, and the
1970s work of David Hull, Michael Ruse, and William Wimsatt), made the following explication of
how teleological explanation works, i.e. explanation of the form “A exists (is the way it is) for the
sake of B.” There are two sufficient requirements, and yet both are perfectly mechanical. First, that
(things of type) A has regularly caused / brought about (things of type) B in the past. Second, that
the causing of B in the past has made A exist (be the way it is). This is called consequence-
etiology: the consequences of A are ineliminable elements in the causal chain (etiology) that led it
to exist now (or be the way it is now).

Making functional explanations rigorous. The same dude provided an explication of functional
explanation that makes it the same as teleological explanation. The structure is the same. The only
difference is that, as I perhaps wrongly chose not to include above, in teleological explanation there
is an agent. So we'd have something of the form “S does A for the sake of B.” In functional
explanations we just have things of the form “The function of A is B.” Teleology are just functions
that are either foreseen by an intentional agent or, instead, merely “integrated” unconsciously into
the behavior of an intentional agent.

This account has been improved by John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter in 1987. See pp. 111-113 of
Mr. Salmon's book.
—
26. The modal, epistemic, and ontic conceptions of explanation. To explain something by X is,
respectively, to show it had to be the case given X [modal – but see notions of partial entailment, p.
120], to show that it was to be expected / predicted given X [epistemic – subjective probabilities],
and to show that it had a bigger probability of happening given X [ontic – objective probabilities,
see S-R model, usually involves causality or mechanism].

These three, Mr. Wesley Salmon contends, “harmoniously come together” under determinism (or at
least deductive explanation). What is to be expected is necessitated, and these are part of an
objective order of the world. (Aren't the counter-examples above cases in which these three
diverge?) Yet, they may diverge in an indeterministic scenario (or at least statistical expanation).
What is to be expected may not be necessitated; in fact, the modal conception may “(pace Mellor)
preclude statistical explanation.” Moreover, something that makes part of the order of the world (i.e.
has “nomicity”) may not have high probabilities (i.e. have “expectability”). See pages 120-121.

The epistemic conception of explanation admits of three versions; the explantion of some x is that...
from which x can be predicted or nomically expected [inferential – Hempel's view], that which
transmits of information about x [information-theoretic — Greeno, Hanna, and Sayre, not very
clear], and that which is an answer to questions of the form “why?” and “how come?” (or “how is it
possible?”) [erotetic – Braithwaite, Bromberger, van Fraassen]. See pages 121-122.

There's a possibility Salmon is including too much into each of these categories. I will list the
distinctions he made which do not look like distinctions at all. First, he already conceded the modal-
epistemic-ontic conceptions are coextensive when it comes to a deterministic explanation: that
which is necessitated is 100% expectable both “subjectively” and “objectively” (though I'm still not
very versed in the distinction between these two in this context).

Second, I am not aware of how to characterize the statistical version of modal explanation (which
its notion of partial necessity or partial entailment) in a way which does not either collapse it into
something like probabilistic causation (or stochastic mechanism), which is ontic, or into something
like expectability, which is epistemic.

Third, Salmon is always eager to eliminate explanations relativized to epistemic contexts, and thus
what is the point of talking about “subjective probability” (or talking about expectability or
predictability in an epistemic sense)? What is the difference between talking about objective
probability? (We could talk about objectively probability being less than one even if the world is
deterministic. This is because we could employ high-level generalizations which are not
deterministic, one of the reasons being that high-level structures can be dismantled by low-level
glitches, like high-level generalizations in the design or intentional stances can be defeated by
physical glitches of implementation.)
—
27. Convergence and Avogadro's number. A man named Jean Perrin in 1913 popularized thirteen
independent experiments which converged on the same number: Avogadro's number (N). They
ranged all the way from Brownian motion and alpha radiation/helium production, to blackbody
radiation, X-ray crystal diffraction, and electrolysis. Some of these experiments were done by him.
—
28. The explanatory hunger of the Laplace demon. Wesley Salmon argues briefly (on page 127) that
Laplace's demon would never need to explain anything. Explanations are needed to solve
perplexities, which in turn are caused by incomplete knowledge. Laplace's demon has perfect
knowledge of each state of the world, and may have complete knowledge of the causal connection
between each state. Salmon also commented that Bas van Fraassen would agree with his judgment.

I think he is mistaken, for a few reasons. The first reason is he misses patterns and unifications in
the high-levels of reality. This point is easier to comprehend when we first consider the problem of
levels of reality: is perfect knowledge of the lowest reaches of reality enough for perfect knowledge
of its highest structure? Laplace's demon fails to capture the pattern between “asking for pizza” and
“getting pizza,” because both are multiply realizable whereas he can only understand (given his
low-level descriptions) particular instances of pizza-asking and pizza-getting. This being so, the
demon does not understand why my many different actions bring about a flat, circular structure of
molten cheese in my house. What are their connection? What unifies them? (He would not even
have the concept of homeostasis, feedback loops, self-healing, etc. to explain why I keep existing.)

The second reason is that Laplace's demon has out of his sight any high-level limits to the way
things go. These limis can be expressed modally. Consider an example: profits never exceed
revenue minus spending. Why? The demon doesn't know. He only knows that it happens
unfailingly. He doesn't know that it couldn't happen otherwise, and that's because he doesn't know
why it happens unfailingly. As far as he knows, it is contingent and coincidental. (Take Terrence
Deacon's view of systems as working under constraints. Would the demon capture such constraints?
No. Predicting that something is always the case does not entail knowing that certain constraits
make it so it is always the case.)

Third, he would miss all non-causal explanations, I think. However, I have little understanding of
non-causal explanations. I can only think of logical-mathematical-computational explanations, of
limiting constraints, and of teleological explanations.
—
29.