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Developments in LNG Storage Overview of LNG Storag PDF
Developments in LNG Storage Overview of LNG Storag PDF
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by
C Collins
D A Patel
J Tarlowski
of
M W Kellogg Ltd.
Introduction
The LNG industry emerged with truly commercial international operation in 1964, when this
concentrated form of energy was first transported from Algeria to the UK. Since this time the
LNG market has grown at a steady pace and is expected to continue this trend in the next
decade. There are a number of LNG production and receiving terminal projects at various
stages throughout the world now that are being designed to meet the expected growth in the
LNG business. For these facilities, the LNG storage tanks are key equipment items, since
they represent a major portion of the project capital. Typically, tankage cost for 4 MTPA
receiving terminal and 6 MTPA export plant can represent up to 45% and 13% of the total
project cost, respectively.
The overall safety record of LNG storage systems has been very good. The only LNG tank
failure with safety consequences was the Cleveland, Ohio failure in 1944, and this tank was
constructed of 3 ½ % nickel steel, a material now recognised as having inadequate low
temperature toughness properties for LNG service. Improvements in steel making practice in
recent years have resulted in improved properties for the 9% nickel steel most commonly
used for the primary liquid container, thus providing greater safety than less tough 9% nickel
material used in earlier tanks. Toughness tests made on the 9% nickel steel material
dismantled after 20 or more years of service revealed insignificant or no loss of toughness
properties.
Most LNG tanks built up to the mid ‘70s were Single Containment type constructed with a low
earthen dike or bund wall and were generally built to API 6201 Appendix Q. The earliest
tanks were double roof designs with nitrogen purge in the annular space between the inner
and outer tank. This type of tank is still constructed in Japan. Some tanks were built with
tapered aluminium shell plates or stainless steel shell rings, but the industry adopted 9% Ni
steel for the inner tank after completion and publication of the Final Results from Operation
Cryogenics in 19602. Adoption of open top inner tank designs with an insulation deck
suspended from the outer tank roof followed shortly thereafter. The outer tank and roof were
made from carbon steel to contain the insulating material and warm LNG vapour. Almost all
of LNG tanks built in the USA are of single containment design. Generally these tanks were
also provided with a bottom side outlet for external pumps.
Testing and research into the behaviour of LNG gas cloud dispersion and fires was begun in
the early ‘70s and continued in the ‘80s (see ref.3). As a result of better understanding of
LNG vapour clouds and fires, the importance of reducing the vapour cloud expansion was
recognised. This led to the provision of high bund walls in close proximity of conventional
single containment LNG storage tanks, and the increased use of double or full containment
designs.
Following testing on a small concrete tank by Linde and the Institute of Gas Technology in
1962, it was concluded that prestressed concrete (PC) was suitable for storing LNG. In 1964
Preload (now Cryocrete/Kvaerner) completed a 2000 m3 LNG tank with Invar membrane
inner container and prestressed concrete outer tank for Gaz de France at Nantes. Gaz de
France carried out further tests on a small concrete tank with liquid nitrogen in 1968 at
Nantes to check the effects of thermal shocks on concrete. In 1971, one 80,000 m3 LNG tank
was built for Texas Eastern at Staten Island, New York. The tank had a pre-stressed
The first large scale application of present day design Full Containment type tanks with PC
outer wall, reinforced concrete roof and 9% nickel inner open top tank were constructed for
Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. and Abu Dhabi National Oil Co (ADNOC). This project
began with preparation of project specifications and site plans for ADNOC by M.W. Kellogg
Ltd (MWKL) in the late 1970’s and was completed by CBI in 1985 with MWKL participation
throughout the project. Three 80,000 m3 LNG and four 50,000 m3 LPG tanks were
constructed in close proximity to each other. The outer tanks were designed for three
external impact hazards, thermal radiation resulting from burnout of one of the adjacent tanks
and a postulated vapour cloud explosion. (see ref. 4 )
In addition to postulated external impact hazards, the tanks were designed for sudden
rupture (zip failure) of the inner tank, and overfilling of the inner tank resulting in product in
the annular space in direct contact with the outer wall. A corner protection (expansion joint)
was provided to protect lower portions of the wall. Current day safety standards (BS 7777 &
EN14735) do not consider burnout, sudden rupture, or overfilling as realistic design scenarios
for the Full Containment designs described above.
In addition to the research and testing programs conducted in the USA in the late 50’s/early
60’s and subsequent follow-up programs (see ref. 6 ), work was carried out in the early ‘80s
in improving material properties for improved resistance to initiation and/or propagation of
brittle fracture under the sponsorship of the Gas Research Institute. Results of this work were
discussed at a TWI Seminar7 in 1986. Also, in 1986, the Engineering Equipment & Materials
Users Association (EEMUA), a UK based organisation of major companies in the energy and
chemicals industry, published a document No. 1478. This recommended practice concluded
that use of proper steel, correct welding procedure and inspection eliminated sudden failure
of inner tank (zip failure) as a design requirement, as had been previously reported by the
USA toughness testing programs and reported to API and ASME committees. EEMUA No.
147 for the first time divided low temperature and cryogenic tanks in three groups which
were called Single, Double and Full Containment tanks. The work carried out in preparing
EEMUA 147, was used as the basis for developing the current standard BS 77779 to replace
BS 474110 and BS 538711.
Appendix Q of API 620 has not fundamentally changed since the mid ‘70s, however, when
used in conjunction with NFPA-59A12, it does reflect acceptable practice in the USA and
many other parts of the world. Appendix Q is applicable for double wall steel tanks, it does
not address special requirements for Double or Full containment types of tanks. The
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) established Technical Committee TC265 in
1991 to develop European Standard (EN) for site built metallic tanks for the storage of
liquids. A working group within TC265 is developing a standard for the LNG tanks.
Consideration of the sudden failure of the inner tank is not a design requirement of either of
the major tank codes, when all the requirements of these codes are satisfied. Hence, where
the tank is designed, built and quality controlled to satisfy the requirements of BS 7777or API
620 Appendix Q, zip failure of the 9% Ni tank is not considered a credible event. G G
Karcher and C Clarke13 concluded at The Welding Institute Symposium in 1986 that tanks
designed and built to API 620 would provide the industry with storage tanks which virtually
eliminated the risk of brittle fracture and minimised the risk of catastrophic failure.
The economies of scale drive in recent years has led to testing and development work, which
has permitted construction of a 180,000 m3 tank with 9% Ni steel plates. Plate thickness and
weld joints of up to 50 mm thickness have been qualified with proven anti-crack initiation and
crack propagation arresting properties.
Membrane Tanks:
The membrane technology was first developed for carrying LNG on ships, where fatigue
considerations are an important factor. According to EN 1473, the above ground membrane
type of tank with PC outer tank is an acceptable type of Full Containment tank for storing
LNG. These tanks, when constructed in above ground configuration, can be as competitive
as the Full Containment tanks with 9% Nickel inner container. However, the boil-off gas rate
will be greater and can be twice the amount normally associated with double wall tank. In-
ground tanks using a membrane liner have been in service in Japan since 1970. These tend
to be very expensive to build but offer a very safe form of storage and economic use of the
available land. Their application has been confined to Japan, Taiwan and South Korea only.
In-pit Tanks:
In-pit tanks, consisting of a PC outer tank with 9% Nickel inner tank constructed inside an
open top concrete vault have been constructed in Zeebrugge, Belgium and on Revithoussa
Island for DEPA, in Greece. MWKL provided initial specifications and continuing services for
both of these terminal projects. This type of tank is an expensive and time consuming option
when considerations for visual impact, safety from possible shipboard explosions (Zeebrugge
Harbor) and large amplitude seismic design criteria (DEPA tanks) over ride other economic
considerations.
The development work and construction experience to date has allowed the industry to build
very large above ground Single and Full Containment tanks for storage of LNG with
capacities up to 180,000 m3. In Japan and South Korea very large in-ground LNG storage
tanks with membrane inner container (200,000 m3 capacity) have been constructed or are
under construction. The recent experience in large scale tank projects have also resulted in
reduced cost per cubic metre storage of LNG for other containment types. Other benefits a
larger tank may bring are more efficient use of the available land and reduction in overall
project cost. Recent experience in large capacity tanks is listed in Table 1.
A recent survey of budget costs for a range of above ground Full Containment tanks (9%
Ni/PC) from 80,000 to 150,000 m3 indicates that per cubic metre installed tank cost reduces
by approximately 21% (see graph below - Figure 1)
F u ll C o n ta in m e n t L N G T a n k P e r C u .M .
C o n s tru c tio n C o s ts v /s S iz e
105
( For 80,000 Cu.M tank based at 100 units)
Relative Cost/cubic metre
100
95
90
85
80
75
50 75 10 12 15 17
,0 ,0 0. 5. 0. 5.
00 00 .. .. .. ..
L N G S to r a g e T a n k S i z e i n C u b i c M e tr e s
Tank Type
The choice of Single, Double or Full Containment type of tank depends on the specific
location, HSE assessment, regulatory requirement and the level and acceptance of risks
involved. Considering the LNG tank cost only, Full Containment tanks with concrete roofs are
the most expensive type, as these have outer tank and roof made with
prestressed/reinforced concrete. Double Containment tanks are expected to be less
expensive when compared to the Full Containment design. Single Containment tanks are the
cheapest to construct as these can be built in 2 years against 3 years for the Full
Containment type.
A terminal with Full Containment tanks can be laid out on a much smaller plot, resulting in
cost savings in piping runs, access roads, utilities, etc. There are other factors, arising out of
the type of LNG tank chosen, which will have impact on the total cost of the LNG import
terminal and these are discussed below.
Tank Size
It was previously noted that larger tanks provide economical storage. For example, it is
expected to be cheaper to build two tanks of 150,000 m3 instead of three tanks of 100,000
m3 when a total storage capacity of 300,000 m3 is required at the terminal. Larger and fewer
tanks also have benefits in reducing the required plot space and piping runs.
Design Code:
A tank designed and constructed to fully satisfy the requirements of BS 7777 results in a
more expensive design compared to a tank built to API 620, Appendix Q requirements, since
the BS 7777 Code requires a full design height hydrotest and 100% radiography of all shell
butt weld joints. However, a requirement to fully comply to NFPA 59A-1996 results in 100%
radiographic examination of inner tank shell butt welds. Some material requirements are also
more stringent in BS 7777 when compared to those in API 620 Appendix Q.
Tank geometry is optimised by the tank builder to produce the most cost effective design for
the given set of design parameters. However, the choice of in-tank pumps and their ability to
reach the lowest possible pump down level can have an impact on the bottom ullage
requirement. At the tank top, required free space for level alarm controls and to provide
space for seismic sloshing also has an impact on the tank cost.
Seismic design requirements are dependent on the geographic location for the tank. Some
locations have good quality data available for specifying the seismic design requirements.
Other locations may have a history of seismic activity but the quality of data available may
not be comprehensive. This may lead to over or under specification for the earthquake
intensities for the operational basis earthquake (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)
cases which are required design parameters in NFPA-59A and EN 1473.
At a seismically active location a large diameter tank with a low height to diameter ratio may
result in a more economical design compared to a design utilising seismic isolators.
Installation of seismic isolators requires two base slabs and may reduce the horizontal and
vertical seismic design forces by 50%. For example, the tanks at Marmara Eregisi terminal in
Turkey have a large diameter with low height design, whereas those at the Revithoussa
terminal in Greece have seismic isolators under the tank base.
Full Containment tanks have been designed for pressures up to 300 mbarg, whereas Single
and Double Containment tanks have been traditionally designed for 150 mbarg maximum
and usually much less. Higher operating pressures of Full Containment tanks with concrete
roofs allows the installation of lower capacity vapour handling equipment for ship unloading,
which can result in substantial cost savings.
Recently in Japan two all metal tanks have been built with 250 mbarg design pressure. The
additional cost from increasing the pressure from150 mbarg to 250 mbarg was reported to
be approximately 2% of the tank cost. The higher design pressure capability gives a distinct
advantage in reducing the cost of vapour handling equipment. However, with Single
Containment or other bare steel roof higher pressure designs, the high cost of long pipe runs,
deluge water and foam equipment can not be eliminated.
• Cost of the LNG tank increases with reduction in the specified BOG rate, as more
insulation material is required.
• Reduction in BOG produced is desirable for reducing the capital and operating cost of
the BOG compressors.
The terminal vapour handling system and tank boil off gas rates require assessment for
optimising the overall capital and O&M costs. Where the terminal vapour handling system
has to be very large for the ship unloading case, the tank BOG rate has very little impact on
the sizing of compressors. It is usual to specify between 0.05% and 0.08% BOG rate due to
heat in-leak for double wall LNG tanks.
API 620 Appendix Q permits a partial height hydrotest such that the total load imposed on
the tank foundation during hydrotest does not exceed 125% of the foundation design basis.
This code also requires the stress in any part of the tank be limited to 85% of MYS or 55% of
UTS. LNG tanks designed, constructed and hydrotested in accordance with API 620
requirements are in service at many locations worldwide.
Although BS 7777 has a similar limit on stress level during hydrotest, it requires a full design
height test with water. Thus for tanks designed to BS 7777, the hydrotest condition
determines the plate thickness for the tank wall. A full height hydrotest also imposes
expensive foundation and bottom insulation designs since the total load from water and tank
weight imposed on the tank foundation during hydrotest exceeds 200% of the maximum
operating load. The industry has recognised the disadvantages of full hydrotest as required
in BS 7777. A full height test increases the tank building cost and limits the size of tanks that
could be built using BS 7777 (see references 14 and 15). EN 1473 now allows a partial
hydrotest as low as 125% of the rated load, which is the same as the API 620 requirement.
Full hydrotest also requires more test water and additional time for filling and emptying the
tank.
Soil Conditions
A tank built on a well compacted tank pad without the need to provide piled foundation is the
most economic solution. Where the geotechnical conditions are not suitable such that
unacceptable total and differential settlement may result, a piled foundation is required,
which can add significant cost. For a Single Containment tank, if a large diameter low height
bund is required to be built on soft soils subject to settlement, the piling cost for such a bund
can be very high. In such circumstances, it may be more economical to opt for either a
Double Containment tank which has a bund within 6 m of the primary tank or choose a Full
Containment tank.
A recent study at MWKL concluded that Full Containment tanks can provide an overall
economic solution when additional cost for piles to support the bund wall, vapour handling
equipment, fire fighting equipment and long piping runs to flare were considered as additional
costs applied to Single Containment tanks.
BS 7777 and NFPA 59A - 1996 require 100% radiography of inner tank shell butt welds
whereas API 620 Appendix Q is selective with requirements based on stress levels and
location of welds. Weld examination is essential to monitor the weld quality. Due to the
hazards and necessary precautions associated with radiographic examination, the technique
is both expensive and time consuming. Development of ultrasonic (UT) procedures and
techniques and their acceptance by major safety codes is expected to yield time and cost
savings for required non destructive examinations.
The amount and type of equipment and accessories specified for service on and in the tank
has some impact on cost. Relief valves venting directly to atmosphere offers a cheaper
solution when compared to those venting to the flare system. However, venting directly to the
atmosphere may not always be acceptable for HSE reasons. Other items contributing to the
cost include:
Safety Issues
Basic guidelines for the safe design, installation, testing and operation of LNG facilities are
outlined in safety standards, NFPA 59A and EN 1473. The combination of load and
accidental cases to be considered whilst designing LNG tanks are given in Annex A of EN
1473. The approach in NFPA 59A is prescriptive and may result in higher costs for providing
safety equipment for LNG tanks.
Guidelines for considering the effects of a blast over pressure wave on the tank structure
resulting from a nearby explosion are given in BS 7777. The purchaser is responsible for
ensuring that any applicable blast effects are taken into account. EN 1473 requires
assessment of risk from an over pressure wave generating explosions. It also states that the
widely used method, for its simplicity, of the TNT equivalent, which equilibrates the gas
explosion to a TNT explosion, is too conservative when applied to unconfined natural gas
clouds.
For protecting LNG tanks, blast wave scenarios should be considered when there is an LPG
or other hazardous substances (e.g. ethylene) processing or storage facility within or
adjacent to the plant. The magnitude of blast load depends on the quantity and nature of
hydrocarbon vapour, level of confinement and distance of blast from the tank requiring
protection. Blast protection requirements are normally defined by the purchaser after
considering safety, environmental and capital protection issues and following a consequence
analysis. In a recent paper16, it has been suggested that steel tanks can be designed
economically for blast pressures up to 0.07 bar and concrete tanks can be designed for a
higher pressure. Design of steel tanks for blast overpressures that exceed 0.07 bar will result
in significant additional costs.
Usually blast conditions are considered only for their effect on normally occupied buildings
and personnel safety. It is not a common industry practice to consider blast resistant designs
for equipment unless the consequences would be unacceptable. Since a typical LNG tank of
100,000 m3 cost US $ 45 million and its inventory cost is US $ 9 million today, the economic
consequence of its loss may not be acceptable to some owners.
BS 7777 requires weight and velocity values to be provided by the purchaser if design for
flying objects is to be considered. BS 7777 suggests a value of 55 kg (to represent valve
body) mass for flying objects whereas some contractors specify 110 kg (to represent valve
with actuator) mass. This is based on a typical missile from a plant explosion. API 620 and
NFPA 59A do not have any requirements for external impact loading. General requirements
for consideration and method of evaluation for deformable (e.g. aircraft body) and
indeformable (e.g. aircraft engine) are given in Annex A of EN 1473.
Generally, for Full Containment tanks with concrete roofs a 110 kg mass flying object (valve
plus its actuator) does not impose any additional cost as these have a thick concrete wall
and roof. For metal tanks, 55 kg mass flying object does not impose any additional cost
where the metal wall thickness is 10 mm or larger. Design of Membrane tanks for flying
objects must include consideration that the concrete wall provides primary support for the
membrane container.
The fire protection to be installed on an LNG tank and on the tank-top equipment will be
dependent both on the tank design and the fire scenarios against which protection is needed.
These fire scenarios may be split into two basic groups:
a. Fire hazards at a tank originating from accidents and incidents at the tank itself; for
example an ignited RV or an LNG spill from joints and seals at the tank top platform
b. Fire Hazards originating from fire at an adjoining tank or facility; for example impounding
basin fire, ignited RV discharge at an adjoining tank or potential major fire at a nearby
tank
For pre-stressed concrete the concrete thickness has to be adequate to maintain the integrity
of the LNG tank with full liquid load and pressure. Where no water deluge system is installed,
tank integrity has to be guaranteed during the time needed to bring in adequate supply of
water from an external source. If the time needed to bring in deluge water is excessive, pre-
stressing strands and rebars would need to be designed to ensure that any loss of strength
due to prolonged fire exposure is compensated for. For the membrane type of tank this is
very important since the outer container supports the membrane container.
For metallic Single and Double Containment tanks, full diameter bund fires and roof collapse
may need to be considered in the site fire protection provisions. With Full Containment tanks,
total tank failure resulting in the tank burnout is not a credible scenario, hence the required
deluge water and foam equipment is very small for Full Containment tanks with concrete
roofs when compared to that for the other types of tanks. This can produce substantial cost
savings.
For fires originating external to the tank, if predicted thermal radiation from a nearby
impoundment basin or tank fire is above the criteria for inherent resistance of the tank
structure, provision of deluge or other forms of fire protection will be required. Other tanks,
nearby a Full Containment tank, do not require fire protection against external fires beyond
the intrinsic capabilities of the tank structure to handle small local spills or incidents, such as
an LNG road tanker accident on the nearest road. This approach is seen in the current trend
to eliminate the costs of tank wall deluge on Full Containment LNG tanks, unless there are
particular local hazards such as an especially close impoundment basin or a nearby metallic
D:\data\Papers\LNG2k-7.doc Paper No. 1651 Page 10 of 13
tank for which an ‘incredibility of failure’ case cannot be made. Where recognition has to be
given to full burnout of an adjoining tank, the fire protection requirements will be particularly
onerous.
For steel roof tanks, the roof has to be protected from LNG spillage which may occur as a
result of pipe leak, or leak from a flange joint, cable entry seal failure or valve stem seal
failure. The NFPA 59A requirement is to consider the failure of the largest line and resulting
spillage for 10 minutes in the impounding area. There is no requirement stated in NFPA-59A
that the full line failure scenario be applied on the tank roof. The full line failure scenario
requires a comprehensive protection and collection system in the impounding area. Where it
can be established that such failure is not a credible event, a less comprehensive protection
and collection system can be installed, thereby reducing the cost.
The requirements in NFPA 59A – 1996 are relevant and applicable to plants within the USA
and its territories. Where the plant is being built outside the USA, local requirements must be
met. Compliance with the requirements intended for the US plants should be reviewed
carefully with fitness for purpose in mind. The need for compliance to the recommendation in
EN 1473 should also be checked with the local regulatory authority.
A number of power projects either in construction, such as Dhabol, India and Penuelas in
Puerto Rico, or in development, e.g. Pipavav in India and Bilbao in Spain, Kwangyang in
South Korea, utilise vaporised LNG as feed gas to the power plant. This does provide an
opportunity for cost savings by integrating the LNG import and electrical generation facilities.
The integrated use of cooling water and cold recovery can be considered to improve overall
economics. Further cost reductions can be achieved by integrating the plant utilities,
administration and maintenance facilities. Reduction in operational costs are also achievable
by combining the management and other functions common to both facilities. Ideally, the two
plants should be as close as possible; however, there are safety implications and careful
assessment of different LNG tank designs must be made together with the plant layout to
arrive at a cost effective, safe solution. Layout considerations includes assessment of
required separation between the relief valve discharges and ignition sources such as flare,
exhaust stack, road tanker filling points and power lines.
Onshore Storage:
The LNG storage tank technology has moved rapidly in all areas by developing better 9%
Nickel steels, building larger tanks both above ground and in-ground, building inherently
safer storage tank systems and reducing costs where possible. Significant developments
include tougher 9% Nickel steels and welding consumables, seismic isolators for tanks in
high earthquake zones and improved Non Destructive Examination (NDE) methods and
procedures.
Offshore Storage:
Studies concerning offshore natural gas liquefaction and liquid natural gas vaporisation
plants incorporate consideration of the requirements for LNG storage tanks.
Various schemes have been proposed for these floating LNG facilities including:
• Mobil’s17 Floating LNG Plant, where the LNG storage consists of triple containment
concrete tanks located in the floater.
• Studies associated with the AZURE18 project include a review of both concrete and steel
hulls in which provision is made for LNG storage.
• The Kvaerner concept uses the traditional spheres, installed on some LNG ships, for
LNG containment. The process facilities are located between or adjacent to the spheres.
The storage of LNG in an offshore situation requires special attention to deck layout and
safety. The sloshing effect in partially filled tanks must also be considered in the design of
these facilities.
The alternative to FPSO for LNG plants is to use a gravity based structure and some
information has been published on the comparison between FPSO and GBS schemes. Of
course, the latter is favoured in shallow locations.
A number of attempts have been made to store LNG directly in frozen soil or rock caverns.
These have so far not been successful due to excessive boil off rates, extensive permafrost
and development of fissures between storage areas. Development work in this area is
continuing, but if successful will probably be restricted to locations with suitable geological
conditions.