Upper house

An upper house is one of two chambers of a bicameral legislature, the other chamber being the lower
house.[1] The house formally designated as the upper house is usually smaller and often has more restricted
power than the lower house. A legislature composed of only one house (and which therefore has neither an
upper house nor a lower house) is described as unicameral.

Definite specific characteristics

An upper house is usually different from the lower house in at least one of the following respects (though
they vary among jurisdictions):

Powers:

In a parliamentary system, it often has much less power than the lower house. Therefore, in
certain countries the upper house
votes on only limited legislative matters, such as constitutional amendments,
cannot initiate most kinds of legislation, especially those pertaining to supply/money,
fiscal policy
cannot vote a motion of no confidence against the government (or such an act is much
less common), while the lower house always can.
In a presidential system:
It may have equal or nearly equal power with the lower house.
It may have specific powers not granted to the lower house. For example:
It may give advice and consent to some executive decisions (e.g. appointments of
cabinet ministers, judges or ambassadors).
It may have the sole power to try (but not necessarily initiate) impeachment cases
against officials of the executive or even judicial branch, following enabling
resolutions passed by the lower house.
It may have the sole power to ratify treaties.
In a semi-presidential system:
It may have less power than the lower house
in semi-presidential France, the Government can decide to legislate a normal law
without the Sénat's agreement (Article 45 of the constitution), but
It may have equal power to the lower house regarding the constitution or the territorial
collectivities.
It may not vote a motion of no confidence against the government, but it may investigate
State cases.
It may make proposals of laws to the lower house.

Status:
 In some countries, its members are not popularly elected; membership may be indirect, ex
officio or by appointment.
Its members may be elected with a different voting system than that used to elect the lower
house (for example, upper houses in Australia and its states are usually elected by
proportional representation, whereas lower houses are usually not).
Less populated states, provinces, or administrative divisions may be better represented in
the upper house than in the lower house; representation is not always intended to be
proportional to population.
Members' terms may be longer than in the lower house and may be for life.
Members may be elected in portions, for staggered terms, rather than all at one time.
In some countries, the upper house cannot be dissolved at all, or can be dissolved only in
more limited circumstances than the lower house.
It typically has fewer members or seats than the lower house (though notably not in the
United Kingdom parliament).
It has usually a higher age of candidacy than the lower house.

Powers

Parliamentary systems

In parliamentary systems the upper house is frequently seen as an

advisory or a “house of review” chamber; for this reason, its powers
of direct action are often reduced in some way.[2] Some or all of the
following restrictions are often placed on upper houses:

Lack of control over the executive branch. (On the other The French Senate, hosted in the
hand, in the US and many other presidential systems, the Palais du Luxembourg
Senate or upper chamber has more control over the
composition of the Cabinet and the administration
generally, through its prerogative of confirming the president's nominations to senior offices.)
No absolute veto of proposed legislation, though suspensive vetoes are permitted in some
states.
In countries where it can veto legislation (such as the Netherlands), it may not be able to
amend the proposals.
A reduced or even absent role in initiating legislation.
No power to block supply, or budget measures (a rare example of a Parliamentary upper
house that does possess this power is the Australian Senate, which notably exercised that
power in 1975)

In parliamentary democracies and among European upper houses the Italian Senate is a notable exception to
these general rules, in that it has the same powers as its lower counterpart: any law can be initiated in either
house and must be approved in the same form by both houses. Additionally, a Government must have the
consent of both to remain in office, a position which is known as "perfect bicameralism" or "equal
bicameralism."

The role of a revising chamber is to scrutinise legislation that may have been drafted over-hastily in the
lower house and to suggest amendments that the lower house may nevertheless reject if it wishes to. An
example is the British House of Lords. Under the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the House of Lords can
no longer prevent the passage of most bills, but it must be given an opportunity to debate them and propose
amendments, and can thereby delay the passage of a bill with which it disagrees. Bills can only be delayed
for up to one year before the Commons can use the Parliament Act, although economic bills can only be
delayed for one month. It is sometimes seen as having a special role of safeguarding the uncodified
Constitution of the United Kingdom and important civil liberties against ill-considered change. The British
House of Lords has a number of ways to block legislation and to reject it; however, the House of Commons
can eventually use the Parliament Act to force something through. The Commons will often accept
amendments passed by the Lords; however, the two houses have sometimes reached a constitutional
standoff. For example, when the Labour Government of 1999 tried to expel all hereditary peers from the
Lords, the Lords threatened to wreck the Government's entire legislative agenda and to block every bill
which was sent to the chamber. This standoff led to negotiations between Viscount Cranborne, the then
Shadow Leader of the House, and the Labour Government, resulting in the Weatherill Amendment to the
House of Lords Act 1999, which preserved 92 hereditary peers in the house. Compromise and negotiation
between the two houses make the Parliament Act a very rarely used backup plan.

Even without a veto, an upper house may defeat legislation. Its

opposition may give the lower chamber a chance to reconsider or
even abandon a controversial measure. It can also delay a bill so
that it does not fit within the legislative schedule, or until a general
election produces a new lower house that no longer wishes to
proceed with the bill.

Nevertheless, some states have long retained powerful upper The chamber of the House of Lords,
houses. For example, the consent of the upper house to legislation the UK's Upper House
may be necessary (though, as noted above, this seldom extends to
budgetary measures). Constitutional arrangements of states with
powerful upper houses usually include a means to resolve situations where the two houses are at odds with
each other.

In recent times, Parliamentary systems have tended to weaken the powers of upper houses relative to their
lower counterparts. Some upper houses have been fully abolished; others have had their powers reduced by
constitutional or legislative amendments. Also, conventions often exist that the upper house ought not to
obstruct the business of government for frivolous or merely partisan reasons. These conventions have
tended to harden with a passage of time.

Presidential systems

In presidential systems, the upper house is frequently given other powers to compensate for its restrictions:

Executive appointments, to the cabinet and other offices, usually require its approval.
It frequently has the sole authority to give consent to ratify and abrogate foreign treaties.

Institutional structure
There are a variety of ways an upper house's members are assembled: by direct or indirect election,
appointment or a mixture of these. The German Bundesrat is composed of members of the cabinets of the
German states, in most cases the state premier and several ministers; they are delegated and can be recalled
anytime. In a very similar way, the Council of the European Union is composed of national ministers.

Many upper houses are not directly elected but appointed: either by the head of state, by the head of
government or in some other way. This is usually intended to produce a house of experts or otherwise
distinguished citizens, who would not necessarily be returned in an election. For example, members of the
Senate of Canada are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister.
In the past, some upper houses had seats that were entirely hereditary, such as in the British House of Lords
until 1999 and in the Japanese House of Peers until it was abolished in 1947.

It is also common that the upper house consists of delegates chosen by state governments or local officials.
Members of the Rajya Sabha in India are nominated by various states and union territories, while 12 of
them are nominated by the President of India. Similarly, at the state level, one-third of the members of the
State Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad) are nominated by local governments, one-third by sitting
legislators, and the rest are elected by select members of the electorate. The United States Senate was
chosen by the State legislatures until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913.

The upper house may be directly elected but in different proportions to the lower house - for example, the
senates of Australia, Brazil and the United States have a fixed number of elected members from each state,
regardless of the population.

Abolition
Many jurisdictions once possessed upper houses but abolished them to adopt unicameral systems, including
Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Mauritania, New Zealand, Peru, Sweden, Turkey,
Venezuela, many Indian states, Brazilian states, Canadian provinces, subnational entities such as
Queensland, and some other jurisdictions. Newfoundland had a Legislative Council prior to joining
Canada, as did Ontario when it was Upper Canada and Quebec from 1791 (as Lower Canada) to 1968.

Nebraska is the only state in the United States with a unicameral legislature, having abolished its lower
house in 1934, while the Senate of Nebraska, the upper house prior to 1934, continues to assemble.

The Australian state of Queensland also once had an appointed Legislative Council before abolishing it in
1922. All other Australian states continue to have bicameral systems (the two territories have always been
unicameral).

Like Queensland, the German state of Bavaria had an appointed upper house, the Senate of Bavaria, from
1946 to 1999.

The Senate of the Philippines was abolished – and restored – twice: from 1935 to 1945 when a unicameral
National Assembly convened, and from 1972 to 1987 when Congress was closed, and later a new
constitution was approved instituting a unicameral Parliament. The Senate was re-instituted with the
restoration of a bicameral Congress via a constitutional amendment in 1941, and via adoption of a new
constitution in 1987.

A previous government of Ireland (the 31st Dáil) promised a national referendum on the abolition of its
upper house, the Seanad Éireann, during the 24th Seanad session. By a narrow margin, the Irish public
voted to retain it. Conservative-leaning Fine Gael and Left-leaning Sinn Féin both supported the abolition,
while the centrist Fianna Fáil was alone among major parties in supporting the retention of the Seanad.

Titles of upper houses

Common terms
Senate — by far the most common
Legislative Council (Indian states having upper houses; Isle of Man; and every Australian
state that has an upper house)
Federal Council (Germany, Austria) or Federation Council (Russia)
 Council of States (Switzerland, India (Rajya Sabha), Sudan)
First Chamber — Netherlands (formerly, Sweden)
House of Lords – seen in the United Kingdom, as well as formerly in Ireland and in German-
speaking monarchies (Herrenhaus), e.g. the Austrian House of Lords and the Prussian
House of Lords

Unique titles

Government Upper house unique title Translation

Bosnia and Herzegovina Dom naroda House of Peoples

Republic of China (Taiwan) Control Yuan[3] Supervisory House

Denmark Landstinget Deliberative assembly

Ethiopia Yefedereshn Mekir Bet House of Federation

Rajya Sabha Council of States

India
Vidhan Parishad Legislative Council
Indonesia Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Regional Representative Council

Japan Sangiin House of Councillors

Kingdom of Hungary Főrendiház House of Magnates

Malaysia Dewan Negara National Assembly (Senate)

Myanmar Amyotha Hluttaw[4] House of Nationalities

Nepal Rastriya Sabha National Assembly

Republic of Somaliland Golaha Guurtida House of Elders

Slovenia Državni svet National Council

South Africa National Council of Provinces

Thailand Wutthisaphaa Senior Council

Notes and references

1. Bicameralism (1997) by George Tsebelis
2. Russell, Meg (2000). "REFORMING THE HOUSE OF LORDS: Lessons from Overseas" (htt
ps://www.aspg.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/22-BookReview-Griffith.pdf) (PDF).
Australasian Study of Parliament Group. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2022102500
0022/https://www.aspg.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/22-BookReview-Griffith.pdf)
(PDF) from the original on 25 October 2022. Retrieved 24 January 2022.
3. Ceased to be a parliamentary chamber in 1993.
4. "National Parliament - Beta" (https://web.archive.org/web/20141214142004/http://www.amyo
thahluttaw.gov.mm/). www.amyothahluttaw.gov.mm. Archived from the original (http://www.am
yothahluttaw.gov.mm/) on 14 December 2014. Retrieved 2 March 2016.

Further reading
Aroney, Nicholas (2008). "Four Reasons for an Upper House: Representative Democracy,
 Public Deliberation, Legislative Outputs and Executive Accountability" (https://poseidon01.ss
rn.com/delivery.php?ID=68710106700810302102602400107608009009605505804702304
303108800110908710802908902812106105300000003309705211607412502602209607
000909401004501412112700411811808607107508512700209902802312108211309508
0104121081027119117006027108109092066005102102089&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE).
Adelaide Law Review. 29. Retrieved 21 February 2021.
Stone, Bruce (2008). "State legislative councils: designing for accountability." In N. Aroney,
S. Prasser, & J. R. Nethercote (Eds.), Restraining Elective Dictatorship (https://research-repo
sitory.uwa.edu.au/files/1485835/5257_PID5257.pdf) (PDF). UWA Publishing. pp. 175–195.
ISBN 978-1-921401-09-1.

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