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Strange bedfellows:
a network analysis of
Mali’s northern
conflict
Olivier Walther, Antonin Tisseron | December 18, 2015

Unravelling the Malian puzzle requires

looking at the way in which relations
between antagonists explain the political
violence in Mali. Building on previous
work in which we applied social network
analysis to West Africa’s conflicts [i], in this
research article we will map the alliances
and conflicts between groups involved in the
Malian conflict. This map will allow us to
formulate some principles to explain the
apparent unpredictability of many of the
contemporary conflicts in the Sahel-Sahara.

Much ink has flowed during the last four years to

describe the relationships between state and non-state
actors involved in the Malian conflict. In a region
transformed into a battleground for rebels, terrorists
and traffickers, armed groups split and coalesce
unpredictably, change names as new opportunities
arise, and morph into transient coalitions between
tribal and ethnic groups.

For example, the Salafist Group for Preaching and

Combat, itself a splinter group of the Armed Islamic
Group of Algeria, rebranded itself as Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Some of its members broke
off to form the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in
West Africa (MUJAO), which then merged with a
splinter group called Al Moulathamoun to form Al
Mourabitoun. Al Mourabitoun was then briefly
renamed Al-Qaeda in West Africa before re-joining
AQIM.

A similar volatility characterizes commanders and

rank-and-file fighters who frequently shift allegiances
among regular forces, rebel movements and violent
extremist groups. A man like Iyad ag Ghaly, for
example, has been a fighter in the Islamic Legion of the
late Colonel Gadhafi, a rebel in multiple rebellions, a
government negotiator and a consular officer for the
Malian government, before founding the Islamist group
Ansar Dine.

Conflicts and alliances

The groups currently in conflict in Mali form a rather
compact and dense cluster of enemies. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, which maps the relations
between 15 belligerents in 2015 using a social network
analysis methodology. This figure shows that the
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA), the Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imhad et
Alliés (GATIA), the High Council for the Unity of
Azawad (HCUA) and the Malian military are
simultaneously involved in many conflicts and tied to
other actors that also have many enemies. Islamist
groups have a significant number of enemies, but fewer
than many rebel armed groups.

Figure 2: Alliances and conflicts between selected

organizations in Mali, 2015 (click to enlarge)[ii]

In purely network terms, having a high number of

enemies and being connected to parts of the network
that have the greatest degree of warfare is a structural
constraint. Such negative relationships adversely affect
organizations’ military operations, reduce their ability
to coordinate activities across the region, and limit the
number of allies with whom they can cooperate to
achieve their political goals.

Considering the high number of conflicts between

organizations in the region, it is not surprising that the
structure of the network of allies contrasts strongly
with the structure for the network of enemies. Instead
of forming a compact and dense cluster, this network of
positive ties is fragmented into several sub-groups. The
first cluster connects Al-Qaeda affiliated organizations
and the newly-created Macina Liberation Front (FLM).
This cluster is isolated from both government and rebel
forces. Government forces can mainly count on support
from the pro-governmental militia GATIA and from the
United Nations Mission in Mali. On the rebel side,
organizations that are part of the separatist
Coordination of Movements of Azawad (MNLA, MAA,
HCUA) form a triad separate from those that belong to
the pro-government Platform of Algiers (CMFPR, CPA).

The fragmentation of the network of allies highlights

the lack of broad coalitions among rebels and the
relative isolation of the government. The contrast
between the high density of conflicts and the sparsity of
alliances is even more visible when both negative
(enemies) and positive (allies) ties are represented
simultaneously in a third graph in Figure 1.
Government forces, rebels and Islamists form three
components of a political environment with relatively
equal structural constraints. Consequently, none of
them is capable of rallying support from the rest of the
network and building a broad and sustainable alliance.

Is the enemy of my enemy

really my friend?
In a political environment as uncertain as Mali, the
only certainty is that alliances will be renegotiated and
that new conflicts will arise. But how exactly? On the
basis of the above analysis we can formulate three
general principles characterizing the northern Malian
context. These apply not only to terrorist groups and
rebels, but also to the Malian state itself which, since its
independence in 1960, has been one of the main
architects of the power relationships forged in the
North of the country.

First, any alliance or conflict is possible. Any state or

non-state actor may at one time or another be allied
with, or the enemy of, another. This applies to both
organizations and individuals, further complicating
peace processes in the region. The alliance between the
secular MNLA and religious extremists at the beginning
of the Malian conflict in 2012 illustrates that there is no
fundamental antagonism between the actors currently
in conflict in the region. Even the state itself can ally
with armed groups and tolerate religious extremists, as
happened during the presidency of Amadou Toumani
Touré (2002–2012). At the individual level, the Malian
conflict shows that the same individuals can pass from
the ranks of the army to the rebellion, from the
rebellion to religious extremists, and from religious
extremist groups to rebel or pro-government groups if
circumstances are favourable. For example, a few
weeks after being arrested by French soldiers, the
former chief of police of MUJAO, Yoro Ould Daha, was
released by the Malian government and decided to join
a pro-government faction of the MAA.

Second, many conflicts have their origins in the

balance of power between the various segments that
compose local societies in the North of the country.
Conflicts reflect tribal, regional and social fault lines
within these societies and their inability to unite at the
national or supranational level. Tuareg and Arab
societies are still divided into confederations, tribes,
factions and sub-factions that may ally against
segments of the same order and unite with these
segments against wider segments. Former Tuareg noble
tribes, such as the Ifoghas, for example, have
conflicting relationships with former vassal tribes and
with other noble tribes from other regions. Another
fault line can be observed between countries: Tuareg
rebel movements from Niger and Mali have never
merged despite a common cultural heritage and similar
grievances with their respective governments. Tuareg
and Arab societies are also internally divided between
those who migrated to neighbouring countries due to
the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, and those who
stayed in their own country. Finally, economic
inequalities are rising within both Tuareg and Arab
societies, between those who profit from the trade of
illegal goods and people across the Sahara, and those
who rely on pastoralism or tourism, two industries that
have been hit by recent droughts and political
insecurity.

Whether such internal divisions can eventually be

overcome by a more ideological project, such as the
restoration of a theological order, remains a matter of
scholarly debate. The creation of the Islamist group
Ansar Dine – whose name means Defenders of the Faith
– for example, was motivated both by religious factors
and internal power struggles among Tuareg tribes.
More recently, the Macina-based FLM is seen by many
as an attempt to restore the Caliphate of Hamdullahi
formed in the 19th century in the Inner Niger River
Delta by Shekou Amadou. Both Ansar Dine and FLM –
which claimed responsibility for the attack on the
Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako in November 2015 (also
claimed by AQIM and Al-Mourabitoune) – seem to have
developed a religious and political project that does not
exclusively rely on tribal and ethnic alliances against a
common enemy.

Third, there is no durable alliance between groups.

Because alliances result from a temporary agreement
among local actors, they frequently dissolve when a
better deal comes along or when a common enemy
disappears. Continuing mergers and divisions between
groups should, therefore, be considered a normal state.
When the French offensive started in 2013, for
example, most of the fighters from Ansar Dine joined
the MNLA or the newly created Islamic Arab Movement
(MIA) founded by Alghabass Ag Intalla. A few months
later, MIA integrated the new HCUA, headed by
Alghabass Ag Intalla’s brother Mohamed. During the
same period, fighters of the MUJAO also created their
own movement, the MAA, arguing that their goal was
now to reach a peace agreement. While peace
negotiations are usually favourable to the creation of
new coalitions, the signature of peace agreements
frequently leads to the fragmentation of armed groups,
as when the Tuareg rebellion divided into multiple
tribal-based movements in 1991. The lucrative business
of trafficking drugs and arms across the Sahara is also a
source of versatile conflicts and alliances, which
transcend political and religious boundaries between
groups. Money flows generated by trafficking explain
many episodes of violence between armed groups that
compete for control of key trans-Saharan roads.
Occasionally, alliances of convenience can also be
forged between groups that temporarily agree on
stability in order to conduct their business and
maintain their influence, as in the recent local peace
agreements between northern businessmen and
warlords in Anéfis.

Which way North? Two

scenarios
The reason why the Malian crisis is so complex is
because the two most obvious strategies that could
contribute to easing political tensions in the northern
part of the country are not feasible at this moment.

The first option would be to invest heavily in transport

infrastructure, telecommunications and local
government services beyond the Niger River Bend and
physically secure the North with substantial military
and law-enforcement forces. However, such a regional
strategy comes up against two significant obstacles, the
first one being that rebel groups in Northern Mali
demand more decentralized investments, but also more
political autonomy, while the interest of the Malian
government is to invest where it can project its power
and to restore formal political control in the North. The
fact that over 50 years after Mali’s independence there
is still no paved road connecting Timbuktu and Kidal to
the rest of the country gives some idea of the challenges
ahead.

The other option is to use local tribes and govern the

North by delegation which is how the French ruled
during the colonial era. Allied to the Tuareg Ifoghas and
Arab Kounta tribes, the French let them weaken the
Iwellemmeden confederation and establish their
political dominance in the region. Like the French
before them, presidents in the post-colonial era have
sought to support one or other of the northern tribes in
order to govern. This principle, which temporarily buys
the loyalty of certain groups, does not guarantee
political stability in the long term, as evidenced by the
four major rebellions in the last 50 years.

In a political environment in which political alliances

can be forged between any kind of groups, but only for
a limited time, neither the state, the rebels nor the
terrorists are capable of building a large coalition that
would transcend social and religious divisions. The
inability to govern northern Mali other than through
local tribes has never been so obvious, both for the
Malian government, which reproduces a political
system born during the time of colonization, and for
the international community, whose resources are
stretched to the limit after several years of conflict in
what is probably
one of the world’s most inhospitable places for Western
armies.

So which way North? A possible compromise would be

to reconcile regional development and state
consolidation in the North. This strategy – which would
lead to better integration of the North with the rest of
the country in exchange for the restoration of state
authority from Sévaré to Taoudeni – is a fine line to
walk, but possibly the only one that could ensure
lasting peace in the country.

References
[i] Walther, O; Christopoulos, D (2015)’ Islamic
terrorism and the Malian rebellion.’ Terrorism and
Political Violence 27(3): 497–519; Walther, O; Leuprecht,
C (2015) Mapping and deterring violent extremist
networks in North-West Africa. Sønderborg,
Department of Border Region Studies Working Papers
4.

[ii] Source: Authors. Figure is based on a selection of

academic and policy articles and press reports from
French and English-speaking media published between
2012 and 2015. Note: Alliances are defined as formal
agreements, joint political events or military
operations. Conflicts are defined as notorious
avoidance, hatred publicly expressed, political violence
or military confrontations.

Photo credit main picture: MINUSMA Force

Commander Visits Anefix in Northern Mali / Photo by
Marco Dormino / Via Flickr
Programme

Sahel Watch
RESEARCH ARTICLE

Summary
The conflict in Mali has made strange
bedfellows of government forces, rebels and
Islamists. However, so far, none of these
groups have managed to sustainably control
Mali’s North.

About the author

Olivier Walther
Dr Olivier J Walther is an Associate
Professor in the Department of Political
Science at the University of Southern
Denmark.
full profile   ▶

Antonin Tisseron
Dr Antonin Tisseron is a Research Fellow at
the Thomas More Institute in Paris.
full profile   ▶

Tags

network conflict

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