An Intellectual History of China, Volume Two

Brill’s Humanities in
China Library

Edited by

Zhang Longxi (City University of Hong Kong)

Axel Schneider (Göttingen University)

VOLUME 12

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bhcl

An Intellectual History of China,
Volume Two
Knowledge, Thought, and Belief from the Seventh
through the Nineteenth Century

By

GE Zhaoguang

Translated by

Josephine Chiu-Duke
Michael S. Duke

LEIDEN | BOSTON
This book is the result of the translation license agreement among Ge Zhaoguang of Fudan University, Fudan
University Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. This book is translated into English from an abbreviated version
of the original《中国思想史》(葛兆光著) (Zhongguo sixiang shi, by Ge Zhaoguang) with the financial
support of the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences (中华社会科学基金) and Fudan
University Press.

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov

LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2018008143

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Contents

Chronology of Chinese States and Dynasties vii

Abbreviations Used in Footnotes and Bibliography ix
Note on Translation xi
Author and Translators xv
Series Editors’ Foreword xvi

7 Tang Dynasty Thought I: From Unity to Intellectual Crisis (ca. Mid-7th to

Mid-10th Centuries CE) 1
Prologue: Power, Education and the Intellectual World  1
1 Mediocrity in a Flourishing Age: Knowledge and Thought in the First
Half of the 8th Century 4
2 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism I: The Decline
of Theoretical Interest 20
3 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism II: The Victory
of Chan Buddhism and the Defeat of Buddhism 35

8 Tang Dynasty Thought II: From Unity to Intellectual Crisis (ca. Mid-7th
to Mid-10th Centuries CE) 52
1 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism III: Language
and Meaning 52
2 Re-establishing National Authority and Intellectual Order: A New
Understanding of Intellectual History Between the 8th and 9th
Centuries 62
3 Anti-Buddhist Persecution of the 840s and 9th-Century Daoist
Religion 84

9 From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I (Mid-10th

Century to the End of the 16th Century) 96
Prologue: China Before the Birth of the Neo-Confucian School of
Principle 96
1 Luoyang and Kaifeng (Bianliang): Separation of the Political and
Cultural Centers 104
2 Continuation of Neo-Confucianism: The Zhu Xi-Lu Xiangshan
Debates and Their Surroundings 125
vi Contents

10 From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 149

1 State and Scholars Support the Expansion of Culture and Establish
the Uniformity of Ethics in Everyday Life in the Song Dynasty 149
2 From Yuan to Ming: The General Condition of the World of
Knowledge, Thought and Belief 166
3 Making Waves Again: The Rise and Significance of the Learning of
Wang Yangming 178

11 From Ming to Qing I: From Tianxia, “All under Heaven,” to the

“Ten Thousand States” (End of the 16th to the End of the
19th Centuries) 201
Prologue: From “All under Heaven” to an “Age of Ten Thousand
States”: Background to the Reinterpretation of Ming and Qing
Intellectual History 201
1 Collapse of Heaven and Earth I: The Ancient Chinese Cosmic
Order Encounters Western Astronomy 205
2 Collapse of Heaven and Earth II: “All under Heaven,” “China,” and
the “Four Barbarians” as Depicted in Ancient Chinese Maps of the
World 216
3 The Rise of Textual Criticism and Evidential Research and the
Chinese Intellectual World from the Mid-17th to the Late 18th
Centuries 227

12 From Ming to Qing II: Chinese Intellectual World in the 18th and
19th Centuries 247
1 Attempting to Rebuild the Intellectual World: The Turn of the
18th- and 19th-Century Evidential Research 247
2 Influx of New Western Knowledge and Changes in the Chinese
Intellectual World in the Second Half of the Nineteenth
Century 267
3 The Late Qing Rediscovery and Reinterpretation of Traditional
Chinese Resources: Classical Learning, Study of the Ancient
Schools of Philosophers and Buddhism 283

Epilogue: China in 1895: The Symbolic Significance of Intellectual

History 305

Bibliography 323
Index 336
Chronology of Chinese States and Dynasties

Xia 2000?–1600? BCE

Shang 1600?–1027? BCE
Zhou 1027?–256 BCE
Western Zhou 1027?–771 BCE
Eastern Zhou 771–256 BCE
Spring and Autumn Period 771–481 BCE
Warring States Period 481–221 BCE
Qin 221–206 BCE
Western Han 202 BCE–8 CE
Wang Mang 9–23 CE
Eastern Han 25–220 CE
Three Kingdoms 220–280
Wei 220–265
Shu 221–263
Wu 222–280
Western Jin 265–316
Sixteen Kingdoms 301–439
North-South Dynasties 317–589
South
Eastern Jin 317–420
Liu Song 420–479
Southern Qi 479–520
Liang 502–557
Chen 557–589
North
Northern Wei (Tuoba Wei) Xianbei or Särbi 386–535
Eastern Wei 534–550
Western Wei 534–557
Northern Qi 550–577
Northern Zhou 557–581
Sui 581–618
Tang 618–907
Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms 907–960
Northern Song 960–1127
Southern Song 1127–1276
Liao Khitan 916–1125
viii Chronology of Chinese States and Dynasties

Jin Jurchen 1125–1234

Xi Xia Tangut 1038–1227
Yuan Mongol 1271–1368
Ming 1368–1644
Qing Manchu 1636–1911
Abbreviations Used in Footnotes and Bibliography

CASS 中國社會科學院 Chinese Academy of Social Science

Chan, SB A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 1963
CHC Cambridge History of China
Commercial Press 商務印書館
CSJC 叢書集成 Congshu jicheng
CTP Chinese Text Project, http://ctext.org/
De Bary, Sources  Sources of the Chinese Tradition from Earliest Times to 1600, 2nd
Edition, Vol. 1
ECJ 二程集 Er Cheng ji
ESWS  二十五史 Ershiwu shi, Zhonghua punctuated edition (all are
Zhonghua unless otherwise stated)
GSZ 高僧傳 Gaoseng zhuan
HHS 後漢書 Hou Hanshu
HJAS Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
HS 漢書 Hanshu
JAS Journal of Asian Studies
JTS 舊唐書 Jiu Tangshu
LJYJ 陸九淵集 Lu Jiuyuan ji
QTW 全唐文 Quan Tangwen
SBBY 四部備要 Sibu beiyao
SBCK 四部叢刊 Sibu congkan
SGSZ 宋高僧傳 Song Gaoseng zhuan
SHYJG 宋會要辑稿 Song huiyao jigao
SKQS 四庫全書 Siku quanshu
Soothill, Dictionary A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, online
SS 宋史 Songshi
SSXYJJ 世說新語校箋 Shishuo xinyu jiaojian
SUNY State University of New York
Tsukamoto, History A History of Early Chinese Buddhism
Watson, CT The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu
Wilkinson Chinese History: A New Manual
XTS 新唐書 Xin Tangshu
XZZTJCB 續資治通鑑長編 Xuzizhi tongjian changbian
YS 元史 Yuanshi
Zhonghua 中華書局 Zhonghua shuju
ZWGWJ 朱文公文集 Zhu Wengong wenji
x Abbreviations Used in Footnotes and Bibliography

ZYL 朱子語類 Zhuzi yulei

ZZJ 张載集 Zhang Zai ji
ZZQS 朱子全書 Zhuzi quanshu
ZZTJ 資治通鑑 Zizhi tongjian
Note on Translation

It has been almost four years since the publication of our translation of the
first volume of Professor Ge Zhaoguang’s An Intellectual History of China in
2014. In this second volume, readers will find that the translators’ note is basi-
cally the same as that in the first volume, but here we have added information
about the edition of the Chinese texts that served to prepare for this transla-
tion project.* We have also offered some additional comments on the avail-
ability of the sources when the volume was first completed in 2000.
The work translated here was first published in two volumes as Zhongguo
sixiangshi, di yi juan: Qi shiji qian Zhongguo de zhishi, sixiang yu xinyang
shijie 中國思想史，第一卷，七世紀前的知識、思想與信仰世界 (1998) and
Zhongguo sixiangshi, di er juan: Qi shiji zhi shijiu shiji Zhongguo de zhishi,
sixiang yu xinyang 中國思想史，第二卷，七世紀至十九世紀中國的知識、  
思想與信仰 (2000). The original text ran to just over 1,400 pages. This transla-
tion represents Professor Ge’s unpublished abbreviation of these two Chinese
editions into just 666 pages of Chinese text. Volume Two of this two-volume
translation covers pages 372 to 666 of this unpublished Chinese text.
This extensive work was a considerable success in China. As of 2014, it has
been printed ten times with more than seventy thousand sets sold after its
first publication, quite unusual for such a scholarly book. There may be many
reasons for this success. One is that it was published in an environment where
education and scholarship were allowed to resume their proper place in soci-
ety after decades of social and political turmoil during Chairman Mao’s rule.
A longing for knowledge and understanding of their own history has been
widespread ever since the end of that rule. External causes can of course only
explain part of the story. Without the great erudition and deep insights he
employs in a reflective and open-minded manner, Professor Ge’s work may not
have appealed to so many Chinese readers in a manner that some earlier works
of a similar nature have failed to do.
There have previously been valuable Chinese works on Chinese intellectual
history both written and translated by prestigious scholars in the field. Fung
Youlan’s History of Chinese Philosophy was translated by Derk Bodde and pub-
lished in 1952 and 1953 while part of Hsiao Kung-Chuan’s History of Chinese

*  This addition is based on Professor Paul R. Goldin’s thoughtful review of the first vol-
ume published in Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy (online September 30, 2014).
We are grateful to him for pointing out a few mistakes in the volume, and if it is possible to
have another edition, we will certainly make the corrections as he suggested.
xii Note on Translation

Political Thought was translated by F. W. Mote and published in 1979. These

texts have been regarded by many scholars as required classics and they have
well served Chinese studies in the West. Fung’s History, however, focuses on
the exposition of Chinese thought as a branch of philosophical study, and
Professor Mote’s passing in 2005 meant that only half of Hsiao Kung-Chuan’s
original work could be made available to the English speaking world. A trans-
lation of Ge Zhaoguang’s most important recent study of Chinese intellectual
history for the English speaking world would seem, then, to offer a rich supple-
ment to the above texts as well as bringing in different perspectives and new
understandings of a tradition that has more than two thousand years of history.
As Professor Ge’s own “introduction” (pp. 1–67 of volume one—An
Intellectual History of China: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief through 1895 (Brill,
2014)—makes clear, his approach to Chinese intellectual history is very dif-
ferent from that of previous Chinese scholars in the field. Here, it is perhaps
not out of place to state briefly that he discusses the importance of appro-
priating as wide a range of source materials as possible, especially those that
only came to light recently and those that were neglected in the past. He also
emphasizes the necessity of understanding ideas and thought in their proper
historical contexts so that his Chinese readers can reduce their unavoidable
preconceived modern assumptions and see the dialectical interaction between
historical background and intellectual thought. Throughout, he stresses the
complex dynamics involved in the interaction among the intellectual thought
of elite Chinese scholars, their historical conditions, their canonical texts and
what he calls the “worlds of general knowledge, thought and belief.” In the pro-
cess, some key issues, including the formation of the Chinese world order, its
underlying value system, the origins of the Chinese cultural identity and the
impact of foreign thought, emerged to underscore his narrative. Such discus-
sions can no doubt help readers understand why this work was so well received
in contemporary China and hopefully also help stimulate dialogue about
these issues in the field since they are clearly relevant to our time.
It is necessary to emphasize that Professor Ge’s work was written primar-
ily for Chinese readers before the 21st century. As rich as the knowledge
and insights included in his two volumes are, he was understandably unable
to employ the information and discoveries offered by many new studies of tra-
ditional Chinese intellectual history in different time periods published after
2000 in Chinese, Japanese, English, and other major languages. This should
not, however, hinder cross-cultural dialogue since these new studies of various
specific time periods may not contradict, but agree with and supplement, the
overall picture presented in Professor Ge’s two volumes.
Note on Translation xiii

As translators, we have been faced with the daunting task of trying to match
our linguistic and intellectual abilities with Professor Ge’s enormous scholarly
range and coverage of Chinese textual and archeological source materials. The
many excellent available translations of Chinese works and the various online
Chinese texts have been most helpful to us. We have also greatly benefited
from discussions of our questions with Professor Ge in Vancouver. Without his
quick and careful answers through email exchanges to our questions on each
chapter, it would have been impossible to complete this work within a reason-
able time.

Some Technical Matters

All citations of the “twenty-five dynastic histories” (Ershiwu shi 二十五史)

are from the Zhonghua shuju punctuated editions. In Chinese, Professor Ge’s
original work relies on very many Chinese translations of works originally in
non-Chinese languages. Whenever possible, we have sought out the original
texts that these translations are based on and reproduced them rather than
re-translating from Chinese translations. We have noted any minor changes
made to these published translations to match Professor Ge’s overall format. To
avoid unnecessary confusion, references to those Chinese translations are not
included. In addition to using published translations of Chinese classical texts
in many cases, all other translations of quoted Chinese materials are our own.
At the first appearance of a Chinese book, an italicized English translation
is given with non-italicized Chinese Romanization in parentheses; subse-
quent appearances of the same text are given in English only. For example:
The Exact Meaning of the Five Classics (Wujing zhengyi) first, and The Exact
Meaning of the Five Classics from then on. Romanized Chinese titles are given
in the notes. Complete references are given in the bibliography. For traditional
Chinese books we use j. for juan 卷 meaning chapter or volume. Page numbers
for books and journals are given after the date of publication without p. or pp.
Chinese characters are given for selected terms in hopes that readers will find
them useful.
In dealing with the titles of Buddhist sources, we have done the same as with
Chinese titles, giving an English translation with the Indian language titles in
parentheses. For these English translations of titles, we have relied on Zenryû
Tsukamoto, A History of Early Chinese Buddhism (Chûgoku Bukkyô tsûshi), as
translated by Leon Hurvitz. In translating the titles of Daoist texts we have
followed the same format and relied on Livia Kohn, ed., Daoism Handbook.
xiv Note on Translation

If such standard translations of Buddhist and Daoist texts are unavailable, we

have attempted our own. For Buddhist terms, we have relied on the online edi-
tion of A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms by William Edward Soothill and
Lewis Hodous.
Translating this volume has been a humbling experience, and any infelici-
ties in our translation, in spite of Professor Ge’s timely help, are unquestion-
ably our own.

Josephine Chiu-Duke and Michael S. Duke

Vancouver, December, 2017
Author and Translators

Ge Zhaoguang
is a Professor of History at Fudan University, Shanghai. He was the founder
of Fudan’s National Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies and served
as its Director for six years. He is well known for his studies of Chinese his-
tory and the religious and intellectual history of ancient China. He has been a
visiting professor at Kyoto University in Japan, City University of Hong Kong,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium and National Taiwan University. He
was also appointed Princeton University Global Scholar for 2009–2010. Among
his many Chinese publications are Zen Buddhism and Chinese Culture (1986),
Taoism and Chinese Culture (1987), Ten Chinese Classic Canons (1993), Chinese
Intellectual History, 2 volumes (1998 and 2000), Here in ‘China’ I Dwell (2011),
and What is China (2018, available in English translation).

Josephine Chiu-Duke
is an Associate Professor of Chinese Intellectual History in the Asian Studies
Department of the University of British Columbia, and Co-Director of the
Centre for Chinese Research. She is the author of To Rebuild the Empire: Lu
Chih’s Confucian Pragmatist Approach to the Mid-T’ang Predicament (2000)
and the editor of a Chinese work entitled Liberalism and the Humanistic
Tradition—Essays in Honor of Professor Lin Yü-sheng (in Chinese, 2005). She
is the co-translator of Ge Zhaoguang, An Intellectual History of China, Vol. One:
Knowledge, Thought and Belief Before the Seventh Century CE (2014), and co-
editor of Ying-shih Yü, Chinese History and Culture, 2 volumes (2016). She
has also published many articles in both English and Chinese on traditional
Chinese women and traditional and contemporary Chinese thought.

Michael S. Duke
is Professor Emeritus of Chinese and Comparative Literature from the Asian
Studies Department of the University of British Columbia. He is the author
of several books including Blooming and Contending (1985). He has also trans-
lated many modern Chinese works of fiction such as Raise the Red Lantern
(1993), The Fat Years (2011), co-translated, with Timothy D. Baker, Cho-yun Hsu,
China: A New Cultural History (2012), and is the co-translator of Ge Zhaoguang,
An Intellectual History of China, Vol. One: Knowledge, Thought and Belief Before
the Seventh Century CE (2014), and co-editor of Ying-shih Yü, Chinese History
and Culture, 2 volumes (2016).
Series Editors’ Foreword

The rise of China as an economic and political power is unquestionably one

of the most striking phenomena of global significance as we enter the
first decade of the twenty-first century. Ever since the end of the “Cultural
Revolution” and the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, tremendous changes have
transformed China from an isolated and relatively weak country into a rap-
idly developing and dynamic society. The scale and speed of such transfor-
mations have taken the world—even the Chinese themselves—by surprise;
China today is drastically different from, and in a remarkably better condition
than, China thirty years ago despite the many economic, social, and political
difficulties and problems that yet remain to be dealt with. China scholars in
Europe and North America are called upon to provide information and expla-
nation of the rise of China, a country with history and tradition reaching back
to antiquity and yet showing amazing strength and cultural virility in the
world today. Interest in China is not limited to the traditional field of Sinology
or China studies, nor is it confined to the academic world of universities, for
more and more people outside of academia are curious about China, about its
history and culture, as well as the changes taking place in the contemporary
world. The Western news media brings images from China to every household;
Sinologists or China scholars publish numerous articles and books to satisfy
the general need for understanding: China is receiving a high-level of atten-
tion in the West today whether we turn to the scholarly community or look at
popular imagination.
In understanding China, however, very little is available in the West that
allows the average reader to have a glance at how China and its culture and
history are understood by the Chinese themselves. This seems a rather strange
omission, but in much of the twentieth century, the neglect of native Chinese
scholarship was justified on the grounds of a perception of political control in
China, where scholarship, particularly in the humanities and social sciences,
was dominated by party ideology and strictly followed a prescribed party line.
Such politically controlled scholarship was thought to be more propaganda
than real scholarship, and consequently Western scholars rarely referred to
contemporary Chinese scholarship in their works.
In the last thirty years, however, Chinese scholarship and public opinion,
like everything else in China, have undergone such tremendous changes that
the old stereotype of a politically controlled scholarship no longer holds. New
and important archaeological findings in China have changed our knowledge
of ancient texts and our understanding of Chinese history in significant ways,
Series Editors ’ Foreword xvii

and detailed studies of such new materials are available in native Chinese
scholarship. Since the 1980s, many Chinese scholars have critically reflected
on the nature of scholarship and questioned the old dogma of political and
ideological orthodoxy, while many important books have been published that
present a new outlook on Chinese history and culture. The time has come for
Western scholars and other interested readers to engage academic perspec-
tives originating in China, and making important academic works from China
available in English is an important step in this engagement. Translation of
influential academic works from China will greatly contribute to our better
understanding of China from different perspectives and in different ways,
beyond the dichotomies of the inside and the outside, a native Chinese view
and a Western observer’s vantage point.
Brill’s Humanities in China Library is an established book series that has been
commissioned by Brill in response to that need. The series aims to introduce
important and representative works of native Chinese scholarship in English
translation, in which each volume is carefully selected and expertly translated
for the benefit of Western scholars as well as general readers who have an inter-
est in China and its culture but may not read the Chinese language in the origi-
nal. It is our hope that this series of representative books in translation will be
useful to both specialists and general readers for understanding China from a
different point of view, and that it will be an important step towards a fruitful
dialogue and an exchange of ideas between Chinese and Western scholars.

Zhang Longxi
Axel Schneider
 Chapter 7

Tang Dynasty Thought I: From Unity to Intellectual

Crisis (ca. Mid-7th to Mid-10th Centuries CE)

Prologue: Power, Education and the Intellectual World

When dynasties changed in ancient Chinese history, it was not enough for the
new rulers to rely only on military might and political tactics. They also had to
obtain the widespread support of general cultural norms before their political
domination and the actions of their government could be generally accepted.
According to Max Weber (1864–1920)’s observations, there are three types of
legitimate and rational domination: (1) traditional, (2) legal and (3) charismatic.
Imperial power in ancient China was, however, far more complex than that. It
was an integrated “universal kingship” in which historical tradition, military
power, thought, religion, culture and spiritual authority were combined and
overlapping. Precisely for this reason, if the rulers wanted to obtain legitimacy
and reasonableness for their power and authority, they had to have cultural and
intellectual support. To gain cultural and intellectual support, they also had to
have a monopoly on the interpretation of the thought of the classics, establish
educational and official recruiting systems, and create a new intellectual and
conceptual system and a new cultural atmosphere.1
The rulers of the Tang dynasty that replaced the Sui dynasty in the first
half of the seventh century were concerned from its inception about the legiti-
macy of their regime. This was especially the case with the second emperor,
Tang Taizong, or Li Shimin (r. 626–649). Besides employing quite enlightened
and effective political tactics, he also relied on frontier expansion and pacifi-
cation of alien border peoples to establish his prestige. At the same time, he
employed very intelligent cultural tactics, such as issuing authoritative editions
of the five classics and a new ritual code for the five-fold division of rituals
to claim discursive power over the explication of the classics. He established
the hierarchical order of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism to confirm his
authority in the intellectual world, and so on. All of these efforts were not in

1  See Max Weber, “Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaf ” (The Three Types of Legitimate
Rule), Preussische Jahrbücher 187, 1–2, 1922 Originally published in the journal Preussische
Jahrbücher 187, 1–2, 1922, translated by Hans Gerth, in Berkeley Publications in Society and
Institutions 4.1 (1958), 1–11.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_002

2 Chapter 7

vain and by around 636, the middle of the zhenguan reign period (627–649),
the legitimacy and authority of the new imperial regime and the new emperor
received general recognition.
A few decades later, the legitimacy of the Great Tang ceased to be an issue
as people’s memories of the previous dynasties faded with the passage of time.
Especially after the promulgation of the Zhenguan Ritual Code (Zhenguan li,
637) and the Xianqing Ritual Code (Xianqing li, 658), the completion of The
Exact Meaning of the Five Classics (Wujing zhengyi, 642) and the seriatim
publication of the histories of preceding dynasties—the History of the Jin
(Jinshu), the History of the Qi (Qishu, includes the Southern and the Northern
Qi, Nan Qi shu and the Bei Qi shu), the History of the Zhou (Zhoushu), the
History of the Liang (Liangshu), the History of the Chen (Chenshu), the History
of the Southern Dynasties (Nanshi), History of the Northern Dynasties (Beishu),
the History of the Sui Dynasty (Suishu) and so on—it was well proven that the
Mandate of Heaven had passed to the Great Tang empire. Under considerable
political pressure, the arguments between Confucianism, Daoism and
Buddhism had also quieted down. At that time, a seemingly new ideology, new
institutional norms, and a new history had been established. The establishment
of education, examination and recruiting systems that carried on the Sui
dynasty models particularly brought about the integration of thought and
knowledge. A unified state then had a unified thought and culture.
A unified state also having a unified thought and culture, however, is both
extremely fortunate and also unfortunate. In ancient China, there was a very
widespread concept that humanity should have an ultimately rational “order,”
and that this “order” surely constituted an extremely satisfactory interpretive
system. The mainstream of the ancient Chinese intellectual world was always
engaged in arguing for and constructing this sort of interpretive system. It
attempted to explain how the structure of space and time in Heaven and Earth,
the political structure of rulers (diwang 帝王) and states (diguo 帝國), ethics
and morality in human society, and the myriad phenomena of nature were all
perfectly incorporated into this order.
Under conditions of widespread social disorder, when the state was divided,
the ethnic nationality was in crisis, morality was in chaos and so on, and these
problems were incapable of solution, then the thought that had this sort of
“order” as its central element would command very sharp critical abilities and
unquestionable ideals, truth, and justice.
When a dynasty was well established and everything seemed to be perfectly
fine, however, it would seem as though the mission of thought had come to
an end. Because thought seemed to have lost its object of criticism, it would
Tang Dynasty Thought I 3

rapidly be reduced to a species of knowledge that was merely an appendage

to the classic texts. Under the domination of the examination system, thought
was reduced to some meaningless texts and formulas that existed only for the
sake of memorization and recitation.
In an age of unification of All Under Heaven, educated people were deprived
of a place for independent thought, lost their most important sense of ques-
tioning, and could only remain in their increasingly narrow official careers.
Given the Tang dynasty’s rather relaxed official recruitment, as serving offi-
cials, scholars concentrated on knowledge and thought within the scope of the
official examinations. The whole world of knowledge, thought and belief was
controlled by the “official examinations.” These “official examinations” were
not fair intellectual competitions between different people; they were rather
a political declaration of one’s acceptance of the correct answers under the
domination of the authorities. It is recorded that after a scholar entered an
academic institution, he had an examination every ten days, a major exam-
ination at the end of each year, and if he received a low grade three times,
he had to stop taking the exams and return home. The advantages of offi-
cial life were both a motive and a source of pressure because the knowledge
and thought of the intellectual stratum was tied down by the examination
system.
From the reign of emperor Gaozong (r. 649–683) to that of Xuanzong
(r. 712–756), the government established a bureaucratic system designed
to absorb the whole intellectual stratum and an evaluation and assessment
system designed to control that intellectual stratum. The regime also sum-
marized all knowledge, thought and belief through the large-scale collection
of texts and leishu encyclopedia compilation projects. Emperor Xuanzong’s
annotations of the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing), the Diamond Sûtra
(Jingangjing) and the Laozi (Daodejing) were even more an indication of the
trend toward the syncretic integration of the Three Teachings (Confucianism,
Daoism, Buddhism) as well as a demarcation of the boundaries of thought.
In light of this, Shen Jiji (ca. 740–ca. 800) later wrote that the world was
at peace during the kaiyuan (713–741) and tianbao (742–756) reign periods. As
he wrote:

during those periods, even though there were grand plans and excellent
strategies they were not appropriated, and there was no need for peo-
ple with wonderful proposals and heroic martial talents to exert them-
selves…. Thus, gentlemen in the age of great peace concentrated only
on selecting and looking for wives with good family backgrounds and
4 Chapter 7

preparing essays for possible examination questions so that they could

obtain official rank and salary.2

This was especially the situation during the High Tang period (713–756 or
most of the eighth century) when the social atmosphere was one of luxury,
wealth and self-satisfaction. Since official careers were so wide open, educated
men either competed eagerly in the pursuit of fame and profit, immersed
themselves in romantic and unconventional lives, or idled about under the
patronage of great families. They no longer possessed the critical spirit and
independent consciousness of former times and they were no longer able to
diagnose and criticize the ills of society. The entire society was preoccupied
with superficial satisfactions. They ardently sang the praises of the order and
stability of the age and the affluence of life. They also rhapsodized about the
power and prestige of their empire reaching out to the “four seas” (the known
world), but very rarely did anyone show any anxiety or fear or notice the
hidden crises to come.
When an age ceases to have an object for its social criticism, when its
knowledge becomes only a bargaining chip, when its thought becomes mere
ornamentation, and when its language is only used for game playing, has the
intellectual world of that age not also begun to grow increasingly mediocre?

1 Mediocrity in a Flourishing Age: Knowledge and Thought in the

First Half of the 8th Century

The An Lushan (ca. 703–757)-Shi Siming (703–761) Rebellion broke out in

755 and lasted until 763. This rebellion marked a turning point in the history
of the Tang dynasty, and indeed, in all of Chinese history. It also divided
Chinese intellectual history into two periods. Although the transformation
of the ancient Chinese intellectual world did not become fully apparent until
the following century, the signs of that coming transformation had already
appeared during this period.
The Tang dynasty had actually just experienced crises of both thought and
political order at the beginning of the eighth century. First off, Wu Zetian
(624–705, r. 690–705) supplanted the Li family Son of Heaven, replaced the

2  Tongdian, j. 15, “Xuanju san,” 358. The High Tang usually refers to the forty-three years of the
kaiyuan and tianbao reign periods, but Stephen Owen, The Great Age of Chinese Poetry: The
High Tang (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1981), xi–xv, considers it to com-
prise almost the entire eighth century.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 5

Tang dynasty with the Zhou dynasty and unprecedentedly, even unimaginably,
set herself up as a female Emperor. Her actions presented a most serious
challenge not only to the traditional Chinese distinctions between men and
women but also to the ancient Chinese cosmological view that “Heaven
[male] is high and noble and Earth [female] is low and humble” (tian zun di bei
天尊地卑).3 Wu Zetian’s Zhou dynasty introduced reforms in many traditional
political systems and threw the once unified and stable political order and
intellectual world into disorder. Secondly, the previously very strict channels of
official recruitment became extremely relaxed and a large number of scholars
who were not scions of the great or noble families moved from the periphery to
the center. This in turn caused the hitherto clearly stratified aristocratic society
and its ceremonial rituals, ethics, and morality to lose their constraining power.
Although this turmoil in the political regime came to a temporary halt when
the Tang Emperor Zhongzong (Li Zhe, r. 705–710) resumed the throne, unrest
still remained in thought and social order, and they did not really return to
their original state following the restoration of the political system.
The early eighth-century government had a very strong desire for reform.4
In 714, Emperor Xuanzong not only ordered the return to normal life of twelve
thousand Buddhist monks and nuns, but also, following the advice of his min-
isters, he strongly supported the Confucian classics and tradition. In the next
few years, Xuanzong personally carried out a strict rectification of the dis-
cipline or intellectual trends of the official examination degrees “enlighten-
ing the classics” (mingjing) and “advanced scholar” ( jinshi). He also ordered
learned officials to sort out texts in accordance with the four categories of
classics, history, philosophy and literature. Furthermore, to re-establish the
legitimacy of the Tang dynasty regime, a series of symbolic cultural activi-
ties were carried out. They included creating a new calendar system during
the kaiyuan reign period, measuring the great earth again, and performing

3  This Yijing passage is translated in Richard John Lynn, ed. and translated, The Classic of
Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, 1994, 131.
4  For example Tang Ruizong (Li Dan, r. 684–690 and 710–712) repeatedly issued edicts call-
ing for reformation of social customs and the restoration of rites and ceremonies, and the
government emphasized the re-establishment of order all the way down to the beginning
of kaiyuan reign period. Many histories say that this was the result brought about by Tang
Xuanzong’s efforts in establishing good rule during his early reign, but they do not regard it as
a self-salvation movement of the traditional aristocratic society. Many historians believe that
the time from Wu Zetian to Xuanzong constituted a process where educated members from
lesser lineages or from lower ranks at court continuously rose, but I believe that Xuanzong
did not necessarily consciously support the newly rising stratum; rather he very much hoped
for the restoration of the old social order and traditions.
6 Chapter 7

the Feng and Shan ceremonies on Mt. Tai in 725 to re-emphasize the sacred-
ness of the Heavenly Mandate undertaken by the Tang dynasty to govern all
under the Heaven. In 732 the Rites of Kaiyuan (Kaiyuan li) was finally com-
pleted and the state’s re-establishment of the ritual order seems to have come
to a successful conclusion.
This was a time in which tradition had already lost its fascination, and so
these government actions did not give rise to any new interest among the
general society. From the middle of the seventh to the middle of the eighth
century, China experienced a period of “mediocrity in the midst of flourishing.”
This was because mainstream knowledge and thought no longer possessed
either the power of self-correction or clear judgments of contemporary social
problems. A very strange intellectual situation occurred during this period. On
the one hand, orthodox ideas and thinking were raised by government power
to the position of an unquestionable ideology that dominated everything,
while, on the other hand, in popular society, thought and ideas were reduced
to a form of knowledge learned and recited by rote without the necessity of
reflection. Only political power and worldly benefits could serve to maintain
the attraction of orthodox ideas and thinking for the intellectual stratum. Just
as Emperor Xuanzong said, the contemporary intellectual classes only knew
how to write flowery essays and talk vulgar nonsense to please the crowd;
their schools were like playhouses and their lectures were like dramatic
performances.5
In contrast to this, however, in the first half of the eighth century, previ-
ously marginalized Buddhism and the Daoist Religion became the most
active and dynamic forms of knowledge, thought and belief of the age. The
life styles and patterns of thought of alien peoples that had never occupied
the mainstream in the past emerged as the freshest and most popular of con-
temporary fashions—heresy and the periphery had already become quiet
threats to the mainstream and the center.
For this generally labeled “flourishing” eighth century, I want to call
readers’ attention to the following phenomena that perhaps exerted profound
influences on the contemporary world of knowledge, thought and belief.

1.1
First off, during this period, mainstream thought and ideas became both
simplified and dogmatic. Chinese history always seems to have presented such
phenomena. In general, when thoughts and ideas were supported by political
power and became a monopoly ideology while at the same time serving as the

5  “Edict on the Ritual for Confucius and the Sages” (Jiangxing shidianli ling), QTW, j. 20: 97.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 7

content of official examinations and the basis of official promotions directly

connected to personal interests, these sorts of thoughts and ideas rapidly
became simplified dogmas that could only provide materials to be recited
by rote memory. At the same time, simplistic texts to transmit and reproduce
these thoughts and ideas, however rigid and dogmatic, would be very quickly
copied, circulated and recited in great numbers following the requirements
of education, official examinations and social communication. Even though
some people opposed this trend and tried to preserve the integrity of the classic
texts, this conservative attitude toward traditional knowledge could not, in the
end, overcome the widespread demands of the general society.
The powerful enticement and influence of the official examination system
(keju) on the educated men of the time was extremely important. The
contemporary “enlightening the classics” and “advanced scholar” examination
system, the scope of the examination questions, and the appraisal preferences
of those grading the exam essays often suggested to the scholars a certain
academic or intellectual orientation. For example, the topics of the jinshi
examinations of that age, the examination that was regarded as attracting the
most outstanding talents, tended to lead the examinees to rack their brains
and strain their imaginations searching out and piling up stale rhetorical
phrases. At the same time, the limited rhymes the examinees were allowed
to use also limited their thought and expression. The topics in the “writing of
refined beauty” (wenci yili) and the “vast erudition and grand composition”
(boxue hongci) exams also led toward knowledge and thought becoming mere
verbal ornamentation. Even the various examinations in specialized field
were judged on the basis of literary style and were replete with showy but
insubstantial qualities. As ever more members of the general intellectual elite
no longer possessed the sort of easy cultural tradition of the aristocracy, but
anxiously needed to be able to deal with practical examination knowledge,
classical knowledge could scarcely escape becoming simplified and dogmatic.
Let me give an example. After the seventh century, various types of manuals
on human relationships and rules of etiquette and various classificatory
handbooks, and books for entertaining and exchanging poems were very popular
in Chinese society. This demonstrates that the previous erudite knowledge and
easy going self-cultivation had already disappeared and that the newly rising
educated cohort relied on these simplified handbooks and manuals to guide
their expression and behavior. It also shows that the knowledge foundation
of very many of these people was only the undemanding knowledge that they
derived from these simplistic texts. From the point of view of intellectual
history, this simplification of knowledge had already transformed knowledge
into common sense, turned education into dogma, and employed the format
8 Chapter 7

most easily remembered and recited by rote to cram up people’s memories.

Even though in the eighth century, this knowledge and thought still emanated
from the ancient classics, they had already become texts for memorization and
recitation in response to various contingencies. They lacked a sense of inner
belief and meaning in real life. They vainly possessed an ornamental nature
but had lost the ability to judge and critique social problems.

1.2
Secondly, thought also followed the structural changes in the intellectual
group and inclined increasingly toward ornamentation and superficiality. This
change was inseparable from the contemporary secularization of knowledge.
Just as Chen Yinque (Chen Yinke, 1890–1969) long ago pointed out, from the
time of Wu Zetian through Tang Xuanzong’s reign, a major change in Tang
dynasty society was simply that the “ordinary court officials” replaced the orig-
inal “aristocratic members of the great families from the Guan-Long regions
(roughly including today’s southern and central areas of Shaanxi, southwest
Shanxi, and southeast Gansu provinces).”6 Due to the opening up of channels
for upward mobility, education became increasingly universal, and in general,
beginning with the reign of Empress Wu, the newly rising educated stratum
steadily replaced the old aristocracy.7 Due to this newly rising educated stra-
tum’s particular concentration on worldly importance and their practical
orientation, their intellectual interests and tendencies of thought were very
different from those of the original aristocratic scholars.
One element that spurred on the intellectual interests and tendencies of
thought of this newly risen intellectual stratum to become a universal social
custom was mobility. Mobility (ease of movement) undermined the spatial
structure of traditional society in which the aristocracy relied on their family
names, their lineages and their fixed regional dwelling places. Due to the
prolonged stability and increase in wealth, the scholars of the eighth century,
especially the first half of the century, could travel and move around very
easily. This great change in social structure and the expansion of cultural space
had a rather profound influence on intellectual history. Just as the Mid-Tang
figure Liu Fang (?–?) said in discussing lineages, from the Sui dynasty on, the

6  Chen Yinque draft manuscript, Tangdai zhengzhishi lüegao, 37.

7  Translators’ note: Chen’s views have been greatly modified, but his important contribution
to the study of Tang political and institutional history is, to be sure, still highly appreciated.
For the modifications, see The Cambridge History of China, Volume 3, Sui and T’ang China,
589–906, Part 1, edited by Denis Twitchett, London: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 10–11.
The Chinese translation of this book was not available until after 2000.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 9

stable society of region, social status, wealth and occupation had gradually
disintegrated. This was because mobility caused the formerly quite stable
social order and the ideas that maintained that order to be thrown into great
disarray.8 In the long period of disunity, from the fall of the Eastern Han (220)
to the beginning of the Sui (589), the constant dwelling places of the great
lineages, the family background and superior circumstances of aristocratic
intellectuals, their exemption from worldly cares, and their habit of pursuing
transcendent thought no longer existed with the break up of aristocratic
society. They were never to return again.9
In the eighth century, the individual household or family ( jiazu) replaced
the lineage (zongzu) as the foundation of society and the state. The collapse
of the great lineages rendered the old selection and recommendation system
(chaju tuijian) an unrealistic fantasy, while the opening up of official careers
allowed a large number of previously marginalized scholars of lowly birth to
enter into practical political life and participate in the contest for political
power and personal rewards. Because they needed power and advantages in
actual political life, they began to abandon the previous aristocratic style of
stately dignity while some worldly ideals began to become fashionable public
trends. The lives of scholars of that period were no longer ones of reverence,
thrift and solemnity, but rather of luxury and frivolity. Their ideals were no
longer virtuous nobility and a free and easy demeanor that transcended vulgar
society, but rather worldly status and wealth. The cultural capital they relied
upon to achieve social prestige was no longer extensive knowledge and profound
thought, but rather a flamboyant literary style and a rich imagination. The
ability to memorize and recite became an important standard for measuring
a person’s worth, and a rich vocabulary and skill at rhyming became powerful
tools for gaining social renown. Among these newly rising scholars who were
ceaselessly streaming in to the center, not only was aristocratic society falling

8  X TS, j. 199, “Ruxue shang Liu Chong zhuan fu,” 5679. Liu Fang hoped to rely on the three
elements of “being tied to a person’s regional or prefectural origin,” “being sustained by a
prestigious family or lineage name” and “being connected by marriage” to distinguish clearly
the relations among the powerful and influential lineages as well as great surnames so as to
have a base to rebuild social order in the Tang.
9  Translators’ note: Nicolas Tackett’s important study demonstrates that aristocratic scholars
did continue to maintain their networks and power in the post-An Lushan Rebellion era until
after the Huang Chao Rebellion. See his The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). Tackett’s research findings do not neces-
sarily contradict Ge Zhaoguang’s overall interpretation in the sense that, as can be seen in
the following chapters, Ge is concerned with showing the decline of aristocratic power as a
major tendency in the development of Chinese society during the Tang and Song dynasties.
10 Chapter 7

apart, but even the way of life based on ritual norms and its conceptual system
were already on the verge of collapse.
Just this situation, however, stimulated quite a few marginal scholars to
communicate back and forth in vigorous pursuit of both their ideals and personal
benefit. Scholars who were formerly restricted to the periphery outside of the
capital Chang-an could now enter into the center of the contemporary world
of thought and belief and they were actually able to transform profoundly the
thinking of the whole society. As much as the former intellectual world had
begun to resound with heteroglossia, knowledge had still not discarded the
old and brought in the new, and thought had escaped from criticism of reality.
The once highly regarded, solid, dignified study of the classics was replaced
by frivolous and flamboyant creative literature. Literature was the fashion of
that period and thought became only the packaging for literature. An anti-
academic tendency pervaded the entire society.

1.3
Finally, the boundaries of belief began to blur, a phenomenon that had actually
begun before the eighth century. From the Wei-Jin and North-South Dynasties
periods (220–589) on, the process of conflict, compromise, and accommodation
of Buddhism and the Daoist Religion with Confucianism had steadily eroded
the sphere of mainstream belief. In the seventh century, though, due to the
necessity of establishing the legitimacy and reasonableness of a new dynasty,
there was a process of renewed clarification of thought, knowledge and belief
following a political ideology founded on Confucianism. The editing of The
Exact Meaning of the Five Classics, compilation of dynastic histories, rigorous
regulation of the content of the examination system questions and strict
government limitations on the propagation of Buddhist and Daoist thought
among the upper strata of society combined to constrain the spread of heresy
for a while.
In the prosperous and relaxed social environment of the first half of the
eighth century, however, orthodox Confucianism lost its power to control and
lead. Some non-Confucian religious personages were extremely favored
and virtually became symbols of contemporary intellectual trends leading
toward a transformation of the world of belief. During the reigns of emper-
ors Ruizong (Li Dan) and Xuanzong (reign ended in 756), many Buddhist and
Daoist personalities received special imperial praise and encouragement. Even
though the government issued orders on many occasions forbidding officials
to associate with Buddhist monks and Daoist priests, street markets to cast and
sell statues of the Buddha and Buddhist scriptures, women from great families
Tang Dynasty Thought I 11

to donate money to temples and monasteries such as Huadu and Fuxian, and
even did not allow the ordination of new Buddhist monks for twenty years
while strictly regulating the populations of Buddhist monasteries and Daoist
temples, these policies did not stop the spread of Buddhism and Daoism. This
was because the imperial house was intimate with Daoists and Buddhists,
and scholars and leading officials also had very close relations with them.
This meant that the intellectual world with Confucianism as its core that the
government was working so hard to establish in the early eighth century grew
imperceptibly less and less powerful.
Let us first examine the situation of the Daoist Religion. Starting at the
beginning of the kaiyuan reign period (713), the government set up shrines on
the five famous mountains—Tai, Hua, Heng, Song and Heng—to the Highest
Lord Lao (Laojun, a title of Laozi in the Daoist Religion), and ordered every
family, high and low, in the realm to keep a copy of the Laozi in their home.
Shrines to the Laozi as Emperor of the Mysterious Beginning (xuanyuan
huangdi 玄元皇帝) were ordered set up in the two capitals of Chang-an and
Luoyang and in all prefectures. Daoist schools called “Sublime Mysterious
Studies” (chong xuanxue 崇玄學) were also established for the study
of the Laozi, the Zhuangzi, the Liezi and the Book of Master Wen (Wenzi).
On the birthday of the three important Daoist deities, the deities of Heaven,
Earth and Water, i. e. on the fifteenth day of the first, seventh and tenth lunar
months, scholars were ordered to lecture on the Classic of the Way and its Power
(Laozi) and the True Scripture of the Southern Florescence (Zhuangzi). During
this period, every prefecture had a Daoist Jade Emperor Palace and the number
of temples of the Daoist Religion reached the historically unprecedented num-
ber of one thousand six hundred and eighty-seven.
As for Buddhism, there were two things in the history of Tang dynasty
Buddhism that had great symbolic importance. The first was that special
religious areas were set aside in the palace chapel for reading aloud Buddhist
scriptures, fasting assemblies (zhaihui 齋會), lecturing on Buddhist scriptures
and practicing the Buddhist religion. Many eminent monks took advantage
of this channel to come down from their forest retreats and enter the city and
even the imperial palace; at that, they daily increased their influence on the
upper strata of society. The second thing was that Buddhism not only set up
temples and monasteries in Chang-an and Luoyang, but also legally established
government temples throughout the prefectures, and the government actually
appointed monks as officials to administer them. These newly established
Buddhist temples and the monks who were allowed to set them up and
were given official permits to become monks and join them became the
12 Chapter 7

representatives of official government religion. For example, Kaiyuan temples

were set up in many places throughout the realm and one of their most
important duties was to carry out appropriate Buddhist rituals on birthdays
and anniversaries of death days of members of the Tang royal family. At the
same time, when people in the general society needed relief from distress or
suffering, the Kaiyuan temple monks would carry out ceremonies on their
behalf to give them a sense of spiritual comfort.
The two religions of Buddhism and Daoism were not the only ones that
became widespread. Right before and after the eighth century, following
the circulation and cohabitation of alien peoples in Han Chinese regions, the
so-called “three barbarian religions” of Manichaeism (monijiao 摩尼教),
Nestorian Christianity ( jingjiao 景教), and Zoroastrianism (xianjiao 祆教)
that had early on been brought to China started increasingly to be propa-
gated in these areas of predominantly Han Chinese civilization. During that
time, there were Nestorian Da Qin temples (literally Roman temples) in
Chang-an, Luoyang, Lingwu (Ningxia), Zhouzhi (Shaanxi), Shazhou (Gansu)
and Guangzhou, while Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism were similarly
beginning to flourish. The entrance of these religions from beyond the area
of Chinese civilization into the Chinese belief world caused the barriers of
the Chinese world of knowledge, thought andbelief to become progressively
weaker.
One series of events that took place at this time was unusually important
for intellectual history. In 722, Tang Xuanzong issued to the whole country
his Commentary on the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing zhu); from 732 to 733,
Xuanzong completed his Imperial Commentary on the Daodejing (Daodejing
yuzhu); right after that, in 734 he issued his annotated edition of the Diamond
Sûtra (Jingangjing). It would seem that the emperor’s thinking was already
confused. The issuance of these three readers of classic texts in the emperor’s
name carried perhaps the greatest symbolic significance for the intellectual
history of that period. Putting aside the question of the intellectual quality
of the commentaries, the fact that an emperor who was the symbol of ortho-
dox thought and social order chose these three texts that are Buddhist, Daoist
and Confucian classics and are also the most brief and concise texts on those
three forms of thought and texts that explore precisely the origins of the uni-
verse and the depths of the human heart/mind was certainly very significant.
Does the fact that these three classics were given commentaries with official
approval and that they were required reading for officials and people through-
out the country not suggest that the intellectual climate after the eighth cen-
tury was going to shift in the direction of fusion, simplification, and looking
inward?
Tang Dynasty Thought I 13

1.4
It has often been said that thought is the medicine of society and any vital form
of thought should be able to offer a profound diagnosis for the ills of society.
Even if it is unable genuinely to serve as a scalpel to dissect the social o­ rganism
and excise any malignancy, it should be able to offer relevant criticism and
by means of such sharp criticism make people reflect on their situation. The
world of knowledge, thought and belief in the eighth century would seem to
have already lost that particular ability to diagnose and criticize society.
First off, Heaven and Earth and the cosmos as the ultimate foundation
of the state’s political legitimacy and the social order seem to have already
lost their effectiveness. They had already lost the ability to support and confirm
the truth of contemporary thought and order.
Originally the ancient Chinese had a tendency to believe in hierarchy and
social order and that “Heaven does not change and Earth does not change.”
They regarded the orderly movements of Heaven and Earth and the cosmos
and their spatial structure as symbols of and supports for the legitimacy and
rationality of this order. The system that maintained this order was simply
the ritual norms that were “set up in accordance with the Way of Heaven.”10
From the Wei-Jin period on (220–420), the Confucian study of the classics,
Book of Rites (Liji) studies, and Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu) studies
were always most closely related to questions of social order. The study of
the Spring and Autumn Annals offered support for both political ideology
and the political power to exercise control by reference to history, while the
Book of Rites used ceremonies symbolic of social hierarchy to establish social
order. For a very long period of time, all the way down to the eighth century,
the Book of Rites was a repository of the most important knowledge.
There were three discussions that nearly all the famous literati and officials
participated in from the xianqing reign period of Emperor Gaozong through
the kaiyuan and tianbao reign periods of Emperor Xuanzong (from the 660s
to 756): (1) a long running discussion of the dishes and vessels of wood and
bamboo (bian, and dou), that is, ritual vessels, and mourning garments to be
used in ancestral temples;11 (2) a debate during the shengli reign period of
Empress Wu (698–699) as to whether the three-year mourning period was

10  This was a very important ancient Chinese concept. The “Ceremonial Usages” (Liyun)
chapter of the Book of Rites states that “the rites and ceremonies must have their roots in
the big and the one, that is Heaven,” and Kong Yingda comments that “the biggest is called
Heaven, and the undivided is one.” That is to say, the rites and ceremonies are modeled on
Heaven and Earth and so they are reasonable.
11  See XTS, j. 122, “Wei Anshi zhuan fu Wei Tao zhuan,” 4356.
14 Chapter 7

actually thirty-six or twenty-five months;12 (3) a clarification, from the Early

to the High Tang, of the status of seniors and juniors in the same lineage as
well as the rank order of social standing among the prominent families and
lineages by means of genealogical records.13 All of this proves the importance
of the study of the rites as the knowledge background of political ideology.
Despite the fact that the social order had already undergone steady change,
academic and intellectual habits still kept the rites in a central position.
This thinking about the cosmos and human society that was completely
constructed after the Han dynasty and had never received any serious
challenges was unable, however, to explain the dazzling series of changes in
the social hierarchy that took place during this time period. In traditional
Chinese thinking, a society with clearly demarcated social ranks was taken
to be correct and unalterable. Every person who lived within that ordered
society was expected to live in the manner appropriate to his or her status so
as to maintain the stability of the social and hierarchical structure. In reality,
though, at that time the social order was continually being broken down.
In the first place, ever since Wu Zetian’s time, Princess Taiping, Empress Wei
(wife of Emperor Zhongzong [Li Xian, r. 684 and 705–710]), Shangguan Wan-er,
Princess Changning, and Princess Anle actively interfered in the government.
Even some palace maids sometimes got involved in court affairs. All of this
demonstrated that the status of Yin and Yang had been turned upside
down and the unalterable principles of Heaven and Earth had already been
overturned.14 Second, from 710 to 713, Emperor Ruizong and his son Xuanzong
were involved in a power struggle. This further indicated that the rites built
on the bond between Heaven and Earth and between fathers and sons no
longer had any power to constrain behavior. Third, changes in the center of
power and the social hierarchy presented an even greater challenge to the
traditional order and further implied doubts about the tradition of Heaven
and Earth and the cosmos as the ultimate foundation of social order. Due to
their constant moving around, the original great lineages and families were
always in a state of division at the same time that lower class scholars with no
aristocratic blood were streaming in from all directions to join the “process of
selection and appointment of officials” (xuanguanchang 選官場). Entering the

12  JTS, j. 91, “Zhang Jianzhi zhuan,” 2936.

13  JTS, j. 102, “Xu Jian zhuan,” 3157.
14  See XTS, j. 120, “Huan Yanfan (653–706) zhuan,” 4310: “Allowing Yin to ride above Yang
is against the principle of Heaven; allowing wives to rise above husbands is against the
principle of the human life. Going against Heaven is inauspicious and going against
the human is morally wrong.”
Tang Dynasty Thought I 15

center by means of the examination system, they began to share power with
the aristocracy and this changed the original social structure with its orderly
hierarchy of noble and low born.15 Fourth and finally, before the An Lushan
Rebellion, a few men from alien peoples or low status who were appointed as
officials to oversee the border regions, together with groups of scholars gath-
ered around them, caused the political and cultural center of gravity between
the center and the periphery to be thrown out of balance.
As a result, the boundaries between center and periphery, aristocrat and
commoner, the great and the lowly, civilized and uncouth, and Han and non-
Han had become blurred. The social order that once had a clear hierarchical
ranking collapsed as a result of the cultural overlapping of various ethnic
groups, geographical regions and powerful and influential families. The
original Chinese tradition of ritual norms based on Heaven and Earth and
cosmic differences also broke down together with these changes. At that, the
concept of ritual norms as the supporting background for the genealogical
studies of great families also lost it power to regulate and rectify society.
In the second place, at the same time, old historical knowledge could
no longer prove the superiority of the Han Chinese ethnic group and its
civilization, nor could it criticize the idea that the various alien cultures
then residing within the borders of the country were not equally reason-
able. Something that has often been neglected by researchers is that the
Tang dynasty imperial Li family that succeeded the Northern Zhou and
the Sui dynasty did not originally have a purely Han ethnic blood relationship.
They were, furthermore, not so bold and confident about their non-Han ori-
gins and consequently they always wanted to employ the orthodox doctrine
of dynastic succession to support the legitimacy of their power and authority.
They also changed their ancestral origin to the aristocratic block in Longxi in
the northwest to conceal the historical fact of their partially non-Han origins
and to support the orthodox status of their culture.
In terms of genealogical connections, the early Tang took the Northern
Zhou as the rightful heirs to the empire and later based their legitimacy on the
legitimacy of the Northern Zhou and Sui dynasties. This could to some extent
weaken the claim that the Han ethnic group was the only orthodox civilization
and also allow the non-Han Son of Heaven to have the same legitimacy in the

15  In 733, there were already 17,686 officials from the eminent dignitary rank of Three
Preceptors (sanshi 三師) down, and for clerks 57,416 from the rank of Accessory Clerk
(zuoshi 佐史) down. The state and society’s overall division of power and hierarchical
structure had already undergone great changes. That is why Sima Guang wrote that “there
are more ways of entering officialdom than can be recorded.” ZZTJ, j. 213, 6802.
16 Chapter 7

historical genealogy. Later on during the reigns of Gaozong and Xuanzong,

however, this historical genealogy was seriously challenged; in the eleventh
month of 750, Emperor Xuanzong decided to change the orthodox succession
from the northern dynasties to the southern dynasties and unintentionally
revised dynastic history. Perhaps this was because the dynasty had been
established for over a hundred years and he no longer needed to worry about
being of non-Han origin, or perhaps he wanted to seek a connection with a
pure Han blood relationship due to the ruling family’s submission to Han
Chinese civilization. That would make it seem, then, that the Tang dynasty not
only possessed political legitimacy but also cultural respectability.
Perhaps this kind of change in the historical narrative was intended to
focus criticism on contemporary reality, but the result was precisely to evade
contemporary reality. What actually was the real contemporary situation?
It was that being surrounded on all sides by alien cultures, the Han Chinese
civilization’s monopoly of superior power was daily declining. The Tang
dynasty was a very open, cosmopolitan period and the eighth century was
particularly so. Not only did various alien peoples live within the Tang imperial
territory, but the dynasty also developed close relationships with the cultures
of distant countries in the southwest and the northwest by communication
channels over land and sea.
Even though the coming of Buddhism and the rise of the Daoist Religion did
not radically shake the foundations of Chinese confidence in their preexist-
ing ancient mainstream civilization, cultural conflicts and competition were
quietly going on. One result of this mixing of the cultures of different peoples
was that the traditional Han Chinese ethical norms were losing their universal
ability to constrain behavior at the same time that traditional modes of behav-
ior were also losing their general reasonableness. The Han Chinese industri-
ous, plain and simple, cultured, refined and ritually modest and regulated
way of living based on Confucian-established norms of human relationship
was being supplanted by the bold, unconstrained, uninhibited, extravagant,
decadent way of life preferred by alien peoples and this was being privately
imitated by many members of the great families and the educated elite. In
addition to Buddhism, the existence of various Nestorian Da Qin temples and
Zoroastrian Ahura Mazda temples were evidence of the fascination the knowl-
edge, thought and belief of alternative civilizations had for contemporary
people. The importation of various forms of dress, playthings, games, songs
and dances and so on also demonstrated the attractiveness of these alterna-
tive cultures for everyday life. At the time, one Lü Yuantai (around 705–710, in
Zhongzong’s time) brought up a seemingly very simple and yet actually very
Tang Dynasty Thought I 17

profound question: “How can our dynasty based on rites and ceremonial eti-
quette imitate the customs of the barbarians?”16
Past historical knowledge could not really explain, however, why Han
Chinese should be superior to alien peoples, nor could it prove the superiority
of Han civilization over theirs. Even though the emperors ruling over China
believed that history had already bestowed both political and cultural
reasonableness upon them, and Chinese scholars still believed that their
culture would not be challenged, Han Chinese civilization was actually being
threatened from all sides already. This was especially the case after the An
Lushan Rebellion when the state could no longer calmly observe the rise of
the non-Han peoples. After all, should they dampen their psychological feeling
that Han Chinese civilization was uniquely superior and accept coexistence
and the mutual appreciation of other civilizations, or should they re-write the
historical narrative and re-establish the superiority and orthodox genealogy
of Han Chinese civilization in that narrative? Contemporary scholars did not
seriously reflect upon this question and so it was left for the Northern Song
dynasty (960–1127) finally to give it a conclusive answer.
In the third place, the traditional system of ritual norms and the concepts of
ethics and morality were no longer able to regulate and critically evaluate social
life. In the face of increasingly unrestrained feelings and uncontrollable desires,
traditional ritual norms and morality seemed to be in a most embarrassing
situation, and we could give innumerable examples of contemporary lapses
in morality. By the kaiyuan and tianbao periods, a quite untraditionally
extravagant atmosphere pervaded society. Many scholars and officials gathered
around a few newly emerged powerful upstarts to pursue lives of luxury. They
not only abandoned the values of hard work, simple living and self-control, but
even the most traditional Confucian spirit of public service could not give rise
to feelings of responsibility in them. They no longer regarded success in social
undertakings as their highest ideal.
The contemporary world of thought was incapable of offering any remedy
for these rapid changes in social life. They could only trot out some traditional
prescriptions and repeatedly quote the ancient classics on hard work, frugality,
reverence, respect, self-control, return to propriety (the rites), diligence in
government affairs, and taking good care of people. For example, in the early
eighth century, Lu Huishen (?–716) sent up a memorial discussing contemporary
government affairs. He first cited Confucius’ words to criticize the tenure for
the official as being too short so that officials could not discharge their duties

16  XTS, j. 118, “Song Wuguang zhuan fu Lü Yuantai zhuan,” 4277 citing a memorial by Lü.
18 Chapter 7

at ease; then he cited the Book of History (or Documents, Shangshu) to criticize
officials for not paying attention to official documents and enjoying their salaries
for doing nothing. He criticized the corruption of government officials, but the
classics he cited did not really provide any specifically corresponding methods
for preventing and controlling the widespread corruption and incompetence
of contemporary officials. The social diagnoses of these Confucian scholars
were perhaps fairly correct, but they were always just armchair discussions of
strategy.17 Another example is Yuan Chuke (8th century) who sent a memorial
to Wei Yuanzhong (?–707) warning him about ten problems of contemporary
society, such as the failure to name an heir apparent, women occupying men’s
offices, the sale of official certificates to become monks or nuns, the granting
of official positions to various entertainers and so on. His diagnosis of social ills
was still based upon the ritual norms of the old order, and their prescriptions
for curing these ills were also quite outmoded.18
It was not the case that no one noticed this sort of widespread mediocrity
and degeneration.19 Throughout the entire eighth century, many people fre-
quently criticized these conditions, and there were two famous instances of
such criticism. The first occurred when Zhang Yue (663–730) and Zhang Jiuling
(673–740) both worked hard to restore thought and social order and actually
did spur on society and opinion for a brief time. Their proposals for political
reform and advocacy of rites, music, culture, and education on the one hand
were intended to restore early Tang traditions and on the other hand were
actually also propagating the need for reform. That kind of “restoration” was
merely to start using the old ritual norms again to deal with new problems and
that kind of “reform” could not restrain people’s increasing self-indulgence. At
the same time, there was no way for tradition to explain or critique the new
social changes. At a time when employing the traditional cosmology as a sup-
port for ritual norms and the regulation of national order, making traditional
Xia-Yi (Chinese-barbarian) distinctions to deal with the problem of the mix-
ing of ethnic groups, and applying traditional ethnics and morality to rectify
human relationships after the collapse of the great families were all unsuitable

17  JTS, j. 98, “Lu Huishen zhuan,” 3065–3067.

18  XTS, j. 122, “Wei Yuanzhong zhuan,” 4345–4348.
19  Some scholars have pointed out the sorry state of the intellectual landscape at that
time—regarding flowery but empty diction as displaying literary talent, willingly serving
as lackeys for influential officials or the imperial court, forming factions and constantly
wrangling, general decline of morality, etc. See Tai Jinnong, “Lun Tangdai shifeng yu
wenxue,” in his Jinnong lunwen ji, 1989, 105–118.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 19

and out of date, China’s pre-existing knowledge, thought and belief systems
were powerless to reverse the contemporary situation.
The second critique occurred after the middle of the eighth century
during the baoying (762–763) reign period—notably this was just after the
An Lushan Rebellion had been put down throughout the country. Yang Wan
(?–777) sent up a memorial critical of the jinshi examinations and calling for
the restoration of the ancient method of seeking out the filial and incorrupt-
ible (cha xiaolian 察孝廉) for recommendation from town to county, from
county to prefecture, and after the prefectural examination, to the provincial
level. Yang believed that this could change the practice of recitation from rote
memory and stubbornly sticking with just any one school of thought as well as
regulate the selection process. At that time, Yang Wan could be said to be the
symbolic leader of the cultural spirit of scholar-officials, but his recommenda-
tions could not be implemented. The background of the ills that he was deal-
ing with were the great changes in society and so the cure that he proposed
was ineffective. When his proposals were sent to other officials for discussion,
they pointed out that scholars then had very great mobility, village household
registries were confused, and the original lineage system was no longer useful.
For those reasons, there was no way to practice selection by recommendation.
All one could do was to make a few improvements.
To maintain the superficial fairness of the official selection system, passing
the “examinations” remained the general method. Every scholar had the
opportunity to enter the cultural elite through the examination route.
The leisure, prosperity and natural status position of the aristocratic elite
was disappearing, but the examination scholars who replaced them as the
bearers of culture did not possess their aristocratic wealth, leisure, and
generations of educational cultivation. Competition on the narrow road to
official service often forced them to adopt an extremely practical attitude
toward the existing society and an accommodating stance toward the official
government ideology. They no longer had the time to think, and even if they did
think, they generally maintained a practical attitude. With such a background,
thought could not but become increasingly mediocre. As a result, since the
mainstream ideology with Confucianism as its core was already helpless in
the face of the breakdown of social ethics and morality, it could not but allow
space for Buddhism and the Daoist Religion to enter through the back door
into the world of mainstream knowledge, thought and belief.

1.5
People of later ages have continually praised the “atmosphere of the High
Tang.” This atmosphere was indeed pretty fine from the point of view of its
20 Chapter 7

populousness and affluence, the brilliant quality of its poetry, and the generous
and open-minded attitude with which Tang people accepted various other
cultures. From the point of view of Chinese intellectual history, however, the
situation was precisely the opposite. First off, the integration of knowledge,
the establishment of intellectual boundaries, and the regulation of the
intellectual order since the early seventh century not only created a world
that dominated all knowledge, thought and belief, it also seems to have
left the intellectuals bereft of questions or issues. At that, they fell into a
situation in which they had nowhere to exert their intelligence. Second, the
separation of intellectual doctrines from practical politics further led to a
situation in which their thought was merely useless armchair theorizing, or
could only become a tool for seeking personal benefit. Since scholars were
seeking official appointment, they all had to follow this single road and their
thought and knowledge lost any vital life force or power of keen criticism in this
competitive race for office. Finally, once their fine and detailed train of thought
and emotion could not offer any assistance to and criticism of knowledge,
thought and belief, it became continuously expressed in poetry in which “if my
lines don’t startle others, in death I’ll find no rest.”20 Consequently, their ideas
went into prose writings and their intelligence went into verse. All the while
thought tended increasingly toward mediocrity and intellectual abilities were
turned toward the intense contemplation of how to polish and refine one’s
poetry.

2 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism I:

The Decline of Theoretical Interest

Something happened in Chinese intellectual history at this time that very much
deserves our attention. That is, from the mid-eighth century, after the An Lushan
Rebellion, the study of those Buddhist doctrines that had flourished for some
time tended to fade away. It seems that many scholars were tending toward
genuine faith and the meaning of such faith in Buddhism lay not in the study
and reading of the scriptures, but in practicing meditation and maintaining
Buddhist precepts. That means they protected their bodies from pollution
by strictly obeying the Buddhist precepts and then practiced meditation
to experience their original mind or their original state of purity. Then they

20  The celebrated phrase “if my lines don’t startle others, in death I’ll find no rest.” is from
a poem by Du Fu (712–770). Translation is from Stephen Owen, The Great Age of Chinese
Poetry: The High Tang, 1981, 209.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 21

continued to abide carefully by the Buddhist precepts to conserve this state

and make sure they did not lose it. This practical religious belief directly aimed
at the heart was the correct path of Buddhism. This was not only the view of lay
believers; even among Buddhist monks, the trend of simultaneously practicing
meditation and obeying Buddhist precepts, entering the religion by means of
the precepts, and regarding meditation as their ultimate destination was also
becoming increasingly common. At the same time, the once popular reading
of the scriptures and interpreting the doctrines grew less and less important.
We should mention here in passing that Tang dynasty Buddhist leaders were
divided into three categories. Those who primarily translated the scriptures and
explicated their doctrines were called “masters of the scriptures” ( fashi 法師);
those who were responsible for teaching the rules and practice of the discipline,
overseeing the ethics of the lay believers and the behavior of the Buddhist
monks were called “masters of the discipline” (lüshi 律師); those called “masters
of meditation” (chanshi 禪師) regarded meditation and personal experience of
the deepest recesses of the mind as the most important path to the Buddhist
faith. At the end of the North-South Dynasties period and the beginning of
the Tang dynasty, the study of Buddhist doctrines was very flourishing and
masters of the scriptures—monks who were accomplished at translating
and interpreting the meaning of the scriptures—were given extremely
ceremonial and deferential treatment. This was particularly the case when
society in the contemporary centers of government and culture, like Chang-an
and Luoyang, had even more widespread interests in Buddhist ideas. By the
end of the eighth century and the beginning of ninth, though, the situation
had already changed greatly. At that time, precepts and meditation became the
two most attractive elements of belief in Buddhism. The practitioners of chan
meditation, especially of the Southern school, the Ox-Head school and Tiantai,
became nearly the most active Buddhist propagators of that time. At the same
time, the practitioners of discipline (Buddhist precepts and commandments)
always included a few eminent monks who attracted scholars by the force of
their personalities and had rather close relations with various literati. Their
influence swept through all of China and they were respected and admired
by many of the most powerful officials and most outstanding scholars such
as Li Hua (715–766), Qi Ying (748–795), Yan Zhenqing (709–785), Quan Deyu
(759–818), Li Mi (722–789), Liu Zongyuan (773–819), Liu Yuxi (772–842), Bo
Juyi (772–846) and so on. Masters of the scriptures were ignored no doubt due
to the decline of interest in scriptural knowledge.
The next questions we ought to ask are what after all caused interest in
exegesis and theory, so flourishing from the North-South Dynasties period to
the early Tang, to disappear at this time? Furthermore, while interest in the
22 Chapter 7

personal experience of Buddhist faith continually increased, what caused

people to be on guard against Buddhism’s permissive and undisciplined
atmosphere at the same time that the lofty behavior of scrupulously abiding by
monastic discipline and Buddhist commandments became an ideal pursued
by scholars?
Before we answer these questions, let’s first consider a resource from
the first half of the ninth century. Zongmi (780–841), who practiced both
Chan and Huayan (Flower Garland) Buddhism, was already somewhat
dissatisfied when he critically recalled the history of Buddhist propagation
in China. He criticized Buddhism since the early Tang for “having produced
numerous explanations about the phenomena of the world, with the content
of these explanations changing back and forth and frequently being false and
superficial, and taking power and authority for substance and truth.” In other
words, being overly concerned with doctrines and analyses of concepts while
neglecting the real purpose of the faith. In this, he revealed the view of ninth
century Buddhists.21
What were the phenomena of early Tang Buddhism he was talking about
really like, then? Why did later Buddhists criticize the atmosphere of that
period?

2.1
In the early period of Buddhism’s entrance into China, reading the sûtras was
the most important channel for scholars to accept it. The ideas of this religion
from India were both more detailed and more profound than ancient Chinese
thought and they aroused a high level of theoretical interest among the
educated elites. Very many sûtras, even contradictory sûtras or those deriving
from different intellectual origins, were eagerly studied and discussed. After
several centuries of Buddhist propagation, things changed. After the sixth
and seventh centuries, the intellectual world of Chinese Buddhism adopted
a general pattern of relying principally on one sûtra or one similar set of
sûtras to elucidate and expound religious doctrines. Some Chinese monks
hoped to employ the meticulous analysis and rigorous logic of the terms,
thinking and principles of one type of scripture to unify the entire system of
Buddhist knowledge and thought and to penetrate the most profound and all-
embracing Buddhist doctrines.
Although there were differing opinions and mutual discrepancies in the
study of Buddhist ideas among the upper strata during the North-South

21  See Zongmi, Yuanjue jing dashu, j. shang 1, Xu cangjing, ce 9, 327.

Tang Dynasty Thought I 23

Dynasties period, the Mahâyâna Buddhist thought that was popular with the
great families was of two general types.
One type was the school of Nâgârjuna. It argued from fundamental real-
ity and believed that “the substance of all things is permanently empty” ( fati
hengkong 法體恆空). This way of thinking was based on the Prajñapâramitâ
texts of Mahâyâna Buddhism: the Vimalakîrti-nirdesa-sûtra as translated by
Kumârajîva (c. 334–413), the Prajñâpâramitâ-sûtra (Perfection of Wisdom
Sûtra), the Mâdhyamika shâstra (Middle school or Three Treatise school,
sanlun zong 三論宗) and the Saddharma Pundarîka-sûtra (Fahua jing or Lotus
Sûtra). Although their various interpretations of Buddhism were somewhat
divergent, in general they could be understood on the basis of the Daoist and
Neo-Daoist thought that Chinese scholars were very familiar with and so they
were very quickly accepted. This was especially so because the monks Zhizhe
(Zhiyi, 538–597), with the Lotus Sûtra as his main text, and Jizang (549–623),
with the Three Treatise school sûtras as his main texts, were both treated with
great respect during the Sui and Tang dynasties. Not only did the disciples and
followers of this school have great influence, but its doctrines were very popu-
lar for some time.22
The other type followed the thought of Asanga (ca. 410–ca. 500) and
Vasubandhu (ca. 420–ca. 500). It argued from the causative links in the chain
of being (yuanqi 緣起) and so maintained the idea that “all things that have
noumenal or phenomenal existence exist in the mind or consciousness only”
(wanfa weishi 萬法唯識). The knowledge and thought of this Yogâcâra (Way
of Yoga) or Consciousness Only (Weishi 唯識) school was extremely com-
plex. Paramârtha (499–569) of the Southern dynasties Chen state (557–589)
translated the Mahâyâna-samparigraha (Acceptance of the Great Vehicle,
She dasheng lun) that propagated this consciousness only knowledge and
thought, and the Dasabhûmikâ-sûtra (Dilun) was also propagated at the
time. Nevertheless, it was not until after Xuanzang (600–664) translated and
commented on these Consciousness Only scriptures and Kuiji (632–682)
and Woncheuk (Yuance, 613–696) explained and interpreted the Consciousness
Only ideas that this complex and abstruse thought became one of the central
topics of contemporary studies of Buddhist doctrines.
Xuanzang’s aspiration was to “unify all Buddhist doctrines under one
interpretation,” but his actual work primarily involved the translation of
various Buddhist sûtras. Among the seventy-five texts in one thousand three

22  They are commonly called the Three Treatise school (Sanlun zong) and the Lotus school
(Fahua zong). Our translations are mainly from Soothill’s Dictionary, but some are our
own attempts.
24 Chapter 7

hundred and thirty juan the translation of which he supervised, were several
important Consciousness Only texts, including the Yogâcâra-bhûmi-shâstra
(Yujiashi dilun), the Buddhabhûmi-sûtra-shâstra (Fodijing lun), the Vijnapti-
mâtrâtasiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness
Only, Cheng weishi lun) and so on. His disciples Kuiji and Woncheuk expounded
the doctrines and spread the Consciousness Only school throughout China.
This school of Buddhist thought offered a great many extremely complex
and abstruse ideas and concepts. Among them are the following: the eight
consciousnesses (parijñâna, bashi, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touch,
mano-vijñâna, the sense-center consciousness and âlaya-vijñâna; the
storehouse consciousness (from which come all “seeds” of consciousness); three
types of nature (sanxing): nature that maintains the seeming or imagined to
be real (parikalpita, pianji suo zhixing), nature of dependence on elements and
without a nature of its own (paratantra, yita qi zixing), complete and perfect
nature, or perfect reality (parinishpanna, yuancheng shixing); the three powers
of transformation (san nengbian), i.e. the six senses (vijñâna): different when
cooked, or matured (the effect differing from the cause, vipâka, yishou); thinking
and measuring, or comparing (siliang); the seventh vijñâna, intellection,
thought center consciousness (siliangshi); five groups of the hundred modes
or “things”: the eight perceptions, or forms of consciousness (xinfa); the
fifty-one mental ideas (xin suoyou fa); the five physical organs and their six
modes of sense, e. g. ear and sound (sefa); six inactive or metaphysical concepts
(fenweifa), that is the twenty-four indefinites, or unconditioned elements (xin
buxiangying xing); six inactive or metaphysical concepts (wuweifa); the five
divisions or stages (wuwei) of idealism—ziliang wei, accumulating food for
virtue and wisdom; jiaxing wei, cultivating and meditating the consciousness
only view; tongda wei, realizing the law of consciousness only; xiuxi wei,
cultivating and practicing consciousness only; and jiujing wei or Fowei, the
supreme stage of Buddhahood, eliminating all worries and knowledge and
reaching the ultimate wisdom)—that transform from ordinary knowledge
to Buddhist knowledge or wisdom, and many other ideas and concepts. All
of these complicated ideas, concepts, analyses, speculations and experiences
constituted one vast and rigorous system of thought.23
To summarize it briefly, Consciousness Only doctrine holds that all
phenomena (dharma, fa 法) in the universe are created by “consciousness” and
“consciousness” is the ability of human beings to see clearly and have knowledge

23  See Xianyang shengjiao lun, j. 1–4, in Sheshi pin di-yi, Taishô, j. 31, 480–501. Our translation
has also been guided by Chan, SB, 370–395 on Xuanzang and the Consciousness Only
school.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 25

and cognition. Human beings originally have the eighth consciousness, the
storehouse consciousness or âlaya, and this âlaya consciousness is the origin
of human wisdom and knowledge; it stores up all possibilities like the “seeds”
(of consciousness). There are two possible manifestations of these seeds of
consciousness. One is a fundamental original nature that does not rely on other
kinds of causes to be manifest. It is also called anâsrava (no leak or flow, wulou
無漏) because it will not allow human consciousness and feelings to flow into
various illusions and become lost in (louxie 漏泄, leak into) the suffering of the
triple worlds of sensuous desire, form and formless pure spirit.24 The second
is âsrava (youlou 有漏) meaning “outflow” or “distress.” Because of the seven
abodes or stages of perception or consciousness that are born out of education,
this form of consciousness and feeling takes illusion for truth (reality) and
people become lost in (louxie, leak into) various forms of suffering. Because
these seeds of consciousness have various “powers of transformation,” sentient
beings are often unable consciously to maintain their condition of original
true âlaya consciousness. They move into the world of ordinary consciousness
due to the seventh or thought-center consciousness (the klista-mano-vijñâna,
monashi 末那識) and then experience various feelings (of form and color,
sound, smell, taste and touch). The eyes, ears, nose, tongue and body (wushi
五識, five parijñānas, perceptions or cognitions) give birth to various illusions
and discriminations of consciousness between all phenomena such as likes,
dislikes, loves and desires and these give rise to various forms of suffering.
The central idea of the entire Conscious Only doctrine was how to allow
human beings to escape from these sufferings and return to âlaya consciousness.
The path of escape they imagined was a process of self-salvation just the
opposite of the process that gave rise to the eight forms of consciousness or
perception. That is, a path that was exactly the opposite of how ordinary people
went from âlaya consciousness to various forms of illusory consciousness and
feelings. By this path the religious practitioner returned from various forms of
illusory consciousness and feelings back to âlaya consciousness and this was
called the “transformation from ordinary knowledge to Buddha knowledge
or wisdom” (zhuanshi chengzhi 轉識成智). What this made clear was a path
from the outside world to the inner world, from a consciousness that observes,
contacts, experiences and analyzes the external world into a form of wisdom
that comes from the inner mind and is self-confirming and self-apprehending.

24  
Cheng weishi lun, j. 2, Taishô, j. 31, 8.
26 Chapter 7

2.2
Just as Xuanzang, Kuiji, Woncheuk and other monks embraced the Conscious-
ness Only school, there was another group of Buddhists whose ideas were
based on the Avatamsaka-sûtra (or the Mahâvaipulya Buddhâvatamsaka-sûtra,
the Flower Garland Sûtra, Huyuan jing). Du Shun (557–640) was later recorded
as the founder of this Huayan or Flower Garland branch of Buddhism, but the
person who really shaped this doctrine was his disciple Zhi Yan (602–668)
and it was his later disciple Fazang (642–712) who was responsible for mak-
ing this doctrine very popular at all levels of Chinese society. It is said that in
699, Fazang expounded the Flower Garland Sûtra to Empress Wu Zetian and
that allowed these Huayan Buddhists to become celebrated. They expounded
the sûtra in terms of several groups of ideas that included the “perfect har-
mony of everything” (six characters of everything in perfect harmony, liuxi­
ang yuanrong 六相圓融), the “four dharma-realms” or “dharmadhâtu” (si fajie
四法界), the “ten philosophical ideas” (ten mysteries or gates, shi xuanmen
十玄門), the “five divisions and ten schools of thought” (wujiao shizong 五教
十宗) and so on.
According to the Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Conscious­
ness Only, “Everything in the three realms (the entire phenomenal world) is
only one mind” (sanjie suoyou, weishi yixin 三界所有, 唯是一心). Starting with
this fundamental premise, this school analyzed the entire phenomenal world
as arising from mind. Everything in the phenomenal world has the same six
characteristics (liuxiang 六相) at the same time: (1) since all phenomena really
have no nature of their own, but arise from human consciousness, perceptions
and feelings and human “consciousness” is governed by different “roots” or
“sources” (mûla, gen); every phenomenon has various elements of perception
or feeling—these are known as “universals” (universal characteristics of all
phenomena, zongxiang 總相); (2) since the various elements of perception or
feeling are not really the same, there are also “particulars” (specific character-
istics, biexiang 別相) that contrast with universals; (3) these various elements
of perception or feeling are necessarily interdependent and form one general
body—this is called “(being of) the same universal” (tongxiang 同相); (4) since
the one general body also includes various different elements of perception
or feeling, each one different from the other, then there is also “difference” or
“differentiation” (yixiang 異相); (5) from the differentiation and integration of
these elements of feeling are formed various characteristics in the phenom-
enal world and this is called “formation of characteristics” (chengxiang 成相);
(6) these elements cannot leave their place or separate from the aggregated
body; if they did, they would not be able to exist—this would be “destruction”
Tang Dynasty Thought I 27

or “decay” (huaixiang 壞相). According to their understanding, the entire phe-

nomenal world is a manifestation of this “perfect harmony of everything,” and
this world of perfect harmony of everything is simply the Realm of Dharmas
(dharmadhâtu, fajie 法界) that is manifested right before our eyes.
What they called dharmadhâtu, the Realm of Dharmas, however, refers
on the one hand to zhenru 真如—the bhûta-tathatâ (the one reality or the
Buddha-nature), above all differentiation and immutable—or to the natural
purity of the rulai zangxin 如来藏心 Tathâgata-nature (the Buddha-nature
possessed by all sentient beings). On the other hand however, because, fol-
lowing causal circumstances, it changes into the multifaceted phenom-
enal world, they emphasized that everything in this finite world and the
spiritual world beyond are the function of mind. Because the various elements
of the phenomenal world all arise from the mind, they are interconnected and
mutually reflective and all have some sort of original common nature. For this
reason, the Huayan school firmly believed that “one is all and all is one” (yi ji yiqie,
yiqie ji yi 一即一切, 一切即一). Because worldly intelligence cannot compre-
hend this, ordinary people first recognize the “phenomenal world” or “phenom-
enal existence” (shi fajie 事法界) a world of illusions and endless distinctions,
they take the false for the true and they believe that this world really is a world
of manifold diversity. If people went a step further and became conscious that
everything is only the transformations of the mind and that the original nature
of the phenomenal world is Shûnyatâ (emptiness, kong), then they would be
able to touch the original nature of the phenomenal world and reach “the uni-
verse as law or mind (li fajie 理法界, the dharmakâya, common essence, of
all beings).
Even this understanding of the phenomenal world is, however, not suf-
ficiently penetrating because regarding the entire phenomenal world as
empty in nature, one may still fall into the trap of believing that “empti-
ness has two distinctions” (kong you liang bie) or “practice and theory are
divided” (shi li xiang fen). On this account, the third realm should be one in
which “the Buddha-nature and the thing (the Absolute and phenomena)
are not mutually exclusive” (lishi wu-ai fajie 理事無礙法界). That is to say,
practice and theory, the individual and the whole, can all exist at the same
time and be mutually connected. Here there is still one more distinction, though,
and that is the distinction of “names” (nâman, ming 名); maintaining the dis-
tinction between “practice” (shi 事) and “theory” (li 理), one still cannot har-
monize them. People must transcend this final distinction and seek out the
ultimate realm of Buddhism where “phenomena are not mutually exclusive,
but in a common harmony as parts of the whole” (shishi wu-ai fajie 事事無礙
28 Chapter 7

法界). People must try to achieve this state and understand that nothing in the
Realm of Dharmas is mutually exclusive and all characteristics (xiang) are in
harmony; they must comprehend that the universe is mutually connected and
harmoniously intertwined—this is the true realm of the Buddha.
On the basis of their understanding of the ultimate goals of Buddhism,
Huayan divided all of Buddhism into five teachings and ten schools based on
their degree of understanding of the Buddhist dharma. According to Fazang,
these five teachings were: (1) Hînayâna, based on the early Buddhist Âgama
sûtras (Ahanjing 阿含經). Hînayâna Buddhists believed in various simple
doctrines such as the “Four Noble Truths” (sidi 四諦) and the “twelve links
in the chain of existence (shi-er yinyuan 十二因緣). (2) The primary stage of
Mahâyâna. It referred to (a) the Shûnya or Prajñâ (Wisdom) sects that held
that every dharma (all things) are Shûnyatâ (empty) and to (b) the Yogâcâra
(Consciousness Only) school that believed that everything is a manifestation of
mind. (3) Mahâyâna in its final stage. It taught that the Buddha-nature (bhûta-
tathatâ) is universal and every sentient being can become a Buddha. (4) The
Sudden Enlightenment school. The previous four schools could only be prac-
ticed by gradual cultivation, but there was still this school that believed “that
no thought emerging can be called reaching the realm of Buddha, and this
(naming, calling) is not formed according to one’s level and speed of under-
standing Buddhist teaching.”25 Just as the Brahma-viśesa-cintî-pariprcchâ-
sûtra (Siyi jing) and the Lankâvatâra-sûtra (Lengjia jing) said, it was a Buddhist
vehicle by which one could transcend many stages and be instantly enlight-
ened. (5) Of course, the last teaching was that of the perfect, all-embracing
Huayan school that surpassed all of the other schools. According to their way
of thinking, only by having reached this stage was Buddhist doctrine finally
complete and perfect.

2.3
Although among the Buddhist theorists active from the seventh to the mid-
eighth century there were masters who lectured on the Prajñâpâramitâ-sûtra
(Perfection of Wisdom Sûtra, Boruo jing) and the Nirvânasûtra (Niepanjing),
the most profound schools and also the ones with the most theoretical char-
acter were the two discussed above. Of course, Tantric or Esoteric Buddhism
(Vajrayana) was also rather popular at court and throughout society due to
its widespread promotion by Shubhakarasimha (Shan Wuwei, 673–735),

25  Fazang, Huayanjing tanxuanji, j. 1, in Dazheng xinxiu da cangjing, ce 35, 115.

Tang Dynasty Thought I 29

Vajrabodhi (Jin Gangzhi, 669–741) and Amoghavajra (Bukong, 705–774).26

Although it enriched the ancient Chinese intellectual world, it was very diffi-
cult for it to blend into the intellectual mainstream. This was probably the case
for two reasons: (1) the teachings of Esoteric Buddhism conflicted with China’s
mainstream ideas of morality, and (2) its mystical cultivation practices differed
from the traditional Chinese humanistic ethical values.
The erudition of the Buddhist masters and the profundity of Buddhist
doctrines certainly did give rise to an ardent interest in such theories among
the Chinese intellectual elite. Around the eighth century there were many
large assemblies to discuss and debate Buddhist teachings and their frequent
attacks and rejoinders recall to mind the disputes about Neo-Daoist mysteries
that took place during the Wei-Jin and North-South Dynasties period.27 The
study of various Buddhist sûtras and their exposition also attracted a great
many scholars at the time. In the Buddhist monasteries in the great cities,
there were many ardent expounders of these various sûtras, but this kind of
enthusiasm dissipated quite rapidly.
The Consciousness Only school’s excessive search for the “original aim or
purpose” of Buddhism and their hopes to match the homeland of Buddhism in
the realm of ideas and to be able to analyze the universe and the human mind
at the highest level of meticulousness and complexity was really an unrealistic
fantasy in the Chinese language context. For this reason, that sort of Buddhist
thought only flourished in the cities for a few decades and then ran out of
disciples to carry it forward. Judging from the Consciousness Only school’s
theoretical orientation, this can probably be blamed on its tendency toward
intellectual aristocratization. Although the school’s detailed and complicated
names and appearances (mingxiang 名相), abstruse logical distinctions, and
convoluted methods of argumentation satisfied the desires of some scholars
and monks well versed in theoretical ideas, and genuinely achieved their goal

26  The brief time that Esoteric Buddhism lasted in China may have been related to the
Chinese people not being accustomed to accepting complicated theories and mysti-
cal cultivation practices. The paucity of Han Chinese Tantric monks, especially famous
monks, would seem to confirm this point. See Zhou Yiliang’s study Tangdai mizong, 1996,
for more on Esoteric Buddhism.
27  These sorts of disputations generally featured one particular monk who would put for-
ward several propositions and then the opposing masters would try to refute him. Perhaps
this practice was derived from Indian methods of theoretical disquisition, but China also
had such practices. For example, during the Sui dynasty, Shen Jiong frequently “ordered
three or five people to challenge a new proposition put forward by him. Afterwards,
he would take the lead to integrate these different views into a general theory” See Xu
Gaoseng zhuan, j. 13, Taishô, j. 50: 526.
30 Chapter 7

of surpassing the theoretical level of past masters, nevertheless this sort of

purely abstract activity increasingly lost its power to promote religious faith.
Although it enriched the world of Chinese knowledge and thought, it turned
its back on the religious needs of the Chinese people.
In the same manner, the complexity and abstruseness of the names and
appearances and logical argumentation of the Huayan school was no less
formidable than that of the Consciousness Only school. Their theoretical
ideas were enormously complex and prolific. Their analyses of “substance” or
“fundamental” (ti) versus “function” or the “phenomenal” (yong), “practice”
(shi), “theory” (li) and “names” (ming) seemed too minute and trivial even for
Buddhists who were very well versed in doctrinal theory. Their over-emphasis
on the appearance of symmetrical design in their ideas also made their expla-
nations seem very formalistic to their readers and could not escape appear-
ing mechanical and inflexible. This was especially true of their wish to give a
completely harmonized interpretation of Buddhism and attempt to include,
make compatible, and transcend all theoretical ideas. This caused their inter-
pretations to become enormously complex, over-burdened with trivial details,
cryptic and obscure and so their theories had great difficulty penetrating the
Chinese intellectual world.

2.4
There were indeed ancient Chinese who possessed outstanding talent
for theoretical thinking. Men like Xuanzang, Kuiji, Zhiyan, and Fazang all
demonstrated high standards of intellectual ability. I believe, though, that
ancient Chinese scholars did not really enjoy pure theoretical ideas of such
detail and complexity, especially after the High Tang atmosphere of practical
knowledge became widespread. This may have led to the decline of interest in
doctrinal theory and indirectly to the flourishing of Chan Buddhist practices.
I actually believe that in a certain sense Chan temporarily saved Buddhism
because a religion cannot, after all, be permanently immersed in the
construction of purely theoretical doctrines. Relying only on abstract symbols
to analyze the mind, consciousness, and feelings and on the logical pursuit
of the origins of the universe left the goals of religious faith in an essentially
unresolved limbo. Religion is primarily a spiritual quest for an agent (a sacred
object), a goal (redemption or transcendence) and a function (to give meaning
to life and to provide the power of identification and coherence) to manifest
its importance.
There were three even more important reasons for this contemporary
decline in doctrinal or theoretical interests.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 31

The first was the collapse of the aristocratic intellectual stratum and the
rise of an ordinary intellectual group who were full of the practical spirit of
moving ahead and getting on. This led the entire society away from purely
scholarly interests divorced from practice. As noted above, their mastery of
the knowledge necessary to change their social status and situation in life
led to the simplification of knowledge and a climate of practicality.28 I have
always wondered whether or not Xuanzong’s selection of the Diamond Sûtra
for imperial commentary to some extent drove forward the essentialization of
Buddhist thought. and whether or not the Chan school’s commitment to read-
ing and explicating short scriptures led to an indifference toward large systems
of thought.
Second, another quite important element was the disruptions of war. In
the widespread chaos of war after the middle of the eighth century, those
large Buddhist monasteries housing many monks given to doctrinal explora-
tion found it very difficult to maintain the flourishing conditions of the past.
After the outbreak of the An Lushan Rebellion in 755, not only was the soci-
ety plunged into chaos but the Buddhists were also hard put to avoid suffer-
ing a general calamity. At that time, not only did the rebel armies wantonly
pillage and loot monasteries and so on, but even the official armies also slaugh-
tered and plundered. In the midst of such dangerous and chaotic conditions,
the Buddhist monks had no time to engage in scholarship. Under these trying
conditions, the doctrinal study that once flourished in the monasteries of the
big cities suffered a setback from which it never recovered.29

28  For example, the SGSZ, j. 5: 95, “Tang zhong Dayunsi Yuan Hui zhuan” on Jia Zeng and
Yuan Hui’s discussions of Master Guang (Pu Guang)’s “Jushe shuyi” (“Commentary on the
Abhidharma-kosha or Treasury of Abhidharma”) uses the phrase “extremely complex and
difficult to locate.” … “He stated that it is difficult because he did not want to incur confu-
sion (may also mean: because he did not intend to read it). He stated that it is complex
because he would not be able to grasp the real meaning of the Commentary regardless
of some understanding of it.” On this account, Huai Yuan made his “Abbreviations” of
ancient commentaries.
 Fozu tongji, j. 10, in Taishô, j. 49: 203, also records that Liang Su, “because the meaning
of the ‘Zhiguan’ text is rich and vast, and it takes time to understand it,” edited out part of
the original text and also wrote a “Tongli or General Principles of Zhiguan.”
29  Concerning the importance for Buddhist thought of the great monasteries, Sun Changwu
has pointed out that “both the large translation projects and the rich Buddhist writings
constituted high caliber academic scholarship. A minority of learned monks took advan-
tage of the conditions offered by Chang-an to carry out this work … Their contribution to
cultural and intellectual history was extremely great.” Here I have approached this topic
32 Chapter 7

Third, in the middle of that sort of social transformation, any theoreti-

cal analyses requiring mutual encouragement and debate before they could
clarify their thinking and any pure theories requiring calm deliberation before
they could proceed with their narration became little more than inappropriate
luxuries and unobtainable skills quite divorced from religious faith.
These were historical developments that Buddhism simply could not avoid.
If we look back and survey the history of Buddhism before that time,
we will see that the continuation and improvement of Buddhist theoreti-
cal abilities were guaranteed by the four series of activities: (1) translating
sûtras, (2) lecturing on the scriptures, (3) doctrinal debates, and (4) writing
commentaries.
“Translating sûtras” did not simply refer to the activity of translation per se;
it rather referred to the practice of the state or a particular monastery gathering
together a rather large group of people collectively to share the work of
translating Buddhist sûtras.” Lecturing on the scriptures,” took place especially
in the monasteries where eminent monks would publicly preach the sûtras
to influential scholars, aristocrats or the emperor. This sort of symposium
required one to have a rather high-level of theoretical accomplishment, and
during these discussions of lofty ideas the doctrinal consciousness of both
the lecturers and the audience would be stimulated. “Doctrinal debates” were
organized theoretical discussions that constituted a method for Buddhist
monasteries to study and exchange ideas. Through these debates, doctrines
would receive encouragement and thinking would become more rigorous.
“Writing commentaries” was a way to present more meticulous elucidations
and explanations of already very abstruse and complex sûtras and theories by
means of scholarly annotations.
In the seventh century, the Lotus Sûtra, Prajñâpâramitâ-sûtra, Vimalakîrti-
nirdesa sûtra, Nirvânasûtra, Dashabhumika-sûtra, Satyasiddhi-shâstra (Cheng­
shi lun) and other Buddhist sûtras were all given very careful commentaries.
Some sûtras had sub-commentaries on the commentaries, and there were
even several annotated editions of the same text in circulation at the same
time. These commentaries and sub-commentaries became more and more
detailed, analyzing and re- analyzing doctrinal ideas, or they became increas-
ingly refined and concise, both integrating and re-integrating the scriptural
messages.

from the other way around by pointing out that because the great monasteries were the
main support for academic Buddhism, the depredations of war brought this encourage-
ment to an end. Sun Changwu, “Tang Chang-an Fosi kao,” Tang yanjiu, 2 (1996), 1–49.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 33

The practice of reading these commentaries constituted the gate to enlight-

enment for Buddhist believers while writing commentaries became an expres-
sion of the depth of the writer’s knowledge of Buddhism.
In the seventh and eighth centuries in the great monasteries, such as the
Ci-en, Xingshan, Zhangjing and Fuxian, in Chang-an, Luoyang and other
large cities, Buddhist masters maintained very high theoretical standards
due to their translating and lecturing on the scriptures, debating Buddhist
doctrines, and writing commentaries to the sûtras. At the same time Buddhism
penetrated the upper levels of aristocratic society and also drew closer to the
higher intellectual stratum. This kind of academic Buddhist thought was often
steeped in abstruse doctrines and took great pleasure in such complex, detailed
doctrines and their empty yet mysterious ultimate realm. After the mid-eighth
century, however, this tendency seems to have turned a corner and with the
decline of the aristocracy, the rise of a practical atmosphere and the wartime
destruction of the great urban monasteries, this large-scale translation of and
lecturing on Buddhist scriptures and debating and writing commentaries on
Buddhist doctrines lost its support system.
Hence, in the written Buddhist materials of the eighth to ninth centuries,
we see that interest in Buddhist theories seems to have suddenly come to an
end and the doctrinal work carried on by the Buddhist masters seems to have
lost its powers of attraction. People seem to have preferred more to accept
the practical methods of cultivation and the road to liberation offered by the
masters of discipline and the masters of meditation. It was precisely for such
reasons that the faithful both in and out of the Buddhist church received spiri-
tual inspiration from the practice of the School of Discipline (lümen 律門) that
had always been a religious strength of Buddhism and whose strict discipline,
simple life, and persevering determination manifested the significance of the
noble character and meaning of its faith. Chan Buddhism also began to emerge
at that time. Regardless of whether it was Northern or Southern Chan, their
contempt for theory, their lucid and direct understanding of Buddhist doc-
trines and their close interest in spiritual salvation led many more believers to
be interested in their version of the faith.30
The decline of interest in theory may also have harmed both the ancient
Chinese people’s ability to deal with the abstract world and the creative

30  This trend may well have already begun in the middle of the eighth century. Not to
mention Shenxiu and his disciples Puji and Yifu who were deeply venerated by the
faithful, and Huineng and Shenhui who were very popular for a while in the south, but
even people like Faxian, often overlooked by modern histories of Chan Buddhism, also
held that sort of stubborn attachment to scriptural doctrines in contempt.
34 Chapter 7

capacity of their philosophical language. The universe has a self-evident exis-

tence, but to comprehend this universe a corresponding world has to be con-
structed in the mind by means of symbolic language and levels of connection.
Only through this new process of simulation, analysis and construction can
people bring this self-existing world into view. This is the way it was in Indian
Buddhism. The phenomenal world (world of dharma) was constructed by
a series of sensations (consciousnesses) from the mind, and their system of
exceptionally detailed terms, speculative reasoning, and determinations
(nâman, ming) constituted a description of that process of consciousness and
sensations. This description had no relationship to the phenomenal world
before people’s eyes, but that phenomenal world had to rely on it to appear. For
this reason, the more complex and detailed this set of theoretical constructs
was, the more it was then separated from human experience and formed a
purely abstract philosophical world.
Perhaps this was the first step toward later “pure philosophy,” but in China
this sort of philosophical thought did not really continue. Later Chinese
intellectual history demonstrated that the direct grasp of the world by
experience and feelings, the general comprehension of problems of the cosmos
and human life, and the artistic use of language made up the old tradition of
ancient Chinese thought. The great esteem for intuitive knowledge (wisdom)
and the disdain for linguistic knowledge that came from Buddhism constituted
a new tradition in ancient Chinese thought. The Chinese intellectual world of
later ages received a certain amount of influence from the profound and long-
lasting continuation of both these old and new traditions. It therefore always
maintained an attitude of respecting and keeping at a distance the complex,
abstract, symbolic theoretical world. This was especially so in the generally
secularized age of the Tang dynasty. Under the influence of the An Lushan
Rebellion, no matter how profound, refined and detailed Buddhist doctrines
were, that sort of aristocratic intellectual climate was very difficult to maintain.
In the propagation of Buddhism, the abstruse and complicated doctrines were
very quickly replaced by effortless, simplified methods of realization.

2.5
In 810, the Tang court ended the large-scale official translation of Buddhist
sûtras, a symbolic event in Buddhist history.31 New doctrinal theories could
no longer stimulate interest among the Chinese people and Mâdhyamika,

31  SGSZ, j. 3: 57, states that “it has been more than one hundred and fifty years since the court
suspended sûtra translations from the fifth year of Tang Xianzong’s yuanhe reign period
(810) to the Later Zhou (951–960) and thus, this [Buddhist] Dao has been silenced.”
Tang Dynasty Thought I 35

Yogâcâra, and Huayan Buddhism slowly declined. Even though Chengguan

(738–839 or 760–838) was an outstanding doctrinal studies monk, his detailed
annotations and complicated explanations were no longer able to arouse any
doctrinal enthusiasm and his ambition to include all Buddhist theories and
ideas also ran counter to the practical tendency of that age. No matter how
much his great erudition amazed people, after him there was never another
monk whose doctrinal studies equaled his.32
I may as well mention here that later Chan masters made quite satirical
remarks about Buddhist doctrines. They considered these Buddhist ideas, so
carefully constructed out of abstruse and complicated theories, to be mere
linguistic expressions of the “Buddhist dharma” and disdainfully considered
this sort of “Buddhist dharma” as a “hindrance” (lizhang 理障) to the truth and/
or nirvâna. They believed that “wisdom” (zhi)—intellectual understanding of
the sûtras—could not really comprehend the “Way” of Buddhism. In their
view, the key was to obtain a mental realization of the transcendent realm in
one’s mind and this realization could be seized upon by oneself in an instant
of “sudden enlightenment” (dunwu 頓悟). This direct mental realization of the
Buddhist dharma was the ultimate truth of Buddhism. They considered relying
on reason and intellect to understand the truth of Buddhism to be a “film or
mote” (yi 翳) or “golden flakes” ( jinxie 金屑) in the eyes that prevented people
from fully understanding the Buddhist truth and reaching enlightenment. As
they sarcastically put it, “although golden flakes are very costly, they fall into
one’s eyes and cloud one’s vision (understanding).” In other words, no matter
how precious were the “golden flakes” of theoretical analyses and scriptural
knowledge, to those who searched for faith, they were like a dark shade or
screen that clouded the eyes and made it impossible to see things correctly.33
This age really did not have much need of abstruse and complicated
doctrines, and so the interest in Buddhist theories that flourished at the
beginning of the High Tang melted away in the Mid-Tang.

3 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism II: The

Victory of Chan Buddhism and the Defeat of Buddhism

Prior to the second half of the eighth century, traditional dhyâna (medita-
tion) masters (chanshi) were just one group of Buddhists who stood on equal
footing with masters of the scriptures ( fashi) and masters of the discipline

32  SGSZ, “Tang Daizhou Wutaishan Jingliangsi Chengguan zhuan,” j. 5: 104–107.

33  See Zutang ji, 1994, “Furong lingxun,” j. 17: 640 citing monk Guizong Zhichang.
36 Chapter 7

(lüshi). Chan Buddhism (chanzong 禪宗) was just one method of Buddhist
cultivation leading to enlightenment, and the Eastern Mountain Chan with
the Lankâvatâra-sûtra as its main text was only one rather more conspicu-
ous branch of Chan Buddhism. Due, however, to the remarkable decades long
activities of Shenxiu (?–706), Puji (651–739) and Yifu (658–736) of the Northern
Chan school and Huineng (638–713), Shenhui (684–758), Benjing (667–761) and
Huizhong (?–775) of the Southern Chan school and so on, in the middle of the
eighth century, meditation masters came to surpass masters of the scriptures
and masters of the discipline, and the way of meditation or chanfa became of
central interest to Buddhist believers. Chan in China also became a very large
system that encompassed both theory and practice. Huineng of the Southern
school of Chan transformed the traditional way of Chan with his idea that
“the self-mind (svacitta, one’s own mind) is the Buddha-nature” (zixin ji foxing
自心即佛性), his method of sudden enlightenment, and his undifferentiated
transcendent realm of Shûnyatâ. On the one hand, he carried on the Buddha-
nature thinking that “the self-mind is the Buddha,” while on the other hand he
sought out the ultimate realm of Shûnyatâ and so opened up the path of later
Chan Buddhist thought.34
The theoretical and doctrinal thinking of Chan Buddhism was not very
quickly unified, however, and many different ways of thinking and tech-
niques were popular among its different masters. In the early eighth century,
all schools of Chan Buddhism—Zhishen (539–618)’s followers in Western
Sichuan, Shenxiu’s followers of the Northern school, the Ox-Head school in
the Southeast, and Huineng’s followers in the South—wanted to establish a
system that would include the cosmos-in-itself (the noumenal universe),
the ultimate realm, and the religious life. Their efforts continued down
to the middle of the eighth century. After them, especially from the end of the
eighth century to the beginning of the ninth century—the Mid-Tang—all of
Chinese Buddhist thought, especially Chan Buddhist thinking, underwent a
very extensive transformation.
In the writings of later Chan Buddhists describing the transmission of
the lamp of Buddhism (chuan deng lu 傳燈錄), this period of Buddhist his-
tory has been simplified as the history of Chan Buddhism, and this history of
Chan Buddhism has also been abbreviated and truncated into the history
of the Southern school only, but this scenario is highly problematic. According
to contemporary historical materials, we can see that from the second half of
the eighth century on, so-called “Chan Buddhism” should have included five

34  On this period of Chan Buddhist history and thought, see Ge Zhaoguang, Zengdingben
Zhongguo Chan sixiangshi—cong 6 shiji dao 10 shiji, 2008.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 37

different major systems: the Northern school, the Heze (Lotus Marsh) school,
the Ox-Head school, the Tiantai school and the Hongzhou school that grew
increasingly flourishing later on. The situation of eighth-century to ninth-
century Buddhism, especially the history of Chan Buddhism, was much more
complicated than they later described it.

3.1
Let us first consider the Northern school after Puji and Yifu. In general, we have
believed that the Northern Chan school declined very quickly after the rise of
the Southern school, but this was really a misapprehension. In the second half
of the eighth century there were many very active figures who were disciples of
Puji, that is second generation disciples of Shenxiu. It is quite easy to see, then,
that the history of Northern Chan Buddhism had really not come to an end.
This school was still quite influential in Chan history all the way down to the
xiantong reign period of 860–874. It was perhaps for this reason that Guifeng
Zongmi (784–841) in his contemporary commentary on the history of Chan
Buddhism, the Chart of the Master-Disciple Succession of the Chan Gate that
Transmits the Mind Ground in China (Zhonghua chuanxin di chanmen shizi
chenxi tu), wrote that “the succession of their posterity has been unending to
this day.”35 The Japanese scholar monk Ui Hakujû wrote in his Researches in
the History of Zen Buddhism (Zenshûshi kenkyu) that the history of Northern
Chan was not what people had generally thought; in fact it lasted for some one
hundred and fifty plus years, from 706 when Shenxiu passed away in Luoyang
to the death of Master Rizhao in 862. Even more telling is the fact that after the
middle of the ninth century, disciples of Northern Chan were still active; their
school had certainly not disappeared.
Next let us look at the disciples of Shenhui of the Heze school. There are very
few records of Shenhui’s tradition in the transmission of the light of Buddhism
historical records, but this does not accord with the facts of Mid-Tang history.
At least in the beginning of the Mid-Tang, the Heze school was actually one of
the most influential schools of Chan Buddhism. It is just that it appeared to be
on the decline in comparison with the flourishing condition of the Hongzhou
school. In the Mid-Tang, the conflict between these two branches of Southern
Chan was extremely sharp. At the beginning of the Mid-Tang, the Heze school
failed to flourish so greatly as Northern Chan during the kaiyuan and tianbao

35  
Zhonghua chuanxin di chanmen shizi chenxi tu, quoted from Zhongguo Fojiao sixiang
zi­liao xuanbian, j. 2, ce 2, 460. The English title of this Chart is from Zongmi on Chan by
Jeffrey Lyle Broughton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
38 Chapter 7

periods. It very quickly lost out in its competition with the Hongzhou school
and so appeared to be in rather steep decline.
What were the main reasons for this? It appears from the extant materi-
als that the later followers of Shenhui became increasingly conservative. They
often presented themselves as transcending all schools and did not clearly
exhibit the main characteristics of Southern Chan. They often blended the
sudden and gradual enlightenment doctrines and tried to take a harmonizing
position by advocating the convergence of all Chan ideas. At that they lost the
true features of Southern Chan. Given these tendencies, they could not com-
pete with the Mazu Chan school which advocated the identity of mind and
Buddha—“the mind is the Buddha” ( ji xin shi Fo 即心是佛), “apart from mind
there is no Buddha” ( fei xin fei Fo 非心非佛)—“everything is truth” (yiqie jie
zhen 一切皆真) and “all human behavior is the [Buddhist] Way” (chulei shi dao
觸類是道). Moving gradually toward emphasizing “the ordinary mind is the
[Buddhist] Way” (pingchang xin shi dao 平常心是道), the Mazu Chan school
was thus quite able to preserve its own unique outlook that was simple, clear,
and straightforward. In the beginning of the ninth century and in the face of
the fierce competition from the rising Mazu Chan school, the domain of the
Heze school was eventually reduced.
Next we come to the Ox-Head school. This was another Mid-Tang branch
of Chan Buddhism and it was led by Huizhong (683–769), Xuansu (668–752)’s
disciples Yize (713–770) of the Buddhist grottoes on Tiantai Mountain and
Faqin (714–792) of Mount Jing. This school once flourished very widely
and was listed as one of the four great schools at the beginning of the Mid-
Tang along with the Northern school, the Heze school and the Hongzhou
school. In the beginning of the dali reign period (766–780), Faqin was invited
to Chang-an by Emperor Daizong (Li Yu, 727–779, r. 762–779). At that time he
was greatly admired by very many literati and scholar-officials. Although Yize
did not have such sensational influence as Faqin, he seems to have had very
great attainments in Chan theory, and so in the yuanhe reign period (806–821)
the term “Grotto Studies” (Fokuxue) emerged.36 He went to the headquarters of
Tiantai Buddhism on Tiantai Mountain in Zhejiang to preach and even man-
aged to rival Tiantai’s Guoqing Temple. It is said that during the time of the
Ox-Head Chan master Guan Zongde (d. 809), “there were nearly ten thousand
followers of Ox-Head Chan Buddhism.”37

36  SGSZ, j. 10: 229, “Tang Tiantaishan Fo kuyan Yize zhuan.”

37  Hu Di 胡的, Da Tang Gu Taibai chanshi taming (bing xu), http://tripitaka.cbeta.org/
zh-cn/X63n1225_001 and https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/大唐故太白禪師塔銘(並
序). Also see QTW, j. 721.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 39

Relations between the Heze school and the Hongzhou school were some­
what strained, but the Ox-Head school had a very harmonious relationship
with the Hongzhou school. The ultimate for Ox-Head school thought was to
speak of “Shûnyatâ” and “Nonbeing,” and their method of cultivation was a kind
of natural indulgence. In this they went even further than Huineng’s Southern
school. After Mazu, the Hongzhou school also moved toward this sort of think-
ing. They sought the goal of spiritual and behavioral freedom, took a sort of
relaxed going along naturally as the way of cultivation, and regarded the undif-
ferentiated transcendent realm described by the Prajñâ concept of Shûnyatâ
as the ultimate Buddha realm. Was this not, then, a direct connection to the
Ox-Head school? And was the later disappearance of the Ox-Head school not
due to the increasing closeness of their thought to that of the Hongzhou school
until they essentially merged together?38
The final school we will consider is the Tiantai school. Although previous
researchers have always separated the Tiantai school from Chan Buddhism
and considered it the first independent Chinese Buddhist school, if we look
at the Tang dynasty situation, their leaders were all called Chan masters
(chanshi) and they both regarded the practice of meditation (dhyâna, chan) as
the primary path to salvation. After their great masters Zhizhe and Guanding
(561–632), they steadily produced a historical genealogy for Tiantai Buddhism,
but they did not really have much influence among the various Chan schools.
In the eighth century only a few of their monks—Hongjing (634–712) from
Dangyang in Hubei, Huizhen (673–751) who lived in Nanquan in Jingzhou
(Hubei), Chujin (698–759) who lived in the Dayuan monastery in Xian
(Shaanxi), Xuanlang (673–754) who lived on Mount Zuoxi in Puyang (Zhejiang),
Zhanran (711–782) of Jingxi in Changzhou, Daozun (?–784) of Mount Zhixing
in Jiangsu and so on—had any influence. By the beginning of the ninth cen-
tury, there were only Yuanhao (?–817), Zhiyuan (768–844) and others main-
taining their position with considerable difficulty under pressure from the
great flourishing of Southern Chan. Since Tiantai Buddhism did not receive
imperial favor, it could not compare to the thriving of Chan, Consciousness
Only, and Huayan Buddhism. It was only due to the belief and enthusiastic
promotion of scholars like Li Hua (715–766) and Liang Su (753–793) that this

38  At the end of the eighth century and beginning of the ninth century, the Hongzhou
Chan masters gradually moved into the Ox-Head school’s original territory in Jiangning,
Zhenjiang, Suzhou, Changzhou, Chizhou, Ningguo, Huainan, and Fengyang, that is,
the area of present day Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui provinces, and this probably led
to the demise of the Ox-Head school.
40 Chapter 7

branch of Chan Buddhism was able to maintain its position in the Southeast
in the early ninth century.39
Although Tiantai Buddhism continued to carry on its idealist or
consciousness only thought, the origins and constitution of its knowledge and
thought actually grew increasingly complex and varied, especially when its
followers tried to transcend and include all Buddhist theories and practices.40
At the same time, they continued to waver between doctrinal studies and
Chan practices.41 Their ideas came to seem even more disorganized and their
theories even more detailed and complex. Their celebrated fourth patriarch
Chengguan (737–838 or 738–839) actually had his name linked with Confucius’
disciples Ziyou and Zixia. In his writings, he evinced a sort of comprehensive
and syncretic tendency. Tiantai’s complete combination or perfect harmony
among all differences and their meticulous theories could not, however,
include all Buddhist schools; they steadily lost ground under the attacks of
the simple and easily understood practices of Chan Buddhism. Added to this
was the destruction caused by Tang Emperor Wuzong (Li Chan, r. 840–846)’s
persecution of Buddhism and the chaos of the various wars at the end of the
Tang dynasty that caused the loss of most of their theoretical writings. With
this loss of support from their classic scriptures, the tradition of the Tiantai
school was virtually cut off. It was not until King Wuyue (Qian Liu, 852–932) of
the Kingdom of Wuyue in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period found
their lost doctrinal writings from abroad in the tenth century that Yiji (919–
987) of Luoxi in Zhejiang (Mt. Tiantai) and others emerged.

39  In his Sui-Tang Fojiao shigao, Tang Yongtong also states that “after Jingxi (i.e. Jingxi
Zhanran, 711–782), the An Lushan Rebellion and Emperor Wuzong’s huichang reign
period (841–846) persecution, Tiantai Buddhism also greatly declined.” Tang Yongtong,
Sui-Tang Fojiao shigao, 1982, chapter four, 140.
40  Just as Liang Su criticized in his “Tiantai famen yi”: “Those who discourse on the dharma
are tied to the written word and none of them know how to explain things by themselves.
Those who practice Chan meditation believe the nature of anything and its phenomenal
appearance are without substance and non-existent, and thus they can no longer lead
them to return to [the correct path].” He seems to have been dissatisfied with both ten-
dencies. QTW, j. 517, 2327.
41  Zongmi, Wanzi xinzuan xu Cangjing, j. 2, states that although Southern Chan and Tiantai
both advocate sudden enlightenment and gradual cultivation, “sudden enlightenment
became increasingly intensified in the Southern Chan, while the Tiantai school’s inter-
pretation of sudden enlightenment gradually was made part of the central principles in
discussing its scriptures. ” Xu zangjing (Taishô Continuation), 15 ce, 219.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 41

3.2
Of all the various Chan Buddhist schools, the Hongzhou Mazu school derived
from Huineng’s Southern Chan became very popular in both north and south
during the ninth century.
From Tang dynasty records, we can see that during the zhenyuan and
yuanhe reign periods (785–820) the most celebrated Mazu Chan masters
were Zhizang (738–817) of Xitang Monastery (in Jiangxi), Weikuan (754–817)
of Xingshan Temple (in Xian, Shaanxi) and Huaihui (756–815) of Zhangjing
Monastery (in Xian, Shaanxi). This is completely at variance with the records
of the transmission of the lamp of Buddhism history.42 Zhizang of Xitang
was Mazu Daoyi (709–788)’s first close disciple; after Mazu passed away,
he was certainly Mazu’s chosen successor among all of the many monks
under his leadership at Gonggong Mountain (Jiangxi). Mazu died in 788 and
three years later, Zhizang responded to repeated popular appeals and began
to expound Buddhist teachings, spreading Mazu’s Chan practices widely
throughout the south. At this time people said that Zhizang was to Mazu’s
teaching, and Mazu was to Buddha’s doctrines, as Dong Zhongshu was to the
ideas of Mencius, and Mencius was to the teachings of Confucius—they were
all Masters coming from one unbroken line.
An important master from another branch of Mazu Chan was Huaihui of
Zhangjing Temple. He was active in the north and spread Mazu Chan thought
into the areas of the Northern and Heze Chan schools. In particular, in 808,
he was summoned to live in the Zhangjing Temple in Chang-an, and every
year he expounded Buddhist doctrines before the emperor, occupying a cen-
tral cultural stage. It is recorded that this “Great Master of the Mountains”
once carried on a fierce debate with his opponents. Especially important is
his Transmission of the Masters (Fashi zichuan) that traces the genealogy of
Huineng and Shenxiu and the history of the division of Southern and Northern
Chan. In it he wrote that “the heart/mind is clear and clean in its original state.
It is not because we dispel consciousness to purify the heart/mind, or remove
filthiness to make it clean.”43 This kind of pleasurably straightforward Chan

42  The history of Chan Buddhism has always followed the transmission of the light (lamp)
of Buddhism version that took Huaihai of Baizhang (720–814) as Mazu’s most important
disciple, but this is mistaken because Huaihai of Mount Baizhang’s status at that time was
nowhere near as high as that of Huihai, Zhizang, Weikuan, and Huaihui.
43  Quotation about the heart/mind is from Quan Deyu, “Tang gu Zhangjingsi baiyan dashi
beiming bingxu,” text at https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/唐故章敬寺百岩大師碑
銘（並序）.
42 Chapter 7

thought influenced very many scholar-officials, and so Huaihui was called the
leading master of his generation.
Another monk who came to Chang-an at about the same time as Huaihui
and spread Mazu Southern Chan thought was the celebrated Chan master
Weikuan of Xingshan Temple. According to Bo Juyi’s “Essay on Chuanfa Tang
(Chuanfa Tang bei), we know that after Mazu passed away, Weikuan visited
Fujian, Zhejiang, and other places and spread widely the Way of Chan.
Sometime after 797 he visited the north and in 809, he followed Huaihui in
being invited by Emperor Xianzong (Li Chun, r. 805–820) to enter the Anguo
Temple; the following year, the emperor invited him to the Linde Palace and
questioned him about Buddhism.44 Later on, he continued to live in the great
Xingshan Temple, the most important Buddhist temple in Chang-an. As with
Huaihui, Weikuan used the question and answer and disputation formats to
explain various issues such as the unsullied mind is originally pure (xinxing
ben jing, 心性本淨), no cultivation and no thoughts (wuxiu wunian, 無修無念),
Chan departs from speech and words (chan li yanshuo, 禪離言說), and so on
to propagate the ideas of the Southern school of Mazu Chan. In the process,
he gained many followers among the literati and scholar-officials and was
especially successful in clarifying the genealogy of Mazu Chan and spreading
the belief in Mazu as the orthodox line of descent in the Southern school
among the general public.45
Mazu Daoyi’s Chan thought was extremely clear and straightforward and
he had a very large number of disciples; his thought flourished during the
zhenyuan and yuanhe reign periods. As we know, the south was originally
the “base area” of Southern school Chan, especially the Mazu Hongzhou
school (Mazu Daoyi also being known as Hongzhou Daoyi), but by this time
the influence of the Mazu organization had already spread into the north and
moved into the central area of the Northern and Heze Chan schools. That
both Huaihui and Weikuan came to Chang-an in the early ninth century and

44  Chuanfa Tang is a place in the Xingshan Monastery. Bai Juyi’s essay describes Monk
Weikuan’s life and his explanation of the transmission of Chan Buddhism under a succes-
sion of different Chan Masters. This “Chuanfa Tang bei” is in Bo Juyi ji, 1979, j. 41. Also see
https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/白氏長慶集/卷041.
45  Weikuan had many disciples. The Chuanfa Tang bei states that “he had almost a thou-
sand disciples and thirty-nine of them attained great distinction or reputation.” Juan 10
of the Northern Song Records of the Transmission of the Lamp (Jingde chuandenglu) how-
ever, lists only six disciples; not only does it omit Yichong and Yuanjing who “entered the
Master’s chamber and directly received his teaching of the Way,” but of the six mentioned
there is only one name and nothing about their lives.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 43

moved into the most prestigious Zhangjing and Daxing temples represents the
victory of Mazu Daoyi’s form of Chan Buddhism. Because they entered into
the political and cultural center and conversed with the emperor, spread new
Chan thought widely among the literati and scholar-officials, clarified sectar-
ian disputes, and achieved the position of orthodox transmission, Mazu Chan
rose rapidly during the zhenyuan and yuanhe reign periods and became the
mainstream form of Southern Chan.
By the second decade of the ninth century, the map of Chinese Buddhism
had already undergone great changes. Following the gradual loss of interest in
pure Buddhist theory, the practice of seeking out the meaning of the former
classics also disappeared from the purview of the faithful. Chinese intellectual
circles came to accept Chan Buddhism’s attention to the mind and life
conditions of the believers and its system of monastic discipline. Following
the Hongzhou organization’s occupation of the mainstream position after the
ninth century, Chan thought was increasingly transformed in the direction of a
natural and easy philosophy of life and slowly permeated the world of Chinese
knowledge, thought and belief.

3.3
What is the relationship between human nature and the Buddha-nature? This
was a perennial question for Chinese Buddhism. Even though after Faxian
translated the Mahâparinirvâna-sûtra (Da po niepan jing) in the Eastern
Jin and everyone admitted that “all people possess the Buddha-nature,” the
relationship between human nature and the Buddha-nature had still not been
settled. If one believed that although human nature possesses Buddha-nature
it is still different from Buddha-nature and that the process of going from
human nature to Buddha-nature requires people to keep the commandments
(śîla, rules), calm their body through meditation (dhyâna), practice wisdom
(prajñâ) and go through arduous forms of cultivation, then there still remained
an important theoretical activity to maintain the existence of the Buddhist
community, the rules and Buddhist cultivation. These practices were, then, a
last line of defense for religious belief. If, however, one believed that human
nature simply was the Buddha-nature and people could abandon all religious
restraints and studies, then that opened wide the door to the secularization of
the Buddhist religion and foreshadowed the self-destruction of Buddhism. To
go any further in that direction would mean that the rules would be relaxed,
cultivation could be dispensed with and religious belief would naturally
collapse.
The price of spiritual or mental freedom is sometimes the loss of ultimate
meaning. This is a key theoretical point, and from the earliest Chan studies
44 Chapter 7

to the latest Chan school, the transmutations of Chan intellectual history

seem to have always been intimately related to this point.
In general, traditional Chan thought always tended toward the firm opinion
that although human beings possessed the Buddha-nature, human nature
was not simply equivalent to the Buddha-nature. From Hongren (601–675) on,
Dharmatâ (Faru 法如, 638–689), Shenxiu, Lao-an 老安 (i.e. Daoan 道安) and
the other Northern Chan masters all carried on this trend of thought. It was
said that Shenxiu’s famous gâtha very accurately summarized traditional Chan
thought:

The body is the tree of perfect wisdom (bodhi)

The mind is the stand of a bright mirror.
At all times diligently wipe it.
Do not allow it to become dusty.46

On this account, when Zhang Yue summarized Shenxiu’s thought, he wrote

that the key was “concentrating on intoning the Buddha’s name to stop all
other thoughts, and striving to the utmost to control the mind”47 The way that
the Chan masters saved the ordinary believers was to enlighten them on how
to eliminate their illusory thoughts and employ the “method of concentration
on intoning the Buddha name to stop all other thoughts” to cause the faith-
ful to practice “abandoning thought” (linian 離念) and “observing their minds”
(guanxin 觀心).
That was traditional, orthodox Chan Buddhist thought, but in the early
eighth century it was seriously challenged by Huineng of the Southern Chan.
Huineng did not much believe that dust (chenyuan 塵緣, that is, causes)
really polluted the mind, and from that starting point, he revealed his dif-
ferences from traditional Chan learning. He said that Buddhism must “take
calmness (meditation, samâdhi) and wisdom (prajñâ) as its foundation” (yi
dinghui wei ben 以定惠為本).48 Samâdhi (achieved through meditation) and
prajñâ (wisdom) were frequently used Chan ideas, but what Huineng meant
by samâdhi and prajñâ was quite different from the traditional idea. The tra-
ditional idea was “to go from samâdhi to prajñâ” (yi ding fa hui, 以定發慧),
from meditation to wisdom, in which meditation was simply a technique

46  Chan, SB, 431. On Daoan 道安, see Song Dan, “Songshan Huishansi gu Dade Daoan chan-
shi beiming” QTW, j. 396, http://www.mahabodhi.org/files/yinshun/32/yinshun32-07
.html Also see a study of Lao-an’s dates at http://qk.laicar.com/Home/Content/394720.
47  “Tang Yuquansi Datong chanshi beiming,” QTW, j. 231: 1030.
48  For our translation of these terms, see Chan, SB, 433 passages from the Platform Sûtra §13.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 45

or process and wisdom was the achievement of genuine enlightenment.

Because the human mind contains the Buddha-nature within it, the Buddha-
nature first had to be brought to the surface before it could manifest itself and
because the worldly nature of the human mind has to be slowly cultivated
before it can be suppressed, traditional Chan always maintained definite
methods of cultivation such as obeying the rules, meditating, repeatedly inton-
ing the name of the Buddha and so on. As they saw it, samâdhi and prajñâ
(meditation and wisdom) were two separate things and they always advocated
“going from samâdhi to achieve prajñâ.”49
Huineng, however, believed that “meditation (samâdhi) should equal
wisdom (prajñâ)” just like the relationship between a lamp and its light:
“if there is a lamp, there is light and if there is no lamp, there is no light.”50
That is to say, samâdhi is simply prajñâ, prajñâ is simply samâdhi, and it is
not necessary to rely on samâdhi (meditation) to achieve prajñâ (wisdom).
Because the causes (dust, chenyuan) that pollute the mind are all illusions
brought about by humanity’s wild thoughts and because human beings
possess the keen sense of awareness, this “cleansing” or “eliminating” of the
dust is certainly not polishing the mirror of the mind. It is rather an awareness
in one’s consciousness that the mirror of the mind is originally clean and the
dust is only a false image:

Fundamentally perfect wisdom has no tree.

Nor has the bright mirror any stand.
Buddha-nature is forever clear and pure.
Where is there any dust?51

49  The second gate of the Dunhuang edition of the Mahâyâna Gates of Upâya for the Unborn
(Dacheng wusheng fangbianmen), “Kai zhihui men” mentions this idea many times.
Taishô, j. 85: 1274.
50  From the Platform Sûtra of the Sixth Patriarch. De Bary & Bloom, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999,
494–504 has extensive translations. The passage “Meditation [samâdhi] itself is the sub-
stance of wisdom [prajñâ]; wisdom itself is the function of meditation” is on p. 499. See
the Platform Sûtra, Dinghuipin, section 4 for the passage “Where there is a lamp there
is light; where there is no lamp there is no light” (You deng ji you guang; wu deng ji wu
guang 有燈即有光, 無燈即無光) http://ddc.shengyen.org/mobile/text/10-06/132.php,
第四天：晚上.
51  Chan, SB, 432. Chan also gives another version of this famous ghâta:
The mind is the tree of perfect wisdom.
The body is the stand of a bright mirror.
The bright mirror is originally clear and pure.
Where has it been defiled by any dust?
46 Chapter 7

In this way, Huineng fundamentally revised the division of the mind into
two parts present in traditional Chan thought and began the comprehensive
importation of Prajñâ school thought.
Continuing on naturally in this way of thinking brought about an enormous
upheaval in Buddhist thought. At first and all the way through Shenhui’s system,
the contradictions of Huineng’s thought still remained—the distance in the
mind between “man” and “Buddha,” “polluted” and “clean,” and samâdhi and
prajñâ had not been completely eliminated. People still required prajñâ wisdom
(borezhi 般若智) to bring about their “sudden enlightenment.” The problem
was that in as much as the human mind is “itself the treasury or storehouse (of
all Buddhist truth, zijia baozang 自家寶藏)” and no different from the Buddha-
mind, then why would people still have to employ “knowledge” and “wisdom”
in an extremely arduous pursuit of “enlightenment?” In as much as all distress
and all the elements that intrude on the mind and cause mental anxiety
(kleśa and âgantu-kleśa) have no real existence in the world of the mind, then
why do people still have to hold tenaciously on to the defensive line of “True
Buddhahood” or “Absolute Reality?”
In the late eighth and early ninth centuries, then, when Hongzhou Chan
advocated an even more thorough naturalism, the contradictions left behind
from Huineng and Shenhui’s thought were totally cleared away. In the thought
of Mazu Daoyi, because the human mind was simply the Buddha-nature and
there was no difference between the “human mind” and the “Buddha-mind,”
whatever was manifest in the ordinary world of the human mind was sim-
ply the pure land of the Buddha-realm and ordinary ideas (meanings) were
simply the great ideas (meanings) of the Buddha-dharma. For this reason,
every form of natural human behavior was a manifestation of the true essence
of life. This was simply the idea that “everything we touch or do is the Way, and
so just follow our heart.”52
The traditional idea that “this mind is the Buddha” ( ji xin ji Fo) had finally
reached its limit and Chinese intellectual history made a great turn at that
point. Under the influence of the Prajñâpâramitâ idea that everything is
Shûnyatâ (empty), the idea that “this mind is the Buddha” that derived from
the Lankâvatâra tradition finally turned toward the idea that “there is no
mind and there is no Buddha” ( fei xin fei Fo). Sometime between 766 and
805, Mazu Daoyi put forth this idea for the first time in Chinese intellectual

52  This is Zongmi’s explanation of Mazu’s Chan thought. Zongmi, Wanzi xinzuan xu
Cangjing《卍字新纂续藏经》, j. 3. See also Wudeng Huiyuan, 1991 or 2007, j. 3, Mazu
Daoyi chapter.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 47

history. He said that “this mind is the Buddha” was only an expedient idea or a
“momentary saying” and could really not lead people to achieve the Buddha-
nature. Once people truly entered into Buddhist cultivation or practice and
turned their attention to their innermost heart, Mazu affirmed, at that point
they should realize that “there is no mind and there is no Buddha.”
The saying that “there is no mind and there is no Buddha” received some
positive responses from Mazu’s disciples. Pu Yuan (748–834) of Nanquan in
Anhui, Zizai (741–821?) of Mt. Funiu (in Henan), Ruhui (744–843) of Dongsi (in
Hunan) and others all supported this thoroughly naturalistic thought because
it represented the new direction of Chan Buddhism—“the ordinary mind.” As
they said, “the ordinary mind” (pingchang xin) is the “Way” (dao).53

3.4
Methods of cultivation were most important in the process of approaching
the Buddha-nature from human nature. The various methods that different
Chan schools argued about—the differences between “sudden” versus
“gradual” enlightenment, so-called “sitting in meditation” versus “not sitting in
meditation,” and so-called “just sitting (facing the wall) in meditation” versus
“natural non-action”—were all essentially concerned with the question of
whether or not to practice cultivation. As long as Chan Buddhism wanted to
survive, some sort of cultivation or practice was, of course, a practical necessity.
No matter how much extreme Southern Chan argued that there was no need
for cultivation, reaching an awareness of the idea that just acting naturally
was itself liberation was also mental cultivation in a broad sense. In the
intellectual history of Chan Buddhism, then, the so-called practical art of how
to cultivate or practice Buddhism would change in accordance with changes
in the theories of human nature and the Buddha-nature. Should one resolutely
hold on to external things like obeying the monastic rules, meditation and
reading the sûtras, or should one regard only internal things like concentration
or calmness of mind as important? Should one guard the purified realm of
one’s inner mind, or should one indulge human nature and not confine oneself
in any way? The answer to these questions was a major element of Chan
Buddhism as well as the dividing line between the various schools of Chan.
Obeying the rules, meditating and repeatedly intoning the name of the
Buddha all carried great weight in traditional Chan thought. The traditional
four dhyānas and eight concentrations (sichan bading 四禪八定) all demanded

53  See chapter five, section two “Cong ‘ji xin ji Fo’ dao ‘fei xin fei Fo,’ in Ge Zhaoguang
Zengding ben Zhongguo Chanzong sixiangshi, 2008 especially 382–388.
48 Chapter 7

that one go through an arduous process before one could move from delusion
(mâyâ, mi 迷) to enlightenment (bodhi, wu 悟).54 This was the consensus of very
many traditional Chan masters; all the way down to the Mid-Tang, Northern
Chan monks still firmly maintained this rationalistic belief. One could only
enter the crystal-clear realm of purification from all illusions by degrees, going
through an arduous process of cultivation. In the Southern Chan of Huineng
and Shenhui, however, the difference between bodhi (enlightenment) and
mâyâ (delusion) was only a single turn of the mind. Shenhui believed that
human beings are born with the original intelligence to return to the roots of
their beginning mind and that this sort of intelligence was simply the Buddha-
realm that they should achieve. Precisely because human nature originally
possesses this kind of “knowledge,” there is no need to practice the various
superfluous forms of cultivation such as mental concentration or fixation in
meditation, developing the mind of bodhi or bodhisattva, and so on; they are
all as superfluous as “painting legs on a snake.” All one had to do to achieve sud-
den enlightenment was to return to one’s original knowledge or intelligence.
These ideas had not yet reached their extreme point because no matter
whether it was “sudden” or “gradual” enlightenment, as long as a distinction
was made between mâyâ and bhodi, cultivation was still necessary. According
to the most completely extreme way of thinking, this boundary between
mâyâ and bhodi would also be eliminated. For this reason, we need to pay
attention to the influence of the Ox-Head school of thought. The school was
expert in discussing Shûnyatâ and Nonbeing and it considered “just letting go
of your mind/thoughts and acting” (zhixing fangren 直行放任) as the most
convenient way of cultivation. In High Tang to Mid-Tang times, this kind of
thought and methodology had already developed in the direction of seeking
freedom and spontaneity (ziran, the natural). The freedom and naturalness
of the Ox-Head school was quite different from the thinking of the Heze
school, and it had a rather profound influence on later Chan, especially on
the Hongzhou school. Ever since Mazu stated that “there is no mind and there
is no Buddha,” and the idea spread widely that one could reach Buddhahood
without meditation, ever more Chan masters advocated theories that aban-
doned the need for cultivation. The following sayings on this line became
prominent: “when hungry, then eat; when tired, then sleep” (Huihai of Dazhu
in Fujian); “when hot, cool off; when cold, stand near the fire” (Jingcen [788–
868] of Changsha in Hunan); “become a Buddha without any exertion of mind
or effort” (Congshen [778–897] of Zhaozhou Temple in Hebei); “the dharma

54  Soothill’s definition of the sichan bading 四禪八定: “The four dhyānas on the form-
realms [sejie 色界] and the eight concentrations, i. e. four on the form-realms [sejie] and
four on the formless realms [wuse jie 無色界].”
Tang Dynasty Thought I 49

does not require great effort; just live an ordinary life” (Yixuan [?–866/867] of
Linji in Hebei); “call him a man of the Buddhist Way, but he is also called a man
who does nothing” (Lingyou [771–853] of Weishan in Hunan); “Roam around
as your mind takes you, free and unrestrained whenever it is fitting; just let go
to your heart’s content (because) there is no sacred explanation” (Tianhuang
Daowu [748–807] of Jingzhou [in Hubei).55
What needs to be further explored, however is the question that if religious
faith is “no special activity,” the “Buddha-mind” is the same as “my mind”
(woxin 我心), the “ordinary mind” is the “Way,” and cultivation is useless, then
would not religion and religious belief be simply unnecessary? At this time
the “chan” (meditation) of Chan Buddhism had already quietly disintegrated
and the meaning of Buddhism as a guardian and a guide to liberation for its
believers had also declined. Once religion had atrophied to become ordinary
life and the spiritual transcendence derived from religious faith had been
replaced by natural, ordinary, everyday life, then a form of thinking grew up
among Buddhist believers that regarded “ease and comfort” as the most ideal
realm of thought. This was especially widespread among the upper levels of
society.

3.5
Finally, if one really reaches the Buddha-nature from human nature, what
kind of a state or realm is it? What benefit do believers derive from the attain-
ment of that realm? This is the result of cultivation (Buddhist practice) and
the promise that Buddhism must make to those who cultivated its religious
practices as well as the questions that the religion had to answer for its believ-
ers. Chan Buddhism is a religion without a supreme being such as “God” or
“Heaven.” It promises its believers a purely psychological state of life that is
“calm in mind,” “natural” and “easy.” How, though, can this kind of state make
the faithful experience its attraction and derive from it a feeling of settling
down and getting on with their lives? Throughout Chan intellectual history,
this question was constantly being discussed and debated.
“Calmness of mind” or “ataraxy” (anxin 安心) was the highest ideal sought
by cultivation in early Chan thought.56 Even as early as Eastern Jin times (265–
420), Huiyuan (334–416), who regarded intoning the Buddha-name as the gate
to enlightenment, said that intoning the Buddha’s name could concentrate

55  These quotations are scattered throughout the Jingde chuandeng lu, in Dazheng xinxiu da
cangjing, 1992.
56  In juan 1 of Jingjue’s Lengjia shizi ji, when discussing the origins of Chan thought and recall-
ing Gunabhadra (394–468)’s thought, he writes that “those who aspire to Buddhahood
must first learn to quiet their minds.” Taishô, j. 85: 1286.
50 Chapter 7

and silence thoughts and bring about calmness of mind and tranquility. Later
on, Chan masters from the school of Bodhidharma, Daoxin (580–651) and
Hongren (601–675) also urged believers to practice meditation; through long
meditation they could experience the “silent void (nirvana)” and “eternity.”
It was said that through such meditative practice the believers could experi-
ence a state of purity of mind (qingjing 清靜) and such purity of mind was just
what Buddhism always sought. All the way through the seventh century to the
early eighth century, traditional Chan thought continued to hope to go from
meditation to wisdom and make the mind go from pollution to purity. This was
regarded as the road of return to humanity’s spiritual homeland.
By the time of Huineng and Shenxiu, this goal had already changed. They
advocated the “absence of thought” (wunian 無念).57 Although they did not
fundamentally deny the ultimate state of purity of mind, they already asserted
that arduous cultivation and long sitting in meditation were not necessary,
and they eliminated the difference between the state of purity of mind and
the vulgar realm of dust (everyday life). All of this opened the way for Chan
Buddhism’s later naturalism. They greatly esteemed freedom of mind and
natural life, both quite different from the promotion of religious cultivation by
traditional Chan practice.
Ninth-century Hongzhou Chan was precisely following Huineng’s thought
when it made the world of natural life the ultimate realm of their pursuit.
“Naïve naturalness” or “naïve spontaneity” (tianzhen ziran 天真自然) was the
slogan they put forth. What we need to pay attention to, however, is that if
we follow humanity’s natural disposition, there will be love and hate, feelings
and desires, amazement and disgust, stubbornness and distress, all the things
that traditional Buddhism warns against. The Southern Chan of the Hongzhou
school, however, told its believers that this “ordinary mind” was reasonable
because when people do not deliberately make distinctions between right and
wrong, love and hate, good and evil, their minds will simply dwell in a state of
complete relaxation and absence of thought. They believed that the genuine
truth of Chan Buddhism was simply “roaming around as your mind will take
you, free and unrestrained whenever it is fitting.”58 Congshen of Zhaozhou and
Puyuan of Nanquan (748–834) had a most celebrated dialogue: The Master
asked: “What is the Way?” Nanquan said “The ordinary mind is the Way.”59
Some of the Mazu school Chan masters expressed a general mood of free,
bold and unrestrained dialogue, actions that followed their hearts’ desires,

57  Wunian might also be translated “no thoughts.” We follow Chan, SB, 435 translation.
58  “Longtan heshang,” Zutang ji, j. 5: 188–189.
59  “Zhaozhou heshang,” Zutang ji, j. 18: 656.
Tang Dynasty Thought I 51

contempt for restrictions, and practiced free thought. We have discovered,

then that the realm of freedom of mind that they sought was already very dif-
ferent from the realm of purity of mind sought by early Chan Buddhism.

3.6
From Sengzhao (384–414)’s question and answer: “is the Way far away?
Reality is wherever there is contact with things” (Dao yuan hu zai, chu shi er
zhen 道遠乎哉，觸事而真) in his “Essay on the Emptiness of the Unreal”
(Bu zhen kong lun)60 to the assertion of Mazu and his disciples that “there
is no mind and there is no Buddha” and “the ordinary mind is the Way,”
Prajñâpâramitâ and Lao-Zhuang thought finally melded together and came to
serve as principles guiding attitudes toward everyday life. At that Chan Buddhism
also ultimately achieved the domestication (or Sinification) of Prajñâpâramitâ
thought.
What I should point out here is that the aim of Buddhism is salvation for the
souls of all human beings. What it is concerned with is not only metaphysical
issues, question about the legal system of society or people’s basic needs for
food, housing and so on. It is rather concerned with questions of ultimate
significance that have an effect on both human life and the transcendence of
that life. From the beginning, Buddhism held out a vision of a brilliant and
everlasting ultimate realm that it called the realm of the Buddha-nature.
Its intention was nothing less than to lead the faithful to escape from their
actual, transitory, wretched world full of suffering. Ultimately, Buddhism also
presented its believers with an ordinary and effortless realm that could only
be actualized in their minds. It came to regard the world of everyday life as
the ultimate realm of religion, the character and emotions that all human
beings have (human nature), as the much sought after Buddha-nature, and
people’s ordinary state of mind as a sacred mental realm. At that, Buddhism
finally completed its transformation from an Indian religion to Chinese Chan
Buddhism.
This also caused the Buddhism that was full of religiosity step by step to
abandon its responsibility for instruction and guidance for spiritual life. It
became an advocate for an esthetic appreciation of life interests, linguistic
knowledge, and a graceful attitude toward living. For these reasons, in spite
of the fact that Buddhism penetrated deeply into Chinese life and the world of
Chinese art, still over a long period of time it gradually faded out of the worlds
of Chinese thought and belief.

60  Excerpts from Senzhao’s essay are in Chan, SB, 350–356. This phrase is on 356.
 Chapter 8

Tang Dynasty Thought II: From Unity to

Intellectual Crisis (ca. Mid-7th to Mid-10th
Centuries CE)

1 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism III:

Language and Meaning

In 815, Huaihui of Zhangjing Temple died, Zhizang of Xitang and Weikuan

of Xingshan died in 817, followed by the deaths of Puyuan of Nanquan and
Weiyan of Yaoshan (751–834) in 834. In the space of twenty years, the third-
generation disciples of Huineng and the Southern Chan were history. Ten years
later in 845, Emperor Wuzong ordered a purge of Buddhism. It is recorded
that in the summer of that year, some 4,600 temples and monasteries were
destroyed and some 260,000 monks and nuns were forced to return to secular
life.1 Those Chan monks that were unwilling to be secularized had no other
option than to run away and hide to continue their religious activities.
After the calamity passed, not only did the Buddhist sangha and the mas-
ters of discipline (the former needing commentaries to the sûtras and places
to teach their doctrines, and the latter requiring altars), both dwindle, but
many Chan schools faded away one after another. With the exception of the
Hongzhou school, the Northern, Heze and Ox-Head schools of Chan all went
into decline, while the Tiantai school had already begun to diminish even
before the 845 purge. The fourth-generation disciples of Huineng’s Southern
Chan emerged anew, though. Although they had endured the 845 purge as
well as the general chaos of war after 881, they and their disciples still emerged
one after another and made Southern Chan popular again in both north and
south. Among them were several celebrated Chan masters, such as the sixth
generation Yicun (822–908) of Xuefeng (in Fujian) and Benji (840–901) of
Caoshan (in Jiangxi), the seventh generation Wenyan (864–949) of Yunmen
(in Guangdong) and the ninth generation Wenyi (885–958) of Qingliang (in
Nanjing). In their separate activities, they founded the Guiyang (or Weiyang),
Linji, Caodong, Yunmen and Fayan schools of Chan and ushered in the tenth-
century “age of the five schools of Chan.”

1  Z ZTJ, 248: 8015–8017.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_003

Tang Dynasty Thought II 53

There are still many questions about the history of the founding of these
five schools during the ninth and tenth centuries, but I am not going to exam-
ine them in detail. Nevertheless, we should pay attention to three things.
First, when the practice of Buddhist cultivation was increasingly made a part
of everyday life by Southern Chan during the Mid- to Late Tang, the expres-
sion of Buddhist thought also underwent an obvious change of direction. The
bookish language of the classic sûtras was replaced by the ordinary language
of everyday life, and this ordinary language, was in turn replaced by various
kinds of deliberately distorted discourse. This deliberately distorted discourse
developed into the “keen words” ( jifeng 機鋒) and paradoxical anecdotes
or riddles (gong-an 公案) customarily employed by Chan masters. Second,
from the point of view of intellectual history, the appearance of jifeng and
gong-an demonstrated that language had gone from being symbolic of mean-
ing to constituting meaning itself, and from a tool for the transmission of
truth to truth itself. The truth expressed by Mahâyâna Buddhism was no longer
following its traditional way of thinking that truth was not to be found with
language; it had undergone a great transformation, as if truth was to be found
precisely within language itself. Third, China’s particular intellectual con-
text and social background caused this religious language that was originally
within the realm of thought to develop into the linguistic artistry and playful-
ness of literature. Profound reflections on religious truth turned into the quick
wit and skillful thinking of daily life. The language of the arts replete with wit
and clever tropes caused the thought of Chan Buddhism to become a realm of
literature and art while, Chan Buddhism itself, at the same time became more
and more a part of literati culture (wenrenhua).
For all these reasons, we should pay particular attention to the new changes
in Chan Buddhist thought from the ninth to the tenth centuries.2

1.1
In Chan Buddhism’s intellectual history before the middle of the ninth cen-
tury, Southern Chan masters deliberately expressed their criticisms of author-
ity, their abandonment of the classic sûtras, and their contempt for language.
It seems that the sûtras could no longer incite the interest of the believers and
logical analyses could only reveal superficial levels of thought, but could not

2  Intellectual history should value this linguistic change of direction in the intellectual realm.
Even though it only went around in a linguistic circle and very quickly turned again, still, this
sort of philosophic awareness of language had not appeared in the world of Chinese knowl-
edge, thought and belief for over a thousand years—since at least the appearance of Moism,
Hui Shi and Gongsun Long in the fourth to third centuries BCE.
54 Chapter 8

reach the origins of truth. Much less could language express the real essence
of truth. Buddhism’s original meticulous thinking about religious faith, layer
upon layer of rational speculation and rational explanation were replaced
by joyful intuitive awareness. “Sudden enlightenment” became, then, a trick
to escape from thought and reflection, and this caused the Buddhist religion to
be transformed into an art form.
Ridicule of theory and contempt for writing can be found everywhere in the
works of Southern Chan masters. For example, Lingyou (771–853) of Guishan
(in Hunan) asked his disciple Huiji (807–883) of Yangshan (in Jiangxi) “How
much of the forty-chapter Nirvâna-sûtra is the preaching of the Buddha and
how much is the preaching of Mâra, the Evil One?” Huiji answered “It is all
the preaching of Mâra.” Again, Congshen (778–897) of Zhaozhou (in Hebei)
belittled those who argued about the differences of meaning in written words
by asserting that they were only able to act as “judges” (panguan) but not to
achieve “liberation” ( jietuo). He said derisively that “at least you are literate.”3
In spite of this disparagement of writing, in actual fact very many Chan mas-
ters were well-versed in the classic sûtras and often had recourse to the writ-
ten word. For example, Puyuan (748–834) of Nanquan (in Anhui) and Yixuan
(?–886) of Linji (in Hebei) were both quite proficient in the classic sûtras and
knowledge of Yogâcâra (Consciousness Only).4 Wenyi of Qingliang of the
Fayan school wrote the Treatise on the Three Realms of Consciousness Only
(Sanjie weixinlun), the Meaning of the Six Characteristics of the Huayan school
(Huayan liuxiang yi) and the Ten Admonitions for the Fayan School (Zongmen
shiguan lun).5 Throughout the entire history of Southern Chan Buddhism,
written records were not really completely abandoned as later Chan mas-
ters claimed. The writings of various Chan masters—texts of Chan Masters’
speeches (yuben), essentials of Chan Masters’ speeches (yuyao) and addi-
tional records of Chan Masters’ teachings (bielu)—that explicated the
Buddhist dharma continued to be popular everywhere. Even the Quotations
(yulu) of Mazu Daoyi, the monk who most vehemently renounced the writ-
ten word, was widely copied everywhere. His disciple, Tianran (739–824) of
Danxia (Mt. Danxia in Henan), compiled even more written words, such as
“Song of Appreciating Our Pearl” (Wan zhuyin 玩珠吟), “Song of the Precious
Black Dragon Pearl” (Lilong zhuyin 驪龍珠吟), “Song of Toying with Our Pearl”
(Nong zhuyin 弄珠吟), and so on. These three songs emphasize the impor-

3  Jingde chuandenglu, j. 9: 266.

4  “Linji heshang,” Zutang ji, j. 19: 719.
5  According to Soothill, Dictionary, the three realms, or Triloka, of Buddhism are the “world of
sensuous desire, world of form, and formless world of pure spirit.”
Tang Dynasty Thought II 55

tance of regarding our own heart as the Buddha heart (a precious pearl) so that
there is no need to look for a pearl outside of ones own heart. Behind many
of the seemingly simple ideas put forth in the Chan Buddhist thought of the
ninth and tenth centuries, there was actually quite profound and complicated
knowledge from the sûtras. Thus when carefully examined, Chan Buddhism
no longer appears to have so absolutely rejected the classic sûtras, eliminated
theoretical discussions and abandoned the written word.
It must be pointed out, however, that in the Mid- and Late Tang, tradi-
tional Buddhism’s style of reading the sûtras and using language certainly
began to change. If we recall the history of Buddhism, we will see that in
the Buddhist interpretation, exposition, and propagation of the thought
of the sûtras, besides direct translation and reading, there were two other fre-
quently employed styles of dissemination of knowledge and truth. One style
involved “incanting aloud” (zhuandu 轉讀) and “public chanting” (changdao
唱導). Zhuandu was the melodious incanting of sûtra texts while chang­
dao was the recitation and chanting of Buddhist doctrines in the manner
of the popular entertainment speaking-, and singing- literature (shuochang
wenxue 說唱文學).6 The other style consisted of notes and commentaries
on chapters, sections, sentences, and phrases of the sûtras. Buddhist discus-
sions of the sûtras from as early as the Eastern Jin (317–420) already had some
commentaries—written notes on their understanding of the meaning of the
classic texts as well as textual explications of sûtra passages. This kind of com-
mon intellectualistic practice was particularly prevalent during the southern
dynasties when doctrinal study flourished, and, by the seventh century, quite a
few Buddhist sûtras contained very detailed commentaries.
“Incanting aloud” only involved chanting sûtra texts, but did not itself add
anything to the meaning of the sûtras; much less could it replace the classic
texts themselves.7 Although “public chanting” added speaking and singing per-
formances of everyday metaphors of interpretation, propagation, stories and
verses, still in this style of dissemination, the implications of language remained
confined to how to convey cleverly the message of Buddhist thought; the form

6  G SZ, j. 13, “Jingshi: lun,” states that “according to Indian customs, all chanting of the Buddhist
dharma was called bai 唄, “chanting.” In our land, chanting the sûtras is called “incanting
aloud,” zhuandu and songs of praise (gezan) are called fanbai 梵唄, “chanting Sanskrit
prayers.” Tang Yongtong, GSZ, annotated edition, 1992, 508.
7  Sengyou, Chu sanzang ji ji, j. 15, “Dao-an fashi zhuan,” says that “every time the sûtras were
explained, only the general ideas were discussed in the form of zhuandu, ‘incanting aloud,’
and that is all.” Taishô, j. 55: 108.
56 Chapter 8

of the language itself never possessed its own significance.8 Commentaries on

chapters and passages in the classics were only an extension of the contents
and thought of the Buddhist sûtras. Although these annotations and inter-
pretations could also increase knowledge of the texts, the words of the com-
mentaries themselves still remained confined to the scope of meaning of the
sûtra texts and this precisely limited any expansion of the scope of the com-
mentary; it had to be centered on the text itself to produce its knowledge and
could not depart from the text of the sûtra to create its own thought.
For these reasons, Buddhism’s mainstream conception of language was still
that language was an “obstruction” or “hindrance” to enlightenment. Although
language was able to transmit meaning, it could also obscure it. “Abandoning
the raft and going ashore” and “forgetting the trap after catching the fish”
remained apt metaphors for language that were put forth in prominent theo-
ries from Prajñapâramitâ to Neo-Daoism. Continuing to exclude language from
meaning (place language beyond meaning) was precisely why Chan Buddhism
from the beginning declared “do not establish the written word” (buli wenzi
不立文字). “Do not establish” simply meant do not affirm the truth or author-
ity of written words because language is really not meaning and sometimes it
can even obscure meaning.

1.2
During this period, however, the situation changed.
Originally Chan Buddhism carried on the Mahâyâna tradition of suspicion
of language and writing. The Chan history Hall of Ancestors Collection (Zutang
ji) contains the following anecdote: When Huineng was lecturing on the
dharma at Caoxi (Guangdong), he once said: “There is something that has no
words, no head, no tail, no here, no there, no inside, no outside, is not square,
is not round, is not large, is not small, is not the Buddha, and is not a mate-
rial thing. Then what is it?” he asked his audience. No one could understand
him, except Shenhui who pointed out that “this is the original source of all
Buddhas and also the Buddha-nature of Shenhui.” Over a century later, when
the Chan master Huiji of Yangshan interpreted this story, he said that ever
since Buddhism was transmitted into China, everyone had been confused by
the written doctrines of the sûtras, but Bodhidharma and Huineng wanted to
rescue the people from this confusion caused by the written word so they said,
“do not establish the written word.”9

8  G SZ, j. 13: 521.

9  Zutang ji, j. 18: 692.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 57

Chan Buddhism was, of course, aware that the transmission of thought

required language, it was just that the mind should not be tied down and
restrained by written words. Chan masters pointed out that the words written
in the sûtras were only for transmitting meaning; in themselves they were not
significant. Just as in the Chan story “pointing at the moon,” the finger (zhitou
指頭) that points (zhi 指) at the moon is not itself the moon.10 Nevertheless,
to rely only on what Chan Buddhism called “transmission from mind to mind”
(yi xin chuan xin 以心傳心) could not really transmit the truth. Especially after
Chan became the mainstream Buddhist school in the ninth century, it needed
a systematic format to preserve Buddhist faith and knowledge. At that point,
some Chan masters acknowledged the importance of the sûtras and even the
idea that language itself was significant or full of meaning.
Here need to add a further discussion about Chan and language. That is,
in the eighth to ninth centuries, in order avoid superstitious belief in the
sûtras and stubborn attachment to the written word, Chan masters frequently
resorted to the use of ordinary everyday language to spread Chan thought.
This kind of ordinary “vernacular” language (baihua) not only removed the
obstruction of refined “literary language” (wenyan) but also served to suggest
that both people’s minds and language should return to the state of everyday
life as the only way to avoid violating the principles of ease and naturalness.
The problem with this arose, however, because when people employed this
plain, unadorned ordinary everyday language to speak so plainly of some fact
or significant meaning, they would frequently remember what they said while
forgetting how it was said. Much less would they reflect upon the profound
meaning of Buddhist truth in everyday life; such truth would be destroyed
by this ordinary dull language. Furthermore, when such truth had been done
away with by this ordinary everyday language, the very existence of Buddhism
would forfeit its significance. According to Chan Buddhist ideas, this kind of
everyday usage was known as “dead language” (literally, dead sentences, siju
死句). To make language and writing have significance in themselves, Chan
believed it had to render them different from everyday usage and allow this
exceptional, even abnormal, language to focus the attention of the faithful on
language in itself. They called this “living language” (literally, living sentences,
huoju 活句).
In the ninth and tenth centuries, then, Chan masters created many forms of
“living language” that were quite different from ordinary everyday usage. Here
are a few examples. The first form of “living language” was the self-contradictory

10  See Wudeng huiyuan, j. 10, 562 on Qingliang Wenyi.

58 Chapter 8

or logically unacceptable phrase.11 Such phrases were once very popular in

Chan circles. For example, “face south and see the north star” (Wenyan of
Yunmen); “rabbits do not necessarily have no horns just as Oxen do not neces-
sarily have horns” (Benji of Caoshan), and so on.
The second type of “living language” involved deliberate misinterpretations
or irrelevant answers to questions. These sorts of false answers, just like the
phrase “an ox head does not fit a horse tail,” are found everywhere in the quota-
tions (yulu) of Chan masters. Someone might ask: “what sort of talk can surpass
the Buddha?” and the answer would be: “horse tail (ephedra) from Puzhou (in
Shanxi) and monkshood (aconitum carmichaelii) from Yizhou (in Sichuan).”
Again someone might ask: “What is the ancient Buddha-mind?” and the answer
would be: “rubble at the base of a brick wall.”12 This sort of extremely unfamil-
iar discourse destroys the cause and effect relationship in any colloquy. In a
question about Buddhist doctrine one expects an explanation of that doctrine
just as in a question about practicing austerities one expects an explanation
of that practice, but Chan Buddhism deconstructs such customary reasoning
and leaves its audience with an uncomfortably awkward feeling. This feeling
of “awkwardness” runs right contrary to the human habit of rationality. Chan
Buddhists were searching precisely for the unusual or abnormal because they
believed that for people to remain puzzled after thinking for a long time was
the only thing that would allow them finally to turn around and search for a
new realm beyond rationality and logic.
Chan Buddhism always warned people to be on guard against becoming
mired down in endless investigations of Buddhist doctrines because during
such ceaseless questioning they might forget the real significance of their quest.
Their study of Buddhist truth might begin to change into a form of theoretical
competition. Chan masters ridiculed such practices as “demanding answers
from books” or “searching for answers in writing” that lead people down diver-
gent paths. At the same time though, they understood that once people were
used to employing reason and language to understand the world of truth, it
was already very difficult for them to free themselves from them. It was for this

11  In his The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), William James points out the use of
“self-contradictory phrases” in relation to understanding. He writes that in the tradition
of Western mysticism there were also things like “dazzling obscurity,” “teeming desert,”
“eternity is timeless,” “whispering silence” and so on. James, William, The Varieties of
Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature (1902), New York: Penguin Books, 1982,
420, 422.
12  See respectively Zutang ji, j. 11: 429; Wudeng huiyuan, j 13, 777, Zutang ji, j. 18: 661, Jingde
chuandenglu, j. 10: 279; Wudeng huiyuan, j. 4: 205.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 59

reason that in the ninth century Chan masters frequently used these seem-
ingly strange methods and relied on language to undermine language. Through
superficial contradictions, misreadings and false replies, they undermined the
rationality of people’s accepted discourse and understanding of questions and
they upset the customary relationship between questions and answers. They
did all this to obstruct people’s ways of thinking and expectation of interpreta-
tions to transcend the history and rationality of language.

1.3
Both Chan Buddhist thinking about and use of language were very profound
and it is said that the later use of paradoxical anecdotes or riddles (gong-an)
was a way of employing language to reach the truth.13 Because when a believer
ponders these deliberate misinterpretations or irrelevant answers to questions
again and again, he or she may become mired down in an unprecedented pre-
dicament of consciousness. If such a believer affirms that the Chan master’s
discourse that runs counter to common sense possesses a certain significance,
then his or her ordinarily used resources for understanding history, discrimina-
tory logic, and linguistic habits will all suddenly lose their effectiveness and he
or she can only become lost in darkness. At that point, the believer will have
to seek anew for a different path to transcendence. Just as the Chan master
Huiqing of Bajiaoshan (Mt. Bajiao in Hubei), originally from Śîla, said, it is just
as though a person on a journey, “suddenly came to face a bottomless pit while
a wildfire was closing in from behind and a thicket of brambles was on both
sides. If he goes forward, he’ll fall into an abyss; if he goes back, the wildfire will
consume him; if he goes to either side, he will be stopped by the brambles. At
that point, what can he do to escape with his life? If he escapes, he must find a
road to rebirth, but if he cannot escape, he’s a dead man.”14 That is to say, if one
is able to start from the original location of thought before being swallowed
up in history, rationality and language and seek out “his true features before
his parents gave birth to him,” then he can employ this language contrary to
language to give prominence both to his own self-mind (zixin, svacitta 自心)
and to the real truth. With this language, he can then comprehend the genuine

13  
Gong-an originally referred to official documents (andu), but later on Chan Buddhism
employed the term for anecdotes and so on for the edification of the faithful. Suzuki
Daisetsu (D. T. Suzuki) discusses them together with various Buddha names of the
Pure Land school, various ways of chanting Buddha’s sutras of the Tiantai school, and
the method of observing the Buddha of Tantric Buddhism. See, “Zen shishôshi kenkyû,”
“Koan ron,” in Suzuki Daisetsu zenshu, j. 4 (1968), 177.
14  
Wudeng huiyuan, j. 9: 551.
60 Chapter 8

truth (zhendi, satya 真諦) of the Buddhist dharma. At that point, language is
no longer just a “fish trap”—it is the “fish” themselves. Language is simply truth
and meaning.
The problem still remained, however, that language had both the power to
give prominence to the truth and, at times, to obscure the truth. It was only
those poems and songs that did not have just one single, fixed, and accurate
annotation and explanation that were able to make known the inner mean-
ings of things. For this reason, in the tenth century, many quick-witted, pro-
vocative and humorous dialogues became models of imitation for later Chan
monks. Some very clever tropes and witty passages were repeatedly employed,
especially after various literati and scholar-officials became Chan Buddhists.
These very knowledgeable Chan masters who also possessed great literary tal-
ent brought literary language into their dialogues explaining Chan ideas and
gave Chan Buddhist colloquies a new vitality as well imparting a flavor of artis-
tic language to them.
In Chan writings of the Late Tang, we can see how these men not only
employed lines of Tang poetry as tropes in the practice of Chan meditation
and enlightenment but also wrote up their own dialogues and lectures in the
form of poetry rich in literary qualities. From an examination of later Chan
Buddhist quotations, we can see that this language replete with great wisdom
later on developed into genuinely literary language. When Chan masters no
longer went through a process of understanding their own minds and care-
ful reflection, but merely imitated the phrases of previous generations and
employed them in elegant and polished gong-an anecdotes, these gong-an eas-
ily declined to the level of stale and repeatedly duplicated dogma. Sometimes
Chan monks recycled these tropes merely as a form of intellectual competition
and a contest of wits rather than a presentation of wisdom. Once they had
imported the literati’s natural artistic quest and literary preferences into their
dialogues, these dialogues that should originally have purveyed profound phil-
osophical thought came to constitute only a creative literature (wenxue) that
showed off quick-witted thinking and facile cleverness. Once both Chan mas-
ters and the believers were no longer able genuinely to regard these dialogues
as containing serious intellectual questions and rather mistakenly regarded
these seemingly playful keen words ( jifeng) as a form of veritable game play-
ing, then they could only serve in great numbers as material for the artistry of
creative writers and not as sources of genuine edification about the cosmos
and human life. Their function became, then, merely to render the language of
Chan Buddhism closer to the language of poetic verse.
In his preface to a collection of Buddhist poems or gâtha a monk from
Mt. Longya (in Hunan), the Late Tang poet-monk Qiji (863–937), mentioned
Tang Dynasty Thought II 61

the common practice around 860 of Chan Buddhists writing poetry. We still
need more research to determine whether or not the Chan trend toward litera-
ture (wenxuehua) began at that time. At any rate, there certainly were many
literary talents among Chan monks of the ninth and tenth centuries. Brilliant
and elegant phraseology is to be found in the dialogues of Zhixian (?–898) of
Xiangyan Monastery (in Henan), Benji of Caoshan, Wenyi of Qingliang and
others. Living in the mountains in relaxed and leisurely conditions, they were
greatly inspired to write poetry. In their descriptions of their states of mind and
natural surroundings, are found many tropes and worlds akin to the realms of
poetry, or perhaps they were simply poems.
As mentioned above, since the eighth century an obvious trend in Chinese
Buddhism was the decline of interest in doctrinal theories. The believers
showed themselves to be weary of the intricate details of conceptual determi-
nation, the excessive analyses of levels of meaning, and the manipulation of
abstract symbols. The fate of the Consciousness Only and Huayan schools was
an apt example of this phenomenon. During this time, Chan Buddhism under-
mined the seriousness of the religion and the profundity of doctrinal theo-
ries by transforming religious life into ordinary daily life, regarding religious
language as artistic language, and converting deeply philosophical expressions
into emotionally ladened poetry. Nevertheless, at this time Chan Buddhism
was welcomed by the faithful, especially by the literati and scholar-officials.
After the dazhong reign period (847–849), Chan Buddhism slowly recov-
ered from Wuzong’s great persecution of Buddhism, came to an understanding
with imperial power at the center and military governors in different regions,
attracted a great number of believers, and grew into the mainstream Buddhism
of the age. Many literati, scholars and bureaucratic aristocrats expressed an
exceptionally ardent interest in Chan. It is recorded that after the Chan master
Yicun of Xuefeng opened up Mt. Xuefeng, “Buddhists from everywhere under
Heaven, whether Hua or Xia, rushed to it as though answering a summons.”15
He also received the favor of many officials and even of the Son of Heaven
himself. After the fall of the Tang, the Qian, Li and Liu families of the Later
Tang (923–936), Later Jin (936–946), and Later Han (947–950), of the Five
Dynasties in the north and of the various kingdoms in the south, all exhibited
great interest in Chan Buddhism.16 When they practiced Chan meditation and
visited Chan masters, they competed with them in intelligence and language,

15  SGSZ, j. 12: 287.

16  For example, Shibei (835–908) of Mt. Xuansha in Fujian, Qingliang Wenyi, Deshao (891–
972) of Mt. Tiantai in Zhejiang, Xiujing of Huayan Monastery in Xian, Shaanxi, Chongji
of Tianlong Monastery in Zhejiang, Taiqin (?–d. 974) of Qingliang in Nanjing, Zongjing of
62 Chapter 8

sparring with them in keen words ( jifeng) and paradoxical riddles (gong-an)
rich in linguistic wit and humor. They concentrated their energy on the sugges-
tiveness, richness, and inclusiveness of language, exploiting fully the special
characteristics of Chinese to come up with narrations of profound significance
in everyday life or to write poetic lines replete with implicit humor. All of this
led the practice of Chan to become increasingly the pleasurable pastime of
upper class literati. At this time, the religiosity of Chan Buddhism was progres-
sively weakened due to the social stratification of its adherents and the change
in cultural orientation, while its literary artistry and interest in everyday life
became the center of attention for the faithful. At that, those outstandingly
brilliant dialogues and highly philosophical keen words also lost their critical
nature and sense of transcendence of the commonsense world and rational
discourse. They became simply linguistic techniques for the literati to express
their life interests and their literary talents.

2 Re-establishing National Authority and Intellectual Order:

A New Understanding of Intellectual History Between the 8th and
9th Centuries

From the end of the eighth century through the beginning of the ninth cen-
tury, was an extremely difficult period for the Tang dynasty. This originally
very powerful state seemed to lose its authority and control over events, and
its declining political situation produced a chain reaction of disorder in the
worlds of knowledge, thought and belief.17
Internal disorders, civil strife and foreign aggression were continuous dur-
ing this period. I’ll examine first the internal disorders. From the middle of
the eighth century on, provincial military governors ( fanzhen 藩鎮) became
increasingly powerful and constantly threatened the existence of the dynasty.
From 782, during the jianzhong reign period of Emperor Dezong (Li Kuo,
r. 779–805), beginning with Zhu Tao (?–785), Tian Yue (751–784), Wang Wujun
(735–801) and Li Na (758–792) calling themselves king (wang), military gov-
ernors in various provinces increasingly disregarded imperial authority and
competed with each other to challenge the dynasty. However fortunate the
dynasty was in fending off crises one after another and finally recapturing

Longxing Monastery in Zhejiang, and so on all received the support of the Southern Tang
(937–975), Southern Han (917–971), Min (909–945), and Later Tang regimes.
17  The Chinese word guojia 國家 can mean government, state and nation. We translate it
according to context.—trs.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 63

the capital city of Chan-an, people’s confidence in the rejuvenation of the

dynasty had probably not been restored even into the beginning of the ninth
century.
Then there was external aggression. The greatest threat to the dynasty came
from the non-Chinese groups in its four neighboring regions. At its most flour-
ishing, the Tang could still not do anything about them and in the dispirited
conditions of the Mid-Tang, the regime was even more worried about these
external threats. Even though the Tujue (Türks) threat had been eliminated,
the Tubo (Tibetan) threat from the western frontier continued to cause the
dynasty many sleepless nights. These external threats were not merely lim-
ited to military incursions; they also included the loss of any feeling of secu-
rity and even a wavering of confidence in Tang civilization among the general
population.
At such a time, not only did these internal and external troubles discour-
age people, but the social conditions of the dynasty also disappointed them.
For a long time imperial authority seemed to have lost its power to awe or
intimidate while the military governors on the frontiers each conducted their
own government, central government officials were poorly paid, and people
did not trust one another. Due to the crisis situation that the nation found itself
in, a mood of pragmatic expediency was widespread and ethics and morality
faded away. Pure thought, knowledge and belief no longer carried any author-
ity either and even the scholar-officials were all in a very embarrassing predica-
ment. The people of the capital city had also lost all feeling of security. With
Buddhism penetrating the upper levels of society, the customs of foreign peo-
ples permeating the entire society and scholars treating traditional thought
with contempt while running after heretical doctrines, the entire mainstream
intellectual order was on the verge of collapse.18
Just then, however, an opportunity for dynastic revival was in the offing. The
Huihe (or Huihu, Uighurs), the Shatuo Türks (Western Tujue) and several eth-
nic groups in Yunnan broke away from the Tubo (Tibetans), while during that
decade or so the Tang repeatedly defeated them and slowly removed the threat
on their western border. From 806 on, due to a number of concomitant factors,
the court’s control over the military governors improved, the central govern-
ment’s financial situation became more prosperous, and, under these con-
ditions, determination to restore the dynasty also grew increasingly strong.19

18  ZZTJ, j. 239, 7713, 7714.

19  Chen Yinque wrote in his Tangdai zhengzhishi shulungao (1980, 95), that “Emperor
Xianzong’s objective in governing the country was to rectify the deep-rooted dali and
zhenyuan reign period (766–779 and 785–805) customs of seeking temporary peace
64 Chapter 8

During the yuanhe reign period (806–821) of Emperor Xianzong, owing to the
pacification or voluntary submission of some of the powerful military gov-
ernors, it would seem that the conditions of the Tang dynasty underwent a
change for the better.
Many important changes that influenced later intellectual history took
place during this complicated and subtle period.

2.1
Most discussions of changes in Tang and Song intellectual history begin with
Han Yu (768–824), but they have not paid sufficient attention to Han’s essay
“Pacification of Huaixi” (Ping Huaixi bei).20 In essence this work emphasizes
the necessity for the authority of a powerful state, government or nation
(guojia), that this state’s power is embodied in the person of the emperor, and
that the emperor and his imperial power are both authorized by the “Mandate
of Heaven”—providing their natural legitimacy and reasonableness. This essay
strongly expresses the hopes of Han Yu and others to rebuild the nation and
bring the people of the four frontiers into submission as well as their reliance
on authority and order.
Beginning with the reign of Emperor Dezong, many scholars began to pon-
der the problem of national authority and restoration. After experiencing the
An Lushan Rebellion of the mid-eighth century and the acute crisis it brought
about, simply relying on old methods to emphasize the sacredness of receiving
the Mandate of Heaven to rule and the unity of political ideology did not seem
to be very effective. These old methods included such things as promulgating a
new calendar, performing the fengshan sacrifices on Mt. Tai, offering sacrifices
to Heaven, Earth and Confucius and so on. Those traditional Chinese meth-
ods for ruling the nation had already become weak and ineffectual before the
High Tang and by the Mid-Tang, things like general amnesties for All Under
Heaven and emperors sincerely “blaming themselves” in an attempt to win
over the hearts of the people had also been shown to be fruitless. The prac-
tice of emperors visiting the homes of the common people, listening to their
complaints and rewarding those who dared to voice their criticisms was still
unable to repair a collapsing social order. In those circumstances, criticisms
and treatment of contemporary political problems became concentrated on
the question of how to restore governmental, state, or national authority. The
most important priorities for that were first to pacify the external enemies and

through appeasement; that is, to use military force to pacify the military governors and
re-establish the authority of the central government.
20  QTW, j. 548, 2458.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 65

the military governors inside China’s borders and second to re-establish the
authority of thought and culture.
During the zhenyuan reign period (785–805), after the country had regained
some of its former strength and external threats had settled down somewhat,
a group of officials in charge of rites replaced those in charge of finances, and
court discussions about how to restore an ideal order replaced discussions of
practical administrative tactics. This change made ideas on how to reorganize
the laws and discipline of the imperial court widespread in public opinion and
even moved contemporary scholars in the direction of support for centralized
power.
The background for reflections on the loss of political authority came
from two sources. The first was from historical memory. Quan Deyu, who pre-
sided over literary circles, used the fall of the Han empire as an example in
his “Discussions on the Fall of the Two Hans” (Liang Han bian wang lun) to
call for the re-establishment of national (state, government) order. In these
people’s minds, the national or state order that the imperial power symbolized
was above everything. Facing a crisis of the collapse of that order, even super-
ficial Confucian rhetoric could also be dispensed with, otherwise it would be a
case of “using Confucian teachings to extend one’s evil thoughts” and “wielding
passages from the six Confucian classics to extend one’s evil ambitions.”21 The
second source was the actual contemporary situation. The arrogance toward
China of the alien peoples or barbarians in the four neighbouring regions,
the threat of the military governors to the central authority, and partisan con-
flicts at court were all undermining and eroding imperial power. What Pei Du
(765–839) feared—that “the eunuchs would usurp power, the Son of Heaven
would be only an empty name and the scholar-officials would lose all sense
of morality”—precisely expressed the greatest anxieties of contemporary
scholars.22 Their approval of the “two tax system,” support for the government’s
direct control of household registers, praise for the centralized commandaries
and counties system, criticism of the ancient fengjian system, demand that the
military governors’ monopoly of salt transportation be returned to the imperial
court, and that the eunuch leadership of the military be taken over by the cen-
tral government were all expressions of the widespread feelings of the scholars
of that time. For example, praise for the centralized system of commandaries
and counties ( junxian) in Liu Zongyuan (773–819)’s “On Fengjian” (Fengjian

21  “Liang Han bianwang lun,” QTW, j. 495, 2235.

22  “Pei Du zhuan,” XTS, j. 173: 5213. Also see “Yuan Zhen zhuan,” XTS, j. 174: 5228, where Pei
Du is recorded to have said “if Your Majesty wants to put down the rebels, You must first
purify the court, and then it can be done.”
66 Chapter 8

lun) was simply a demand for a powerful and effective imperial power to estab-
lish national order.23
In this context, the “resoluteness” (duan 斷) in Han Yu’s “Pacification of
Huaixi” where he says, “All of the success in Cai was achieved through reso-
luteness,” echoes what he said in 815: “all success or failure depends upon Your
Majesty’s resoluteness.”24 In the minds of these people, it would be much bet-
ter to appeal to the ruler’s own “sagely judgement and arbitrary resolution”
than to tolerate confusion and disorder in a time of widespread chaos.

2.2
As much as many scholar-officials since the beginning of the ninth century had
been trying fundamentally to reestablish national authority and order, their
demands still basically aimed at the intellectual order. Although they were
sometimes able to participate in politics and government policies, they could
not generally join the political center of government. Their reflections and dis-
cussions were mainly focused on how to restore intellectual order and author-
ity. As men of culture who undertook the task of expressing social thought,
they always relied on the endorsement of some form of traditional thought or
the promotion of some kind of social ideal to express their hopes for the future
direction of the country. Contemporary appeals for the return of traditional
Confucian studies followed this tendency. They called this ideal condition one
in which “the Way prevails for All Under Heaven” (tianxia youdao 天下有道, a
phrase appearing several times in the Analects) and they believed that there

23  Du You, Tongdian, j. 31, 849, “Zhiguan 13, Wanghou zongxu,” says that “establishing a
regional state will only benefit a lineage, but establishing a prefectural system can ben-
efit ten thousand households (all the people).” Although Du was influenced by Liu Zhi’s
lost Zhengdian, his changing Liu’s praise for the feudal enfeoffment system, very clearly
expresses this tendency toward the establishment of national order.
 Han Yu’s essay “Dui Yu wen,” by opposing the tradition that that it was unjust for Great
Yu to pass his power down to his son, and particularly emphasizing the natural legitimacy
of Heaven bestowing imperial power on the imperial clan was also intended to increase
the power of the ruler as well as suggesting his support for national order and political
authority. Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 1, 30–32; Liu Zongyuan’s “Fengjian lun” says
“now our state has completely established the system of counties and prefectures accom-
panied by setting up Prefects and Magistrates throughout the land. It is certain that this
system should not be changed. If our government controls the military well and is careful
in the selection of local officials, then there will be good and just rule.” Liu Zongyuan ji,
1979, j. 3: 74.
24  A note in ZZTJ, j. 239: 7712 explains that this statement “refers to the deep-rooted dali and
zhenyuan reign periods (766–779 and 785–805) practices (of appeasement).”
Tang Dynasty Thought II 67

really was an eternal “Way” (Dao) that embraced and controlled everything.
Practical policies and actual changes should not be valued above the “Way.”
Just as Li Ao (772–836/841) said, “the morally superior man follows the Way and
not the multitude.”25
There was, of course, good reason for this concern with the intellec­
tual order. As mentioned above, from the High Tang on, the Chinese intel­
lectual world was in a state of general mediocrity and had long since begun
to lose its authority. At the same time, the scholars whose métier was knowl-
edge and thought were no longer well-regarded. Since the court could not
take in talented persons, scholars could only turn to the military governors.
Their position was not as high as imagined, and, at the same time, those ritual
norms that were once so venerated in society were declining daily. During the
dazhong reign period (847–860), in Liu Tui (fl. ca. 850)’s “A Southerner’s Letter
on the Village Drinking Rite” (Jiangnan lun xian yinjiu lishu), a description
of the sadly worn out state of the ritual vessels during a ceremony to send off
the first grade examination candidates to the next level would seem to be a fit-
ting symbol of the disintegration of the intellectual order.26 In similar fashion
at this time, the classics, including those Confucian texts validated in the Early
Tang, were no longer authoritative; they could be subject to doubt in the official
examinations. For example, the final set of questions from Yuan Jie (723–772)’s
“Questions for Presented Scholars” (Wen jinshi) actually contained the follow-
ing: “Which chapter(s) of the three rites can be deleted? Which of the three
commentaries (to the Spring and Autumn Annals) can be abandoned? The
Moists school condemned music. What rite did they follow? The Confucian
school trusted in Fate. Is this statement correct?”27 Private criticism of the

25  Li Ao, “Congdao lun,” QTW, j. 636: 2846.

26  QTW, j. 789: 3660. Zhao Lin (834 jinshi)’s, Yin hualu, 1957, j. 4 records that Liu Yanfan, some-
time between the High- and Mid-Tang, was an expert in the Confucian classics who had
become a Buddhist monk, but deeply regretted the decline of Confucianism in society.
He said that “none of those in recent times who honor the Confucian Way can match the
ways of the older generations.” For a monk to lament the decline of the Confucian schol-
ars is emblematic of the age.
27  QTW, j. 380: 1708. Later on people criticized Yuan Jie for this and said that he did not
consider Confucius as his teacher, but Li Shangyin (813?–858) defended him and even
publicly declared that “besides humanity, rightness, morality and virtue (ren yi dao de),
what does Mr. Kong have to offer? For thousands of years, we have seen sage after sage
everywhere.” See “Rongzhou jinglüeshi Yuan Jie wenji houxu,” Fannan wenji, 1988, j. 7: 434.
Somewhat later, Dugu Ji (725–777) also posed questions similar to those of Yuan Jie; see
QTW, j. 384: 1728. The “three rites” are the Yili, Liji and Zhouli and the three commentaries
are the Zuozhuan, Gongyangzhuan and Guliangzhuan on the Chunqiu.
68 Chapter 8

classics was perhaps even more common. The skepticism of Dan Zhu (725–
770) and others of the Mid-Tang toward the three commentaries to the Spring
and Autumn Annals was definitely not an isolated case.
At this time, there were three intellectual trends that caused great anxiety
among the scholar-officials.
First, in a society that generally sought practical results, knowledge and
thought were easily dominated by a psychology of intense pragmatism. Many
scholars who wished to engage in politics were concerned with tactical issues
rather than ideals. They were interested in how to solve the problems of taxa-
tion, military supply, government efficiency, bureaucratic integrity and so on.
They did not feel any need to aim too high and seek a “golden age of peace.” To
manage practical problems satisfactorily was good enough for them.
Second, this mental attitude allowed some historically manageable intellec-
tual resources to be very quickly brought forward in the Mid-Tang—knowledge
of things like the administration of finance and taxation, ideas about strength-
ening the legal system, military strategy and tactics and so on. Especially
when Confucian authority and idealism were increasingly in decline, some
resources that were previously marginalized, like various schools of thought
regarded as “heresy” by Confucians, became active again. As Liu Ke (fl. ca. 873)
described the situation: “Today there are some very outstanding men among
the impoverished scholars of the realm and they are able to discuss Yellow
Emperor Daoism, or Confucian teachings, or penal law.”28 This trend demon-
strated that the once unified and distinct order of thought and the intellectual
world were already divided and chaotic and those heresies that had once been
suppressed and forced to the “margins” were already making a grand entrance
into the “center” and beginning to invade the mainstream intellectual world.
Although the saying that “the zhenyuan reign period honored the unconven-
tional and the yuanhe reign period honored the strange” was meant to apply to
literature, the tendency to rebel against conventional orthodoxy was not lim-
ited to literature. In the Mid-Tang when many kinds of knowledge, thought and
belief were very active, the intellectual world seemed not to have an authorita-
tive mainstream.29

28  “Shang Wei youcheng shu,” QTW, j. 742, 3400.

29  For example, at the time there were people who scored victories over their opponents
by means of their discourse and, according to Shu Yuanyu (d. 835)’s “Bei Shanxi guteng
wen”: “actually said that their writings were the best in the world, and so they despised
the Way of the sages.” QTW, j. 727. There were also men who were extremely conceited and
“often called themselves the only one in the universe,” seemed to be expert in the Three
Tang Dynasty Thought II 69

Third, the flourishing of Buddhism produced an even greater intellectual

crisis. Throughout the Tang dynasty, Buddhism had penetrated deeply into
the world of daily life and many contemporary scholars were very interested
in it. Li Hua, Liang Su, Quan Deyu, Pei Xiu (791–864), Liu Zongyuan and Bo
Juyi all had a very favorable opinion of Buddhism. Quite a few scholars felt
that Buddhism was useful not only in the realms of spirituality and daily life
but also for reestablishing social order. No matter how much this great num-
ber of scholars was able in theory to limit the significance of Buddhism to the
spiritual level of mental cultivation and transcendence, this foreign faith had
already entered Chinese life and even its politics. It also constituted a threat to
the traditional Chinese intellectual world.

2.3
In ancient China, the restoration of thought and political order often went
hand in hand. In the nearly thirty years from the end of the yuanhe reign
period into the huichang period (820–846), the factional struggles within intel-
lectual circles and the succession struggles at court grew ever more fierce. The
death of Emperor Xianzong, considered the “restoration emperor,” in 820, was
a great shock to many scholar-officials. Their dream of restoration was depen-
dent on the enthusiastic efforts of the emperor, political reforms, and the hard
work of important ministers; it was then shattered again. Nevertheless, dur-
ing this same time there were opportunities for revival. The decline of the
Huihu (Uighurs), internal chaos among the Tubo (Tibetans) and the recovery
of the four garrisons and eighteen prefectures of Hehuang (overlapping pres-
ent day Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang) again revived hope for the rebuilding
of peace and prosperity in the Great Tang as well as stimulating the national
confidence and self-respect of Tang scholars.30 Excavating historical resources
again, establishing intellectual genealogies, confirming doctrinal boundaries,
and rejecting various dissident views became chief priorities for contempo-
rary scholars who were attempting to restore order. Under those conditions,
their deep-rooted sense of national confidence and self-respect was first
easily aroused. This ancient Chinese feeling of self-centeredness sometimes
almost amounted to a form of xenophobia against people who were, as the Zuo
Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals (Zuozhuan) put it, “not of our
kind and so their hearts and minds must be different” ( fei wo zu lei, qi xin bi yi

Teachings and always criticized the former sages. See Yunxi youyi, 1994, j. 4 discussion of
Cai Jing of Yongzhou.
30  TZTJ, j. 247: 7999.
70 Chapter 8

非我族類，其心必異).31 This feeling led to a number of intellectual phenom-

ena to be discussed below.
First came critical attacks on Buddhism and other religions and beliefs orig-
inating with different non-Han Chinese peoples. People having Han Chinese
culture (Hanzu wenhua) had a psychological sense of their cultural superior-
ity and a concomitant tendency toward the exclusion of others. For example,
anti-Buddhist critiques during the Wei-Jin and North-South Dynasties eras
reproached Buddhism for being a barbarian religion. In the Early Han, as noted
in Volume One of this work, Fu Yi (555–639) vehemently criticized Chinese
believers in Buddhism by saying that “… in the teaching of Confucian scholars,
they even talk about the demonic barbarians and their dissolute language.”32
In the first half of the Tang dynasty, though, feelings of optimism were most
prevalent and such harsh critiques of Buddhism were not very common. In
general, the anger and criticism of Tang scholars was aimed at Buddhism’s
struggles against the Tang government to secure its economic interests and
had little to do with the thought, doctrines and beliefs of the religion.
After the shock of the An Lushan Rebellion, Chinese scholars’ ideas changed
and “the defense and distinction between non-Chinese (Yi) and Chinese (Xia)
also grew rigorous.”33 Some scholars who hoped to eliminate the threat of this
alien religion in a fundamental way, spurred on by their national confidence
and self-respect, passionately criticized Buddhism as a barbarian religion and
the Buddha as a barbarian.34 They believed that “if the ways of the barbarians
are practiced in China (Zhonghua) … and barbarian customs are allowed to
transform the Chinese (Zhuxia 諸夏), it will be a great calamity.”35 Regardless
of the fact that in their daily life very many scholar-officials did not necessar-
ily reject Buddhism and even carried on rather warm and friendly relations
with Buddhist monks, they still “opposed Buddhism.” This indicates, further-
more, that the discourse of extreme national self-centeredness and its political
strategies being brought forth at this time were simply making known the re-
affirmation of the mainstream authority of traditional ideology as well as the
stance of reorganizing the social and political order. It was even more a symbol
and a manifesto of an intellectual orientation.

31  Zuozhuan, “Chenggong 4 nian,” has this passage: “The state of Chu, though it is very big,
they are not our kind of people, how could they love us?” CTP.
32  Guang Hong ming ji, j. 11: 89 cites Fu Yi’s “Shang fei sheng Foseng biao.”
33  Fu Lecheng, “Tangdai Yi-Xia guannian zhi yanbian,” in Han Tang shilun ji, 1977 and
1995, 214.
34  Han Yu, “Lun Fogu biao,” Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 8: 613–616.
35  Li Ao, “Qu Fozhai lun,” QTW, j. 636: 2846.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 71

Second, there were some subtle changes in the intellectual background of

the Mid-Tang period. As the foundation of mainstream thought, Confucianism
was very important and the most important studies that could be directly
applied to society, government and thought were of the Spring and Autumn
Annals and the study of rites and ceremonials. The former relied on historical
knowledge to supply a foundation for political legitimacy and rationality, while
the latter relied on ceremonial or ritual rules to regulate social order. In the
study of the Spring and Autumn Annals at that time, the “three commentaries”
(Zuozhuan, Gongyangzhuan, Guliangzhuan) had lost their authority and the
laconic and segmented outlines of the original Annals text could hardly offer
any principles for interpretation and development of thought. At the same
time, in an age when great family lineages and territorial connections were
breaking up, the study of rites and ceremonies had lost its ability to integrate
and clarify the social order and had declined to the status of mere words that
were learned and recited by rote. In the ninth century, these tendencies were
increasingly obvious, and for that reason when history and the socio-political
system were no longer able to establish value and meaning, Confucian schol-
ars all the more extoled the “Way” that transcended everything. They regarded
this moral “Way” as a foundational principle and hoped on the basis of it to
re-establish the order of thought, knowledge and belief as the cornerstone of
Chinese thought.
According to Han Yu’s “Essentials of the Moral Way” (Yuandao), this “Way”
was particular to Confucianism and very different from the “Way” of Buddhism
and Daoism. He wrote, “To love broadly is called humanity (ren 仁); to act
according to what should be done is called rightness (yi 義). To proceed from
these principles is called the moral Way (Dao 道).” This “Way” as it is written
about in various classic texts is expressed in rites and music (liyue) and penal
laws and government decrees (xingzheng); put into practice in the life of the
masses, it is the proper social class order of scholars, peasants (farmers), arti-
sans (craftsmen) and merchants (shi, nong, gong, shang); in social stratifica-
tion, it is the proper relationships between rulers and ministers, fathers and
sons, friends, guests and hosts, brothers, and husbands and wives. If one uses
it for personal cultivation, one will find “ease and happiness”; if one uses it
for the sake of others, one can be “loving and fair”; if one has it in one’s own
mind, one can find “harmony and tranquility”; finally, if the political rule of the
state (guojia) relies on it, “there will be no place where it is inappropriate.”36

36  Han Yu, “Yuandao,” Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 1: 18. Some of our translation is
taken from De Bary & Bloom, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 569, 573. Translation of ren changed
72 Chapter 8

Hence, putting forth this “Way” should serve as the underlying foundation of
everything.
How was this all-transcendent “Way” to be verified? How could it connect
individual cultivation and the norms of society? And, finally, how could it
establish national (government) and social order? According to Han Yu, this
“Way” is eternally correct because it is in accord with correct human nature
(xing) and correct human nature relies on the edification and restraints of
education and law. Han Yu’s “An Inquiry on Human Nature” (Yuanxing) states
that “human nature consists in five virtues, namely, humanity, propriety, faith-
fulness, rightness, and wisdom” (ren, li, xin, yi, zhi 仁, 禮, 信, 義, 智), and there
are three grades of human nature: “superior, medium, and inferior” (shang,
zhong, xia). Similarly, “what constitutes the feelings are seven: pleasure, anger,
sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire (xi, nu, ai, ju, ai, wu, yu 喜, 怒, 哀, 惧, 愛, 惡,
欲) and they also have three grades of “superior, medium, and inferior.”37 Due
to their education, superior people consciously move toward the “Way,” while
inferior people obey the “Way” by habitually following the law.
Although these ideas that carried over from Han dynasty Confucians, espe-
cially Dong Zhongshu (ca. 179–ca. 104 BCE), had a number of supporters, still
they were obviously contradictory and not very profound.38 According to this
view, the idea of “returning to one’s true nature” would not have universal
value, but would only apply to medium grade people. This is because superior
people would not really need to search for their pure human nature, and infe-
rior people would be unable to find theirs.
Given that Buddhism and the Daoist Religion already generally accepted
the idea that every human being possessed a pure and unadulterated human
nature, however, Confucians also had to have a response to this idea. For this
reason, Li Ao’s “On Returning to One’s True Nature” (Fuxing shu) revised Han
Yu’s ideas by maintaining that returning to one’s true nature depends upon
humanity’s basic nature (benxing): “The reason that a man can be a sage lies in
his true nature” (ren zhi suoyi wei shengren zhe, xing ye 人之所以為聖人者，  

from “humaneness” to “humanity.” This essay is also translated in Chan, SB, 454–456, with
the less interpretive title “An Inquiry on the Way.”
37  Han Yu, “Yuan xing,” Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 1: 22. Translation is from Chan, SB,
451–454.
38  In his “Mengzi Xunzi yanxing lun,” Huangfu Shi (777–835) agreed that “there are three
grades of human nature: inferior ignorant people, medium people, and superior wise
people.” QTW, j. 686, 3315.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 73

性也).39 Every person’s basic nature is pure and unadulterated and bestowed
on one by Heaven: “there is no true nature that is not good” (xing wu bushan
性無不善).40 The reason that people turn away from their original true nature
and cause social disorder is simply because their feelings of pleasure, anger,
sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire obscure their true nature. It was, then,
extremely important to consciously “return to one’s true nature.” To restore
human nature by means of education; to restore the universal “Way” by means
of pure human nature; to re-establish intellectual authority by relying on this
“Way”; and to rebuild the central core of government through this intellectual
authority—all of these things constituted the tradition and responsibility of
Confucian intellectuals.
The concept of “returning to one’s true nature” was, of course, not really Li
Ao’s original invention. There were discussions of human nature and feelings
(xingqing 性情) in early Confucianism. The bamboo texts of Guodian offer
proof that this topic was already being discussed in the intellectual world of
the Warring States period.41 In general, early Confucianism may have had more
to say about human nature than we once thought. The idea that due to exter-
nal stimulation human nature gives rise to feelings and desires already existed
in embryonic form very early on, and with the interpretations and explana-
tions of Han dynasty Confucians, it became both a historical resource and an
intellectual topic.
At this time, however, this idea had its own specific background. After expe-
riencing the social upheavals of the Mid-Tang and the impact that Buddhism
had on the Chinese intellectual world, and when Confucian thought needed
to find a new intellectual foundation, Chinese thinkers borrowed many
resources from Buddhism and the Daoist Religion. Ideas like “icchantika pos-
sess the Buddha-nature” from the Nirvâna sûtra (Mahâparinirvâna-sûtra, Da
po niepan jing); “one mind, two characteristics” from the Awakening of Faith
in the Mahâyâna (Mahâyâna Śraddhotpâda Śâstra, Dacheng qixin lun); and
“rest of body for clearness of vision” (zhiguan 止觀) from the Tiantai school all

39  Li Ao, “Fuxing shu, shang” QTW, j. 637, 2849. See T. H. Barrett, Li Ao: Buddhist, Taoist or
Neo-Confucian?, 1992, for a study of Li Ao. Chapter 4 contains a complete translation and
discussion of his “Fuxing lun” and “returning to one’s true nature” (Barrett’s translation).
This passage is translated and discussed on page 94.
40  This quote is from Cheng Yi, Ercheng yishu, no. 18, in “Cheng Yichuan de renxing lun,” Fang
Shihao ed., Hong Kong renwen zhexuehui wangye.
41  “Xing zi ming chu,” “Yu cong er” and so on all discuss xingqing, Guodian Chumu zhujian,
1998, 179, 203. For a complete study of the Guodian texts, see Scott Cook, The Bamboo
Texts of Guodian, A Study and Complete Translation, 2012.
74 Chapter 8

furnished ninth-century Confucian thought with resources from Buddhist dis-

cussions of human nature and feelings.42 Both Sui-Tang Daoism and religious
Daoism’s ideas of “nature is tranquil, feelings are active” (xing jing qing dong)
and “curbing your mind to recover your true nature” (shouxin fuxing), and the
idea of moving toward “nature” purified of defiling illusions and renouncing
“feelings” that symbolized desires likewise stimulated thinking about “return-
ing to one’s true nature.” At this time, Confucian scholars already realized that,
as Liu Yuxi (772–842) wrote, because “Confucians employ the Middle Way to
govern the society, and seldom speak of nature and destiny, hence their Way
ceases to function when the world is in chaos.”43 They then appropriated intel-
lectual resources from Buddhism and religious Daoism to construct their own
discourse on nature and feelings. As a result, stimulated by its contemporary
background, this composite concept of nature and feelings was made up of
various reflections that drew from early Confucianism, Wei-Jin and North-
South Dynasties Buddhism and Neo-Daoism, and Sui-Tang Daoist Religion,
with the support of Confucian classics like the “Great Learning” (Daxue)
and the “Doctrine of the Mean” (Zhongyong). It changed the direction of a
Confucianism dominated by Xunzi’s ideas toward the thinking of Zisi and
Mencius.

2.4
To re-establish the authority of any kind of knowledge and thought in ancient
China required both historical and textual backing. In the absence of support-
ing evidence of historical origins, or the confirmation of classic texts, espe-
cially the Confucian classics, the reasonableness of any interpretations would
always be suspect.
At that time, the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean” were
re-emphasized as part of the recovery of Confucian historical materials. The
“Great Learning” provided a way of thinking that brought together moral
cultivation of the mind and the administration of national order. It supplied
the sequence of cultivation, one after another, of the “investigation of things”
(gewu 格物), the “extension of knowledge” (zhizhi 致知), “sincerity of thought”
(chengyi 誠意), “rectification of the heart/mind” (zhengxin 正心), and so on,
and then followed the path of “cultivating one’s self” (xiushen 修身), “ordering

42  Medieval (3rd to 9th centuries) Buddhism’s ideas about human nature and feelings
were extremely rich and had a profound influence on contemporary Confucianism.
Translations of Buddhist terms are from Soothill, Dictionary.
43  Liu Yuxi (772–842), “Yuanzhou Pingxiang xian Yangqi shan gu Guang Chanshi bei,” Liu
Yuxi ji, 1990, j. 4: 57.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 75

one’s family” (qijia 齊家) and “regulating the state” (zhiguo 治國) to “bring
peace to All Under Heaven” (ping tianxia 平天下).44 These ideas completely
altered the direction of the older ways of thinking that relied on the struc-
ture of Heaven and Earth and the cosmos as a foundation for establishing
lineage laws and ethical order and that relied on lineage laws and ritual
norms as the basis for the rectification of national order. The establishment
of national (governmental, guojia), ethnic (national, minzu), and social order
was changed to a process of self-awareness from within outward instead of the
former process of restraint from the outside. In that way, the ultimate founda-
tion of all legitimacy and reasonableness was transferred from “Heaven and
Earth and the cosmos” (tiandi yuzhou) to the human “mind, nature and feel-
ings” (xinling xingqing 心靈性情”).
The “Doctrine of the Mean” provided a text that supplied a way of think-
ing derived from an orthodox Confucian classic for ideas that were otherwise
perhaps deeply influenced by Buddhism. This text connected the Mandate
of Heaven and human nature, human nature and the principles of universal
nature, the principles of universal nature and the behavior of the individual,
the family and the nation (state, guojia) to establish an interpretive founda-
tion for the reasonableness of ethics, morality, and politics. Ideas in the “Great
Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean,” such as that

the superior man is watchful over himself when he is alone … Before the
feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy are aroused it is called equilib-
rium (zhong, 中 centrality, mean) … Only after knowing what to abide in
can one be calm … Only after having achieved tranquility can one have
peaceful repose … Only after having peaceful repose can one begin to
deliberate. Only after deliberation can the end be attained …

and so on45 were combined with the techniques of the “investigation of things”
(gewu), the “extension of knowledge” (zhizhi), moral “self-cultivation” and
“achieving enlightenment through sincerity” (chengming 誠明) to provide
this way of thinking decidedly emphasizing the purification of the individual
nature with textual proof derived from the Confucian tradition. Hence it was

44  See Daxue, section 2 for the eight steps of cultivation; also see Volume One, page 140 of
this History for another discussion of these ideas.
45  Chan, SB, translations from the “Doctrine of the Mean” §1 and the “Great Learning” §1 on
pages 98 and 86 respectively. Chan’s chung is changed to zhong. Pages 84–113 of Chan, SB
contain selected translations of these two texts with discussions of Zhu Xi’s comments.
76 Chapter 8

demonstrated that such thought was not the exclusive property of Buddhism
and Daoism. Rather, its legitimacy could be proven by Confucian texts.
Simply relying on the support of ancient classical texts was, however, not
enough. A genealogy of intellectual history was also required. When a custom-
ary world of knowledge, thought and belief is being threatened, searching for
historical roots, defining the individual’s identification with the ethnic group
(nation, minzu) and the state (nation, guojia) through a reorganization of
history and establishing the authority of thought and knowledge are all fre-
quently employed methods. In the age of Han Yu and Li Ao, Buddhism and the
Daoist Religion had already established their own proselytizing systems and
these systems had the same significance as that of the system of accompany-
ing sacrifices in the Confucian temples. They validated an orthodoxy and the
reasonableness of a form of truth by reference to generation after generation
of symbolic figures.
From the early ninth century on, then, Han Yu, Li Ao and others expended
a great deal of effort to construct a Confucian genealogy out of their own his-
tory, and the key figure in this construction was Mencius, though he was not
actually re-discovered by them. After the An Lushan Rebellion, some people
had already asserted that Mencius should be the most famous Confucian after
Confucius, and in random discussions of the Confucian tradition in Buddhist
texts of the late eighth and early ninth centuries, Mencius was also said to fol-
low Confucius.46 In the works of scholars of the early ninth century, like Han
Yu, Liu Zongyuan, and others, Mencius, however, is mentioned with unusual
frequency and had become the key figure in the historical genealogy of
Confucianism. This Confucian genealogy that Mencius inherited and carried
on was called daotong 道統, the “tradition of Confucian moral principles” or
“the succession of the Way.” This daotong thus symbolizes the tradition of truth
that clearly distinguished itself from the heretical Buddhism and Daoism. As
Han Yu wrote in his “Essentials of the Moral Way”:

What Way is this? It is what I call the Way, not what the Daoists and
Buddhists have called the Way. Yao passed it on to Shun, Shun to Yu, Yu

46  In 763 when the An Lushan Rebellion had just been put down, the Head of the Ministry
of Rites Yang Wan (d. 777) asserted that Mencius was also “a great learned Confucian,”
and recommended that in studying for the Filial and Incorrupt examination (xiaolian
yike), the Mengzi should be studied together with the Lunyu and the Xiaojing. This may
have been the beginning of the re-emergence of Mencius. Later on in 780, the Prefect of
Haozhou, Zhang Yi (d. 783) compiled the Menzi yinyi. In the Early and High Tang, Mencius
did not have much influence and very few people quoted from the Mengzi.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 77

to Tang, Tang to King Wen, King Wu and the Duke of Zhou; then these
passed it on to Confucius, who passed it on to Mencius. But after the
death of Mencius it was not passed on.47

This passage is significant in two important ways. First, it establishes the legiti-
macy of a historical genealogy of thought by continuing the orthodoxy of the
legenday Four Emperors (Yao, Shun, Yu and Tang), the Two Kings (Wen and
Wu), the Duke of Zhou and Confucius through Mencius to contemporary
times: “My Way is thus the Way that was passed down by Confucius, Mencius
and Yang Xiong.”48 It draws upon the support of this imaginatively constructed
historical genealogy to establish the authority of a way of thought with itself at
the center. Second, it establishes the historical origins of a rational system of
thought. Since the Mencian way of thinking extends opportunely from intrin-
sic human nature toward extrinsic political rule, then “the idea that only a sage
can realize his heavenly endowed nature was explained clearly by Mencius
in his book, and one should study it thoroughly…. The way of realizing this
nature is none other than being sincere.49 In this way the genealogy of correct
thought continues on naturally.
Han Yu believed that if they possessed a historical genealogy of thought,
they could eliminate the influence of alien religion, restore the authority of
Confucian knowledge, thought and belief, and re-establish the demarcation
of center and periphery in the intellectual world. He further believed that the
political world would follow the intellectual world and its authority and order
would be restored.50

47  Han Yu, “Yuandao,” Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 1. Translation from De Bary &
Bloom, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 573. De Bary renders daotong as “Succession of the Way” in his
later discussions of Song Neo-Confucianism. See Sources chapter 20.
48  Han Yu, “Chongda Zhang Ji shu,” Han Changli wenji xiaozhu, 1986, j. 2: 136.
49  Han Yu, “Da housheng wen Lunyu shu,” Han Changli wenji xiaozhu, 1986, houfu,
“Yiwen,” 727.
50  I should also point out that at the same time that they re-established order in the intel-
lectual world, they also had to re-establish the authority of the language used to express
this new thought. In essence, the “Reviving Ancient Prose Movement” (fuxing guwen yun-
dong 復興古文運動) of Han Yu and others simply used elegant ancient prose to resist
the overly decorative and ornate language used in the official examination system. With
the emergence of the slogan that “writing expresses the Way” (wen yi zai dao 文以載道)
in the eleventh century, this elegant ancient prose transcended literature per se and pos-
sessed the ability to transmit thought and ideas.
78 Chapter 8

2.5
In his “On Han Yu” (Lun Han Yu), Chen Yinque summarized six aspects of
Han’s thought as “establishing the tradition of the moral principle or daotong
to demonstrate the historical origins of transmission [of the Dao];” “point-
ing directly to human relations and eliminating the trivial details of studying
sentences and phrases;” “rejecting Buddhism and Daoism and rescuing gov-
ernment and society from evil;” “condemning the Buddha and asserting the
clear boundary between Chinese and Barbarians;” “changing the literary style
and achieving wide efficiency through its propagation;” and “encouraging
and promoting newcomers while expecting that his teaching could be spread,
or made known, to later generations.”51 These six aspects are seen to consti-
tute the significance of Han Yu’s carrying on the past heritage and opening
up future thought, culture, and scholarship. Although later on many scholars
doubted or even criticized Chen Yinque’s thinking and conclusions, we still in
general agree with him. These six aspects do indeed represent the common
intellectual tendencies of Han Yu and a great many scholars contemporane-
ous with him.
Now I need to further point out that ever since the shock of the An Lushan
Rebellion, scholars had continuously entertained the idea of “reform” (weixin
維新). They hoped to “eradicate old habits” (ge jiufeng) and “return to the
correct Way” (gui zhengdao).52 Li Jifu (758–814), Pei Du (765–839), and Li
Deyu (787–85), when in government office, resisted alien peoples outside
the country, pacified the provincial military governors inside the country,
and defended imperial power to restore order in the state. Han Yu, Li Ao and
many contemporary scholars had similar ideas about re-affirming the author-
ity of Confucianism to reform the intellectual world. Their ideas included the
following:

(1) To emphasize the universal rationality of the “Way,” to ground this uni-
versal rationality of the “Way” on “human nature,” and to re-establish
morality and political order by consciously returning to basic human na-
ture (benxing).
(2) Through the re-establishment of this world of knowledge, thought and
belief, to make society return to the pure and honest customs, simple
thinking, and peaceful and unsophisticated state of ancient times. To rely

51  Chen Yinque, “Lun Han Yu,” Lishi yanjiu 2 (1954), 105–114.
52  The word “reform” (weixin) had already been used in 778 in a memorial by Peng Yan
(fl. 766–780) See, “Peng Yan zhuan,” JTS, j. 127: 3580.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 79

upon the “tranquility” ( jing 靜) of everyone’s original nature to restrain

the “activity” (dong 動) of everyone’s feelings and desires.
(3) To re-establish the authority of the state and the intellectual order.

At the time, all of this was undoubtedly an extremely idealistic way of think-
ing. In a certain sense, they simply did not want to consider various aspects
of the real world and of actual individual feelings and emotions. They regarded
the “Way” as the absolute truth; regarded “nature” (xing) as basic human nature
and denied “feelings” or “emotions” (qing); they regarded Confucian doctrines
as the only truth in the intellectual world and repudiated all heresies; they
made “social order” their only priority and regarded it as supremely reasonable
while rejecting the rationality of any other political alternatives; they went so
far as to raise the imperial power above everything else and to endow it with a
very formidable exclusiveness. Scholars who find themselves in extremely anx-
ious and distressed situations often produce such idealistic “utopian” forms of
thought.
It should be admitted that this idealistic thinking harbored within it
another possibility. When such exceedingly idealized thinking was carried
out to its ultimate limit and emphasized the absolute authority of the state
(government) and the intellectual order, then all other needs—the individual’s
emotional needs, free space for society, enjoyment of national or ethnic cul-
tures, the public’s pluralistic choices, and even intellectual and cultural policy
compromises—would lose their reason for existence in the face of this ideal-
istic supreme truth. Implicit in this state of affairs might be a tendency toward
totalism, and the result of such totalism is generally intellectual conformity
and obedience.
Of course, in the yuanhe (806–821) and changqing (821–824) reign periods
and even later, this sort of thinking did not really go to extremes. In the begin-
ning of the ninth century, when Han Yu became the leader of a new thought
group, he was not immediately accepted by general public opinion and did
not receive complete support from the political authorities. His was, after all,
a group of men of letters and they were expressing an extremely high-minded,
unrealistic and impractical idealism. At the beginning of the yuanhe reign
period, from 806 to 810, in Chang-an and Luoyang, Han Yu and other schol-
ars, including Meng Jiao (751–814), Zhang Ji (ca. 766–c. 830) and Li Ao, came
together to form a coterie of men of letters that had considerable influence
among literary circles, but they were only active in the field of literature. Han
Yu became a genuine leader of intellectual circles in 811 after he returned to
Chang-an and after the deaths of Lu Tong (790–835), Li He (790–816), and
Meng Jiao. Han Yu reached increasingly high official positions, interacted with
80 Chapter 8

an ever-broader group of people in society, and, due to his penchant for teach-
ing others, his thought began to have an influence. In 815, Han Yu participated
in a series of political plans that finally brought his thinking a step closer to
harmonizing with mainstream political ideas.53 Because his thinking actually
carried on the ancient Chinese slogan of “honoring the king (royal house) and
repelling the barbarians” (zunwang rangyi 尊王攘夷), it could naturally carry
the banner of “the return to antiquity” ( fugu) to strengthen its legitimacy and
reasonableness. At the same time, it also responded to contemporary realities,
and, on that account, received support from those who shared a widespread
feeling of anxiety.
When the ideas of Han Yu and his friends began to be taken seriously, how-
ever, they also came in for some intense criticism from various people, even
from some of his friends who held the same principles. There was particular
scholarly resistance to the absolute and extremist tendencies of his thought
and argumentation. People who were partial to Buddhism took exception,
intentionally or unintentionally, to his absolute rejection of it.54 Some peo-
ple were also deeply antipathetic to his penchant for lecturing others and his
way of propagating thought and literature through high praise.55 Some people
could not understand his argumentative habits, his fondness for writing, his
thinking of the use of language as a vehicle of the Way, and his manner of
seeming to occupy the high ground in the possession of the truth.56 There were
also some objections to his high-sounding moral idealism and his excessive
praise for Mencius.57

53  See ZJTJ, j. 239: 7712.

54  For example, Liu Zongyuan’s “Song seng Haochu xu,” records that Han Yu twice criticized
him for being “addicted to the Buddha,” but he continued to maintain that some aspects
of Buddhism “should not be condemned” because it’s “Way was not different from that of
Confucius.” Liu Zongyuan ji, 1979, j. 25: 673.
55  On Han Yu’s penchant for lecturing others, see Sun Qiao (855 jinshi), “Yu youren lun wen
shu,” QTW, j. 794: 3690. Even Liu Zongyuan did not necessarily like this practice of forming
cliques and factions. See his “Yu Wei Zhongli lun shidao shu,” “Da Yan Houyu xiucai lun
wei shidao shu,” and “Bao Yuan Junchen xiucai bi shiming shu,” in Liu Zongyuan ji, 1979,
j. 34, 872, 878, 880.
56  Pei Du criticized Han Yu in his “Ji Li Ao shu,” for “not using writing to establish institu-
tions, but regarding it as a game.” QTW, j. 538: 2419. Zhang Ji also criticized Han Yu as “loud
and garrulous” and extremely competitive.” See Zhang Ji, “Shang Han Changli shu,” and
“Shang Han Changli er shu,” QTW, j. 684: 3105.
57  Although Liu Zongyuan and Han Yu were basically in the same intellectual camp, they
nevertheless had many differences. For example their ideas about “Heaven” and about
the “Way” were not the same. Liu Zongyuan was also somewhat critical of Mencius who
Tang Dynasty Thought II 81

Han Yu’s emphasis on the “Way” and his universalizing and absolutizing of
this moral principle as well as his idealistic tendency toward re-constitution
of the social and government orders implied in such thinking was naturally
attacked by political and governmental circles. Among them, the most severe
and explicit criticism came from Li Zongmin (d. 846?), a man who occupied a
rather high political position and whose views were in conflict with those of
Pei Du and Li Deyu. In his “Discussion of Going Along with the Times” (Suilun),
Li Zongmin took great exception to the contemporary atmosphere of “rever-
ence for Mencius” because he believed that policies should be decided accord-
ing to current circumstances and society should not be administered on the
basis of any fixed “Way.” He mocked those who stubbornly adhered to antiquity
and “did not change when encountering changes, nor follow the times when
opportunity was at hand” as “gluing the fretts and still trying to play the zither,”
and asked whether “there was a constant norm when implementing laws in
ancient time.” He further ridiculed what he regarded as the excessively hypo-
critical empty talk of those who continued to make high-sounding speeches
when society was facing a crisis and expedient methods of saving the situa-
tion were available to them. He also derided the moral idealism of Mencius
as, “nothing but making people one after another protect their own goodness,
how could it [be of any use for] governing the world?”58
This intellectual history polemic undoubtedly had undercurrents of differ-
ing political viewpoints and practical tactics. At that time, there were, perhaps,
really two different groups behind the differing opinions about “going along
with the times” (suishi 隨時) or “guarding the Way” (shoudao 守道). One fac-
tion believed in defending the actually existing contemporary situation to deal
with various political and economic crises. The other faction strongly advo-
cated changing the existing situation to bring back good order and re-establish
authority. These two groups differed in their evaluation of the situation and
in their choice of tactics. Those radical scholars who felt the loss of national
or state authority and the breakdown of order, demanded that their already
defective nation (state, government) rely on the “Way” to reaffirm a state of
affairs in which imperial power is unified, that their already decaying society
re-establish the ethical and moral order according to the “Way,” and that the
excessively florid language of contemporary prose return to the style of ancient
prose “writing to express the Way” to emphasize “meaning” and “significance.”

was so vigorously praised by Han Yu. Liu believed that Mencius “loved the Way but lacked
feelings, thus the results of his teaching were slow and sparse.” “Li shang,” Liu Zongyuan
ji, j. 20: 546.
58  QTW, j. 714: 3248–3249.
82 Chapter 8

They employed the term “Great Peace” (taiping) to situate their social and
political goals in the realm of an extremely high idealism. There was also, how-
ever, a group of rather more realistic scholars who rejected this anxious and
pessimistic state of mind and its high-sounding idealism. For example, Niu
Sengru (780–849)’s evaluation of the contemporary situation was that “today
the four barbarians do not disturb our land, the common people live and work
in peace; there are no powerful families among private households; above, the
emperor is not deceived, and below, the people have no resentment or com-
plaint; although we have not reached the height of flourishing, the situation is
good enough to be considered well ordered.” Niu Sengru did not seem to have
any interest in the idealism of the emperor and some scholars that demanded
further progress towards an age of “Great Peace” and the pursuit of a “golden
age of prosperity” (shengshi 盛世). He even complained to the emperor saying
that “Your Majesty’s demands for fulfilling [my] tasks being such as they are,
how can I assume this position [of Chief Minister] for long?”59

2.6
There can be no doubt that the desire of Han Yu and other scholars of the
early ninth century to rebuild the authority of the government or the state
(guojia) and the intellectual order was derived from their deep anxiety for
the Han Chinese ethnic group (minzu), the state, and the society of that time.
They also carried on the ancient idea of “honoring the king (royal house)
and repelling the barbarians.” They tapped into the historical memory of tra-
dition within which they emphasized their feeling of identity with Chinese
history, geographical territory, and nationality. They took historical sources
from existent classical texts and tried to construct from them a system of
knowledge and thought that could resist various forms of heresy. In their
enlarged early-ninth-century fabrication of a so-called “tradition of Confucian
moral principles” (daotong), they narrated Chinese history anew to lend sup-
port to the legitimacy and reasonableness of their new thought and to re-
establish the leading role of knowledge, thought and belief.
There were several kinds of significance latent in their actions. First, the
newly described idea of daotong made possible the reconstruction of a gene-
alogy of knowledge and thought. The new interpretation of the theory of
human nature and feelings (xingqing) also allowed for the discovery of a new

59  “Niu Sengru zhuan,” XTS, j. 174: 5213. From Shi Jie (1005–1045)’s Song dynasty essay strongly
critical of Niu Sengru, we can see that from the Tang to the Song Confucian idealists influ-
enced by Han Yu were very dissatisfied with Niu and his faction. “Niu Sengru lun,” Culai
Shi Jie xiansheng wenji (1986), j. 11: 122.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 83

cornerstone and an ultimate foundation for transforming traditional thought.

Third, the newly and repeatedly emphasized ancient texts (like the Mencius,
the “Doctrine of the Mean,” and the “Great Learning”) would provide new
and authoritative classical texts for later changes in the direction of thought.
Fourth and finally, “ancient prose” (guwen), endowed with a significance that
transcended literature, seems to have become a glorious emblem of ancient
knowledge and new thought and it symbolized the locus classicus of the “Way.”
As mentioned above, however, at the time this tendency only existed in the
form of a possible direction for Chinese intellectual history. Because it never
achieved either discursive supremacy nor strong support from imperial power,
therefore through the Late Tang and the Five Dynasties period (to 960), this
radical idealism really did not receive much more support. During the last
years of the progressively declining Tang dynasty, this kind of thinking only
expressed the idealism of the intellectual stratum and their great desire for the
return of authority and order. Mencius, whom they esteemed so highly, never
held such high status in their lifetimes, and his name never appeared on the
list of official sacrifices. Even though in the Confucian temples in some local
districts, like Chuzhou (in today’s Zhejiang), Mencius and Xunzi were included
among the Confucians to receive sacrifices,60 Mencius was only officially rec-
ognized and given official status during the xining (1068–1078) and yuanfeng
(1078–1086) reign periods of the Song dynasty, that is, in the seventies and
eighties of the eleventh century.61
We know, then, that Han Yu and the thoughts, discussions, and feelings of
the ninth century had to wait until they were rediscovered and reinterpreted
in the Song dynasty before they could come to constitute a new mode of think-
ing. That is the way intellectual history works: in the course of the discovery
of new historical resources, the construction of new historical genealogies
and new interpretations, the worlds of knowledge, thought and belief are grad-
ually transformed.

60  This was a special case and really not the official system throughout the country. Even
though during the xiantong reign period (860–874), Lu Guimeng (?–881) clearly reiter-
ated that Mencius should be ranked above Xunzi, and Pi Rixiu (834/84–883) even more
enthusiastically recommended that the Mengzi be made into an examination subject and
that Han Yu be included in the sacrifices to Confucius in the Imperial University, none
of these things actually came about. Lu Guimeng, “Daru ping,” QTW j. 801, 3729; Pi Rixiu,
“Qing Han Wengong peixiang taixue shu,” “Qing Mengzi wei xueke shu,” QTW, j. 796, 3701;
see Sun Guangxian (900–968), Beimeng suoyan, 2002, j. 2, 7.
61  SS, j. 16: 311–312; j. 105: 2548.
84 Chapter 8

3 Anti-Buddhist Persecution of the 840s and 9th-Century Daoist

Religion

As mentioned above, in 845 Emperor Wuzong ordered the destruction of

Buddhist temples and monasteries and the forcible secularization of monks
and nuns; some five hundred thousand acres of farmland (using one 頃 qing is
2.7 acres) and one hundred and fifty thousand male and female servants (nubei
奴婢) were reclaimed by the state. At the same time, Zoroastrian priests and
more than three thousand Zoroastrians were also forcibly secularized. At that
time, with the exception of a few governor generals north of the Yellow River
who did not obey the central government, this practice involved virtually the
entire area of Tang China.62 It became known as “the Huichang Period Anti-
Buddhist Persecution” (huichang miefo 會昌滅佛).63
We should ask an important question about this sweeping persecution of
Buddhism: did it have an even more intellectual history background?

3.1
The first thing we need to examine is the situation of the Daoist Religion in the
first half of the ninth century.
From the early Tang on, Daoist religionists who followed the Highest Clarity
school (also Supreme Purity, shangqing, 上清) of Maoshan Daoism (Mt. Mao is
in today’s Jiangsu) came to occupy the mainstream at the center of the world
of knowledge, thought and belief.64 The Maoshan Highest Clarity school, from
Sima Chengzhen (647–735) to Li Hanguang (682–769), had the greatest influ-
ence among upper echelon scholars. Even When Yan Zhengqing (709–785) in
the dali (766–780) reign period and Li Bo (773–831) in the zhenyuan (785–805)
reign period actually traced the history of this school, Lu Xiujing (406–477)
and Tao Hongjing (456–536) of the North-South Dynasties period and Wang
Yuanzhi (580–667), Pan Shizheng (?–682), Sima Chengzhen, and Li Hanguang
of the Sui-Tang period were all still considered the mainstream and ortho-
dox school of religious Daoism. This way of thinking, of course, may perhaps
have been an imaginative construction of later times. The extent to which the

62  Yuanren (Ennin in Japanese, 794–864), Ru Tang qiufa xunli xingji, 1992, j. 4, 496.
63  See “Wuzong ji,” JTS, j. 18 shang: 605–606. Yuanren (Ennin), Ru Tang qiufa xunli xingji,
1992, j. 4: 479 on Yangzhou. For some modern scholarship on the huichang persecution
of Buddhism, see Tang Yongtong, Sui-Tang Fojiao shigao (1982), chapter 1 part 6, 41–51,
“Huichang fa-nan.”
64  See Isabelle Robinet, “Shangqing—Highest Clarity, in Livia Kohn, ed., Daoism Handbook,
2000, 196–224.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 85

Maoshan Highest Clarity school flourished during the Tang can be seen from
the way the emperors honored and looked after it. The emperors especially
favored this school during the eighth century when Sima Chengzhen and Li
Hanguang were active. It was just as Yan Zhenqing wrote: “Being elevated as the
teachers of the emperor, coming in and out of His Majesty’s enlightened palace,
and enjoying the prestigious palanquin as a favor specially bestowed on them.”65
According to the Complete Tang Prose (Quan Tangwen), “the Maoshan
school was the universal leader of the Daoist Religion.”66 Although after the
chaos of the An Lushan Rebellion of the mid-eighth century, the Maoshan
Highest Clarity school no longer included so many outstanding Daoist activ-
ists, nevertheless because its influence far surpassed all other branches of the
Daoist Religion Maoshan was still the most sacred location of religious Daoism
in the ninth century, especially among the scholar class. Just as Liu Shi (fl. 8th
century) wrote, “the status of the Huayang, the Highest Clarity school of Daoist
Religion, is just like the status of Confucius in the teaching of Confucianism.”67
At this time, all of the famous scholar-officials who were associated with the
Daoist Religion believed in the Maoshan school. Men like the well-known
calligrapher Yan Zhenqing and Wei Qumou (749–801), who called himself
Yimingzi (a man without a name), had close relationships with Li Hanguang;
the poet Gu Kuang (725–814) and his son Gu Feixiong (fl. ca. 836) also went to
Mt. Mao to cultivate Daoism and be inducted into the Maoshan school with
formal certificates. The most noteworthy of these men was Li Deyu who was
later involved in the huichang suppression of Buddhism. He was a worshipper
in the Maoshan school and not only did he call himself “a disciple of The Three
Pure Ones,” but his wife, née Liu, and his concubine, née Xu, also received cer-
tificates as formal members of the Daoist Religion.
In the ninth century, however, the Maoshan Highest Clarity school could
no longer monopolize the leading position of religious Daoism at the imperial
court. Although this branch still maintained the highest position among high
echelon scholars, due to the confused condition of religious Daoism’s geneal-
ogy, Daoist masters of other branches followed them into the center of power.
By the early ninth century, the Nanyue branch from Mt. Heng began to
assert its influence. Nanyue or Mt. Heng is the Southern Mountain; one of
the Five Sacred Mountains, it is located in modern Hunan province. For

65  Yan Zhenqing, “You Tang Maoshan Yuan Jing xiansheng Guangling Li jun beiming,” QTW,
j. 340: 1523–1524.
66  Liu Shi (fl. eighth century), “Maoshan Ziyangguan Xuanjing xiansheng bei,” QTW, j. 377:
1694.
67  Ibid.
86 Chapter 8

example, in the beginning of the yuanhe (806–821) reign period, Tian Liangyi and
Jiang Shehong were “absolutely outstanding in their Daoist cultivation,
and people from near and far all admired and respected them.”68 Tian Liangyi
was also known as Tian Xuying (?–811) and Jiang Shehong as Jiang Hanhong
(fl. 806–820). According to various sources, around the ninth century the fol-
lowers of He Zunshi (?–743) and Tian Liangyi of the Nanyue branch were quite
important. From the High Tang on, after He Zunshi there was not only Tian
Xuying (Liangyi) but also, Du Guangting (850–933), the most important Late
Tang religious Daoist. Among the Daoist masters of this branch, Tian Liangyi,
Feng Weiliang (fl. 806–820) and Ying Yijie (810–894) known later as the “Three
Masters of the Numinous Treasure Mystery Grotto” (Dongxuan Lingbao sanshi
洞玄靈寶三師)—the original initiative master ( jingshi 經師), the subsequent,
preaching or transmission master ( jieshi 藉師), and the inducting master
(dushi 度師)—even though they sometimes also proclaimed themselves to be
followers of the Maoshan Highest Clarity school.69
In Emperor Wuzong’s time, the doctrinal genealogy of those Daoist masters
who frequented the court and urged on the persecution of Buddhism was, how-
ever, not very clear. From Zhao Guizhen (?–846) to Wang Qiong (9th century)
and from Liu Xuanjing (?–851) to Deng Yankang (773–859), they came mostly
from Nanyue, Mt. Magu (in Jiangxi), Mt. Luofu (in Guangdong) and so on. They
did not necessarily come from one branch of religious Daoism, but they had
a common orientation and common expertise. It would seem that in addition
to the arts of Daoist immortals, they were particularly good at establishing
vegetarian dietary regimens and performing sacrifices for blessings and avoid-
ing disasters, worshiping the astral deities, ordering about ghosts and spirits,
and refining and ingesting cinnabar elixirs. Perhaps it was for this reason that
they were favored and trusted by emperors Jingzong (Li Zhan, r. 825–827) and
Wuzong. Perhaps this was also why they met with severe criticism, even from
scholars who were also believers in religious Daoism.

3.2
In 826, Li Deyu, who was in Runzhou (in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu) at the age of forty,
sent a memorial up to Emperor Jingzong expressing his doubts about Zhao
Guizhen and Du Jingxian (fl. 825), Zhou Xiyuan (mid-9th century), and others
that he had recommended to the court. He particularly criticized these invi-
tees to court as the kind of people who were definitely “pedantic and obscure,

68  Zhao Lin, Yin Hualu, j. 4, jiaobu, yuanhe chu. See http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=231063.
Also see http://www.guoxue.com/tangyanjiu/tdsl/yhl/yhl04.htm.
69  “Dongxuan lingbao sanshi ji,” Daozang, Dongxuanbu pululei, you er, di liu ce, 751–752.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 87

strange, and without principle; they treat the conventional practice of melt-
ing ice with special medicine as not important, but show off their weird and
uncanny methods to deceive the wisdom of Your Majesty.” He said that the
Daoist Religion was worthy of belief, but one should not believe in these men.70
In 844, just when the arrogance of Zhao Guizhen and other Daoists was at its
height and they were most clamorous, Li Deyu, at the age of fifty-eight, again
warned Emperor Wuzong against favoring and trusting Zhao.71
Li Deyu’s attitude was quite representative. He believed in the Daoist
Religion, and his attitude was the same as other Daoist religionists during the
huichang persecution of Buddhism. This was not, however, solely because
he was a long-time believer in religious Daoism. An even more important
reason was that the result of this persecution of Buddhism was in agreement
with his desire to re-establish the authority of the government and intel-
lectual order. At that time, as discussed above, there were a considerable
number of higher officials and scholars who shared a widespread feeling of
anxiety. They carried on the traditional idea of “honoring the king and repel-
ling the barbarians,” and derived from it a trend of thought leading toward the
re-establishment of the authority of the government and the intellectual order.
They were always uneasy about the Buddhist monastic economy that seriously
threatened the power of the Chinese state and about the Buddhist beliefs that
had penetrated deeply into the world of Chinese thought. Even though the
persecution of Buddhism arose due to the activities of Daoist masters whom
they did not very much trust or hold in esteem, still they often looked on from
the sidelines or were even happy to see it happen. They were not really stunned
by or ashamed of the sometimes excessive persecution of the Buddhists. Their
indulgent attitude actually facilitated this fairly cruel movement to eliminate
Buddhism.
What is even more worthy of our attention is that Li Deyu, no matter how
devout his belief in the Daoist Religion, was fundamentally a Confucian
scholar-official. He obviously did not approve of or endorse the activities of
Zhao Guizhen and other Daoist masters at the court of Emperor Wuzong, much
less did he approve of their seemingly mysterious Daoist techniques, ceremo-
nies and practices.72 In his critique, these ceremonies and practices with their
long history in religious Daoism were regarded by Confucian scholar-officials

70  “Li Deyu zhuan,” JTS, j. 174: 4517–4518.

71  ZZTJ, j. 247: 8000 records the events of bingzi, fourth month, huichang year four.
72  According to a “Lun” in SGSZ, j. 17; 435, Zhao Guizhen mainly “instructed the emperor on
the arts of how to prolong life and the arts of mysterious secrets such as have not existed
in ancient times or today.”
88 Chapter 8

as the preposterous black arts of sorcerers and wizards. Li Deyu pursued

a balanced position of maintaining a tolerant attitude toward the Daoist
Religion and its persecution of Buddhism, both supported by the emperor,
while vigilantly guarding against presumptuous and absurd Daoist master like
Zhao Guizhen.
The widespread consensus of the great majority of contemporary scholars
was to separate out the Daoist Religion’s ideas of transcendence and tranquility
and its ultimate ideals and practical techniques and recognize them as Daoism
(daojia). At the same time, they equated Daoist adepts ( fangshi, magicians)
and Daoist masters who were experts at relieving distress and reproached
them for being shamans and wizards. For example, in the second half of the
eighth century, in his On the Biographies of Immortals (Shenxian zhuan lun),
Liang Su criticized those Daoist masters who “transform gold to make cinnabar
elixirs and refine the vital essence to preserve life;” he believed that they did
not understand Lao-Zhuang thought and did not deserve to be included in the
“Daoist School.”73 In the yuanhe reign period, Pei Lin (d. 838) also memorial-
ized Emperor Xianzong concerning his belief in those adepts who refined elix-
irs. His critique was that “all of those who show off their techniques for refining
elixirs are certainly not people who comprehend the Way; they all come
to court seeking their own benefit and asserting that they can concoct elixirs to
make you immortal.”74 Even Niu Sengru, whose political stance differed from
Li Deyu, was also very antipathetic to Emperor Jingzong’s “inviting Daoist mas-
ters from all over the world to talk to him about long life” during the baoli reign
period (825–827). He wrote that “Your Majesty should read the Five Thousand
Words of the Supremely Mysterious and Primordial Emperor (Laozi) to obtain
pure tranquility and a long, healthy life. Those Daoist masters are all medio-
cre characters, who boast emptily about absurdities. How can they be worthy
of emulation?75 This was exactly the same as Li Deyu’s opinion. In general,
scholar-officials all approved of the Daoist Religion’s spiritual beliefs, tranquil
lifestyle, and ideal of transcendence while rejecting its concoction of elixirs,
dietary regimens, sacrifices, prayers to avoid calamities, burying magic incan-
tations and imprecations in a designated site when starting a construction
project, and all such rituals, practices and techniques. They believed that
these ceremonies, practices and techniques were barbarous, ignorant and

73  QTW, j. 519: 2336.

74  “Pei Lin zhuan,” JTS, j. 171: 4450, quotes from a memorial he submitted during the chang­
qing reign period (821–824).
75  “Tang gu Taizishaoshi Qizhang jun Kaiguogong zeng Taiwei Niugong muzhiming, bing
xu,” Du Mu, Fanchuan wenji, 1978, j. 7: 114.
Tang Dynasty Thought II 89

antithetical to civilization. From very early in Chinese history, it was the com-
mon tendency of the intellectual strata to accept the spiritual beliefs of reli-
gion while rejecting religious ceremonies and practices.

3.3
In ancient times, because Confucian doctrines constituted an ideology that
was the foundation of imperial politics, and officials to fill the imperial bureau-
cracy were selected from this intellectual stratum, Confucian knowledge and
culture exerted a tremendous pressure, so much so that it forced the Daoist
Religion to transform itself. Ever since the fourth-century, the Daoist Religion
had been trying to purify itself to draw closer to the scholar elite strata and
to their faith and religious consciousness; since then, the Daoist Religion had
yielded to the mainstream. In public forums, in dissemination to the higher
strata of Chinese society, and in their writings and the arrangement of their
classical canon, members of the Daoist Religion tried very hard to conceal
their ritual and practical nature while highlighting their theoretical and tran-
scendent side.
There have been at least four important phenomena that researchers have
paid attention to that can make this trend in the Daoist Religion of the Tang
and Song dynasties clear.
First was the theory of “Twofold Mystery” (chongxuan 重玄) that appeared
in the Daoist Religion from the seventh century on, and the concomitant
orientation toward emphasizing theory. The idea of the “Twofold Mystery”
derived from the first chapter of the Laozi: “… Darker than any Mystery, The
Doorway whence issue all Secret Essences.”76 From the Southern dynas-
ties and Sui-Tang period on, a group of scholars in the Daoist Religion
explained and interpreted this concept of Twofold Daoist Mystery and
regarded it as the ideal common realm uniting humanity and the universe.
This gave rise to a re-interpretation and re-institution of the Daoist Religion’s
concept of human nature, methods of cultivation, and ultimate goals.77 This

76  Arthur Waley’s translation of last two lines of Laozi, chapter 1 is in the spirit of the Chinese
scholars discussed here. The Way and its Power, 1948, 141. Chan, SB, 139 gives a less mystical
translation: “… They both can be called deep and profound (xuan 玄), Deeper and more
profound, The door of all subtleties!”.
77  The earliest examination of “Emphasizing the Mysteries” thought was Meng Wentong,
“Jiaoli Laozi Cheng Xuanying (fl. 630s and 640s) shuxulu) in Guxue zhenwei, 1987, 343–
360. The first work to discuss its main points and to designate it as a school of thought
was Minoru Sunayama’s “Daojiao zhongxuanpai biaowei” in Shûkan Tôyôgaku 43 (1980),
later included in Minoru’s Zui Tô Dôkyô shisōshi kenkyû, 1990, part 2, chapter one. Other
Chinese research on this tendency includes Lu Guolong’s Zhongguo zhongxuanxue, 1993,
90 Chapter 8

trend toward emphasizing theory that began in the Sui-Tang period contin-
ued to increase among the higher-level members of the Daoist Religion. For
example, works appeared like The Principle Meanings of the Mysterious Gate
(Xuanmen dayi) as well as Meng Anpai (7th century)’s encyclopedic Pivotal
Meanings of Daoist Teaching (Daojiao yishu), and others that contain re-inter-
pretations of Daoist mysteries under the influence of Buddhism.78
Second was the Scripture of the Genesis Point (Benji jing), published dur-
ing the Sui dynasty. This classic that thoroughly discussed the “Dao nature”
(daoxing 道性) was both highly esteemed by the government and widely
popular in the general society. Scholars have generally noted that among the
manuscripts of the Daoist Religion discovered at Dunhuang, there are 103 cop-
ies of The Canon of the Greatest Mystery of the Genesis Point (Taixuan zhenyi
benji jing, abbreviated as Taixuan jing). This makes up some 21% of the 493
Daoist Religion manuscripts from Dunhuang, more than any other scriptures
of the Daoist Religion.79 Moreover, the central discussions of this Daoist classic
do not concern the arts of the immortals (shenxian zhi shu), but rather quite
abstract questions such as “the primal origin or genesis point” (koti, benji 本際
or primal nothingness benwu 本無), “immortal Dao body” (daoshen 道身 or
Dao nature, daoxing), “twofold forgetfulness” ( jianwang 兼忘 or Daoist aus-
terities, xiulian 修煉), the realm of the Twofold Mystery (chongxuan jingjie
重玄境界) and so on.
Third was the symbolic stance and the orientation of the Highest Clarity
(Supreme Purity) school of Maoshan Daoism that was supported by imperial
patronage. They emphasized and disseminated the idea from the Laozi that “the
pursuit of the Dao consists in decreasing (subtracting) day by day, decreasing
and again decreasing until you reach the point of non-action (wuwei),”80 and
Zhuangzi’s “goal of non-interference (wuwei zhi zhi 無為之旨).” When they dis-
cussed the practices of the Daoist immortals, all of the Highest Clarity Daoist

and others. I believe that “Emphasizing the Mysteries” is only an intellectual tendency
in Sui-Tang Daoist Religion and should not be regarded as a school of thought. See Ge
Zhaoguang, “Ping Sui-Tang daojiao sixiangshi yanjiu,” Tang yanjiu 2 (1997), 466–470.
78  See Mugitani Kunio, “Nanbeichao Sui Tang chu daojiao jiaoyixue guankui” in Riben xuezhe
lun Zhongguo zhexueshi, Zhonghua, 1986, 232–250.
79  There are many copies of the Benji jing (本際經) among the Daoist Religion manuscripts
from Dunhuang; see Kamata Shigeo, Dôzônai Bukkyô shisô shiryô shûsei.
80  These lines are from the Laozi, chapter 48. We have modified Arthur Waley and Wing-tsit
Chan’s translations. Waley, 201 has “The practice of Tao consists in subtracting day by day,
Subtracting and yet again subtracting, Till one has reached inactivity.” Chan, SB, 162 has
“The pursuit of Tao is to decrease day by day. It is to decrease and further decrease until
one reaches the point of taking no action.”
Tang Dynasty Thought II 91

leaders who maintained good relationships with the emperor—Pan Shizheng,

Sima Chengzhen, Li Hanguang, Wu Yun (?–778)—always told the emperor he
should emphasize morality and that refining cinnabar elixirs to obtain long
life and become an immortal was really not important for emperors, but was
rather “the behavior of the uncouth.”81
Finally, there were the Maoshan Highest Clarity school texts by important
figures, such as Sima Chengzhen’s Master of Heavenly Immortality (Tianyin
zi) and On Sitting in Oblivion (Zuowanglun), Wu Yun’s The Mysterious Network
(Xuanganglun) and so on. These texts of the Tang dynasty Daoist Religion
have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. They represent the Daoist
Religion’s interest in metaphysical philosophy and its ideas concerning the
pursuit of transcendence. Because the Daoist Religion presented these text
to scholars as very praiseworthy, and elite scholar-officials demonstrated an
interest in them they brought about a change in the Daoist Religion of these
scholar-officials.
At the same time, it should be pointed out that the polemic competition
between the Daoist Religion and Buddhism from the two Jin and the North-
South Dynasties period (from 265 to 589) into the Tang dynasty also spurred
on these changes among the upper level members of the Daoist Religion. It can
be justly said that Daoist religious thought did not originally have any particu-
larly rich theoretical elements, especially not concerning human nature and
transcendence. That is why, from the Wei-Jin and North-South Dynasties on,
the Daoist Religion continually borrowed various Buddhist terms, knowledge
and thought, and dressed them up in ancient Daoist garb. For example, the
“Twofold Mystery” trend of thought, mentioned above as one of the four sig-
nificant phenomena of the history of the Daoist Religion during the Sui-Tang
period, absorbed various elements of Buddhist thinking while the Scripture of
the Genesis Point cites Buddhist ideas concerning many technical terms such
as the Buddha nature ( foxing), dispelling unreal appearances or phenom-
ena, abandoning thought, and practicing calmness (meditation) and wisdom
(dinghui 定慧). At the beginning of the High Tang, the various greatly respected
Masters of the flourishing Highest Clarity school of Maoshan Daoism were
all quite well versed in Buddhism. Perhaps it was just in their polemics with
Buddhism that they unconsciously assimilated Buddhist knowledge and

81  See Yunji qiqian, j. 113: 632; Yan Zhenqing, “Xuan Jing xiansheng Guangling Li jun bei­
ming,” QTW, j. 340, 1523–1524; the former cites Liu Shi, “Maoshan Ziyangguan Xuan Jing
xiansheng bei,” QTW, j. 377, 1694; Quan Deyu, “Wu Zunshi zhuan,” in Daozang, Taixuan
bu, 6 zun, 23 ce, 682. The transmission of this text is problematic; it is quite different from
Quan’s preface to Wu Yun wenji, and further research is needed determine its authenticity.
92 Chapter 8

this caused the members of the upper echelon of the Daoist Religion to pay
increasingly greater attention to metaphysical and spiritual questions like
original human nature and human life, the origin and transformation of the
universe, the possibility of human transcendence and so on. This also led
these upper echelon members to display a more elegant and simple life phi-
losophy and inclinations and interests that transcended the secular world.
Interest in these issues and their style of living gradually became the sign that
marked their entrance into the upper level of society, and such issues also
became the focus of the upper echelon of believers in the Daoist Religion.
Of course we should also be aware that the polemics between Buddhism
and Daoism in the Tang dynasty, especially those carried out in front of the
emperor, were no longer genuine religious confrontations. In Xuanzong’s time
(712–756), the tendency was toward moderation between the Three Teachings
of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, and as time went on these intel-
lectual confrontations grew increasingly attenuated. The discourse of the
Three Teachings was in balance at the royal court, and, with the exception of
the argument between Wu Yun and Shen Yong (710–788), these discussions
actually developed into dramatic performances in which the advocates of
Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism simply tried to please the emperor.82
The coming together of various forms of thought was already the trend, and

82  For example on the birthday of Emperor Dezong in the twelfth year of the zhenyuan
period (796), a discussion forum on the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and
Daoism was held for the occasion. However, it was turned into an entertainment for the
emperor by the mutual mocking of Confucian scholar-officials Zhao Xu and Xu Mengrong
(?–818), Daoist scholar-official Wei Qumou (749–801), and a Buddhist named Tan Yan.
In the tenth month of the first year of the taihe period (827), the discussion forum that
Bo Juyi, the Director of the Palace Library, a Buddhist named Yilin, and a Daoist Yang
Hongyuan participated in simply became a ritualistic activity.
 The last serious and fierce polemic between Buddhism and Daoism in the Tang
dynasty was incited by Wu Yun (?–778) in the dali reign period (766–779). It is said that
at the time Wu Yun had written three essays—“Mingzhen bianwei,” “Fuzheng chuxie,”
and “Bianfang zhenghuo”—“to defame Buddhist masters and honor Daoist doctrines.”
This gave rise to an ardent debate with the Chan Master Shen Yong. See “Fozu tongji,” in
Taishô, j. 49, 202. SGSZ, j. 17 also records that “earlier the Daoist Wu Yun from Mt. Song
in Henan produced several evil treatises to slander and attack Buddhism. Those mud-
dle headed people were deluded by them. Chen Shaoyou (724–784), the Surveillance
Commissioner (guancha shi) of our region (in Zhejiang), invited Monk Shenyong to judge
between Buddhism and Daoism which represents the perfect Dao…. At the time when
Shenyong and Wu Yun had just arrived there, Wu Yun’s carriage got overturned; Shenyong
thus wrote a treatise in three juan entitled On Breaking and Overturning the Baffled or
Confused (Po daofan milun). Almost none of these essays survived into later times, and
Tang Dynasty Thought II 93

hence, whether they spoke in derision or to curry favor, all parties had to put on
a unified front under the auspices of political power.
If we explore, however, the deeper significance of these debates between
the Three Teachings, then we need to explain something about the Daoist
Religion that had originally been “marginalized” in the area of theory. As
they entered the center of the intellectual world, in those competitive con-
frontations of language and thought, the advocates of religious Daoism had
to raise significant issues that could challenge their opponents, and some of
the intellectual topics they brought up were very important. For example, dur-
ing the xianqing reign period (656–661) Li Rongli (fl. 683) proposed discussing
“the significance of the Genesis Point (or primal origin)” (benji yi) and “the
meaning of the Dao gave birth to the ten thousand things” (dao sheng wanwu
yi, derived from Laozi chapter 42) touching upon the quite profound issue
of the origin of the universe as well as a rather abstruse linguistic question.
Facing the refutations and counter arguments of the Buddhists, also forced the
advocates of the Daoist Religion to think deeply about Buddhist philosophy
and its very complex methods of argumentation. In every debate, they had to
pick out carefully some central topics, and this selection process itself required
a detailed understanding of the various intellectual positions of Buddhism,
Daoist Religion, and Confucianism. In the process of gaining this understand-
ing, the Daoist religionists could not help re-evaluating their own positions,
reasoning and discourse. As the Song Gaoseng zhuan puts it: “facing the vari-
ous confusing and crisscrossing lines of reasoning, they had to resist and refute
them one by one, and, in so doing, the disordered lines of thought became
re-regulated and reorganized on their own and eventually returned to the right
and just path.”83 In these sorts of competitive confrontations of knowledge,
thought and belief, some subtle and abstruse Buddhist theories seeped into
the Daoist Religion. Those ideas about spiritual transcendence that scholars
regarded as more refined and elegant came to prominence among the elite
scholars of the Daoist Religion and so they and their classic texts came to take
precedence over the beliefs and techniques in the Daoist Religion that had
originally derived from shamans and adepts (magicians).
There is another point about the Daoist Religion from the last half of the
eighth century to the first half of the ninth century that we need to pay atten-
tion to. The genealogy of schools of the Daoist Religion that originally seemed
to be quite straightforward had become rather confused. The schools, like the

there are very few records of this polemic; they are almost completely absent in docu-
ments on the Daoist Religion.
83  “Tang Jingzhao Da-an Guosi Li She zhuan,” SGSZ, 1987, j. 17: 420.
94 Chapter 8

Zhengyi or Tianshi (Celestial Masters) Zhengyi, Lingbao or Numinous Treasure,

and the Highest Clarity (Supreme Purity), that could be clearly delineated
on the basis of their practices, written charms, ceremonies and their areas
of religious activity during the North-South Dynasties, in the ninth century
ceased to represent obvious demarcations of schools of Daoist Religion. They
no longer maintained definite regional areas of activity either. The so-called
Zhengyi, Lingbao and Highest Clarity schools became increasingly more like a
hierarchical ladder which was used to define people as junior fellow appren-
tices with different statuses under the same religious master or group. During
the North-South Dynasties and the Sui-Tang period, the increasingly inter-
mixed and converging Daoist ritual procedures and their texts and talismans
for eliminating evil spirits among the Zhengyi, Lingbao, and Highest Clarity
schools seem to have already distinguished their high or low status. Among
the various texts and talismans, the rather intellectualized (wenrenhua) and
highbrow Highest Clarity (Supreme Purity) school of Maoshan Daoism came
to be ranked highest.
Placing the Zhengyi school rather low in the Daoist Religion and giving the
Highest Clarity school premier status itself suggests a value orientation. Since
they wanted to win the high esteem of scholars in public forums, Daoist mas-
ters may have wanted to hide their original doctrinal backgrounds and appear
in the guise of the Highest Clarity school. Many contemporary members of the
Daoist Religion would then seek to obtain texts and talismans for eliminating
evil spirits from the Highest Clarity and would all declare themselves mem-
bers of this school. At the same time, they would claim that they had grasped
Highest Clarity knowledge and thought, and were willing to express even more
in open forums that what they grasped was the profound theory for realizing
pure and quiet cultivation. This tendency suggests that at that time members
of the Daoist Religion had to admit that the highest realm of their faith was
its seemingly recondite theories, pure lifestyle, and elegant discourse. There
was no other way they could go because if their religion was to be established
in higher levels of society and in mainstream culture, they had to cater to
the tastes and interests of the scholars who were in command of intellectual
authority. They also had to establish a place for themselves within a recognized
intellectual genealogy.
In the world of ancient China where imperial, religious and intellectual
authority were all highly unified, this was the only way for a religion to estab-
lish itself in elite society. By the ninth century, then, this tendency had become
a consensus among high level members of the Daoist Religion and it had also
become the key to the recognition of the Daoist Religion among the upper
strata of Chinese society. When scholars wrote biographies or inscriptions on
Tang Dynasty Thought II 95

stone tablets for celebrated masters of the Daoist Religion, such knowledge,
thought and belief was always highlighted in their narratives.

3.4
The leaders of Emperor Wuzong’s “Huichang Period Anti-Buddhist Persecution”
were actually not, however, members of the upper level mainstream of the
Daoist Religion. They were rather a group of Daoist priests who were not really
welcomed by the intellectual strata or the official bureaucracy. Although they
employed various magic arts to win imperial support, this really rather ill-
advised anti-Buddhist movement came to an end after Emperor Wuzong died
from ingesting elixirs. In the third month of the sixth year of the huichang
period (846), Tang Emperor Xuanzong (Li Chen, r. 846–859) came to the
throne. He immediately had Zhao Guizhen and other Daoist priests executed
and banished the Daoist master Xuanyuan Ji (9th century) to Lingnan (mod-
ern Guangdong and Guangxi). In the following year, Xuanzong also ordered
the restoration of previously destroyed Buddhist monasteries. The persecution
of Buddhism that was originally caused by the Daoist Religion resulted, in the
end, in the failure of the Daoist Religion in the world of the Chinese elite. After
the religion suffered this defeat, its knowledge and techniques of summon-
ing and testing incantations and magic symbols, dietary regimens, prayers for
warding off calamities, concocting elixirs, and “uniting the vital essence” (heqi
合氣) of male and female seem to have become further removed from elite
society and mainstream civilization following the repudiation and fall from
grace of those Daoist priests.
After the ninth century, then, at least in public forums, the practitioners
of the Daoist Religion could not but make a pure and tranquil nourishment of
life the sign of their belief, the mysteriously unfathomable discourse of their
scriptures the hallmark of their religion, and a lofty transcendence of the dusty
world the ideal goal of their austere cultivation. All of those summoning and
testing incantations and magic symbols, dietary regimens, prayers for warding
off calamities, concocting elixirs and “uniting the vital essence” of male and
female that were originally a very important part of the Daoist Religion were
even more “marginalized” and declined to a status of secondary importance.
They went from being a celebrated part of the practice of religious Daoism to
an existence as secret arts, declining from the upper to the lower level of reli-
gious observance.
 Chapter 9

From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a

New Tradition I (Mid-10th Century to the End
of the 16th Century)

Prologue: China Before the Birth of the Neo-Confucian School of

Principle

For some twenty years in the second half of the tenth century, the Song
emperors Taizu (Zhao Kuangyin, 927–976, r. 960–976) and Taizong (Zhao
Kuangyi, 939–997, r. 976–997) recovered or pacified the states of Northern
Han, Southern Tang, Wuyue, Southern Han, Later Shu, and so on. Except for
the Liao Khitan dynasty (916–1125) in the north and the Xi Xia Tangut state
(1038–1227) in the north west, the constantly changing situation of the Five
Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (907–960) and the land seizures of the Regional
Commanders since the Mid-Tang dynasty were basically brought to and end.
With the establishment of the Song dynasty (Northern, 960–1127; Southern,
1127–1276), China again entered an era of “unity” (yitong 一統). With the Liao
and the Xi Xia occupying a very large piece of land formerly controlled by the
Tang empire, however, this “unity” was far from perfect. Under pressure from
the border regions, the disdainful attitude of Chinese emperors toward “All
Under Heaven” was subtly transformed. At the beginning of the Song dynasty,
the celebrated official Zhao Pu (922–992) consoled himself by saying that “the
five stars and twenty-eight constellations along with the five sacred mountains
and the four great waterways are all in China and not with the four barbarians
(siyi 四夷).”1 On the one hand, they felt somewhat at peace by limiting their
borders to the area of China occupied by the Han people, but on the other
hand they were quite worried because they now knew that this China was no
longer a tianxia; it no longer represented “All Under Heaven.”
Precisely because they were facing foreign countries, besides resisting the
threat of alien peoples, the Song dynasty of the Zhao family also had to empha-
size the legitimacy of their government (state, guojia) and demonstrate the
reasonableness of their culture. They felt a profound and pressing anxiety, and
this anxiety was the starting point for Song cultural awareness. These were

1  “Guan huixing,” Song wenjian, 1992, j. 41, 619. According to XZZTJCB, 1979, j. 30, 685, this
memorial was submitted in 989.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_004

From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 97

the feelings both of the emperors and the high officials. After the loss of state
authority and the increasing intellectual chaos of the Late Tang and the Five
Dynasties period, these urgent feelings of apprehension were conspicuous
among many intellectuals both at court and in the society at large. Both the
menace of foreign enemies and internal divisions represented a crisis of legiti-
macy for the government (the state) and the social order.
Re-establishing state authority and intellectual order were both rather
thorny problems. This was especially so at the beginning of the Song. Having
experienced the chaos of the end of the Tang and the Five Dynasties, the mili-
tary revolt of 960 that brought Zhao Kuangyin to power and then his sudden
death leading to the suspicion that Zhao Kuangyi murdered his elder brother
to usurp the throne, how could people be convinced that this was a legitimate
and reasonable political regime? In traditional China where a new regime
always had to prove that it had “received and was carrying out the Mandate of
Heaven,” it required more than just political and military power. It also seemed
to need a series of cultural policies to support its legitimacy. On this account,
the following actions of the early Song court were quite significant. First, they
re-established a ritual system and tried to validate the legitimacy of Heaven’s
gift of power to them by means of a series of ceremonies. Second, they progres-
sively established an authoritative and efficient bureaucratic system and re-
established political, economic, and cultural order. All this was well received
by the general public. Finally, step by step they re-established the efficiency of
the world of knowledge, thought and belief, employed education and exami-
nations to foster a hierarchical intellectual class, and re-established a well
ordered cultural support system in order to re-affirm intellectual order.
After about forty or fifty years, due to the signing of the Chanyuan Treaty
of 1004 with the Liao Khitan state, external threats to the Song dynasty were
temporarily eliminated. By the reign of Zhenzong (Zhao Heng, 916–1122,
r. 997–1122), the legitimacy of the state and its power had become generally
accepted. Since it had established an authoritative governmental system and
restored political, economic and cultural order, the Zhao Song dynasty was
also acknowledged and accepted by the scholar class. The dynasty also began a
process of re-establishing intellectual order using a strategy of reigning in the
military and developing the civil institutional system, rehabilitating the world
of knowledge, thought and belief, and using education to foster a hierarchical
intellectual class.
No matter how much the state re-established its legitimacy and gained
the acceptance of the scholar class, however, the crisis of the world of knowl-
edge, thought and belief still persisted. This was because the successful
re-establishment of governmental authority and national (minzu) confidence
98 Chapter 9

had primarily to rely on people’s acceptance of a common culture and com-

mon ethics. After the elimination of external hardships, internal problems
began to arise. Because the unity of the intellectual world no longer existed,
the old world of knowledge, thought and belief had lost its power to restrain
behavior. Especially after Zhenzong’s reign when confirmation of the legiti-
macy of dynastic power had become a thing of the past, then, provoked by
the internal troubles and outside aggression, establishing the reasonableness
of the intellectual order became a new focal point. Various greater anxieties
that were hidden deep in the minds of the scholar class began to rise to the
surface, and this led to some changes in the intellectual atmosphere of that
age. As Chen Liang (1143–1194) wrote, “in the qingli (1041–1049) and jiayou
(1056–1064) reign periods, those renowned scholars of the time often worried
that the government would not change its laws (would not launch reforms).”2
In fact, they were not only concerned with the “laws”; the intellectual strata
were also reflecting anew on the effectiveness of all knowledge, thought and
belief. Hence the tendency to demand an intellectual transformation began to
appear at that time.
The first priority was to re-establish the significance of Chinese knowl-
edge, thought and belief to rebuild national confidence and self-esteem dur-
ing a period of widespread confusion of values. The ancient Chinese people
habitually believed that China was not only the geographical center of “All
Under Heaven” (tianxia) but that it was also the center of a civilizational
tianxia. At that time, however, no matter how much the Chinese insisted
that “All Under Heaven is one family,” various alien peoples were always quite
powerful. Under attack from the cultures of these alien peoples, traditional
Chinese civilization had lost its guiding force in the world of everyday life. Its
significance also needed to be re-established.
The intellectual world of the early Song always seemed to be discussing the
political issue of “honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbar-
ians” (zunwang rangyi) and the historical issue of “orthodoxy” or the “tradi-
tion of political power” (zhengtong 政統, loyalty to the ruler). As soon as these
arguments moved from the political realm to the cultural arena, they would
begin to discuss how to “honor the king (royal house) and repel the barbar-
ians” in the intellectual sphere and what is the “tradition of political power”
in the realm of civilization. Northern Song scholars frequently expressed such
intellectual demands. For example, Sun Fu (992–1057) called for the defense
of Confucian doctrines while denouncing Buddhism and Daoism for “elimi-
nating humanity and rightness, abandoning rites and music, and obstructing

2  “Quanxuan zige,” Chen Liang ji (zengding ben), 1987, j. 11.

From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 99

the eyes and ears of the world.”3 Shi Jie (1005–1045)’s essays “On China”
(Zhongguo lun) and “On the Bizarre” (Guai shuo) both focused on this attempt
to rebuild the centrality of Chinese civilization; in “Guai shuo” he attacked the
euphuistic Xikun literary style as harmful to the sagely Way. He most strin-
gently distinguished both the spatial and the cultural differences between
“China” and the “four barbarians.” He believed the most urgent need was to
resist Buddhism that was close to undermining the “constant Way (changdao
常道) of China” because it “destroyed the Way of ruler and ministers, cut off the
feelings between fathers and sons, went contrary to the rites and music, broke
down the five constant virtues, changed the constant position (status) of the
four classes (shi nong gong shang, scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants),
abandoned the Chinese people’s proper dress, removed the ancestors (from
the temples), and sacrificed to the barbarians.”4 This “discourses on dynastic
legitimacy” (zhengtong lun) polemic of Song dynasty historians was simply a
process of reconstructing history by employing a foundation of cultural and
ethnic (or national, minzu) identity for the dynasty during its time of “honor-
ing the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians.”5 Having this sort of
mentality, the significance of re-establishing the intellectual world was even
more strongly emphasized.
The second important priority was to re-establish an ideology and a set of
lofty principles for the intellectual world, and then employ them to direct social
life. This would include directing the political, economic and cultural realms
in order to make the whole world of life in society correspond to these prin-
ciples. Although the Zhao Song dynasty had already successfully convinced the
scholar class to recognize the legitimacy of their political power, these scholars
also hoped that their nation (state, government) would possess cultural legiti-
macy as well. On this account, they often made more idealistic demands on the
government. Quite a few scholars had not entered the political world, but they
were always very interested in politics and they often employed a very lofty
idealism to demand a general legitimacy of politics.6

3  “Taishan xue-an,” Song-Yuan xue-an, j. 2, 58–59.

4  “Zhongguo lun,” “Guai shuo,” shang, zhong, xia pian, in Shi Jie, Culai Shi xiansheng wenji, 1986,
j. 10, 116 and j. 5, 60–62.
5  See Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072), “Yuan zhengtong lun,” “Ming zhengtong lun,” and so on in Jushi
waiji, j. 9 in Ouyang Xiu quanji, 1992, 414–416.
6  For example, when Xing Bing (932–1010) preached the Confucian classics before the emperor,
“in addition to interpretation and elaboration based on commentaries and exegeses, he often
employed current affairs as analogies,” “Rulin zhuan,” SS, j. 431, 12800.
100 Chapter 9

This kind of lofty idealism was based on historical experience. These schol-
ars believed that the loss of governmental authority since the Mid-Tang was
due to moral degeneration and ethical collapse. People had become indiffer-
ent to the legitimacy of the government and the rationality of the social order.
It was precisely the relaxation of the restraints of morality and ethics and the
disappearance of self-awareness that brought about such a historical crisis.
The long two centuries of change made quite a deep impression on the mem-
ory of the intellectual class and also stimulated their thinking about rebuilding
the nation and the social order. Ever since the Mid-Tang, what scholars like
Han Yu and others continued to be extremely worried about was precisely the
loss of governmental authority and the chaotic lack of intellectual order. They
also believed, however, that to re-establish in a fundamental way the national
authority and ethnic self-confidence they had to do more than simply make
the people recognize the legitimacy of the state. It was even more important to
rely on people’s identification with a common civilization and common ethical
principles. The foundations for such a united and shared identification were
“principle” (li 理) and “the Way” (dao 道) because only they were able to tran-
scend individual life, political power, and geographical region. Thus the saying
“nothing is greater than the Way and principle” (dao li zui da 道理最大).7 Shao
Yong (1011–1077) wrote “There is nothing in the universe (tianxia) without prin-
ciple, nature and destiny.”8 And the Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao (1032–1085)
and Cheng Yi (1033–1107), wrote that “Heaven has this principle, the sages
adhered to and practiced it, it is called the Way (Dao).” Principle and the Way
even surpassed the emperor.
A final priority—to re-establish the critical ability of the Chinese knowl-
edge, thought and belief world—also amounted to a reaffirmation of the
significance of culture and the position of the scholars. The Song dynasty
nomination and appointment of a large number of scholars opened up a chan-
nel for the official selection of scholars and filled the capital city with a great
many of them. The re-establishment of government schools, especially the
building of new government schools and setting up of government teachers in
the prefectures and counties, and the encouragement of private learning and
private schools also generated an extremely large collection of scholars in the

7  See Yao Mian, “Guichou tingdui,” Xuepo ji, 1981/83, j. 7, 3A–33B, and Shen Kuo, Mengxi bitan,
Xu bitan, 2003, 285.
8  Shao Yong goes on, “These can be known only when principle has been investigated to the
utmost, when nature is completely developed, and when destiny is fulfilled. The knowledge
of these three is true knowledge. Chan, SB, 487–488, passage is from the Huangji jingshi shu
(Supreme Principles Governing the World), 6: 26a–b.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 101

peripheral regions. The sacrifices to the former sages led by these teachers in
the prefectures and counties and the intellectual orientation of these teach-
ers themselves had an influence on the academic atmosphere and intellectual
trends throughout the country. Their influence in the local areas allowed an
atmosphere of urban culture to spread into the peripheral regions. The greater
significance of this trend was that it provided the local gentry (shishen 士紳)
and newly risen families a chance to train a rather large number of mem-
bers of the scholarly class, and this slowly eroded the monopolistic position
of the center and the great families (guizu) in knowledge, thought and belief.
Under these conditions, the scholars who hoped to participate in politics often
employed intellectual discussions to express their political opinions, and these
opinions often developed into the positive actions of scholarly leaders. In this
way, the struggle over the center of power and influence between the “tradition
of political power” (zhitong 治統) and the “tradition of moral principle” (that
is, the tradition of the Way of Confucius and Mencius, daotong 道統), between
political power and moral and intellectual power, began to emerge. In the 1070s
and 1080s, the political center and the cultural center became disconnected, and
this led to the rise of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle (lixue 理學).9
Originally in ancient China, the intellectual stratum’s tactics for restrict-
ing imperial power generally relied on cultural knowledge that transcended
political power. In early imperial times, however, as in Dong Zhongshu
(179–104 BCE)’s day, scholars relied on “Heaven” (tian) to restrict the emper-
or’s power. They employed their interpretations of “Heaven-sent” calamities
to limit imperial abuses of power. Relying on their ability to interpret various
natural phenomena, they used the transcendent power of cultural knowledge
to criticize imperial power and achieve a certain balance with it. After the “the-
ory of calamities” (zaiyi shuo 災異說) and divination combined with mystical

9  There are two different meanings of the term daotong 道統: (1) the “tradition of moral princi-
ple” used in this passage, and (2) the correct Transmission of the Way or the Succession of the
Way as established by Zhu Xi and others as an important part of Neo-Confucianism. There
are also two main schools of Neo-Confucianism that are translated differently by various
scholars: (1) Daoxue 道學, the Learning of the Way and Lixue 理學, the Learning of Principle
(both the literal translations used by Theodore de Bary) also called the School of Principle by
Wing-tsit Chan. (2) Xinxue 心學, the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (de Bary), the School
of Mind (Chan). We use the Learning of the Way for Daoxue, the School of Principle for
Lixue and the School of Mind for Xinxue depending on Professor Ge’s usage. For more on dao-
tong and Neo-Confucianism see, Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China, 1983,
9, where he discusses daotong as the “repossession or reconstitution of the Way (daotong)”;
romanization changed to pinyin. Also see his Introduction and Chapter 1: “Human Renewal
and the Repossession of the Way.”
102 Chapter 9

Confucianist beliefs (chenwei 讖緯) were rejected by rationalistic scholars, they

could only believe in the power of culture and knowledge, and so they hoped
for a principle (li) that possessed universal applicability. They believed that
because this principle was able to transcend all extant rules of nature and soci-
ety, and because the scholars possessed the ability to interpret, explain and put
this principle into practice, they could employ these interpretations to repre-
sent or epitomize the significance and value of knowledge, thought and belief.
Just as later scholars passionately asserted, “Only the Way and Principle (daoli)
are the greatest under Heaven, thus even as august a One as the Son of Heaven
sometimes had to submit himself to the single word of an ordinary person, and
even though he had all the wealth within the four seas, he was not supposed
to use it to favor his relatives and friends.”10 “The emperors could not obtain
immunity from the decisions of principle. They had to face the scholars and
the culture that they represented “because they had to rule the world with the
scholar-officials, not with the commoners.”11
For such reasons, in Song dynasty intellectual history, we often encoun-
ter terms like “All Under Heaven” (tianxia 天下) used together with “Great
Peace” (taiping 太平), the Way (dao 道) used together with principle (li 理)
and “heart/mind” (xin 心) used together with “nature” (xing 性). In fact, there
was a rather concrete background behind these abstract terms. First, when
scholars were very anxious about “China,” what they proposed was actually
“All Under Heaven” and the “universal Way and Principle” that would suit “All
Under Heaven.” Second, when they were very concerned about “enriching
the country and strengthening the military” ( fuguo qiangbing 富國強兵), the
goal they proposed was, however, that “All Under Heaven enjoy great peace

10  Huang Keren, ed., Huang Song zhongxing liangchao shengzheng, j. 47, [1168, qiandao 4],
1967.
11  X ZZTJCB, 1979, j. 221, 5370, xining 4th year 3rd month (1071). For example, Ouyang Xiu
believed that only following the teachings of Confucius and scrupulously abiding by the
“rites and rightness” (liyi 禮儀) constituted the eternal “root” (foundation). Only this
“root” was able to transform fundamentally this crisis-filled world: “When the Confucian
Way becomes illuminated, the teaching of the hundred schools will naturally come to an
end,” and “if we can teach and cultivate it, diligently practice it and immerse ourselves
in it day by day so that ordinary people will all happily move toward this Way, then it
will be fully realized throughout All Under Heaven.” Only this kind of “principle,” with its
“penetration among the people in a gradual manner will definitely last long and eventu-
ally [help the world] reach the realm of great peace.” On this account, Ouyang and others
believed in the existence of a kind of universal truth that surpassed imperial power, and
that everyone including emperors had to obey this universal truth; it was valid anywhere
in the world. See “Benlun,” shang xia, Jushi ji, j. 17 in Ouyang Xiu quanji, 124.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 103

forever” (tianxia zhaoxi taiping 天下朝夕太平).12 Great Peace did not merely
mean that the country should be populous, affluent and powerful; it was a
realm of everlasting happiness and peace. Finally, when social life, especially
the increasingly prosperous urban life, lost its unifying moral foundation, the
basic method the scholars put forth to save society was self-awareness of
“heart” (xin) and “nature” (xing). They resolutely persisted in this form of cul-
tural idealism while simultaneously regarding the thinking embodied in the
Neo-Confucian Learning of the Way (daoxue 道學) or Neo-Confucian School
of Principle (lixue 理學) as the only road to China’s salvation.
Without doubt this current of intellectual idealism and the movement for
the promotion of thought followed and carried forward the way of thinking of
Han Yu and others since the Mid-Tang. They examined once again various his-
torical resources and seem to have had a four-fold strategy. First, to construct
a so-called “tradition of moral principle” or “succession of the Way” (daotong
道統) and to write a new account of the history of thought to support the legit-
imacy and reasonableness of their new thought. Second, to re-interpret the
ancient theory of “human nature and feelings” (xingqing shuo 性情說) so that
it could serve as the ultimate new foundation for changing traditional intel-
lectual thought. Third, to emphasize repeatedly new classical texts such as the
“Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean” to provide authority for a later
change of intellectual direction. Fourth, to accord to “Ancient Prose” (guwen)
a significance that transcended writing and make it a splendid representa-
tion of both the ancient and the new thought as well as a symbol of the Way.
They particularly carried forth and amplified Mid-Tang thinking about human
nature and, even more significantly, raised ethical principles, hitherto merely
moral demands and standards of behavior, to a paramount importance that
surpassed all other first principles and established them as the foundation of
the Neo-Confucian School of Principle.
It must be pointed out, however, that this current of intellectual idealism and
the movement for the promotion of thought always remained on the political

12  “Xie Mi zhuan,” SS, j. 306, 10095, quoting his memorial at the beginning of Zhenzong’s
reign. There were many discussions of this “great peace,” and it had already become an
ideal realm sought after by contemporary scholar-officials. To give two examples, “Han
Yi zhuan,” SS, j. 315 quotes him as saying “when great peace prevailed under Heaven, the
mind of the sage ruler would want to make even insects, grass and trees achieve satisfac-
tion.” A poem by Cai Xiang (1012–1067) contains the lines: “our imperial house has enjoyed
several decades of great peace and this is the exact time to look into antiquity and rectify
our institutional rule and ritual norms.” In Zhang Zai’s famous phrase: “to establish great
peace for the ten thousand generations to come.” Zhangzi yulu, zhong, ZZJ, 1978, 322.
104 Chapter 9

margin. At a time when a great number of scholars were still crowding into the
examination sites and only a minority supported this transcendent position,
this thought tide and intellectual movement did not really become a noted
school of thought. As long as it could not obtain the support of the powers
that be and could not become an ideology but only remained as the thought
expressed by some very anxious scholars, it could only persist as a method of
criticism and a respected form of thought among the scholar class. Following
the gathering of a group of rather influential scholars at Luoyang during the
second half of the eleventh century, however, as well as the emergence of more
penetrating discussions of theory and history, this trend of though eventually
came to be supported by some scholar-officials and expanded its influence.
This planted the seeds of a later transformation of Chinese intellectual history.

1 Luoyang and Kaifeng (Bianliang): Separation of the Political and

Cultural Centers

In the late 1060s into the 1070s in the political capital of Kaifeng (Bianliang),
a group of scholar-officials, with the emperor’s support and represented by
Wang Anshi (1021–1086), carried out their new realist policies. At the same
time, in the cultural capital of Luoyang, another group of scholar-officials who
were influential but temporarily lacked political power held fast to a position
of high-minded conservatism. The most prestigious of them was Sima Guang
(1019–1086). They had widespread influence among scholar-officials, and many
people looked forward to their return to power. Although this hope could not
really become a reality, still the existence of this cultural center that was capa-
ble of contending against the political center was attractive to a great number
of scholars and literati.
Song dynasty Luoyang was not only the gathering place of great and pres-
tigious families but also of the scholarly class. With the exception of Zhou
Dunyi (1017–1073), whose position in intellectual history is quite problematic,
and Zhang Zai (1020–1077), who alone lived in China’s west, many of the most
important scholars in Northern Song intellectual history, especially of the Neo-
Confucian School of Principle—Shao Yong (1011–1077), Cheng Hao, and Cheng
Yi—all lived in the Luoyang area. These scholars had very close relationships
with Sima Guang, Wen Yanbo (1006–1097) and Fu Bi (1004–1082), all of whom
lived in retirement in Luoyang. Together they came to constitute the center of
scholarship and culture at that time. For a decade or so, in this place not too
far from the capital, they made up an intellectual circle that called attention
to its ethics and morality and appealed through its thought and scholarship.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 105

It expressed a different voice in the contemporary world of knowledge, thought

and belief.
Looking back on Chinese history, we can see that it was very rare in ancient
China for the political center and the cultural center of the country to be so
strictly separated. Under the governance of the ancient Chinese “universal
kingship” in which political, religious and cultural authority were combined,
the emperors and their governments not only symbolized truth itself, they
also had a monopoly on the discursive power to interpret the truth. Just at
the time when imperial power was expanding in the 1070s and 1080s, how-
ever, this separation of the political and cultural centers occurred. How, then
did this come about, and what influence did it have on the Chinese world of
knowledge, thought and belief?

1.1
Researchers studying Song dynasty history have all noticed that really extensive
change in the Northern Song began in 1044 (year four of the qingli reign period).
After over eighty years, even though the regime’s political power was already
well consolidated, society was increasingly calm and orderly, and the popula-
tion had begun to grow prosperous, latent crises were beginning to become
apparent. The dynasty had numerous and extremely inefficient officials, enor-
mously large, indolent and incompetent military forces, and suffered frequent
outbreaks of very troublesome incursions on the western border. In addition,
both the rise of corruption stemming from long-term peace and the worsen-
ing economic conditions caused the dynasty to be even more concerned.13 It
was precisely under these conditions that a desire for change pervaded the
upper classes. The need for change had already become a consensus among
the scholar-officials and a leading element of public opinion in the broader

13  13 Wang Mao (1151–1213), Yenyi yi mou lu, 1981, j. 2, 17 & 14 records that “after the xian-
ping (998–1003) and jingde (1004–1007) reign periods, there was a false picture of peace
and prosperity; people’s costumes and items of daily use became gradually extravagant.
Not only did the families of the scholar-officials advocate and worship such a trend, even
ordinary people in market towns and rural villages all wanted to outdo each other with
luxurious and beautiful things. Thus, those who disliked this trend started to criticize it.”
It also records that after the xianping period, commodity prices rose precipitously: “from
the xianping to the xiangfu period (1008–1016), there were but ten plus years, and yet
society has changed to such an extent, not to mention that after a long period of peace,
this extravagant and wasteful trend became increasingly widespread and extended even
to the time between zhenghe (1111–1118) and xuanhe (1119–1125) reign periods?”.
106 Chapter 9

society.14 This situation finally led Emperor Shenzong (Zhao Zhongzhen, Zhao
Xu, 1048–1085, r. 1067–1085) and Wang Anshi to embark on their radical reforms
during the xining reign period (1068–1077).
There is an issue related to later intellectual history that should be discussed
here. Even though the reforms of the qingli reign period (qingli xinzheng
慶歷新政, 1041–1049, often referred to as the Minor Reforms) followed by Wang
Anshi’s New Policies (bianfa 變法) of the xining period (1068–1077) simply
represented a natural extension of the tide of reform thought, what needs to
be noted here, however, is that during the xining period, the thinking of the
scholar-officials underwent a rather dramatic change. One group of scholar-
officials, like Wang Anshi, carried forth the qingli reform thinking and were
oriented toward adopting intensely pragmatic tactics. With the emperor’s sup-
port, they carried out a series of experiments in radical change. Another group
of scholar-officials, however, was oriented toward adopting a form of moder-
ate cultural conservatism and a position of high-minded moral idealism. They
attempted by means of the reconstruction of cultural tradition and with the
help of moral rationality to establish firmly the regulative and instructive sig-
nificance of knowledge and thought as well as their bearers in socio-political
order, and further to rectify and establish an ideal social order in a moderate
and gradual manner.
In light of these changes, during the xining and yuanfeng reign periods
(1068–1085) a bifurcation occurred among the Song literati elite. Lü Gongzhu
(1018–1089), Fan Chunren (1027–1101), Zhang Fangping, Fu Bi, Han Qi (1008–
1075), Cheng Hao, Zhu Guangting, Zhang Zai, Lü Dajun (1029–1080), Su Shi and
(1037–1101) Su Che (1039–1112) came to a parting of the ways with Wang Anshi.
Even Ouyang Xiu, who had vigorously recommended Wang in the beginning,
was forced to withdraw from the political arena in 1070 because his political

14  “Zhang Fangping zhuan,” SS, j. 318, 10335, records that during Emperor Renzong’s reign
(Zhao Zhen, r. 1022–1063), Zhang Fangping (1007–1091) submitted a memorial that said
“Since the xiangfu reign period (1008–1016), the court has simply tolerated all kinds of
irregularities, and gradually lost the old rules set up by the founding fathers. Rules of
promotion and filling vacancies in the civil examination system, appointing sons to high
offices, and the five-year review of military personnel have all broken down. Ordering
generals to maintain armies is not following old law either. Since the state finance is in
poor condition, orders tend to come out from different parts of the government. The big
merchants and powerful local people then take advantage of this loophole to seek their
own profits, and thus the regulations of tea, salt, incense, and alum are in chaos. These
rules and regulations are the foundation of good and prosperous rule. Your Majesty must
treat them as of urgent concern.”
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 107

views did not conform to Wang’s.15 What these scholars had in common was
their opposition to setting up a completely new political system. They did not
wish to institute a fundamental transformation of politics and they especially
did not want to see the country thrown into excessive turmoil. In this split
between what might superficially be called “activist” or “interventionist” and
“quietist” or “non-interventionist” positions, we can see the conflict between
the reform faction and the conservative faction, between radical and gradual-
ist tactics.
Was there an even deeper intellectual history background behind this situa-
tion? Obviously, the separation of the “tradition of political power” (zhengtong)
and the “tradition of moral principle” (daotong 道統) was another reason. In
his “Letter in Answer to Fan Xunzhi,” Zhang Zai said something very thought-
provoking. He wrote that what is troublesome now is that “the imperial court
considers the [Confucian] Learning of the Way (daoxue), and the art of ruling
(zhengshu 政術) as two separate things, and this has become something that
we really should worry about.”16 The people he was referring to as the bearers
of so-called daoxue and zhengshu were ancient Chinese “teachers” (shi 師) and
officials (li 吏) respectively.
Ever since the Han dynasty, it had always been an intractable problem
whether it was better for “teachers to act as officials” (yi shi wei li 以師為
吏) and rely on education to establish the kingly way (wangdao), or for
“officials to serve as teachers” (yi li wei shi 以吏為師) and rely on laws to
establish the Way of the Overlords (or Hegemons, badao). Although we can
say that the traditional Chinese political system was “a combination of the
ways of the Overlords [Hegemons] and the Sage Kings” (wang ba dao za zhi
王霸道雜之), nevertheless in political practice any partiality could always
disturb the center of gravity between culture and politics. During the xining
and yuanfeng reign periods, the Chinese political world was obviously domi-
nated by the radical reformers who relied on imperial support, and this led to
three changes in the cultural and intellectual worlds. First, the power of the

15  XZZTJCB, j. 211, 5134–5135, records that while in Qingzhou Ouyang Xiu submitted a memo-
rial discussing the “green sprouts cash” (qingmiao qian 青苗錢), with the result that Wang
Anshi attacked him in front of Emperor Shenzong, even going so far as to say that he
“does not know the classics, does not comprehend moral principles, discredits the Rites of
Zhou, and slanders the “Appended Phrases” of the Yijing. In this way, many scholars were
harmed by him and it almost led to their ruin.”
16  “Da Fan Xunzhi shu,” ZZJ, addendum “Wenji yicun,” 349. The complete quote is “the court
treats the Learning of the Way (daoxue) and the art of ruling (zhengshu 政術) as two
separate things, and this has been something to worry about since ancient times.”
108 Chapter 9

emperor and the government increased until politics overwhelmed culture

and came to constitute the central core of daily life. Second, the study of the
rites (lixue 禮學) that had always served as resources for the political sys-
tem, the study of writing literary essays as a strategy for entering officialdom,
and the study of governance for administrative officials were all made to
occupy the central core of the intellectual world. Third, the tendency toward
intellectual realism, or pragmatism, gradually assumed the central position
in the Chinese intellectual world.
What were the results of these changes? From the vantage point of the
scholar-officials, they would be forced to play the role of minor “officials”
(li) and give up their dignity as “teachers,” leaving the emperors, their gov-
ernments, and their officials in charge of politics to control everything
while the scholars in charge of culture steadily lost their status.17 Scholars
in the role of “teachers” generally expressed their political thinking by
means of the Way, that is, culture, and so they always called for “respect
for the teacher and valuing the Way in his teaching” (zunshi zhongdao
尊師重道).18 From the point of view of the political rulers, however, they
enthusiastically hoped for the scholars to act as mere “officials” and make
culture serve as a resource for the explanation of politics. For example,
Emperor Shenzong became very angry if the scholars did not carry out his
decrees, wanted the official examination questions to have more to do with
decrees and ordinances ( faling), and earnestly hoped for the shi “teachers”
to become li “officials.” Sima Guang was ardently opposed to this because
he felt that it would make the “teachers” who were the symbols of moral-
ity into “officials” who only implemented the laws.19 This Confucian learn-
ing of the Way (daoxue) and the art of ruling (zhengshu) having been
thus separated illustrates the fact that daoxue—culture—was already unable
to influence politics, and zhengshu had also lost the support of culture.
When this group of scholars gathered in Luoyang, most of them were
already retired or out of office. They had a knowledge of the Confucian

17  Translators’ note: shidafu 士大夫 are generally higher officials, and the term as used from
the Song dynasty onward is generally translated as scholar-official, while li 吏 generally
refers to minor officials or mere clerks or functionaries; the contrast explains why the
shidafu were reluctant to be reduced to the status of li.
18  For example, in Cheng Hao’s “Qing xiu xuexiao zun shiru qushi zhazi,” he says that “the
sage is far in the past and the Way of the teacher has not been established…. we should
establish one morality to harmonize customs, but if the teaching of the sage teacher is
not rectified (correct), what then can morality rely upon to become an inclusive unity?”
Henan Chengshi wenji, j. 1, in ECJ, 1981, 448.
19  Quoted in “Xuanju si,” in Wenxian tongkao, j. 31 top of 295.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 109

Learning of the Way, but were far from “the arts of ruling.” They did have
a good deal of social capital, though, and also quite a number of support-
ers. The following elements of their cultural background are well worth
attending to. First, due to the widespread use of printing, the speed of cul-
tural dissemination was daily increasing. At the same time, the prosperity
of private academies and prefectural and county schools led to the steady
transmission of knowledge to the general population. Through their pri-
vate teaching, these scholars attracted disciples, traveled around widely,
and increasingly gained society’s respect and support. Probably sometime
after the qingli reign period (1041–1048), they grew into a very large scholar
elite class. Second, this class lived in the midst of a comparatively liberal
and relaxed discursive milieu. Teaching, debating, and letter and book writ-
ing in the Northern Song often dealt with contemporary political and social
issues, and created to some extent a discursive space that also contributed to
the separation of the cultural and political centers. Third, since these Song
dynasty scholar-officials began to re-establish families and clans, a class of
what we call “village gentry” (xiangshen 鄉紳) came into being. They took
office and entered into politics by means of their cultural knowledge and
then relied on their political connections to become family and clan lead-
ers. This led them to become the only stratum between the emperor and
the common people since the great hereditary families of the Han and Wei
periods. In the Northern Song, the strength of this gentry class could hardly
be ignored. In a certain sense, these scholar-official leaders and teachers of
Luoyang actually possessed abundant resources, and, with these resources,
they symbolized a marginal position and a form of idealism. Employing cul-
ture to offset politics, they attempted to use their cultural center to achieve a
balance with the political center.
I have always believed that the current of reform thinking from the Mid-
Tang through the Song harbored a strong tendency towards centralization
( jiquan zhuyi 集權主義). This was very clearly expressed in the Northern
Song. For example, Wang Anshi hoped to bring about a unified situation in
which “no one has a differing opinion” (ren wu yilun 人無異論) and ener-
getically proposed strengthening the power of the ruler to control public
opinion.20 In 1072, then, when Emperor Shenzong seriously stated that “today
when everyone follows different doctrines, what can we rely on to unify moral-
ity?” and when he wanted Wang Anshi to “make the scholars settle on a fixed

20  “Da Wang Shenfu shu,” 2 and “Yu Ding Yuanzhen shu,” Wang Wengong wenji, 1974, j. 72,
and j. 75.
110 Chapter 9

unity,” this already adumbrated a severely autocratic tendency.21 One result

of the reforms would probably be just to strengthen this tendency. The mar-
ginalized scholar-officials were naturally antipathetic to that sort of power.
While these Luoyang scholars had high prestige and commanded abundant
resources, but were far from the center of political power, then, they would
express different concerns arising from gentry society by means of historical
narratives, ethical explanations, and the establishment of a new cosmological
theory.

1.2
As mentioned above, the traditional scholar-official class in general relied on
their authoritative interpretations of natural calamities to restrain imperial
power. Ever since the Han dynasty, they were used to employing these expla-
nations in the manner of Dong Zhongshu (ca. 179–ca. 104 BCE). They relied on
these calamities to warn the emperors and express in a roundabout way the
views of the intellectual class at a time when imperial power was supreme over
everything and only “Heaven and Earth” could transcend “imperial power” and
command the authority to proclaim the truth. In the Song dynasty, however,
this tradition slowly lost its efficacy. In an age when people believed that “a
change in Heaven is not worth fearing” (tianbian buzu wei 天變不足畏), the
scholar-officials’ explanations of natural calamities were no longer sufficient
to warn or restrict the limitless power of the emperors.22
For precisely this reason, these scholars wanted to emphasize the “Way
and principle” (dao li) that transcended imperial power. They hoped that this
Way that enveloped everything in existence and explained society, nature, and
human beings would become a self-evident principle. In their view, no mat-
ter how much things changed, only by establishing the absolute value of the
Way or principle could the shi “scholars” really be shi “teachers” and the “tra-
dition of moral principle” (daotong) be higher than the “tradition of political
power” (zhitong 治統). In other words, only by establishing the paramount sta-
tus of truth and its interpreters could these scholars have genuine power and
authority.

21  XZZTJCB, j. 229, 5570. Actually, as early as 1070, Wang Anshi had already told Shenzong
that “if everyone in the court gives a different view, that starts agitation among them, then
how can one bring about good governance?”, and his view received Shenzong’s approba-
tion. As Shenzong said, “Allowing different views to start agitation is certainly not accept-
able.” Ibid., 5169.
22  “Wang Anshi liezhuan,” SS, j. 86.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 111

They were also quite aware that one of the resources they possessed was the
Way and principle. An anecdote about Cheng Yi can serve to illustrate their atti-
tude. It was said that he regarded himself as following the way of the teacher
(shidao 師道) when he lectured to the emperor with a dignified demeanor, and
the emperor greatly revered him. When people asked him why this was so, he
said “because I wear the simple clothes of a commoner to act as the emperor’s
teacher, how could I not conduct myself with dignity?”23 A second resource
that they possessed was the background support of the scholar-official com-
munity. Since the emperor had to face the scholars and their symbolic culture,
Wen Yanbo (1006–1097) could tell the emperor that “[Your Majesty] rules All
Under Heaven with the scholar-officials, not with the common people.”24 That
is to say emperors must rely on the scholar-official bureaucracy to rule the
country and the people, and only on that account could the will of the scholar-
officials carry sufficient weight to restrain imperial power.
During the xining and yuanfeng reign periods (1068–1085), Luoyang became
the central gathering place for these scholars. They did not command any
practical power and they were only able to concentrate their energies on cul-
tural discourse. Nevertheless, because they were always concerned with the
fundamental problems of the state (guojia) and they possessed quite substan-
tial social and cultural resources, they constituted the contemporary center of
knowledge and thought. They established the position of the scholar-officials
in culture and politics.
From the beginning of the Northern Song and for a rather long period of
time, scholar-officials had two interwoven points of focal concern. One was
“honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians,” that is, restor-
ing the authority of the state and social order. Works like Sun Fu’s “On the
Subtle Principle of Respecting the Ruler in the Spring and Autumn Annals”
(Chunqiu zunwang fawei), Shi Jie’s “On China,” and Ouyang Xiu’s “Essay on
Fundamentals” (Benlun) and “Discourses on Dynastic Legitimacy” (Zhengtong
lun), all revolved around how to increase the authority of the state, promote
Han Chinese civilization and Confucian ideas, resist the twin cultural and
military threats from alien lands, and appeal for Chinese ethnic and cultural
identity.25 Their second focus was “illuminating principle and discussing

23  “Henan Chengshi waishu,” j. 12 quotes “Shao shi wenjian lu,” in Er Chen ji, 1981, 423.
24  XZZTJCB, j. 221, 5370, xining sinian sanyue.
25  For Ouyang Xiu’s “Benlun,” see De Bary, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 590–595. In his “Discourses
on Dynastic Legitimacy in the Northern Song” (Hoku Sô sono ta no seitô ron 北宋その他
の正統論), Nishi Jyunzô points out that the Northern Song discourse on dynastic legiti-
macy and the Han dynasty idea of the absolute power of the unified state’s Son of Heaven
112 Chapter 9

nature” (mingli bianxing 明理辯性). By emphasizing the preeminent value of

ethics and morality, they extrapolated from the origin of mind and nature all
the way to the ultimate Way and principle of the universe, and constructed a
new system of knowledge and intellectual order. For example, Hu Yuan (993–
1059), Sun Fu, Chen Xiang (1017–1080), Jia Gongsong (mid-eleventh century)
and others all focused on this point. From the time of Emperor Renzong (Zhao
Zhen, r. 1022–1063), “honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbar-
ians” and “illuminating principle and discussing nature” established an intel-
lectual atmosphere that formed the inner element to their external political
thought. By the time of Emperor Shenzong, these two focal concerns made up
the general trend of scholarly thought.
These two points of concern were really two sides of the same coin, and
together they were intended to rebuild the authority of the state and the
intellectual order. As already noted, from as early as the Mid-Tang, Han Yu,
Li Ao and others had already voiced such anxiety about the authority of the
state and the intellectual order. The writings of Han Yu and other early ninth
century scholar-officials naturally became the starting point for the intellec-
tual reflections of Song dynasty scholars. Sun Fu, Shi Jie, Mu Xiu (979–1032),
Liu Kai (948–1001), Ouyang Xiu, and so on were all impressed by Han Yu’s rev-
erence for and enthusiastic promotion of the “tradition of moral principle” or
the “succession of the Way” (daotong), “human nature and feelings” (xingqing)
and Ancient Prose (guwen). They eventually incorporated Mid-Tang thought
as a historical resource to support the rebuilding of the world of knowledge,
thought and belief.
The situation had changed, however, perhaps because the Mid-Tang was a
period during which the authority of the state was weak, but the state and
government of the middle of the Northern Song was quite strong and stable
and imperial power had increased with it. On this account, the scholars trans-
ferred the focus of their reflections from “the authority of the state” to “intellec-
tual order.” Commanding only intellectual power and without political power,
these scholar-officials attempted to employ the “tradition of moral principle,”
to restrain the “tradition of political power,” to employ history and culture to
criticize political power, to use the power of thought to gain the widespread

were two different things. Dynastic legitimacy in the Northern Song required a historical
record, a unified state, and an ethical identity, that is, a historical tradition, political space,
and cultural power must all be possessed at the same time in order to realize the concept
of the unity of All Under Heaven. This concept transcended the actual unification of the
country and developed into a demonstration of the legitimacy of the state. “Hoku Sô sono
ta no seitô ron”, in Hitotsubashi ronsô (1953), j. 30, no. 5, 34–48.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 113

acknowledgement and endorsement of the scholar class, and to provide an

alternative voice during a period of formidable imperial power.
It must be pointed out here that in a situation in which they did not have
political power or responsibilities, but were extremely dissatisfied with
contemporary politics, it was very easy for the scholar-officials to exhibit
a high-minded idealism and an intense moralism. They generally made very
high demands on others. That is, they demanded that people be aware of and
reflect upon their mental attitudes and behavior as well as strive, by means of
conscious emphasis on ethical concepts and standards, to establish a social
order in accordance their ideals. They often raised social ethics to the level of
original and instinctive nature (ziran benxing 自然本性), and raised morality
to a position of transcendence. On the one hand, they particularly emphasized
the Way and principle, believing that they transcended society, nature, and
humanity. This gave ethical principles, originally connected only to “human
beings,” support from “nature” and “society.” It also made the universe of
Heaven and Earth, the governance of society, and human ethics jointly to share
a single ultimate “Way and principle.”
The Great Ultimate of Zhou Dunyi’s Explanation of the Diagram of the Great
Ultimate (Taijitu shuo) and what Shao Yong called principle were meant pre-
cisely to transform truth into a universal principle. What Zhang Zai called
principle was higher than “Heaven and Earth,” and Cheng Hao’s assertion that
“when there is the Way and there is principle, Heaven and the Human will be
one, and there can be no separation” was also intended to emphasize that prin-
ciple cannot be limited to any present reality, time or place, and to employ it to
envelope everything—to be that “one single thread” mentioned by Confucius
when he said “There is one single thread binding my way together.”26 On the
other hand, they regarded this transcendental Way or principle as the foun-
dation for explaining the universe, the basic standard for politics and gover-
nance, and the origin of morality in human nature. In the practical world of
everyday life, it served them as an absolute principle for guiding and criticizing
everything. The Cheng brothers said, “nature is simply principle; from Yao and
Shun down to ordinary people, principle has always been one.” They wanted
people to grasp this “one thread” and to search for the ultimate truth of the
universe, society, and humanity by means of exhausting principle, developing
ones nature to the utmost, and understanding destiny.27

26  “Zhangzi yulu shang,” in Zhang Zai ji, p. 312. Lunyu 4. 15, D. C. Lau, Confucius the Analects,
1979, 74.
27  Cheng brothers, “Henan Chengshi yishu,” j. 18 in Er Chen ji, 1981, 204. See Chan, SB, 512 on
exhausting principle, developing nature, and understanding destiny.
114 Chapter 9

1.3
At this time, the scholar-officials faced two challenges. One emanated from
the political center, that is the practical thinking of the reformers. This kind
of practical thought increasingly undermined the fundamental significance of
the scholar-official class as the guardians of cultural values. The other came
from the heretical doctrines of Daoism and Buddhism. The rise of many dif-
ferent heretical doctrines made it difficult for people to choose their spiri-
tual stance and thereby brought about a rupture of history and tradition that
deprived the scholar-officials of their intellectual authority. Sun Fu’s “The
Humiliation of the Confucians” (Ru ru) excitedly exclaimed that not only were
Yangzi (Yang Zhu), Mozi, Shen Buhai and Han Fei causing intellectual chaos,
but Buddhism and the Daoist Religion were running riot throughout China so
that the domain of Confucianism was almost eliminated.28 With such uneasy
feelings, they needed to push their intellectual search for the Way and prin-
ciple to the extreme, placing “Way and principle” in a paramount position.
It was a general intellectual practice of contemporary scholar-officials to
search for a fundamental interpretation of classical texts. They customarily
sought to provide an overall explanation of all knowledge, and such explana-
tions were often reduced to a small number of large abstract principles such
as “the “Great Ultimate,” the “Way,” “Principle” or “Nature” (taiji, dao, li or xing).
In his Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate, Zhou Dunyi posited
an empty position called the “Ultimate of Nonbeing” (wuji 無極)29 above the
“Great Ultimate” simply to express exhaustively investigating and searching
for the origin, and the “Great Ultimate” that he employed as a symbol for the
origin, according to his own interpretation, is simply an absolute “unity” (one,
oneness, yi 一).” This “unity” not only represents the undivided state of primal
chaos of the universe but also the absolute unmoved condition of the human
heart/mind. Human beings need to return to the spiritual realm of the “quiet,
motionless tranquility,” or “sincerity” (cheng 誠), as it may also be called.30

28  “Taishan xue-an,” Song-Yuan xue-an, j. 2, 58–59. On these kinds of comments, see Cheng
Hao’s acutely critical remarks: “The reason that the Way is not clear lies in the harm caused
by heretical doctrines.” in “Daoxue yi—Cheng Hao zhuan,” SS, j. 427, 12717. For more of
Zhou Dunyi’s writings, see Chan, SB, 460–480 and De Bary, Sources, 1999, 669–682.
29  The “Ultimate of Nonbeing” is Wing-tsit Chan’s translation, in Chu Hsi: Life and Thought,
1987, 55, 86, 115, 116; in Chan, SB, 464, it is rendered as “Non-ultimate”; in De Bary, Sources,
673, it is translated as Non-Polar in contrast to Supreme Polarity (our Great Ultimate).
30  See “Tongshu—Cheng ji de di-san” and “Tongshu—Sheng di-si,” in Zhou Dunyi, Zhouzi
tongshu, p. 1. De Bary, Sources, 676 translates Tongshu as Penetrating the Classic of Changes
and describes it as “focus[ing] on the sage as the model of humanity.” On cheng,” sincer-
ity,” see Chan, SB, 465–467, especially 465n 28: “The word means not only sincerity in the
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 115

Zhang Zai, in similar fashion, put “principle” above “Heaven and Earth.” He
regarded “principle” as the key to experiencing and comprehending “the Way
of Heaven and Earth” (tiandi zhi dao) and regarded traditional ideas about
Heaven and Earth as unbelievable fabrications. The establishment of “prin-
ciple” was precisely the difference between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism
and Daoism. As Zhang Zai put it, “the ten thousand things all possess prin-
ciple, if one does not know how to understand principle to the utmost it is like
living one’s entire life in a dream.31 Cheng Yi was even more straightforward.
Someone asked him “what is the Way of Heaven?” He replied, “it is only prin-
ciple, principle is simply the Way of Heaven.”32
Although Song Confucians had not completely rejected traditional pre-Tang
cosmological knowledge such as Heaven and Earth, Yin and Yang, four sea-
sons, Five Phases, and so on, they had already begun a new method for observ-
ing and explaining the universe. Shao Yong wrote that “the Way is the root of
Heaven and Earth, and Heaven and Earth are the root of the ten thousand
things. Observe the ten thousand things from Heaven and Earth, and the ten
thousand things are simply the ten thousand things; observe Heaven and Earth
from the Way, and Heaven and Earth are also the ten thousand things.33 This
is a very important passage. It means that when people carefully observe the
material things of the universe (the ten thousand things, wanwu), they present
a diverse and complex individual appearance where a bull is a bull, a tree is a
tree, and so on. It is only when one rises to the high level of the origin of the
cosmos—the Way or principle—that one can grasp them as a totality and then
use them as the one single thread (principle) to make an overall explanation
of them. Only on the level of the Way and principle are people able to truly
explain and interpret the myriad things and affairs of the universe. This Way or
principle, however, is also innate within the human “heart/mind.”
To push knowledge and thought to their ultimate origins and to investigate
the foundations of the reasonableness of knowledge and thought was the
characteristic feature of the ratiocinations of Song dynasty scholar-officials.
Another characteristic feature was their transferal of the foundations of the
reasonableness of ultimate origins from the external Heaven and Earth and
the cosmos to the internal human mind and nature. The foundation of the

narrow sense, but also honesty, absence of fault, seriousness, being true to one’s true self,
being true to the nature of being, actuality, realness.”
31  “Zhangzi yulu, shang,” ZZJ, 1978, 312, 216 and “Zhangzi yulu, zhong,” ZZJ, 321.
32  “Henan Chengshi yishu,” j. 22 shang, ECJ, 290.
33  “Guan wu di sishi-san,” Huangji jingshi shu, 1965, j. 11 shang, and “Guan wu waipian,” ibid.,
j. 20 xia. Daocang, Taixuan bu, 23 ce, 422, 446.
116 Chapter 9

reasonableness of Shao Yong’s “nature” (xing), Zhou Dunyi’s “heart/mind”

(xin), Zhang Zai’s “knowledge” or “knowing” (zhi 知) and Cheng Yi’s “princi-
ple” (li) was derived from humanity’s original nature (benxing) or rationality
(lixing, literally the nature of having li or principle).34
At that time, their intellectual orientation and anxiety about rebuilding
social order spurred on these Song scholar-officials to what later scholars would
call their “inward turning” (neizhuan 内轉) or “inner transcendence” (neizai
chaoyue 内在超越) thinking. This mode of thinking provided the precise foun-
dation for the growth of Song Neo-Confucianism, the School of Principle.

1.4
In this thinking that revolves around the ideas of principle, three intercon-
nected key statements were “principle is one but its manifestations are many”
(li yi fen shu 理一分殊), “to investigate things and to understand principle to
the utmost” (gewu qiongli 格物窮理), and “to exhaust principle and human
nature to the utmost” (qiongli jinxing 窮理盡性).35
“Principle is one but its manifestations are many” simply means that the
things and affairs of the universe are complex, but its ultimate reason is very
simple. Ancient Chinese terms like “one/unity” (yi), “ultimate” ( ji), “great” (da),
and even “nothingness” (wu) all really have this significance. This idea may
actually be connected to Buddhism, especially to the Huayan School. When
Cheng Yi was asked his opinion of the Flower Garland Sûtra (Avatamsaka Sûtra,
Huayan Jing), he said it is a matter of “a myriad principles return to one prin-
ciple” (wan li guiyu yi li 萬理歸於一理). When asked further whether there was

34  For example, a later member of the Shao family [Shao Yong’s grandson], Shao Bo (?–1158),
explained the idea of “Xiantian Yixue, 先天易學” [which treats the Classic of Changes as
a metaphysical study of the original nature of being] in his Shao Shi wenjian houlu, j. 5
zhong, 40–41. He wrote that Shao Yong’s “Xiantian tu [chart of eight trigrams] is about
the message or methods of the mind”; “it regards the mind as the root foundation, and
its discussion on statecraft or governing the state is really not that important for Kangjie
(Shao Yong).”
35  “Principle is one but its manifestations are many,” is from Cheng Yi, Henan Chengshi cui-
yan, j. 1, 23–24, Er Cheng quanshu, SBBY, translated in Chan, SB, “To investigate things
in order to understand principle to the utmost does not require the investigation of all
things in the world….” is from Er Cheng yishu, as translated in De Bary, Sources, 696. “[The
sage] exhausted principles to the utmost and dealt thoroughly with human nature, and
in doing so arrived at the workings of fate.” is from “Shuo gua” (Explaining the Trigrams)
§1 of the Classic of Changes (Yijing) as translated in Richard John Lynn, ed. and trans-
lated, The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi,
1994, 120.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 117

any way to break away from this idea, he could only admit that “there is also no
way to prove it wrong.”36 The Song Confucians, however, had very many other
formulations concerning principle and affairs or things (shi 事)—for example,
“the one” and “the many” (duo), “the Way” and “concrete thing” (qi 器), “root”
(ben) and “branch” (mo), “general” or “universal” (gong 共), and “particular”
or “specific” (shu 殊), the “Principle of Heaven” (tianli) and “human desires”
(renyu), and so on. It is obvious, though, that Song Confucians made a clear
value distinction between principle and affairs or things. They wanted to exam-
ine principle and they hoped to grasp the “fundamental basis” (genben) of all
phenomena, not simply some concrete affairs or things or any commonplace
political or administrative system. Cheng Yi once rather proudly asserted that
“although my learning came from receiving instruction, the words ‘Principle of
Heaven’ were, nevertheless, grasped by my own understanding.” Because this
fundamental ultimate “Principle of Heaven” was the new resource for their
critiques, these scholar-officials could only maintain their sense of transcen-
dent confidence above everything under the banner of principle and the Way
(daoli).
On this point, however, they of course scrupulously separated their constant
search for “principle” from Buddhism’s endless pursuit of Shûnyatâ (kong).
They were all at pains to explain that the spiritual condition of “silence” ( jiran
寂然) and “absence of desires” when one experiences the truth as the Principle
of Heaven was a perfect fit for human nature and definitely not the same as
Buddhism’s “vast and empty tranquility” (kongkuo xuji 空闊虛寂) of a clear
mind. The final goal of their pursuits was a real, substantial principle and
their attitude toward this principle was one of “sincerity” (cheng). When they
approached or experienced this principle, their minds had to maintain the
same kind of “seriousness” ( jing 敬) they had toward truth. When this prin-
ciple was the guide for life in society, it could establish a meaningful order.
This was certainly very different from Buddhism.37 As Zhang Zai once put it,

36  
Henan Chengshi yishu, j. 18, ECJ, 195. Also see Henan Chengshi cuiyan, j. 1, ECJ, 1180. Song
Confucians seem to have regarded Zhang Zai’s narration even more highly. Cheng Yi said
that “the ‘Western Inscription’ (Ximing) illuminated and clarified the idea that ‘principle
is one but its manifestations are many.’” See “Da Yang Shi (1053–1135) lun ‘Ximing’ shu,”
Henan Chengshi wenji, j. 9, ECJ, 609. See De Bary, Sources, 683–684 for a complete transla-
tion of Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription.”
37  
Henan Chengshi cuiyan, j. 1 criticizes as follows: “Scholars thought that to get rid of knowl-
edge and opinions and abandon all worries was to grasp the Way. This amounts to “abol-
ishing wisdom and cleverness” and will definitely slip into a state of Chan meditation.”
Because in that state, there will be no firmly established meaning and value in their heart/
mind, and thus he believes that “this won’t do until there is a concentration [zhu 主] in
118 Chapter 9

“Confucians investigate principle to the utmost and therefore can follow their
nature. This constitutes the Way. Buddhists, on the other hand, do not know
how to investigate principle and arbitrarily consider [Emptiness, Shûnyatâ] as
the true nature. Consequently their theory cannot prevail.”38
Because “principle is one but its manifestations are many,” the Song
Confucians wanted “to investigate things and to understand principle to the
utmost.” Despite the fact that in weighing up thought and knowledge, they
were somewhat scornful of concrete knowledge, since their principle was
universally contained in all things and affairs, they accepted that the way to
experience and grasp principle was through observation, inference, reflection,
and analysis of various “material objects” (shiwu 事物). Zhang Zai said “often
observe material things, often understand principle to the utmost, and in that
way you can exhaust the nature of material things,”39 and Shao Yong said
that everyone could “with one mind observe a myriad minds, with one body
observe a myriad bodies, with one world observe a myriad worlds.”40 These
statements simply mean that one can understand the truth from the world of
everyday life and the numerous and complicated natural world in front of ones
eyes. To quote Cheng Yi’s formulation, “in front of our eyes are only material
things, and all material things have principle just as fire is hot and water is cold;
between rulers and ministers and fathers and sons there is always principle.”41
We should say that this intellectual tendency made Song Neo-Confucians
continue to maintain a high level of interest in “following the path of inquiry

one’s heart. Concentrating on heart means to concentrate with seriousness, and concen-
tration with seriousness in turn means to concentrate on the one (yi, principle or one’s
mind).” ECJ, 1191–1192.
38  Zhengmeng (Correcting Youthful Ignorance)—Zhongzheng pian di ba, ZZJ, 31. Translation
from Chan, SB, 515–516 with minor changes. See Henan Chengshi cuiyan, j. 1, section enti-
tled “The Buddhist pursuit of the Way (Dao) is like looking at the sky through a tube”
where he writes that “Buddhism only concentrates on things above without understand-
ing what happens in the surrounding environment,” and also that Buddhism “only strives
to understand the profound principle above without studying what is happening in soci-
ety below, and thus makes no connection between the root and the branches.” He is actu-
ally suggesting that the Buddhist search for truth is definitely not practicable in the social
order and the world of daily life. See Chan, SB, 563 for Cheng Yi’s opposition to Buddhist
“tranquility,” and also 785 (and 522, 547, 593, 264–65) for the difference between jing 敬
and gong 恭 “seriousness.”
39  “Zhangzi yulu shang,” ZZJ, p. 312.
40  “Guanwu pian di si-shi-er,” Huangji jingshi, j. 11 shang, Daozang, Taixuan bu, gui yi, di
23 ce, 421.
41  Henan Chengshi yishu, j. 19, ECJ, 247.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 119

and study” (dao wenxue 道問學), and shows that they did not devote all of
their mental effort and intelligence to “honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing
尊德性) It should also be pointed out that the psychological precondition for
the “investigation of things” was first “rectifying ones mind and making one’s
will sincere” (zhengxin chengyi 正心誠意), that is, raising morality to be the
ultimate goal of the “investigation of things.”42 For this reason it also embodied
the mode of thinking in which knowledge was transformed into morality, and
this caused knowledge to lose its independent sphere and significance.
It was precisely due to this latter psychological reason that the Song Neo-
Confucians made “to exhaust principle and human nature to the utmost”
(qiongli jinxing) the ultimate goal of learning. The phrase “to exhaust prin-
ciples to the utmost and deal thoroughly with human nature” comes from
the “Explaining the Trigrams” section in the Classic of Changes. The ancient
Chinese people often believed that if they could grasp one absolute truth
then they could resolve all of the questions of nature (wuli, the principle of
material things; the modern word for physics), society (zhengyi, justice) and
life (daode, morality). This sort of thinking was also echoed by Buddhism in
that the Tiantai and Huayan sects made many similar arguments. The differ-
ence was that in the interpretation of Song Neo-Confucians, the significance
of such thought gradually shifted from comprehensive coverage of the mate-
rial world of nature, social justice, and everyday morality toward innate inner
nature, moral self-correction, and self-conscious moral cultivation. At that, the
significance of “exhausting principle and human nature to the utmost” came
to be investigating and experiencing the principle of the myriad things and
events in order to give prominence to humanity’s original good nature. The
goal of “investigating things and understanding principle to the utmost” then
developed into an exploration or development of human nature. As Zhang Zai
interpreted this line from “Explaining the Trigrams,” “to exhaust principle and
nature to the utmost is already saying that nature is close to human nature;
having exhausted the principle of material things and also exhausted human
nature to the utmost, one can then reach destiny, and destiny is also said to
refer to oneself.”43 On this account the search for the meaning of principle
began to focus on inner ethics and morality; this was reportedly called “study-
ing to improve oneself” (wei ji zhi xue, 為己之學).

42  Zhengxin and chengyi come from the “Great Learning.” See Chan, SB, 86 for translations of
these terms and 84–94 for a complete translation.
43  “Hengqu Yi shuo, Shou gua,” ZZJ, 235.
120 Chapter 9

Ancient Chinese people believed that every person’s inner nature possessed
the self-conscious ability to establish the value of life. Although this sort of
self-conscious original nature was not diverse and multifaceted like the myriad
things of the cosmos so that people could grasp its existence through their
feelings, however, its significance could be made to stand out through people’s
reflexive understanding of their inner experience. People could also confirm
the reasonableness of the social order by giving prominence to this moral
origin. Through this process of “rectifying ones mind and making one’s will
sincere” to “regulating the state” and “bringing peace to All Under Heaven” as
pointed out in the “Great Learning,” people could complete the meaning their
lives. This was simply the meaning of “exhausting the principle of material
things and exhausting one’s nature to the utmost so as to understand one’s
destiny.”

1.5
The earliest usage of the term “Learning of the Way” (daoxue) for Neo-
Confucianism started during the qingli (1041–1049) and huangyou (1049–1054)
reign periods of the Northern Song. It indicated a change in the scholarly land-
scape and intellectual tendencies. The genuine completion or fulfillment of
the Neo-Confucian “Learning of the Way” or “School of Principle” (lixue) did
not occur, however, until the mid-eleventh century, after the separation of
the political and the cultural centers of China. Still the contents of the world
of knowledge, thought and belief of the scholars of that period of time were
very rich and complex. The intellectual interpretations and comments of men
like Shao Yong, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi and Sima Guang actually
contained many different views. It was simply that they had among them a
relatively similar thought process—a pursuit of the “principle” and the “Way”
that transcended everything else.
When we discussed Wei-Jin thought above, we noted that Confucian doc-
trines were quite weak when it came to thinking about “human nature and
the Way of Heaven.” This weakness betrayed a great inadequacy of Confucian
discourse on truth and arguments about human nature at the time that these
topics became an extremely active area for heretical ideas. Nevertheless, it was
precisely the Song Confucians’ reflections and reassessments of this area of
thought that became the starting point of the Song reconstruction and renewal
of Confucianism. After Han Yu and Li Ao, the thinking of Song Neo-Confucians
like Shao Yong, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi and others went beyond indi-
vidual morality and social order to a search for the fountainhead of all moral-
ity and order. They reinterpreted “human nature and the Way of Heaven” and
drew on some of the resources of Buddhism and the Daoist Religion to rebuild
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 121

a reasonable foundation for morality and order, and thus regained possession
of this lost intellectual domain.44
During this time, Song Neo-Confucians re-established an entire conceptual
system concerning the “Way,” “principle,” “material force” (qi 氣), “heart/mind,”
“human nature” and “feelings.”45 The core of this conceptual system was that
it transferred the foundation of reasonableness from “Heaven” to “Man” (ren,
human beings), made the “original nature” (benxing) of humanity the origin of
an axiomatic “goodness” (shan) and the foundation of a self-evident “Heaven,”
and re-established an absolute truth that linked together the natural world
(ziran), society and humanity. They demanded that every person should dem-
onstrate this kind of original nature and develop this kind of consciousness of
their nearness to truth. As the Song Neo-Confucians saw it, this conceptual sys-
tem was a comprehensive plan that encompassed humanity, society and the
cosmos.
The plan could be said to have at least four parts. First, to confirm every per-
son’s original nature, encourage people’s intentions to move toward goodness,
and allow their goodness to receive the support and affirmation of principle.
Second, to re-confirm the relationships between human beings by means of
this affirmation of the goodness of human nature that would then consti-
tute the foundation of social values, allow for society’s mutual identification
with these values, and bring about the re-establishment of social order. Third,
to connect these ideas about humanity and social values with the Principle
of Heaven to create a vast mutually supporting system. Fourth, to employ the
idea that “principle is one but its manifestations are many” to separate ulti-
mate truth from ordinary knowledge, employ the practice of “investigation of
things and understanding principle to the utmost” to regulate the acquisition

44  For example, Zhang Zai reinterpreted Zi Gong’s statement that “one cannot get to hear
(bu de er wen 不得而闻) [the Master’s] views on human nature and the Way of Heaven.”
(Lunyu, 5. 13, Lau, Analects, 78) He wrote that “one cannot get to hear” did not mean that
Confucius did not have an argument on the subject, but rather that one could not rely on
what the ears hear (er wen 耳闻) in terms of human nature and the Way of Heaven. He
went on to assert that the learning of his contemporary Confucians was already much
clearer and it not only “realized rituals in daily activities, but also made human nature
and the Way of Heaven visible in these activities. Someday it will surpass the teachings of
Mencius.” “Jingxue liku—xue da yuan shang,” ZZJ, 281. Cheng Yi also answered a student’s
question about this and asserted that the “human nature and the Way of Heaven” that
“one cannot get to hear [the Master’s] views on” could actually be “understood on ones
own, but could not be transmitted in words.” The statement certainly did not mean that
Confucius had not discussed this subject. “Henan Chengshi cuiyan,” j. 2 ECJ, 1252.
45  For qi as “material force,” see Chan, SB, 784.
122 Chapter 9

of knowledge and the path of thought, and to employ the exercise of “exhaust-
ing principle and fulfilling human nature to the utmost” to establish the orien-
tation of thought for inner transcendence—all to create a new foundation of
Confucian (that is, Neo-Confucian) thought. It was precisely at this point that
the direction of the later mainstream Chinese world of knowledge, thought
and belief and the Neo-Confucian strategies for the re-establishment of
social and intellectual order were revealed. A great many Song dynasty scholar-
officials also identified with that direction and those strategies.
Song Confucians were quite proud of their re-establishment of this tradi-
tional knowledge and intellectual order. Zhang Zai asserted that this was “to
establish a mind (moral mind or principle) for Heaven and Earth, to set up a
destiny (meaningful life) for human beings, to continue the lost teaching of the
past sages, and to build a great peace for ten thousand generations to come.”46
What he called “establishing a mind, a moral mind or principle, for Heaven
and Earth” symbolized the fact that the new Neo-Confucian explanation of
the cosmos would be based on a fresh ultimate foundation. The time and
space of Heaven and Earth would no longer be the ultimate origin of all reason-
ableness; it would have to receive internal confirmation or proof from “princi-
ple.” And “principle” was unarguable; it only required self-interpretation by the
“heart/mind” to confirm its reasonableness. What he called “setting up a des-
tiny, a meaningful life for human beings,” expressed the complete confidence
of the Neo-Confucians in their social responsibilities. They believed that re-
establishing an intellectual order based upon ethics and morality would allow
people to experience anew the value and meaning of life, mark off the bound-
ary between that and the uncultured and barbarous, and achieve a worthwhile
world of social life. What he called “continuing the lost teaching of the past
sages” seems to express their hopes for the re-establishment of the “tradition
of moral principle” (daotong). They believed that the learning of the ancient
sages from Confucius on had been repeatedly interrupted. Only now, because
they had re-established the authoritative truth of principle, the foundation of
social order, and the value and meaningfulness of life, was it possible for the
interrupted learning of the ancient sages to be fully developed and promoted.
Finally, “build a great peace for ten thousand generations to come” refers to the
ideal world that they hoped for. The usual political and economic strategies
could only temporarily enrich the country and strengthen the military and, in
the discourse of the ancient Chinese, bring about the “Way of the Hegemon”
(badao) that could establish a strong state and maintain a flourishing condi-
tion for a limited period of time. When “principle” was generally recognized as

46  “Jinsi lu shiyi,” ZZJ, 376.

From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 123

the foundation of civilization, however, it would bring about the “Kingly Way”
(wangdao) and extend widely to All Under Heaven to constitute the corner-
stone of eternal peace.

1.6
In the 1070s and 1080s, however, the situation in China was still one where the
“learning of the Way” and the “art of government” were two separate realms.
The trend of thought of the scholars discussed above was only a species of high-
minded moral idealism and a moderate form of conservatism that existed in the
non-governmental world of thought. Except for a short time during the yuan-
you reign period (1086–1094) when Sima Guang and others returned to office,
this Neo-Confucian thought that was later known as “Learning of the Way” or
“School (Learning) of Principle” really did not hold a high position in the world
of thought. Although it was very attractive to and a source of inspiration for
some scholars, it was not transformed into a political ideology because it never
had government support and never achieved the status of a kind of absolute
“truth.” In the world of contemporary politics, a very practical or pragmatic ori-
entation of thought continued to hold the leading position. From the reforms
of the qingli (1041–1049) reign period to the New Policies, or New Laws (radical
reforms, xinfa 新法) of the xining reign period (1068–1077), this form of practi-
cal thought gradually developed. Because it achieved rapid results, it became
the representative thought of that time, and it was also the mainstream form
of thought enjoying imperial support. The main characteristics of this form of
thought can be summarized as follows: emphasizing practical political tac-
tics; emphasizing the classic Rites of Zhou (Zhouli) that could be used as the
basis for political or governmental actions; advocating the discussion of profit
and desire; being partial toward economic strategies as between economics and
culture; advocating the strengthening of state (government) administration;
not hesitating to maintain the priority of imperial power; speaking in defense
of expedient hegemonic government (bazheng 霸政), and even going so far as
to admit the importance of legalism ( fazhi zhuyi 法制主義).47
Perhaps it was precisely this intellectual trend that made those power-
less scholar-officials employ idealism and conservatism to contend against
it. Those who were branded as the so called “first ones expressing different

47  Thus, as mentioned above, Emperor Shenzong was quite dissatisfied that “so many of
this generation of scholars do not study legal decrees,” and Wu Chong (1021–1080) also
wanted legal studies (lüxue 律學) to be made part of the official examination questions.
He criticized “gentry officials [for] being ashamed to study this field.” “Xuanju si,” Wenxian
tongkao, j. 31, 295.
124 Chapter 9

views at the beginning of the New Policies” simply referred to this group of
Neo-Confucian scholars.48 They had quite a strong sense of confidence and
believed that their way of thinking possessed a universalist concept of truth.
They believed that the approach of “the investigation of things and the exten-
sion of knowledge” and “exhausting principle and developing human nature
fully” of their Neo-Confucian “Learning of the Way” was not only a way of
learning but also the starting point for social behavior. The “art of ruling” and
“knowing how to govern the world and the state as well as all the families”
were regarded as only minor, inessential branches as opposed to the important
roots; at best, they were only the practical applications of knowledge.49 This
was because “knowing how to govern the world and the state as well as all the
families must be founded on one’s own self. There is no such thing as a person
who can govern the whole world and the state as well as all the families, but is
not able to conduct himself correctly.”50 On this account, the Neo-Confucians,
under the overall guidance of “principle,” scrutinized the moral legitimacy of
government actions without regard for the practical nature of its tactics, exam-
ined the quality of individual morality without regard for its social functions,
and frequently drew upon very severe idealism as a standard of evaluation for
the government and the individual. In short, this group of scholars employed
moral idealism and placed it above political pragmatism. They wanted to use
cultural conservatism to restrain excessively radical policies and employ the
gentry scholars’ intellectual authority and the power of public opinion to con-
trol the ever-expanding contemporary state and government. Since they only
commanded cultural authority without political power, all they could do was
to continue to advance their own form of critical idealism.51

48  SS, j. 427, 12717.

49  The cited Chinese phrase is zhi tianxia guojia 治天下國家 and is from the “Doctrine of
the Mean” article 21. CTP. James Legg’s translation is: “Knowing how to govern the king-
dom with all its states and families.”
50  “Henan Chengshi cuiyan,” j. 1, ECJ, 1197.
51  See “Jingxue liku—zongfa,” ZZJ, 259–260; Henan Chengshi yishu, j. 18, ECJ, 242. During
the yuanyou reign period, this group of scholars held political power for a short time.
Cheng Yi said that “nothing is more worrisome for our state than that those occupying
government positions do not know the importance of learning. If rulers do not know the
importance of learning, then they will not be able to know the great Way and the court
will not be able to obtain the way of good governance. Not knowing the Way, then superfi-
cial views can easily find an ear while words of moral principle will have a hard time doing
so.” “His emphasis on the priority of “learning” (xue) and the “Way” (Dao) over “ruling”
(zheng) and “laws” ( fa) was simply to defend the priority of the “tradition of moral prin-
ciple” (daotong) over the “tradition of political power” (zhitong). XZZTJCB, j. 397, 9676.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 125

During the period when the Neo-Confucian School of Principle was just
taking shape, it was always marginalized and only symbolized the idealistic
trend of thought of the scholar-official class. It was said that Shenzong once
asked Wang Anshi about the suitability of employing Sima Guang, but Wang
was firmly opposed to the idea. Wang Anshi believed that the way to handle
this group of scholars with their moral idealism and cultural conservatism
was resolutely to exclude them from political power. Only in this way could he
maintain his political mainstream position and carry forward his radical poli-
cies. Otherwise they might be very troublesome, using their cultural authority
to return to the mainstream and monopolizing the central discourse with their
version of universal truth. During this period when practical values controlled
all reforms, they could only be kept marginalized and unacknowledged.
In sum, in the 1070s and 1080s, the differences between Kaifeng (Bianliang)
and Luoyang, bureaucrats in and out of office, and practical policies and cul-
tural ideals brought about a division in the world of Chinese thought between
the “tradition of political power” (zhengtong) and the “tradition of moral prin-
ciple” (daotong), “teachers” (shi) and officials (li), and the political and cultural
centers that was unprecedented in Chinese history.

2 Continuation of Neo-Confucianism: The Zhu Xi-Lu Xiangshan

Debates and Their Surroundings

In 1175 (last year of the Southern Song qiandao reign period), through the intro-
duction of Lü Zuqian (1137–1181), Zhu Xi (1130–1200) met with the brothers Lu
Jiuling (1132–1180) and Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan, 1139–1193) at the Goose Lake
Temple on Mt. Qian in Xinzhou in Jiangxi. They discussed thought and learn-
ing; each one holding on to his own views, they parted unhappily in disagree-
ment. From then on, they strongly defended their different positions and their
disciples were also divided. As Huang Zongxi (1610–1695) wrote: “those who
modeled themselves on Zhu defamed Lu as a wild Chanist; those who modeled
themselves on Lu regarded Zhu as a vulgar scholar; the learning of the two
each grew into their own schools, as different as ice and charcoal.”52 The
debates between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan demonstrated the first clear split
in the seemingly unified Neo-Confucian School of Principle. From the point
of view of intellectual history, we could say that this also indicated that the
various different ways of thought within the School of Principle had also come

52  “Xiangshan xue-an,” Song-Yuan xue-an, j. 58.

126 Chapter 9

to maturity. Later on, this “maturity of various ways of thought” also provided
many more intellectual resources for diverse orientations.
These debates are known in Chinese intellectual history as the Meeting at
Goose Lake Temple (E hu zhi hui 鵝湖之會), sometimes called the Goose Lake
Temple Debates. They took place at a time a full century after the rise of the
Luoyang School of Principle in the Northern Song, nearly fifty years since
the demise of the Northern Song and the founding of the Southern Song, and
also about fifty years before the School of Principle broke out of its predica-
ment and became the mainstream political ideology.53 Strictly speaking, this
Meeting at Goose Lake Temple, that has regularly been presented as a major
event in Chinese intellectual history, was actually an affair involving only a
small group of individuals, and probably did not have very much influence on
contemporary social life. Still, it took place during a period when the School of
Principle was most vital. In that year, Zhu Xi was forty-six, the Lu brothers were
forty-four and thirty-seven, Lü Zuqian was thirty-nine, and another celebrated
scholar, Zhang Shi (1133–1180), who did not attend, was forty-three. They were
all living in an age of rich and vigorous thought when discussions of the uni-
verse and human nature were very free and full of imagination.

2.1
Before going on, let me survey the history of this century. In 1126, the first year
of Song Emperor Qinzong (Zhao Huan, 1100–1156, r. 1126–1127)’s jingkang reign
period, the great army of the Jurchen Jin state marched south and brought the
Northern Song to an end the following year. Thus 1127 marks the beginning
of the Southern Song dynasty. Early in the Southern Song, both the court and
the scholars were preoccupied with three things: how to deal with a powerful
enemy and maintain their regime; the necessity of validating the legitimacy of
imperial power by means of rites and ceremonies after the fall of the Central
Plains; and, in the confused state of government affairs both in and outside
China, the necessary reinstatement of a practical-minded bureaucracy to
reorganize and consolidate an ordered state administrative structure. Under
such circumstances and for a very long period of time, impractical discussions
of human nature and principle were temporarily set aside, and high-minded
moral idealism was also out of favor. Having experienced the bitter pain of

53  Although the party proscription of the qingyuan reign period (1195–1201) was lifted in
Song Ningzong (Zhao Kuo, 1168–1224, r. 1194–1201)’s time, it was not until Emperor Lizong
(Zhao Yun, 1205–1264, r. 1224–1264) began to employ Neo-Confucians and accord great
importance to Zhu Xi’s Sishu jizhu that the School of Principle really entered mainstream
politics. See “Ningzong ji san,” SS, j. 39, 754; j. 41, and “Lizong ji yi,” 789.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 127

dynastic destruction and devastation, political pragmatism occupied the main-

stream. Assuring the safety of the regime (dynasty) was an absolutely sufficient
reason, during this special period of time, for people to pay most attention to
things like political action, funding the military, people’s feelings of obedience
or opposition, political success or failure and the installation of a legal sys-
tem. In 1128, the second year of the jianyan reign period (1127–1131), a scholar
sent a memorial to the emperor stating that “now there are three things that
should be discussed by officials in designated departments: military affairs,
budget and expenses, and the efficiency of the officialdom.”54 Even the father
and son, Hu Anguo (1074–1138) and Hu Yin (1098–1156), who had supported
the Learning of Principle, criticized the atmosphere in which “scholars regard
using empty talk as making them superior, but they are actually unsuitable
for practical use; they view managing practical affairs as vulgar conduct and
say that such conduct is not worthy of mention.”55 The significance of thought
and culture was really not so important during this special period of time, and
idealism about morality seemed to be a very long way from practical reality.
Nevertheless, from the xining and yuanfeng reign periods (1068–1085) on, the
flourishing moral idealism and cultural conservatism of the scholar-officials
from Luoyang continued to prosper among the gentry class, and the practice
of discussing human nature and principle did not decline due to the changes of
the times. This intellectual fashion, especially the learning of the Cheng broth-
ers, began to spread to many areas due to the propagation of Xie Liangzuo
(1050–1103), You Zuo (1053–1123), Yang Shi (1053–1135) and Lü Dalin (ca. 1042–
ca. 1090) as well as the expositions of the early Southern Song scholars Yin
Chun or Yin Tun (1071–1143), Zhu Zhen (?–1138), and Lin Guangchao (1114–1178)
as well as Hu Anguo and his sons Hu Yin and Hu Hong (1105–1161).56 After the
party proscriptions were lifted in the Southern Song, even the emperors also

54  Li Xinchuan (1167–1240), Jianyan yilai xinian yaolu, 1988, j. 14, 298.
55  Ibid., j. 27, 533–545 contains the complete text of Hu Yin’s memorial of jianyan year 3 (1129);
the text contained in “Rulin wu-Hu Yin zhuan,” SS, j. 435, 12918 is only an abbreviation.
56  “Xulu,” Song-Yuan xue-an,” 3, says “Those who introduced the Luo Learning to the Xi-an
Shaanxi area were the three Lü brothers, Lü Dajun (1031–1082), Lü Dazhong (1020–c. 1100),
and Lü Dalin (c.1042–c.1090); its way to Hubei and Hunan areas was through the teaching
of Xie Liangzuo (1050–1103) from Shangcai (Henan) in the southern part of the Hubei
area; its spread in the Sichuan area was through Cai Shi and Ma Juan; its spread in the
Zhejiang area was through the four Yongjia scholars Zhou Xingji (1067–1125), Liu Anjie
(f. 12th century), Xu Jingheng (1072–1128) and Bao Ruoyu (f. 11th–12th century), and its
spread in the Jiangsu area was through Wang Xinbo (f. 12th century).”
128 Chapter 9

began to take an interest in ideas of moral idealism and cultural conservatism.57

In 1136, however, when the Chief Minister Zhao Ding (1085–1147), who favored
nature and principle studies (xinglixue) resigned, Chen Gongfu (ca. 1081–ca.
1150) urged the emperor to prohibit the “Luoyang Studies” (Yichuan xue) of
Cheng Yi. He said that the mutual recognition of scholars and their formation
of a community could threaten imperial power. This strategic proposal obvi-
ously fit in very well with the emperor’s needs, and he immediately signaled
his approval. The repeated protestations of men like Hu Anguo and Lü Zhi
(1092–1135) in defense of Cheng Yi’s transmission of the ideas of Confucius and
Mencius and interpretations of Confucianism seem to have been quite useless.
At that time almost all the scholars who were oriented toward the School of
Principle could only remain silent while ideas about nature and principle were
marginalized. This situation lasted for several decades until the time of Zhu
Xi, Zhang Shi, Lü Zuqian, Lu Xiangshan (Jiuyuan), and Lu Jiuling (1132–1180).
It should be pointed out, however, that during these decades the number
of scholars who were interested in the study of nature and principle increased
rather than decreased. Even though this high-minded moral idealism and strict
cultural conservatism did not find much room for development in the politi-
cal arena, such an intellectual atmosphere still continued to proliferate among
an increasing number of private academies and communities of local scholar-
officials. Due to the growing ease of printing, the development of transporta-
tion and communication, and the custom of holding intellectual discussions,
this trend of thought was often able to attract new adherents through the
exchange of letters, discussion meetings, and lectures.58 Such thought was even
more welcomed by scholars because it could be studied by relying on textual
exegesis of the classics, could be propagated using those classic texts, could be

57  “Daoxue er,” SS, j. 428, 12735: “After Emperor Gaozong crossed the Yangzi [and settled
down in the south], he then summoned Yang Shi to establish the sequential order for
officials to attend the court. He also summoned Hu Anguo to assume the positions of
Supervising Secretary and Secretariat Drafter and made both Fan Chong (?–1141) and Zhu
Zhen (1072–1138) the Crown Prince’s teachers.” Emperor Gaozong of the Southern Song
(1107–1187, r. 1127–1162) was not really opposed to the learning of Cheng Hao [called the
learning of Yiluo because Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi usually taught in the areas between
the Yi and Luo rivers in Luoyang, Henan]. Gaozong actually accepted Fan Chong’s sugges-
tion in the fifth year of the haoxing reign period (1131–1162) to summon Cheng Yi’s disciple
Yi Chun (1071–1142) to serve as a member of the Hanlin Academy. See Jianyan yilai xinian
yaolu, 1988, j. 14, 297, j. 17, 352, j. 105, 1712, j. 109, 1774.
58  The degree to which Zhu Xi, Lu Xiangshan, Lü Zuqian, Zhang Shi, Chen Liang, and so on
were able to assemble together, exchange letters and deliver lectures at that time is quite
rare in Chinese history.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 129

expounded by means of a lecture and discussion format, and, even more, could
rely on the background of the classics to criticize the present situation.
A group of such scholars became the leaders of a new intellectual world;
they had great reputations and very many followers. For example, Zhang Shi
in the Yuelu Academy (Changsha, Hunan), Zhu Xi in the White Deer Grotto
Academy (Jiujiang, Jiangxi), and Yang Jian (1141–1226) in the Lake Tai Academy
(Wuxi, Jiangsu) all had considerably great influence. Their influence had three
main aspects. First, they raised the cultural awareness and moral standards of
the intellectual stratum by means of the classic texts and their rational argu-
ments. Second, they involved themselves in politics, discussed “the right way
of governing the state” (guoshi, 國是), and put forth their opinions on national,
religious and local issues. And third, they criticized the Imperial University
and education in the official schools as well as the officials in the schools in the
prefectures and counties, demonstrating the local gentry’s idealistic position
on education.59
This last point is particularly important. According to statistics from the
Southern Song, there were two hundred and fifty private academies in Jiangxi,
Hunan, Zhejiang and Fujian, not to mention the number of private village
schools (xiangshu 鄉塾). If every one of these academies had a hundred stu-
dents and teachers, that would make at least twenty or thirty thousand people.
In these places where scholars gathered together, they discussed the Principle
of Heaven and human desires, the sequence of principle and vital essence or
material force (li qi xianhou 理氣先後), the investigation of things and the
extension of knowledge, the dispute between rightness and profit (yi li zhi
bian 義利之辯), and so on. In the course of these discussions, these scholars
gradually cultivated a sense of lofty personal integrity and strict standards of
criticism.60
This current of thought, however, was always resisted by the political
bureaucracy. We will recall that in 1136, Chen Gongfu called for the prohibi-
tion of Luoyang Neo-Confucianism or the “Luoyang Studies” of Cheng Yi.

59  See Zhu Xi, “Xuexiao gongju siyi,”, ZWGWJ, j. 69, 27a–28a; also see Zhu Xi’s critique of offi-
cial schools in “Song Li Bojian xu,” Wengong wenji, j. 75, 27b. He said that “although there
are school officials throughout the empire, those who study under them are only after
what is currently popular and intending to use it for seeking a government position.” As
for the Way of “cultivating one’s self” (xiushen), “ordering one’s family” (qijia), and “regu-
lating the state” (zhiguo) in order to “bring peace to All Under Heaven” (ping tianxia), they
have never even heard of it.”
60  See Liu Zijian’s discussion of Zhu Xi in “Buhe shiyi he shenghuo zuofeng,” chapter 5 of his
Songmo suowei daotong de chengli, in Liang Song shi yanjiu huibian, 1987, 268–273. Also
see Zhu Hanmin, “Nan Song lixue yu shuyuan jiaoyu,” Zhongguo zhexue 16 (1993), 110–119.
130 Chapter 9

From the shaoxing reign period (1131–1162) of Emperor Gaozong (r. 1127–1162),
to the shaoxi era (1190–1195) of Emperor Guangzong (r. 1198–1194), these schol-
ars were repeatedly attacked by various officials at the imperial court. These
attacks culminated in the well-known Qingyuan Party Proscription of 1195 to
1201 that began with Zhao Ruyu (1140–1196) being forced out of office in 1195.
Their enemies claimed that this intellectual trend was a threat to the political
power holders and that their trend of thought was only empty talk harmful
to the state (wuguo 誤國).61
The Southern Song Neo-Confucian School of Principle still continued to
develop even in this context. It spread rapidly and became customary among
the scholar class while always remaining in a marginal position under pressure
from the political mainstream. In the intellectual circles of popular society,
it had already gained the power of public opinion and established a certain
amount of public space, but in the center of political power and practical polit-
ical activity it never obtained any discursive rights.

2.2
Zhu Xi was without doubt the most important figure among all of the Southern
Song Neo-Confucian scholars, both his contemporaries and later generations.
Many scholars have already written to point out his important significance in
the history of Neo-Confucianism: the successful development of the “study of
principle and material force” (li qi zhi xue 理氣之學) and of “form and number”
(xiang shu zhi xue 象數之學), the establishment of the system of Song Neo-
Confucianism, and so on. In our reconsideration of the importance of Zhu Xi
in intellectual history today, however, I think we should particularly discuss the
following three aspects.
First, the establishment of the “tradition of moral principle” or the “succes-
sion of the Way” (daotong). This so-called “succession” or “transmission” was
originally an imaginary historical genealogy that consisted of the thought of
certain individuals from the past carefully selected and given prominence by
some thinkers to form a sort of suggestive “history.” This sort of history was
then given sacred significance to express the reasonableness and eternal
nature of some kinds of thought; thus it constituted a so-called “succession” or
“transmission” (tong 統). Giving such prominence to this “transmission” meant
that the principles emanating from this system of thought should be venerated
as universal truth, and that those who describe this historical train of thought
also possess the authority to interpret the truth.

61  “Lin Li zhuan,” SS, j. 394, 12029.

From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 131

After Han Yu put forth the “succession of the Way” or the “tradition of moral
principle” and used it to symbolize the entirely different nature of the tradi-
tion of Confucian truth compared to the Daoist and Buddhist heresies, in the
Northern Song it was then vigorously propagated by Cheng Hao and Cheng
Yi until this “succession” or “transmission” began to be universally accepted
as a historical commonplace among the scholar class. In the establishment
of this “tradition of moral principle,” there were, however, still two problems
that had to be solved. One was to enable Mencius to be genuinely accepted
as the expounder of Confucian truth who formed the connecting link with
the past tradition, and to remove those comparatively impure figures such as
Yang Xiong (53 BCE–18 CE), Wang Tong (584–617), and so on. The second was
to explain that after Confucius and Mencius, the tradition of Confucian truth
was then passed down through the line of the “Luoyang Studies” of the Cheng
brothers. In his White Deer Grotto Academy, Zhu Xi once asked his students
why people criticized Mencius. He also told them that Confucianism flour-
ished greatly in the Song dynasty; officially there was the learning of Ouyang
Xiu, Wang Anshi, and the Su brothers, and in society there was the learning
of Hu Yuan and the Cheng brothers.” Who, then,” Zhu asked, “had the correct
doctrine?”62 Obviously, the “succession of the Way” still needed to be verified
and manifested again.
In this respect, there were two aspects to Zhu Xi’s most important work.
First, he edited the Records of the Origins of the School of the Chengs (Yi-Luo
yuanyuan lu) and reconstructed the history of the transmission of the Way.
This work tracing the origin and transmission of the School of Principle begins
with Zhou Dunyi and then in succession discusses Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, Shao
Yong, the Zhang Zai brothers, the disciples of the Cheng brothers like the three
Lü (Dazhong, Dajun, Dalin), Xia Liangzuo, You Zuo, Yang Shi, Yin Tun and Hu
Anguo of the early Southern Song, and finally the disciples of the School of
Principle who were close to Zhu Xi himself. He superimposed the transmis-
sion of the truth and its propagation from teacher to disciple and described
the dissemination of thought from one generation to the next as one historical
genealogy. This both established the boundaries of the truth and made clear
the surrounding heresies. And this made it possible for later scholars to have
clear standards of selection, imitation, acceptance, and rejection when search-
ing for the truth.63

62  ZWGWJ, j. 74, “Bailu shutang cewen,” 12b–13a.

63  Thus the tiyao of the SKQS zongmu, j. 57, 519, “Yi-Luo yuanyuan lu,” says that “the men of
Song’s discussions of sub-schools and distinctions of factions in the School of Principle
begin with this book.” The SS followed even more the ideas of this book in its “Daoxue
132 Chapter 9

Second, with Lü Zuqian, he edited Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu).

In this book, quotations of Zhou Dunyi, Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, and Zhang Zai
are brought together according to the ideas of the “rectification of the mind/
heart” (zhengxin), “cultivating one’s self” (xiushen), “ordering one’s fam-
ily” (qijia), and “regulating the state” (zhiguo) in order to “bring peace to All
Under Heaven” (ping tianxia). They are divided into fourteen juan with the
following titles: “On the Substance of the Way,” “The Essentials of Learning,”
“The Investigation of Things and the Investigation of Principle to the Utmost,”
“Preserving One’s Mind and Nourishing One’s Nature,” “Correcting Mistakes,
Improving Oneself, Self-Discipline, and Returning to Propriety,” “The Way
to Regulate the Family,” “On Serving or Not Serving in the Government,
Advancing or Withdrawing, and Accepting or Declining Office,” “On the
Principle of Governing the State and Bringing Peace to the World,” “Systems and
Institutions,” “Methods of Handling Affairs,” “The Way to Teach,” “Correcting
Mistakes and the Defects of the Mind,” “Sifting the Heterodoxical Doctrines,”
and “On the Dispositions of Sages and Worthies.”64 According to Wing-tsit
Chan, the compilation of Reflections on Things at Hand was also based on Zhu
Xi’s own philosophy and his idea of the transmission of the Way (daotong)
because it offers a more rigorous description of that transmission and continu-
ation than the Records of the Origins of the School of the Chengs. Not only does
it place Sima Guang, who was good at politics and history and was doubting
Mencius and honoring Yang Xiong, outside of the daotong transmission, but
it also places Shao Yong, whose thought has strong Daoist implications, out-
side the system of Confucian orthodoxy. It establishes an intellectual geneal-
ogy for the School of Principle using Zhou Dunyi as its beginning, the Cheng
brothers as its orthodoxy, and Zhang Zai as a supplement to it.65

zhuan,” and thus firmly established a so-called “transmission of the Way” (daotong) in the
historical record.
64  Zhu Xi offered a rather detailed explanation of the general meaning of the Jinsi lu table
of contents in ZYL, j. 105, 2629. Wing-tsit Chan, tr., Reflections on Things at Hand, 1967, is a
complete annotated translation of the Jinsi lu. We use Chan’s translations of the table of
contents.
65  This genealogy of the transmission of the Way was quite quickly accepted by very many
people. In the ninth year (1216) of jiading reign period (1208–1224), Yuan Xie (1144–1224)
wrote in his Lianxi xiansheng citang ji that “the tradition of the Way gradually became
profound and subtle, and its transmission continued like an unending thread.” (see
Jiezhai ji, j. 9, CSJC edition, 132.) Also, we again find that Li Xinchuan (1167–1244) did not
compile the Daoming lu in ten juan in 1239 until after the emperor in 1224 recognized
that “Mr. Yichuan (Cheng Yi) continued Cheng Hao’s teaching and became the Confucian
master model of the Song dynasty.” Li Xinchuan reaffirmed this genealogy through a
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 133

Next, Zhu Xi re-established the “classics.” In order to move the interpreta-

tion of the Confucian classics in the direction of School of Principle thinking,
he had to re-determine the order of importance of the classic texts. This was a
very important strategic question. According to Zhu Xi’s thinking, Reflections
on Things at Hand was a stepping stone leading to the Four Books, and the
Four Books were really a stepping stone leading to ultimate truth.66 So it
was even more important to re-confirm the status of the Analects (Lunyu),
the Mencius (Mengzi), the “Great Learning” (Daxue) and the “Doctrine of the
Mean” (Zhongyong) as the preeminent and most fundamental Confucian clas-
sics, and to interpret their ideas on the basis of School of Principle concepts. In
this light, Zhu Xi’s most important contributions to later Chinese intellectual
history are not only that he established the “transmission of the Way” but also
that he produced a new classic text dealing with this daotong—the Collected
Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu zhangju jizhu).
Among the Confucian classic texts, the Analects, Mencius, “Great Learning”
and the “Doctrine of the Mean” had begun to be highly regarded starting in the
middle period of the Tang dynasty. Zhu Xi’s contribution was that he brought
these four texts together and employed them to configure a system of clas-
sic texts that supported Neo-Confucian School of Principle thinking. Then he
made these four classics into the textual basis for the genealogy of his “trans-
mission of the Way,” providing textual support for the history of this transmis-
sion from Confucius to Zisi to Mencius. Finally, through his annotations, both
concise and precise, and his elucidations in the Collected Commentaries on the
Four Books, he connected together and harmonized the thinking of the School
of Principle.
From extant sources, we know that very early on Zhu Xi began to pay atten-
tion to various scholars’ interpretations over time of the Analects, Mencius, the
“Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean.” In reading the works of
the older generation of School of Principle scholars, he spent a great deal of time
on and paid particular attention to their discussions of the meaning and sig-
nificance of these four classic texts. In his Collected Commentaries, he not only
judiciously selected many older commentaries but also cited the explanations
and elaborations of many earlier School of Principle scholars. He himself also
made many new interpretations that provided both very clear explanations of
the four classical texts and a summation of School of Principle thinking, con-
necting it from the “Principle of Heaven” (tianli) to the “ten thousand things”

historical narrative and collecting and storing their writings in the preface to his Daoming
lu, see Xuxiu SKQS, ce 517, 507–508.
66  ZYL, j. 105, 2629.
134 Chapter 9

(wanwu, the whole world). For all of these reasons, several centuries later, the
Collected Commentaries on the Four Books were designated by the government
as the official texts for the imperial bureaucratic examinations; it became the
most influential ancient Chinese text transmitting the thought of the Neo-
Confucian School of Principle.
Third and finally, by dint of systematic efforts at concretization and pop-
ularization, Zhu Xi gradually brought those moral and ethical principles
that originally belonged to upper class scholars down into the everyday life
of the common people. Of all ancient Chinese thinkers, Zhu Xi was probably
the one who most consciously popularized his thought, applied it to daily life
and created a practical system. Perhaps it was due to his long years of teach-
ing that he paid so much attention to how to apply School of Principle ideas
to daily life. As he investigated these abstract and profoundly abstruse prin-
ciples, he repeatedly emphasized their realization in daily life as well as the
expression of those principles in people’s everyday thought and behavior. He
really did not agree with the idea of the absolute inwardness of truth; he rather
attended to the implementation of “principle” in daily life. On this account,
he paid close attention to the rules and ceremonies of the common people’s
everyday life. He once made a rather painstaking revision of the Lü Family
Community Compact (Lüshi xiangyue). He also paid a great deal of attention
to the early teaching of beginning students and wrote a preface to Cheng and
Dong’s Principles of Learning (Cheng Dong er xiansheng xueze) edited by Cheng
Duanmeng (d. 1191) and Dong Zhu (1152–?).
Among works of this kind, Zhu Xi’s most important and historically most
influential work was his Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals (Zhuzi jiali). He believed that
although the ritual order and norms of “capping, marriage, funerals, sacrifices,
and rituals” of “families and clans” were only outward ceremonies, these cer-
emonies could still point to the contents that implicitly included those con-
ceptual values such as “title and status” (mingfen 名分) and “love and respect”
(aijing 愛敬). Thus he revised ancient Chinese ceremonial etiquette in hopes
that with the support of these external ceremonies people would be made
to “be careful about their titles and status and value love and respect” as well
as develop “the Way of cultivating one’s self, ordering one’s family, carefully
attending to the funeral rites of one’s parents, and sacrificing respectfully to
one’s ancestors.”67 This work contained a chapter on “general principles of rit-
ual” and a system of the four important ceremonies—“the capping ceremony,”
“weddings,” “funerals,” “sacrificial rites”—that made up the ethical standards

67  “Jiali xu,” ZWGWJ, j. 75, 18 A-B. In 1174 Zhu Xi also edited Gujin jiajili. See Wang Maohong,
ed., Zhu Xi nianpu, 1998, j. 1, 62.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 135

for families and clans. In compiling it, Zhu Xi’s principle was to follow as much
as possible the popular customs of his day to revise the ancient ritual system
and its accoutrements that were very difficult for his contemporaries to prac-
tice. He also established common offering halls (or ancestral shrines, citang
祠堂) for scholars and common people according to the realignment of con-
temporary social hierarchy. He also employed the method of Sima Guang’s
Letters and Etiquette (Shuyi 書儀) to revise the Cheng brothers’ entrenched
ideas about ancient rites.
Professor Patricia Ebrey has well described the significance of Zhu Xi’s
Family Rituals:

Zhu Xi drew on Confucian ritual scholarship going back to the classics

but also incorporated many modifications and adjustments. His goal was
to encourage performance of more authentically Confucian forms of the
rituals and thus combat the popularity of customs he considered vul-
gar or superstitious…. [Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals] is a militantly Confucian
book, designed to promote the practice of rituals modeled on revered
Confucian sources and to combat the practice of Buddhist rites or other
rites that could not be reinterpreted as Confucian. Its author, Zhu Xi, was
committed to working for the strengthening of Confucian values and
practices.68

It was precisely Zhu Xi’s efforts to popularize Confucian ideas and bring them
into daily life that guaranteed that the principles of the Neo-Confucian School
of Principle would genuinely penetrate Chinese society.69

2.3
From the point of view of later intellectual history, however, the School of
Principle’s tendency to search for “inward transcendence” (neizai chaoyue)
exerted a very great influence. In their exploration of knowledge, they often
broke away from the concrete phenomenal world, not limiting themselves to
concrete people and things, but always trying to find a fundamental “Way” or
“Principle.” They sought an ultimate explanation that could “bind [their ideas]

68  Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Chu Hsi’s Family Rituals, 1991, ix, xv.
69  If we examine what various local gazetteers (difang zhi) record concerning local customs,
we will discover that all the way to the beginning of the twentieth century what the Zhuzi
jiali had to say about the rules for wedding and funeral ceremonies was still most com-
monly employed by local gentry families.
136 Chapter 9

together in one single thread.”70 And on this account, they came to be known
as the so-called School of Principle and Learning of the Way.
This was quite different from traditional Confucianism being “unable to
hear the Master’s views on human nature and the Way of Heaven” (xing yu
tiandao 性與天道).71 The orientation of Song Neo-Confucianism was not sim-
ply satisfied with the construction of standards and norms for government or
state order (guojia zhixu) and daily life, but sought even more the universality
and absolute nature of those standards and that order, and closely questioned
their ultimate support. On this account, they had to re-establish a metaphysical
(xing er shang, 形而上) foundation for those standards and the order that tran-
scended concrete objects, affairs and phenomena. When Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian
were writing their Reflections on Things at Hand, in spite of their aversion to
discussing such questions as the fundamental principles of the universe, they
still had no alternative but to begin their work with a chapter entitled “On the
Substance of the Way” (daoti 道體) that discusses just those issues.
In School of Principle discourse, this fundamental element that they called
“Principle,” “Way,” and “Great Ultimate” involved first of all a metaphysical
world that transcended (existed before) the phenomenal world of things and
events. Just as Zhu Xi wrote in his “Answer to Lu Zijing (that is, Lu Jiuyuan or
Lu Xiangshan)” (Da Lu Zijing), “anything that has a form and a shape is a ves-
sel or an instrument and the principle that was employed to make this thing
is the Dao or Way.”72 Secondly, it was a principle prior to and giving birth to
everything in the world (the ten thousand things and events, wanshi wanwu
萬事萬物) and constituted the regulations that formed a connecting thread
from the beginning to the end of everything in the world. As Zhu Xi said,
“Before Heaven and Earth existed, there was after all only principle.”73 Thirdly,
it was absolute, unconditional and pure. As Zhu Xi said, “there is only one
Great Ultimate, and it has no comparison” … “it is simply the principle of the
highest good.”74 Finally, “before it was activated” (weifa 未發), it existed in a
void and tranquil state that was nevertheless pregnant with the extremes of
both activity and quietude, and this Yin and Yang of motion and stillness con-

70   Lunyu, 4. 15: “The Master said, ‘Can! There is one single thread binding my way together.’”
Lau, Analects, 74.
71   Lunyu, 5.12: “Zigong said, ‘One can get to hear about the Master’s accomplishments,
but one cannot get to hear his views on human nature and the Way of Heaven.’ ” Lau,
Analects, 78.
72  ZWGWJ, j. 36, 14A.
73  ZYL, 1, 1. Translations from Chan, SB, 635.
74  ZYL, 100, 2549. Translations adapted from Chan, SB, 638 and 640.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 137

tained all of the ten thousand things and events of the cosmos.” After it was
“activated” (yifa 已發), however, when “principle” appeared in the phenom-
enal world (that exists after physical form, xing er xia 形而下), it would appear
in the “material force” (qi 氣, energy or life force) that constituted the basic ele-
ment of everything in the cosmos. Although “principle” is an absolute “unity”
(yi, one), “material force” is divided into yinqi 陰氣 and yangqi 陽 氣 that gave
birth to the “substance” (zhi 質) of the Five Phases (wuxing 五行), and then the
Yin and Yang combined with the Five Phases gave birth to the ten thousand
things (the cosmos).75 In this way a unified “principle” had a multitude of dif-
ferent appearances among the ten thousand things and events of the cosmos.
Here Zhu Xi once again cites the Northern Song Neo-Confucian dictum of
Cheng Yi: “the principle is one, but its manifestations are many” (liyi fenshu).76
In his Collected Commentaries on the “Great Learning,” he also said that “the
things of this world all have their principles …”77 It was precisely because “prin-
ciple” exists everywhere that people had to observe and experience every thing
and event, that is, follow Zhu Xi’s theory of “the investigation of things and
extension of knowledge” (gewu zhizhi 格物致知) or “fathoming the principle
of any thing or affair”78 As regards human beings who are born endowed with
“material force,” because “material force” is divided into clear and turbid types
(qingqi 清氣 and zhuoqi 濁氣), before it “begins to operate” (weifa) it does not
differ very much, but after it has “begun to operate” (yifa) it is completely differ-
ent. When the mind “has not begun to operate,” its “nature” (xing) is in accord
with “principle” (li); but after the mind “begins to operate,” it gives rise to vari-
ous thoughts and feelings (emotions) and then people begin to have different
kinds of thoughts and behavior. On this account, a mind set of “seriousness”
( jing 敬) must be employed to carry out self-reflection and self-restraint on
the mind, and this is what is known as the “rectification of the mind” (zhengxin
正心) and “sincerity of thought” (chengyi 誠意). It is precisely these two ways
of investigating knowledge and thought that embody Zhu Xi’s intellectual
pursuit and moral practice. Of necessity, on the one hand, he tended toward
the intellectualism of “following the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue),

75  ZYL, 1, 9.
76  ZYL, Ch. 1, 2; cf. Chan, SB, 639.
77  See De Bary, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 729 and 721–731 for extensive quotations from Zhu Xi’s
Daxue zhangju.
78   Daxue zhangju in Sishu zhangju jizhu, 1983: “’The extension of knowing lies in the investi-
gation of things’ means that if we wish to extend our knowing, it consists in fathoming the
principle of any thing or affair we come into contact with …” Translation from De Bary,
Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 729.
138 Chapter 9

and on the other hand, he tended toward the moral stance of “honoring the
moral nature” (zun dexing).
Zhu Xi was fairly consistent in his view of “the investigation of things and
extension of knowledge.” He believed that “from the ultimate non-being
and being to the minuscule one tree, one grass, and one insect, each has its own
principle.”79 And so he not only read extensively but also paid considerable
attention to various phenomena of society and nature. In his every day teach-
ing, he often required his students to explore various forms of new knowledge,
and in his conversations with his disciples, he repeatedly stressed both read-
ing and observing material things. He believed that as a scholar one should
follow this style of study combining the pursuit of knowledge and moral culti-
vation and rising from “following the path of inquiry and study” into the realm
of “honoring the moral nature.” Owing to his increasingly intense debates with
Lu Xiangshan (Lu Jiuyuan) and others, Zhu Xi’s position gradually became
more partial to the intellectualism of “following the path of inquiry and study.”
This could perhaps be attributed to the fact that in such intense debates, peo-
ple could not help but overstate their positions.80
Zhu Xi was really always quite alert to the relationship between “follow-
ing the path of inquiry and study” and “honoring the moral nature.” On the
one hand, he criticized the scholar class for “suffering from the harmful way
of studying the current Classics required by the examination system,” that is
for the erroneous practice of placing knowledge from the Confucian classics
and knowledge about the natural world into two separate sections, and also
regarding knowledge from Confucian texts as only something to be recited by
rote memory having nothing at all to do with the restraint of the mind.81 On
the other hand, he took precautions to avoid the shortcoming of being influ-
enced by the general atmosphere of Daoism and Buddhism that was single-
mindedly devoted to constraining the mind and regarded all forms knowledge
as superfluous burdens. He sought with great difficulty to find a balance
between knowledge and thought. He agreed with and endorsed the so-called
“transmission of the mind of the three sages” (sansheng chuanxin 三聖傳心)
of the “Counsels of the Great Yu” in the Book of History (Shangshu). There it
says: “The human mind is precarious (i. e., liable to make mistakes), the mind
of the Way (the moral mind) is subtle (i. e., the mind that follows the Way).

79  ZYL, 296.

80  For more on Zhu Xi’s intellectualism and morality, see Yü Ying-shih, “Morality and
Knowledge in Zhu Xi’s Philosophical System,” in Wing-tsit Chan, ed., Chu Hsi and Neo-
Confucianism, 1986, 228–254.
81  See ZYL, 10, 175.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 139

Have absolute refinement and singleness of mind. Hold fast to the Mean” (ren
xin wei wei, Dao xin wei wei, wei jing wei yi, yun zhi jue zong 人心惟危，道心
惟微，惟精惟一，允执厥中).82 Zhu Xi believe this because he asked people
to employ a mind set of “seriousness” ( jing ) by means of the “investigation
of things” (gewu) and the “exercise of seriousness” ( jujing 居敬) to guide their
own minds and gradually move from the chaos of sensual desires toward the
purification of their temperament (nature of the mind, xinxing 心性), from
the “human mind” (renxin 人心) to the “mind of the Way” (daoxin 道心).
In Zhu Xi’s thinking, Lu Jiuyuan’s (Lu Xiangshan) direct and simplistic idea
that “the mind is principle (xin ji li 心即理) was the same as Southern Chan
Buddhism. For Zhu, this was undoubtedly only a one-sided affirmation of the
“human mind” that ignored any warning about the “sensual desires” (qingyu
情欲) the mind randomly harbors; it lacked any period of effort (gongfu 功夫)
to restrain the mind. If “sensual desires” are indulgently unrestrained, they will
be just like Wild or Crazy Chan Buddhism (kuangchan 狂禪) and then “evil”
(e 惡) desires will be out of control.

2.4
Zhu Xi’s thinking had already more or less taken shape before the 1175 Goose
Lake Temple Debate with Lu Jiuling and Lu Jiuyuan, and after those debates,
he continuously revised and enriched the content and systematic nature
of his ideas. There was really no lack of differing opinions at the time. Not
only between Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, and not only between
those who scrupulously abided by the traditional study of the classics
and those who believed in the study of nature and principle. Even among
those who equally believed in the School of Principle, there were also vari-
ous different orientations and trends of thought. For this reason, at the same
time that he was establishing the daotong and arranging the classics, through-
out his life Zhu Xi strenuously rejected Buddhism and Daoism, and what he
called “mixed learning” (zaxue 雜學). In addition to religious Buddhism and
the Daoist religion, he carried out severe critiques of many former doctrines.
During the process of developing his knowledge and thought, Zhu Xi always
found himself in the unfavorable situation of doing battle on all sides with his
greatest contemporary theoretical threats coming from two sources, one prag-
matic and one transcendent.
One of these challenges came from utilitarian and pragmatic trends of
thought within the School of Principle itself. Utilitarian and pragmatic think-
ing always has a sort of natural reasonableness in any age, but especially in

82  Translated by Wing-tsit Chan in his Chu Hsi: Life and Thought, 1987, 66–67.
140 Chapter 9

an age in which the state and society are in relatively difficult circumstances.
At such times, people are more likely to demand practical and clearly visible
results from ideas, knowledge and beliefs; they are not very likely to accept
the sort of transcendent thinking and idealism that belong in the purely spiri-
tual realm. Take Lü Zuqian and Chen Liang for example.83 They may both have
felt that merely discussing transcendent ideas could really not save the state
(nation) nor establish order. And so they may have given more consideration
to historical experience, realistic politics and practical actions. Just as Huang
Zongxi wrote, they “taught people to understand things through doing them.
When managing affairs, as long as every step is realistic and whatever is said
is also definitely realized in action, then people will certainly comprehend the
principle of these affairs and be able to develop various ways to accomplish
their tasks.”84 But Zhu Xi always remained wary of those excessively utilitar-
ian tactics known as “saving the drowning.”85 He said that this sort of thinking
“followed both rightness and interest and employed both the way of kings and
the way of the hegemon.”86 He believed that this common practice of empha-
sizing realism and practical results could damage the transcendent nature of
truth and the independent nature of criticism. What Zhu Xi truly wanted to
accomplish was to establish an “orthodox Way (zhengdao 正道) based on the
three bonds and five constant virtues (sangang wuchang 三綱五常)” and to fill
every scholar’s mind with an “authentic Confucian” (chunru 醇儒) spirit. On
the basis of such a lofty idealism, they could preserve an independent schol-
arly stance, and, in addition to making suggestions and offering political tac-
tics, they could still possess the power to criticize the government.87
Chen Liang was quiet dissatisfied with what he regarded as Zhu Xi’s exces-
sively transcendent and lofty theories. In a letter in response to Zhu Xi, Chen
politely but forcefully criticized his ideas. He wrote that if in an era when the ten-
dency of the times is changing, one only insists on thinking highly of “employ-
ing the Way to rule All Under Heaven” (yi Dao zhi tianxia 以道治天下), criticizes

83  Of course, we should also include Xue Jixuan (1134–1173), Chen Fuliang (1141–1203), Ye
Shi (1150–1223), and so on. Although these scholars were somewhat different from Chen
Liang, they all still generally tended to pursue practical efficacy. See “Genzhai xue-an,”
Song Yuan xue-an, j. 52. According to Zhu Xi, Lü Zuqian possessed the good qualities of
both trends of thought. See ibid. 51.
84  “Longchuan xue-an,” Song Yuan xue-an, j. 56. Also see Wu Jiang, “Nan Song Zhedong xue-
shu lungao,” Zhongguo wenhua 8 (1993), 32–39.
85  “Saving the drowning” (jiuni 救溺) is from Mengzi 6A.17, Lau, Mencius, 124–125. Chen
Liang’s response also alludes to this passage.
86  “Da Chen shu si,” one of “Da Chen shu shi-er,” Zhu Wengong wenji, j. 36, 25a.
87  “Ji Chen Tongfu,” and “Da Chen Tongfu,” ZWGWJ, j. 36, 20B, 22A, 25A.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 141

the Han and the Tang dynasties for combining “the ways of the kings and the
hegemons” along with the practical expedients for “saving the drowning,” this
would amount to making the path of the “Learning of the Way” too narrow.
He believed that constantly pursuing the purity of the Principle of Heaven
was actually quite impractically making people aim too high. Even worse, it
amounted to regarding the Way as something that only the ancient sages can
possess. And that was the same as claiming that the Way is not really universal
and everlasting. As a result, Chen claimed, the Way that originally belonged
to everybody would be turned into a “hidden treasure” monopolized by a few
Confucian scholars. This kind of intellectual monopoly would insure that these
scholars who believed that they possessed intellectual authority would always
maintain a higher status than the rest of society.88
It may be that Chen Liang did not understand Zhu Xi’s thinking very well.
At that time scholars could not control politics on the basis of culture. They
could only rely on knowledge to criticize politics. On that account, merely
advocating utility and pragmatism would not only be unable to provide schol-
ars with the power to criticize freely but would very possibly cause them to lose
any space for criticism and willingly give up their already very narrow criti-
cal stance in the name of politics, state (government) and emperor. Since the
members of the School of Principle were always marginalized in terms of polit-
ical power, they would most likely be inclined to using the “tradition of moral
principle” (daotong) to restrain the “tradition of political power” (zhitong) and
to rely on transcendent truth to limit real power. In a letter to a friend, Zhu Xi
once explained why he definitely wanted to “put humanity and rightness (righ-
teousness) first, and not consider utility as our the most urgent priority.”89 He
was not really saying that utility was not important, but he was emphasizing a
seemingly abstract “principle,” and it was actually for establishing a legitimate
reason that would transcend political power and help carry on criticism and
supervision of the government. It would seem, however, that Chen Liang was
never able to understand the profound significance of this position.90
An even more extreme and powerful challenge came from Lu Jiuyuan
(Lu Xiangshan) who strongly advocated a theory of inner transcendence.
Compared to Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan was more deeply influenced by Buddhism,
especially Chan Buddhism. He was also much more intense in his pursuit

88  Chen Liang ji (zengding ben), j. 28, 340, 347, 352: “You jiachen qiu (yu Zhu Xi) shu,” “You
yisi chun (yu Zhu Xi) shu zhi yi,” “You yisi qiu shu.”
89  “Song Zhang Zhonglong xu,” Zhu Wengong wenji, j. 75, 16a.
90  On the polemics between Chen Liang and Zhu Xi, see Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian
Confucianism: Ch’en Liang’s Challenge to Chu Hsi, 1982.
142 Chapter 9

of a transcendent realm. In his view, man’s “original mind” (benxin 本心)

was simply the “Principle of Heaven” (tianli). And so, a scholar only had to
grasp his pure “human mind” (renxin) and it would already have become the
“mind of the Way” (daoxin). He believed that traditional Confucianism’s sepa-
ration of the “Principle of Heaven” and “human desires” and Zhu Xi’s emphasis
on the difference between the “human mind” and the “mind of the Way” were
both highly problematic.91 For Lu, the mind was simply the universe and it
included the two poles of good and evil; that is to say every possibility was
contained in the mind. The goal of human cultivation and the ultimate mean-
ing of their existence lay only in the inward nurture of the mind. For these
reasons, he believed that the direction of study and learning should be look-
ing inward and not seeking outward; Zhu Xi’s theory of “the investigation of
things and extension of knowledge” could not help being excessively verbose
and confusing.
Thus, once when he answered a student’s question: “what is the investiga-
tion of things?,” Lu replied: “Study the principles of things (yanjiu wuli).” The
student went further and asked him: “There are so many things in the world.
How can one study all of them?” Then Lu told him: “‘All things are already
complete in oneself’ (quoting Mencius 7A.4). It is only necessary to understand
principle (zhiyao mingli 只要明理)” and you can master everything.92 In this
vein, he further said that the ideas in the classics are not really that important
because the entire truth is contained in Mencius’ admonition to “exert [one’s]
mind to the utmost.” That is, to understand fully and experience the mind that
connects “man” (ren, the human) and “Heaven.”93 He regarded his method as
much more expeditious and uncomplicated than getting tangled up in the
knowledge of the classics, and so he mocked Zhu Xi’s learning and approach as
excessively verbose and confusing. He also criticized Zhu Xi for “not enjoying

91  “Yulu shang,” Lu Jiuyuan ji (hereafter LJYJ), j. 34, 395, and “Yulu xia,” j. 35, 463, j. 35: “There
are good and evil sides to people just like there are these two sides in Heaven…. This view
is from the “Book of Music” not from the words of the sages.” Also j. 35, 475: “It is highly
problematic to say that the Principle of Heaven is separate from human desires.”
92  Dialog with Li Bomian translated in Chan, SB, 584, from Xiangshan quanji, 35:7b–8a. “Yulu
xia,” LJYJ, j. 35: “If in our study we know the fundamentals, then all the Six Classics are my
footnotes.” Translated in Chan, SB, 580, from Xiangshan quanji, 34:1b.
93  “Yulu shang,” LJYJ, j. 34, 395. Mengzi 7A:1 states that “he who exerts his mind to the utmost
knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven (Nature)” ( Jin qi xin zhe,
zhi qi xing ye. Zhi qi xing, ze zhi tian yi 盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣)
Translated in Chan, SB, 585.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 143

the big world, but opting for occupying a small trail and a small road; not aim-
ing at being a big man, but choosing to act as a small-minded man.”94
This is just the way Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan) ridiculed Zhu Xi at the Goose
Lake meeting. Lu’s sort of thinking often scorned study and the search for
knowledge and valued reflexive examination of the mind, neglecting the sig-
nificance of the classics and emphasizing subjective understanding. In 1175, Lu
wrote the following two lines of poetry:

Work that is simple and easy will in the end be lasting and great,
Understanding that is devoted to isolated details will end up in aimless
drifting.95

He was thus putting “honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing) ahead of “fol-
lowing the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue).
At the time, Lu Jiuyuan was really not that confident. Later on he may also
have realized that he was being quite extreme, but in order to emphasize his
position, he still wanted to persist in his view that “if one does not know how
to honor his moral nature, how can he talk about following the path of study
and inquiry.”96
It was very difficult for anyone to refute those who pushed ideas to the point
of extreme idealism and universalism. In terms of the general orientation of
members of the School of Principle, they all agreed that spiritual improvement
and spiritual transcendence were more important than anything else. On the
defensive, Zhu Xi could only question the validity of Lu Xiangshan’s theories
in general terms. First, he raised doubts about the origin of Lu’s theories and
suggested that Lu’s ideas had very strong Buddhist and Daoist overtones. Next,
Zhu argued that Lu’s practical thinking was shallow and contrived and pointed
out that he was too contemptuous of knowledge and learning. Finally, in his

94  “Yulu xia,” LJYJ, j. 35, 444, 449.

95  Chan, SB, 583, Xiangshan quanji, 34: 24a–b.
96  Chan, SB, 582, Xiangshan quanji, 34: 4b–5a. “Yulu shang,” LJYJ, j. 34, 400. In his Songxue,
Jia Fengzhen believes that this line of thought came from Cheng Yi and “then passed on
to Xie Liangzuo and Wang Zhenze, but it was only that Xiangshan was dissatisfied with
Cheng Yi’s teaching, and thus often rejected it,” 115–116.
 Ying-shih Yü notes this passage in note 3 of “Morality and Knowledge in Zhu Xi’s
Philosophical System,” in Wing-tsit Chan, ed., Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, 1986, 228–
254: See Lu Xiangshan’s “nianpu” 年譜 in the Xiangshan xiansheng quanji, SBCK, Ch. 36,
321; and Yulu 語錄 in Ch. 34, 261.
 See Lu Xiangshan’s “nianpu” in the Xiangshan xiansheng quanji, SBCK, Ch. 36, 321;
and Yulu in Ch. 34, 261.
144 Chapter 9

letters and conversations with his friends and disciples, Zhu Xi spoke about
his profound anxiety. He felt that several of Lu’s ideas were quite dangerous:
regarding the “mind” as the origin of everything; equating the “human heart”
with the “Principle of Heaven”; rejecting the pursuit of knowledge through
study and the cultivation of self-restraint. The result of these ideas, Zhu felt,
might be to elevate the ordinary worldly “human heart” to the same transcen-
dent level as the “heart of the Way,” and remove the restraint that the “Principle
of Heaven” should have over the “human desires” that necessarily exist in the
mind of man. In the final analysis, such ideas could lead to the complete col-
lapse of the defensive wall of ethics and morality because both goodness and
evil could justify their reasonableness and rationality by relying on this “mind.”
In later intellectual history, we can see that Zhu’s views were unfortunately
very accurate. Later on, the orientation of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529)
and his successors’ Neo-Confucian School of Mind (xinxue 心學) quite simply
undermined the moral ideals that they themselves repeatedly sought.
The debate between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan was only a difference of opinion
within the School of Principle, and their thinking was not that far apart on
many issues. They were both investigating the ultimate meaning and funda-
mental principle of the universe, society and human life, advocating a kind
of lofty moral idealism and strict cultural conservatism, and standing on the
margin of political power hoping to employ the “tradition of moral principle”
to restrain the “tradition of political power.” Even their ideas concerning study
and learning, about which they most differed and debated, were not really
so very far apart. Although Lu Jiuyuan always privileged the significance of
the “mind,” Zhu Xi also attached a similarly great importance to the mind.
Although Lu Jiuyuan continually criticized Zhu Xi’s system for being disor-
ganized or incoherent, Zhu Xi actually very much emphasized the search for
meaning and criticized culling phrases and passages without understanding
their meaning. The so-called “reading books and appreciating the principle
[embodied in them]” is just what it implies here.97 Perhaps at the time their
disagreements were not as great as they were later imagined to be. The exces-
sive differences between Zhu and Lu were gradually magnified in later polem-
ics and only became so extreme when later generations read through and
selected from the historically available intellectual sources.

2.5 Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan’s Influence

Having mentioned intellectual sources, we should point out in passing the
influence that Zhu Xi’s thought and works had on later intellectual history.

97  “Da Lü Ziyue,” ZWGWJ, j. 47, 5A.

From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 145

First, Zhu Xi linked together the “Way” (dao) or “principle” (li), the ultimate
origin of everything with “concrete things” (qi) and “material force” (qi) of the
phenomenal world. He also placed the Way and principle in a transcendent
position, and asked people to hold fast to the Way, forget material things and
search for the “Principle of Heaven” while downplaying “human desires.” Owing
to all of this there existed a great deal of tension between the two extremes of
the metaphysical and the physical realms. Although this tension caused peo-
ple to be somewhat vigilant about their mind and spirit, it also caused them to
exist permanently in the midst of contradiction.
Second, Zhu Xi investigated both questions of ethics in the social realm and
questions about material things in the natural world under the category of a
common “principle.” As a result it was very easy for him to practice a habitual
kind of thinking. That is, when confronting questions concerning the natural
world, he would investigate ethical rationality. When confronting questions in
the area of society, however, he would investigate the rigorous nature of the
material world. Thus it came about, in Zhu Xi’s thought, that knowledge of
the natural world and knowledge of society were too closely connected. Later
on this sort of connection would further lead to a great rupture. Because these
two realms lacked their own respective independence, when new knowledge
coming from a different civilizational system attacked each of them individu-
ally, it would create a chain reaction between them. Once new questions in the
realm of the natural world came to influence the old traditions of social ethics,
or new questions of social ethics came to influence old interpretations of the
natural world, then the old traditions and the old interpretations would be
completely rejected or collapse at the same time.
Third, Zhu Xi’s theory of “the investigation of things and extension of knowl-
edge” assigned everything in the category of knowledge to the self-cultivation of
human character and the spiritual realm. This resulted in the strengthening
of a particular element of ancient Chinese tradition, namely that the ultimate
significance of learning is “to improve one’s self” (weiji 為己).98 This perhaps
particularly influenced Chinese scholars in their disdain for knowledge of
phenomena in the natural or physical world, the world that exists after physi-
cal form (xing er xia 形而下) and their very high regard for knowledge of the
world of moral ideals, a metaphysical world of “what exists before physical
form (xing er shang 形而上).”99

98  Lunyu 14.24: “The Master said, ‘Men of antiquity studied to improve themselves 為己;
men of today study to impress others.’” Lau, Analects, 128.
99  See Chan, SB, 786–787 for an explanation of xing er shang and xing er xia.
146 Chapter 9

We should also examine the influence that Lu Jiuyuan’s thought and works
had on later intellectual history.
Lu Jiuyuan’s first importance for later generations was that in the world
of the Neo-Confucian Learning of Principle he gave particular prominence
to the significance of the “mind.” The original intention of elevating “mind” to
such a high status was naturally to emphasize the self-consciousness, autono-
mous, and self-regulating nature of man’s moral rationality. But as Zhu Xi had
observed, implicit in this was another tendency similar to that of Southern
Chan after it changed from the stance of Northern Chan. That is when people
particularly affirm the autonomy and self-regulation of the “mind,” and the
human “mind” also cannot possibly always aim at pure moral rationality but
rather is often dominated by “feelings” and “desires,” then would the mind, in
its ceaseless extension, not come to recognize tacitly the reasonableness of
“human desires?” Although in Lu Jiuyuan’s time this sort of thinking did not
appear, when later generations emphasized individuality, it may have actually
served as an intellectual resource.
Lu Jiuyuan’s second importance for later generations was that when he
emphasized a personal experience of truth that transcended all individual
concrete knowledge, he inadvertently affirmed the existence of a kind of uni-
versal truth. That is what meant when he asserted that

Sages appeared in the Eastern Seas and they shared this same mind, and
they shared this same principle (ci xin tong ye, ci li tong ye 此心同也, 此
理同也). Sages appeared in the Western Seas, and they shared this same
mind, and they shared this same principle…. No where in the world will
this mind and this principle be different (ci xin ci li, mo bu tong ye 此心此
理,莫不同也).100

This reasoning affirming that universal truth can transcend time and place
inadvertently undermined the authority of history and power, the classics
and elites, ethnic nationality and tradition to explain and interpret the truth. And
this caused the ability of the state (guojia), ethnic nationality (minzu), and tra-
dition to restrict the influence coming from other civilizations to vanish. As a
result, knowledge, thought and belief were then situated in an open and plu-
ralistic world, and any reason for refusing factual truth had been discredited.
Although in Lu Jiuyuan’s time this kind of thinking certainly did not lead to
the collapse of the absolute meaning and significance of traditional Chinese

100  “Nianpu,” LJYJ, j. 36, 483. Also see De Bary, Sources, 716 for similar passage from Xiangshan
quanji.
From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I 147

ideas of truth, when in the future “China” genuinely encountered “the world”
and “tradition” genuinely encountered “modernity,” this idea of one mind
might possibly become a genuine intellectual resource leading to the accep-
tance of new knowledge. And this would cause the Chinese intellectual world
to experience a shocking crisis. Of course, all this is something to be taken up
later.
At that time, though, Lu Jiuyuan’s ideas did not exert any particularly great
influence, much less than Zhu Xi’s line of thinking. Even Zhu Xi’s ideas did
not actually become the mainstream intellectual discourse either. Under great
political repression, in the final analysis it always remained marginalized. This
was true despite the fact that their contemporaries already acknowledged the
importance of the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi, Lü Zuqian, and so on
for pointing out the transmission of the moral Way (daotong) of Confucius,
Yan Hui, Zengzi and Mencius, and for establishing the position of the “Great
Learning,” the “Doctrine of the Mean,” and other classics.101 Despite the fact
that the influence of the Confucian Learning of Principle was gradually grow-
ing due to the increasing numbers of the gentry class, the development of
the means of dissemination of writings, the opening up of clan education,
and the steady establishment of space for a common discourse, throughout
the Song, political repression always pushed it into a marginal position.
During the Qingyuan Party Proscription of 1195 to 1201, Zhu Xi, the only
remaining School of Principle scholar still alive, was already sixty-six, Lu
Jiuyuan had been dead for two years, Lü Zuqian, who had mediated between
Zhu and Lu had been dead for fourteen years, another Neo-Confucian, Zhang
Shi, who was equally as famous as Zhu Xi, had also been dead for fifteen years,
and it was already twenty years since the Goose Lake debates.
This restrictive situation persisted for over a decade. In 1209 (year four of
the jiading era), the restrictions on the School of Principle slowly began to
lessen. In 1220, the court conferred posthumous titles on Zhou Dunyi, Cheng
Hao and Cheng Yi, and the most celebrated members of the Northern and
Southern Song School of Principle genealogy were one by one granted post-
humous titles. This was a symbol that the ban on School of Principle thought
was completely lifted and that the genealogy of the School of Principle was
now officially recognized. It still did not so smoothly enter the center of power,
however. It was almost half a century after the Qingyuan Party Proscription,
in the first year of the chunyou reign period (1241), that Emperor Lizong (Zhao
Yun 趙昀, 1205–1264, r. 1224–1264) issued an order in his own hand authorizing
Zhang Zai, Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi to receive sacrifices

101  Ye Shi, “Tong-an xian Zhu xiansheng citang ji,” Shuixin wenji, j. 10, in Ye Shi ji, 167.
148 Chapter 9

in the Confucian Temple. It was only when their names were placed on the
list to receive these sacrifices, that the “succession and tradition of the moral
way” (daotong) was finally granted a legitimate place under the “tradition of
the power” (zhengtong).
At this point the history of the Song Neo-Confucianism School of Principle
finally underwent a great transformation. I have frequently reflected on the
problematic nature of the changes that occurred during this period of his-
tory. The School of Principle was originally an intellectual doctrine employed
by the gentry class to resist political authority by means of cultural authority;
it relied on transcendental thinking to withstand worldly tendencies, and it
was a richly creative revolutionary way of thinking. Once it entered into the
official ideology and served as the content of the official bureaucratic exami-
nations, it would be reproduced by later scholars who cherished various sorts
of worldly desires. At that point, its original nature would be steadily distorted.
Nevertheless, we have to admit that it was precisely because this originally
purely ideational form of thought came to be supported by its position as
constituting the examination authority and benefiting official careers that it
was able to become a set of concepts in general use and enter into the world
of daily life. Furthermore, it was precisely because it came to be regarded as
correct and unalterable knowledge, like the principles of Heaven and Earth
themselves, and was duplicated and circulated everywhere that it became the
most popular way of thinking and direction of learning among the scholarly
world. And on this account, it actually altered both the mainstream and the
leitmotif of Chinese culture while at the same time creating the landscape of
the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief for the next eight hundred
years.
 Chapter 10

From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II

1 State and Scholars Support the Expansion of Culture and Establish

the Uniformity of Ethics in Everyday Life in the Song Dynasty

In the middle of the eleventh century during the reign of Emperor Renzong
(Zhao Zhen 趙禎, 1010–1063, r. 1022–1063), with the support of Xia Song (985–
1051), the government used its administrative power to order more than 1,980
shaman (shiwu 師巫) households to “change professions, return to agricul-
ture, and to practice acupuncture and medicine.” All of their paraphernalia,
including spirit images (shenxiang 神像), talismans ( fulu 符箓), spirit robes
(shenshan 神衫), magic staffs (shenzhang 神杖), soul headbands (hunjin 魂巾)
and soul caps (hunmao 魂帽), were also ordered destroyed or confiscated.1 Of
course the government had issued such prohibition orders more than once.
General prohibitions of shamans, witches, and unorthodox and unacceptable
cults in order to improve the ethics of everyday life and moral order through
the exercise of political power had always received the support of emperors
and the central government. Ancient governments’ resistance to “unaccept-
able cults” and “shamanistic customs” usually took the form of establishing
schools to raise the educational standards.
In the same manner during Renzong’s reign, Fan Zhongyan (989–1052) rec-
ommended the establishment of new schools. Many of the newly established
schools not only transmitted knowledge but also even more widely dissemi-
nated “civilization” (wenming) as the content of education.2 From the records
of various extant Song dynasty gazetteers, we can see that after the jingyou
reign period (1034–1038) schools really began to be universalized. The state
revised its previous policy of engaging celebrated Confucian scholars to teach
in these schools and began to appoint government officials as teachers. This
strategy of having “officials serve as teachers” (yi li wei shi 以吏為師) further
brought the top-down activity to promote civilization into government admin-
istration and also greatly accelerated its progress.

1  Xia Song, “Hongzhou qing duan xianwu,” Song wenjian, j. 43, 652.
2  “Zhoujun shuyuan,” Hong Mai, Rongzhai sanbi, j. 5, in Rongzhai suibi, 1993, 477.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_005

150 Chapter 10

This collaborative effort by officialdom and the gentry to promote the

broadening of civilization through the twin methods of strict prohibition and
educational persuasion continued for several centuries from the Northern
through the Southern Song dynasties. The government continuously issued
imperial orders and enacted laws forbidding temples for worshiping unorth-
odox gods (yinci 淫祠), improper cults (sacrifices not acceptable to ritual
norms, yinci 淫祀), and “congregations of men and women from dusk to dawn
(yeju xiaosan 夜聚曉散).” They also forbade the old custom of drowning new-
born babies known as haozi (薅子, weeding out), the use of ceremonial ban-
ners and weapons (yizhang 儀仗) in sacrifices to spirits, and self-punishing
religious practices such as burning the head or arms, stabbing to cause bleed-
ing, breaking the fingers, and so on. The gentry also continued to run schools,
put into effect various regulations and ceremonies of etiquette, promote har-
monious relations within clans, and encourage a climate of respect for the
elderly and filial piety toward parents. Due to all of these actions, a quite rapid
and widespread process of advancing civilization occurred during the Song
dynasty—from the cities expanding to the villages, from the central region
radiating out to the peripheral areas, and from the elite scholarly class dis-
seminating down to the lower stratum of the general population. Following
this process of promotion, social life experienced a transformation. To put it in
ordinary terms, society was moving in the direction of a higher level of civiliza-
tion. Because the influence on society of the intellectual stratum responsible
for interpreting culture was increasing, the spread of knowledge had become
extremely easy due to the art of printing, and the convenience of travel was
making the distance between the cities and the countryside increasingly
shorter, the advance of civilization during the Song dynasty seems to have
increased at a hitherto unprecedented pace of acceleration.
The expansion of civilization from the cities to the countryside, the exten-
sion of a moral and rational order of life from the top to the bottom of society,
and the shift from external to internal acknowledgement of social rules com-
bined to develop a pattern of everyday life customs. This may possibly have
been the soil from which the Song dynasty School of Principle grew, and also
the basis on which it was accepted by the Song scholar-official class as their
ethical and moral doctrine. It was also the result of its progressively entering
deeply into the world of everyday life due to its standardization and secular-
ization. In any case, this expansion of civilization reconfigured the uniform
nature of the ethics of everyday life for the Han Chinese after the Song dynasty.
The resulting landscape of everyday social life was seemingly very much differ-
ent from that of China in the Tang dynasty and earlier, it would also seem that
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 151

Chinese society, thought and culture had genuinely undergone a profound

change.3

1.1
As noted above, the banning of temples worshipping officially unacceptable
gods and improper sacrifices did not begin with the Song dynasty; starting in
the Wei-Jin era (265–557), successive governments had issued rather strict pro-
hibitions against such practices. Many officials also carried out fierce crack-
downs against these cult activities all the way to the Tang dynasty. For example,
Di Renjie (630–700) of the High Tang and Li Deyu (787–850) of the Mid-Tang
both suppressed similar popular beliefs.4 These severe measures were sym-
bolic of the way the government employed its political power to advance civi-
lization and to establish or strengthen social order.
When dynasties were still stable and prosperous, the emperors and the
nobility were usually not very anxious to outlaw temples worshipping officially
unacceptable gods and improper sacrifices. They could tolerate the existence
of such abnormal sacrifices and spirits (or gods, shenling) as providing quaintly
interesting and exotic spectacles. When the authority of the state (govern-
ment) and social order were in great danger, however, these illegal sacrificial
activities came to be seen as damaging to social order. At such times, these
sacrificial ceremonies originally fabricated by the populace were regarded as a
real challenge to the political power of the state.
During the Song dynasty, there was a great deal of government promotion of
civilization that steadily penetrated some relatively remote and marginal areas.
For example, in Yongzhou (modern Nanning in Guangxi) at the beginning of
the Northern Song dynasty, Fan Min (936–981) promoted medical treatment
of illness to reduce the prevalence of shamanistic practices; in Lingnan (south
China, including Guangdong and Guangxi), the emperor commissioned offi-
cials to forbid superstition and encourage education; in Wenzhou (in modern
Zhejiang) shamans were even put to death by cutting them in half in order to
put a total end to shamanistic beliefs. In Xuzhou (in modern Jiangsu) at the
same time some forty-five people, including the criminal wizard Li Xu, were also
punished; in several prefectures in Xichuan (in modern Sichuan), white-robed

3  The differences between the Tang and Song dynasties is a topic that has been repeatedly
discussed, but very many of these discussions have been carried out from the point of view
of the history of social development and concentrated their attention on things like social
structure and economic organization. This is clearly inadequate.
4  “Di Renjie zhuan,” JTS, j. 89,” and “Li Deyu zhuan,” XTS, j. 180, 5330.
152 Chapter 10

shamans were even more strictly prohibited; a magistrate named Li Weiqing,

immediately on taking office in Fuling (near the modern Chongqing region),
had the highest ranking shaman brought in and whipped to demonstrate that
shamans did not possess any magical powers, and to encourage the people to
abandon their beliefs in the spirits and to put their faith in medicine instead.
Around the same time, the court also adjusted the name list of gods and
spirits in the legally sanctioned sacrifices. At the beginning of the Song
dynasty, Emperor Taizong removed from the list the famous Qin general Bai Qi
(?–258 BCE) and general Wang Sengbian (d. 555) of the Liang, both of whom
had received sacrifices in the Tang dynasty. Bai was removed because he was
too cruel and Wang because his morality was suspect. Next he issued an edict
removing the names of twenty-two people, including three from the Warring
States period: the notable political and military reformer Wu Qi (440–381
BCE), the famous military strategist Sun Bin (d. 316 BCE), and the general Lian
Po (?–?), because they were faulty in their morality or achievements or had
physical defects (e. g., Sun Bin had been punished by face-tattooing and was
rendered crippled by having his kneecaps removed). The same edict elevated
Guan Zhong (c. 720–645 BCE), the celebrated political advisor to Duke Huan
of Qin, to an important position in the sacrificial ranks.5 These changes in
the lists of temple sacrifices expressed the court’s official position. Because the
sages and worthies who received sacrifices were granted legitimacy thereby,
these were “official sacrifices” (zhengsi 正祀); they were set up to furnish ideal
examples for the living, and so any rise or fall in the lists had ethical and moral
significance. The center sent down orders forbidding sacrifices to various spir-
its whose names were not on the official lists with the intention of conveying
moral and ethical standards through official rejection of those spirits. This also
indicated the control of the center over the local, the official over the popular,
the mainstream over the marginal, and the integration of secular life through
political power.
A very large number of gods and spirits were worshiped in the Song dynasty.
There were two categories of worship in non-religious temples. The First
involved temple sacrifices to mountains, rivers, local gods of the land, and the
Dragon King. They can be said to embody changes of reverence for the natu-
ral world. The second involved commemorative temple sacrifices to historical
emperors, meritorious ministers, celebrated generals, filial sons, female mar-
tyrs (who died preserving their honor or chastity), and village worthies. These

5  See XZZTJCB, j. 4 qiande yuannian (late in 963), 92–94; SHYJG, 16 ce, li 16, 686. We have to
point out that this reform was repealed during the qingli reign period (1041–1042). See “Li zhi,”
SS, j. 1058.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 153

two categories of temple were officially recognized by the government. There

were, however, still many varieties of unofficial popular worship. And on this
account, from the Northern Song to the Southern Song both the central gov-
ernment and local officials continued to make great efforts to eliminate these
so-called “temples for worshipping unorthodox gods” and “improper cults” in
order to monopolize the power to offer sacrifices to the gods or spirits.6
It was precisely this promotion by government power that contributed to the
dissemination and expansion of the concept of the nation or the state (guojia
guannian) and the propagation of mainstream civilization. The dismissal and
replacement of those gods and spirits whose morality was suspect reflected
a critique of such behavior not in accord with proper ethics and morality.
That a few supernatural beings (guishen 鬼神) and even common people who
could serve as moral exemplars were placed into a new canon of sacrificial
ceremonies demonstrated an affirmation of the reasonableness of some sorts
of ethical behavior. That those sacrifices that were not in the canon of sac-
rificial ceremonies were abolished symbolized conversely the existence of a
unified system of supernatural beings, and the existence of a unified system
of supernatural beings, then, symbolized the control of a unified state politics
(guojia zhengzhi) and universal values of civilization. What the “Doctrine of
the Mean” meant by the saying “for conduct there are the same ethical rules”
(xing tonglun 行同倫) could only become the universal and self-conscious pur-
suit of the general population when cultural power, though outside of political
and military power, also actually participated in this control.7 For this reason
the scholar-official class that bore the responsibility for civilization continued
quite actively to employ their power to push forward the process of achiev-
ing “the same customs and a single morality (tong fengsu, yi daode 同風俗,
一道德)” throughout the three hundred plus years of the Song dynasty.8
During the Song dynasty, the court and the officialdom always carried
out very severe attacks against popular sacrifices and ceremonies because
they believed that these kinds of sacrifices together with the secret activities

6  To give some Southern Song dynasty examples, in the important Jiangnan area in the south
there was much worshipping of unorthodox gods including Wutong, Muxia Sanlang, Muke,
Dujiao Wutong, Tongtian Erniang, Menggong Shizhe, Huang Sanlang, Taibaigong, and so on.
As soon as the Southern Song government was established, they started to “destroy these
officially unacceptable cults.” “Gaozong qi,” SS j. 30, 564.
7  “Zhongyong,”  §29, CTP, James Legge translation.
8  “The same customs and a single morality” was a commonly repeated phrase in the Song
dynasty. See my discussion in section 4 of “Du Yu Yingshi xiansheng Zhu Xi de lishi shijie ji
xiangguan pinglun,” http://book.douban.com/review/5583280/.
154 Chapter 10

they engendered among the people presented a challenge to national order.

Communal activities “learning and teaching the methods of witchcraft” and
“congregations of men and women from dusk to dawn” had the potential abil-
ity to create another power center beyond the reach of the government’s politi-
cal power. The strength of beliefs that “only know how to fear the gods, and
no longer fear the law” also had the potential to produce a religious author-
ity beyond the reach of the government’s political authority.9 If the general
population carried out sacrifices to various gods and spirits on their own it
could undermine the government’s monopoly power over sacrifices and cer-
emonies. It could also allow popular society and regional authorities an alter-
native channel to obtain the Will of Heaven through sacrifices and ceremonies.
For these reasons, proscribing unacceptable sacrifices not only increased the
government’s authority and made those who relied on religion for relief from
distress or suffering turn instead to relying on the government, it also set the
social order right and made people live according to certain social regulations.

1.2
“A single morality and the same customs” was a phrase that was frequently
repeated by the Song dynasty government and gentry. In a civilization that had
“morality” as its core to transform and reorganize customs, to impel national
ethics and morals toward unification and social order toward standardized
rules, the “nation” (guojia) that the imperial power symbolized and the “soci-
ety” that the gentry represented were of one mind. When the Northern Song
dynasty was just established, orders were repeatedly sent down to change the
old customs that did not conform to Confucian principles.10 Then for several
hundred years, the Song emperors sent down orders to extend the popular-
ization of New Etiquette (Xinyi 新儀) and such writings about the rules and
ceremonies involved in social life.11 They wanted to use their power to make
the ideas formulated in the classics into the habitual customs of the people’s
daily lives.
This stern proscription combined with positive advocacy naturally produced
obvious results. In a few hundred years with the support of the state power, the
“civilization” endorsed by the upper stratum of urban society, with the clas-
sic texts, as interpreted and explained by scholar-officials, as its foundation

9  XZZTJCB, j. 159, qingli liunian jiuyue.

10  “Xingfa er,” Song huiyao jigao, 1957, 165 ce, records the imperial orders of jianlong sinian
and qiande sinian, 6496.
11  For more on the many such works with “ceremonies” in the title, see SS, j. 98–125 (Zhi 志
51–78).
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 155

and serving as a system of “rules” for life gradually expanded outward from the
center to the periphery, from the cities to the countryside and from the upper
classes to the lower levels of society. This resulted in the construction of a uni-
fied ethics of everyday life for the people of China (Zhongguoren) with the Han
Chinese (Hanzu) as its center.
In what follows, I want to give three examples of this process.
The first is “killing people to sacrifice to demons” (sharen jigui 殺人祭鬼).
Chinese and Japanese scholars have both taken note of this abnormal phe-
nomenon. Extending down to the Song dynasty, the custom of “killing people
to sacrifice to demons” was still widespread in Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei and simi-
lar locales.12 The custom was known as “capturing the living” (caisheng 採生);
the range of its practice was very broad and it had not yet disappeared even
in the Southern Song. What is even more amazing is that not only in border
areas but even in a relatively developed and central place like the Wuxing area
(modern Zhejiang) such things happened. In the first year of the jiatai reign
period (1201) an official reported that because the local people believed that
“if one dies after murdering someone, he can become a god,” often if he can be
persuaded to commit suicide, a custom known as “urging self-injury” (qishang
起傷), was actually popular. That was simply to urge a murderer to commit
suicide and then later set up a temple to sacrifice to him and even to call him a
god (shen); in one year there were actually forty-nine people killed in this way.13
It should be pointed out that an era in which an abundance of reports about
“killing people to sacrifice to demons” appears again in the historical records
is precisely an era in which the mainstream society is strongly resisting this
kind of custom. The court’s strict prohibition of temples worshipping officially
unacceptable gods and improper sacrifices also included a ban on “killing

12  See Tai Jinnong, “Nan Song renti xisheng ji,” in Jinnong lunwenji, 325–338; Sawada Mizuho,
Chûgoku no minkan shinkô, 1982, 331–340. Also see Pang Dexin, “Zongjiao xinyang ji qita,”
chapter 6 of his Cong huaben ji nihuaben suojian zhi Songdai liangjing shimin shenghuo,
374–379. There is also a section specifically discussing the use of human bodies for sacri-
fices (renti xisheng ji 人體犧牲祭). This is especially valuable because in addition to the
usual historical materials, he also cites passages from many types of fiction (xiaoshuo).
13  “Xingfa er,” SHYJG, 166 ce, 6561. Zhao Yushi, Bin tui lu, 1983, j. 7, 85 records that “Lin Qianzhi,
the Prefect of Qinzhou (in modern Guangxi) committed the crime of eating human flesh.
He was removed from office and banished to Hainan as a slave.” It also records many other
cases of cannibalism from the Tang dynasty, the Five Dynasties and the Song. We can see
then that this “barbarous” custom still existed in the Tang dynasty and even “also in the
present” (the Song dynasty). However, from the fact that the tale of Lin Qianzhi eating
human flesh “was regarded as bizarre by All Under Heaven when it became known” we
can see that such customs were already disappearing.
156 Chapter 10

people to sacrifice to demons.” The severe punishment of such practices by

official law inevitably also acted as a powerful deterrent on these illegal popu-
lar practices. According to the “Criminal Law, section two” chapter of the Draft
Recovered Edition of the Essential Documents and Regulations of the Song (Song
huiyao jigao), in the forty some years from the first year of the xianping reign
period (998) of Emperor Zhenzong (Zhao Heng 趙恆, 968–1022, r. 997–1022) to
the first year of the kangding reign period (1040) of Emperor Renzong, impe-
rial orders forbidding the practice of “killing people to sacrifice to demons”
were issued at least three times. In the Southern Song when the government
for an extended period of time employed several policies, such as the baojia
system, to implicate and punish a criminal’s associates, offering rewards for
making accusations against criminals, employing specialist informers, and
strictly enjoining officials from receiving money or goods from shamans, these
hitherto common practices steadily faded away. At that, the social customs of
places like Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hunan, Hubei and Guangdong were gradually
transformed.14
The second example is similar to abolishing the custom of “killing people
to sacrifice to demons.” It was the disappearance of public nude performances
(luoxi 裸戲) and erotic ceremonies. This was accompanied by the gradual
establishment of women’s absolute, unconditional attachment to the families
of their husbands. From various sorts of historical documents, we know that
before the Song dynasty “sex” (xing 性) was a very common topic of discussion
and the taboo against male and female nudity was not so severe. The institu-
tion of marriage was also not so strict, not to mention that divorce and remar-
riage were very common occurrences. This situation slowly changed during
the Song dynasty. If we say that in a certain sense civilization is a system of
rules, then we can say that during the Song dynasty, and especially among the
scholar-official class, this system of rules became increasingly stringent. Any
behavior that went beyond the boundaries set by this system of rules would be
seen as uncivilized. Two things from that era that especially attract our atten-
tion are Sima Guang’s memorial to the emperor calling for a ban on the enter-
tainment spectacle of women’s nude wrestling and Cheng Yi’s statement that

14  According to “Xingfa er,” SHYJG, j. 165 ce, in the southeast region of the Northern Song
dynasty, especially in Xuanshe (in modern Anhui), Jiangning (modern Nanjing area) and
Raoxin (Jiangxi), the custom of “weeding out children” (haozi 薅子) was practiced; that is
“where male [children] were more numerous, they killed the male [children], and where
female [children] were more numerous, they killed the female [children].”
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 157

for a women “to starve to death is a small thing, but to loose her chastity is a
very serious matter.”15
From the existing sources, we can surmise that in the Northern Song the
taboo against the female body does not seem to have been so strict. That in
the eleventh century Emperor Renzong could watch “naked women perform
right before his eyes” (in Sima Guang’s words) in a public place with numer-
ous other people would make it seem that at the time the nude female body
really did not give rise to any unusual feelings. Sima Guang and some other
scholar-officials felt that such spectacles ran contrary to the ceremonial
rites and propriety, and they asked the court to abolish them. These sorts of
male and female taboos progressively grew into a “consensus.” With this con-
sensus, the female body became a symbol of uncleanness and something to be
kept hidden and secret. In like manner, it came about that married women’s
relationships with their husbands became subordinate ones, and this greatly
increased the strength of male society. One of the very important results of all
this, of course, was that due to the end of freedom of contact between men and
women and women becoming the appendages of men, the traditional ethi-
cal system with its characteristic regular succession of older and younger and
clear distinctions between male and female and the system of primogeniture
as its central tenets was once again reaffirmed.16
The spread of customs and the expansion of civilization started from the
top of society. We can see that among the intellectual stratum and the great
families this defense of rites and rightness was highly praised. This was not in
the laws and not a general rule among the populace, but since it was widely
accepted and held up as a model by the gentry, under the influence of the
gentry’s recommendations and the state’s punishments it gradually became a
universal norm among the people. It usually takes quite a long time from the
advocacy of a new concept through its practice in daily life to the construction
of a conventional custom, but this change, however slow, was bound to be real-
ized once a number of scholar-officials came to regard it as a form of honor
and a fashion. From then on, it would influence many people. The expansion of

15  Sima Guang, “Lun shangyuan ling furen xiangpu zhuang,” Sima Wenzhenggong chuanjiaji,
j. 23; Jinsi lu, j. 6, see Chen Rongjie [Wing-tsit Chan], Jinsi lu xiangzhu jiping, 2007, 346. On
Cheng Yi, Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi’s opposition to remarriage of both men and women, see
Henan Chengshi yishu, j. 22B, Ercheng ji, 303; “Jingxue liku-sangji,” ZZJ, 298; ZYL, j. 90, 3319.
16  Chen Dongyuan, Zhongguo funü shenghuo shi, chapter 6, “Song Ru duiyu funü de guan-
nian,” says: “Because the Cheng brothers revered the rites they took the ancient sayings
too seriously and so they became very strict concerning the concept of female chastity.”
158 Chapter 10

civilization is often just like a circle of ripples radiating out from the center of
an idea to the periphery of society.
Third and finally, we can discern a particular phenomenon in the change
of atmosphere between the Tang and Song dynasties. This is the rejection,
on the part of the nation represented by the imperial power and the society
represented by the gentry, of any abnormal behavior contrary to mainstream
ethics. This rejection was aimed at strengthening state power and social order.
It had three main aspects: criticism of the civilization of non-Chinese ethnic
groups; suppression of popular religious activities; and firm restrictions on any
antisocial behavior. These three aspects were undoubtedly related to the ten-
sion resulting from the Song dynasty always being under pressure from foreign
peoples, to the dynasty’s need to strengthen state control, and even more to
the defense and expansion of the traditional ethical order by the gentry class.
With the dual promotion of the state and the gentry, a very uniform state and
social order was re-established and grew increasingly stronger.
First, there was the criticism of and resistance against the civilization of
non-Chinese ethnic groups. To use the contemporary language, they intended
to “rigorously debate [the distinction between] Hua (Chinese) and Yi (non-
Chinese, barbarians” (yan bian Hua Yi 嚴辯華夷). Once when Zhu Xi was
talking he very seriously pointed out that they should “discuss [the distinc-
tion between] Hua and Yi” (bian de Hua Yi 辯得華夷), that is re-establish and
re-confirm the Han Chinese tradition. In his historical memory, the history of
the China of the Han Chinese being infected by barbarian customs (hufeng
胡風) could be traced back to the Tang and Sui and even to the time when the
Tabgatch (Tuoba) began its rule over North China as the Yuan (Northern) Wei
during the Era of Disunity. According to his understanding, the Chinese civili-
zation of the Han Chinese had already been undermined by barbarian peoples
(huren), or alien civilizations had already replaced the native Han Chinese
civilization. So in his mind the most important thing to do was to distinguish
clearly the dividing line between Hua Chinese and Yi barbarians.17
Starting very early on, however, alien peoples had been traveling from the
west to the east and continually infiltrating the comparatively wealthy, popu-
lous and civilized area of the Han Chinese. Their religions and cultures, includ-
ing Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeanism, and so on came into China

17  ZYL, j. 11, 2328. In addition to this, the idea of the orthodox doctrine of dynastic succes-
sion (zhengtonglun 正統論) in Song dynasty historiography and the admonition in the
classics to “honor the king (royal house) and repel the barbarians” (zunwang rangyi) both
actually strengthened a Han-Chinese-centered civilization as well as expressing anxiety
about alien or heretical civilizations.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 159

with them and led to confusion and transformation in the Han-centered world
of knowledge, thought and belief. By the Tang dynasty this situation had already
become extremely serious.18 On this account, Song dynasty scholar-officials
were extremely vigilant against this kind of change in Chinese civilization.
Second, was the suppression of various kinds of popular religious beliefs
and activities. These included Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism that had been
spreading since the Tang dynasty, various shrines offering sacrifices to spir-
its and demons (cishen sigui 祠神祀鬼) that already existed among the Han
Chinese, regional sacrifices to mountains and rivers, as well different types of
religious activities that were not sanctioned by the state authorities—these
were all totally prohibited. The state forbade the private engraving of classic
texts, strange religious beliefs and practices, even including the practice of
cremation that we consider quite “civilized” today. Because they derived from
the culture of alien lands and did not accord with Han Chinese civilization, the
state and the gentry both carried out severe crackdowns on the popular belief
in many “demonic religious teachings” (yaojiao 妖教) as well as social customs
that were not part of Han Chinese traditions. Under the unremitting resistance
and rejection of the gentry class and School of Principle scholars, including
Cheng Yi, Sima Guang, Zhu Xi, and so on, all of these things came to be com-
pletely prohibited.19 This was of course related to the constant threat from for-
eign peoples. The most widespread resistance to foreign civilization found its
common expression in the propagation and exaggeration of ancient Chinese
civilization.
Third and finally, the state and the gentry were quite vigilant against all anti-
social popular activities. Let me give two explanatory examples of this. The
first involves ceremonial banners and weaponry used in popular sacrificial
ceremonies. From the Northern through the Southern Song dynasties the gov-
ernment repeatedly sent down orders forbidding both the use of banners and

18  Not to mention the tremendous influence of Buddhism, we can take Zoroastrianism as
an example. It began to exert its influence in Han Chinese regions in the fourth century.
Since Sogdian people continually penetrated China from the west, Zoroastrianism also
came east with them. Although it was strongly attacked during the reigns of emperors
Wuzong of the Tang (r. 840–846), and Shizong (r. 954–959) of the Later Zhou, it still con-
tinued to have believers all the way into the Northern Song.
19  On gentry resistance to cremation, see Liu Yizheng, “Huozang kao,” Shixue zazhi, 1/3 (1929),
1–5; Zhu Ruixi, et al., Liao Song Xixia Jin shehui shenghuo shi, 1998, chapter 11, “Sangzang
(1): Song xia Hanzu juzhu qu,” 189–194. (As we pointed out in Volume One of this history,
Jacques Gernet’s Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276, 1959,
173–176, discusses the “widespread” use of cremation in the Southern Song, and believes
that it began with upper class Buddhist.—tr.).
160 Chapter 10

real weapons as ceremonial ensigns and weapons in popular sacrifices and the
copying of symbolic implements used by the state. On the one hand, this was
meant to protect and monopolize the imperial power and order symbolized by
certain commemorative objects. On the other hand, it was intended to avoid
the formation of a genuine challenge to dynastic political power because the
possession of real weapons and banners could very easily lead to rebellion.20
The second example concerns popular gatherings, especially “learning and
teaching the methods of witchcraft” and “congregations of men and women
from dusk to dawn.” Such gatherings constituted one of the social problems
most in evidence in official reports to the court. The information contained in
these reports was that the imperial power and the gentry both need to have a
settled agricultural social order in which the people went out to work the fields
in the morning and returned home in the evening. Because such gatherings
violated the normally approved rules of work and rest and secretly taught and
transmitted beliefs outside of the government’s political ideology, in the eyes
of the power holders, they were very dangerous activities greatly to be feared.
In the political memory of the government, these sorts of abnormal activities
and secret beliefs could quite easily bring about the collapse of social order.
Hence the prohibition of such practices was always very stringent.
At the same time, however, Han Chinese civilization was drawing support
from political power to advance into its border areas. The customs of the vari-
ous peoples living on the borders of Song China were originally quite different,
but the state and government of the day were very cruel toward these border
peoples and the so-called barbarians (manyi 蠻夷). They both forced these
alien peoples to accept the rules of Han Chinese civilization and, at the same
time, worked very hard to transform their customs. As for those peoples who
refused to accept the rules of Han civilization, the Chinese made war on them
and forced them to submit. In the three hundred plus years of the two Song
dynasties, their civilization with Han Chinese at its center and Confucianism
as its core continued to advance. Through the expansion of their government
system and their education to the border areas, the general knowledge and
regulations of the civilization of the upper strata in the Han regions during the
Song dynasty gradually formed a uniform civilization and assimilated the vari-
ous populations on their borders.

1.3
Imperial power and the gentry cooperated in the construction and expansion
of a unitary civilization.

20  See “Xingfa er,” Song huiyao jigao, 1957, 6503, 6517, 6557.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 161

One of the rather important changes in the Song dynasty was the great
expansion of the gentry class. A great deal of recent research has shown that
besides the Song scholars who gained access to the centers of political power
by way of the official keju 科舉 examinations, there was a large number of them
who were dispersed to the various local regions. Even though the number of
men who sat for the examinations increased from some eighty thousand in
the eleventh century to around four hundred thousand in the thirteenth cen-
tury, the number of them who achieved the “advanced scholar” ( jinshi 進士)
degree was after all not very large. As a result, a rather large number of scholars
steadily entered into popular regional society and carried the ideas and rules of
“civilization” from the cities to the villages, from the upper classes to the lower
classes and from the center to the periphery of the country.
Any discussion of the gentry class promotion of civilization must of course
mention the significance of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle.
The first thing we need to say is that due to the flourishing of clan organi-
zations, to a large degree the gentry represented clan society, and the severe,
stern, and unforgiving ideas of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle for fam-
ily and clan order and its strict principles obviously had a great influence on
a series of later family rituals, village compacts, clan rules, clan genealogies,
and so on. Many people have taken notice of texts such as the Wengong Family
Rituals (Wengong jiali) that was edited by Zhu Xi himself and continued in use
for several hundred years and the Lü Family Village Compact (Lüshi xiangyue)
that was edited by Zhang Zai’s disciple Lü Dajun (1029–1080) and later revised
by Zhu Xi.21 The Lu family clan of the celebrated Lu Jiuyuan in Fuzhou in
Jiangxi actually had young people sing in the early mornings to remind clan
members of the various rules of Confucian ethics and morality. It is said that
the words to their songs were written by Lu Jiuyuan’s elder brother.22 These
systematic regulations of the doctrines of the School of Principle that perhaps
unconsciously penetrated society were precisely emblematic of the popular-
ization of the School of Principle. It was only such popularized Neo-Confucian
School of Principle ideas that genuinely possessed a significance for the direc-
tion of the daily life of society. At this point, thought became principles, prin-
ciples became rules and regulations, and rules and regulations entered the
daily lives of the populace. Once the populace in general had lived under these

21  “Zeng sun Lüshi xiangyue,” ZWGWJ, j. 74, SBCK, Shangwu Yinshuguan.
22  “Lushi yimen,” Luo Dajing, Helin yulu, neipian, j. 5, 1983, 324. On the Lu clan’s family
ethics, see Xu Huailin, “Lu Jiuyuan jiazu ji qi jiagui shuping,” Jiangxi shifan daxue xuebao,
2 (1989), 45–50.
162 Chapter 10

rules and regulations for a long time, they unknowingly became the “common
sense” of everyday usage.
The second thing we need to say is that in the Neo-Confucian concept of the
cosmos there was basically no place for spiritual beings (guishen 鬼神). For
example, Zhu Xi repeatedly said that guishen derived from the energy of mate-
rial force ( jingqi 精氣) and the hun and po souls (魂魄) resulted from the inter-
action of the cosmic forces Yin and Yang. These ideas bordering on atheism
were actually held by many gentry scholars.23 With the exception of sacrifices
to the ancestors in the clan temples, they were quite apathetic to many sacri-
fices to guishen. On this point their attitude was the same as the attitude of the
state in forbidding the improper sacrifices of unorthodox cults.24
Third and finally, we can see that the position of the gentry in their pro-
motion of civilization was often the same as that of the state. They actively
participated in political actions to purify thought and define social order.25 The
Southern Song Neo-Confucian, Chen Chun (1159–1223), wrote in his Meanings
of Neo-Confucian Philosophical Terms (Beixi ziyi) that “generally the sacrifices
that should not be made are all improper sacrifices to unorthodox gods.” What,
then, were the “sacrifices that should not be made”? In Chen Chun’s view, not
only Buddhism and Daoism, but even the stars, Mt. Tai, Mt. Heng and other
spiritual entities (shenling 神靈) whose sacrifices were approved by the state
should also be on the list of “sacrifices that should not be made.” Obviously
the ideas of Neo-Confucians of the School of Principle were incompatible
with sacrifices to guishen. In his Crane Forest Morning Dew (Helin yulu), the
Song scholar Luo Dajing (1196–1242) recorded that it was said that when Lu
Jiuyuan was in Jingmen (in Hubei), “he did not perform religious services on

23  A Southern Song scholar Chu Yong edited a book called On dispelling doubts (Chuyi shuo)
that is probably the most brilliant and most complete Song refutation of so-called super-
stition, though it has not been fully explored by scholars.
24  For example, Zhuang Chuo’s consciously prohibiting “eating only vegetables and serving
the devil” (chicai shimo 食菜事魔) was because they “do not serve the ancestors, but they
bury them naked” (luozang 裸葬) and because they believe that “human life is suffering”
so they kill people in the belief that they are saving them from suffering and sending them
on to a better place. Zhuang Chuo (?–?), Jilei bian, j. shang, 1983, 12. For a brief discussion
of the Neo-Confucian view of guishen, see, Wing-tsit Chan, tr., Reflections on Things at
Hand, 366–367. On the ancient Chinese concepts of the two souls, see Ying-shih Yü, “‘O
Soul, Come Back!’ A Study in the Changing Conceptions of the Soul and Afterlife in Pre-
Buddhist China,” HJAS, 47/2 (December 1987): 363–395.
25  Of course this is not to say that this tendency only began in the Song dynasty; after the
Han dynasty this was the quite self-conscious behavior of the intellectual stratum. It is
just that they never had such complete theoretical support as they did in the Song.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 163

the Lantern Festival,” and when Cheng Dachang (1123–1195) and Zheng Bing
(1121–1194) were in Jianning (in Fujian), they also “did not allow the monks to
expound their Buddhist teachings in public forums.” It was also said that when
Zhu Xi was in Linzhang (Zhangzhou in Fujian), he only “supervised the burn-
ing of incense according to local customs, but did not allow people to ask any
questions.”26
From the relationships between the state (imperial power), the gentry (edu-
cated elite) and the common people, we can see that two different trends seem
to have emerged in Chinese history from the Tang dynasty into the Song. On
the one hand, by means of its economic policies and political strategies, state
control over the general population intensified; the state increasingly mani-
fested a tendency towards autocracy. The state and the legal system, ethics and
morality, and concepts of civilization that it symbolized were rapidly expand-
ing, from the center to the periphery and from the cities to the villages.
On the other hand, with the growth in the gentry population, after the end
of the age of great aristocratic families, they organized clan gatherings (clan
settlements or villages, jiazu juhui 家族聚會), and this resulted in the gentry
coming to act as intermediaries between the state and the people. From chan-
nels such as the official examinations, service as officials, inherited meritorious
titles and ranks, and so on, the gentry came to be the leaders of local society.
In their negotiations with the state, they promoted the expansion of the state’s
legal system, ethics and morality, and concepts of civilization, but at the same
time they also resisted the state’s direct rule over the general population.
Sometimes they also became the spokesmen for the interests of the populace
and impeded the unlimited growth of state power.
For these reasons, conflicts between the state and the gentry at times
became very serious. The state was often very anxious about the propaga-
tion of the thought and opinions of the gentry class; they would try to limit
them whenever they could. This was particularly the case with the doctrines
of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle that transcended political author-
ity and seemed to possess the discursive power to express the truth. The state
would sometimes attempt to restrict it by every possible means. Doing their
utmost to forbid the propagation of reports on the current political situation
and policies, events on the borders, military preparations, and popular non-
governmental publishing was simply the Song dynasty’s way of warning the
scholars about their interference in politics and a tactic for strengthening state
control.27 From the end of the Northern Song to the middle of the Southern

26  Helin yulu, yi bian, j. 3, 1983, 164.

27  See “Xingfa er,” Song huiyao jigao, 1957, 165–166 ce, 6514, 6519, 6527, 6529, 6558.
164 Chapter 10

Song the rejection and prohibition of various School of Principle writings

and recorded quotations (yulu) all reflected official repression of the popular
gentry (minjian shishen 民間士紳).28
In general terms, in their expansion of a civilization with the ceremonial
rites as its background and support for traditional morality as its core, the
imperial power and the gentry, political power and cultural authority, were very
much the same. The state worked at this by “punishing” the people according
to the laws, and the gentry worked at it by “disciplining” the people through
education. We can see that the Song dynasty gentry class often relied on regu-
lations like family rules ( jiagui), family rituals ( jiali), clan rules (zugui), and
village compacts (xiangyue), as well as the dissemination of beginning read-
ing materials, and even the popular entertainments present in sacrifices and
ceremonials (such as shuochang 說唱 speak-and-sing performances) to trans-
mit extensively the knowledge, thought and belief of the scholarly elite to the
popular masses. In this universal endorsement of civilization, they would also
seem to have employed rational means to represent the civilized order (of the
state). All of the Song dynasty family rules, family rituals, clan rules, and village
compacts that we can still see today basically reflect and embody the princi-
ples of “conforming to Confucian ethics” (hehu lijiao 合乎禮教), “emphasizing
moral education” (zhuzhong jiaohua 注重教化), and “agreeing with the laws
of the state” ( fuhe guofa 符合國法).29 The various kinds of Song dynasty text-
books still extant also generally transmit the traditional knowledge, histori-
cal memory and social principles commonly supported by both the imperial
power and the Neo-Confucian School of Principle. At the same time, overtones
and tendencies of ethical and moral education began to appear in the per-
formances presented during ancestral temple sacrifices, clan gatherings, and
festival activities.
In recent years, researchers have noticed that in the Southern Song dynasty
there were quite a few popular educational texts with titles like “Exhortation
to Work at Farming,” “Orders about Customs,” “Exhortation to Practice Filial
Piety,” “Exhortation to Study”, and so on. Well-known scholars, including Chen
Dexiu (1178–1235) and Zhu Xi himself, personally authored such texts. They
repeatedly exhorted secular society on the necessity of working hard at farm-
ing, complying with village customs, being filial toward fathers and mothers
and, if they had extra time, reading more of the classic texts of the former sages
and the works of the School of Principle to strive for a better future. Through

28  See Tai Jinnong, “Nan Song xiaobao,” in Jinnong lunwen ji, 339–342.
29  See Zhu Ruixi, Liao Song Xixia Jin shehui shenghuo shi, 1998, Chapter 25, “Minjian jiazu
zuzhi,” 428–429.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 165

this popularization, the gentry class promulgated to the general population

ideas of life that in later times came to be know as “civilization.” In general,
these ideas represented attempts to convince or even force the populace to
establish and to follow a kind of rational order of life. They also included very
many stipulations concerning compliance with the legal ordinances of the
state. No matter whether inside or outside the family and clan, and no matter
whether it was the common people or the educated elite, they should always
keep in mind the key term “order” (zhixu 秩序)—as correct and unalterable
as Heaven and Earth, in accord with the Heavenly Principle—an “order” that
should emanate from one’s innermost being.
It was precisely during this push by imperial power and the gentry that
some Confucian principles, as correct and unalterable as Heaven and Earth,
came to be solidified. A system of orderly life established on these principles
also came to be acknowledged and extended to various regions of the country.30
Consider, for example, the concept of “filial piety” (xiao 孝) fundamental to
family and clan order. It was not simply a concept; it was a system. Not support-
ing and providing medical treatment to ones sick parents and grandparents or
taking ones wealth and moving out of the family while ones parents were still
alive were both considered to be crimes that violated social morality, and such
practices were forbidden.31 “Loyalty” (zhong 忠), the fundamental support for
state (national) order, also became an all-embracing and overarching ethical
concept after the universal acceptance of the legitimacy and reasonableness
of imperial power. Even religions that originally emphasized transcendence
also had to be mindful of the existence of imperial power. These regulations
endorsed by scholars and derived from the ancient Confucian ceremonial sys-
tem of etiquette also expanded into the lives of the common people of vari-
ous regions of the country and became their new habitual customs. To use
contemporary language, in the space dominated by the power of the state, a
unitary ethics and morality slowly developed, a universally accepted world of
thought began to take shape, and in the end constructed the Chinese people’s
world of daily life. In this daily life, the Chinese people, consciously or uncon-
sciously, had already identified with rules of life and a social order embodying
rationality, self-control and harmonious relations centered upon family and
clan, and they upheld the ethical and moral concepts based on these regula-
tions and order. With all of this, the unity of Chinese civilization with ethnic

30  On the spread downward of “civilization,” see Zhang Bangwei, “Songdai wenhua de xiang-
dui puji,” in Guoji Songdai wenhua yanjiu taolunhui wenji,” 1991.
31  See “Xingfa er,” SHYJG, 165 ce, 6496.
166 Chapter 10

Han Chinese as the mainstream was genuinely established during this histori-
cal epoch.

2 From Yuan to Ming: The General Condition of the World of

Knowledge, Thought and Belief

In the last years of the Southern Song, after the death of Lu Jiuyuan, Zhu Xi
and their outstanding disciples, thought and scholarship seems to have come
to a halt. Contemporary people were already cognizant of this predicament
of poor performance and few accomplishments. Some of them sarcastically
said that the bookstores were full of books about nature and principle (xingli
性理). Anyone could buy a few of these works, edit them this way and that,
and then quite easily talk pretentiously about great ideas. Some people would
read the Four Books for a few days and then start pontificating about the
nature of the “Great Ultimate,” but they were not even interested in reading
the ancient classics. This was certainly a crisis of thought and scholarship.32
Some people used the word “vulgarization” to explain that after the ideas of the
School of Principle entered popular society, they underwent a great transfor-
mation. They pointed out that because former scholars had personal historical
memory and demanded practical, realistic social strategies, in their scholar-
ship they frequently embodied their own thoughts and feelings. By compari-
son, contemporary so-called scholars of the Learning of the Way only regarded
ideas as texts to be recited by rote while believing such textual recitation to be
evidence of genuine thought.33
Those scholars who had always been antipathetic to the School of Principle
were even less polite in their criticisms. Zhou Mi (1232–1298) cited Shen
Zhonggu, an elderly Confucian from Wuxing (in Zhejiang), as saying that his
contemporaries who styled themselves Neo-Confucians (followers of daoxue)
did not deserve the name. They looked down on everyone, regarding those who
were concerned with the economy as plundering the common people, those
who were concerned with military affairs as coarse brutes, those who concen-
trated on literature as paying excessive attention to trivia and losing their sense
of purpose, and those who were concerned with politics as vulgar bureaucrats.
They read works like the Four Books, Reflections on Things at Hand, The All-
Embracing Book or Penetrating the Classic of Changes (Tongshu), Explanation
of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate, the Eastern Inscription (Dongming) and

32  Ouyang Shoudao (1208–1272), “Song Huang Xinshu xu,” Xunzhai wenji, j. 7, 11A.
33  “Li Renzhong shikao xu,” Xunzhai wenji, j. 11, 1B.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 167

the Western Inscription (Ximing), and Recorded Quotations (Yulu) and believed
that they were (according to the “four sentences of Heng Qu [Zhang Zai])
“establishing lofty standards for the people, establishing their heart/mind for
Heaven and Earth, opening up great peace for all ages, and carrying on the lost
learning of the former sages.” Nevertheless, their fame was very great and their
influence very wide; many scholars joined that current of thought and together
they pushed aside their critics. Even the emperor could not help but reluc-
tantly put up with them.34
All this was the inevitable outcome of the process of popularization of
School of Principle thought. Once this way of thinking, originally possessing
analytic and critical acuity, became popular and fashionable, it could easily
devolve into a text to be memorized and recited. There were only so many
books to be read and so many things to be said over and over again. Even
though these few texts were classics and the few things said were the truth,
these few texts and their truths came to seem like mere high-sounding rhetoric
and could hardly serve as guidelines for daily life. As a result, they turned into
abstract dogma. Having said this we should also admit that superior thought
often has to wait for this sort of mediocre popularization, and brilliant ideas
always have to be duplicated and abbreviated by not very outstanding people
and turned into slogans to be bruited about or texts to be recited before they
can really inter into the life of society. In this way, thought sacrifices its pro-
fundity and wisdom, but it gains many more followers. Of course, there is one
more very important point, and that is that for a form of thought to become a
universal truth it must perforce become a political ideology, and to become
a political ideology it must draw its support from the seat of power.

2.1
Although after Emperor Lizong of the Southern Song died in 1264, the School
of Principle slowly gained official approval, in the final analysis it never actu-
ally became a state institution. To put it another way, since an institutional-
ized linkage was never made between the knowledge embodied in Cheng-Zhu
Neo-Confucianism and the official examinations with their prospects for
office-holding, the School of Principle remained a free form of knowl-
edge and thought.35 However, the integration with political power that the

34  “Daoxue,” Zhou Mi, Kuixin zazhi, Xuji xia, 169.

35  Late in the Southern Song, Yao Mian (1216–1262), in answering the emperor at court,
quoted Zhao Pu (922–992)’s words emphasizing that “the Way and Principle are the great-
est” and further said that “once this statement is accepted all forces and all things will
respond and follow it” and that is why there was the School of Principle. He criticized
168 Chapter 10

Neo-Confucian School of Principle did not achieve during the Song dynasty
began its process of institutionalization and achieved its transformation
toward political ideology during the Yuan dynasty under the rule of an alien
people.
This would seem to have been quite a natural historical process. When the
Mongol Yuan entered the Central Plains, they could not but accept the tra-
dition and culture where ethnic Han Chinese occupied most of the land. As
time passed, then, a scholarly group that supported Confucianism was formed
among the Mongols and the semu people (色目 “colored eyes” or “people of
varied categories,” one of the four ethnic designation under the Yuan).
The Mongol Yuan’s cultural strategies underwent some rather profound
transformations.
First, in 1232, the fourth year of the Mongol Yuan Emperor Taizong (Ögedei
Qaghan, 1186–1241, r. 1229–1241), Yelü Chucai (1190–1244) found a descendent
of Confucius for him, and the emperor ennobled him as the Sagely Duke Yan
(衍聖公, Yan shenggong). In 1236 the Yuan set up an Office of Compiling and
Editing (Bianxiusuo 編修所) and an Office of Classical Texts (Jingjisuo 經籍所)
in Yanjing (modern Beijing) and Pingyang (in Shanxi). In 1237, Liu Zhong,
the Commissioner-in-Chief (xuankeshi 宣課使) of Dezhou prefecture (in
Shandong), was allowed to hold the official examinations in his own prefec-
ture; they were divided into the three categories of the meaning of the classics
( jingyi 經義), poetry (cifu 詞賦) and essays (lun 論), and it is said that they
attracted four thousand three hundred examinees. In the following year, all the
other regions also held the official examinations.36
Second, in 1247, before ascending the throne, Khubilai Qaghan (1215–1294,
Yuan Emperor Shizu, r. 1260–1294) had a discussion with the Confucian scholar
Zhang Dehui (1195–1275) concerning the true meaning of Confucianism and the
significance of Confucian studies for political rule. Zhang convinced Khubilai
to sacrifice to Confucius and, a few years later, he and Yuan Haowen (1190–
1257) “invited Emperor Shizu to take the title of Great Scholar of Confucianism

studying for the keju examinations as “poisoning their minds” … “concentrating on the
words (literary composition) but not the Way” … “and thus setting up empty learning in
name only.” That his passionate views were praised by officials who believed in the School
of Principle demonstrates that at that time the position of the School of Principle was
quite independent, their thought was quite free, and the social and intellectual atmo-
sphere was relatively relaxed. See Yao Mian, “Guichou tingdui,” Xuepo ji, 1981/83, j. 73A–33B.
36  See “Yelü Chucai zhuan,” YS, j. 146, 3459; j. 81, “Xuanju yi,” 2015. Also see Yao Congwu, “Jin
Yuan zhiji Kong Yuancuo yu Yan shenggong zhiwei zai Menggu xinchao de jixu,” Lishi
yuyan yanjiusuo jikan, 39/2 (1969), 189–196.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 169

(Rujiao da zongshi, 儒教大宗師), and the emperor happily accepted.”37 In 1271,

then, when the dynasty was officially proclaimed, it was announced that the
name of the dynasty was to be Yuan, and it is said that this was taken from Qian
yuan 乾元, the fundamental nature of Qian (Heaven, Pure Yang) in the Classic
of Changes.38
Third, during the huangqing reign period (1312–1313) of Yuan Emperor
Renzong (1285–1320, r. 1311–1320), the official keju examination system was
put in place. It stipulated the “Great Learning,” the Analects, the Mencius, and
the “Doctrine of the Mean” as the examination texts with Zhu Xi’s Collected
Commentaries on the Four Books as the key reference book. And so it was that
the School of Principle that had developed in the Song dynasty started to
be integrated with politics in the Yuan dynasty. It became not only an intel-
lectual discourse with political power but also a political discourse with
intellectual force. In the Yuan dynasty, this channel for the advancement of
educated men was still not particularly wide; that is, the systematic linkage
between thought and power could still not take in very many more scholars.
Nevertheless, its symbolic significance was quite strong, and it suggested to
very many scholars a way of exchanging knowledge for personal benefit.
In this kind of political environment, ethnic conflicts began to lessen and
cultural identities began to be establishsed. Although the first Mongol Yuan
Confucian, Zhao Fu (?–?) could still be considered a Han Chinese national-
ist, with the somewhat later Xu Heng (1209–1281), Hao Jing (1223–1275), and
Liu Yin (1249–1293), the boundaries between ethnic groups had already disap-
peared and cultural distinctions were also unclear. Because the Mongol Yuan
also enthusiastically put the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian School of Principle
into practice, everyone seemed to share commonly recognized truths; anyone
who kept these truths in mind was part of a single family. And so culture could
transcend ethnic boundaries, and the tradition of Confucian moral principle
(daotong) could also connect different political powers.39 When the famous
Confucian scholar Hao Jing paid his last respects to the major Mongol minister

37  “Zhang Dehui zhuan,” YS, j. 163, 3821–3825.

38  “Shizu benji si,” YS, j. 7, 138. See Lynn, Classic of Changes, 129–142.
39  This not only implies Han Chinese acceptance of Mongolian imperial power, but also
naturally involves Mongol and semu people’s acceptance of Han Chinese civilization. As
one historian has pointed out, “the collective consciousness of scholars of every national-
ity already ranked higher than any particular ethnic consciousness … In cultural terms
there was really no difference between Mongols, semu people, and Han Chinese scholars.”
See Xiao Qiqing, “Yuanchao duozu shirenquan de xingcheng chutan,” in his Yuanchaoshi
xinlun, 1999, 240–241.
170 Chapter 10

Yang Weizhong (1205–1259), he said that Yang collected School of Principle

writings, established a Zhou Dunyi Temple and a Great Ultimate Academy and
invited Zhao Fu to lecture in it, and so “relying on this, our Way did not per-
ish, and All Under Heaven again witnessed China’s rule.” It is obvious that this
“China” certainly did not differentiate between Song and Yuan or Han Chinese
and Mongols. As soon as School of Principle Neo-Confucianism achieved uni-
versal acceptance and Confucians received a modicum of respect from the
political powers, and especially when the cultural order that Confucianism
hoped for and identified with was comprehensively instituted, then the earlier
intense nationalist emotions could finally subside.40

2.2
During the process of turning the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle into an ide-
ology in the Yuan dynasty, the most important scholar was perhaps Xu Heng.
We can see from various sources that as a Confucian scholar Xu really did not
have very many original ideas; his importance was primarily in promoting and
expanding the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle. During the zhiyuan reign period
(1264–1295), his twelve disciples “were the tutors (zhaizhang 齋長) in several
study halls in the imperial university.” In this way, this Neo-Confucianism with
its roots in the Han Chinese culture was surprisingly transformed into a kind
of very widespread knowledge and authoritative thought in this empire under
the rule of an alien civilization. In some ways, its significance even surpassed
what it was in the Song dynasty.
When it came to School of Principle’s knowledge and thought, however,
there were very few new advances, and Yuan scholars could not at all com-
pare with the generation of Zhu Xi, Zhang Shi, Lü Zuqian and Lu Jiuyuan, or
even with their best disciples. From the records of the Scholarly Cases of Song
and Yuan Classical Scholars (Song Yuan xue-an), we can see that the topics they
discussed were still confined to the “Heavenly Principle,” the “mind/heart,” the
“investigation of things,” and the “extension of knowledge.” Even the words
they used in their discourse and elucidations were also still those of the Song
dynasty. It should be pointed out especially that in their intellectual world the
distinction between practical knowledge and free or independent thought

40  In one section of his “Yuandai de Ruhu: Rushi diwei yanjinshi,” Xiao Qiqing points out
that previous assessments of the low status of Confucian scholars during the Yuan
dynasty, such as the idea that the status of Confucian scholars was just above the beggars
who were ranked at the lowest strata by the Yuan rulers, were not really accurate. He says
that “earlier people obviously exaggerated the low status of Confucian scholars.” In Xiao
Qiqing, Yuandaishi xintan, 1983, 36.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 171

was already muddled. For them, knowledge was simply textual material to be
recited by rote, and this textual material that was recited by rote effectively
constituted the principles of thought.
Ma Tingluan (1223–1289) toward the end of the Southern Song once said
that practical learning for the keju examinations was not genuine knowledge,
but genuine thought is what scholars really pursue in their reading and study-
ing. Thus we see that in the Yuan dynasty, politics had “brought the study of
the classics, the School of Principle, and preparation for the imperial examina-
tions together as one.”41 And this meant that knowledge that was of practical
utility had overpowered everything. The upshot was that thought turned into
mere texts, texts degenerated into mere words, words were fodder for memori-
zation and recitation, and the significance of memorization and recitation was
exchange for benefits (profit). It should be particularly noted that once this
originally very meaningful Neo-Confucian thought was no longer a weapon
of criticism wielded by a few marginalized scholars, but had become the prin-
ciples of a political ideology, it would frequently morph into some very strange
things. This was unfortunately just the case in the Yuan dynasty. As Cheng
Duanli (1271–1345) wrote in his “Preface to Jia Xuanweng (1213–?)’s Poetry”:

Ever since Master Cheng and Master Zhu appeared, true Confucian
studies were again illuminated. Ever since Xu Wenzhen gong relied on
the light of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle to assist Emperor Shizu
(Kublai Qaghan), true Confucian teachings were again prominent. In
recent years the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle has been used for impe-
rial examinations to choose scholars for officialdom (qushi, 取士). The
true Confucian Way has gradually been seen in the style of governing
(lizhi, 吏治).42

According to this statement, the School of Principle of the Cheng-Zhu era was
a doctrine that elucidated thought, but in Xu Heng’s time it was used to assist
the emperor. In the keju examination era, the School of Principle was imple-
mented in the official style of administration. The Neo-Confucian School of
Principle was no longer a free form of thought; it had become part of the newly
implemented political institutions.
According to the research of several scholars, during the Yuan dynasty, with
the exception of a fortunate few, there was a limited number of important

41  Cheng Duanli (1271–1345), “Yiyang xian xinxiu Lanshan shuyuan ji,” Weizhai ji, 1994,
j. 5, 3A.
42  Ibid., j. 4, 22A.
172 Chapter 10

channels for scholars to enter the upper levels of society. One was to take up
a post as a Confucian teacher and as the head of an academy, and another
was to fill an official government post and serve as a staff member in one of
the various levels of the many branches of government.43 Scholars occupying
both of these status positions had actually been taken into the state system.
The former were given official appointments and their responsibility was to
teach. That is, to instruct students in the text book version of the School of
Principle. The responsibility of the latter was to handle government affairs,
and they transformed Confucian principles into practical policies. Together
they changed a form of knowledge and thought that was once rich in criti-
cal acumen into a schoolroom dogma or political strategy. Whether it was the
former or the latter, the result was still the popularization or vulgarization of
Confucian learning. In reality, the idea that the “true Confucian Way has gradu-
ally been seen in the style of governing” simply meant that the Yuan dynasty
was repeating the Han dynasty history of “employing scholars as government
personnel” (yi ru wei li 以儒為吏) and taking Confucian learning in the direc-
tion of politicization and standardization.
At the beginning of the Yuan dynasty, there was considerable admiration for
private learning outside of the official system. People hoped that Confucian
learning could be shifted in the direction of popular society and serve to dis-
seminate knowledge and awaken thought. However, in the process of con-
necting the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle to political power and economic
gain, two complementary potential tendencies were produced. First, as impe-
rial examination subjects, Cheng-Zhu thought could end up as textual dogma.
Second, through their connection with political power, Cheng-Zhu principles
could become part of the political system. Superficially it would look as though
the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle had entered the center of power and been
victorious, but in reality, it would have surrendered its independent critical
stance and steadily lost all capacity for self-transcendence and continuous
renewal.44

43  On the Yuan dynasty establishment of official schools and academies in various places,
see Chen Gaohua, “Yuandai de difang guanxue” in Yuanshi conglun 5 in Chen Gaohua,
Yuanshi yanjiu xinlun, 2005, 376–420, especially 395–396. He points out that these schools
were very crowded because they were very important for getting ahead and so scholars
thronged to compete in them.
44  Perhaps this intellectual situation was not really particularly clearly expressed during the
Yuan dynasty because its history was very short, but I believe that it was precisely during
the Yuan that this trend began and was well established.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 173

2.3
In the second half of the fourteenth century, the Yuan dynasty was replaced by
the Ming, and Han Chinese replaced the Mongols as emperors, but the main-
stream thought remained the School of Principle. Han Chinese replaced the
Mongols as emperors and called the Mongols barbarians. They criticized
the Mongol Yuan for “abandoning the three bonds and five constant virtues.”45
They also said that the Yuan dynasty “caused the teaching of the costume and
ceremonies of the former kings to be mixed together with those of the barbar-
ians.” They emphasized the importance of “schools” and “moral transforma-
tion through education,” and demanded that All Under Heaven “discuss the
Way of the sages … in order to eliminate polluted habits.”46 The Cheng-Zhu
School of Principle of the Yuan era, however, remained the mainstream politi-
cal ideology of the Ming dynasty and also the most important knowledge for
the generality of scholars who took the imperial examinations.
At the beginning of the Ming, though, the popularization and political
institutionalization of Confucianism, especially the knowledge and thought
of the School of Principle, may perhaps have become increasingly serious. In
1368, the third month of the first year of the Hongwu Emperor (Ming Taizu,
Zhu Yuanzhang, 1328–1398, r. 1368–1398), he ordered the examinations set up
for the selection of scholars, and in the tenth month, he set up the Imperial
University system. In 1370, the capital and various provinces began the tri-
ennial provincial imperial examinations (xiangshi 鄉試) on a large scale. In
the third month of 1384, the Ministry of Rites proclaimed the format for the
keju imperial examinations.47 All of this was very rapidly institutionalized.

45  This is from Zhu Yuanzhang’s text on the founding of the dynasty, Ming Taizu shilu, j. 26,
Ming shilu, ce 1, 1968, 127.
46  Ibid., j. 46, in Ming shilu, 257.
47  The first round of these examinations contained three questions testing the meaning of
passages from the Four Books. There had to be more than two hundred words in each
answer. In addition, there were four questions testing the meaning of passages from
the Confucian Classics and each answer had to have more than three hundred words.
To interpret the meaning of the Four Books, Zhu Xi’s commentaries were predominant.
As for the Classics, Zhu Xi’s commentary to the Book of the Songs (Shijing) was primary;
Cheng Yi’s and Zhu Xi’s commentaries to the Classic of Changes, Mr. Cai’s [Cai Chen (1167–
1230)] commentary, and the ancient exegeses [exegeses made during the Han, Jin, Tang
and Song dynasties] were the principal ones used to interpret the Book of Documents or
Book of History (Shangshu); for the Spring and Autumn Annals, the three commentaries
of Zuozhuan, Gongyangzhuan, and Guliangzhuan, and those of Mr. Hu [Hu Anguo] and
Zhang Qia (1160–1237) were the primary; and the ancient exegeses were the main works for
the Book of Rites (Liji). The second round of examinations included one discursive essay,
174 Chapter 10

The regulations and content of the imperial examinations as well as the

interests protected by the system were already approved by the political
power, and so the scope for freedom of knowledge and thought grew more
and more narrow.48 From the Hongwu Emperor’s ordering that all students
memorize his “Great Announcements” (Dagao 大誥) and that eighty-five
objectionable passages be excised from the text of the Mencius (in 1394)
down to the Yongle Emperor (Zhu Di, Chengzu, 1360–1424, r. 1402–1424)’s issu-
ing strict official reprimands and admonitions and severely punishing the
Confucian scholar Zhu Youji (from Raozhou in Jiangxi) for vilifying the School
of Principle, knowledge and thought was already under the control of politics.
During the Yongle Emperor’s reign, the Complete Collection of the Five
Classics (Wujing daquan), Complete Collection of the Four Books (Sishu daquan),
and the Complete Collection on Neo-Confucian Nature and Principle (Xingli
daquan) were compiled with prefaces by the Emperor himself. This even more
established these absolute and universal truths and stipulated the direction
of reading and understanding for all scholars.49 Under the double restraint of
these highly authoritative moral reprimands and admonitions and classic tex-
tual discourse with its high truth value, together with the double political
inducements and economic enticements, the vulgarization and standardiza-
tion of knowledge and thought was very serious indeed. Even Gao Panlong
(1562–1626), who supported these policies, could not avoid also admitting that
the Confucian learning of that time was something that “scholars start to read

five on making judgments and one on knowledge about government edicts, announce-
ments, regulations, and various internal policies. The third round of examinations
included five questions on knowledge of the Classics, history and current affairs. See the
Veritable Records of Emperor Ming Taizu (Ming Taizu shilu), juan 160. Veritable Records
of the Ming (Ming shilu), Volume 1, p. 643. Although this process of institutionalization
was once discontinued due to various reasons such as Emperor Ming Taizu’s dissatisfac-
tion with the examination system and his exclusion of examination candidates from the
Jiangnan area due to his repression of the southern scholars, this abuse of imperial power
actually suggested to the scholars that culture was dominated by power, and thus the
officially affirmed thought of the School of the Principle turned out to be viewed as an
unalterable principle or a matter of course.
48  Yang Qiqiao’s “Mingchu rencai peiyang yu dengjin zhidu jiqi yanbian,” in his Ming-Qing
shi jue-ao, 151–240. Yang provides a meticulous study of the development of the institu-
tional academic system during this period. He also points out the serious problems that
gradually came to light under the system, and that the decline of academic scholarship
was inevitable under such a system.
49  After the fall of the Ming dynasty, Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) studied its history and even con-
sider it the reason for the decline of the study of the classics. See Rizhi lu, j. 18 in Rizhi lu
jishi, 650–651.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 175

when they are young, but they do not know one word that is of use when they
are old.”50
From their criticisms of the development of thought during this period of
intellectual history, we can see some of the problems and concerns that later
people had about these issues. By the hongzhi, zhengde and jiajing reign peri-
ods (1488–1567), the defects were increasingly obvious. As Wang Yangming had
already discerned, due to the rigidity of thought very many scholars could only
turn their intelligence toward philological studies, memorization and recita-
tion, and poetry and belle lettres—all of which Wang regarded as empty and
worthless forms of learning. During Wang Yangming’s lifetime, social life had
already undergone huge changes, but during this time of change, thought
had still remained stubbornly entrenched in the same old dogmas. How could
such thought effectively respond to the changes and rectify the crisis? This was
precisely the widespread concern and anxiety felt by scholars at the time.
Later historians have widely examined the social and intellectual ruptures
that occurred during this era. Very many documents, especially local gaz-
etteers (difang zhi) and random jottings (biji), record the changes that took
place in society. First, the unified nature of the whole country under the blan-
ket of imperial control broke down; in the southern Jiangnan area, culture
increasingly displayed various changes; cultural fissures between different
areas began to appear. Second, the cultural orientation of the cities and the
countryside increasingly diverged, especially in the Jiangnan region. The hith-
erto unified nature of urban and rural areas broke down. In the cities, where
commerce and consumerism were central preoccupations, behavior that was
rejected in traditional thought—pleasure seeking, extravagant spending,
unscrupulous accumulation of wealth and flaunting that wealth—permeated
the whole society and emerged as the reigning fashion. The cities and the vil-
lages that once formed a single body were now separated. Third, in these dif-
ferent regions the once unified lifestyles of the various levels of society began
to be undermined. Due to their wealth, the urban merchants and great fami-
lies began to create new life orientations, while some of those scholars who
scrupulously abided by tradition hoped to maintain the seriousness of the
traditional way of life and social order and by so doing to maintain their own
cultural influence. On account of these changes, there was also a disconnect
between the value orientation of various levels of society. Lastly, within the
ranks of the scholars themselves, their formerly similar lifestyle was also lost.
Part of them, due to advancement in office, owning property, or going into
commerce, grew prosperous and very rapidly changed the orientation of their

50  “Chong zhengxue pi yishuo shu,” Gaozi Yishu, j. 7, 2B.

176 Chapter 10

lives. Some scholars, then, were quite shocked by these sorts of changes and
severely criticized them.
In short, dislocations occurred between north and south, urban and rural,
wealthy and poor, and internally in the conceptual world of the intellectual
stratum. In other words, from the point of view of the history of social life,
this was a profound transformation taking place after a unified civilization had
been established from the Song dynasty on. The historically constructed ethi-
cal standards to maintain social order had been steadily lost; the unified nature
of ethical precepts that were originally respected, at least on the surface col-
lapsed, one after another under these conditions of dislocation in the dispa-
rate worlds of daily life.
At this time when the unified nature of social life was disappearing, how-
ever, the unified nature of thought still remained. The political ideology and
ethical and moral concepts under the control of the imperial power employed
the official examinations, children’s education, popular literature, family and
clan rituals, and popular customs to penetrate the conceptual world and con-
tinue to dominate the life of society. Many men of culture were still quite satis-
fied; they even believed that Zhu Xi’s interpretations of the Four Books already
embraced all formal and practical knowledge (knowledge having both sub-
stance and function, youti youyong 有體有用). Some of them were even too
lazy to actually read those classic texts; they simply “focus[ed] on reading and
studying essays currently prescribed for the civil examination as a shortcut.”51
However, a few acute scholars discovered that in real social life knowledge
could not explain various sorts of unusual phenomena, and thought was
unable to respond to all kinds of changes in the social order. The resources at
these scholars’ disposal were unable to diagnose and remedy the many-sided
changes in state (guojia) and society. Two things resulted from this situation:
moral idealism was advocated in speech and writing while vulgar pragmatic
tactics were employed in real life—ideology and practice had become sepa-
rated, but there was no medicine to cure the ills of the time. The world of main-
stream knowledge, thought and belief continued to carry on with the same
mediocre and well well-worn doctrines.
It was precisely those mediocre and well-worn doctrines that compelled
those scholars to turn around and look for alternative resources that could
stimulate new ideas. In that age when the scope of intellectual resources was
relatively narrow and there was no stimulus or influence coming from other
civilizations, the easiest resource to find was a form of knowledge, thought and

51  
Zhanshi xiaobian, j. 30, p. 30 quoting from Lin Qingzhang [1948–], Qingchu de qunjing bian
weixue, 1990, 30.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 177

belief that existed in the historical past but had been marginalized. The most
stimulating and challenging intellectual resource at that time, with the excep-
tion of Buddhist studies which were less and less prominent in mainstream
civilization and among the upper strata of society, was simply the learn-
ing of Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan) who had squared off against Zhu Xi in the
Southern Song.

2.4
Although Lu Jiuyuan’s ideas were quite marginalized at this time, their simple,
uncomplicated, quick-witted and clear character of getting to the heart of the
matter could still attract many scholars. Here we can briefly review the histori-
cal continuity of the arguments between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan. From the Yuan
to the Ming, because the official examination subjects that were related to offi-
cial career advancement were based on the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle, it
occupied a monopoly position in the intellectual world. Starting in the begin-
ning of the Yuan dynasty, the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle was in the center
like the sun while the ideas of Lu Jiuyuan were regularly criticized. The learn-
ing of Lu Jiuyuan, then, always remained silent at that time.
From the beginning of the fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth
century, however, this learning of Lu Jiuyuan attracted a few scholars. Men like
Chen Yuan (1256–1330) and Zhao Xie (?–1364), and so on still carried on the
learning of Lu Jiuyuan in Jiangxi and Siming (Mt. Siming in Zhejiang), but at
the time they were quite marginalized.52 Just because they were marginalized,
though, they could on the contrary manifest their pure and lofty intellectual
attitude and their spirit of resistance to vulgar worldly society. It was particu-
larly because of its orientation toward searching for the clear and pure state
of the mind that the learning of Lu Jiuyuan could even more readily stimu-
late those radical scholars who were disgusted with the mediocre, incoherent,
pragmatic, and trivial thinking of their age.
There actually was not such a wide gap between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan, or
the School of Principle and School of Mind in terms of their terminologies,
learning, and reasoning. The School of Principle originally put quite a bit of
emphasis on the inner mind, and Zhu Xi also said that “the mind is princi-
ple” (xin jishi li 心即是理).53 It was only that the School of Principle was com-
paratively more concerned with its limitations and regulations and leaned
comparatively more toward the accumulation of knowledge and the under-
standing of particular details. Although for a long period of time this “mind”

52  “Jingming Baofeng xue-an,” Song-Yuan xue-an, j. 93, 1750.

53  “Lunyu 19,” ZYL, j. 37, 985.
178 Chapter 10

had been constrained by the limitations and regulations of “principle,” and

“innate knowledge” or “innate knowing” (liangzhi 良知) had been overshad-
owed by the voluminous exegesis on the classics and complicated ceremonial
norms, in the Ming dynasty a group of Confucian scholars who valued practice
began to bring into prominence the significance of the “mind.” In School of
Principle discourse from Cao Duan (Yuchuan, 1376–1434), Xue Xuan (Jingxuan,
1389–1464), Wu Yubi (Kangzhai, 1391–1469), Hu Juren (Jingzhai, 1434–1484) and
Chen Xianzhang (Baisha, 1428–1500) on, the relationship between the mind
and principle began to change. This change slowly grew more extensive and
more profound until in the end it brought about a great transformation in the
world of knowledge and thought.
Wang Yangming (Shouren, 1472–1528) was simply the last scholar to poke
holes in this paper window.

3 Making Waves Again: The Rise and Significance of the Learning of

Wang Yangming

In the age in which Wang Yangming lived, the fifteenth to the sixteenth cen-
turies, many people were already quite weary of both politics and the impe-
rial examinations. Even though year after year the great majority of scholars
kept on studying, memorizing, and taking the examinations according to the
state-sponsored curriculum materials on the classics, still in the intellectual
world many other intellectual trends had already emerged. It was just that the
development of these trends was not at all smooth. In 1528, the year of Wang
Yangming’s death, he and his students were accused at court of attacking Zhu Xi,
and their arguments were characterized as the sort of idle talk (qingtan 清谈,
pure talk) that could destroy the nation. His accuser advised that his doctrines
be proscribed. The Jiajing Emperor (Zhu Houcong, 1507–1567, r. 1521–1567) sup-
ported this suggestion and announced that Wang Yangming had “spoken reck-
lessly and without restraint, vilified former Confucian scholars, called together
disciples to adhere to and promote his teachings, employed trickery to let
themselves go without any constraints, and polluted the minds and thoughts
of the people.” He further ordered the Censorate (Chief Surveillance Bureau)
to announce the order to All Under Heaven that it was forbidden to study
Wang Yangming.54 To the end of the jiajing reign, then, the doctrines of Wang
Yangming continued to be suppressed.

54  
Ming Shizong shilu, j. 98, Ming shilu, 8035.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 179

This situation did not last very long, however. Although the ideas of Wang
Yangming were spurned by the government, because Wang was good at train-
ing students, had a very high reputation, and his doctrine of the “extension
of innate knowledge/knowing” (zhi liangzhi 致良知) was rather simple and
straightforward and easily stimulated idealism and a critical spirit, in a short
time his thinking came to be highly regarded by some scholars and even by
some serving officials.55 In 1567, the first year of the Longqing Emperor (Zhu
Zaihou, 1537–1572, r. 1567–1572), some officials at court recommended that
Wang Yangming and Cheng Baisha receive sacrifices in the official schools
(xuegong 學宮). We can see from this that by that time quite a few scholars
already had a favorable opinion of Wang Yangming. We should take particular
note that society underwent some very great changes at the time. All kinds
of signs clearly indicate that after the Jiajing Emperor’s reign, the space for
popular society increased considerably, and the lifestyles of urban residents
tended toward diversification. The restraining power of traditional ethics was
increasingly attenuated at the same time that the government’s control powers
were continuously relaxing. Along with the development of cities, commerce,
communication, printing techniques, and paper manufacturing, the dissemi-
nation of knowledge was much easier and harder to control. The wealth and
resources of the gentry and urban residents also made it possible for them to
open up alternative ways of disseminating thought and knowledge.
It was precisely under these circumstances that a large number of scholars
began again the practice of lecturing, and these lectures also advanced the dis-
semination and communication of new thought. The private schools (sishu)
and academies (shuyuan) in particular were very instrumental in their support
of this new atmosphere of freedom of study. Because lecturing and teaching in
the academies took a stance different from government education, they were
centered on knowledge-related learning and the cultivation of morality and
not on professional training and striving for official qualifications. They easily
stimulated many kinds of free discussion.
At that time, not only did Wang Yangming himself lecture in many academies,
such as those of Longgang (Guizhou), Guiyang (Guizhou), Lianxi (Jiangxi),
Jishan (Zhejiang), Fuwen (Guangxi) and other places, but many scholars also
opened up educational establishments outside of the official government

55  We use Ying-shih Yü’s translations of zhi liangzhi here. For a new and perceptive view of
Wang Yangming’s contribution to Chinese intellectual history and his ideas on liangzhi,
see his, “Reorientation of Confucian Social Thought in the Age of Wang Yangming,” in
volume one of Ying-shih Yü, Chinese History and Culture: Sixth Century BCE to Seventeenth
Century, 2016.
180 Chapter 10

schools. There they fiercely criticized government schools and the preparatory
studies for the imperial examinations.56 In reality an intellectual force belong-
ing the gentry in popular society was already forming outside of the court, offi-
cialdom, and government schools. Because of this trend, in 1584, the twentieth
year of the Wanli Emperor (Zhu Lijun, 1563–1620, r. 1572–1620), the emperor
had no choice but to obey their opinion and decide to allow Wang Yangming,
Chen Baisha and Hu Juren to receive sacrifices in the Confucian Temple and
thereby enjoy the highest form of honor for a Confucian. Due to this change
of attitude within the court, from the Wanli era on, the doctrines of Wang
Yangming rapidly became popular throughout society.

3.1
In a certain sense, we can say that the problems that Wang Yangming was
concerned with represented a continuation of the Song dynasty School of
Principle. Although the intellectual essence of Wang’s thought absorbed the
ideas of Lu Jiuyuan of the Song dynasty, we should still pay attention to Wang
Yangming’s differences from Lu Jiuyuan. If we say that the questions asked by
Lu Jiuyuan’s thought derived from the history and intellectual world of the
Southern Song, then Wang Yangming’s ideas grew out of a Ming dynasty con-
text already dominated by the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle. In other words,
the problems Wang Yangming was concerned with really derived from Zhu
Xi of the Southern Song, and Wang’s ideas actually represented a revision of
Zhu Xi’s doctrines. It is also in this sense that the Ming dynasty ideas of Wang
Yangming are a continuation of the Song dynasty School of Principle.
One of the essentials of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle was the sepa-
ration of human desires and the Heavenly Principle. By controlling worldly
desires and emotions, they hoped that people could gradually rise to the height
of the Heavenly Principle. They often emphasized and magnified the distinc-
tion between human desires and the Heavenly Principle. Although they admit-
ted that in reality “mind” is one, they still emphasized that only “the mind of
the Way” (daoxin) was in accord with the Heavenly Principle, while the “human
mind” always remained sunk in depravity.57 This distinction was very impor-
tant because only by recognizing this difference in principle could one confirm

56  For example, in his “Wansong shuyuan ji,” Wang Yangming wrote that since the flourish-
ing of the keju examinations “scholars have all run around competing in memorizing liter-
ary compositions, and gaining and losing material profits has divided and confused their
minds.” Schools and scholars “thus no longer have the desire to make clear the proper
human relations.” And so academies and lectures were necessary to supplement govern-
ment education. Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, 1936, j. 7, 43A–B.
57  ZYL j. 62, 61, 1487, 1462.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 181

in practice one’s rise from the worldly level up to the realm of the Heavenly
Principle—it required a rather difficult process of study.
According to Zhu Xi’s theory, because the Heavenly Principle existed and
was reflected in the ten thousand affairs and the ten thousand material things
(that is, everything in the world), one must observe and experience everything;
one must practice “the investigation of things and the extension of knowl-
edge” (gewu zhizhi) and only then could one understand “principle” (li). Only
through the process of “investigation of things and extension of knowledge,”
can one verify the significance and value of the teaching and guidance of a
scholar as a “teacher who teaches the Dao and skills in villages” (shiru 師儒).
Only by confirming the significance and value of the teaching and guidance of
a scholar as a “teacher of Confucianism,” could the intellectual stratum finally
preserve a space for its existence.
This way of thinking is reasonable in its way, but this reasonableness can
only be seen when imperial power does not dominate everything, the politi-
cal world is sufficiently relaxed, and the intellectual stratum has relatively
enough room for independence. Only then would there be a real possibility
for this kind of moral and political idealism to be genuinely put into practice.
However, during the reign of the Hongzhi Emperor (Zhou Youcheng, 1470–
1505, r. 1488–1505), the relaxed political environment had already disappeared,
and under the Jiajing Emperor, the domination of imperial power was again
very strict. And besides, at a time when the School of Principle had already
become a political ideology, the Heavenly Principle could simply become part
of the administrative system of autocratic rule and a restraint on free minds.
According to School of Principle thinking, only the Heavenly Principle ensures
the passage of the mind from depravity to transcendence, from vulgarity to
purity, and from the “human mind” to the “mind of the Way.” Precisely because
the School of Principle greatly despised the vulgar world and excessively
revered the world of transcendence, its moral demands were overly strict, and
so it could often devolve into a set of dogmatic precepts by which the govern-
ment could control all thought while its rules of social restraint could totally
stifle people’s lively imagination and free thinking.
Wang Yangming’s revision of Zhu Xi’s doctrines that dominated the intel-
lectual world at the time began with a re-definition of “mind.” As Wang’s
Instructions for Practical Living (Chuanxi lu) puts it, “the mind is principle. Is
there any affair in the world outside of the mind? Is there any principle outside
of the mind?”58

58  Translation from Wing-tsit Chan, Instructions For Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian
Writings by Wang Yang-Ming [that is (Wang’s Chuanxi lu, 傳習錄], 1963. part I7. 3. Chan,
SB, 667.
182 Chapter 10

According to Wang Yangming, the mind naturally possesses “innate knowl-

edge/knowing” or “innate knowledge of the good” and such knowledge is the
original substance of the mind. The mind is naturally able to know.”59 With
this way of thinking, Wang Yangming transformed the external social rules and
regulations (li 禮, rites, propriety, etiquette) into a “principle” (li 理) that tran-
scends such concrete norms.60 He also brought this “principle” back into the
inner “mind.” When his “innate knowing” naturally emanates from the “mind”
it is simply the “mind of the Way” (the moral mind, daoxin). It is inherently in
accord with the Heavenly Principle, and it is able to make people’s external
behavior spontaneously adjust to “propriety.” Everything in the mind can lead
to self-fulfillment. The mind is simply morality itself and also the inspector of
morality. People do not need the help of the restraints of an external ethics and
morality, nor do they need to rely on the mirror of the Heavenly Principle that
is external to the mind.
Superficially the difference of these ideas from Song dynasty Confucianism
does not actually seem to be very great, but this is precisely the special charac-
teristic of Wang Yangming’s thought. He said that what Lu Jiuyuan really inher-
ited was the thought of Mencius.61 His evidence was quite concise. Because Lu
Jiuyuan had said, “as for mind, mind is unitary, and as for principle, principle
is unitary,… this mind and this principle really cannot tolerate duality”; this
was simply Mencius’ saying that “all the ten thousand things are there in me”
(wanwu jie bei yu wo 萬物皆備於我).62
In light of this, Wang Yangming criticized Zhu Xi for incorrectly separating
“mind” and “principle.”63 Wang said that “the learning of the sages” (shengren
zhi xue) was simply “the learning of mind” (xinxue 心學) and asserted that “the
mind is simply human nature, and human nature is simply principle” (xin ji xing,
xing ji li 心即性, 性即理). The so-called “principle” that envelopes everything in
the universe actually comes from the “mind” that possesses innate knowledge,
and the origin of this “mind” possessing innate knowledge is simply our human

59  “Xu Ai lu,” Chen Rongjie, Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. shang, 40.
Translated in Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, part I, 15.
60  Ibid., p. 41: “the character li 禮 is simply the character li 理.”
61  Wang Yangming, “Xiangshan wenji xu,” (gengchen), Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, 1936,
j. 7, 29B. Lau, Mencius, VIIA. 4, 182.
62  “Yu Zeng Zhaizhi shu,” LJYJ, 1, 4–5. Mengzi VII. 4, Lau, Mencius, 182.
63  “Lu Cheng lu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. shang, 71. Translation from
Chan, SB, 673.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 183

nature that is bestowed by Heaven. Wang repeatedly emphasized that “there is

no principle outside the mind; there is no event outside the mind.”64
This way of thinking very much resembles that of Chan Buddhism, and
its significance is just the same as when Chan Buddhism replaced Indian
Buddhism during the period from the seventh to the eighth centuries.
Chan Buddhism rejected the idea of a duality of the “human mind” and the
“Buddha mind” and emphasized that the vulgar human mind and the realm
of transcendence were united in one. This was really because Chan wanted to
transfer the power of salvation from monastic discipline, cultivation, and anal-
ysis to personal self-awareness (enlightenment) in the mind. In like manner,
Wang Yangming brought the “human mind” and the “mind of the Way” (the
moral mind) together as one; this goal was implicit in his way of reasoning.
As a Confucian, though, Wang Yangming still believed that good and
evil existed in this world, and so in theory he could not abandon the
Confucian responsibility for moral education, nor could he turn his back on
the Confucian duty to purify the social order. In his own discourse, he was
never able to completely endorse the reasonableness of natural (spontaneous)
human nature; he still abided by the principles of ethics and morality. That is to
say he continued to believe that in the universal human mind there was really
not only pure innate nature (tianxing, 天性); there were still impure human
desires. Because of this, when his disciple asked him, since “all people have
this mind, and this mind is identical with principle, why do some people do
good and others do evil?”,65 he could only admit that there was a difference
between the “mind of the Way” and the “human mind.” So in another place
he said: “When the human mind is rectified it is called the moral mind [mind
of the Way, daoxin] and when the moral mind loses its correctness, it is called
the human mind.”66 Although this “mind” was originally radiantly bright, but
“only because it is hidden by selfish desires is the original substance of heaven
lost …” Wang Yangming concluded, however, that the transformation of good
and evil or of the human mind and the mind of the Way still simply depended
on a person’s own inner mind. He believed that when the obstructions were
removed from a person’s mind, that mind could then return to its original
condition of unclouded clarity. As he said, “Now if one extends the innate

64  “Shu Zhu Yangbo juan,” Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, 1936, j. 8, 12A. Chan, Instructions
For Practical Living, Part I. 32, 1963, 33.
65  This passage is followed by “The Teacher said, ‘The mind of the evil man has lost its origi-
nal substance.’” Chan, SB, 674, (Chuanxi lu, 1:24b).
66  “Xu Ai lu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. shang, 42. Chan, Instructions For
Practical Living, Part I. 10, 1963, 16–17.
184 Chapter 10

knowledge in every thought and removes all these hindrances and obstacles,
its original substance will be recovered and right …”67

3.2
If one still had to go from the human mind to the mind of the Way, then what
method must one employ? In Zhu Xi’s thought, it was the so-called “investiga-
tion of things and the extension of knowledge.” A person had to work as hard
as possible to exhaust completely various kinds of knowledge. As Zhu Xi put it,
“if you do not exhaust one thing, then you will be deficient in one reason, and
if you do not investigate one thing, then you will be deficient in one principle.”68
So Zhu Xi emphasized study. He believed that only in this way could one rise
from “following the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue) to “honoring
the moral nature” (zun dexing), and by studying books and observing things
one could cultivate one’s own mind.
Wang Yangming on the other hand advocated the so-called “extension of
innate knowledge” (zhi liangzhi 致良知).” “Extension of innate knowledge” was
essentially not seeking reason from external knowledge, but rather uncovering
the original nature (benxing) possessed by one’s inner mind. This was a very
fundamental aspect of Wang Yangming’s thought. According to him, the basic
reason that problems arise in society is simply because “in later generations,
the doctrine of innate knowledge has not clearly prevailed.” He believed that
“if gentlemen of the world merely devote their effort to extending their innate
knowledge, they will naturally share with all a universal sense of right and
wrong, share their likes and dislikes, regard other people as their own persons,
regard the country as their own family, and look upon Heaven, Earth, and all
things as one body.”69
In order to correct the biases of the School of Principle, Wang Yangming did
a whole series of re-interpretations of the ancient Confucian classics, espe-
cially the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean,” that formed the
basis of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism. Wang believed that the Cheng-Zhu
interpretation of “the investigation of things” (gewu) in the “Great Learning”
led many scholars to pursue external knowledge as their goal. He believed that
the correct path should be to rely on the inner mind for self-examination and
thought; that is, “the important thing in learning is to acquire learning through

67  Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 222, 1963, 199–200.
68  ZYL, j. 15, 295.
69  “Da Nie Wenwei,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. zhong, 258–259. Chan,
Instructions For Practical Living, Part II. 180, 179, 163, 167. We modify Chan’s translation
slightly to match Wang Yangming’s original.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 185

the exercise of the mind.”70 On this account, he made a new interpretation of the
key “Great Learning” passage on “investigation of things and extension of knowl-
edge” (gewu zhizhi). For Wang, rectifying their minds (zhengxin 正心), making
their will sincere (chengyi), investigation of things (gewu), and the extension
of knowledge (zhizhi) in the “Great Learning” were only a series of activities
searching for nature and principle (xingli 性理) in the inner mind.71 For Wang,
“mind,” “things,” “will,” and “knowledge” were really only different aspects of
the mind, and he interpreted “rectified,” “sincere,” “investigate,” and “extend”
as the mind’s self-conscious adjustment, self-examination, and thought. Wang
continued the train of reasoning since Mencius that presupposed that the
human mind naturally possesses innate knowledge (liangzhi), that this innate
knowledge was the original substance (benti 本體) of the mind, and it was sim-
ply the original mind “before it was activated” (weifa). Even though “after it
was activated” (yifa), it would have various unwarranted thoughts, that eter-
nal innate knowledge would, however, still seem to be there in the depths of
the mind always maintaining its original clarity. People only had to turn back,
then, and re-experience that state of clarity. According to Wang Yangming’s
interpretation, this realm of the mind that resembles Buddhism is simply what
the “Doctrine of the Mean” meant by saying that “the superior man is watch-
ful over himself when he is alone” ( junzi shen qi du 君子慎其獨). This state of
the mind that is neither perturbed nor afraid is simply the pure realm of the
Heavenly Principle.72

70  “Da Luo Zheng-an shaozai shu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. zhong,
247–248. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part II. 173, Part II. 173, 1963, 159.
71  This iconic passage in the “Great Learning” runs as follows: “The ancients who wished
to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states.
Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those
who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who
wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished
to rectify their minds would first make their will sincere. Those who wished to make their
will sincere would first extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in
the investigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when
knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is
rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life
is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in
order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world.” Chan, SB,
86–87.
72  “Xue Kan lu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. shang, 148. The first section
of the “Doctrine of the Mean” reads as follows: “What Heaven (Tian, Nature) imparts to
man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (Dao). Cultivating the
Way is called education. The Way cannot be separated from us for a moment. What can
186 Chapter 10

It is said that Wang Yangming’s doctrine was aimed at what he considered

a defect of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle in separating “knowledge” or
“knowing” (zhi 知) and “action” or “acting” (xing 行) into two polarities. Because
Zhu Xi put great emphasis on the “investigation of things,” that is the search for
knowledge, he could not avoid separating the “Doctrine of the Mean” concepts
of “extensive learning” (boxue 博學) and “earnest practice” (duxing 篤行).73
With that, “knowledge” is one pole and “action” is another pole, and one must
first obtain knowledge before one can act. This way of thinking led the Cheng-
Zhu School of Principle to place too much emphasis on “following the path of
inquiry and study” (dao wenxue).
According to Wang Yangming’s interpretation, the “investigation of things”
is really not a search for external knowledge because the ears, the eyes, the
mouth, the nose, and the four limbs that obtain knowledge of the world are
also controlled by the mind; the body and the mind are one.” Therefore “if
there is no mind, there will be no body, and if there is no body, there will be
no mind.”74 For Wang, all the external phenomena in the world can be seen
as sprouting (emerging) from the mind,75 and all study was fundamentally
intended to rediscover this clear and unsullied mind. To establish this mind
amounted to achieving true knowledge. And so “extensive learning” was
intended only to assure that the Heavenly Principle remained always in the
mind, while “earnest practice” was simply to continually practice this storage

be separated from us is not the Way. Therefore the superior man is cautious over what
he does not see and apprehensive over what he does not hear. There is nothing more vis-
ible than what is hidden and nothing more manifest than what is subtle. Therefore the
superior man is watchful over himself when he is alone (shen qi du).” Chan, SB, 98, with
changes into pinyin romanization.
73  Zhongyong, §20 last paragraph, reads as follows: “Study it (the way to be sincere) exten-
sively, inquire into it accurately, think it over carefully, sift it clearly, and practice it
earnestly.” (boxue zhi, shenwen zhi, shensi zhi, mingbian zhi, duxing zhi, 博學之，審問
之，慎思之，明辨之，篤行之). Chan SB, 107.
74  “Chen Jiuchuan lu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. xia, 282. Chan,
Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 201, 1963, 189.
75  The most famous example of this is the passage in “Huang Mianzhi lu” [following Chan’s
translation] concerning the idea that “there is nothing under heaven external to the
mind.” Wang said that “these flowering trees on the high mountain blossom and drop
their blossoms of themselves … Before you look at these flowers, they and your mind are
in the state of silent vacancy. As you come to look at them, their colors at once show up
clearly. From this you can know that these flowers are not external to your mind.” Wang
Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. xia, 332. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living,
Part III. 275, 1963, 222.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 187

of the Heavenly Principle. Since human “knowledge” and “action” actually take
place simultaneously in an instant, then the minute that innate knowledge is
activated it is already also action.76 Otherwise, “How can all things in the world
be investigated?” Wang further asked: As “[Cheng Yi] even said ‘Every blade
of grass and every tree possesses principle.… [if so] How can we [completely]
investigate [them]?”77 In light of this, a Confucian’s every concern should be
to maintain the pristine purity of the mind. Wang believed that if there was
no sprouting (emergence) from innate knowledge, then so-called knowledge
would simply not be genuine knowledge belonging to the mind. When all
knowledge was only the emergence and presentation of the inner mind, so-
called “knowledge” and “action” could no longer be regarded as two elements;
they would all be subsumed into the process of the mind’s search for innate
knowledge in the direction of the realm of clarity and brightness.
All forms of ancient Chinese thought always tried to derive support for
their reasonableness and authority from history and tradition. From Han Yu
on, especially in Confucian doctrines from the Song dynasty on, Confucians
put particular emphasis on the so-called “tradition of moral principle” or the
“succession of the Way” (daotong). They also worked hard to construct a his-
torical progression reaching from themselves back to the ancient Chinese
sages and worthies. Wang Yangming was no exception. He believed that he,
much more than Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, felt the pulse of genuine Confucian
truth from Confucius and Mencius down to the present, and for this reason,
he also repeatedly claimed that he himself was the true heir of the authentic
Confucian tradition.

3.3
History often seems like a cyclical reincarnation, time after time enacting the
same drama. Intellectual history seems even more frequently to carry on
the same debates and argue about the same topics from one side and the other.
Discussing Wang Yangming’s doctrines, we cannot help but be reminded of
the seventh-to-eighth-century polemics between mainstream Buddhism and

76  In “Huang Mianzhi lu,” Wang Yangming had this to say about “the unity of knowledge and
action”: “I advocate the unity of knowledge and action precisely because I want people to
understand that when a thought is aroused it is already action.” Wang Yangming Chuanxi
lu xiangzhu jiping, j. xia, 302. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 226, 1963, 201.
77  “Chen Qiuchuan lu,” Chuanxi lu, Part III. 318. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living,
Part III. 318, 1963, 247.
188 Chapter 10

Chan Buddhism concerning the Buddha nature and gradual enlightenment.78

That polemic concerned the two ghâta:

The body is the tree of perfect wisdom (bodhi)

The mind is the stand of a bright mirror.
At all times diligently wipe it.
Do not allow it to become dusty.
And
Fundamentally perfect wisdom has no tree.
Nor has the bright mirror any stand.
Buddha-nature is forever clear and pure.
Where is there any dust?79

In the Ming dynasty, they seemed to have been playing the same old tune over
again.
Indeed, Wang Yangming’s thought was obviously stimulated and influ-
enced by Buddhism, but, on the other hand, he also stimulated and influenced
the revival of Buddhism among the scholar-officials.80 During the reign of
Emperor Wanli, Lianchi (Zhuhong, 1535–1615), Zibo (Zhenke, Daguan, 1543–
1603), Hanshan (Deqing, 1546–1623) and other celebrated Buddhists came
into prominence at the same time, and this may well have been related to the
intellectual atmosphere around Wang Yangming’s thought.81 Their thinking
and their language was also often related to Wang Yangming’s doctrines. In
the same way, however, that the clear and uncomplicated “doctrine of sudden
enlightenment” (dunwu shuo) of Southern Chan very quickly attracted many
believers at the time and led to many worries about the survival of Buddhism
itself, just so, due to its quick-wittedness and high-mindedness, did Wang

78  For this polemic between Buddhism and Chan Buddhism, see above “The Eighth to Tenth
Century Transformation of Buddhism, II: The Victory of Chan Buddhism and the Defeat
of Buddhism.”
79  The first ghâta is by Shenxiu and the second is by Huineng. Chan, SB, 431–432.
80  Tao Wangling, “Xinchou ru du ji Junshi di shiwushou zhi shi” Xie-an ji, 1610, j. 16, has
this line: “Those who study Buddhism today, Do so because of the enticement of innate
knowledge (liangzhi).”
81  “Xuelang fashi Engong zhongxing fadao zhuan,” in Hanshan dashi ji, records that after
Yongle (1403–1424), “the Way of Chan was not popular (conspicuous). There was only a
sect that still actively lectured on Chan Buddhism in the Northern capital, but the prac-
tice of Chan and its Way in the south gradually disappeared.” It was not until after zhengde
(1506–1521) and jiajing (1522–1566) that this situation changed. See Shen Defu (1578–1642),
“Chanlin zhu mingsu,” Wanli yehuo bian, 1997, j. 27, 693–694.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 189

Yangming’s thought also deliver a great shock to the Ming dynasty and make a
great deal of trouble for Confucian doctrine. This was because the foundations
of his thought gave rise to two different intellectual trends.
The first trend embodied the “doctrine in four axioms” (siju jiao 四句教) that
Wang Yangming gave to his disciples at the so-called “Colloquy at the Tianquan
Bridge” (Tianquan zhengdao) meeting. During those discussions, Wang said:

In the original substance of the mind there is no distinction of good and

evil.
When the will becomes active, however, such distinction exists.
The faculty of innate knowledge is to know good and evil.
The investigation of things is to do good and remove evil.82

Perhaps these four axioms come closest to the basic meaning of Wang
Yangming’s doctrines.
Although the idea that “the mind is principle” (xin ji li) had already in theory
placed good and evil in one mind, in the final analysis Wang Yangming still
admitted that the mind could continue to produce the two poles of good and
evil. People still had a responsibility, then, to search for knowledge, that is to
“extend innate knowledge” and seek to return to the “original substance of the
mind” (xin zhi ben 心之本) that was crystal-clear without any impediment. On
this account and similar to the situation of Northern Chan, Wang Yangming
very carefully maintained the last line of defense of Confucian morality. Thus
after Wang Yangming expressed his “basic aims” in the above quoted four axi-
oms, he repeatedly exhorted his two students, Qian Dehong (1496–1574) and
Wang Ji (1498–1583) as to what they should do as follows:

People’s minds are dominated by habits. If we do not teach them con-

cretely and sincerely to devote themselves to the task of doing good
and removing evil right in their innate knowledge rather than merely
imagining an original substance in a vacuum, all that they do will not be
genuine and they will do no more than cultivate a mind of vacuity and

82  “Sijujiao,” Chuanxi lu, Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 315, 1963, 243–245.
Also see Chan, SB, 687–689 for Chan’s comment on Wang Yangming’s famous “doctrine in
four axioms” (sijujiao 四句教). Hou Wailu, et al., asserted that these four axioms “should
be seen as Wang Yangming’s final conclusions near the end of his life.” Hou Wailu, et al.,
Song Ming lixueshi, j. xia, chapter nine, second edition, 1997, 236.
190 Chapter 10

quietness. This defect is not a small matter and must be exposed as early
as possible.83

Precisely because efforts still had to be made Wang Yangming, like Northern
Chan before him, paid rather great attention to the process of nourishing and
cultivating the mind. He once told his students that the extension of innate
knowledge also went forward gradually day by day.
Wang’s closest student, Qian Dehong, abided by this part of Wang’s thought,
and so he brought up the idea that “the learning of the superior man must
work at having no desires” and that it was necessary to employ “watchful-
ness when alone” (self-watchfulness, shendu 慎獨) to seek “harmony within”
(zhonghe 中和) and “admonishment and trepidation” ( jingju 驚懼) to seek
“innate knowledge.”84
The second trend is closely associated with Wang Yangming’s student Wang
Ji. If we carefully analyze it, the reasoning discussed above can be seen to have
left some key questions that were never satisfactorily answered. First, if the
original state of the mind was without good or evil, how then could it give rise
to the two poles of good and evil? Second, if one says that the original sub-
stance of the “mind” comes to contain both good and evil “when the will (yi 意)
becomes active,” then how can it possess “knowledge” and how can it guaran-
tee that “goodness” can overcome “evil?” Third, why is it possible for worldly
enticements, practical interests and inner desires to obey the guidance of rea-
son and incline toward so-called “innate knowledge?” It was due precisely to
the perplexity of these questions that after Wang Yangming a different sort of
interpretation developed among his students. It started with the presupposi-
tion of “mind is principle”.
Wang Ji believed that “the mind is a mind that contains good but not evil,
and so the will is a will that contains good but not evil; knowledge (knowing)
is also a knowledge that contains good but not evil; and things (wu) are also
things that contain good but not evil.”85 This is to say that no matter whether it

83  “Sijujiao,” Chuanxi lu, Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 315, 1963, 244–245.
“Nianpu san,” Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, j. 34, for jiajing sixth year (1527), ninth month
renqu, 39A–41B. Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. xia, “Huang Mianzhi lu,”
359–360.
84  See “Zhezhong Wangmen xue-an yi,” Mingru xue-an, j. 11, 227 and 233, citing Qian
Dehong’s “Huiyu” and “Lunxue shu”; Mingshi, j. 282, 7272, “Rulin er: Qian Dehong zhuan”
simply says that Wang Ji “actually entered into Chan, but Dehong still did not lose the
basic rules or principles of being a Confucian.
85  “Nianpu san,” Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, j. 34, jiajing sixth year (1527), ninth month
renqu, 39A–41B.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 191

is mind, will, knowledge, or material things, they all must “contain good but no
evil.” Superficially this interpretation does not seem to be really unusual, but
only a matter of emphasizing that the mind originally contains “innate knowl-
edge” and making the “innate (good, liang 良)” of “innate knowledge” or “good
knowing” more prominent. Implicit in this slight distinction, though, there
was actually an extremely great difference. If the mind, will, knowledge, and
material things are all regarded as containing “goodness” and without “evil,”
it amounts to bestowing complete reasonableness upon the “mind.” Just the
same as with Southern Chan’s final assertion that “my mind is the Buddha,”
once the mind is affirmed in this way, then all of the desires of the mind will
have been rationalized.
During his lifetime, Wang Yangming did not refute Wang Ji’s views, but rather
maintained an attitude of mediation toward this way of thinking.86 But after
Wang Yangming, these different ideas began to be disseminated under the
name of Wang Yangming thought. Since Wang Ji expanded “innate knowledge”
to the extreme, the mind was without evil and only contained good, and this
created a very large scope for the self-indulgence of human desires. Just like the
idea that “my mind is the Buddha” of Southern Chan a thousand years earlier,
this search for absolute freedom and spontaneity (ziyou, ziran) undermined
the last responsibility of Confucianism for society, ethics, and life.87 Although
Wang Ji himself still insisted on “quietism” and being “without thought” in
theory, the “genuineness (zhen, 真)” that he emphasized and his affirmation
that the mind contained good but not evil still very easily enabled people to
follow the path of naturalism (ziran zhuyi) in which they could follow their
desires and do as they pleased.

86  In the so-called “Colloquy at the Tianquan Bridge,” Wang Yangming made the following
statements to mediate between the views of Qian Dehong and Wang Ji: “You two gentle-
men complement each other very well, and should not hold on to one side … Wang Ji
should employ Dehong’s view of cultivation, and Dehong should apprehend thoroughly
Wang Ji’s view of original substance. If you two gentlemen use your views interchangeably,
you will be able to lead all people—of the highest, average, and lowest intelligence—to
the truth.” But this imagined balance only existed in theory; in reality there would often
be partiality, and this was proven by later history. “Nianpu san,” Wang Wenchenggong
quanshu, j. 34, 40A. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 315, 1963, 244. With
name and romanization changes and one modification for clarity due to ellipses in the
quote.
87  Just as Shimada Kenji wrote in his Shushigaku to Yômeigaku, Wang Ji’s “was a form of Chan
Buddhist [Wang] Yangming teaching from the beginning. He eliminated the last vestiges
of Confucian content and turned it into something completely Chan Buddhist.”
192 Chapter 10

Later on, members of the so-called “Left Wing” or radical Wang School were
predominantly descended from the internal logic of Wang Yangming’s and
Wang Ji’s ideas. Simply put, because they affirmed the reasonableness of the
idea that the mind “contains good but not evil,” then this allowed all actions of
the mind in real life to be considered reasonable. Because “no feelings and no
desires” (wuqing wuyu) was only a theoretical condition, however, and in real
life people always “have feelings and desires” (youqing youyu), these people
who had feelings and desires found a rationale for liberating or even indulg-
ing themselves behind the theoretical reasonableness of those feelings and
desires.

3.4
At the time, not everyone actually agreed with Wang Yangming’s ideas. For
example, during Wang Yangming’s lifetime people like Luo Qinshun (1465–
1547) and Gu Lin (1476–1545) both sent letters to Wang refuting his opinions
on Zhu Xi.88 A few decades later, Chen Jian (1497–1567) wrote his Thorough
Debate on Three Teachings (Xuebu tongbian 学蔀通辩) fiercely criticizing the
Wang Yangming School. Inside the Wang School itself, Huang Wan (1480–1554)
also criticized Wang Ji in his On Illuminating the Way (Mingdao bian).
In spite of these critiques, however, by the reign of the Longqing Emperor
(Zhu Zaihou, 1537–1572, r. 1567–1572), after the reversal of the political verdict
against it, the Wang Yangming School very quickly grew into a contemporary
intellectual fashion following the widespread practice of scholars giving lec-
tures and the sudden upsurge of private learning. Wang Yangming’s radical
critique of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle and his own idealism attracted
many different sorts of people in a very short period of time. A group of very
learned men came to agree independently on the revolutionary significance of
these kinds of ideas. In the words of Liu Zongzhou (1578–1645), they believed
that

since the line of the Cheng-Zhu School of teaching was discontinued,

there has been no one who could correct the one-sided views and the
mistaken ideas and bring Confucian teaching back to the sage’s views and
return to the original principle as profoundly and brilliantly as Master
(Wang Yangming).89

88  See “Da Gu Dongqiao shu,” “Da Luo Zheng-an shaozai shu,” in Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu
xiangzhu jiping, j. zhong, 159–201, 247–256.
89  Liu Zongzhou, “Yangming chuanxinlu yi, xiaoyin,” in Liuzi quanshu yibian, 1892, j. 1, 1119a.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 193

This was because after the long process of ideological systemization and insti-
tutionalization, the School of Principle had already lost its significance as the
salvation of the mind, a critique of power and authority, and an establisher of
social order. It had devolved into a set of empty moral regulations and blood-
less dogmatic texts. A strong and lively form of thought was needed in order to
revitalize the age.90
Each of the two tendencies arising out of Wang Yangming’s doctrines had
its believers among members of the later Wang School. Among them, besides
the above mentioned Qian Dehong, Luo Hongxian (1504–1564), Zou Shouyi
(1491–1562), Nie Shuangjiang (1487–1563), and others still advocated holding
on to Confucianism’s last line of defense, and had a fearful attitude toward the
indulgence of the mind. Because they were still able to separate out and dis-
tinguish between the ideal realm and worldly life and between ultimate goals
and the present situation, and because they still maintained an aspiration and
a spirit for moral improvement, Huang Zongxi considered that they were the
true descendants of Wang Yangming.
Nevertheless, the disciples of Wang Ji and Wang Gen (1483–1541), especially
the so-called “Taizhou School,” represented a different tendency that was even
more popular in these several decades. The spirit of naturalism and the search
for freedom within the Wang School eventually went beyond the boundaries
set by Wang Yangming, and overstepped the bounds allowed by the political
system.91 It gradually became the most noticeable and most attractive current
of thought. Its followers attacked Chinese tradition and social order as hard as
they could; they conflated daily life with the ideal realm, and worldly feelings
and desires with the original substance of the mind. They further affirmed the
reasonableness of worldly feelings and desires, and regarded the natural (origi-
nal) condition of the mind as the ultimate ideal condition; they equated the
ordinary common mass of people with the sages and worthies, and affirmed

90  In the early Qing, Lu Longqi (1630–1692) commented on why Wang Yangming’s thought
was so well received and he mentioned two reasons: (1) “His thought could let people
indulge themselves and also feel at ease about it. It was not like Cheng-Zhu’s thought that
required them to observe carefully the prescribed rules and norms without any leniency.”
and (2) “Wang’s teaching viewed everything under Heaven as empty but only this (heart/
mind) as real. Thus, those who were not worthy were happy about the indulgent side of
his teaching while those who were virtuous also wanted to seek his teaching that there is
no difference in life and death.” Tang Jian (1778–1861), Qing xue-an xiaoshi, j. 1, SBBY, 3B.
91  Just as Huang Zongxi wrote, “Wang Yangming’s School had Taizhou and Longxi factions
and so became fashionable all over the empire [De Bary, Sources, 864 has “spread like the
wind over all the land”], but also because of these two factions it ceased to be transmit-
ted.” “Taizhou xue-an, 1,” Mingru xue-an, j. 32, 703.
194 Chapter 10

the value of human existence and the significance of life. Both the thought
and the behavior of men like He Xinyin (1517–1579), Luo Rufang (1515–1588) and
Li Zhi (1527–1602) presented a challenge to the traditional social order.92
This sort of audacious idealism and radical naturalism of, in Li Zhi’s phrase,
“no sages and no laws” ( feisheng wufa 非聖無法) was particularly enticing
to those young men who had long been confined in an intellectual straight-
jacket. It was also very attractive to men with strong literary temperaments.
Later scholars have paid widespread attention to the unconventional literati
of that time, such as Yuan Hongdao (1568–1610), Tang Xianzu (1550–1616), Tao
Wangling (1562–1609) and Dong Qichang (1555–1636), all of whom emerged
under the influence of this intellectual atmosphere. Although from today’s
vantage point, their thought did not exceed the boundaries of the traditional
Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief, its internal destructive power
still moved many people to be abnormally vigilant.93 In 1602 (wanli 30), Zhang
Wenda (1554–1613) accused Li Zhi of misconduct in office and impeached him,
and then Kang Piyang (1592 jinshi) impeached Da Guan (Zibo Zhenke, 1543–
1603) who, together with Li Zhi, had been dubbed the “two major heresy lead-
ers” (liang da jiaozhu 兩大教主).94 Feng Qi (1558–?), a Secretary in the Bureau of
Rites, was even more incensed about this “no sages and no laws” discourse. He
sent a memorial to the thrown furiously denouncing this fashion and request-
ing that the court have all of those heretical writings burned. Having little
choice in this situation, Emperor Wanli, who originally supported the Wang
Yangming School sent down an imperial edict strongly criticizing the intel-
lectual atmosphere following the wide-scale rise of Wang Yangming thought.
The edict said:

Recently scholars have not only defamed Song dynasty Confucian schol-
ars and come close to slandering and ridiculing Confucius, but they have
also done away with right and wrong and abandoned proper deport-
ment. How can the court now find loyal and filial scholars with moral

92  In his “Shiliu shiji Zhongguo jinbu de zhexue sichao gaishu,” Hou Wailu separated the
intellectual currents of that time into four categories; he called the Taizhou School of
Wang Gen, He Xinyin and Li Zhi “heretical anti-feudal thought” and proposed that it “was
a form of materialism linked to humanism,” Hou Wailu shixue lunwenji, xia ce, 1988, 1–29.
93  The most influential among them was Li Zhi. See Mizoguchi Yûzo (1932–2010)’s study,
translated by Suo Jieran and Gong Ying as Zhongguo jindai sixiang de quzhe yu zhankai,
1997. In his “Lun Li Zhi zai Mingdai sixiangshi shang de diwei,” Li Zhuoran is critical of the
exaggeration of Li Zhi’s antitraditionalism. See his, Mingshi sanlun, 153–168.
94  Shen Defu, “Liang da jiaozhu,” Wanli yehuo bian, j. 27, 691.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 195

integrity and righteous behavior to employ as officials? That the situation

has come to this is all because our chief examination officials were most
interested in valuing talents and wrongly accepted these strange new
progressive scholars [into the government].95

3.5
He Xinyin was killed in jail in 1579 and Li Zhi committed suicide in prison in
1602. Political ideology narrowed the scope for thinking, realistic social order
demanded the preservation of a unity of thought, and this led to a change of
intellectual direction. This change of direction was not, however, only due
to political pressure from the court or practical necessity. In actuality, a self-
adjustment within Confucianism itself had been going on all along, and some
new intellectual tendencies emerged at this time.
One of these tendencies was the criticism leveled by Gao Panlong (1562–
1626), Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612) and others at the intellectual world that took
the Wang Yangming School as it center. They hoped to employ the Cheng-Zhu
School of Principle to remedy the excessive radicalism of Wang Yangming
thought, to clarify the intellectual order through a revision of knowledge, and
to put forth “the investigation of things” again as an antidote to the vacuous
ramblings of the Wang Yangming School. Gao Panlong saw the crisis implicit
in their thinking, and so he criticized it as follows:

The Wang Yangming School began by “sweeping away sense knowledge in

order to clear the mind” and ended by “indulging the mind and abolish-
ing learning.” It began by “sweeping away good and evil in order to empty
thought” and ended by “indulging in emptiness and abolishing good
behavior.” These tendencies led to “taking reputation, integrity, loyalty,
and rightness lightly while scholars rarely practiced moral cultivation.”96

In a similar fashion, Gu Xiancheng pointed out that due to Wang Yangming and
his later followers’ excessive emphasis on the significance of the self-awareness
of the mind, the restraining force of morality was undermined because the
mind is a living thing and very difficult to master.97

95  Ming Shenzong shilu, j. 370, Wanli sanshi nian sanyue yichou, Ming shilu, 11935. However,
the citation in the Ming shilu was quite brief or sketchy. See the complete text of Feng Qi,
Zhengxue shu in Feng Yingjing, Huangming jingshi shiyong bian, j. 28, 2526.
96  “Chongwen huiyu xu,” Gaozi yishu, j. 9 shang, 24A.
97  See Gu Xiancheng, “Rixin shuyuan ji,” Jing gao cang gao, j. 11, SKQS, ce 1292, 145.
196 Chapter 10

Gao and Gu both tried to re-introduce the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle

and to clarify the intellectual world by means of their new interpretation of
the learning of principle. At a time when the Wang School was spreading
unchecked, Gao Panlong again asserted the importance of Zhu Xi’s teachings.
He said that “without Master Zhu, the Way of Confucius would not have been
made known, and not knowing Confucius, the Way of Master Zhu would also
not be known.98
Gu Xiancheng also said that “when scholars become used to flighty and
absurd practices, it is fine to rectify this with Master Zhu Xi’s teaching; when
scholars become stubborn and incapable of change, it is fine to turn them
around with Master Wang Yangming’s teaching.”99 These statements could
perhaps have represented the thinking of some elite scholars who were look-
ing for a new intellectual orientation. They also represented the hopes of
scholars who already had a clear view of contemporary society and its intel-
lectual conditions.
These hopes were expressed in a very concentrated form in Gao Panlong’s
memorial entitled “On valuing correct learning and refuting strange views”
(Chong zhengxue pi yishuo shu) that he sent up to the throne in 1592 (wanli
20). In the text of this memorial, Gao criticized various intellectual schools, but
he was also reserved about them. He tried to employ an integrative method
to restore the order of the intellectual world.100 Regrettably, however, it was
extremely difficult to find a logical connection between the thinking derived
from the Cheng-Zhu and the Lu-Wang traditions.101 In the end his thought
returned to the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle as a cultural absolute:

[Scholars] must read the Four Books and the Five Classics, and must not
be engrossed in the doctrines of Buddhism and Daoism. They must lecture

98  “Zhuzi jieyao xu,” Gaozi yishu, j. 9 shang, 3A-4B. Also see “Chongqie Jinsi lu xu,” “Zhuzi
xingli yin xu,” “Cheng Zhu quelizhi xu”, and so on, ibid., j. 9 zhong.
99  See Gu Xiancheng, “Rixin shuyuan ji,” Jing gao cang gao, j. 11, SKQS, ce 1292, 146.
100  “Chong zhengxue pi yishuo shu,” Gaozi yishu., j. 7, SKQS edition, see 1A–6B.
101  For example, in the early Qing, Lu Longqi (1630–1692) criticized the two trends as fol-
lows: “taking principle as external and wanting to envelope it in mind, that is the learn-
ing of Wang Yangming; taking principle as internal and wanting to envelope it in mind,
that is the learning of Gao [Panlong] and Gu [Xiancheng]. Wang Yangming’s mistake lies
in regarding mind as nature; Gao and Gu’s mistake lies in disliking action and seeking
quietude.” This critique in Tang Jian, Qing xue-an xiaoshi, j. 1, SBBY, 3A is not necessarily
correct. In my understanding, when they really could not find a path to harmonize the
two extremes, promoting Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism again may perhaps have simply
made the pendulum swing to the other pole.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 197

on the four main schools of Song dynasty Neo-Confucian thought and

not confuse people by discussing strange novelties.

He demanded of scholars that “in their studies they should not separate into
factions, and they should not study heterodox ideas.” This naturally led to a
great deal of restraint on the intellectual world.102
Another similar new tendency aimed at remedying Wang Yangming
School thought came from within the school itself. Besides the men of
the Jiangyou or Jiangxi Wang School (represented by Luo Hongxian, Zou
Shouyi and Nie Shuangjiang) mentioned above, many other scholars who
embraced Wang Yangming’s doctrines gradually came to realize the problem
with the Wang School’s excessive promotion of the “mind.” They also became
aware that once the controlling “principle” was weakened, this could very
well lead to self-indulgence of the mind in everyday life. Whether “mind”
and “principle” are one or two was the dividing line between two trends of
Confucian thought. If they are two, then the “principle” of the universe has
the power to restrain the moral “mind.” If they are one, then the internal mind
and nature and the external Heavenly Principle exist together in one thought,
people are their own censors (examiners), and once they begin to practice self-
indulgence there is no way to limit or stop them.
Due to the assumption that “the mind is principle,” the actor and the cen-
sor in the entire thought process are brought together in the same mind, but
no one knows how or whether this mind in which good and evil are interwo-
ven can examine itself. If this excessively promoted mind lacks the restraints
of principle, will it always be able to tend toward the path of goodness, hon-
esty and decency? When the idea that “the mind is principle” was carried to
extremes, some questions began to arise. Who is going to guarantee that people
will always tend toward the good? Who is able to ensure that innate knowledge
can prevent the social order from becoming chaotic? That very many mutual
examination or mistake correction groups or meetings (xingguohui 省過會)

102  At the time, many scholars entertained very strong ideas about reforming the ideologi-
cal world. In his “Sanbainian qian de jianli Kongjiao lun,” Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan, 6/2
(1936) 133–162, Chen Shouyi pointed out that Wang Qiyuan (fl. 1620s)’s Qing shu jing tan,
published in 1623, simply “established a new and well-ordered theology for a Confucian
religion.” The targets of his critique were very clear; he was dissatisfied with the Wang
School that “employs the sacred classics to support their own views” and Jiao Hong (1540–
1620) and Li Zhi who “contradict the sacred classics in order to give unbridled scope to
their own opinions.” Thus he wrote that Jiao and Li were disloyal, unfilial, inhumane and
unrighteous (buzhong, buxiao, buren, buyi) and “their crimes cry out to Heaven; how are
they any different from unbridled thieves?”.
198 Chapter 10

and registers of merits and demerits (gongguobu 功過簿) appeared in the late
Ming demonstrates that many people were trying to restrain themselves by
relying on methods of external censorship beyond the mind’s self-awareness.
And this further demonstrates that the Wang Yangming School’s theory that
“the mind is principle” had already encountered a crisis.
It was for this reason that the Wang Yangming School itself began to self-
consciously adjust its theoretical formulations. For example, Liu Zongzhou
(Jishan, 1578–1645) admitted that ever since the appearance of Wang Yangming’s
Instructions For Practical Living, “the moral teaching of families has gradually
declined.” On the one hand, then, Liu changed his attitude toward the Zhu Xi
system. In his “Essential principles and developments of the Learning of the
Sages” (Shengxue zongyao), he arranged the Song dynasty Confucianism of
Zhou Dunyi, Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi together with Wang Yangming as
one continuous system. On the other hand, he especially stressed “self-watch-
fulness” (shendu) and hoped to use a kind of conscious moral self-discipline
to rescue the self-indulgent mind. In this way, he initiated a style of reasoning
that sought a balance between self-cultivation and knowledge by harmonizing
Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang thought and placing equal emphasis on inner self-
awareness and external control.103
Later on in the early Qing dynasty, even though they believed in Wang
Yangming’s ideas, Chen Que (1604–1677), Li Yong (Erqu, 1627–1705), Huang
Zongxi, and so on all independently rectified the shortcoming brought about
by the Wang Yangming School’s excessive promotion of the mind through their
appreciation of gaining knowledge and their strengthening of moral control.
Whether they advocated repenting ones mistakes and starting afresh or inte-
grating the classic and history, their goal was, on the one hand, simply to rely on
inspection and supervision by others and other concrete measures to induce
self-reflection and restrain ones mind.104 Because a third party was required to
play the role of objective supervisor and accuser, witness groups (people cor-
recting each other’s moral failings, zhengrenhui 證人會), and mutual exami-
nation or mistake correction groups and similar organizations were formed.
Similarly, on the other hand, they tried to amass even more knowledge from
the classic to serve as the foundation of rationality. Because they required
objective knowledge, including knowledge of the history recorded in the clas-
sics and of the cosmos, and so on to serve as a support system for truth and
rightness (justice), they gave birth to a new round of intellectualism. This is of
course a topic to be taken up later.

103  See Liu Zongzhou, “Shengxue zongyao,” in Liu Zongzhou quanji, ce 2, “Yulei 7,” 2007, 2: 28.
104  See Li Yong, “Huiguo zixin,” Erqu ji, j. 1, 3.
From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 199

3.6
The late Ming dynasty was a very complex and many-sided age. On the one
hand, in terms of morality, theory, writing, erudition, and literature, there were
expressions of each by very outstanding individuals. On the other hand, how-
ever, underneath this “overly mature splendor” was concealed a profound and
serious malaise that these people were unable to self-diagnose and self-treat.
The diverse and changeable intellectual world seemed to be unable to find an
effective prescription to remedy the situation. Due to over almost a century of
battering by the Wang Yangming School, the intellectual world had certainly
been thrown into chaos and it had now reached an age of reorganization.
No matter how one evaluates the Wang Yangming School, I believe the
prevalence of Wang Yangming thought in the middle and late Ming at least
bequeathed an atmosphere of freedom to the Chinese world of knowledge,
thought and belief.
Because people tended toward skepticism in their thinking and the originally
unified ideology was undermined by various skeptical attitudes, an unprec-
edented rupture emerged in the intellectual world, and the intellectual classes
gradually developed a very relaxed space for expressions of opinion. Because
the doctrines of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming particularly valued the mind’s
ultimate authority to judge things, and due to Lu Jiuyuan’s idea quoted above
in full that “no matter whether in the Eastern Seas or in the Western Seas, they
shared the same mind and the same principle,” (Donghai Xihai xin tong li tong
東海西海心同理同) people became inclined toward a concept of truth that
could be called universalism, and this also provided the foundation for a new
pluralistic intellectual world.
This trend in the Chinese intellectual world came to an abrupt end after
the Wanli era due to a series of events that occurred one after the other. The
first thing was that the mainstream political ideology combined with its politi-
cal power carried out a large-scale suppression of this atmosphere of freedom
of expression in the name of the state (nation) and social order. During the
reign of the Tianqi Emperor (Zhu Youxiao, 1605–1627, r. 1620–1627), the gov-
ernment’s control of freedom to teach through lecturing became increasingly
strict. In 1625 (tianqi five), the emperor issued an edict ordering the disman-
tling of all the private academies in Donglin, Guanzhong, Jiangyou (Jiangxi)
and Huizhou, and bringing about a severe setback for freedom of expression.105
The second thing was that the pressure of internal troubles and external
aggression gave the scholars no option but voluntarily to change direction.
From the end of the Wanli reign into the reign of the Chongzhen Emperor

105  
Ming Xizong shilu, j. 62, tianqi wunian bayue renwu, in Ming Shilu, 13870.
200 Chapter 10

(Zhu Youjian, 1611–1644, r. 1627–1644), social and national (minzu) crises arose
one after another. These included the Japanese invasion of Chaoxian (Korea),
armed peasant rebellion, and the Manchu invasion of Chinese territory. These
events brought the significance of the nation and social order into a pre-
eminent position. Freedom and transcendence of thought lost their urgency
and priority in the face of these national crises. When “the nation” or “state”
(guojia) is in crisis, the people, country, and civilization that the dynasty rep-
resents would seem, as a matter of course, to be justly considered of priority
importance. Under such pressure, scholars could only self-consciously choose
to study the practical learning that could save the country from its peril and
re-establish the order of the laws and discipline of the imperial court. Concern
for “the individual,” the “mind” and such like were naturally pushed into the
margins of scholars’ field of vision.
 Chapter 11

From Ming to Qing I: From Tianxia, “All under

Heaven,” to the “Ten Thousand States” (End of the
16th to the End of the 19th Centuries)

Prologue: From “All under Heaven” to an “Age of Ten Thousand

States”: Background to the Reinterpretation of Ming and Qing
Intellectual History

Ancient China had a great deal of contact with foreign lands, but, except
for the influence of Buddhism, foreign civilizations had never given a very
great shock to the Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief. Not
until Western culture entered China during the Ming and Qing dynasties did
Chinese culture really receive a fundamental blow. In 1583, the eleventh year
of Emperor Wanli (Shenzong, r. 1572–1620) of the Ming dynasty, the Jesuit mis-
sionaries Michele Pompilio Ruggieri (1543–1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552–1610)
came to China and settled in the city of Zhaoqing in Guangdong province.1
They published Chinese language versions of A Roman Catholic Catechism,
True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven and other works; they also translated
Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, Comprehensive Charts of the Spherical and Vault
of Heaven Astronomical Theories (Hungai tongxian tushuo) and other works;
and they drafted versions of the Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and
Seas (Shanhai yudi quantu). All of this work indicated that Western knowl-
edge, thought and belief had truly come to China.
It was not until three hundred years later, however, in the second half of
the nineteenth century, that the Western powers finally employed their new
foreign knowledge, powerful ships and weapons, and trade and commercial
relations to influence profoundly the world of traditional Chinese knowledge,
thought and belief and led it to undergo tremendously great changes.
The Tang dynasty very confidently called itself the Heavenly Empire, the
Center of the World and the Great Country, but at least from the Northern
Song on, the Chinese state and government slowly lost its self-confidence. In

1  Francis Xavier (1506–1552) was actually the first Jesuit to enter China, but he only entered
Chinese territory briefly before his death in 1552; he had little influence on Chinese history.
In the translations of titles and terms in this chapter, we have as far as possible followed those
of Benjamin A. Elman, On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900, 2005.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_006

202 Chapter 11

the face of powerful enemies, the ethnic state’s (minzu guojia) stance of shield-
ing itself behind lofty ramparts was certainly reasonable. This position had its
drawbacks though. It could easily alter the traditional Chinese openness and
cause Chinese thought and culture to adopt a defensive and even isolationist
posture. In stark contrast, when the Mongols entered Han Chinese territories
and became the ruling group, they pursued a policy of cultural openness.
Such a policy of cultural openness existed at least at the beginning of the
Ming dynasty. For example, in 1402 the Yongle Emperor issued an edict that
said: “Today the four seas are one family, and this is just the time to demon-
strate that we do not treat outsiders differently. Anyone who comes from the
various states to submit themselves and pay tributes to us, just let them be.”2
On the one hand this demonstrated a breadth of mind while on the other hand
it positioned China as the leader of the world. This attitude can be consid-
ered quite open-minded.3 Unfortunately China gradually abandoned its global
pursuits. Having just set foot in the wide world, it withdrew into itself, and
the door that was once open to the world quietly closed, but it could not be
completely closed. When the Western powers began to rely on their nautical
technology and navigated across the ocean to the Ming empire, the context
of Chinese knowledge and thought had already joined a multi-state world, an
“age of ten thousand states.”
From the middle of the sixteenth century, China’s international position
was already rather awkward. In the face of the missionaries and their Western
civilization, the Han Chinese concept of tianxia or “All under Heaven” was
steadily undermined. Under various shocks from the greater world, China
was in a process of transformation from being the center of “All under Heaven”
to becoming merely one state (yi guo) in a multi-state world. At the same time
China was being watched by powerful enemies on all sides and was invaded
by the “Manchu barbarians” from the north, by the “Japanese barbarians” from
the east and by the “western barbarians” from across the sea. In government,
economics, knowledge, thought and belief, the symptoms of a very dangerous
situation were already apparent.
For the general intellectual world, these subtle and barely perceptible
changes might not have meant much, but for more sensitive scholars these
shifts in China’s situation left them with inner feelings that were very hard to
articulate. From this time on, then, the world of Chinese knowledge, thought
and belief silently and slowly underwent a profound transformation. Books

2  Ming Taizong shilu, j. 12 shang, 1024.

3  On this period, see Wang Gengwu, “Wubai nian qian de Zhongguo yu shijie,” Ershiyi shiji 1
(1990), 91–100.
From Ming to Qing I 203

from foreign countries discussing Western methods of thought and practical

technology entered the traditional Chinese intellectual world at the same time
that many works describing the four frontiers also became available. All of
these works exacerbated the sense of concern for possible crisis in the minds
of China’s intellectual stratum, and made the Chinese vaguely aware that their
world of knowledge, thought and belief was now in a difficult position—
between becoming part of a multi-state world or defending their position as
the center (Middle Kingdom) of a tianxia.
In a country like China with a long historical tradition and a stubborn sense
of self worth, there were usually two possible ways to respond to the coming of
a different civilization. One was to adopt a superficial attitude of universalism.
Although welcoming this seemingly unquestionable knowledge, thought and
technology, by means of particular interpretations this new knowledge could
be transformed into “ancient studies” and make the world blend into Chinese
tradition. The other response was to adopt an attitude of particularism or
exceptionalism and, by stirring up strong conservatism and intense national-
ist sentiments, resolutely reject anything that could undermine and shake the
foundations of China’s ancient knowledge, thought and belief.
We know of course that the ancient Chinese world of knowledge, thought
and belief was embodied in a system that had undergone several bouts of
integration and reintegration. The central element of this knowledge system
was the concept that made up the Chinese understanding of the universe
of time and space: “Heaven is round and Earth is square.” This concept was
also the foundation of all authority, including political, intellectual and reli-
gious authority. Thus when the Chinese first came in contact with Western
knowledge, the “study of Heaven (tianxue)” or astronomy quite naturally
aroused their greatest interest. In China, however, where the ultimate foun-
dation of their intellectual system was “the Way (Dao) of Heaven,” this new
“study of tian” was most capable of undermining or even deconstructing their
world of knowledge, thought and belief. This was because this Heaven (sky) of
Western astronomy was precisely the Heaven of the Chinese view that “Heaven
is round and Earth is square” that was intimately related to the rationale and
reasonableness of the Chinese conceptions of proper human behavior (ren-
lun), their intellectual system, and political power and authority.
As just noted above, the Chinese intellectual stratum could either start
ceremoniously employing the magic talismanic phrase that “Western learn-
ing originated in China” (xixue zhongyuan 西學中源) to maintain their cul-
tural integrity and alleviate the psychological shock of the new knowledge
by regarding this foreign civilization as one of only practical knowledge and
technology, or they could violently reject this new knowledge by following a
204 Chapter 11

train of thought from mere “tools” (qi) to the “Way (Dao)” and from mere
“function” (practical use, yong 用) to “substance” (ti 體). They could point out
that this foreign civilization was a grave threat to traditional Chinese knowl-
edge, thought and belief, and close the door on it in complete rejection.
History, of course, has many variables. The change of dynasty from the Ming
to the Qing may have been to some extent a historical rupture, but in terms
of civilization, history simply continued on its way. Entering the seventeenth
century, although the emperors in the Forbidden City had changed from Han
Chinese to Manchus, the above mentioned two strategic positions vis-à-vis for-
eign knowledge had not changed, and with them China maintained a sense
of serenity. From the seventeenth to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
in the deep recesses of the world of knowledge, thought and belief those ele-
ments of Western civilization that challenged and shocked China remained
distant memories and furnished potential materials and background for
new knowledge and thought that often stirred up troublesome waves. Just as
Joseph R. Levenson wrote: “In large part the intellectual history of modern
China has been the process of making guojia of tianxia.”4 We should say that
this historical process had already begun during the Ming dynasty, but in the
conceptual world it was not until the late Qing that the depth of the transfor-
mation became fully apparent.
By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the usually confident Chinese
suddenly discovered that after making contact with Western civilization their
very near neighbor to the east had transformed themselves from barbaric
“Japanese pirates” (wokou) into a progressive nation. They had even become
a formidable opponent that defeated the great Qing Empire in war and forced
it to sign the humiliating treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. From then on China’s
sense of serenity was gone and Chinese confidence in the entire edifice of their
civilization disappeared. I consider the period from the sixteenth century to
the last decades of the nineteenth—with 1895 as a symbolic marker—as a new
era in Chinese intellectual history. After China joined the wider world or the
wider world entered China in the sixteenth century, Chinese intellectual his-
tory had to take cognizance of global factors. First came the Western missionar-
ies and the new knowledge they brought with them; then came the changes in
Chinese culture brought about by the Europeans with their powerful warships
and the commodity trading they forced upon the Chinese; finally, the Chinese
had to think about Asia. Why was it that China and Japan, having entered the

4  Levenson, Joseph R., Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy, 1968, 103 with change to
pinyin romanization. Levenson’s book also has a lengthy discussion of the ti-yong dichotomy
and the difference between a tianxia and a guo in Chinese history.
From Ming to Qing I 205

age of globalization from the same background, nevertheless wrote very differ-
ent chapters in the history of the world?

1 Collapse of Heaven and Earth I: The Ancient Chinese Cosmic Order

Encounters Western Astronomy

When the Chinese intellectual class first encountered Western civilization

in the Ming and Qing dynasties, they frequently had an unusual reaction.
They had quite different interpretive attitudes and patterns of acceptance in
regard to the aspects of Western culture concerned with the state (guojia),
society, and concepts of human ethics and morality in contrast to those con-
cerned with the cosmos, nature, and scientific knowledge and technology. As
a result, these two kinds of Western learning during the Ming and Qing had
very different fates. Even though some rather more open-minded scholars
like Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), Li Zhizao (1565–1630), Yang Tingyun (1557–1627),
and so on approved of Western concepts of religious ethics and morality, it
is worth noting that after being translated into Chinese these concepts were
quite rapidly absorbed into traditional Confucian ethics.5 Roman Catholicism
and the Western ideas behind it were rather quickly diluted and dissolved by
scholars long steeped in Confucian history and the traditional ideas embod-
ied in the Chinese language. Due to their systematic, precise, and practical
nature, Western cosmological and scientific knowledge of nature was, how-
ever, very difficult to interpret and absorb into the traditional Chinese system
of knowledge. As an alternative category of intellectual resources, this sort of
knowledge, thus, presented an opportunity to penetrate and undermine the
world of traditional Chinese thought.
Western knowledge of “Heaven” and “Earth” was just one such very impor-
tant category, and it should receive thorough treatment in Chinese intellectual
history.

5  For example, Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe 艾儒略) translated “philosophy” as “lixue” 理學 or the
study of li, principle in his Summary of Western Learning (Xixue fan 西學凡), see On Their
Own Terms, 2005, 262–264; Alfonso Vagnoni (1566–1640) used the concepts of cultivating
one’s self xiushen (修身), ordering one’s family (qijia 齊家), regulating the state (zhiguo
治國) and bringing peace to All under Heaven (ping tianxia 平天下) in his translation of
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics; Johann Adam Schall (1592–1666) and Ferdinand Verbiest
(1623–1688) both used “extension of knowledge” (zhishi 致知) as the title for books about
Western learning.
206 Chapter 11

1.1
As repeatedly mentioned above, in ancient China the idea that Heaven is round
and the Earth is square was an extremely important foundational concept. It
made it possible for various fields of thought in ancient China to maintain in
their inner logic a harmonious order and similar thinking. It also provided an
overall explanation that could link all of these areas together and had a pow-
erful influence on the ancient Chinese people’s mode of thinking, extending
into all areas of ordinary life. Everyone accepted the same cosmological theory:
space was a concentric circle extending outward in ring after ring; the round
Heaven (sky) revolved around the North Pole in a circular orbit; the Earth, then,
was a square in the shape of the character jing 井 or ya 亞; Heaven and Earth
both had a fixed central point that transcended space and time; this eternally
unmoving central point, the center of the concentric circle, was the North Pole
and also the spirit or god of the Great Unity (taiyi zhi shen 太一之神), or a sym-
bol of the Dao (Way). These cosmological concepts were extended by analogy
to every other sphere of knowledge and thought.
As the foundation of the ancient Chinese intellectual world, this cosmologi-
cal order could give rise to various concrete conceptions, apparatuses and tech-
niques as well as various ideas and beliefs including even esthetic feelings. In
his A Study of History, Arnold J. Toynbee noted this ancient Chinese cosmologi-
cal “order” and basically described (without using the usual terminology) the
“resonance” or “correspondence” theory “that the affairs of the cosmos, society
and humanity necessarily constituted a mutually interconnected and mutu-
ally interacting whole.”6 When we study philosophical writings, however, we
generally regard “Heaven” as an ontological, political or mythological concept.
This is basically correct, but we need to take note of the fact that above and
in the background of these concepts there is also a more fundamental knowl-
edge of celestial bodies. This cosmological idea that “Heaven is constant and
unchanging, and the Dao is also constant and unchanging” (Tian bubian, Dao
ye bubian) was basically unchallenged throughout the more than a thousand
years from the Han to Ming. Even though during and after the Song dynasty,
the intellectual stratum was increasingly interested in discussions on how
to improve their inner being and moral self-awareness, ideas about Heaven
were never seriously challenged in the theories of virtually all thinkers.7 The

6  Ge Zhaoguang, An Intellectual History of China, Volume One, 2014, 246. Toynbee’s remarks are
in the Chinese translation of the abbreviated version of Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History:
Lishi yanjiu《历史研究》 , vol. 2 of 3, 1966, 324.
7  As John B. Henderson puts it, Chinese cosmological thinking from the Han to the Ming was
a “premodern mode of thought” the impact of which was “manifest in most of the arts and
From Ming to Qing I 207

Persian-speaking astronomer Jamal ad-Din (fl. 1250s) brought new astronomi-

cal and geographic knowledge into China in the mid-thirteenth century during
the Yuan dynasty, but the new ideas about Heaven (the sky) were not widely
transmitted at the time. The intellectual foundations of these new ideas were
not discussed; questions concerning the relations between the calendar and
the legitimacy of the imperial dynasty were especially not brought up, and
all this was soon forgotten.8
This situation changed very greatly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
During this period, Western astronomical knowledge and apparatuses, at least
in their conclusive observations and experiments, were already fully capable
of overturning traditional Chinese cosmology. Relying on geometrical cross-
sections, Western science was able to produce a sundial that surpassed the
accuracy of traditional Chinese sundials. Western telescopes made possible
observations of the surface relief of the moon and the satellites of Jupiter, all
the more conclusively demonstrating the earth’s relationship to the celestial
bodies. The orrery, a mechanical model of the movements of the solar system,
was of course also constructed on the basis of an overall Western theory of
the cosmos. In the Ming dynasty after the arrival of Western missionaries, the
new Western cosmological theories gradually came into China. In 1584, Matteo
Ricci’s Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and Seas introduced further
explanations of the spherical nature of the earth. Ricci realized that this idea
was at variance with Chinese conceptions and he tried to minimize any con-
flict that such differences might bring about. Nevertheless, since the Western
conceptions transformed the earth that the Chinese had always held to be
a square into a sphere and proclaimed that the sky (heaven) above that the
Chinese always believed rotated around the earth was really a vast motionless
space, conflict between the new and the old knowledge was unavoidable. With
the influx of Western knowledge, then, the traditional Chinese conceptions of
“Heaven” and “Earth” faced serious problems.

sciences, most conspicuously in medicine, alchemy, astrology, and the various divinatory sci-
ences, but also in such purely orthodox branches of learning as official historiography, lit-
erary criticism, Neo-Confucian philosophy, and mathematical astronomy.” The Development
and Decline of Chinese Cosmology, 1984, xiv.
8  “Tianwen zhi,” YS, j. 48, 998–999 records that in 1267 Khubilai Qaghan, the first emperor of
the Yuan (r. 1260–1294) had a [model of the] celestial globe (diqiuyi 地球儀) constructed and
“it was a round ball made of wood, seven parts water, green in color, and three parts earth,
white in color; on it was painted rivers, lakes and the seas all connected together; the picture
[of these rivers, lakes and the seas] was in the shape of a small square well which could be
used to calculate the vastness of the round shape [of the globe] and the closeness and dis-
tance of the roads.”
208 Chapter 11

There is no doubt that the missionaries who came to China at that time were
primarily interested in proselytizing their Christian religion, but the greatest
cultural conflicts came rather from Western astronomical and geographical
concepts. Ever since 1593 when the Dominican Fray Juan Cobo (1529–?) pub-
lished the first Chinese language work, Testimony of the True Religion (Bian
zhengjiao zhenchuan shilu), and then many other publications were produced,
such as Structure and Meanings of the Heaven and Earth (Qiankun tiyi, 1605),
Astronomical Instruments (Jianpingyi shuo, 1611), On the Gnomon (Biaodu
shuo, 1614), and so on, they all brought various kinds of new astronomical and
geographical knowledge into China. The most troubling of the new ideas was
the assertion that the earth “is spherical and not square.”

1.2
Western missionaries continually entered China after Matteo Ricci. In a
few decades they revealed to the Chinese a startlingly new and different
civilization.9 Copernicus’ heliocentric theory, the Western view of the spheri-
cal earth, and Roman Catholic theology all entered China at that time, and the
most shocking thing they had to tell the Chinese was that their cosmological
idea that “Heaven is round and Earth is square” was mistaken. The idea that
the heavens did not move but the earth rotated sent shock waves through the
Chinese world. Since the rationality of China’s entire intellectual world was
founded on these traditional cosmological concepts of time and space, when
this world view was shaken by Western ideas, the traditional Chinese world of
knowledge, thought and belief began to fall like dominoes.10
In historical studies of relations between the Ming and Qing and foreign
countries, many scholars have paid attention to the open conflict between
Chinese thought and ideology and the metaphysical concept of “Heaven” and
the “Lord of Heaven” (tianzhu) as the Roman Catholic Godhead. They have
not considered very much, however, the potential significance to the Chinese
intellectual world of the transformations of heaven, or the heavens (and

9  In his 1623 preface to Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe)’s Geografia dei paesi stranieri alla Cina
(Zhifang waiji), Li Zhizao wrote that when seven thousand Western books entered China
“we wanted to place them in the Imperial Palace Library in order to join [participate in]
the scholarship of the sages and the worthies from both the East and the West.” The so-
called “to join the scholarship of the sages and the worthies from both the East and the
West” actually implied an acceptance of foreign civilization and comparison of the differ-
ences between them. See Xie Fang, Zhifang waiji jiaoshi, chapter one.
10  I deal only with Heaven in this section and will discuss questions regarding Earth in the
next section.
From Ming to Qing I 209

earth too) as natural phenomena. On the surface, it would seem that theories
about the celestial bodies and calendrical science were very well received by
Chinese scholars at the time, but “Heaven,” “Lord of Heaven” and the theologi-
cal concept of “Heaven” (tiantang) in Western religious thought were actually
in direct conflict with Chinese thought. This still did not mean, however, that
theories about the celestial bodies and calendrical science could not influence
the Chinese conceptual world.
As I stated above, because traditional Chinese ideas about time and space
that derived from observations and conceptualizations of Heaven (the sky)
were most likely the basis of Chinese knowledge, they constituted the most
unshakable foundational concepts. Chinese knowledge and thought was built
upon this foundation from the Han dynasty on. Whether it was Heaven as a
natural phenomenon or a philosophical concept or a mythological entity, they
were all consistent and mutually supporting ideas, and so they said “Heaven
is constant and unchanging, and the Dao is also constant and unchanging.” If
one fine day, though, Western astronomy came along and suddenly told the
Chinese about their new knowledge; told them that the idea of Heaven and
Earth as the center (of the cosmos) that they had always believed in was not
true because they were not the center; told them that Heaven did not fit like a
cap over the earth and the apparent leftward movement of the celestial bodies
was due to the clockwise rotation of the earth; told them that the earth was not
in the center of the four seas, but there were oceans only directly to the east
and in the southeast, and so there was no symmetry and no harmony, and so
on …, upon receiving this information, Chinese thought would be thrown into
chaos. In the Chinese history of ideas, this was the most significant “collapse
of Heaven and Earth.”
Let us first examine Matteo Ricci’s ideas. Ricci used calendrical time dif-
ferences, eclipses of the sun and moon, and his experiences travelling around
the world to illustrate the spherical nature of the earth. According to Ricci’s
explanations, today’s heaven and earth are no longer the “Heaven” and “Earth”
of the Chinese. In fact, there were actually people who were “standing up on
the other side of the earth from China!” This sort of new knowledge immedi-
ately elicited shocked astonishment and curiosity. The concept of a “spherical
earth,” the observations that Jupiter has four satellite moons, that Venus exhib-
its phases like the Moon, that the Milky Way is made up of a collection of stars,
and so on were all transmitted into China at this time.11 All of this seems to
have steadily changed the nature of “Heaven” for the Chinese.

11  Fang Hao, “Jialilüe yu kexue chuanru woguo zhi guanxi,” Fang Hao wenlu, 1948, 289–290.
210 Chapter 11

In a few decades, these ideas became quiet popular, even becoming known
to government officials. During the chongzhen reign period (1628–1644), with
the support of Xu Guangqi and other scholars, the Chongzhen Emperor com-
missioned the compilation of the Mathematical Astronomy of the Chongzhen
Reign (Chongzhen lishu) that included a series of translations of astronomi-
cal theories. It incorporated the system of movement of the celestial bod-
ies (the solar system) and the theories of the structure of the cosmos of
Claudius Ptolemy (90–168) and Tycho Brahe (1546–1601). Then the Polish
mathematician Jan Nicolas Smogulecki (1611–1656) translated works on
Western astronomy, and in 1644 his student Xue Fengzuo (1600–1680) incor-
porated them into his Synthesis of Mathematical Astronomy (Lixue huitong).
Not only were scholars like Xu Guangqi and Li Zhizao who associated closely
with the missionaries convinced by the ideas that “Heaven and Earth are
spherical bodies,” but even Li Zhi also wrote On the Four Seas (Sihai shuo)
in which he admitted that there were no oceans to the west, north or south
of China, but only to the east and the southeast.12 This caused such tradi-
tional ideas as the three sacred islands and ten sacred continents (sandao
shizhou 三島十洲), the four barbarians’ (siyi 四夷) lands that surround and
protect China, and the idea of China as the center of the world (tianxia)
all to lose their foundations.
Chinese at that time accepted this new knowledge partly on the basis of
historical memory and partly on the basis of experience. Some marginalized
ancient Chinese resources actually lent themselves then to the acceptance of
Western learning. Here are a few examples: Xiong Mingyu (1601 jinshi) remem-
bered the legend that Qibo, the Yellow Emperor’s teacher, once said that “the
Earth is in the middle of Heaven, and the Great Qi (vital energy of the uni-
verse) holds it up (di zai tian zhong, da qi ju zhi, 地在天中，大氣舉之)”; Yang
Tingyun recalled the story in the ancient Chuci that raised a question: “where
is the border of Heaven and Earth? The Confucian scholars, however, could
not answer.” Li Zhizao also recalled many allegorical fables in ancient texts
such as the Basic Questions (Suwen, part of the Huangdi Neijing), The Gnomon
of the Zhou Dynasty and Classic of Computations (Zhoubi suanjing) and even
the Zhuangzi.13

12  For example, in his “Ti wanguo erhuantu xu,” Xu Guangqi employed different methods to
prove the idea that “heaven and earth are spherical bodies.”
13  Xiong Minyu, “Biaodushuo xu,” Tianxue chuhan, 1986, ce 5, 2527; Yang Tingyun, “Zhifang
waiji xu,” Tianxue chuhan, ce 3, 1287; Li Zhizao “Tianzhu shiyi chongke xu,” Tianxue chu-
han, ce 1, 356.
From Ming to Qing I 211

Some people’s personal experiences also started to convince them that the
Western theories were actually very reasonable. Not only did their cosmologi-
cal views and their earth science receive support from the movement of the
stars and navigational measurements, but their new knowledge of astronomi-
cal phenomena received particular verification in the field of calendrical cal-
culation that was most important to the Chinese court. Having been verified
in these ways, this new knowledge became accepted by and spread through-
out the scholar-official class. The successful calculation of the lunar eclipse of
November 19, 1630 was a singular event that probably made a very deep impres-
sion on these scholar-officials. That calculation proved the accuracy of Western
calendrical science, and that accuracy caused many Chinese to accept this for-
eign knowledge; the propagation of this knowledge among the educated elite
faced much less opposition after that. In 1629 with the Chongzhen Emperor’s
permission, many high officials joined the Imperial Astronomical Bureau and
began the large-scale translation of European astronomical theories, and by
1634 the highly influential Mathematical Astronomy of the Chongzhen Reign
was completed; there was no time for it to be widely disseminated due to the
imminent fall of the Ming, but it had a profound influence in later years.
From the Wanli era (1573–1619) on, the spread and acceptance of this new
knowledge proceeded in a tranquil environment. We can see from various liter-
ary sources that many people, including the Wanli Emperor himself and highly
educated and cultured scholars responsible for the interpretation of Chinese
cultural traditions, were very interested in the ideas and techniques of the
Europeans. I have particularly observed, however, that these Chinese scholars
who lived their lives steeped in traditional Chinese civilization and who had
a highly developed sense of cultural superiority, still maintained two distinct
attitudes toward this new Western knowledge and practiced two different
methods of response. One method was to adopt the very widespread theory
that “Western learning originated in China” and consider all of this new knowl-
edge as having historical roots in China. This both satisfied the Chinese feeling
of self-confidence and also gave the new knowledge an air of reasonableness.
The second response was to regard this Western knowledge of “the heavens”
as merely ordinary calendrical measurements and calculations, and thus sepa-
rating it off from traditional Chinese intellectual theories of “Heaven.” When
discussing this new knowledge, the Chinese could limit their acceptance to
techniques of purely practical use. They would then say that although it was
good for acquiring knowledge, it could not lead to an understanding of under-
lying principles.
As soon as this “new knowledge” from abroad began to conflict with tradi-
tional China’s “old knowledge,” then that “old knowledge” began to resist, and
212 Chapter 11

not simply because of nationalistic pride. Matteo Ricci once complained that
“the Chinese consider all foreigners to be ignorant barbarians … they think
it is beneath their dignity to learn anything from the writings of foreigners.14
The situation was really not so simple. Because this foreign knowledge was
so incompatible with ancient Chinese thought, scholars steeped in that
thought could not accept, understand, and interpret this novel and, as they
believed, rather bizarre knowledge. Many people at that time began to take a
stand of intense resistance and to call into question the heliocentric and spher-
ical earth theories. The learned scholar Zhu Guozhen (1557–1632), for example,
argued against these ideas on the basis of the traditional Chinese cosmology.15
The Buddhist leader Zhu Hong (1535–1615) also refuted the Western mission-
ary cosmology by reference to Buddhist conceptions of “Heaven.”16 Slightly
later the noted Confucian scholar Liu Zongzhou (1578–1645) continued to
employ the “round Heaven, square Earth” idea to demonstrate his moral
ideals.17 In his Records of Thoughts and Questions: Outer Section (Siwenlu wai­
pian), the most celebrated scholar of the Ming-Qing transition period, Wang
Fuzhi (1619–1692), used his own personal experience to refute Matteo Ricci’s
experience and relied on common sense experience to ridicule Ricci’s new
knowledge as “wild and foolish.”18 Even some of those who accepted Western
cosmological ideas, did not necessarily completely accept their fundamental
principles.
Besides the problem of seeking a uniform interpretation of Chinese and
Western knowledge and thought, another obstacle to the acceptance of new
knowledge was the old concept of the difference between “barbarians and
Chinese” (yi 夷 and xia 夏). For example, although official calendar-making
could employ the new Western knowledge, as soon as Western astronomy
was seen to cause the Chinese to lose face, it would certainly be restricted.
From the Wanli (1573–1619), Tianqi (1621–1627) and Chongzhen (1628–1644)
reigns of the Ming through the Shunzhi (1644–1662) and Kangxi (1661–
1722) reigns of the Qing, Western implements such as celestial globes, armil-
lary spheres, sun dials, and telescopes continually entered China, even being
used at court as well as employed and very much liked by the Chinese intel-
lectual elite. This employment and enjoyment always remained, however, in
the concrete material domain of implements or apparatuses (qi) and never

14  Li Madou (Matteo Ricci) Zhongguo zhaji, 1983, j. 1, chapter 9, 94.
15  Zhu Guozhen, Yongchuang xiaopin, 1998, j. 16.
16  “Tianshuo yi,” in Tianxue chuhan, ce 2, 652.
17  “Jishan xue-an,” Mingru xue-an, j. 62, quotes his Daxue zabian.
18  Wang Fuzhi, Siwenlu waipian, in Chuanshan quanshu, ce 12, 460.
From Ming to Qing I 213

rose to the lofty metaphysical level of fundamental principles or the Way

(Dao). It most certainly was not allowed to influence the government, power,
or the ideology of the state.
As soon as Western astronomy threatened to disturb the traditional
Chinese cosmic order, it would definitely come in for fierce criticism. A late
Ming work, the Collection Exposing Heterodoxy (Shengchao poxie ji), included
two interesting articles. The first, a report of a late Ming legal trial, is entitled
an “Announcement on Apprehending an Evil Faction” (Nahuo xiedang hou
gaoshi). It states that the foreigners from across the sea are deliberately offend-
ing China’s criminal laws, secretly storing astronomical instruments and fab-
ricating theories about the “seven rulers” (qizheng 七政, five stars plus the Sun
and Moon,) and seven layers of “Heaven” (qichong tian 七重天). All of this
amounts to “holding up the celestial bodies in order to smash them to pieces.”
If things went on that way, the author asked, “could anything under Heaven not
be turned upside-down and confused by these lies?” The other piece, written
by one Zhang Guangtian (fl. 1620), is entitled “A Summary of Ways to Ward off
Heresy” (Bixie zhaiyao lüeyi). He writes that Western astronomy encourages
the Chinese “privately to study astronomy and forge their own counterfeit cal-
endars” (that is, calendars not approved by the state). The study of Western
astronomy will cause the people “to destroy the Way of (the sage kings) Yao
and Shun.19
Why would Western astronomical knowledge turn everything under Heaven
upside-down, confuse people, and cause them to destroy the Dao of Yao and
Shun? Because the “Heaven” that astronomy studied in China was the symbol
of imperial power and authority, and Chinese astronomy still supported the
cosmic order that the Chinese had believed in for several thousand years. If
this cosmic order was destroyed, not only would the power and authority of
the state lose its foundational support but the order of the intellectual world
would also crumble. In China, astronomy was not only the science of “imple-
ments.” It was the foundation of the eternal Way (Dao). If the “implements”
changed, the Dao would have to change, and if the Dao changed, Heaven
would change with it.
The results of these changes would not become fully apparent until sev-
eral centuries later, but already at this time the Dao of China could not avoid
changing.

19  Xu Changzhi, ed., Shengchao poxie ji, j. 2, 5, Xia Guiqi collated edition, 117 & 203.
214 Chapter 11

1.3
All sorts of Western knowledge and ideas entered China during the Ming and
Qing, and the majority of that knowledge that the Chinese accepted was not
far from the most advanced Western ideas.
These Western ideas had the potential to deconstruct the traditional Chinese
intellectual system, including not only Chinese concepts of “Heaven” and other
celestial phenomena but also Chinese concepts of “Earth” and geographical
knowledge as well as other forms of knowledge. If the “Heaven” that Matteo
Ricci spoke of was only part of the study of celestial phenomena, that might
be the end of it; as soon as Ricci went slightly beyond that, his ideas could give
rise to disputes about ultimate questions. When he went on talking, however,
the subject of Heaven and Earth definitely “returning to the One” would then
come under even more scrutiny. What after all is the “One” that forms the ulti-
mate foundation of all knowledge?20
Consider the case of the Western theory of the four elements. Superficially
the Western earth, air, fire and water seemed to be analogous to the Chinese
Five Phases of metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. Since these two views
“were intimately connected to the inception of a world view, ideas about the
human spirit (soul) and the transformations of the ten thousand phenom-
ena (the material world),” the Western four elements theory and the Chinese
Five Phases theory were, however, bound to come into conflict. Matteo Ricci
once borrowed the Chinese scholars’ ti-yong dichotomy and asserted that the
“four elements” are the essence (ti) of the Five Phases, and the Five Phases are
the practical application (yong) of the “four elements.” Following this logic,
Western learning would become the essence and Chinese learning would
become of practical use only, and the traditional position of Qian and Kun
(Heaven and Earth in the Classic of Changes) would be turned upside-down.21

20  See Map of the Myriad Countries on the Earth (Carta Geografica Completa di tutti i Regni
del Mondo, Kunyu Quantu, zhongxiabu) compiled by Matteo Ricci and several Chinese
collaborators. This is why some people criticized Ricci and his collaborators, saying that
they “intended to change and disturb the greatest rules and norms that had been passed
down since the sage kings Yao and Shun. Are they upholding the norms as the way of
Heaven? Or are they simply ignorant about the way of Heaven?” “Can yuan yi shu,” in Xu
Changzhi, ed., Shengchao poxie ji, j. 1, 61.
21  In the Chinese scholar’s version of the ti-yong dichotomy, Chinese learning was the
“essence” (ti) of Chinese society and Western learning was to be employed only for “prac-
tical application” (yong).” Siyuan xinglun,” Qiankun tiyi, j. shang, “Siyuan xinglun,” SKQS
edition, 10A–12B.
 Responses to the Western theory of four elements was somewhat complicated. Some
missionaries, like the Jesuit Alfonso Vagnoni, tried to reconcile the Chinese and Western
From Ming to Qing I 215

There were of course some scholars who still wanted to accept Western
knowledge. Perhaps this was in the first place because they were sincerely
pleased by this “practical and useful” knowledge and were, therefore, also
willing to accept the reasonableness of the intellectual system that supported
it. Their acceptance of this kind of knowledge logically led them to believe
in the fundamental principles of Western learning. For example, when Xu
Guangqi reflected on his intellectual association with Matteo Ricci, he said
that Western missionaries not only possessed a religion that could “supple-
ment Confucianism, Buddhism and the Daoist Religion,” but they also pos-
sessed “a form of learning that embodied the investigation of things and the
exhaustive investigation of principle (gewu qiongli 格物窮理).”22 We know that
the “principle” (li) of ancient China is something that could not easily be used
to describe other people or thoughts. Ever since the Song dynasty, “principle”
was tianli, the “Principle of Heaven,” the ultimate foundation of everything. If
Western astronomical knowledge is not only for “practical application” (yong)
but also partakes of the “essence” (ti), and is not only so much “skill or tech-
nique” ( ji 技) but also possesses “principle” (li), then could ancient Chinese
knowledge and thought any longer be able to have a monopoly on “principle”
to support all of its traditional “knowledge”?
During the Ming and Qing dynasties, Chinese scholars seem to have had
only the two strategies mentioned above to respond to the influx of Western
knowledge: regard it as originating in China or reject it completely. These two
strategies grew out of a psychological feeling that they had no other alterna-
tives. During the five plus centuries of Ming and Qing history, Sino-Western
cultural interaction went back and forth between these two responses. If we
examine these Chinese responses without employing our contemporary sci-
entific attitude, however, but with an empathetic understanding of the back-
ground of their thinking from the point of view of intellectual history, how
then should we interpret this Chinese frame of mind?23

view. Some Chinese scholars, like Xiong Mingyu, Fang Kongzhao (1590–1655) and Fang
Yizhi, accepted the Western view and began to doubt the traditional Chinese Five Phases
view. Of course some Chinese scholars simply affirmed the Five Phases and opposed the
four elements theory; this would lead to disputes about the reasonableness of the founda-
tions of the Chinese cosmology.
22  “Taixi shuifa xu,” in Xu Guangqi ji, j. 2, 66.
23  Just as “Hua Xia zhi jian” in Zhong-Xi jishi has it, Yang Guangxian’s argument with Western
missionaries about astronomy was not really about the accuracy of their “measurements”
(tuibu 推步). It was rather that “what Guangxian attacked about Western methods was
not that they were new methods; he spoke of Mencius rejecting Yang Zhu and Mozi, for
fear that people would have no father and no lord.” This position that would seem very
216 Chapter 11

If we revisit the Chinese intellectual world of that time, we will indeed

encounter an anxious state of mind and feelings that they had very few choices.
Even if a portion of educated Chinese and scholar-officials had a favorable
opinion of the missionaries’ knowledge of astronomy, calendrical science,
physics and mathematics, nevertheless, this learning could only survive when
limited to the scope of technological “tools” (qi) and “practical applications”
(yong); it could not go beyond those limitations. This was because as soon as
those “tools” or “implements” became too formidable and impinged on the
foundations of the Dao, or those “practical applications” were employed too
extensively so as to threaten the entire logic of the Chinese way of thinking—
the Chinese “essence” (ti)—conflicts would inevitably arise. At this point, an
age of the “collapse of Heaven and Earth” could certainly begin.

2 Collapse of Heaven and Earth II: “All under Heaven,” “China,” and
the “Four Barbarians” as Depicted in Ancient Chinese Maps of the
World

In 1584 (the Wanli Emperor’s twelfth year), Matteo Ricci had printed in
Guangdong the Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and Seas. This was the
first map of the world printed in China that was drafted according to Western
cartographical views.24 The important significance of this map from the point
of view of intellectual history is that it transformed the Chinese traditional
image of the world. First, on this map the world is no longer flat; it is spherical.
Second, China is no longer the center of the world; it is rather one of many
other countries randomly distributed around a spherical world. Third, China
no longer occupies the greater part of the map and the four barbarians (siyi)
are no longer just a disorderly group of small states on four sides of China. It
turns out that there are a great many more or less equivalent countries in the
vast world. Although the original of this map has been lost, many more maps
based on this one were printed throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. The new view of the world presented in this map steadily under-
mined the traditional Chinese views of “All under Heaven” (tianxia), “China”

conservative to us today really well describes the focus of the polemics of that time. Ge
Shirui, “Yangwu shiyi,” Qingdai jingshiwen xubian, j.111, 6A.
24  For information on the Shanhai yudi quantu, see Hong Ye (William Hong), “Kao Li Madou
(Matteo Ricci) de shijie ditu,” in Hong Ye lunxue ji, 1981, 150–193. Western celestial globes
had an influence on Chinese thought similar to this world map, but I am only concentrat-
ing here on the maps.
From Ming to Qing I 217

(Zhongguo as a Middle Kingdom) and the “four barbarian lands” on China’s

borders.
In China, ideas about the structure of space and time in the heavens and on
earth, about the positions of the center and the periphery, and about the rela-
tive size of various regions were not simply questions of geography. In the first
place, the ancient Chinese view that “Heaven is round and the Earth is square”
was not just a natural description of space and time in the cosmos. Through an
entire system of linking metaphors and symbols, these ideas had come to con-
stitute the ultimate foundation of the reasonableness of everything in Heaven
and on Earth. If this system was undermined, then the reasonableness of
almost everything in the human world would also lose its ultimate foundation.
The hitherto unalterable truths of Chinese government, culture, and beliefs
would have to be closely examined anew. Secondly, even though the ancient
Chinese long ago understood that the world was very large and they already
had a sense of the difference in size between the tianxia (the whole world)
and China (Han lands), their actual idea of the tianxia, even down to the Ming
dynasty, was still the “nine continents” of the “Tribute of Great Yu” (Yu Gong)
chapter of the Book of Documents. When people thought of the entire inhab-
ited world, the most natural picture that came into their minds was still China
in the center with the four barbarians (Eastern Yi, Western Rong, Northern Di
and Southern Man) surrounding it. Finally, although from the Han dynasty
on, the Chinese were deeply aware of threats from their borders and under-
stood the territoriality of their ethnic nationality (minzu) and their state (guo-
jia), nevertheless when they were really oppressed and became painfully aware
that China no longer dominated the world as a tianxia, this awareness led
to the activation of a kind of Sinocentric or nationalistic thought.
The curious but obstinate idea of China as the center of a tianxia was most
unequivocally displayed in ancient Chinese maps of the world and formed the
universal memory and knowledge of the Chinese people. This view did not
change until the introduction of Matteo Ricci’s map of the world in the Ming
dynasty.

2.1
Chinese cartography began very early on and was technically quite well devel-
oped. Ever since the Han dynasty the Chinese had quite a bit of knowledge
about “the world” from the Roman Empire (Da Qin) to Japan (derogatorily
known as the land of dwarfs, woguo 倭國). Even though the geographical
knowledge of the ancient Chinese already extended to all of contemporary
Asia and beyond, before the sixteenth century they customarily interpreted
and pictured the world from the cultural or civilizational point of view. The
218 Chapter 11

Chinese still believed that the tianxia within the four seas was a space in which
the vast land of China was centrally located and surrounded by innumerable
small barbarian states.25 In the ancient Chinese mind those barbarian states
were on the margins of the tianxia, and any other places that were not in their
field of vision were naturally not even included in the scope of the tianxia.
The adoption of the tianxia was of course related to the ancient Chinese
knowledge and experience of the world. This was also supported by their con-
ception of cosmic space and time. For example, the popular ancient concept of
fenye 分野 or field-allocation is a case in point; that is, associating the constel-
lations or celestial regions with a corresponding terrestrial region. Any excess
regions were simply regarded as “small states that envy us” and never included
in the civilized world of China’s tianxia. It is said that before Pei Xiu (224–271)
of the Jin dynasty drafted his Map of the Regions in the “Tributes of Yu” (Yu Gong
diyu tu), he possessed a “Great Map of All under Heaven” (Tianxia datu), but
we cannot be sure what it was actually like. When Jia Dan (730–805) drafted
his World Map of Chinese and Barbarians (Hainei hua yi tu) during the Tang
dynasty (in 801), he himself wrote that “the first mention of China comes from
the ‘Tributes of Yu,’ while the origin of the external barbarians is first cited in
Ban Gu’s History of the Former Han Dynasty.” It would seem that he still main-
tained the traditional tianxia conception of the world. We can also see from
various Song and Yuan dynasty maps still extant that, although the people of
that time had a great deal more practical geographical knowledge than previ-
ous ages, they were still a long way from understanding the idea that “ten thou-
sand nations are scattered around the world.”26
Besides maps, another source of information about foreign states in ancient
China, were the many pictorial descriptions of envoys from tribute states and
other foreign personages, such as the Paintings of Presentations of Tributes

25  “Jia Dan zhuan,” JTS, j. 138, 3785–3786, records that Jia Dan “loved geography. Every time
when envoys from the four barbarian regions came to court or Tang envoys returned from
those areas, he would exchange with them asking about the details of the mountains, riv-
ers, and lands in those areas.” He subsequently drew a map of those areas with the title of
Map of Chinese and Barbarians Within the Four Seas (Hainei Hua Yi tu). When presenting
this map to the throne, he said in his memorial that the “Tribute of Great Yu” (Yu Gong)
first used the term Middle Kingdom while the term outer barbarians originated in Ban
Gu’s history (i.e., the History of the Former Han Dynasty). They use prefectures and coun-
ties to record the increase and decrease of these units while barbarian tribes were used to
describe their rise and decline.” This would seem to still be the traditional tianxia concept
of space and time.
26  The phrase “ten thousand nations are scattered around the world” is from Lü Wen (772–
811)’s “Preface” to the “Tianwen zhi shang,” in the Jinshu.
From Ming to Qing I 219

(Zhigong tu), Paintings of Imperial Audience (Wanghui tu) and Presentation

of Tributes to the Imperial Court (Chaogong tu).27 The oldest of these is said
to be the Paintings of Presentations of Tributes of Emperor Yuan of the Liang
(Xiao Yi, 508–554).28 It is said to have pictured more than thirty foreign envoys.
According to Emperor Yuan himself, “the official Zhifang is in charge of the
maps of All under Heaven, including all the barbarians from the four neigh-
bouring regions, the nine northern sections, and the seven southern sections
of the Fujian region.” This could also be considered a kind of picture of the
world.
From these images, however, people still could not derive any broader idea
of the world because they were only images of countries that presented tribute
to the Chinese emperor.
Chinese knowledge of foreign lands was undoubtedly derived from commu-
nication with them, but the most important source of Chinese understanding
was cultural interaction. Differences in levels of civilization gave the Chinese
people a much more profound and enduring impression than the presence
or lack of material products. Only when the entrance of elements of a foreign
civilization shocked China’s native culture were the Chinese forced to realize
that there were other civilizations in the world. Only at that point was the con-
cept of tianxia (the whole world) stretched beyond the previous concept of
huaxia (ancient China), Sinocentrism (Zhongguo zhongxin) displaced, and the
Chinese picture of the world transformed.
In this context, it is worthwhile to consider the significance in Chinese intel-
lectual history of the Buddhist conception of the world. Before the arrival of
Roman Catholicism, only Buddhism and the Indian civilization behind it had
been able to deliver a great shock to Chinese culture and make the Chinese
re-assess their own civilization. From Xie Lingyun and Liu Feng (?–200 CE)’s
comparisons of Chinese and Indian cultures,29 to Faxian (337–ca. 422) and
Xuanzang (ca. 602–664)’s travels to India to collect Buddhist sûtras, we can see
some rare instances of a Chinese lack of sufficient cultural self-confidence. In

27  The oldest Zhigong tu passed down was a Tang copy of that of Emperor Yuan of the Liang;
somewhat later examples are the Huang Qing Zhigong tu in the SKQS and the Zhigong tu
by Xie Sui in the Qianlong era (1735–1796).
28  “Yuandi benji” in the Liangshu, j. 5, calls it Gongzhi tu, while the Yiwen leiju, j. 55 calls it the
Gongzhi tu in quotations from Emperor Yuan’s preface, but uses Zhigong tu xu for the title.
29  Xie Lingyun and Liu Feng’s comparisons of Indian and Chinese language and beliefs
highlighted the differences between the two cultures. For the Xie Lingyun material, see
“Bianzong lun,” Guang Hong ming ji, j. 20, 169, SBBY edition; for Liu Feng and his “Neiwai
pangtong bijiao shufa,” see Xu Gaoseng zhuan, j. 2, Dazheng xinxiu dazangjing, j. 50, 436.
220 Chapter 11

Zong Bing’s lament in his Essay Explaining Buddhism (Ming Fo lun) that the
superior men ( junzi) of China cannot “understand the human heart,” we can
also see that in the world of ideas the central position of Chinese civilization
was at least wavering.30 It was just at such a period of modest wavering, that
another civilization could come into prominence and, as it came into promi-
nence, the territory of this civilization was no longer a dependent or subordi-
nate entity in a world dominated by China. It was no longer an insignificant
barbarian state, but rather a country at least as civilized as China. At that point,
the “tianxia” was no longer the center, and All under Heaven was no longer a
concentric circle of clearly defined areas one after another radiating out one
after another from China at the center.
Perhaps non-Buddhist Chinese still could not accept this map of civilization,
but Buddhist monks had to acknowledge the existence of this configuration of
space and time. Thus when Song dynasty monks drafted the General Record
of Buddhist Masters (Fozu tongji) with twelve scrolls of appended charts, and
the three-scroll “Geography of Eastern China” (Dong Zhendan dili tu), “Map
of the Various States of the Han’s Western Regions” (Han Xiyu zhuguo tu), and
“Map of India in the West” (Xitu Wuyin zhi tu), they structured the world in
three parts. During the Song and Yuan dynasties, some scholars probably came
to accept this conception, but, unfortunately, there were very few Chinese
who were able to separate cultural China (wenhua Zhongguo) from geo-
graphical China and admit that China occupied only one small part of the
geographical world; so this minority thinking soon disappeared.
From the Song through the Ming, even though there was vast territorial
expansion in the Yuan, Zheng He (1371–1433) made his magnificent journeys
to the Western Ocean (xia xiyang, 下西洋), and Chinese practical knowledge
of the world had increased quite a bit, the narratives accompanying the maps
continued to repeat the traditional conception of the world. The only excep-
tion was the “Honil Gangni Yeokdae Gukdo Ji Do” (or “Kangnido” Hunyi jiangli
lidai guodu zhi tu) drafted in 1402, supposedly on the basis of Yuan dynasty
geographical knowledge.31 Influenced by Islamic geography, it embraced the
world from Japan in the east to Europe in the west and included the Arabian
Peninsula and over half of Africa. Nevertheless, the narrative accompanying
the graphic representations was still “the spread of Chinese civilization”—the
four barbarians are still on the margins of Chinese civilization, China is still
depicted as at the center of the world and occupying more than two thirds of
the tri-part tianxia—the traditional Chinese view still predominates.

30  Hong ming ji, j. 2, 17.

31  This map is now in Ryûkoku University in Kyôto Japan.
From Ming to Qing I 221

2.2
When Matteo Ricci’s map of the world appeared in sixteenth-century
Ming China, it should be said that it offered another opportunity to change
the Chinese view of the world. According to Ricci’s picture of the world,
ancient China’s conceptions of the so-called “All under Heaven,” “China”
(Middle Kingdom), and the “Four Barbarian Lands” were about to be thor-
oughly undermined because, to quote Yang Tingyun, “it [the world]” was “all a
big circle, without beginning or end, and without center or periphery.”32
It is somewhat strange that when Ricci’s map of the world appeared, several
Ming intellectuals very quickly accepted this new picture of the world. Besides
those who directly assisted Ricci in printing his map, many very influential
scholars like Li Zhi, Feng Yingjing (1555–1606), Xie Zhaozhe (1567–1624) and, a
little later, the erudite Fang Yizhi (1611–1671) and others all cited with approval
this new theory of world geography.33 We can particularly understand the
widespread influence of this new view of the world on Chinese knowledge,
thought and belief from the number of printings of such maps and their
numerous readers. Furthermore many leishu (類書) encyclopedias, usually
taken to be purveyors of general knowledge, also included these types of maps
of the world. In addition to this, after Matteo Ricci, the Account of Countries
Not Listed in the Records Office (Zhifang waiji) of Giulio Aleni (1582–1649) was
published in 1623, and its front section contained a Complete Map of the Myriad
Countries (Wanguo quantu).34
Li Zhizao’s preface to Aleni’s Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records
Office, written in 1623, most clearly records the process by which these scholars
came to recognize this new view of the world and the shock this new knowl-
edge gave to China. He wrote that during the Wanli era, when he first saw Ricci’s
“complete map of the great world with its drawings of border lines and grada-
tions of measurement all very clear,” he was astonished, but, after repeatedly
making his own measurements, he discovered that the Chinese cartographi-
cal tradition was really very crude. After admitting that traditional Chinese
geography was inferior to Western geography, he went on to describe what a

32  Yang Tingyun, “Zhifang waiji xu,” attached at the beginning of Ai Rulüe (Giulio Aleni),
Zhifang waiji. Also see Tianxue chuhan, ce 3, 1289.
33  For Li Zhi’s ideas, see “Da youren” and “Sihai shuo” in Fenshu. For Feng Yingjing, see his
general preface to the Fang yu sheng lüe which also includes the Shanhai yudi quantu; for
Xie Zhaozhe, see his Wu za zu. For Fang Yizhi, see his Wuli xiaozhi and Tongya.
34  For the scholarly influence of Matteo Ricci’s world map, see Chen Guansheng, “Li Madou
(Matteo Ricci) dui Zhongguo dilixue de gongxian ji qi yingxiang,” Yugong, 5/3–4 (1936),
51–72.
222 Chapter 11

shocking revelation this new picture of the world was to him. This world was
so huge and China was so small. In such an enormously large world, why were
people always worrying about trifles and scrabbling for fame and profit? He
then criticized those who stubbornly clung to the old theory for closing their
own eyes and minds. He said that in truth there are unlimited treasures to be
found in different places, different customs and different products throughout
the wide world.35
Qu Shisi (1590–1651) also described even more clearly, in his “Short com-
ments on Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records Office” (Zhifang waiji
xiaoyan), the transformation of their image of the world and the conceptual
changes undergone by those intellectuals who accepted the new knowledge.
He already knew that China was certainly neither the only world nor the only
center of civilization. He also believed that diverse civilizations were not
innately higher or lower, and so it was unreasonable to cling stubbornly to the
idea of Chinese cultural superiority.36 These ideas were obviously influenced by
Roman Catholic views as well as Daoist and Buddhist relativism. Nevertheless,
on the basis of this trend of thought, the ancient Chinese geographical and
cosmological views of the world might certainly face collapse.
In a country like China, however, where history and traditional customs
were still very strong, the impact of this change to a new image of the world
would have too powerful an effect on ancient Chinese concepts. On that
account, the influence of ethnic or national (minzu) and state (guojia) ideol-
ogy behind the drafting of maps of the world was still quite formidable. Not
only the dominant political authorities, but many Chinese scholar-officials
were also unable to accept completely this new image of the world. Even
though some scholar-officials were aware of the new world view, it was still
psychologically very difficult for them to accept it. For example, in 1636 when
Chen Zushou (1634 jinshi) compiled the Illustrious Ming Atlas of the World
(Huang Ming zhifang ditu), he criticized Western maps for “making China
small and the four barbarians large” (xiao Zhongguo er da siyi). He believed
that they should “use Chinese ways to transform barbarians” (yong Xia bian
yi 用夏變夷), but China “cannot be changed by the barbarians” (bian yu yi
變于夷). He still placed China in the center of his map because “the four great
continents surround China … China sits in the center of the tianxia and orders

35  See Xie Fang, Zhifang waiji jiaoshi, 7 as attached to the beginning of Ai Rulüe (Giulio
Aleni), Zhifang waiji.
36  Ibid., 9.
From Ming to Qing I 223

the peoples of the four seas.37 This was not only Chen Zushou’s view. In the late
Ming, Wei Jun (1553–?) also attacked Matteo Ricci’s world map. Even though
Ricci had taken great pains to situate China in the center, Chen still indignantly
denounced Ricci as follows: “How could he possibly conceive of China as being
so small and place it in the near north on the map?”38 If we say that this view
was a product of emotional feelings of ethnic self-esteem, then when the
famous early Qing Neo-Confucian scholar and important minister to the Kang
Xi Emperor (r. 1661–1722), Li Guangdi (1642–1718), debated geography with the
Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688), he used another form of rationalism to
stress repeatedly that China was situated in the center of the world.39
Why was China’s centrality so important? Because the ancient Chinese
temporal and spatial conceptions of “Heaven” and “Earth” also included the
foundations of ancient Chinese political authority and rationality. If the great
square “Earth” was no longer situated under the canopy of a great round
“Heaven,” then everything that ancient Chinese history and tradition told the
Chinese about the experiences of their existence would lose its meaning. If
the world was no longer made up of “five zones” (wufu 五服, royal domain,
regional rulers, guests, controlled, and wild) concentrically arranged from the
center out as in the “Tributes of Yu” and the Rites of Zhou, then the Chinese
would be unable to find a proper place for their own living space. If the “four
barbarians” or “barbarian regions” surrounding China were no longer such
small, uncivilized and dependent states, then the self-confidence of the great
Celestial Empire, the majesty of the central dynasty, the uniqueness of the
Emperor of the most high country, and the grandeur of the supreme monarch
of the world (tianxia) would all collapse into nothing. This would indeed be no
trivial matter.

2.3
In addition to describing this change in Chinese views of “All under Heaven,”
“China,” and the “four barbarians” in intellectual history, we also need to discuss

37  Even many people who more or less accepted Western geographical knowledge also often
drafted maps of the “tianxia” on the basis of traditional ideas. For examples, during the
Wanli era, there were Liang Zhou’s Qian Kun wanguo quantu gujin renwu shiji produced
in a wood block edition by the Fourth Bureau of the Nanjing Ministry of Personnel, Zhang
Huang’s “Gujin tianxia xingsheng zhi tu” (in his Tushu bian), and Cao Mingyi’s Tianxia
jiubian fenye renji lucheng quantu produced in the Chongzhen era as a wood block edi-
tion, and so on.
38  Xu Changzhi, ed., Shengchao poxie ji, j. 3, 185.
39  Li Guangdi, “Ji Nan Huairen dawen,” in Rongcun ji, photocopy of Wenyuange SKQS edition.
224 Chapter 11

the trajectory of these changes. Understanding a new form of knowledge is

quite similar to translating a new language. To translate a new language one
has to match new terms with terms already available in one’s own language,
and to understand new knowledge one also has to call up one’s own historical
memory, traditional knowledge, and imagination as intellectual resources to
understand and interpret the new knowledge. When Matteo Ricci’s map of the
world was spread out in front of Chinese intellectuals, those men who were so
deeply steeped in the traditional tianxia concept were at a loss as to how to
respond. The mainstream intellectual stratum lacked traditional resources
to respond, and so they very quickly began to mobilize all of their knowledge
of the world to tap into their own history for resources to respond to the new
knowledge. No matter whether they accepted or rejected the new knowledge,
they all had to rearrange their intellectual resources.
The first things they thought of were Zou Yan (305–240 BCE)’s theories
and the imaginative visions of the Classic of Mountains and Seas and the Classic
on Divine Marvels (Shenyi jing). Those who accepted the new view of the world
asserted that, based on Zou Yan’s theory of the nine great continents (da jiu
zhou 大九洲) and the Classic of Mountains and Seas and the Classic on Divine
Marvels, ancient China already had such a concept of the world.40 With this in
mind they could accept the new view with equanimity. Those who opposed the
new view said that it was nothing more than Zou Yan’s old theory of Heaven
and the legendary stories of the Classic of Mountains and Seas. The Westerners,
they said, were only plagiarizing the strange tales and absurd arguments of
ancient China, and so there was no reason to worry—their new vision of the
world simply repeated the old Chinese imagination.41
It is worth noting, however, that in making this sort of claim, the concepts
of the rejecters were changing after all. In ancient China, Zou Yan’s theory of
the nine great continents and the exotic tales of worlds beyond the seas
in the Classic of Mountains and Seas were all rejected by Confucian rationality as

40  The Annotated Catalog of the Complete Imperial Library (Siku Quanshu tiyao) note on An
Account with Illustrations of World Map (Kun yu tushuo) attributes what was recorded in
this work, such as “a bronze man stood there straddling the ocean while huge ships passed
back and forth between his legs” and animals from Arctic Ocean and so on to the Shenyi
jing, shang, p. 634. SKQS zongmu, j. 71.
41  For example, Chen Zushou connected Western geographical knowledge to Zou Yan and
hence believed that it would be all right for Western maps to be “retained but not dis-
cussed.” “Siyi liu” in the Huangchao wenxian tongkao, j. 298 stated even more baldly that
Matteo Ricci’s theory of five continents “simply follows Zou Yan’s Warring States theory of
the little seas (pihai 裨海) surrounding the nine continents.”
From Ming to Qing I 225

beyond the ken of genuine knowledge of the tianxia. The mainstream Chinese
view was always that the land within the four seas, the tianxia world, was made
up of China’s vast civilized central empire surrounded on four sides by small
barbarian states. When the Chinese intellectual stratum, with Confucianism
as its mainstream thought, was unable to find the resources to respond to the
new view of the world, the best they could do was to marshal these ideas that
had been hitherto regarded as mere “conversation pieces” and “strange tales.”
When these imaginings were brought back into the Chinese conceptual world,
however, changes occurred in the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and
belief through a process in which “center” and “periphery,” “mainstream”
and “heterodoxy” exchanged places.
Daoist and Buddhist thought and ideas were also involved in the Chinese
scholar-officials’ search for intellectual resources concerning images of the
world. Buddhist ideas about the mahadvîpa or “four great continents” (si da bu
zhou 四大部洲) made it psychologically possible for the Chinese to accept the
reality of the new Western concept of five continents. In any case, according to
Daoist and Buddhist thought, nothing in the world is absolute—the immense
is also the miniscule, and the long-lasting is also the momentary. Following this
relativist logic, all obstinacy and arrogance are undermined and no concepts
or values are everlasting. On the basis of such a revaluation, the Western four
elements theory and the world view of a myriad nations or states existing side
by side could both be accepted. In this way the new Western knowledge and
Daoist and Buddhist thought, oddly enough, combined and worked together
to deconstruct the ancient Chinese view that China was the only center of a
tianxia world.
Finally, these Chinese intellectuals who were steeped in the traditional
tianxia concept also wanted to find the strongest possible intellectual resources
within their universally accepted Confucianism to serve as a basis for accept-
ing the new Western view of the world. Qu Shigu wrote the following in his
“Short Comments on Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records Office”:
“why not listen to what an earlier Confucian said that sages from the eastern
seas or the western seas all share the same mind and the same principle.” An
“early Confucian” (Ru xian 儒先) here refers to the Song Neo-Confucian Lu
Jiuyuan (Xiangshan). The original comes from the Chronological Biography
(nianpu) of Lu Jiuyuan. It says that when Lu was young he was pondering ulti-
mate questions and when he saw the word “cosmos” (yuzhou), he was sud-
denly enlightened. He then said “The universe is my mind, and my mind is the
universe. Over the eastern seas sages appear. They share this mind; they share
this principle. Over the western seas sages appear. They share this mind; they
226 Chapter 11

share this principle.”42 This passage includes a presupposition of both univer-

salism and internationalism. It says that civilization embodies an absolutely
universal truth (“true principle” zhenli 真理 in Chinese) that is unrelated to the
geographical position of a nation’s territory, but is only (and especially) related
to “sages” who are able to experience this truth. While they were accepting the
new view of the world and the new religion, quite a few later Chinese scholars,
such as Li Zhizao, Wang Jiazhi (1604 jinshi), Mi Jiasui (mid-17th century), Kong
Zhenshi (1613 jinshi), Ye Xianggao (1559–1627), Feng Yingjing, and so on appro-
priated and relied on this passage in their interpretation of a universal and
pluralistic view of world civilization.
It is particularly interesting to note that later on when the Jesuit missionary
Lodovico Buglio (1606–1682) wrote to refute Yang Guangxian (1597–1669), he
also cited this passage by Lu Jiuyuan. Buglio wrote that the Chinese should
not insist on their Sinocentric view that they are superior to others, “but they
should just seek out similarities to mind and principle, not distinguish differ-
ences between East and West, and then how could their vision not be broad?”43
In this way the idea that the traditional Chinese empire was the center of a
tianxia, and that China was superior to all of the states on its borders was inval-
idated by the idea of a universal and absolute truth, and as a result li 理, prin-
ciple or universal truth, became of paramount importance in this new way of
looking at the world. It was no longer necessary to cling obstinately to a narrow
ethnic (minzu) and nationalist (guojia) view. The new view of the world that
tolerated a myriad of equal nations or states could now be accepted within
Chinese Confucianism.

2.4
As much as the traditional Chinese intellectual world was facing the “collapse
of Heaven and Earth,” and witnessing an exchange of place between “center”
and “periphery,” “mainstream” and “heterodoxy,” we need to remember that
these changes took place quite slowly and with considerable difficulty. For a
number of reasons the ancient Chinese vision of the world did not thoroughly
change for quite a long period of time. We should recall that in the middle of
the seventeenth century, Yang Guangxian, head of the Bureau of Astronomy

42  Lu Jiuyuan ji, 1980, j. 36, 483. This passage is translated in Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese
Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, 1953, 2: 573. See Wing-tsit Chan, SB, 579–580 translation of
a similar passage from §22.5a of Xiangshan quanji. According to Chan, yuzhou 宇宙 is a
combination of “spatial continuum” plus “temporal continuum.”
43  Li Misi (Lodovico Buglio) “Budeyi bian,” in Tianzhujiao dongchuan wenxian, 332.
From Ming to Qing I 227

and later to be regarded by many as a legal petifogger; questioned the veracity

of Western maps of the world. He felt it laughably preposterous that “the great
Earth is round like a ball.”44 There was a great deal of mental anxiety involved
in such comments because of the important political implications the tradi-
tional world view of China as the center had. Even down to the middle of the
nineteenth century when Xu Jiyu (1795–1873) published his A Short Account
of the Maritime Circuit (Huanying zhilüe), even though he described the vari-
ous states according to the Western maps of the world, he still placed the
Complete Atlas of the Illustrious Qing Empire (Huang qing yitong yudi quantu)
at the beginning of the work to avoid trouble. In the preface, Xu also solemnly
declared that “China is the center of the Great Earth,” and he drew his map
to show China occupying two-thirds of the Asian land mass. This book was
printed in 1848, fully two and a half centuries after Matteo Ricci printed his first
map of the world in China.

3 The Rise of Textual Criticism and Evidential Research and the

Chinese Intellectual World from the Mid-17th to the Late 18th
Centuries

For two centuries after the 1650s, Chinese intellectual history seems to have
been in a depressed state. On the surface, the world of Chinese knowledge,
thought and belief was little different from in the past. Although the Great
Qing Empire replaced the Ming dynasty, official political ideology still relied
upon Confucian ideas centered on Zhu Xi’s School of Principle. The main-
stream intellectual world continued to maintain the homogeneous thought
that had developed from the Song and Yuan dynasties. Most literati continued
to be nurtured by an education based on reading and studying the Four Books
(“Great Learning,” “Doctrine of the Mean,” Analects and Mencius) and the Five
Classics (Book of Songs, Book of Documents, Classic of Rites, Classic of Changes
and Spring and Autumn Annals with the Zuo Commentary). They also contin-
ued to write interpretive commentaries on these works for the edification of
later generations. At this time the only different trend seems to have been the
academic style that would later come to be know as textual criticism (kaoju
考據, also translated: evidential research, evidential studies, evidential inves-
tigation). For a long period of time, through the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns

44  Yang Guangxian, “Niejing” in his collected essays entitled Budeyi. See An Shuangcheng,
“Tang Ruowang (Johann Adam Schall) an shimo,” in Ming-Qing dang-an yu lishi yanjiu
lunwen xuan, 1080–1097.
228 Chapter 11

(1735–1796), evidential studies (kaojuxue 考據學) was the core element of

intellectual history research, but this meticulous philology and research was,
for a segment of the elite intellectual stratum, merely a kind of intellectual
performance intended to show off their intellect to gain a high reputation and
honors. It did not present any fundamental challenge to the traditional world
of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief.
This overall situation was not as simple, however. Behind the superficial
unity of the Qing world of knowledge, thought and belief, everything was
breaking up. Confined under the domination of the School of Principle, schol-
ars had gradually lost any space for freedom of thought. While they employed
this knowledge as a resource for passing the official examinations, adapting
to bureaucratic rules, and making a living, they often sought out alternative
knowledge and an alternative intellectual community to identify with. Their
search led to intellectual divisions. In the Qing dynasty, this intellectual split
was manifest in the opposition between simply proclaiming the truth (zhenli,
真理) and actually investigating the truth (evidentiary investigation, kaojiu
zhenshi, 考究真實 or kaozheng 考證), or between foundational thinking and
evidential research, or between “moral principle” (yili 義理) and “evidential
research” (kaoju).45 The result of this intellectual schism was that textual study,
which had a potentially modern flavor, was marginalized by the traditional
intellectual world at the same time that it came to occupy the central position
in the Qing academic world. Traditional thought, then, lost its solid intellectual
(textual) support, and although it occupied the central position in the official
political ideology, it was marginal to the interests of the Qing intellectual class.
As soon as this change in the actual situation led to a reversal of the marginal
and the central, it created a rupture between knowledge and thought. Thought
lost its evidentiary intellectual support, and evidentiary knowledge became a
resource for the interpretation of alternative thought.
We must now turn to the intellectual history of the middle of the seven-
teenth century. After the Qing conquest of the Ming, their internal policy of
cultural universalism temporarily eliminated or suppressed one reason for eth-
nic conflict. Their foreign policy change from openness to closing down (isola-
tionism) also pushed to one side the tensions between China and the outside
world that had existed since the late Ming. A revitalized School of Principle
both satisfied the needs of those scholars who had come to loath the empti-
ness of Wang Yangming’s School of Mind and shored up their identification
with the new dynasty and the unitary nature of truth, forcibly reintegrating

45  We translate zhenli 真理 as either truth or doctrine, or sometimes truth (doctrine)
because both concepts can be implied in the Chinese use of zhenli.
From Ming to Qing I 229

all that had collapsed since the late Ming. Concealed behind this forcible rein-
tegration and reconstitution of the Chinese intellectual world and this new
unity, however, were some important differences and divisions of thought.

3.1
Due to the influence of Wang Yangming and his later followers, a certain
amount of pluralism had developed in late Ming thought; many types of intel-
lectual discourse were already reaching their extreme form and were close to
mutual conflict. The first important tendency of these Ming to Qing trends of
thought was that Wang Yangming’s ideas caused some people to seek increas-
ingly for transcendence and freedom and even to challenge the political
authorities and resist social order. This spurred on others who were profoundly
anxious about such thinking to advocate strongly for various remedies such
as self-watchfulness, repentance, and external control to limit the inflation of
individual spirit and the excesses of egoism.46
The second important tendency was the simultaneous appearance of many
different intellectual pursuits and orientations. Those who wanted to employ
learning for practical application were interested in “statecraft” ( jingshi 經世).
They repeatedly reminded people that they should pay attention to concrete
political, economic and military affairs and their requisite knowledge. Some of
these people were quite aware of the value of Western astronomy, geography,
ballistics, water conservancy, and mathematics. They wholeheartedly admired
these Western ideas, so much so that they were willing to abandon some obsti-
nate traditional Chinese beliefs.47 Some others who were steeped in traditional
Chinese consciousness, however, looked with great trepidation on these trends
that could lead to the collapse of the Chinese intellectual world. They strongly
opposed this intellectual tendency and even called for the establishment of a
Confucian religion (Kongjiao 孔教).48
The third important tendency was the spread of religious beliefs. A group
of people, especially at court and among the nobility, who were interested in
finding everlasting life, continued to believe in the Daoist Religion, became
infatuated with the philosophy of life, and indulged in experiments with vari-
ous drugs, supposed elixirs of immortality. Another group of people wanted
to transcend this mundane world and so they turned to Buddhism for intel-
lectual support; they also tried to combine Buddhist religious doctrines with

46  The thinking of men like Gao Panlong (1562–1626), Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612), Liu
Zongzhou (1578–1645), and so on was superficially different, but essentially the same.
47  For example, Xu Guangqi, Li Zhizao, and Yang Tingyun.
48  For example, Wang Qiyuan, Wen Fengxiang, and Xu Sanli (1625–1691).
230 Chapter 11

the philosophy of Wang Yangming in an attempt to appear more reasonable.

Various forms of popular religion also absorbed Buddhist and Daoist ideas and
had considerable influence in society. They also gained a great deal of sup-
port in the imperial court and through these channels they even penetrated
the community of upper class scholars. Of course, the opponents of such reli-
gions also firmly maintained their orthodox Confucian stand, sternly opposed
all heretical doctrines, called for protection of the solemnity and purity of
Confucianism and for keeping a clear distinction between Confucianism,
Buddhism and the Daoist Religion.
During the Ming-Qing transition, however, these rich and colorful intel-
lectual tendencies were all reduced to one simple discourse of nationalism.
Traditional Han Chinese scholar-officials could not accept the great change
from the Ming to the Qing even though the late Ming situation had already
driven them to despair. When the Ming dynasty was overthrown by a rebel-
lious populace and a foreign ethnic group, they simply could not accept it.
They had always connected “civilization” (wenming) with ethnic “national-
ity” (minzu) and equated “nationality” with the “state/nation” (guojia) and
the “state/nation” with the “dynasty” (wangchao), and the “dynasty” with the
“emperor” (huangdi). For them the fall of the dynasty and the empire meant
nothing less than the extinction of their civilization.
Perhaps the fall of no other dynasty in all of Chinese history resulted in the
production of such a large number of loyalists (yimin 遺民), survivors who
remained loyal to the fallen Ming dynasty, and brought about such a violent
cultural shock.49 Witnesses to this great historical change felt great sorrow
about culture, thought and politics, and thus an unprecedented amount of
reflection and discussion of these matters occurred at the end of the Ming and
the beginning of the Qing. These discussions were mixed up with feelings of
rebellion and the anguish of seeing their dynasty or state vanquished as well as
a great deal of reflective thought about events since the late Ming. With intense
emotional fervor, many scholars undertook excruciatingly painful criticisms of
the immediate past. This was the case with Fu Shan (1607–1684), Fang Yizhi,
Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), Wang Fuzhi, Lü Liuliang (1629–1683), Qu
Dajun (1630–1696), and many others.
Spurred on by the fall of the Ming dynasty, Han Chinese nationalism was
brought forth with slogans like “distinguish between Chinese and barbarians”
and “not just the dynasty but the tianxia has been destroyed” ( fei wangguo, nai
wang tianxia 非亡國, 乃亡天下). The violently insurrectionary posture of the

49  He Guanbiao, Sheng yu si: Ming ji shidafu de jueze, 1997, has a great deal of detailed infor-
mation about Ming loyalists and their patriotic martyrdom.
From Ming to Qing I 231

Ming loyalists and the influential rebellious thought of uncooperative literati

in the early Qing were both very difficult problems for the political ideology
of the early Qing government. Although these critiques and reflections would
later be interpreted as something similar to European Enlightenment thought,
what they primarily expressed were indignation and resentment at the fate
of their Han Chinese ethnic group (minzu) and feelings of grief at the fall of
their own old state (guguo); they were not necessarily a rational reflection on
or dispassionate analyses of macro history. For ethnic Han Chinese literati
the “distinction between Chinese and barbarians” (Hua Yi zhi fen 華夷之
分) was axiomatic, and it actually embodied a form of ethnic prejudice; this
prejudice that derived from identification with the dynasty also superseded
value judgments based on the idea of universal civilization. On that account,
this seemingly intense critical thought was not really so secure; as soon as
their social and emotional foundations changed, they were undermined
and their followers faded away. During the century of the Shunzhi (1644–1662),
Kangxi (1616–1722) and Yongzheng (1722–1735) imperial reigns, the poignant
and unforgettable memory of the fallen Ming dynasty steadily dissipated.
After the Manchu-Qing regime began to establish its political legitimacy on
the basis of cultural universalism, the intense nationalism of the Han Chinese
was faced with an embarrassing predicament. There was a very big weakness in
their way of thinking. To wit, what is civilization (wenming)? Do ethnicity (or
race, zhongzu) and political authority equal civilization? Does dynastic succes-
sion from one ethnic group to another equal the destruction of civilization or
the tianxia? According to the general logic of Ming loyalist thought, it would
seem that when China was vanquished by a non-Han Chinese ethnic group
that was the collapse of civilization. This was to conflate the ethnic meaning
of being Yi or Di (non-Chinese “tribes” to the east and north of ancient China)
with the cultural meaning of being barbarous and uncivilized (yeman).
In his Record of Great Righteousness Dispelling Superstition (Dayi juemi lu,
1730), however, the Yongzheng emperor argued very persuasively that whether
or not a government regime is legitimate and reasonable depends upon
whether it is politically correct, has the approval of the gods and spirits, and
receives the allegiance of the masses. In modern parlance, a government’s
legitimacy derives from the reasonableness of its political, spiritual, and cul-
tural support. Yongzheng affirmed that “one who possess virtue (de) is fit to be
ruler of the tianxia;” and so he asked “how can you use the distinction between
Hua and Yi to treat them differently?”50 When Yongzheng went on with these
ideas, the weakness in the Ming loyalist discourse was eventually revealed.

50  
Dayi juemi lu, j. 1, 4.
232 Chapter 11

Gu Yanwu said that “there is the destruction of the dynasty, and there is the
destruction of the tianxia.” The destruction of the dynasty (wangguo) takes
place when the surname of the emperors and the name of the dynasty (guojia)
change, but the destruction of the tianxia takes place when culture disappears.
According to Gu Yanwu, it is the function of the emperors and their ministers
to prevent the destruction of the nation, but to prevent the destruction of cul-
ture was “the responsibility of even the most ordinary and lowly person.”51 This
may indeed be true, but if one continues to apply this logic, then if the new
dynasty complies with and follows the path of the traditional culture, would
their conquest not be a reasonable one in the fashion of the historic “revolts
of kings Tang and Wu,” founders of the Shang and Zhou dynasties? If the new
Manchu-Qing imperial regime had a higher moral system than national or eth-
nic rightness (duty) (minzu dayi 民族大義)—practicing “benevolence, com-
passion, and filial piety” (ren ai ci xiao 仁愛慈孝)—would not the feelings of
Han Chinese national or ethnic rightness end up without goals or support?
By the end of the Shunzhi, Kangxi, and Yongzheng reigns, the Manchu-Qing
government had been established for nearly a century, from 1644 to 1735. The
first generation of Han Chinese literati, men like Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi,
Wang Fuzhi, Fu Shan, Fang Yizhi, Qu Dajun (1630–1696), and Lü Liuling (1629–
1683), who had endured the painful demise of the Ming had died off, and the
residual longing for the Ming dynasty had dissipated.52 By that time people’s
identification had shifted from the “Great Ming Empire” with Han Chinese
culture as its core to the Manchu, Mongol, and Han Chinese community that
made up the “Great Qing Empire.” The concept of “China” had lost its purely
ethnic meaning and had taken on a cultural or civilizational meaning. As a
result, Chinese scholar-officials were no longer fixated on maintaining their
ethnic dignity, but now set their sights on the establishment of a moral order.

3.2
As discussed above, from the Song dynasty on, the gentry class possessed
great cultural authority and generally relied on doctrinal truth (principle) to
resist imperial power. Their intellectual resources derived primarily from Song

51  Gu Yanwu, Rizhilu, in Huang Rucheng, Rizhilu jishi, 1994, j. 13, 471.
52  After a decade or more, this resolute distinction between Chinese as good and barbarians
as evil was not even sustainable among Ming loyalists. For example, Gu Yanwu discussed
scholarship with the so-called turncoat official Sun Chengze (1592–1676) and had a deep
friendship with the erudite scholar Zhu Yizun (1629–1709). Huang Zongxi wrote a letter to
high Qing officials in support of his grandson in which he called the Qing emperor a “sage
ruler.” Even his nationalist feelings had gradually dissipated.
From Ming to Qing I 233

Neo-Confucianism, especially the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle. The most

important of these resources was inner moral transcendence (neizai daode
chaoyue 内在道德超越) in relation to political policies and the political order.
That is, they criticized concrete political policies from the vantage point of a
higher truth (principle) and tried to solve political problems by intellectual
and cultural means, relying on the tradition of Confucian moral principle
(daotong) to restrain and control political power (zhengtong).
The power to interpret the truth generally belonged to the scholar-official
class, but the ideal of Confucianism and the School of Principle was to recover
or establish political order. At a time when the imperial power dominated
everything and political power was higher than any other, however, the power
to decide what is or is not truth (correct principle) could also be taken over
by the emperor. For example, the early Manchu-Qing emperors very cleverly
took control of the doctrines of the School of Principle, allowing the emperor’s
“tradition of governance” (zhengtong) to incorporate and co-opt the “tradition
of moral principle” (daotong), thus leaving the scholars without the power or
right to express their opinions or exert their control over affairs.
The government pursued a number of strategies to accomplish its purposes.
First of all, they honored or put into important positions so-called famous Neo-
Confucian statesmen like Xiong Cilü (1636–1709), Li Guangdi (1642–1718), Wei
Xiangshu (1617–1687), Wei Yijie (1616–1686), Lu Longqi (1630–1692), Tang Bin
(1627–1687), Zhang Boxing (1651–1725), and so on who were quite influential in
the Neo-Confucian world.53 At the same time they continually did their best to
bring into government key figures such as Zhu Yizun (1629–1709), Yan Ruoqu
(1636–1704), Xu Ganxue (1631–1694), and so on. In this way, in both actual prac-
tice and intellectual exposition, the government could already assert that the
most excellent scholars all shared the same principles as they did.
Secondly, they employed imperial edicts and the examination system to
appropriate the Han Chinese intellectual tradition and vigorously promote
Confucianism or the ideas of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle. During
his sixty-year reign, Emperor Kangxi used his power to promote the School
of Principle and suppress sectarian deviance, forcing the literati to abandon
any unorthodox positions.54 At that he created an official ideology wrapped

53  Lu Longqi and Tang Bin both have received accompanying sacrifices in the two hall-
ways of the Confucian Temple. Zhang Boxing was highly esteemed by both Kangxi and
Yongzheng. See Tang Jian, Qing ru xue-an xiaozhi, j. 1, “Pinghu Lu xiansheng zhuan;” j. 2,
“Yifeng Zhang xiansheng zhuan;” j. 3, “Suizhou Tang xiansheng zhuan.”
54  Let me give two examples of literati changing their views. After Kangxi criticized Li
Guangdi for “pretending to be a follower of Neo-Confucianism” and praised Xiong Cilü for
234 Chapter 11

up in the language of Neo-Confucian discourse, and this ideology was institu-

tionalized and put into effect throughout Qing society.55 During the Yongzhen
reign, the emperor was even more dominant over the right to determine
truth or principle. As a result, those literati who originally held an ideal of re-
establishing order in the intellectual world were forced by this thought purge
[sixiang zhengsu 思想整肅) to become political “fellow travelers.” Their criti-
cism, however full of genuine concern for suffering, equally suppressed the late
Ming tendency toward intellectual pluralism.56
Thirdly, the Qing emperors frequently employed their power to criticize
sectarian deviance among the literati and to carry out policies of “executing
one to warn the rest.” Through these punishments, the Qing emperors firmly
established their discursive authority in doctrinal matters. Qing “literary inqui-
sitions” (imprisonment for one’s writings, wenzi yu 文字獄) featured very wide-
spread punishments to combat heresies or subversive thoughts. Particularly
emblematic of these inquisitions was Yongzhen’s Violators of the Confucian
Ritual Code (Mingjiao zuiren). The mingjiao (名教) was the ritual code of ethi-
cal behavior established by Confucianism for the preservation of the ethical
and moral order of society. To violate the mingjiao naturally made one a crimi-
nal, especially when the emperor held the discursive power over interpretation
of the mingjiao; anyone who opposed the emperor was ipso facto a criminal.
These punishments further solidified the Qing emperors’ political and moral
legitimacy.57

“venerating only Zhu Xi,” Li changed directions and became a celebrated lixue official. In
the early Qing, Mao Qiling (1623–1716) criticized Song dynasty commentaries on the Four
Books; his Correcting Errors in the Four Books (Sishu gaicuo) cited 451 such errors. When
he heard that Kangxi was going to honor Zhu Xi by offering sacrifices in the Confucian
temple, however, he burned the blocks for his book.
55  Kangxi examined the Hanlin scholars on the subject of “the true and false in lixue Neo-
Confucianism” (Lixue zhenwei lun) as well as repeatedly praising celebrated Song dynasty
Neo-Confucianism scholars. See Qing shengzu shilu, j. 223, Kangxi 44, gengchen, 2988. The
ideological dissemination policy was supported by many literati as a way to protect ethi-
cal and moral order throughout the country.
56  Wei Xiangshu and Gan Rulai (1684–1739) both proposed setting up a system of rites to
maintain the traditional social order; Tang Bin and other celebrated Neo-Confucian
officials forbade the dramas and short fiction of the Jiangsu and Zhejiang area, hence
widely propagating this ideology in the name of maintaining ethical and moral order.
Xiong Cilü, Lu Longqi, Zhang Boxing, Tang Bin, Wei Yijie (1616–1686) and others rather
self-consciously participated in the early Qing reconstruction of thought.
57  See Mingjiao zuiren, appended to Mingjiao zuiren tan, 1999, 49–121.
From Ming to Qing I 235

The first Confucian scholar in the Qing dynasty to receive sacrifices in the
Confucian Temple, Lu Longqi, once asserted that an ideal world would be one
that was characterized by a unity of politics (political or imperial power), cul-
ture, and thought. This may have only been the ideal world of a man of culture,
but it revealed a certain tendency that could lead to ideological dictatorship.
In the conceptual world of ancient China, there were only the two categories
of public (gong) and private (si), and there was no intermediate discourse
between the public and private realms. In the intellectual sphere, “public” and
“private” were relegated to the realms of “reason/principle” (li) and “passion/
desire” (yu) respectively. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, theories link-
ing “public” and “private” with “righteousness” (yi) and “profit” (li 利) or “true/
morally correct” (shi) and “false/morally wrong” ( fei) respectively were very
widespread and amounted to unquestionable principles. When politics (impe-
rial power), culture, and thought actually were unified, many unfortunate
consequences ensued. On the one hand, the emperors could arbitrarily decide
everything in the name of the “public” good, and the state (guojia) could abuse
its power in the name of social and political order. On the other hand, individ-
uals who were relegated to the realm of “the private,” had no choice but to try
to escape this government control of truth. The phrase about so-called “using
principle to kill people” (yi li sharen 以理殺人) was precisely about the Qing
suppression of all other discourse in the name of a seemingly high-minded
politics, dignified morality, and the people.58
In the intellectual space provided by the government, then, there was
only one always correct form of thought, and other intellectual discourses
were completely stripped of their legitimacy. With the flourishing of Wang
Yangming’s thought in the Ming dynasty, there was a real tendency toward
intellectual pluralism. After the transition from the Ming to the Manchu-Qing
dynasty, however, this Ming pluralism was reduced to a monolithic unity, and
the reasonableness of any thought came to be based on Han Chinese national
or ethnic duty (minzu dayi 民族大義), and this national or ethnic duty was for
the most part also limited to the traditional “orthodox doctrine” (zhengtong
lun 正統論). When ethnic or racial differences could no longer support an eval-
uation of the superiority or inferiority of a civilization, then even culture and
doctrinal truth were no longer under the exclusive authority of the intellectual
class; they had become rather a tool for the imperial power to criticize that
class, and the intellectuals no longer possessed their own independent space.
The entire society was under the domination of an empty, dogmatic, absolute,
and grandiose doctrinal discourse. There was no way that people could hide

58  The phrase “using principle to kill people” is from Dai Zhen quanshu, 1994, 496.
236 Chapter 11

from this official discourse; indeed, there was not even any way for people to
situate themselves outside of the state system.
We should particularly point out that because the Qing dynasty employed
“statism” (guojia zhuyi 國家主義) to resist ideas of “power sharing” ( fenquan 分
權), the idea that All under Heaven are one family to criticize regionalism, and
their idea that there is only one truth to restrain the expression of individual
freedom, they deprived the literati even more of any justification for physical
or intellectual escape from universal imperial power. There were vary narrow
channels in the first place that the intellectuals could rely upon to escape from
the domination of imperial power and the oppression of the “public” (gong)
sphere and maintain some small space for freedom to criticize. There were
only Regional States (zhuhouguo 諸侯國), the power of the commanding offi-
cers and their followers (guanliao mufu 官僚幕府), private academies (shuyuan
書院), village private schools (xiangshu 鄉塾), rural lineages (xiangjian zongzu
鄉間宗族), and so on. As a result, Gu Yanwu advocated “listing the idea of
fengjian (establishing Regional States) under the prefecture-county system,”
Huang Zongxi promoted the abolition of the rigid relationship between the
ruler and his ministers and making prefecture and county schools into places
for public discussion, Lu Shiyi hoped to re-establish village clan organizations
(xiangli zongzu 鄉里宗族) in order to expand gentry and regional power, and
Lü Liuliang complained that “later generations abolished the fengjian system
of Regional States and replaced it with the prefecture-county system, and thus
the world was unified under the rule of one single ruler.”59 All of these propos-
als and assertions were actually a continuation of gentry thinking about resis-
tance to government control since the Song dynasty and they embodied their
ideas of striving to gain more space for local gentry. All of this sort of thought
was, however, stifled in the early Qing. Because the scope of knowledge and
thought became increasingly narrow, people could not escape control either

59  
Tinglin wenji, j. 1, “Junxian lun,” expresses great dissatisfaction with the emperor’s abso-
lute control. Gu Yanwu advocated a system of power-sharing between center and local
regions, including distribution of wealth, assistance for local clans (providing support for
local clans so as to strengthen their power), establishment of local schools, and so on.
These policies were intended to gain some space in an autocratic system. Gu Tinglin shi-
wen ji, 12–17; Huang Zongxi’s essay “Yuan chen,” in his Mingyi daifang lu asserted that the
minister and the ruler relationship is only one of political cooperation and “if I am not in
charge of official duties, then I am a stranger to the ruler.” In this way, we see that Huang
also tried to gain some space for the local gentry to operate within an autocratic system.
The Mingyi daifang lu is translated by William Theodore de Bary as Waiting for The Dawn:
a Plan For The Prince, 1993. See Wang Fansen, “Qingchu de xiaceng jingshi sixiang,” Dalu
zazhi 98 (1999) 1–21.
From Ming to Qing I 237

by the system or ideological oppression. In the public sphere they had to com-
ply with the official discourse, and so they could only seek out other channels
where they could express their individual thinking and intelligence.
Political unity did not lead to unity of knowledge and thought; rather it
led to a schism in the Chinese conceptual world. On the one hand, political
authoritarianism claimed a monopoly on truth (doctrine), but on the other
hand people sought out alternative spaces. Qing dynasty evidential research
was precisely the area of activity, beyond the mainstream system of knowledge
and thought, in which Qing intellectuals pursued their ideals, and sought rec-
ognition and expression.

3.3
There seems to have been two views on the intellectual origins of evidential
research. One view saw Qing evidential research as a reaction to Song and Ming
scholarship and praised it as if it were the European Renaissance. People like
Liang Qichao (1873–1929) and Hu Shi (1891–1962) interpreted it from the point
of view that “returning to the ancient ( fugu 復古) is emancipation.” They also
treated it as a “major reaction” to the Neo-Confucian School of Principle that
“abandoned empty talk and moved toward practical matters (practice).” The
system of thought behind their way of thinking was evolution, science, and
pragmatism. This led, however, to an unusual scene unfolding on the Chinese
stage. That is, the classic texts of the ancient Chinese sages performed in a neo-
classical drama of returning to the ancients, but the director’s script seems to
have been written based on the European Renaissance.
Another view saw evidential research as a continuation of Song and Ming
thought. People like Qian Mu (1895–1990) asserted that Qing evidential
research came from early Qing scholars who in light of the dynastic transition
from Ming to Qing hoped to employ knowledge to practice “statecraft” ( jing-
shi 經世). Their spiritual support, Qian said, came from Song and Ming Neo-
Confucianism, and “scholarship will advance further when it moves in a new
direction, and it will definitely seek to change when it reaches an impasse.”60
Qian was obviously searching in the resources of China’s own knowledge and
thought for a logical path for the development of Chinese intellectual history.
How did the Qing dynasty intellectual climate change from empty talk
toward practical matters and evidential research? No matter which position
they held, scholars (upholding the above mentioned two views) all more or less
agreed with the explanation that Qing dynasty thought control and repression

60  Qian Mu, Guoxue gailun, 1979, 61; “Qingru xue-an xu,” in Zhongguo xueshu sixiangshi
cong­shu, 8 (1980), 336.
238 Chapter 11

caused the literati to lose interest in present actualities and to pay more atten-
tion to China’s classical past. Liang Qichao recounted one by one the keju fraud
case of 1657, the 1661–1662 Jiangnan abusive collection of tax deferral case, and
the 1661–1663 Zhuang Tinglong (?–1655) case about compiling the Ming dynas-
tic history, and was certain that they were the cause of the transformation
of the scholarly landscape.61
The majority of scholars also had similar views and held that Qing eviden-
tial research arose from the suppression of thought and the decline of spirit
of the scholar-officials. This is a rather persuasive argument and it is still quite
influential today. I think, however, that although focusing on policies of per-
secution such as “literary inquisitions” is generally correct, it is nevertheless
somewhat too simplistic. The universal silencing of the intellectuals in the
Qing dynasty cannot really be blamed purely and exclusively on the highly
repressive policies directed against Han Chinese nationalism. I have come to
see that the Qing dynasty silencing of the intellectuals involved more than
just the political suppression of deviant thought. There was also the emperor’s
monopoly of doctrinal truth—the complete incorporation of Confucian moral
principle (daotong) by the “political orthodoxy” (zhitong 治統) of the state.
After the foundation of this moral high ground was occupied by the state, the
literati scholars lost both the discursive power to interpret doctrine (truth) and
the power to guide society.
Given that there was already a division in intellectual discourse, there was
no place for the literati scholars in the “public” sphere, and it was also not pos-
sible for them to share their feelings, knowledge, and thought in the “private”
sphere. In this situation, these scholars began to search for an alternative mode
of intellectual expression situated somewhere between the poles of the public
and the private. As Liang Qichao wrote in section seventeen of his Intellectual
Trends in the Qing Period (Qingdai xueshu gailun), their scholarly annotations,
reading notes, and letters constituted the new textual criticism or evidential
research and historical studies. Liang Qichao noted with great sensitivity that
“Qing Confucians did not want to imitate Song and Ming scholars by lecturing
to groups of disciples, and, unlike today’s European and American scholars,
they did not have various associations and schools at which they could gather
and teach. Thus, they had few opportunities for the exchange of knowledge.”
As a result, the large amount of detailed and complex explanatory notes and

61  Liang Qichao, Zhongguo jin sanbai nian xueshushi, 1958, sections 2–4; “Qingdai xueshu
bianqian yu zhangzhi de yingxiang,” in Zhu Weizheng, annotated, Liang Qichao lun Qing
xueshi erzhong, 1985, 103–137.
From Ming to Qing I 239

commentaries attached to classic texts and handed down to us still tortuously

expressed some of their genuine thinking.
These reading notes and letters that were printed, published, and sent
around through the mail provided alternative channels of communication
between mutually recognized scholars, and greatly facilitated the circulation
of knowledge. Administrative offices of high officials, private schools of the
high born, and the residences of the rich merchants to a certain extent espe-
cially provided a forum for the dissemination and continuity of this intellectual
discourse. During late Qing imperial China, these offices, private residences,
notes, letters, and even annotations of the classics served in a certain sense
the function of protecting this new intellectual activity. The scholars served
as teachers for the high officials or rich merchants or as advisors to top offi-
cials, “or masters of private academies, or prepared local gazetteers for various
provincial and county governments, or compiled genealogies for great clans,
or authenticated the texts for those who had the means to produce them.”62
Particularly in the area of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui where the economy
was quite well developed and political policies were a little more relaxed, there
grew up an intellectual landscape centered on evidential research and a com-
munity of scholars who prided themselves on that research.

3.4
The external tendency toward transformation of this history of knowledge ser-
endipitously corresponded with the intrinsic direction of contemporary intel-
lectual history.
The Ming dynasty Wang Yangming School of Mind gave prominence to the
individual’s inner mind, was skeptical of extrinsic doctrines, and represented
an intense attack on the restraints on social life and the maintenance of social
order by traditional ethics. This inflation of the individual’s inner mind could in
practice have led to the elimination of the restraints of ceremonies (rites) and
social rules, and this prospect made many people uneasy. They began to hope
to remedy the School of Mind, especially the radical tendencies of later Wang
Yangming followers, by means of moral self-discipline, and this gave rise to a
search for such morality. In a similar fashion, members of the Donglin faction
(Donglin dang 東林黨) and others again put forth the idea of the investigation

62  See Liang Qichao, Qingdai xueshu gailun, section 8, Zhu Weizheng, annotated, Liang Qichao
lun Qing xueshi erzhong, 54. Qingdai xueshu gailun is translated by Immanuel C. Y. Hsü
as Intellectual Trends in the Ch’ing Period, 1959. Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to
Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China, 1984, discusses
most of these elements of our story.
240 Chapter 11

of things (gewu 格物 literally, “approaches to phenomena”) and believed that

solid factual knowledge was necessary to verify or prove the truth. This in turn
led to an academic trend that valued conclusive (evidentiary) knowledge and
“broad learning concerning the nature of things” (boxue zhuyi 博學主義).
Under the shock of the demise of the Ming dynasty, these two latent tenden-
cies activated two intellectual orientations among early Qing scholar-officials.
They can be summed up in two phrases from the Analects of Confucius: “main-
tain a sense of shame in one’s personal conduct (xing ji you chi 行己有耻),” and
“extensively study all learning (bo xue yu wen 博學于文).”63
“Maintaining a sense of shame in one’s personal conduct” meant to employ
practical moral reason (daode lixing 道德理性) and moral action to change the
Ming intellectual custom of empty talk about the heart/mind (xin) and human
nature or temperament (xing).64 Even some of the later followers of Wang
Yangming had already begun to quote the Neo-Confucianism of the Cheng-
Zhu School of Principle as a corrective to Wang Yangming’s School of Mind.
Sun Qifeng (1584–1675) wrote: “Take self-watchfulness as one’s model; take the
realization of the Heavenly Principle as most important; take proper everyday
human relationships as one’s practice.”65 Chen Que (1604–1677) wrote: “Revere
the teaching of self-watchfulness; personally practice it; honor accumulated
norms and regulations.”66 Li Yong (1627–1705) also used “repent the past and
start anew” (huiguo zixin 悔過自新) as a sign that the focus of their studies
was no longer on inner freedom, but rather on putting morality into practice.67
With this transformation of their knowledge and thought, they had already
changed the direction of the late Ming Wang Yangming School of Mind.
“Extensively studying all learning” called for the investigation of things, and
it was considered “a profound shame to be ignorant of any phenomenon.” This

63  “Yu youren lun xueshu,” Lin Ting wenji, j. 3, Gu Tinglin shiwen ji, 43.
 It should be noted that there are three different translations for these Lunyu passages.
We basically use Legge’s version in the text above. There are different interpretations of
shi 士 as officer, knight of the Way, gentleman and, scholar. Wen 文 is rendered as learn-
ing, letters and culture—trs.
64  Later Qing dynasty followers of Wang Yangming, like Sun Qifeng, Li Erqu, and Huang
Zongxi had already changed their academic style considerably. They were now following
different roads to the same destination as were also representative figures, like Gu Yanwu
and Yan Yuan, who opposed the shallow academic atmosphere of the day.
65  “Sun Qifeng zhuan,” Qingshi gao, j. 480; Fang Bao, “Sun Zheng jun zhuan,” also records this
change in Sun Qifeng’s thinking; both in Qian Yiji, ed., Bei zhuan ji, j. 127, 5979 and 5986.
66  For Chen Yuanlong, “Qianchu xiansheng zhuan,” see Huang Zongxi, “Chen xiansheng Que
muzhiming,” in Qian Yiji, ed., Bei zhuan ji, j. 127, 5996–5999.
67  Li Hong, Er qu ji, “Huiguo zixin shuo,” j. 1, 3 and j. 10, 76, “Nan xing shu.”
From Ming to Qing I 241

attitude and practice moved away from Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming’s par-
tiality for the mind and also corrected the Song School of Principle’s customary
discussions of “heart/mind,” “nature/temperament,” “principle” and “qi” (the
life force or vital energy of the universe). Holders of this mind set seriously
considered that all knowledge, including knowledge of the traditional classics,
relied on conclusive (evidentiary) knowledge to authenticate the reasonable-
ness of morality and the truth of doctrine, and again based morality and truth
on the ancient classics. They advocated a word by word examination of the
classic texts in search of conclusive and reliable exegesis. Thus, Gu Yanwu said
“start with the examination of the words when reading the nine classics, and
begin that examination with a knowledge of the sound (phonetic value) of the
words, and this is true for all of the books of the hundred schools of classical
thought (zhuzi baijia 諸子百家).”68
These two tendencies were actively echoed by many scholars; they were
identical to the early Qing intellectual world’s attempts to correct the scholarly
atmosphere and synthesize the various schools of thought. By that time, many
scholars had already observed that the late Ming intellectual world lacked
any guiding force for both society and life. There were two reasons for this col-
lapse of the guiding intellectual order. One was that the search for an exces-
sively mysterious spiritual consciousness and an overly noble moral state often
led to contempt for knowledge and a shallow academic style. The other one
was that excessive factional conflicts within Confucianism itself weakened and
undermined the original unity of Confucian thought. Huang Zongxi and Quan
Zuwang (1705–1755) both criticized the School of Principle and the School
of Mind for their biases and attacks on each other. They advocated dealing
with such closely similar forms of thought by “discarding their shortcomings
and retaining their good qualities.” This way of reasoning and harmonization
of the two schools of Neo-Confucianism provided resources that supported
later evidential research. It led contemporary scholars from purely “honor-
ing the moral nature” (zun dexing) to combining practice with “following
the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue) of external phenomena and repre-
sented a turning point in the attitude of Confucian scholarship from “treading
the void” (daoxu 蹈虛) to “seeking the real” (zhishi 徵實).69
“Honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing) and “following the path of inquiry
and study” (dao wenxue), as mentioned in the introduction to volume one
of this history (page 16), are two phrases from the “Doctrine of the Mean”

68  “Da Li Zide shu,” in Tinglin wenji, j. 4, Gu Tinglin shiwen ji, 1976, 76.
69  In his “Qingdai sixiangshi de yige xin jieshi,” Yu Yingshi particularly emphasizes the con-
text of this thought and scholarship. Lishi yu sixiang, 1976, 124.
242 Chapter 11

(Zhongyong) in the Classic of Rites (Liji), and originally they simply expressed
two goals that every Confucian should pursue. It was difficult, however, for
anyone to find a perfect balance between these two goals, and so they came
eventually to symbolize different internal orientations in the character of any
Confucian scholar. “Treading the void” and “seeking the real” were two emo-
tionally symbolic terms, but they nevertheless quite vividly expressed the
different intellectual styles of two separate epochs. We may say that the late
Ming actually experienced the phenomenon of scholars “setting books aside,
not looking at them and going around talking baseless nonsense,” but then
in the Qing dynasty, especially during the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong
eras, the search for what was imagined to be the original meaning of the classics
was carried on through annotating texts, compiling lost resources, discriminat-
ing between authentic and forged texts, performing phonetic and philologi-
cal analyses, and textual exegeses. This sort of scholarship then became the
common practice, as many scholar-officials tried to reform the Ming dynas-
ty’s empty academic style. They hoped to arrange systematically the founda-
tions of knowledge and the intellectual order as well as to clarify social ethics
through a reorganization of Confucian ideas. They emphasized the ancient
classics, hoping to establish the truth (doctrine) on a more certain knowledge
base through fundamentally sound interpretations of the classic texts and to
reestablish the authority of thought derived from them based on the support
of scriptural, phonetic, and textual exegeses. At the same time, they hoped to
restore their scholarly and intellectual authority by means of knowledge-based
evidentiary research. After the appearance of textual studies of the classics, like
Gu Yanwu’s Five Works on Phonetics (Yinxue wushu) and Record of Knowledge
Gained Day by Day (Rizhi lu), Yan Ruoqu (1636–1704)’s Textual Criticism of the
Old Text Book of Documents (Guwen Shangshu shuzheng), Hu Wei (1633–1714)’s
An Investigation into the Cosmograms in the” Classic of Changes” (Yitu ming-
bian) and Casual Remarks on the “Tributes of Yu” (Yugong zhuizhi), more schol-
ars became increasingly committed to the intellectual trends of “following the
path of inquiry and study” and “seeking the real.”
One thing we have to acknowledge is that the gradual rise of evidential
research in the early Qing not only heralded a change in the scholarly land-
scape but also a profound revision and reestablishment of Confucian thought.
This was certainly the intention of many contemporary scholars because the
Neo-Confucian schools of both Principle and Mind that were based upon a
“principle” that everyone talks about and everyone says something different
about and an indeterminate “mind” that is in state of flux had already fully
exposed their shortcomings. These scholars rather wanted to make authentic
knowledge from the classics the foundation of truth. As Gu Yanwu said, “In
From Ming to Qing I 243

ancient times, what was called the study of principle was simply the study of
the classics” (gu zhi suo wei li xue, jing xue ye 古之所謂理學，經學也). Huang
Zongxi criticized the Ming scholars for ignoring the authentic classics:

When the men of the Ming lectured, they just borrowed the dregs of the
recorded sayings and did not employ the six classics as the foundation
of knowledge; they set their books aside and wandered around talking
nonsense. Thus those who study [with Huang] must investigate/exhaust
the classics.70

While they were establishing the authoritative nature of certain classic texts,
they also endeavored to differentiate between genuine and spurious texts in
order to undermine those “forged classics” (weijing 偽經) that served as the
foundation for the Neo-Confucian schools of Principle or Mind. For example,
Huang Zongxi, Huang Zongyan (1616–1686), Mao Qiling (1623–1716) and Hu
Wei’s investigations of the yitu 易圖 cosmograms in the Classic of Changes;
Yan Ruoqu, Zhu Yizun and Yao Jiheng (1647–1715)’s investigations of the Old
Text Book of Documents (Guwen Shangshu); Chen Que, Yao Jiheng and others’
investigations of the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean,” and
so on all served to undermine many forged classical texts (or forged scrip-
tures). The Classic of Changes cosmograms (such as the Luoshu 洛/雒書,
Luo writing and the Hetu 河圖, River Diagram) were said to have provided
canonical support for Song Neo-Confucian cosmology.71 The “Great Learning”
and the “Doctrine of the Mean” were venerated texts of Neo-Confucianism,
while the phrase “the human mind is restless and prone to error, and its affin-
ity with the moral Way is slight” (ren xin wei wei, Dao xin wei wei 人心惟危, 道
心惟微) from the Old Text Book of Documents supported the reasonableness of
the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle’s separation of Heavenly Principle (tianli)
and human desire (renyu).72 If these texts were reinterpreted, it would shake
the foundations of Song Neo-Confucianism.

70  “Yu Shi Yushan shu,” Tinglin wenji, j. 3, Gu Tinglin shiwen ji, 1976, 62. Quan Zuwang, “Li
Zhou xiansheng shendao beiwen,” Jieqiting ji, j. 11, 9.
71  In his Yitu mingbian, Hu Wei separated the various cosmograms (tu 圖) out from the
Yijing text and regarded them as later interpolations. This was actually meant to under-
mine some ideas and interpretations of Shao Yong, Zhu Xi, and Cai Yuanding. His Hongfan
zhenglun was also intended to clear up or wipe out in one stroke the false discussions of
the Han Confucians and the chaotic discourse of the Song Confucians.” In this way he
could separate the classics themselves from layer upon layer of false doctrines.
72  The Guwen Shangshu passage is in §13 of “The Councels of the Great Yu (Da Yu mo). James
Legge translates the full passage thus (CTP text): “The mind of man is restless, prone (to
244 Chapter 11

Be that as it may, this extremely critical style of examining the classic texts
eventually lost its deeply critical nature with the passage of time. This is not
difficult to understand. The early Qing Han Chinese critical spirit and the trend
toward statecraft had their own particular emotional reasons and historical
background, and once the Qing dynasty achieved stability, official repression
grew stronger day by day, and the historical memory of the fall of the Ming
weakened, then the fervor of Han Chinese nationalism no longer had the
power to mobilize people. All that was left was evidential studies of the classic
texts, and even this very critical, independent, and popular scholarship was
overwhelmed by official scholarship in defense of imperial power. Especially
when the high tide of intense Han Chinese nationalist feelings receded, and
the ideal of rearranging the intellectual world finally came to naught, the
literati scholars found themselves in a rather embarrassing situation. Since
it was not supported by any new and original critical theories, knowledge,
or terminology, the critique of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism was limited to
partial revisions of some internal questions within the School of Principle by
means of reinvestigations and revised interpretations of its foundational texts.
For similar reasons, especially the lack of new theories, after denouncing it as
vacuous, misleading and harmful to the nation, the critique of the Lu-Wang
School of Mind could only borrow ideas from the officially accepted Cheng-
Zhu School of Principle to attack its rival. With the School of Principle under
the protection of the emperors and the examination system, textual studies
of the classics in time lost their critical edge. This style of evidential study of
other classics through phonetic and philological analyses and textual exegeses

err); its affinity to what is right is small. Be discriminating, be uniform (in the pursuit
of what is right), that you may sincerely hold fast the Mean.” (Ren xin wei wei, Dao xin
wei wei, wei jing wei, yun zhi jue zhong, 人心惟危，道心惟微，惟精惟一，允執厥中)
Yan Ruoqu’s Guwen Shangshu shuzheng has the following passage that clearly expresses
the real purpose of his investigations:
 “It was only since the emergence of people like the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, that
this passage was adopted, and its meaning was explored and elucidated. They probably
truly believed that this passage represented the very idea that had been transmitted from
the sage king Yao and had also initiated the teachings of Confucius. They did so because
they thought what they based [their ideas] upon came from a respected place (text) and
the principle that they upheld was accurate in the first place. Alas, who could have imag-
ined that that passage was actually a forged one!”
 Here instead of following James Legg’s translation of daoxin, we follow Alison Harley
Black, Man and Nature in the Philosophical Thought of Wang Fu-chih, 1989, 59 and 259 in
our translations of daoxin.
From Ming to Qing I 245

then became simply a way for scholars to display their intellect, learning, and
cultivation.

3.5
In the mid-Qing, Jiao Xun (1763–1820) once wrote sarcastically that “recently
when scholars study, they suddenly set up a research subject and call it textual
criticism.” His use of “recently” indicates that the practice of elevating eviden-
tial studies or textual criticism from a method of scholarly research or a schol-
arly tendency to the status of “a research subject,” and using it to introduce
oneself and to exclude others might not have been going on for a very long
time. On the contrary, the establishment of evidential research may have taken
place in the Jiaqing era (1796–1820) in which Jiao himself lived.73
Characterizing this scholarly practice as a confrontation between so-
called “Han Learning” (Hanxue, Han school of classical philology) and “Song
Learning” (Songxue, Song Neo-Confucian School of Principle) probably began
after the appearance of Jiang Fan (1761–1831)’s Record of the Origins of Han
Learning (Hanxue yuanyuan ji, 1811) and Record of the Origins of Song Learning
(Songxue yuanyuan ji, ca. 1822). The so-called “evidential research” versus
“moral principles” or “Han Learning” versus “Song Learning” were just two dif-
ferent scholarly preferences that indicated at most a division in academic ori-
entation among Qing intellectuals.
The growth of this interest in evidential research did not, of course, arise
from nothing. As noted above, on the one hand it was influenced by schol-
arly disdain for “empty talk about mind and nature” since the Song and Ming
dynasties, and on the other hand it was certainly encouraged, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally, by the Qing emperors. From Kangxi, Yongzheng,
and Qianlong on, the emperors liked to display their great erudition, and this
was certainly very suggestive to Qing scholars. Large-scale officially sponsored
organizations of knowledge, like the compilation of the Imperial Library in
Four Treasuries (Siku quanshu, 1773–1782), also fostered this sort of academic
atmosphere. The personal interests of reigning emperors and high officials also
encouraged scholarly endeavors. Nevertheless, I believe that the main impetus
for evidential research came from the above mentioned long time loss of a
critical voice in affairs and of discursive power over the production of truth on
the part of the literati. The traditional resources provided from ancient China
for the literati consisted primarily of classical texts, and thus solid evidential
research on these texts from China’s very long history became the standard

73  Jiao Xun, “Yu Liu Duanlin jiaoyu shu,” Diaogu ji, 1985, j. 13, 215.
246 Chapter 11

for comparing superior or inferior intellect and talent. Scholars often distin-
guished themselves from their peers by means of such expositions of the clas-
sic texts.
No matter how much present-day scholars and their intellectual histories
and histories of scholarship stress the influence of evidential research at that
time, I am still not convinced. I believe they should accept something they
may feel reluctant to accept. If we examine the wider overall picture of the
Qing dynasty, we will see that in the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras (1735–1820), it
was still officially recognized Confucianism, based primarily on the traditional
classics and their Cheng-Zhu interpretations, that constituted a moral and eth-
ical creed or ideology and dominated the entire intellectual world. Educated
people memorized and recited this creed from childhood textbooks, and as
adults they took the official examinations on these School of Principle ideas.
If one was not well versed in this knowledge and thought, one hardly had any
chance of entering the bureaucracy. In public situations and on official occa-
sions, everyone was used to expressing themselves in these Neo-Confucian
terms so much that this seemingly dignified and correct terminology became
an official discourse. If you did not employ this discourse, you would be unable
to express your social status, value orientation, or cultural ideals, and thus
you would be unable to receive social approval. Thus in a sense the spread
of evidential research opened up a little more intellectual space where schol-
ars could escape control through their intellectual activities as well as obtain
personal renown. In this way evidential research, especially philological and
historical analyses of classic texts, gradually grew into an intellectual trend
that was particularly widespread in the rather more wealthy area of Jiangnan
(south of the Yangzi). This intellectual endeavor eventually influenced the
entire Chinese intellectual stratum.
 Chapter 12

From Ming to Qing II: Chinese Intellectual World in

the 18th and 19th Centuries

1 Attempting to Rebuild the Intellectual World: The Turn of the 18th-

and 19th-Century Evidential Research

Could the study of historical documents based primarily on collating and

distinguishing editions actually reconstruct an intellectual system during the
most flourishing period of Qing evidential research? Could historical linguis-
tics based primarily on phonetic and philological analyses and textual exegeses
really reconstruct a system of knowledge? In theory, perhaps, these goals could
be accomplished, but after a long time, however, when evidential research had
lost its questioning consciousness (wenti yishi 問題意識) of contemporary
society, its means had simply become its purpose. Minor and insignificant evi-
dential research gradually developed into a way of showing off one’s erudition.
This produced two related conditions in Qing scholarly and intellectual
history. Knowledge and thought became separated. The pursuit of knowledge
was bereft of intellectual goals and became a sort of meaningless virtuosity.
Thought was also divorced from its knowledge foundations and became empty
sermonizing. On the one hand, it offered seemingly conclusive philological or
linguistic studies, but on the other hand it customarily reaffirmed over and over
some supposedly true dogmas. This situation was especially harmful for both
scholarship and thought after various scholars became flag bearers for either
“Han Learning” or “Song Learning” and insisted on separating out and affirm-
ing either “evidential research” or “moral principles.”
In spite of this situation, if we look more closely we will discover that, from
the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, attempts to employ
scholarly language to express intellectual concepts never really stopped. In
the period that is commonly referred to as the era of “Qianlong and Jiaqing
Learning,” the intellectual history of these two dynastic reigns was actually
quite different. During the Jiaqing reign, some evidential research scholars
were no longer content with only practicing textual and linguistic criticism;
they attempted to use evidential research methods to investigate thought.
On the one hand they continued to distinguish authentic and forged classics
(scriptures) to undermine the foundations of the Song School of Principle, but
on the other hand they tried to find a “general rule” (tongli 通例) to reinvestigate

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_007

248 Chapter 12

the basic presuppositions of evidential research and establish correct channels

for the production of knowledge. For the former, by means of corrected key
terms of ancient thought, newly worked out by ever more precise phonetic and
philological analyses and textual exegeses, they expressed some new ideas.
For the latter, by means of their study of Western knowledge, especially in
astronomy, calendrical science, and mathematics, they reconstructed a com-
prehensive understanding of knowledge. This scholarly tendency began with
Dai Zhen (1723–1777) and Qian Daxin (1728–1804) and was later represented in
the Jiaqing era by Ling Tingkan (1755–1809), Jiao Xun (1763–1820), Ruan Yuan
(1764–1849), and so on.
We can thus see that when critical studies of ancient writings and historical
linguistics really entered the intellectual world and were employed to distin-
guish genuine from forged classics (scriptures), and to give historical expla-
nations of key terms, then evidential studies were also able to express some
new ideas in intellectual history. Furthermore, as soon as evidential research
attempted to transform the traditional intellectual system and reestablish a
form of critical reason that could distinguish right from wrong and the true
from the false, it also began to harbor resources potentially revolutionary for
intellectual history.

1.1
Questions about the relationships between “human feelings” (qing) and “prin-
ciple/reason” (li)—to use Neo-Confucian terminology, between the human
mind (renxin) and the mind of the Dao (the moral mind, daoxin) or between
human desires (renyu) and the Principle of Heaven (tianli)—go back very far
in Chinese history, and these relationships form part of the foundations for
maintaining the traditional order of the world and human life. These rela-
tionships are so important because they are concerned with many important
questions: Can human morality be improved or not? Can social order be estab-
lished on the basis of traditional ethics and morality? Can political power or
a political regime be maintained by relying on Confucian ideology? Can the
civilized values represented by the Confucian elite and their classic texts be
successfully established?
If people in general agreed that the “Heavenly Principle” was a goal to be
sought, then they also had to agree that the ethics and morality established by
Confucianism were indisputable principles of Heaven and Earth. A “nation”
(state, government, guo) modeled on the “family” ( jia), and the “mind of the Dao”
that symbolized such a social order were also beyond question. On the con-
trary, one should be on guard against human “feelings” and “desires.” This was
so simply because unchecked human feelings and desires could aggrandize the
From Ming to Qing II 249

individual and lead to contempt for society, and thus “the human mind” would
damage the “mind of Dao.” According to Confucian ideas, everyone should
“hold on to the Principle of Heaven and put an end to human desires” (cun tian
li er mie ren yu 存天理而滅人慾).1
The Principle of Heaven was the highest principle of Song dynasty Cheng-
Zhu Neo-Confucianism. They developed to an extreme the theory of maintain-
ing the stability of the external social order through inner moral awareness.
The problem with this was, however, that the Principle of Heaven covered
both the social and the natural realms and included two different sorts of rules
and regulations. When the Principle of Heaven was regarded as the “originat-
ing principle” (yuanli 原理) of the universe, it was a pre-existing law of the
phenomenal world, and therefore unquestionable, just as the phrase “Heaven’s
law and Earth’s principle” (tianjing diyi 天經地義) literally implies. When the
Principle of Heaven was regarded as the “originating principle” of human soci-
ety, however, it became merely a historically constructed form of common
understanding, at most a kind of social norm or standard. It was, then, only a
historical agreement concerning human social order. No matter how much the
“principle” of the cosmos was said to serve as the basis of “principle” or “rea-
son” in social life, this was still only an interpretation. To use the Principle of
Heaven to negate human desires was actually only a kind of excessively noble
hope. It could also go to extremes, using high-mindedness to suppress every-
day life and engender mental anxiety and hypocrisy.
The indirect or roundabout challenge of Qing evidential research to the
School of Principle began with textual research and the undermining of its
central idea of “principle” or “reason.” During the Qianlong era, Dai Zhen tried
to change the former interpretation that “nature” and “principle” or “reason”
are noble while “feelings” and “desires” are vulgar. He said that human nature
was like water and human desires were like flowing water; it cannot be said
that human nature is upright (zheng 正), but human desires are evil or immoral
(xie 邪).
According to Dai Zhen, when ancient people discussed “principle” or “rea-
son” they often looked for it within “human feelings and desires,” as far as pos-
sible elevating “feelings and desires” (qingyu) to the level of the “Principle of
Heaven” and pure “human nature.” Dai asserted that his contemporaries, how-
ever, were departing from “human desires” to seek for the “Principle of Heaven.”
They wanted to eliminate human desires to render their hearts and minds
pure and without feelings or emotions. This goal made excessive demands on
humanity, and it came about because the theories of Song Neo-Confucianism

1  See “Li xing,” ZYL, j. 13, 222–225.

250 Chapter 12

carried with them an artificial tension between the “Principle of Heaven” and
human desires.2
Dai Zhen’s main strategy for undermining Song Neo-Confucianism’s oppo-
sition between “principle” or “reason” and “desire” was first to do historical
research and textual criticism of the words and phrases (the actual texts) of the
classics. Qing scholars believed that, because they lacked textual foundations,
the Song School of Principle’s interpretations of thought were merely empty
castles in the air. Dai Zhen went back to the ancient classics as the foundation
of thought and pointed out that the ideas in those classic texts differed from
those of the Song School of Principle. Given the Chinese tradition of respect
for the ancient Sages, the validity of Dai’s critique was regarded as self-evident.
Dai next established the meaning of the actual texts of the classics on the foun-
dation of understanding the characters and words of the classics, and authen-
ticated and determined the meaning of the characters and words of the texts
by means of historical linguistic study, thus confirming the true meaning of the
thought concepts in the classics.
By contrast with other trivial evidential studies, Dai Zhen’s investigation of
the meaning of the characters and words, and his historical philology offered a
path to undermining the foundations of Song Neo-Confucian scholarship and
re-exploring the true meaning of the classics. That was simply his approach
of moving from knowledge to thought, or textual evidence to abstract ideas.3
Dai Zhen was not the only scholar to employ this method of criticizing the
Song School of Principle; Hui Dong (1697–1758) and Qian Daxin did so as well.
In the world of ancient Chinese thought, the textual support of the classics
was extremely important; if one’s ideas lost such support, they could lose their
justification. On this account, the critiques put forth by Dai Zhen and others
using this evidential method had some stunning effects.

2  See Dai Zhen, “Mengzi” ziyi shuzheng, j. shang, 1, 10, 11 and j. xia, 59. For excerpts from
Commentary on the Meaning of Terms in “Mencius”, see Chan SB, 711–722.
3  Dai Zhen’s “Mengzi” ziyi shuzheng begins with a textual critique of li 理 (principle, reason)
and it forms the foundation of his argument. That is why Liang Qichao later wrote that “The
ultimate goal that the classics are intended to reach is the Dao or Way; what illuminates the
Dao are words (ci); what brings words into being are characters (zi). Thus, one must start
from learning [the meaning of] characters to understand words, and then go from learning
the words to reach the Dao [of the classics] before one can really obtain it.” “Dai Dongyuan
xiansheng zhuan,” in Liang Qichao quanji, vol. 7, 4183.
From Ming to Qing II 251

1.2
In his Commentary on the Meaning of Terms in “Mencius” (Mengzi ziyi shu-
zheng), what Dai Zhen did was actually intellectual research based on the his-
torical and linguistic study of terms such as li (principle/reason), yu (desires),
xing (nature) and ji (self) in the Mengzi.4
According to Dai Zhen’s textual studies, the original ancient meaning of
li (principle) was not really a kind of absolute truth isolated and above the
world of daily life activities. Because li was over inflated (overdetermined) by
Song Neo-Confucianism and ranked above human feelings (qing), however,
a rupture in the world of daily life was created. Thus a humanly constructed
Principle of Heaven was regarded as the realm of truth, and real-life activities
were placed under this Principle of Heaven to be interrogated and censored.
Thus reason and life were made into antithetical poles—reason/principle (li)
versus feelings (qing) or desires (yu); the Way (Dao) versus tools (qi); superior
men ( junzi) versus small men (xiaoren); upright (zheng) versus evil (xie); pub-
lic (gong) versus private (si)—to give a few examples.
Dai Zhen pointed out that it was precisely this creation of antithetical
poles that caused “common human emotions and hidden and subtle feelings
such as hunger, coldness, anxiety, resentment, and sex” often to be unable
freely to express themselves under the oppression of an absolute transcen-
dent Principle of Heaven. Furthermore, due to the fact that people escaped
from this Principle in their real lives, this absolute Principle often became a
“Principle in name only.” As a result of this, on the one hand there were no per-
fect junzi but xiaoren remained xiaoren, while on the other hand the powerful
could “use Principle to kill people” (yi li sharen).5 Therefore whether it was
so-called “Heaven” or “Principle,” it could not be considered an absolute moral
decree or a strict moral standard; much less could it be used as a yardstick to
measure morality.6

4  In his “Guochao Hanxuepai Dai (Zhen), Ruan (Yuan) erjia zhi zhexueshuo,” in Jing-an wenji,
1997, 75, Wang Guowei wrote that Dai Zhen already knew that evidential research was “a vast
jumble, and not the same as scholarship” We need to keep in mind, however, that although
Dai Zhen attached significant importance to ideas similar to those of the Song Learning, he
nevertheless employed the method of evidential research popular in the Qing dynasty. Later
on Ruan Yuan did the same, and this was where they differed from the “Song Learning.”
5  “Mengzi” ziyi shuzheng, j. shang, 10.
6  Dai Zhen also cited a passage in the “Yan Yuan” chapter of the Lunyu (12.1) in which Confucius
said that “to return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self constitutes
humanity” (ke ji fu li wei ren 克己復禮為仁) in order to refute Zhu Xi’s idea that “self” is
“the selfish desires of the body” while “rites” are “the moderating etiquette of the Heavenly
Principle.” He pointed out since the next part of the text says that “the practice of humanity
252 Chapter 12

Dai Zhen’s critique of “Principle” was greeted with great misgivings by

some of his contemporaries. Men like Cheng Tingzuo (1691–1767) and Weng
Fanggang (1733–1818) strongly criticized his ideas. Later on, Fang Dongshu
(1772–1851), a staunch defender of Song Neo-Confucianism, lashed out even
more stridently at Dai by asserting that he was the first person to start the
opposition to the School of Principle. Even Zhang Xuecheng (1772–1851), who
was very closely related to Dai Zhen, said that because of Dai’s influence many
young men in Xiuning and She County (both in Anhui) had learned to launch
sensational criticisms against Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism.7
What should be pointed out even more, however, is that Dai Zhen’s thinking
never succeeded in transcending the binary opposition of “reason/principle”
and “feelings.” The result of his emphasis on the reasonableness of “feelings” or
“desires” could simply lead to the abandonment of the past excessive emphasis
on “reason” for another extreme sympathy for “feelings,” much in the fashion
of the late Ming left-wing followers of Wang Yangming. This could not really
heal the breach between an external Principle of Heaven and internal human
feelings, between state order and individual lives, or between social standards
and private discourse. This mode of thinking that emphasized the reasonable-
ness of innate feelings and desires to overcome the restraints of the Principle
of Heaven was still limited to the framework of a binary opposition between
“reason” and “desires” (or reason and passion). As soon as Dai gave prominence
to the significance of the human mind then he ran the risk of rationalizing
selfish desires and falling into the same old rut of the later followers of Wang
Yangming, and could not really free himself completely from this predicament

depends on oneself alone” (wei ren you ji 為仁由己), then what, after all, is the difference
between the “self” in the first part of the text that is full of desires that need to be overcome
and the latter “self” that has the ability independently to overcome its desires? Thus this
“self” that has to be overcome is only being discussed relative to the great size of “All under
Heaven.” Dai Zhen saw the “self” ( ji) as an “ego” (ziwo) that is full of human nature and emo-
tions. It is only that sometimes it can be subject to biases and confused ideas, and so it needs
to be regulated and cultivated by means of rational consciousness and a spirit of morality.
He believed that in this way he could repudiate the Neo-Confucian (lixue) idea of using an
external “Heavenly Principle” to constrain or repress “human desires.” See “Mengzi” ziyi shu-
zheng, j. xia, 56. The Lunyu 12.1 passage is Lau, Analects, 112 with his “benevolence” changed
to “humanity.”
7  See Hu Shi, Dai Dongyuan de zhexue, chapter 3, “Daixue zhi fanxiang,” where Hu lists the
refutations of Dai Zhen by his contemporaries Zhang Xuecheng, Weng Fanggang, Yao Nai
(1731–1815), and others along with the support by Ling Tingkan, Jiao Xun, Ruan Yuan, and
others. Hu Shi xueshu wenji: Zhongguo zhexueshi, 1991, vol. 2, 1040–1103.
From Ming to Qing II 253

of Confucian thought since the Ming dynasty.8 The key to all of this was that
this train of reasoning was never able to solve one major problem: how to make
human desires reasonable or proper, or how to judge what desires are proper
and reasonable, and how to guide human desires to be so proper.

1.3
How can one resolve the opposition between “reason” and “emotions” or the
“Principle of Heaven” and “human desires” and make it possible for society
to have truly applicable standards that are not contrary to human nature
and feelings? How can one reestablish a reasonable order of social life on the
basis of these standards? These are major questions that have been repeat-
edly discussed in Chinese intellectual history. From the “Doctrine of the Mean”
and the “Great Learning” on, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism continually debated these problems, but they never came up
with any breakthrough ideas. People’s mode of thinking has always gone back
and forth between two extreme polarities. Either they emphasize restraining
“human feelings” with the “Principle of Heaven” and using “reason” to con-
trol “passion,” or they privilege the reasonableness of the “mind” or “feelings”
and rely on the idea that the human mind possesses an innate sense of moral
awareness to defend the existence of natural human desires. The thinking of
Dai Zhen and his contemporaries remained limited to these two polarities,
but, later on, between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the think-
ing of Ruan Yuan, Ling Tingkan, Jiao Xun and others underwent a profound
transformation.
As with Dai Zhen, their strategy was also to begin with evidential research.
They agreed that the ancient classics did not use li as “principle;” at least
when the classical texts did use the word li it was definitely not some absolute
“Principle of Heaven.” Ling Tingkan criticized Dai Zhen’s limitation as being
that “as soon as he opened a classic text, he began to debate about the word
li 理.”9 Hence Ling’s evidential research method pointed out that the classic
texts did not have the character li. At least only the Book of Songs and the “Great
Commentary” to the Classic of Changes (Yi Dazhuan 易大傳) have it, but it
always means something like “in order,” “orderly” or “to put in order” (modern
tiaoli 條理). So-called li as “principle” was often brought up by later people and
it might even have come from Buddhism. Both Ruan Yuan and Jiao Xun also

8  See Liang Qichao, Dai Dongyuan zhexue, in Liang Qichao quanji, vol. 7, 4193–4195; Hu Shi,
“Dai Dongyuan zai Zhongguo zhexueshi shang de weizhi” and “Jige fan lixue de sixiangjia,” in
Hu Shi xueshu wenji (Zhongguo zhexueshi) vol. 2, 1104–1108 and 1155–1165 respectively.
9  Ling Tingkan, “Hao e shuo,” (xia), Xiaolitang wenji, j. 16, 143–144.
254 Chapter 12

employed evidential research to trace li back to its origins; they pointed out
its questionable nature and maintained that it was not a term intrinsic to the
Confucian tradition.10 Thus they undermined the classics texts’ supposed sup-
port for li as “principle,” and, as Fang Dongshu wrote, they created a great deal
of inconvenience for the Neo-Confucianism of the Song School of Principle.11
Next they argued from the form of the Chinese characters (zixing 字形)
in question. They pointed out that man’s so-called “nature” (xing) is not
really equivalent to Heaven’s “principle” (li); rather it also contains “feelings
and desires” (qingyu) as well as “good and evil” (hao e 好惡).12 According to
Qing evidential research scholars, the original meaning of the written words
preserved the original meanings of the ancient Sages, and the ancient Sages’
original ideas possessed absolute authority. Thus their textual research into
the original meaning of the words amounted to retracing the meanings of the
ancient Sages and the canonical texts as well as testing the correctness of later
interpretations of those texts. For example, in his philological study of nature
and destiny (xingming 性命), Ruan Yuan inspected almost all of the Confucian
classics including the Book of Documents, Book of Songs, Zuo Commentary,
Guliang Commentary, the “Great Commentary” to the Classic of Changes, and
the Analects.13 His final conclusion was that “what is inborn is called nature”
(sheng zhi wei xing 生之謂性) was the original ancient meaning, and thus
“nature” contains both “humanity, rightness, propriety, and wisdom” “ren yi li
zhi 仁義禮智) and “the desires for taste, smell, sensual sounds and sex” (wei xiu
sheng se 味嗅聲色). That is to say, xing possesses aspects of both wisdom and
reason (rationality) and emotions and desires (passions).
Ruan’s Interpretations of Nature and Destiny (Xingming guxun), On Buddhist
Ideas of Nature (or Refuting Buddhist Ideas of Nature, Ta xing shuo) and
Disputing the Return to the True Nature of Buddhist/Daoist Teaching (Fuxing
Bian), and so on all followed this textual research position to reconstruct the
ancient meaning of “nature” (xing).14 In the process, Ruan rejected all the ideas
about xing that had been derived from Buddhism during the Six Dynasties and
Tang and Song eras.

10  See Ruan Yuan, “Xingming guxun,” Yanjingshi yi ji, j. 10 in Yanjingshi ji, 211–236.
11  Fang Dongshu, Hanxue shangdui, j. zhong zhi shang, 61.
12  For example, Ruan Yuan wrote in his “Xingming guxun,” Yanjingshi ji, 228 that “desires are
born from feelings, they are intrinsic to human nature; we cannot say that our nature is
without desires.” See Ruan Yuan, “Xingming guxun,” 228, in Yanjingshi ji, esp. p. 228.
13  “Xingming guxun,” in Yanjingshi ji, 211–236.
14  “Xing ta shuo” and “Fuxing bian” are in Yanjingshi xuji, j. 3, 1059–1061.
From Ming to Qing II 255

Ruan’s contemporaries, scholars like Ling Tingkan, Sun Xingyan (1753–1818),

Jiao Xun, and others also employed this same method of evidential research to
reinterpret this key term xing.15 Later on some lesser known figures like Wang
Jiaxi (1775–1816), Hu Jin (1438–?), Hong Zhenxuan (1770–1815) and Xu Yangyuan
(1758–1825) followed suit and continued to raise many questions concerning
Song Neo-Confucian definitions of li and xing and other such terms. They con-
cluded that these Song interpretations represented the personal ideas of later
Confucians rather than the original meanings of the terms. In light of that,
they could propose new ideas for the reestablishment of social order.16

1.4
If the human mind contains both elements of “humanity, rightness, propri-
ety and wisdom” that agree with the “Principle of Heaven” and elements of
“taste, smell, sensual sounds and sex” that belong to “feelings and desires,”
how, then, can human beings be expected to maintain, respect and comply
with social order? According to the interpretations of Song Neo-Confucianism,
the traditional social order and its legitimacy was established on the basis
of the “Principle of Heaven.” They hoped that people would self-consciously
maintain the stable existence of social order due to the correspondence of
their “human nature” with the “Principle of Heaven.” These Qing evidential
research scholars repeatedly pointed out, however, that although the “Principle
of Heaven” constructed by Song Neo-Confucians was very transcendent, it was
precisely this transcendence that caused it to exist only in a world of artifi-
cially constructed concepts and not in the real world of everyday human life.
Whenever the social order needed the support of the “Principle of Heaven,”
that “Principle of Heaven” could easily fall into a situation in which “What one
calls right the other calls wrong and what one calls wrong the other calls right.”17
Cheng Yaotian (1725–1814) and Jiao Xun both pointed out that the “Principle
of Heaven” was only a high-sounding proposition, but not a set of rules or regu-
lations. On this account, a high-minded ethics and morality could not nec-
essarily create good order; it could actually lead to dictatorship, conflict and
chaos. Since the “Principle of Heaven” was based on a judgement derived from

15  See Sun Xingyan, “Yuan xing pian,” Wenzitang ji, j. 1, 1A–B, Sun Yuanru shiwen ji; Ling
Tingkan, “Hao e shuo” shang, “Xun Qing song,” Jiaolitang wenji, j. 16, 141 and j. 10, 76 Jiao
Xun, “Xing shan jie yi,” Diaogu ji, j. 9, 127.
16  The four “Xingqing shuo” by Wang Jiaxi, Hu Jin, Hong Zhenxuan, and Xu Yangyuan are all
in Gujing jingshi wenji, edited by Ruan Yuan and included in Yan Jie, ed., Jingyi congchao,
in Qing jingjie xubian, 1987, j. 1388, vol. 7, 847–849.
17  Zhuangzi, “Discussion on Making All Things Equal” (Qiwu lun) in Watson, CT, 39.
256 Chapter 12

the human heart/mind, so-called “human nature” was certainly not itself the
“Principle of Heaven.” Human nature includes both rationality and desires, and
so it was impossible to maintain social order simply by relying on “rationality”
(lixing) alone. Just as Jiao Xun said: “Only when it comes to [basic instincts like]
eating, drinking and sexual desires shared by men and women, can we then see
that everyone has the same mind. Therefore, talking about human nature as
good is just to cling to a clever theory, that can not really be maintained.”18
In their reflections, these scholars emphasized the importance of li 禮 “rites”
or “propriety” over li 理 “principle/reason” because the “rites” represented a set
of regulations. Unlike “principle” that was based upon the belief that human
nature is good, the “rites” assumed that human nature contains both good and
evil. The rites could thus be directed at human beings with both their desires
and their rationality and could direct their words and actions to conform with
the order of society. In this way, “if you discipline people due to their violation
of certain rites, they won’t be able to argue with you, but you won’t be able
to avoid disputes if you discipline them on the basis of their violation of cer-
tain principles.”19 Because these regulations were extremely general and ordi-
nary and certainly not more transcendent than the “Principle of Heaven,” they
could close the gap between the ideal world and the real world of human life,
and they could be employed to establish a human social order that conformed
to reasonable laws and social standards.20
We should, however, be mindful of the fact that in ancient China the “rites”
could very easily turn into “laws” as the example of such a transition from li
to fa in Confucianism from Xunzi to Hanfeizi had demonstrated. Did these
evidential research scholars have such a possibility in mind at that time? We
have no way to know for certain, but, at a time when the Mencius had already
become authoritative, these scholars’ reaffirmation of Xunzi would seem to
imply a change of direction in their thinking. For example, Jiao Xun wrote
eight essays entitled “On Expediency” (shuo quan 說權) in which he stressed
that people should not blindly follow moral absolutism. What Jiao meant by
“expediency” was a sort of pragmatism—neither the highest nor the mini-
mum standard, neither extremely severe laws and regulations nor laissez-faire
indulgence—rather a set of regulations that were to be flexibly adjusted to the

18  Jiao Xun, “Xing shan jie san,” Diaogu ji, j. 9, 128.
19  Ruan Yuan “Shu Dongguan Chen shi Xuebu tongbian hou,” Yanjingshi xuji, j. 3, Yanjingshi
ji, 1062.
20  See Ling Tingkan’s three essays entitled “Fu li” (shang, zhong, xia) in Jiaolitang wenji, j. 4,
27–32.
From Ming to Qing II 257

times.21 With the “rites” to regulate their everyday life, people would not need
to wait for some transcendent “principle” to judge everything nor would they
be controlled by any extravagantly lofty form of absolute moral idealism.22
These discussions by scholars from Dai Zhen, Ling Tingkan, and Jiao Xun
on represented some new reflections by the ancient Chinese intellectual
world concerning social order. The question as to whether “principle” and
“feelings” were one or two had been central to many discussions from ancient
Confucianism to Buddhism and from Song to Ming Neo-Confucianism. What
was so special and important about this discussion at the beginning of the nine-
teenth-century was that its discussion of “principles” nearly broke through the
dichotomy of “principle” and “feelings” as well as the tradition that regarded
absolute truth and real life as in opposition. Implicit in this new consideration
of the “rites” was an undermining of the centrally concentrated system of
power that used the name of the “Principle of Heaven” to practice real think-
ing and cultural autocracy; it implied reestablishing social order on the basis
of common sense knowledge, and regulations. Also implicit in this approach
to “feelings and desires” (qingyu) was the notion that “feelings” (ganqing) and
“life” (sheng huo) were legitimate aspects of social existence. Because the regu-
lations that these scholars emphasized were neither some absolute “Principle
of Heaven” nor simple “human emotions” (renqing), but rather a minimal set
of rules, people only had to confirm and abide by these rules in order to obtain
legitimate living space. By obtaining such legitimate living space, both private
life and private emotions gained legitimacy and the individual “person” (ren)
began to be acknowledged.
From Dai Zhen to Ruan Yuan, all of the evidential research scholars
employed the same methods of historical philology and historical linguistics
in their search for truth. Dai Zhen repeatedly asserted that to find the truth one
must begin with an investigation of the meaning of individual characters (ziyi
字義) and words (ciyi 詞義) (ci, words are usually two-character combinations)
and then proceed to an analysis of sentences, finally ending up with mastery

21  Diaogu ji, j. 10, “Shuo quan yi,” 143.

22  In his “Mingmo Qingchu de yizhong daode yan-ge zhuyi,” Wang Fansen already pointed
out that “this thought that was inclined toward viewing human nature as being natural
and a unity between principle and desires, or a combination of these two into one … was
a very common attitude shared by both left and right schools of Wang Yangming teaching
in the Ming. It also occupied an important place in Qing dynasty thought. Scholars such
as Dai Zhen, Jiao Xun and Ling Tingkan all elaborated on this view.” See Jinshi Zhongguo
zhi chuantong yu tuibian: Liu Guangjing yuanshi qishiwu sui zhushou wenji, 1998, 80.
258 Chapter 12

of the meaning and significance of any text. This methodology of evidential

research was gradually accepted in scholarly circles.
It is important to note here that, although this methodology was still limited
to the canonical classic texts, if it was universalized and Confucian thought
was thereby historicized, then it would transform the scholastic tradition of
taking the classics as the standard and Neo-Confucian thought as the truth.
In other words, this methodology would move toward employing reason to re-
evaluate the truth.
Of course all of this happened later, but even at this time evidential research
was very significant in that its critical methods severely criticized the main-
stream political ideology of the time. Since the high-minded moral idealism
advocated by Song Neo-Confucianism confused the boundaries between the
ideal world and the real world and considered the minority literati’s search for
transcendence to be a universal demand of the masses, it sometimes devel-
oped into an extremely harsh set of moral standards that repressed every
form of “private desire” (siyu) in the name of the “Principle of Heaven.” This
was obviously rather inhumane, and Dai Zhen’s phrase “using principle to kill
people” referred precisely to the unfortunate result of this sort of grandiose
moral idealism. It was particularly during this time when Neo-Confucianism
had already become a form of political power and gradually turned into a set
of vacuous dogmas to be employed in the civil service examinations that this
idealism controlling society in the name of the “Principle of Heaven” increas-
ingly lost the ability to guide private individual life.

1.5
It must be admitted that between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
this challenge to Song Neo-Confucianism did not really shake the traditional
intellectual world. On the one hand, the “rites” being advocated were still the
regulations of traditional society, and it is quite doubtful to what extent they
could reorganize an already transformed social order. On the other hand, the
profound changes taking place at the time had not actually given rise to wide-
spread alarm. People’s lives continued along their usual paths. Although China
had already entered an era when many nations or states existed side by side, in
contemporary intellectual circles there were still insufficient resources to over-
turn the traditional intellectual world. There was still no crisis in society great
enough to shock people’s minds, and so these “rites” were unable to replace
“principle” and reorganize the order of everyday life.
This is not to say that China possessed only traditional intellectual resources
at this time. The Chinese literati’s understanding of Western knowledge and
thought may actually have been much greater than we know today. At least
From Ming to Qing II 259

before the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns (1735–1796), the Chinese intellectual
world had been deeply influenced by Western knowledge. Not only had cel-
ebrated scholars like Wang Xichan (1628–1682), Xue Fengzuo (1599–1680)
and Mei Wending (1633–1721) early on received enlightenment from Western
knowledge, especially in astronomy and geography, but even Confucian schol-
ars like Zhang Erqi (1612–1678) and Li Guangdi (1642–1718) could not avoid
being interested in this new knowledge as were many not very well known
literati. Many scholar-officials who were quite antipathetic to Western knowl-
edge and thought and who frequently attacked Catholicism and called the
Westerners barbarians still could not help admitting that in the areas of prac-
tical knowledge and technology Western knowledge had its advantages over
Chinese knowledge.
In the early Qing, this enthusiasm received official support. The Qing dynasty
was not as sealed off as later people have imagined, but in the early stages of
the regime the Manchu emperors seem not to have actually been hostile to
this new knowledge. Deeply influenced by Western learning, Emperor Kangxi
indeed had a great liking for these practical studies. It was just this encour-
agement that rather excited the scholars. People even combined this sort
of intellectual interest with the trend toward the pursuit of rigorous practi-
cal and concrete learning. Although Emperor Kangxi regarded this practical
knowledge as quite important, as emperor of China, he nevertheless took a
position that would later on have rather profound and lasting influence. That
is, he regarded this learning and knowledge to have originated in China. As a
result, many scholars were very interested in this new knowledge while at the
same time they tried to use Chinese knowledge to interpret it.
This situation meant that the steady influx of Western knowledge since
Matteo Ricci in the Ming dynasty was not cut off due to the change from the
Ming to the Qing; it also led to Western learning being absorbed into the tra-
ditional Chinese system of knowledge and therefore loosing its intense shock
value.23 Slightly later, the Qing idea that “Western learning originated in China”

23  Among Qing scholars, Mei Wending (1633–1721)’s views were very representative. In his
preface to Mastering Chinese and Western Mathematical Calculations Comprehensively
(Zhongxi suanxue tong), he wrote that there were in general two attitudes toward
Western learning at that time. One was to regard it as nothing very extraordinary, and one
was to reject it as heterodoxy. If they could be linked together, however, one need not dis-
tinguish ancient and modern or Chinese and Western. He obviously still hoped that the
new knowledge could adapt to the old tradition and Western learning could blend into
Chinese learning. Jixuetang wenchao, j. 2; Jixuetang shiwen chao, 1959, 52; also see Elman,
On Their Own Terms, 2005, 154–156.
260 Chapter 12

gradually replaced the Ming reasoning that the “sages from the eastern seas
or the western seas all shared the same mind and the same principle.” This
relieved the tension between ethnic (national, minzu) pride and the new for-
eign knowledge, while at the same time providing conditions and opportunity
for the reception of the new knowledge by seeking in China’s own history for
corresponding resources and the language to understand it.
I do not intend to go into the details of the influence of Western learning
on Qing scholarship or of the concrete responses of Qing scholars to Western
learning. I intend rather to point out that although Qing scholars could achieve
a temporary measure of psychological equanimity due to the reassuring idea
that “Western learning originated in China,” they were still very likely to expe-
rience a different sort of challenge from this foreign learning and pattern of
thought due to the overall methodology and general principles of Western
learning. In the mid-Qing, then, Chinese scholar-officials may have already
started to make some conscious responses to this challenge. Signs of changes
in their usual way of thinking may have already quietly begun to emerge.

1.6
As noted earlier, the basic presupposition of evidential research was that in
general the ancient classics and the sages were absolutely correct, the older
the classic text the closer it was to the truth, and the more something was said
by the sages the more reliable it was. Conversely, the later a document or text
appeared, the farther it was from the sages and, consequently, from the truth.
Jiao Xun once satirically asserted that evidential research scholars always
believed that the Tang dynasty must be superior to the Song, the Han must be
superior to the Tang, Jia Gongyan and Kong Yingda must be superior to Zhu
Xi and the Cheng brothers, and Xu Shen and Zheng Xuan must be superior to
Jia Gongyan and Kong Yingda. This principle was not only applicable to intel-
lectual exposition, but could also be employed in the textual criticism of writ-
ten documents, and even more so in making judgments on the correctness of
knowledge based on the authenticity or inauthenticity of classical texts. Yan
Ruoqu and Hu Wei’s textual evaluation of the Old Text Book of Documents and
the An Investigation into the Cosmograms in the “Classic of Changes” is a typical
example. This sort of principle of evidential research maintained the legiti-
macy and authority of ancient Chinese tradition, the truth of the sages and the
meaning of the classics as simply “unarguable knowledge.”
If one did not follow this evidential research principle, though, what could
one rely on to judge authenticity or determine the correctness of knowl-
edge? The further search for another universally applicable “general rule”
represented a fundamental shift of profound and long-lasting significance in
From Ming to Qing II 261

Chinese intellectual history. For Chinese scholars who had been steeped in tra-
dition all of their lives, it was an extremely difficult choice whether to accept
the “principle” of Western learning or to continue to investigate the Chinese
“principle.” A general rule that can be universally applied throughout the world
must have a set of rules of reasoning that can deduce “the unknown” from “the
known,” and from which it can effectively understand and master the myriad
phenomena of the universe. Qing dynasty evidential research scholars were
always enthusiastic in the pursuit of such a “general rule;” they were definitely
not merely seeking fragmentary and minor technical knowledge. According to
Yan Ruoqu:

In the affairs of the world, it is easy to go from the roots (foundation)

to the branches, but it is difficult to go from the branches to the roots; I
believe this is also the case with evidential research.24

In the textual criticism of written documents, then, the way to establish this
sort of “foundation” was simply to look for a “general rule.” They hoped, in
their words, to follow the branches down to the roots, to search upstream for
the source and to find a general rule that would “run through everything” and
would lead to the understanding and interpretation of everything.
If the idea of “comprehending the words from the characters and compre-
hending the Way from the words” (you zi yi tong qi ci, you ci yi tong qi Dao
由字以通其詞, 由詞以通其道) alluded to above can be said to serve as the
“general rule” of historical linguistics and philology, that leaves us with a fur-
ther question.25 In the wider intellectual world beyond history and written
texts, is there a type of “general rule” that can interpret all common-sense
knowledge and explain all phenomena? By examining the extant materials,
we can see that the desire to find such a “general rule” or “general practice” by
mastering the world as a whole was gradually growing stronger at that time.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the quest for a “general
rule” or “general practice” had become a problem upon which a good deal of
attention was focused. From Dai Zhen on, a group of scholars, like Ruan Yuan,
Jiao Xun and Ling Tingkan, were already trying to employ ordinary etiquette or
propriety (li 禮) as a “general rule” to regulate and restrict the world of daily liv-
ing. In the same way, starting with Dai Zhen, these scholars were also trying to
employ the “mathematics” (shu 數) of astronomy and calendrical calculations

24  Guwen Shangshu shuzheng, 1987, j. 8, 3.

25  Dai Zhen, “Yu Shi Zhongming lunxue shu,” Dai Zhen wenji, 1980, j. 9.
262 Chapter 12

as a “general rule” to interpret and explain the entire phenomenal world. (Shu,
numbering, arithmetic, mathematics, is one of the six arts of ancient China.)
What we should point out is that a rather important opportunity for the rise
of this desire to seek out a general rule or practice presented itself at the time—
the entrance of Western learning into China. Researchers have often noticed
that the proportion of space given to the study of astronomy and calendri-
cal calculations in works of evidential research was steadily increasing. Qian
Daxin once said that “mathematics” (shu, the general term for astronomy and
calendrical calculations in ancient China) was not only one of the “six classi-
cal arts” [i.e., li, rites, yue, music, she, archery, yu, riding, shu, writing, and shu,
numbering or arithmetic], but it was also a form of “Confucian learning” for
understanding “the Way.” As we have repeatedly noted, knowledge concerning
astronomical phenomena and calendrical calculations in ancient China was
not only the foundation of dynastic legitimacy, but it was also the earliest field
to be challenged by Western learning and to become an arena of intellectual
confrontation. It was precisely within this type of knowledge of “Heaven and
Earth,” however, that China possessed the greatest amount of resources from
other civilizations; they could provide new resources that could fundamen-
tally break through the old tradition. From Gu Yanwu and Huang Zongxi to
Jiang Yong (1681–1762), and from Dai Zhen and Qian Daxin to Ruan Yuan, they
all paid considerable attention to this sort of knowledge.
When Chinese scholars studied astronomy and calendrical calculation,
Western learning often became an important field of reference for them. While
they were following the ancient Chinese tradition of “following Heaven and
accepting the Mandate (Order)” ( fengtian chengyun 奉天承運) and accepted
the importance of astronomy and calendrical calculations, nevertheless they
unwittingly went over to accepting Western learning. For example, in his 1795
“Shihu xu,” preface to Jiao Xun’s Explanations of Arcs (Shihu 釋弧), Qian Daxin
repeatedly stressed the extremely great significance of astronomy (tianxue).26
He reminded people that this sort of mathematics was the “Confucian idea
of ‘passing through the hall into the inner chamber’; that is, having achieved
a higher level of proficiency in one’s profession” because it was “the science
of measuring Heaven” and “Heaven” was precisely the fundamental basis of
Confucian doctrine.27 Ling Tingkan also pointed out, in his “Reply to Sun
Yuanru (Xingyan 1753–1818)’s Observations,” that it was simply not feasible “to
dismiss the Western view” in astronomy because in astronomy and calendrical

26  Qian Daxin once polished up Kun yu tu shuo for Jiang Youren. See Chouren zhuan, j. 46, in
Xuxiu SKQS, 451.
27  In Litang xuesuanji wuzhong, in Xuxiu SKQS, 1045 ce.
From Ming to Qing II 263

calculations Western methods and Chinese learning were “mutually comple-

mentary, like the inside and outside of the same garment.” He went on to say
that “Western learning is profound and subtle and if one does not delve into it,
one will be ignorant.”28 In his 1799 “Preface to Jiao Xun’s Study of Mathematics,”
Ruan Yuan even more strongly emphasized that Confucian scholars must
“know mathematics” (that is, astronomy and calendrical calculations).29 Later
in 1820, when he set the examination questions for student in his academy, the
Sea of Learning Hall, he asked them several kinds of questions about Western
and Moslem calendrical science. He obviously hoped that the Chinese tradi-
tional intellectual world would begin to change in this regard.
Why did they particularly emphasize this field of study? Because it con-
tained the foundation of all other knowledge. Qian Daxin pointed out that
various kinds of knowledge definitely had to possess common “mathematics”
(shu), and furthermore, this sort of “mathematics” was able to be universally
applicable and to lead to new knowledge because “sages from the eastern seas
or the western seas all shared the same mind and the same principle.” People all
possessed a common “mind” and a common “principle,” but for “those in China
who were good at mathematics, Confucian teaching viewed them as possess-
ing only small skills.”30 On this account, he repeatedly called upon people to
pay attention to this common “mathematics.” If we say that the phrase “employ
propriety in place of principle” expresses the new train of thought of eviden-
tial research scholars concerning the reconstruction of social order, then the
phrase “seeking a general practice (or principle)” that explains the individual
(particular) through an understanding of the whole (general) expresses the
thinking of the evidential research scholars in regard to a new understanding
of the structure and composition of the universe.
In the first year of the Jiaqing era, 1735, with the sole exception of Ruan
Yuan, the evidential research scholars Wang Lai (1768–1813), Li Rui (1768–1817),
Ling Tingkan and Jiao Xun were all celebrated for their mathematics.31 Chinese
scholars’ understanding of Western learning was obviously greater than we

28  Jiaolitang wenji, 1998, j. 24, 214. Also see Qian Daxin, “Da Sun Yuanru guancha shu,” in
Qianyantang wenji, j. 36, in Jiading Qian Daxin quanji, 1997, vol. 9, 611.
29  “Litang xuesuanji xu,” Yanjingshi ji, 1993, j. 5, 681–682.
30  Qianyantang wenji, j. 23, in Jiading Qian Daxin quanji, 1997, vol. 9, 362.
31  Wang Lai wrote Mathematical Studies (Hengzhai suanxue) and Ruan Yuan published Li
Rui’s Eleven Posthumous Works of Li Rui (Lishi yishu shiyi zhong), the “Preface” (Jilüe) to
which states that he was particularly proficient at astronomical single step algorithms; he
and Jiao Litang (Jiao Xun) and Ling Cizhong (Ling Tingkan) were regarded as the “three
friends who talked about Heaven.” Xuxiu SKQS, 1045 ce photocopy, 527; Elman, On Their
Own Terms, 2005, 271–272.
264 Chapter 12

had previously imagined; they all hoped to master the common “principle” and
“mathematics.” In his Author’s Preface to Explanations of Addition, Subtraction,
Multiplication and Division (Jia jian cheng chu shi zixu), Jiao Xun wrote that
“names or titles emerged after the law was established while principles existed
before the law was established.”32 He further said that just as all Chinese char-
acters can be explained and categorized using the “six methods” (liushu 六書),
so all phenomena can also be equally explained and categorized using the four
mathematical rules of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. In
a sense, “mathematics” is an abstract principle that transcends the multifari-
ous phenomenal world. After he conducted specific research in geometry and
mathematics, Jiao Xun went on to carry out a new interpretation of the ancient
Chinese Classic of Changes.33 He pointed out that there were three things
that were most important for the ultimate understanding of the universe: 1)
exhaustive exploration (pangtong 旁通), 2) interlocking combination or con-
nection (xiangcuo 相錯), and 3) timely action (shixing 时行); these three were
all the result of actual measurements.34 This was perhaps the “constant Way
that could link everything together” (yiguan zhi Dao 一貫之道) that they were
mentally pursuing.
Between the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns (around the 1750s and 1760s), peo-
ple seem to have been especially interested in discussing fundamental prob-
lems. We must recognize that this kind of thinking that sought a new overall or
comprehensive interpretation of the universe was really not yet mature, and at
this time Western learning had actually not yet become universally applicable
knowledge. This was the case because as soon as this foreign knowledge began
to pose a threat to Chinese tradition, it would often be shunted aside. This was
especially the case while the idea that “Western learning originated in China”
continued to hold sway. At that time, even those scholars who possessed a gen-
uine spirit of exploration would stop and turn away from their acquisition of
intellectual resources just at the crucial point.

32  Jiao Xun, “Jia jian cheng chu shi zixu,” in Diaogu ji, j. 16, 277.
33  In the intellectual system of ancient China, the Classic of Changes was a foundational
text. The principles (li) and mathematics (shu) of the Changes would seem to have been
for the ancient Chinese a veritable key to the complete understanding of the cosmos and
everything in Heaven and Earth.
34  These three terms are all derived from the Yijing. See Lynn, Changes, 121, 130–131, and 144
respectively for the passages in which pangtong, xiangcuo and shixing occur. Our transla-
tions reflect Richard Lynn’s.
From Ming to Qing II 265

1.7
In his Record of the Transmission of the Masters of the School of Han Learning
(Hanxue shicheng ji), Jiang Fan recorded a celebrated couplet by Hui Shiqi
(1671–1741):

When studying the six classics, one should revere Fu (Qian) and Zheng
(Xuan),
When observing the hundred virtues, one should follow Cheng (Yi,
Hao) and Zhu (Xi).

These two lines are very interesting because they symbolize the value orienta-
tion and two principles of the traditional intellectual world. The first line refers
to the text of the classics and suggests respect for ancient authority. The second
line concerns the world of daily life and expresses deference to the Cheng-Zhu
Neo-Confucian School of Principle. At the end of the eighteenth century and
the beginning of the nineteenth, however, the evidential research of a group of
deeply insightful scholars was in fact vaguely questioning these two positions.
Evidential research thinking was subject to two kinds of influence and stim-
ulus. One was a distrust of empty talk about doctrines. They saw that strict
moral standards and high-minded idealism excessively constrained human
desires and were divorced from the everyday life of society. They therefore
attempted to replace them with another set of rules and regulations of eti-
quette and propriety established by popular convention. This was, then, the
thinking behind the phrase “employ propriety in place of principle.” The sec-
ond was anxiety that thought and learning at the higher levels of culture would
each go to their own extremes, and as a result of the split between a shallow
“principle” (li) and trivial “matters” (shi), they would become either baseless
dogma or fragmentary evidential research bogged down in details. They hoped,
then, to seek anew for a universally applicable “rule” ( faze 法則) to reestablish
a common foundation for knowledge and thought. In this context, what origi-
nally seemed to be traditional philology, linguistics, and the study of calendri-
cal calculations (mathematics) took on a rather new significance.
That so many people were committed at the time to discussing the “sin-
gle thread” that ran through the Way of Confucius would seem to have been
because they were looking for a new foundation on which to situate safely the
intellectual world of thought and knowledge.35 From Dai Zhen and Qian Daxin
to the later Ruan Yuan, Jia Xun, Ling Tingkan, Li Rui, Wu Lanxiu (1789–1839),

35  
Lunyu 4.15, Lau, Analects, 74: “The Master said, ‘Ts’an! There is one single thread binding
my way together.’…”.
266 Chapter 12

and so on, all of their expositions included the above kinds of intentions either
openly or implicitly. At this time, the original study of the classics gradually
absorbed modern implications, but once the door to this kind of knowledge
combining the old and the new was opened, it was then impossible to prevent
the entrance of various sorts of new knowledge from outside. The large-scale
influx of new foreign knowledge into traditional scholarship, would most likely
herald the beginning of the collapse of the tradition.
Temporarily, perhaps, there was no such risk, but danger was concealed
in the wings. Contemporary China just then found itself in an embarrassing
situation. On the one hand, members of the mainstream intellectual world
continued on with their traditional imagination about their own world and
themselves, and they considered various forms of foreign knowledge as
beneath contempt. On the other hand, there was no way for their increasingly
vacuous traditional thinking to respond to the new actualities of life; in the face
of Western knowledge and thought, it had to renew itself. If the Chinese did
not “change within tradition,” then the world of Chinese knowledge, thought
and belief would experience ruptures both in imagination and in reality. These
ruptures would entail two results. They would either lead Chinese scholars
totally to abandon the tradition and to enter into the context of global and
universal truth, or they would lead Chinese scholars to insist on maintaining
their imaginary tianxia and their particular nationalist standpoint.
In 1799 Emperor Jiaqing had the corrupt official Heshen (1750–1799) arrested,
tried and ordered to commit suicide, and so began a series of social and politi-
cal crises at the turn of the century that brought a sudden end to the flourish-
ing of the Qing dynasty. Several incidents followed that shook the intellectual
world: the scholar Hong Liangji (1746–1809) sent his famous letter of criticism
to Emperor Jiaqing; a devastating popular revolt broke out in Sichuan and
Shaanxi and lasted from 1794 to 1804 (known as the White Lotus, bailianjiao
白蓮教 Rebellion); the Eight Diagrams Sect (tianlijiao 天理教 or baguajiao
八卦教) rebelled in 1813, attacked the capital, and shocked the intellectual
world.
Perhaps the psychological impact of these events on the intellectual world
deserves our particular attention. At that time, Hui Dong and Dai Zhen had long
since passed away, and Wang Mingsheng (1722–1797), Lu Wenchao (1717–1796),
and Jiang Sheng (1721–1799) had just died; the few remaining great evidential
research scholars of the Qianlong era—Qian Daxin, Cheng Yaotian (1725–1814),
and Duan Yucai (1731–1815)—were already quite old, and a new generation of
scholars was beginning to dominate the scholarly and intellectual worlds. At
that time, Ling Tingkan was forty-five, Jiao Xun was thirty-seven, Ruan Yuan
was thirty-six, and Wang Yinzhi (1766–1834) was thirty-four. They had to
From Ming to Qing II 267

bear the above mentioned social changes of the age, and what they thought
already differed greatly from their elders in the evidential research move-
ment. The direction of their inquiries into knowledge was also quite different
from the Qianlong era. For them, the world and the Qing empire had already
changed, and in their scholarly research they could not but incorporate new
resources and offer new reflections.
It was just then, in 1799, that Ruan Yuan completed his Biographies of
Astronomers and Mathematicians (Chouren zhuan), an intellectual history
of Chinese scholarship that is quite noteworthy because it especially arranged
in biographical form marginalized areas of study, such as mantic and medi-
cal arts, astronomical phenomenon, and geography, and began to bring them
to prominence within the purview of the intellectual mainstream.36 This was
undoubtedly a distant response to the challenge of Western learning from the
late Ming and early Qing as well as to the problems of national corruption and
weakness. Perhaps what we should pay even more attention to, however, is that
this work faintly adumbrated the anxieties of the Chinese intellectual world
facing the West. The compilation of the work was supervised by the leading
contemporary scholar Ruan Yuan and proofed and revised by scholars of two
generations, including Qian Daxin, Ling Tingkan and Jiao Xun. Did these men
whom later generations have regarded as orthodox evidential research scholars
already have some new ideas about the traditional Chinese intellectual world?

2 Influx of New Western Knowledge and Changes in the Chinese

Intellectual World in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

Ever since Westerners began to come to China in the late Ming, within two
or three centuries, various kinds of Western knowledge continuously entered
China and gradually began to seep into the Chinese intellectual system. In
this regard, most influential was the scientific and technological knowledge
that the Chinese called “the study that investigates the phenomena of nature
to acquire knowledge” (gezhi zhixue 格致之學) found in various translated
Western books. When this intellectual system that modern people would
consider reasonable encountered the original already well-formed system of
Chinese knowledge, thought and belief, it gave rise to intense conflict. Beside
the new knowledge contained in books, many Western scientific implements,
such as spectacles, microscopes, clocks, telescopes, armillary spheres, and so

36  See Elman, On Their Own Terms, 2005, 265–273 for discussion of Ruan Yuan’s Chouren
zhuan.
268 Chapter 12

on, came into China from the late Ming and early Qing on. These Western sci-
entific implements were not merely simple tools. Implicit in the background
of these tools were technologies, and implicit in the background of these tech-
nologies was knowledge. This knowledge with its associated ideas was very dif-
ferent from traditional Chinese knowledge and thought; it contained within it
sufficient resources to call into question, undermine, and overturn the Chinese
intellectual system.
Fundamental conflict and the overthrow of the system did not actually
emerge for a rather long time, however; to overthrow in its entirety the intel-
lectual world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief that had taken several
thousand years to establish was not that easy. This “new Western knowledge”
had aroused the curiosity of many Chinese scholar-officials, encroached upon
China’s intellectual world, and pushed the original already well-formed sys-
tem of Chinese knowledge into a position of passive resistance. Nevertheless,
I believe that before the nineteenth century, Western knowledge had only
imparted to the traditional Chinese intellectual world resources for new
understandings and a foretaste of its overthrow, but had not yet delivered a
mortal blow to that intellectual world.
Why not? Because for this knowledge to overthrow the ancient Chinese
knowledge system and its intellectual world three crucial elements had to
be in place. First, the Chinese intellectual stratum would have to accept the
new map of knowledge, that is, to accept that there was one or many more
different types of independently existing civilizations in the world that were
in no way inferior to Chinese civilization. Second, the Chinese intellectual
stratum would have to confirm that from their “fundamental essence” (ti) to
their “practical applications” (yong) these civilizations possessed intellec-
tual systems completely different from the Chinese system of knowledge and
thought. Third, they would have to admit that there might possibly be a truth
universally applicable throughout the world, and that this truth might not nec-
essarily reside in China. As long as these three ideas had not gained general
acknowledgement, people could easily rely on the idea that “Western learning
originated in China” to explain and interpret this foreign knowledge, and so
they could still maintain a serene state of mind.
In the nineteenth century, this situation began to change.

2.1
In China, the expansion of the “world of thought” frequently followed the
expansion of the “geographical world.” Perhaps it was the enlargement of
the conceptual notion of geographical space that finally caused the Chinese
intellectual world, originally only accustomed to China, to have to admit that
From Ming to Qing II 269

“there are seas beyond our seas” (that is, that other major geographic regions
existed). After the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns (1796–1820 and 1821–1850), the
Chinese people had to accept the reality that “there are skies beyond our skies,”
and hence all of a sudden in the nineteenth century a great many books con-
cerning world geography appeared. It is said that in the forty years from 1821
to 1861 (the first year of Emperor Daoguang to the eleventh year of Emperor
Xianfeng), Chinese scholars wrote twenty kinds of books on foreign geography,
and that in the next forty years, to the twenty-sixth year of Emperor Guangxu
(1900), the number had swelled to one hundred and fifty-one.37
Among them, two mid-nineteenth-century works, Wei Yuan (1794–1856)’s
Treatise on the Maritime Countries (Haiguo tuzhi, published in 1844 and
enlarged in 1847 and 1852) and Xu Jiyu (1795–1873)’s Brief Survey of the Maritime
Circuit (Yinghuan zhilüe, 1848), may be said to mark the transformation of the
traditional Chinese intellectual world. According to the research of modern
scholars, in the compilation of his Treatise on the Maritime Countries, Wei
Yuan quoted from both Chinese works and the writings of foreign scholars.
The number of works in the latter category are not as great as in the for-
mer, but the quantity of material cited from Western works far outnumbers
that from Chinese works. They include both older works by missionaries
who came to China during the Ming and Qing and more recent new works
by Western writers.38 Compared to Wei Yuan’s Treatise, Xu Jiyu’s Brief Survey
of the Maritime Circuit contains even more significant new knowledge. Unlike
the Treatise, Xu’s Brief Survey is not a practical response to the contemporary
situation, but rather a work of geography in a stricter sense. If we say that the
Treatise on the Maritime Countries continued to regard the myriad countries as
China’s “four borders” (siyi) and situated the Middle Kingdom outside of “the
world,” thus reflecting that Wei Yuan still maintained the traditional tianxia
view of the world, then Xu Jiyu’s Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit using the
term “vast ocean and realm, or rings of oceans” (yinghuan 瀛寰 or 瀛環) for
“the world” makes it clear that China’s relation to the world is one of coexis-
tence; that he did not employ the term yi or barbarian to refer to foreign coun-
tries further indicates clearly his consciousness of the equality of the “myriad
countries.” Xu’s introduction to the representative government systems of the
various Western countries and his praise for George Washington’s initiation of

37  For detailed research on the new knowledge of world geography in the late Qing, see Zou
Zhenhuan, Wan-Qing xifang dilixue zai Zhongguo, 2000, Chapter 2, 61–157.
38  For all of the above information, see Xiong Yuezhi, “Haiguo tuzhi zhengyin xishu kaoshi,”
Zhonghua wenshi luncong, 55 (1996), 235–259.
270 Chapter 12

a democratic system also demonstrate very clearly that his thinking was more
liberal or open-minded than that of Wei Yuan.
After this, over one hundred and fifty works were written about the world,
quite a number of them by Chinese diplomats whose actual experience of
the West and Japan genuinely expanded the scope of vision of the Chinese
intellectual stratum. On this account, the preface to Treatise on the Maritime
Countries contains two very important sentences. The first reads:

Then everyone relied on what Chinese scholars said about the West; now
everyone relies on what Westerners themselves say about the West.

That is to say, in the past, knowledge about the West depended on what Chinese
had heard or imagined, but now such knowledge came from Western people
themselves. In this way, the reasonableness of Western people’s knowledge of
the world was accepted, and this implied a change in intellectual stance. The
second sentence is one that we are all quite familiar with:

The book was compiled in order to use the barbarians to combat the
barbarians; in order to use the barbarians to negotiate with the barbar-
ians; to learn the best technology of the barbarians in order to control the
barbarians.

These statements meant that the significance of this knowledge was for prac-
tical use and for practical use in terms of a nationalist stance. They also sym-
bolize a recognition and even a high regard for alternative civilizations and
knowledge.39
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Chinese people began
generally to accept this new picture of the civilized world, and their image
of the world was enlarged from the nine continents of the past to the entire
globe.40 China itself was reduced in size from the tianxia world of the past
to occupying only one corner of East Asia. This expansion of the world and
contraction of China led the Chinese intellectual stratum to begin to consider
and to accept an extremely important new concept—the existence of areas
of multiple civilizations. Those countries that were traditionally thought of as

39  Wei Yuan, “Yuan xu,” Haiguo tuzhi, 1998, 1.

40  Paul A. Cohen, has already pointed out that “Chinese, in 1800, had the sense of being a
universe unto themselves, of literally encompassing the world. This sense was still alive in
1840. But by 1900 it had become moribund.” Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang Tʻao
and Reform in Late Chʻing China, 1974, 5.
From Ming to Qing II 271

a “myriad states” of small barbarians no longer made up the “four frontiers”

of the Great Celestial Empire; they were now countries just like the “Middle
Kingdom” itself. For this reason, their civilizations or cultures, products, and
languages came to be gradually known, and this knowledge also steadily trans-
formed the unreasonable arrogance of the Chinese intellectual class.

2.2
These changes in geographical ideas were followed by changes in historical
ideas, and the changes in Chinese ideas about history also entailed a trans-
formation in their fundamental presuppositions about civilized traditions.
It followed that, if the Chinese were able to accept that various peoples and
countries had different histories and civilizations, then they would have to
admit that the tianxia did not contain only a single dominant civilization, but
rather a multiplicity of coexisting civilizations. The existence of this multiplic-
ity of civilizations further implied that people should respect and understand
the value of alien civilizations.
Due to its introduction by Western missionaries, knowledge of foreign civ-
ilizations and their histories progressively spread in China during the nine-
teenth century. Chinese people’s understanding of those foreign civilizations
was, then, much greater at that time than it had been two hundred years ear-
lier. Scholarly research shows that from 1809 to 1840, some thirteen books and
six periodicals on world history and geography by Western writers were suc-
cessively published; in the twenty years after 1840, a further twelve books and
three more periodicals were published on these subjects. Although they might
seem to have been few in number, works like Robert Morrison (1782–1834)’s
Brief History of Foreign Countries (Waiguo shilüe), Elijah Coleman Bridgman
(1801–1861)’s Brief Chronicle of the American Commonwealth, (revised ver-
sion entitled Brief Chronicle of the American Federation, Lianbang zhilüe) and
William Muirhead (1822–1900)’s Chronicle of Great Britain (Da Yingguo zhi)
were quite lengthy and had a very great influence.
At this same time, the Chinese people’s understanding of this new knowl-
edge gradually broke away from their interest in strange and novel rumors
and fictional jottings, and they began to pen more systematic descriptions
of things Western. Such were works like Lin Zexu (1785–1850)’s Chronicle of
Four Continents (Sizhou zhi), Wei Yuan’s Treatise on the Maritime Countries,
Liang Tingnan (1796–1861)’s Four Essays on the Maritime Countries (Haiguo
sishuo), Yao Ying (1785–1853)’s Record of Travels in Sichuan and Tibet (Kangyou
ji­xing), Xu Jiyu’s A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit, He Qiutao (1824–1862)’s
A Complete History of the Northwest Regions (Shuofang beisheng), and so on. By
the 1860s, after an increasing number of diplomats and scholars went abroad,
272 Chapter 12

historical knowledge of the outside world expanded greatly and the Chinese
gradually accepted the idea that in this world there were civilizations with
equally ancient and brilliant histories as that of China.
This was also a fundamental change. In the past Chinese picture of the world,
from the “three sovereigns and five emperors to the present” constituted one
continuous history. This history supported the traditional Chinese special con-
cepts of “All under Heaven,” the “Middle Kingdom,” and the “four boundaries.”
It also supported the voluntary “tribute system,” and even more the compara-
tive evaluation of civilizations. As foreign lands came into the Chinese purview
and historical knowledge concerning them gradually arrived, this knowledge
progressively transformed the Chinese historical imagination and memory.
The two ideas that the history of the West was as long as China’s and that
Western civilization was really not inferior to China’s were steadily accepted
by the Chinese intellectual stratum. Zeng Jize (1839–1890) once stated that in
dealing with the various Western countries that China was isolated from in the
past “it will not do to fear them like the gods nor to despise them as beasts.”41
This was a comparatively calm way of accepting the new structure of the
world. The Chinese intellectual class, then, began to have a sound understand-
ing of foreign lands. For example, around 1877 or 1878, Guo Songtao (1818–1891)
already had definite knowledge of the history of the West, the Roman Catholic
Church, and even ancient Egypt.42 Li Fengbao, who was sent abroad with Guo
at the same time, wrote that he saw “the historical records of various countries”
in a library in Berlin. When he saw Indian books from three to four thousand
years ago, he became even more aware of the incorrectness of the idea that in
the tianxia only China had “advanced to the stage of civilization.”43
To take the late Qing understanding of ancient Greek thought as an exam-
ple, in 1857 the first number of the new journal Shanghai Serial (Liuhe cong­
tan) had an essay entitled “Greece as the Progenitor of Western Literature,”
and sometime before 1860 Wang Tao (1828–1897) mentioned both Thales and
Socrates in a book he edited entitled Preliminary Investigation of the Origins
of Western Learning (Xixue yuanshi kao). After that, Guo Songtao also men-
tioned the ancient Greek philosophers Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle in his diary. With all this, the ideas of an age that could at least com-
pare with the Chinese age of philosophers and a hundred schools of thought
gradually emerged into Chinese consciousness. People began to see that even
in intellectual doctrines China really did not flourish alone.

41  Zeng Jize yiji, 1983, 167.

42  Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 119, 374, 356.
43  Li Fengbao, Shi De riji, quoted from Zhongguo jindai wenxue daxi: Shuxin riji ji 2, 1993, 76.
From Ming to Qing II 273

We all know that the ancient Chinese stubbornly maintained the idea that
“Heaven does not change, and the Way does not change.” In terms of our
modern understanding, their so-called Heaven was probably just the space
and time that supported their universal rationality. In other words, it sup-
ported both their “world view” and their “idea of history.” Once the world and
history both changed, then the tianxia of the past in which the center looked
down on the four barbarians on the borders was transformed into a “myriad
states” with no center and no external borders, and the civilized “tradition of
moral principle” (daotong) transmitted in a straight line from the past was
replaced by an image of multiple civilizations moving forward in tandem. All
of this brought about a very profound change in Chinese intellectual history.

2.3
The recent history of Chinese self-recognition was intimately related to
changes in the Chinese conception of “the world.” For a very long period of
time, because China did not face any “others” of equal status it would seem
to have lacked a mirror to reflect itself in and so it had no way to recognize
itself clearly. China’s nineteenth-century recognition of “the world” was, then,
conversely also a re-recognition of “China” (the Middle Kingdom), and a reex-
amination of traditional knowledge was also in the background of its new
knowledge of foreign countries. An important change in the Chinese intellec-
tual world in the second half of the nineteenth century was that their standards
for the evaluation of civilization started to vary. In traditional China, people
always regarded ethical reasonableness, moral awareness, the identity of state
politics, lineage ethics, and a regular, harmonious social order as the central
values of civilization. The Chinese always believed that they were superior
to the West in these qualities, but this idea was challenged in the second half of
the nineteenth century. Many people discovered that Western people also had
quite mature and reasonable systems of ethics and morality, and that they also
possessed rational organizations for the maintenance of social order. China
was not necessarily in a superior position in these areas. During this period of
time, due to the steady increase in their knowledge of Western government,
politics, religion, and ethics, the Chinese could not but revise their idea that
“Westerners” were all “barbarians.”
In the second half of the nineteenth century, more and more people who had
first hand experience of the West and who were keenly aware of the changes
in the world began to carry out serious comparisons of Chinese and Western
civilizations, ranging from “essence” (ti) to “practical application” (yong). They
were hoping to understand “why they are small and strong, and why we are
big and weak.” In his 1861 Protests from Jiaobin Cottage, (Jiaobinlu kangyi),
274 Chapter 12

Feng Guifen (1809–1874) asked why are the Chinese, being so intelligent, in
the four areas where “people’s talents have never been abandoned,” “the land
has not been left unused,” “the leaders and the people are not separated,” and
“names certainly match realities” still inferior to the foreigners (yiren, barbar-
ians)? These four areas are not merely limited to “practical application” (yong);
they also involve questions of “essence” (ti).44 As a result, Chinese began to pay
close attention to all the differences between China and the West. For example,
Liang Tingnan had rather high praise for the democracy and the legal system of
the United States while Bin Chun (1804–?) was also extremely interested in the
English Parliament.45 Although this comparative stance still vacillated within
tradition, nevertheless they had already seen the differences.
There were others who saw even more deeply. Around 1877, from the differ-
ences in the Chinese and English political systems, Guo Songtao saw that in the
West “they make their government affairs public to their people, and their rulers
do not regard these affairs as their private business, and he praised England’s
parliamentary democracy, legal justice, and the openness of their public opin-
ion. He recognized the decline of China’s “way of the ruler” ( jundao) and “way
of the teacher” (shidao), and even admitted that he was “using their (the West’s)
possession of the Way (Dao) to attack China’s lack of the Way.”46 In 1884, Zheng
Guanying (1842–1922) also admitted in his Diary of a Southern Tour (Nanyou riji)
that the Western countries “possessed both practical application and essence (ti
and yong) as the foundation of their nation-building.”47 In 1892, Xue Fucheng
(1838–1894) went even further in asserting that democratic countries “are in
accord with Mencius’ saying that ‘the people are of supreme importance (min
wei gui 民為貴),’” and discussed their political conditions on a par with the
ancient Three Dynasties (Xia, Shang, Zhou) that the Chinese most longed for.48
Li Shuchang (1837–1897), who was sent to the West with Guo Songtao, ruefully
wrote that although the democratic system of England’s constitutional mon-
archy “has a monarch in name, in reality it is a nation governed by its people.”

44  Feng Guifen, Jiaobinlu kangyi, Dai Yangben punctuated edition, 1998, 197.
45  Guo Tingyi, “Jindai wenhua zhi shuru ji qi renshi,” in his Jindai Zhongguo de bianju, 1987,
38.
46  Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 393, 548.
47  Zhongguo jindai wenxue daxi: Shuxin riji ji 2, 1993, 270.
48  Xue Fucheng xuanji, 1987, 605–606. Mengzi, “Jinxin zhangju B, §14. Lau, Mencius, 196,
“Mencius said, ‘the people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and
grain come next; last comes the ruler …”.
From Ming to Qing II 275

He was deeply aware that this constituted a very ominous challenge emanating
from the “barbarians.”49

2.4
Which ones were really better, the Chinese or the Western intellectual doc-
trines and political systems? The majority of traditionally educated people
naturally had their own sense of superiority, but this was surely a question that
was not that easy to elucidate. The traditional Chinese system regarded blood-
lines as its foundation, families and lineages as its center, and sought overall
order in society. The modern Western systems had the individual at their cen-
ter, regarded power, and rights and obligations as their limits, and strove for
freedom. In their different social environments and with their different his-
torical traditions, it was, in the first place, quite difficult to distinguish clearly
which was superior and which was inferior. At that time, however, the world’s
comparative power relationships underwent rather great changes.
After the Opium Wars (1840–43 and 1860–61), China gradually fell into a dis-
advantageous position, and then its traditional government and civilization
was subject to serious challenges from the West. On the one hand, imperial-
ism used civilization as a cover for its encroachment, causing people gradu-
ally to overlook that intrusion and call it the “competition of civilizations”
instead. On the other hand, the various Western powers dressed “science”
(kexue) up in a new foundational “rationality” (lixing), regarding “science” as
the outward extension of universal truth and causing people gradually
to overlook the problems behind that rationality. As a result, the truth
or falsity of something came to be determined by later gains and losses;
superiority and inferiority came to be determined by competitive strength or
weakness, and originally disparate evaluations and determinations came to
possess a seemingly common standard. This embodied a great change in the
conceptual world, namely a transformation in the idea of values. The Chinese
began a transformation from the evaluation of superiority and inferiority
centered on morality and ethics toward the evaluation of the superiority or
inferiority of a civilization centered on strength and weakness. As a result of
this transformation in methods of assessing superiority or inferiority, “self-
strengthening” (ziqiang 自強) became the center of gravity of the Chinese
conceptual world.

49  
Xiyang zazhi, j. 8, 251, “Yu Li Mianlin guancha shu.” On the parliamentary system, Song Yuren
wrote in his “Taixi geguo caifengji” that he even believed “if China established a parlia-
ment … it would be able to do things [govern] easier and also accomplish more than foreign
(Western) countries do.” in Guo Songtao, et al., Guo Songtao deng shixiji liuzhong, 349.
276 Chapter 12

After repeated military defeats and in a state of dismay, Chinese scholars

came to regard this method of evaluation as a law of nature possessing univer-
sal truth. There were very many intense expressions of opinion at the time that
we should regard as representing violent changes of mood rather than rational
reflections.
From the middle of the ninth century on, tension and anxiety hung like
a cloud over the intellectual world of educated Chinese. They believed
that if they could not surpass the Westerners and could not defeat
the Japanese, then they would be unable to prove the significance of the
existence of Chinese civilization or the worth of the Chinese national-
ity (minzu). It was precisely because people had already begun to place
China in a global context, “heroes” among the many nations of the world
were determined based on strength and weakness, the strong and the
weak were determined on the basis of wealth and power, and truth and
falsity were determined on the basis of winning and losing (success or
failure) … that “wealth and power” simply came to equal “civilization.”
This way of thinking about “civilization” gave rise to a whole series of con-
ceptual changes. Chinese began to reflect upon history and to revise their
concept of civilization. A very provocative incident is recorded in the Diary of
Guo Songtao (Guo Songtao riji). In the second month of the fourth year of the
Guangxu Emperor (1878) Guo read an article in the Times of London that criti-
cized England for awarding a jeweled medal to the king of the “semi-civilized”
(ban kaihua 半開化) nation of Persia. From this Guo reflected that China, that
had always considered itself to be a civilized nation, was probably regarded
by Western people as a “semi-civilized” country just like Persia. He was greatly
saddened by this and was quite obviously influenced by the Western thinking
that talked of civilization in terms of “strong and weak” and “rich and poor.”
The paramount traditional Chinese concept of the “Kingly Way” began to yield
to the not so glorious “Way of the Hegemon,” and to enrich the nation and
strengthen the military became the most important thing to be accomplished.50
With people feeling that one process had reached its limit and a change should
occur, the traditional Chinese civilization’s use of ethics and morality was rel-
egated to secondary importance, and thus:

If our people could realistically concentrate on mastering the principles

of mathematics and science, grasp the methods of making equipment
based on design pictures, and explore difficult texts about rivers and lakes
while, at the same time, obtaining all the exquisite wonders by becoming

50  
Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 439.
From Ming to Qing II 277

proficient in these principles and methods, then this would be the way
for China to strengthen itself.51

At this point ruptures began to appear in traditional Chinese intellectual con-

cepts. First, people began to doubt the foundations of Chinese knowledge.
Some people pointed out that the Chinese intellectual world’s use of the writ-
ten word, rhyme, commentaries on or philology of the classics, sweeping the
floor and conducting oneself with a sense of propriety when receiving guests
as the foundations of knowledge was obviously inferior to Western people’s
use of scientific instruments in the “investigation of things” (science) based on
physics (wuli, principles of matter), chemistry (huaxue, study of transforma-
tions) and biology (shengwu, living things).52 Second, people began to doubt
the path of the Chinese “investigation of things and extension of knowledge”
(gezhi) beginning with sweeping the floor and conducting oneself with a sense
of propriety when receiving guests. As this sort of reasoning went on, it led to
Yan Fu (1853–1921)’s discussion of “the extremely rapid changes in the world”
and call for the “search for wealth and power.”53 Third, there was a reversal
in the Chinese judgement of the value of knowledge. Ancient Chinese learn-
ing came to be regarded as “useless” knowledge while the new Western knowl-
edge was felt to be “useful.” In 1896 (Guangxu 22) in a preface to Chen Chi
(1855–1900)’s Book on Common Activities (Yongshu), Song Yuren (1857–1931)
mentioned that one popular idea at the time was that “Everyone in the world
is saying our sickness today is our excessive reverence for the literary tradition.”
By “literary tradition” Song meant simply the traditional Chinese practice of
regarding the Confucian classics as all of knowledge, wasting so much energy
and intelligence on this kind of knowledge in the humanities, neglecting other
forms of knowledge, and thus leading to a decline in technology of a practical
nature. Song felt that all this led to China’s “poverty” and “weakness.”54

2.5
When we examine various kinds of written sources from the second half of the
ninth century, we find that new knowledge arriving from outside was rapidly

51  Chouban yiwu shimo (Tongzhi chao), j. 46, 3–4, quoted from Ding Weizhi and Chen Song,
Zhong-xi tiyong zhi jian, 1995, 78.
52  Du Mu 都穆, Shixi riji, 1985, 62. (Characters given to distinguish from 杜牧).
53  See Yan Fu “Lun shibian zhiji” and “Yuanqiang” in Yan Fu ji, vol. 1, 1–32. For more on Yan
Fu, see Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West, Harvard
University Press, 1964.
54  Yongshu, j. shou, in Chen Chi, Chen Chi ji, 1997, 1.
278 Chapter 12

increasing. I’ll start below with the 1850s and present a few examples chosen
at random.
First off, books and periodicals introducing Western learning were increas-
ingly numerous. In terms of books, the early situation was still the same as
at the end of the Ming and beginning of the Qing when foreign missionar-
ies translated, introduced and promoted such works. For example, various
Western books in translation appeared one after another from the American
Presbyterian Mission Press established by the American Presbyterian
Missionary Association and the London Missionary Society Press set up by
British missionaries in Shanghai. Among them, W. A. P. Martin (1827–1916)’s
translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law which received
official support for its publication and was a very important event in China’s
move toward the world.55 After that the Chinese government and populace
also began to get into the business of translating and publishing such books. In
1868, the Jiangnan Manufacturing General Bureau set up a Translation Bureau
in Shanghai, and in 1873 the School of Combined Learning (Jingshi Tongwen
Guan) in the capital set up a Publishing House to translate Western books, an
even more important indication of official recognition of Western learning.
In terms of periodicals, besides Western language publications, there were
many Chinese language periodicals in the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s. Important
among them were the Chinese Serial (Xia-er guanzhen, monthly, 1853–1856),
the Shanghai Serial (monthly 1857–1858), the Chinese and Foreign Gazette
(Zhongwai xinbao, fortnightly, 1858–1861), the New Report of Shanghai
(Shanghai xinbao, 1861, weekly, later changed to thrice weekly), the more cele-
brated Shanghai News (Shenbao, 1872–1949), the China (Methodist) Missionary
New Paper (Zhongguo jiaohua xinbao) started in 1874 and later changed its
name to Review of the Times (Wanguo gongbao) and began to move from reli-
gious propaganda to the dissemination of science and culture, the Chinese
Scientific Magazine (also The Chinese Scientifical and Industrial Magazine,
Gezhi huibian; monthly, then quarterly, 1876–1892) that mainly disseminated
scientific knowledge. Various forms of new knowledge flowed in an unending
stream into the Chinese intellectual world from these books and periodicals.
In the second place, Chinese people began to travel the world to experience
Western civilization first hand and to understand the new Western learning.
At the same time, great quantities of Western implements came into China,
and various Western practices also entered China at an ever-increasing pace.
During the twenty some years from 1847, when the first group of three Chinese

55  See Liang Bohua, Jindai Zhongguo waijiao de jubian—waijiao zhidu yu Zhong-wai guanxi
bianhua de yanjiu, 1990, 54.
From Ming to Qing II 279

students, including Yung Wing (1828–1912), went to the United States, to 1872
when the Chinese government sent thirty students to the United States, many
Chinese went overseas and brought back to the Chinese people scenes of a
new world landscape. In the 1860s beginning in the international concessions
(zujie 租界), postal services and insurance companies were established, and
many things Western, such as printing presses, sewing machines, the art of
photography, and museums, began to appear in China. In the 1870s and 1880s,
various kinds of Western learning, implements and devices entered China in
abundance. The telegraph, telephones, electric lights, stick matches, running
water, foreign cloth, and iron nails soon became everyday articles of use in
China, especially in the coastal regions. If we look at the pages of the most
influential Dianshizhai Pictorial (Dianshizhai huabao) that began in the 1880s,
we can see that Western people, goods, customs, and knowledge had already
become part of everyday life in Chinese society.
It was precisely in this context that Western learning increasingly entered
China’s traditional intellectual world. Chinese gradually learned the theory of
the origin and development of the universe, the theory that the separation
of the moon from the earth was “due to the force of their rotations,” the plan-
ets of the solar system, and the periods of their revolutions around the sun;
they learned about the force of gravity, the elliptic orbits of the planets, the days
required to move around the sun in a week for the various planets, that Mars has
an ice cap, Jupiter has four moons, and about Uranus, solar and lunar eclipses,
and so on. As for the human body itself, they no longer insisted on the tradi-
tional Mencian view that “the organ of the heart can think.”56 In general they
now accepted the Western physiological knowledge that the brain is the organ
of thought and the heart is responsible for the circulation of blood, although
their attitude was still one of hesitation and their understanding still contained
some discrepancies.57
Knowledge of Westerns tools and implements that could be directly used
in national economics and the people’s livelihood entered the Chinese intel-
lectual world in even greater abundance in the second half of the nineteenth
century. In this area there seems to have been no conceptual barriers; the great
majority of educated Chinese felt both surprise and admiration and greatly
praised these new forms of Western knowledge and technology.
Another thing that had great symbolic significance was that ever since the
establishment of the Shanghai Polytechnic Institution (Gezhi shuyuan, 1874),

56  Mengzi, 6A:15. Lau, Mencius, 168.

57  See Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 779; Xue Fucheng, Chushi riji xuke, 2002, j. 3, 50; Yong-an
quanji, 1963, 1109.
280 Chapter 12

from 1886 to 1893 many celebrated officials, such as Li Hongzhang (1823–1901)

Zeng Guoquan (1824–1890), Liu Kunyi (1830–1902), Xue Fucheng (1838–1894),
Zheng Guanying (1842–1922), and so on, all went to this Institution and set
the examination questions. From the topics of their questions, we can see
that at that time all ranks of the imperial court and the ordinary people
were extremely interested in Western science and technology. This was a very
rare event in China where the examinations had for a thousand years been
centered on the traditional classic texts and knowledge of the humanities.
To take one example, the questions set by Li Hongzhang concerned Western
methods of measuring temperature, heat and electricity. He also asked the stu-
dents about the interpretation of “the investigation of things” (gezhi) in the
“Great Learning” and whether there were any areas of “coincidence” between
the ancient Chinese interpretations of the “investigation of things” since the
time of Zheng Xuan and the present ideas of Western science.58 Was he really
testing the students, or was he expressing a shift in the intellectual interest of
both the court and the general public?

2.6
At a time when “to enrich the nation and strengthen the military” ( fuqiang)
was equated with “civilization,” and when Chinese began to realize that sim-
ply imitating the West could not really result in self-strengthening, quite a few
people began to ponder the question of whether or not traditional Chinese
civilization was in need of reconstruction. Finding itself in a state of crisis,
this kind of thinking was increasingly strong among the Chinese intellectual
world. What, people asked, was really fundamental? Very many people felt that
traditional Chinese civilization was in need of renewal, and the transforma-
tion of that civilization should begin with education. The traditional concepts
and system of education, then, began to be changed. In order to respond to the
changing situation and seek practical effectiveness, education was no longer
centered on personal cultivation and morality, but it began to be centered on
ideas similar to Western science and technology; it began to emulate Western
education. One of the direct results of this change for Chinese intellectual his-
tory was no less than the final collapse of the traditional Chinese intellectual
system.59

58  Wang Ermin, Shanghai gezhi shuyuan zhilüe, 1980, 56–57.

59  The undermining of the traditional Chinese knowledge system was undoubtedly related
to the changes in the educational and examinations systems and those changes in turn
were undoubtedly related to the gradual penetration of Western style education.
From Ming to Qing II 281

The traditional Chinese intellectual system was quite different from its
Western counterpart. It was centered on the classic texts and tried to under-
stand the path to truth followed by the sages and the classics with the aim
of nurturing self-conscious moral cultivation. Therefore, its starting point was
the study of language and philology. This traditional knowledge had its own
integrated system of reasoning; it regarded establishing a stable social order,
maintaining the authority of the ruler and the state (guojia), and nurturing
morality among both the elite and the masses as of the highest value. The
entire intellectual system was built around this central core. The value hierar-
chy of knowledge was also judged on the basis of this central core. The entire
body of knowledge concerning Heaven, Earth, and the cosmos also established
a vast system that embraced nature, society and humanity. Its explanations,
classifications and expressions were all different from recent Western ideas;
they belonged to an intellectual world with an altogether different self-created
system.
In recent times, though, Western knowledge had been gradually divided
into separate academic disciplines and already possessed a clear classifica-
tory taxonomy. It, too, was an altogether different intellectual world. In the late
Ming, Giulio Aleni informed the Chinese in his A Summary of Western Learning
(Xixue fan, 1623) that Western knowledge was divided into six branches of
study: rhetoric (wenke 文科), philosophy (like 理科), medicine (yike 醫科), civil
law ( fake 法科), canon law ( jiaoke 教科) and theology (daoke 道科).60 These
six branches of study were incompatible with the Chinese intellectual world’s
long-standing classification of knowledge into the classics, history, philosophy,
and belle-lettres ( jing shi zi ji 經史子集).
On the heels of their admiration and imitation of Western knowledge, edu-
cated Chinese increasingly discussed Western educational systems because
they believed that the wealth and power of the European nations was related
to the organization of these systems.61 On this account, Chinese who went to
the West and Japan during the Guangxu reign period, seem to have been very
interested in systems of academic disciplines. Guo Songtao, Li Shuchang
(1837–1896), Zhang Lichen (fl. 1879) and Wu Rulun (1840–1903) all carefully
observed those systems. We know, of course, that the division of knowledge

60  From Li Zhizao, ed., Tianxue chuhan, 1986, ce 1, 27. For the details of Aleni’s and other Jesuit
classifications of science brought to China, see Nicolas Standaert, “The Classification of
Sciences and the Jesuit Mission in Late Ming China,” in Jan A. M. De Meyer & Peter M.
Engelfriet, eds., Linked Faiths: Essays on Chinese Religions and Traditional Culture in Honor
of Kristofer Schipper, 2000, 287–317.
61  Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 356.
282 Chapter 12

into academic disciplines and the education based on such classifications are
very important, but in the background of the “six branches of study” in the
West and the Chinese “four divisions” (sibu 四部) were incorporated different
understandings and interpretations of knowledge. As soon as this Western
system of academic disciplines and new Western knowledge entered the East
from the West, they would undermine the originally existing system of knowl-
edge in the East.
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the traditional Chinese sys-
tem of knowledge categories was increasingly unable to accommodate the
new knowledge from the West. It was like a box divided into four big squares
and several small squares, and there was no longer any place to locate appro-
priately the rich resources of new Western knowledge in the former catego-
ries (big or small squares) of history, philosophy, and belle-lettres; its squares
impeaded both the increase and the understanding of new knowledge. Once
the new Western knowledge had increased to the extent that the old box could
no longer hold it, then people simply began to doubt the validity of this old box
that they called “tradition.” During the Guangxu reign, however, some radical
intellectuals increasingly admired this Western system of academic divisions.
They believed that the Westerners “divided academic subjects into different
categories and increasingly broadened them, and thus their system could make
progress steadily and become even more advanced than before.” Acceptance of
this classificatory list would clearly subject the traditional Chinese intellectual
system to fundamental adjustments, revisions, and clarification.
The final reconstruction of the system of academic discipline occurred
after the keju examination system was abolished, but signs of the collapse of
the Chinese knowledge system appeared much earlier. These portents of col-
lapse gave rise to acute psychological tensions because once this traditional,
familiar knowledge system that had been relied upon to support understand-
ing and interpretation collapsed, the intellectual world found it hard to resist
a sense of panic. In this situation, there was a widespread demand for a recon-
struction of the Chinese knowledge system.62

62  Xue Fucheng, Chu shi Ying Fa Yi Bi siguo riji; Liu Erqi, Guozhai riji, j. 6, 30b also says that
“Recently when people discuss world academic learning, they divide it into the three lead-
ing topics of philosophy, ethics, and physical sciences, and thus cover quite well its essen-
tial elements.” In 1891 when Zhang Zhidong set up the Two Lakes Academy in Wuchang
(Hubei), although he retained the traditional classical studies, besides the study of the
classics, history, and principle he also established the study of mathematics and econom-
ics. In 1893, he went on to advocate the establishment of a “Self-strengthening College”
(ziqiang xuetang) with departments of languages, engineering, natural sciences, and
From Ming to Qing II 283

3 The Late Qing Rediscovery and Reinterpretation of Traditional

Chinese Resources: Classical Learning, Study of the Ancient
Schools of Philosophers and Buddhism

In the second half of the nineteenth century, China faced a turbulently chang-
ing situation such as it had not faced in three thousand years. In this age of great
changes, as it joined the new world, the ancient Chinese world of knowledge,
thought and belief could not avoid reorganizing its own system of knowledge.
In their diligent search for an intellectual reconstruction that could respond
to the new world, the Chinese intellectual class generally chose the path of
reinterpretation of their ancient classics. They hoped that by means of such
reinterpretations they could ameliorate the shock they had received from the
encounter with new knowledge and thought.

3.1
The first things to be reinterpreted were the Confucian classics that had always
served as the foundations of power and authority.
Since the Confucian classics established the textual foundations of the
mainstream Chinese ideology, any reinterpretation of them would represent
a very important intellectual realignment. Just as the classics section ( jingbu
經部) of the Annotated Catalog of the Complete Imperial Library (Siku quanshu
zongmu) put it: “the classics are nothing less than the self-evident principles
(truth) of All under Heaven.”63 The significance of any change in the interpreta-
tion of a classic text, then, went beyond the history of knowledge and became
part of Chinese intellectual history. During that period of time, any change in
the understanding of the Confucian classics could imply a major transforma-
tion of the entire Chinese intellectual world. In the face of an unprecedented
crisis in the Chinese intellectual world, nineteenth-century classical studies
( jingxue 經學) could not but undergo subtle and unavoidable changes.
The first thing people generally pay attention to in this area is the rise
of the New Text classical learning ( jinwen jingxue 今文經學, or New Text
Confucianism).
Ever since Zhuang Cunyu (1719–1788), Kong Guangsen (1751–1786), and
especially Liu Fenglu (1776–1829) started the practice of Gongyang interpre-
tation (that is, the interpretation of the Gongyang Commentary to the Spring

commerce (that is, economics). Quoted from Xue Huayuan, Wan Qing “Zhongti Xiyong”
sixiang lun (1861–1900), 1987, 171–172.
63  S KQS zongmu, 1965, 1981.
284 Chapter 12

and Autumn Annals, (Gongyangzhuan),64 they continually attempted to

reconfigure the order of the intellectual world through new interpretations of
the Confucian classics. Then, by means of this reconfigured intellectual world,
they hoped to reconstruct the order of everyday life. As part of this project, they
brought out the meaning in the subtle words of the Gongyang Commentary
and energetically expounded them. In their interpretive commentaries they
even more repeatedly discussed the “the duty between ruler and subject” ( jun
chen zhi yi 君臣之義), and the “debate between Chinese and barbarians” (Hua
Yi zhi bian 華夷之辯) that were mutually interrelated in the crisis of order they
were facing.65 This sort of interpretive method had without doubt already
changed classical studies from a form of classical learning to one of modern
thought, and transformed historical research into the formulation of politi-
cal systems. This scholarly practice was pushed to the extreme by those men
who were working to set up schools or factions. They wanted to set this aca-
demic orientation up against the classical studies of the Qianlong and Jiaqing
eras (1735–1820), and when they did, to a certain degree that changed the map
of Qing dynasty scholarship and brought about a profound transformation of
both thought and learning. On this account, very many scholars believed that
the rise of the Changzhou School of New Text Confucianism went beyond evi-
dential research.
There were, however, even more elements involved in the changes in middle
and late Qing scholarship. Not only should we consider the New Text scholars,
but we should also examine the old style evidential research scholars active
after the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras.
Among those who emphasized the meanings of the subtle words, there
were also two different trends. One trend was to rely on the elucidation of
the “meaning of the subtle words” to blend various forms of contemporary
political thinking into the hermeneutics of classical learning and allow it to
go beyond the boundaries of linguistic and philological studies to emerge as a

64  On the significance of the Changzhou New Text School, see Yang Xiangkui, “Qingdai de
jinwen jingxue,” in his Yishizhai xueshu wenji, 1983, 325–389. For an even more detailed
study, see Benjamin A. Elman, Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: the Ch’ang-chou School
of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China, 1990. Also see Chen Qitai, Qingdai
Gongyang xue, 1997.
65  The most conspicuous principles in the Gongyangzhuan are the “orthodox doctrine”
(zhengtong lun), the concept of Hua Chinese versus Yi barbarians (Hua-Yi guannian),
the distinction between inside and outside of China (nei-wai fenbie), vengeance or
revenge ( fuchou), and the distinction between classics/moral principles and expediency
( jingquan). These ideas were well suited to the anxieties of the intellectual class after the
middle Qing. Jun chen zhi yi is from Lunyu 18.7, Lau, Analects, 151.
From Ming to Qing II 285

form of knowledge that expressed real (political) tactics and concerns about
the current situation. At that time, then, the authority of the Confucian clas-
sics was merely used as a resource to justify their position.66
The other trend wished to emphasize and confirm the reliability and impor-
tance of the New Text classics. In order to do so, they introduced historical
methods and relied on evidential historical research to expose the unreliability
of the Old Text classics (guwen jingdian 古文經典). As a result, the New Text
classical learning introduced methods of Old Text classical learning to prove
the antiquity of their New Text classics. In works like Kang Youwei’s Forged
Classics of the Wang Mang Period (Xinxue weijing kao), A Study of Confucius
as a Reformer (Kongzi gaizhi kao), and so on, we often find them using the
methodology of historical research. This practice unintentionally transformed
classical learning into historiography and played a role in undermining classi-
cal learning.
From the point of view of intellectual history, New Text classical learning
was certainly a doctrine with quite a powerful impact at one time; it is just that
very many people overlook the fact that it actually contained two seemingly
opposite but really complementary ways of thinking. In his A Textual Study of
Master Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals (Zuoshi Chunqiu
kao), Liu Fenglu advocated “returning the events of the Spring and Autumn
period to the Spring and Autumn Annals [i. e., the classic], and return whatever
is recorded in the Zuo Commentary to the Zuo Commentary [i. e., history].”67
Easy to say, but in practice a very difficult piece of historical research. Given
their principle of apparently seeking to distinguish “true” (genuine) and “false”
(forged) classics, it would seem that without evidential research and judgment

66  Not only New Text scholars used the classics this way, but similar phenomena also
occurred among Old Text scholars. For example, in his Chunqiu gongfa neizhuan, Liu
Renxi (1844–1919) used the most fashionable contemporary ideas of “international law”
(gongfa 公法) and “universal truth” (gongli 公理) to draw parallels with the Spring and
Autumn Annals, and used it to discuss contractual rules in the international arena and
general principles in the realm of truth. In his interpretation of the words “a son was born
in the same year” (zi tong sheng 子同生) from the sixth year of Duke Huan, he cited the
lives of Prince Edward of Great Britain and the Prince of Japan as two examples to explain
the necessity of learning for the nobility. In his discussion of the words “the people of
Zheng attacked the state of Wei” (Zheng ren fa Wei 鄭人伐衛) from the second year of
Duke Yin, he thought about China’s current situation and repeatedly wrote of “drawing a
parallel between China and Asia so as to solidify a defence line in the Pacific region.” See
the 1912 edition of Chunqiu gongfa neizhuan with a preface by Huang Jie (1871 jinshi) in
Xuxiu Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao: jingbu, xia ce, 707.
67  Liu Fenglu, Zuozhuan chunqiu kaozheng, 1995.
286 Chapter 12

a text (wenben 文本) would not be qualified to serve as a classic ( jingdian 經典).
And so the precondition for the establishment of classical learning ( jingxue)
would be the confirmation it would receive from historical knowledge.
There was still another phenomenon of the history of knowledge and intel-
lectual history that is worth paying attention to. Namely that in their search for
a method of true interpretation, the evidential research scholars who carried
forward the style of study of the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras eventually gave
rise to another seemingly opposite but actually identical tendency.68 That
is, through their search for a conclusive historical method, they led classical
learning increasingly to expand its interpretive horizons until it also became
gradually separated from tradition.
The significance of Qing dynasty evidential research was that its meth-
ods of interpreting the Confucian classics, centered on phonetic and philo-
logical analyses and textual exegeses, allowed classical learning to go beyond
the earlier methods of classical interpretation of Song dynasty scholars, and
changed their vague and impressionistic nature. According to the understand-
ing of Qing evidential research scholars, this could restore, make clear, and give
prominence to the original meaning of the sages. So they called this method
of interpreting the classics “employing philology to understand the classics,
and illuminating the Way by means of the words.”69 Once this search for a
truthful and conclusive method became the highest principle, it would impel
classical learning to point in another direction. That is, it would change the
meaning of classical learning from a quest for (moral) “truth” (zhenli 真理) to
a search for fact-based “reality” (zhenshi 真實). This was especially the case
when the interest of scholars increasingly turned toward evidential historical
research; then they would put aside moral principles (or doctrines, yili 義理).
Just as Chen Li (1810–1882) wrote, quoting Huang Chuwang (1260–1346): “for
the time being just leave aside the empty abstract words and phrases and not
talk about them.” What did he mean by empty abstract words and phrases?

68  I do not use the terms “Han learning” or “Old Text classical studies” here in order to avoid
a contrast with “Song learning” and “New Text classical studies” and creating a misunder-
standing about an argument between Han and Song or New and Old. The disparagement
of Song learning by evidential research scholars was only a matter of the personal opin-
ions of a minority. Until Jiang Fan’s Hanxue yuanyuan ji and Songxue yuanyuan ji came
out and their antagonistic posture became apparent, they really had not been consid-
ered two factions. Of those scholars who favored evidential research methods, there were
some who studied New Text classics and some who concentrated on Old Text classics; this
was the general scholarly atmosphere at the time.
69  See Dai Zhen, “Yu Shi Zhongming lunxue shu,” in Dai Zhen wenji, j. 9, 1980, 140; also see
Ling Tingkan, Xiaolitang wenji, j. 35, 1998, 312.
From Ming to Qing II 287

He simply meant “things like respecting the ruler while making ministers sub-
missive, valuing the kingly rule while belittling hegemonic rule, elevating the
Zhou royal house while suppressing the Regional Rulers” because these moral
principles (or doctrines) were “correct in their meaning, but everyone knew
them.”70
In this intellectual atmosphere that seemed to be the opposite of the New
Text scholars’ emphasis on the meaning of the subtle words of the classics,
a new orientation of research in classical learning opened up. That was to
move from a classical learning that sought reality and conclusiveness and
expounded truth and principles to a historiography (historical study, shixue
史學) that sought to discover fact-based reality. For the sake of conclusiveness,
accuracy and comprehensiveness of knowledge, these scholars did not hesi-
tate to introduce quite a great deal of new knowledge. As this new knowledge
steadily swelled up inside the old knowledge system, it finally burst the origi-
nal boundaries of classical learning, and this led to the undermining of the
authority of the classics.
Below are a few typical examples of this situation. First off, “The Canon of
Yao” (Yaodian) chapter in the Book of Documents, considered a primary guide
for over two thousand years, was the starting point for ancient Chinese astron-
omy and calendar-making, and ancient Chinese astronomy and calendar-
making were also an important basis of the legitimacy and reasonableness of
political power and authority. From the late Ming and early Qing on, however,
with the steady influx of increasingly precise Western knowledge, the original
theories from the classics faced danger from every angle. Chinese scholars who
interpreted the classic texts could only accommodate and introduce this new
Western knowledge to fill the breach in Chinese knowledge. Consequently var-
ious Western astronomical calculations such as those of Ptolemy (ca. 90–168),
Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), Copernicus (1473–1543), Giovanni Domenico Cassini
(1625–1712), and so on, as well as ancient Romans from Numa Pompilius (753–
673 BCE) to Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE), and the Alexandrian mathematician
Sosigenes (fl. 75 BCE) all became resources for the interpretation of “The Canon
of Yao.”71 Secondly, the geographical information in the Da Dai’s Classic of Rites
(Da Dai Liji), the “Xia xiaozheng” ritual calendar (Xia xiaozheng was origi-
nally chapter 47 of the Da Dai Liji), the “Tributes of Yu” (Yugong in the Book
of Documents), and so on were all challenged by the new Western knowledge.

70  Chen Li, Dongshu dushu ji, 1936, j. 10, 30.

71  Alexander Wylie (Weilie Yali, 偉烈亞力 1815–1887), “Preface to Tan Tian,” (Tan Tian
xu), Ye Yaoyuan, “Zhong Xi lixue yuanliu yitong lun,” both can be found in Ge Shirui ed.,
Qingdai jingshi wen xubian, 1988, j. 7 “Xueshu 7”, 15B, and j. 8 “Xueshu 8”, 30A.
288 Chapter 12

The new Western geographical knowledge that had been steadily brought
into China since the late Ming and early Qing had already seeped into Chinese
interpretations of the classics. After the Guangxu and Xianfeng reigns (after
1861) the principle of traditional Chinese exegesis of the classics that “the
commentaries cannot contradict the classic text” (zhu bu bo jing 注不駁經)
was gradually overturned due to the introduction of new Western geographic
knowledge of the northwest. Scholars increasingly imported Western astro-
nomical, geographical, and mathematic knowledge to explain the geogra-
phy of far off alien peoples that were not mentioned in the “Tributes of Yu.”72
These new interpretations presented an unprecedented challenge to the origi-
nally unquestionable authority of the Chinese classics.
On the surface Confucian classical learning would seem to have continued
to maintain its scholarly production and reproduction upon entering the nine-
teenth century; many excellent works of research in philology and historical
linguistics appeared up to the middle of the century. By the second half of the
century, however, cracks really began to appear in this type of study of the clas-
sics. In their dual anxiety and tension about tradition and present reality, both
the New Text and the Old Text scholars tried, through their reinterpretations
of the classics, to discover sources of knowledge and thought belonging to their
own traditions in order to respond to the daily increasing influx of new knowl-
edge. But these new interpretations actually subjected ancient Chinese classical
learning to irreversible harm.
On the one hand, their reflections on reality constantly deconstructed the
interpretations of the traditional classics; they blended these reflections on
reality with their interpretations of the classics and, in the name of the classics,
they established their own discussions as authoritative views of the contem-
porary situation. On the surface, they seemed to regard the Confucian classics
as “sacred texts” that were guaranteed to solve all problems, but in reality they
turned the classics into pragmatic texts of tactical utility. On the other hand,
in their search for conclusiveness, they continually brought in new knowledge,
and this new knowledge undermined the sacredness of the classics. They began
to regard the classics as historical documents, and classical learning turned into
historiography. It was precisely this dual transformation of classical learning
that later on, in a certain sense, brought about such rapid changes in Chinese
knowledge and thought. They also caused traditional classical learning to be
transformed and differentiated into the modern academic subject categories of
literature, history, and philosophy.

72  Yang Maojian, Yugong xin tushuo, front matter, tongzhi year 6 (1867) Bilinglong guan
printing, Guangzhou. See Xuxiu sibu quanshu zongmu tiyao: jingbu, shang ce, 1997, 283.
From Ming to Qing II 289

3.2
Next off, the traditional resources that were brought to the fore and reinter-
preted were the teachings of hitherto marginal ancient schools of philoso-
phers (zhuzi 諸子) of the hundred schools era.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the world of Chinese knowl-
edge, thought and belief may have appeared especially complicated and subtle.
During this period, various kinds of knowledge, thought and belief, whether
“old” (traditional), “new” (present day), “central” (Chinese, from zhongguo,
central states) or “external” (the world), all experienced wave upon wave of
dispute. In the late nineteenth century when people were facing thought and
culture from abroad, it seemed as though China’s old experience and this new
knowledge—the ancient classics and the modern world—suddenly came
apart. Just as Mary Clabaugh Wright wrote, at this time the frame of mind
of traditional Chinese men of learning was anything but tranquil. They were
“haunted by doubts and buffeted by circumstances” and the next generation
was even more “frightened and demoralized” because they were “compelled
within a single lifetime to face the loss not only of livelihood and self-respect
but of every moral and social value.”73 They received a mental shock, and that
combined with various imminent practical problems threw them into a state
of tension and a rarely experienced cultural predicament.
They had to find a way out of this predicament, and so after the 1880s and
1890s educated Chinese began to be divided. Some of them became stub-
born nationalists who criticized and resisted Western thought. Some of them
became radical internationalists who completely accepted the whole list of
Western ideas. Still others continued to employ the ancient Chinese methods
of the past two or three hundred years and maintained that the new Western
knowledge was no more than a “tool” (qi) of practical knowledge and technol-
ogy that had nothing to do with the “Way” (Dao) of traditional Chinese thought
and belief. They used Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909)’s slogan of “Chinese learning
as substance, Western learning for practical application” (Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue
wei yong 中學為體, 西學為用) to neutralize their psychological imbalance and
maintain their national self-respect.
Simply rejecting Western ideas would not work, but completely accepting
them also had its difficulties. After Western knowledge, thought and belief as a
whole entered China and became a powerful discourse, people were bound to
discover sooner or later that it represented a completely “alien civilization.” It
was a much more alien and unfamiliar cultural system than Indian Buddhism.

73  Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih
Restoration, 1862–1874, 1957, 1966, 5.
290 Chapter 12

If they truly wanted to understand and master this kind of new knowledge,
simple translations would not accomplish the task. Rather they would have
to search for resources in their own intellectual background to comprehend
and thoroughly interpret this new knowledge. Thus some scholars searched
through their own classical tradition and let their classic texts speak again.
Some of them surprisingly discovered that the Chinese classical tradition also
obtained a new significance. Among the newly explored “classical” tradition
that was most astonishing and that most attracted people’s attention was not
the traditional classical learning, but rather the learning of the ancient schools
of philosophers (zhuzixue 諸子學) and Buddhism, both of which had existed
on the margins of the Chinese intellectual world.74 It was just at this time that
the learning of the ancient schools of philosophers and Buddhism gradually
took center stage and exhibited their contemporary significance.
Let us first examine the process by which the study of the ancient schools
of philosophers went from latency to prominence. The historical background of
the flourishing of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers was the broad-
ening of scholarly interests after the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras (after 1820). When
the practice of evidential research was at its height during these eras, classical
learning, the study of the Confucian classics, became a field of experimentation.
Various traditional scholarly methods, such as etymology, phonetics, philology,
study of textual variations and versions, cataloging, collating, finding lost texts or
versions, and distinguishing authentic texts from forgeries, had actually already
been experimentally applied to classical learning. Almost every Confucian clas-
sic had been given new interpretations, and almost all of these interpretations
had new explications.
When later scholars tried to continue to seek out an area to employ their tal-
ents fully in traditional scholarship, then, they could not help but look beyond
the canonical classics to discover the schools of ancient philosophers where
they could similarly put their skill at textual examination and criticism into
practice. Although men like Qian Daxin, Wang Niansun (1744–1832), Wang
Zhong (1745–1794), Bi Yuan (1730–1797) and Jiao Xun still mainly employed the
methods they used in treating the Confucian classics to deal with the schools
of ancient philosophers, they considered their works to be spacious reposi-
tories from which they could choose extensively. They either used them to

74  In his “Wan-Qing sixiang fazhang shilun—jige jiben lundian de tichu,” Zhang Hao already
noticed this situation and also pointed out that “late Qing thought was not only impacted
by the West, but also by Chinese tradition. For that reason, a very important topic in
the study of late Qing thought is an investigation of the relationship between these two
impacts.” Zhou Moshan, Jindai Zhongguo sixiang renwu—Wan-Qing sixiang, 1985, 22–23.
From Ming to Qing II 291

corroborate general rules of reading the Confucian classics or as contemporary

sources for interpreting those classics. In the final analysis, though, they were
providing an opportunity for the pre-Qin texts of the various schools to move
from the margin to the center. In the area of textual examination, the texts of
the schools of ancient philosophers and the Confucian classics came to have a
complementary relationship. From the eighteenth into the nineteenth centu-
ries, these new fields of study actually allowed the ancient schools of philoso-
phers an opportunity to regain their legitimacy.
If we look a little farther afield, we can still discern that around these schol-
ars there were also some who were working hard in an attempt to give new
interpretations to the history of knowledge and to expand the scope of intel-
lectual sources. For example, works like the very influential General Principles
of Literature and History (Wenshi tongyi) of Zhang Xuecheng (1738–1801) that
gave a new assessment of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers,
and Wang Zhong’s On Learning (Shuxue) may probably be counted as par-
ticipating in this thought tide.75 Together with the ideas of Ruan Yuan, Jiao
Xun, Ling Tingkan and others, they represented a new direction in knowl-
edge and intellectual history in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and
while no one was paying it much attention this new tendency may have been
gradually growing. For example, Wang Shiduo (1802–1889) was quite dissatis-
fied with Confucianism because it disdained to discuss the methods of Guan
Zhong, Shangyang, Shen Buhai, Han Fei, Sunzi, and Wu Qi, and he leveled very
intense criticism at the thinking of Confucius. He believed that the ideal of
Confucianism was truly “empty thinking” (xuxiang 虛想), and even said that
the Confucians’ “constant talk of restoring the past certainly does not make
any sense.” On the contrary, he thought very highly of the study of the ancient
schools of philosophers and went so far as to assert that “we should establish
Jiang Taigong [Lü Shang, or Lü Wang (fl. 11th century BCE)] above the Duke of
the Zhou and Confucius [in the state temple], and use [the methods and strat-
egies of] Han Fei, Shen Buhai and Shang Yang accompanied by [the martial

75  Zhang Xuecheng argued from a historical point of view. He affirmed that the various phi-
losophers all derived from the six classics, and that Xunzi and Mencius were both follow-
ers of Confucius. See Wenshi tongyi, nei pian 1, “Shijiao shang,” 60 and nei pian 2 “Boyue
xia,” 166. Wang Zhong, though, argued from the point of view of thought. He believed that
Mozi and Xunzi, and so on each had his own method, and that the polemics between
Confucianism, Moism and Daoism arose simply because “they did not agree with each
other.” See Shuxue, nei pian 3, “Mozi xu,” “Mozi houxu,” 1A–4B; Shuxue buyi, “Xun Qingzi
tonglun,” 5B–8A. His understanding was close to Zhang Xuecheng’s opinions, and they
both created an opportunity for the later revival of the study of the ancient schools of
philosophers.
292 Chapter 12

arts of generals] Bai Qi, Wang Jian, and Han Xin as well as [the great statecraft]
of Guan Zhong and Zhuge Liang. Then this would almost lead to long-term
peace and stability.”76
The above mentioned intellectual orientation provided a latent opportunity
for the rise of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers. Nevertheless,
we need to point out that during the entire Jiaqing and Daoguang period,
before the middle of the nineteenth century, the study of the ancient schools
of philosophers remained after all within the scope of philology and historical
linguistics. Its appearance only provided sources of knowledge and thought
that later generations could make use of. It was not until the second half of
the century that a re-evaluation of the thinking of the ancient schools of phi-
losophers was made in an attempt to use their ideas to understand the new
Western knowledge. For example, in the face of a completely new intellectual
world and a new world of nature, Yao Ying (1785–1853) harkened back to the
Classic of Mountains and Seas (Shanhai jing) and the Biography of Mu Tianzi
(Mu Tianzi zhuan).77 Again, Zou Boqi (1819–1869), the earliest Chinese to use
photography, in his “All Western Methods Existed in Ancient China” used the
“Canons” and “Explanations” chapters of the Mozi to interpret mathematics,
mechanics and the science of perspective (shixue 視學) in Western learning.78
Chen Li also introduced the Elements of Euclid and various Western instru-
ments such as concave-convex lenses to interpret the Mozi, while later on
Huang Zunxian (1848–1905), in his Treatise on Japan (Ribenguo zhi) even more
extensively employed the “Exalting Unity” and “Universal Love” chapters of the
Mozi to understand the rules of Western politics and society.79 Although these
writings had not gone beyond the old refrain that “Western learning originated
in China,” nevertheless they did spur on the revival of the study of the ancient
schools of philosophers.
The modern interpretation of their significance, however, would have to wait
for some new opportunities and support from some new resources. Thus it was

76  Quoted from Wang Fansen, “Wang Huiweng yu ‘Yibing riji’,” Dongya jindai sixiang yu she-
hui: Li Yongchi jiaoshou liuzhi huadan zhushou lunwe ji, 1999, 294.
77  See Yao Ying, Kangyou jixing, j. 9, 272 in Shiliao sanbian series, Guangwen shuju photo-
copy edition, n.d. (original published in 1850 and 1867).
78  Zou Boqi, “Xueji yide,” j. xia, from Xu Shichang, ed., Qing Ru xue-an, volume 7 of Shijie
shuju edition, 1966, j. 175, 42B–43A. The “Canons” ( jing 經) A and B and the “Explanations”
( jingshuo 經說) A and B are chapters 40–43 in the Mozi. See Ian Johnston, The Mozi: A
Complete Translation, 2010, 374–577.
79  Chen Li, Dongshu dushu ji, 1936, j. 12, 14. Huang Zunxian, Ribenguo zhi, 1898, j. 32, “Xueshu
zhi yi,” 1898, 1–3. The chapters in the Mozi are 11–13 and 14–16 respectively. See Ian Johnson,
The Mozi, 90–165.
From Ming to Qing II 293

not until the end of the century when the late Qing intellectuals again brought
forth the study of the ancient schools of philosophers that they did so in a new
frame of mind while facing a new context. Under pressure from both a politi-
cal and an intellectual crisis, the study of the ancient schools of philosophers
was no longer simply the rediscovery of the ancient Chinese classics by a small
number farsighted men; these ancient works were then an important source
for the reorganization of the entire world of Chinese knowledge, thought and
belief. Their study was no longer simply a matter of topics within the scope of
philology and historical linguistics; it involved rather a new questioning and a
new direction of thinking. In other words, the thing that really provoked the
opportunity for the revival of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers
was a transformation in the Chinese intellectual stratum’s experience and a
recognition of the unfavorable situation they found themselves in.
First off, in the second half of the nineteenth century, scholars began to be
gradually conscious of the fact that they were already living in a “global” con-
text. At this time, they finally came to a profound feeling of the shock that an
inconceivable yet actually existing new world was inflicting on China. They
were being forced to accept new forms of knowledge one after another, and
these things for which no corresponding knowledge could be found in the
Confucian classics kept flooding into the Chinese people’s field of view. On
this account, the various kinds of “strange and incredible things” and “vague
and nonsensical discourse” that were originally contained in the works of the
various schools of philosophers finally came to be rediscovered in the Chinese
historical memory. On the one hand, they were used as methods to imagine
new knowledge, while on the other hand they were employed as a wonder
drug to dull the pain of China’s mental shock.
Secondly, under pressure from the above-mentioned crises, many people
seem to have become aware of the lack of practical efficacy of the Confucian
doctrines that had always occupied the central position in Chinese thought
and of the knowledge of the humanities that had always dominated Chinese
education and the official examinations. They then began to pursue knowl-
edge that was inclined to be of more practical utility such as the military
knowledge of the Military School (bingjia 兵家), one of the various schools
of ancient philosophers.80 People realized very quickly that if they wanted to
defend their presently existing political authority and social order, they would
need more than ethics and morality; they would need even more a knowledge

80  For example, Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885) was very interested in this practical knowledge
and technology. Some scholars even believe that Zuo’s scholarly research emphasizing
geography, agricultural science, current affairs and military studies were very influential.
294 Chapter 12

of military affairs. The School of Agriculture (nongjia 農家) was similar to the
Military School. In the past, the habitual disdain for agricultural affairs of tradi-
tional Confucian scholars had marginalized this kind of knowledge, but in the
conditions of this age where “a myriad nations competed against each other,”
Chinese scholars had no choice but to begin to pay attention of this practical
technology. That is to say, the pressure of a “crisis situation” and “cumulative
weakness” combined with the ideal of “enriching the nation” and “strengthen-
ing the military” brought the Military School and the School of Agriculture
from the margins back again to the center of scholarly concerns.
Finally, regarding some ideas that were never present in the ancient Chinese
mainstream ideology or in Confucian doctrines, they found some specious
resources in the vast unrestrained symbolic metaphors and allegories con-
tained in the writings of the various schools of philosophers. Among those
apparently true but actually false resources they discovered both clues to
understanding and a certain psychological equilibrium; they even found in the
study of the ancient schools of philosophers the sources of the mathematical
system and of the democratic organization that were delivering the greatest
shocks to the Chinese people. As Zhang Zhidong wrote:

From Daoguang on, scholars liked to use books about omens and Buddhist
writings to discuss classical learning. From Guangxu on, scholars were
especially fond of studying the ancient schools of philosophers of the
Zhou and Qin dynasties. Their long-standing errors were, I’m afraid, not
anticipated by the many gentlemen who were so interested in studying
them.81

These were, however, the intellectual fashions of the time. “All under Heaven”
(tianxia) had already been transformed; the map of the world had also already
been turned upside down; the old thought could no longer explain the new
knowledge; the traditional Confucian classics were no longer enough. Those
individuals who had seen the new world earlier than others could very easily
leaf through the pages of China’s original historical memory and come up with
those source materials. Under these conditions, for example, Zou Yan (ca. 305–
ca. 240 BCE)’s theory of the greater nine regions (see page 175 in volume one of
this history), the Mozi’s logic, the Huainanzi’s natural science, and the Guanzi’s
doctrine of “enriching the nation and strengthening the military” seemingly
could all be rediscovered there.

81  Zhang Zhidong, Quanxue pian: zong jing di-wu, 1967, 20.
From Ming to Qing II 295

Of course, the genuine revival of the study of the ancient schools of

philosophers had to wait until the end of the nineteenth century or even the
beginning of the twentieth. This was because the truly great transformation of
the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief did not begin until after the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. In 1895, after the terrible shock of military defeat
and the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the war, the Guangxu Emperor asked
the examination candidates in the Hall of Preserving Harmony the following
questions in the imperial examinations:

When Master Sun [Wu] (c. 545–c. 470 BCE) disciplined his armies, Master
Wu [Qi] (440–381 BCE) regulated military forces, and in the text of Li
Jing (571–649)’s answers to Emperor Tang Taizong (r. 626–649) about
military affairs, methods about training hands and feet are all given in
detail; when Wang Ji (1378–1460) and Qi Jiguang (1528–1588) of the Ming
dynasty discussed their methods of training soldiers, they also included
five to six categories. Can you list them all?… When it comes to exploring
texts with excellent and subtle qualities and expertise in military strat-
egy, there are texts such as “Instructions on Military Strategy” (Binglüe
xun) in the Huainanzi [compiled under Liu An (179–122 BCE)], Du Mu
(807–851)’s “On Warfare,” (Zhanlun), and Su Shi (1036–1101)’s “Strategy
for Training Armies” (Xunbing lüce). If we put their views into practice,
would they really be effective and bring success?82…

Since these questions could never receive an answer from within the canon
of Confucian classics, the emperor hoped to find other resources from the
study of the ancient schools of philosophers. Unexpectedly introducing into
an imperial examination usually based on the Confucian classics ideas from
the various philosophers that were traditionally regarded almost as heresy
had quite a bit of symbolic significance. Perhaps it was an inadvertent shift in
source materials, but it was going to bring about a mutual transformation of
the intellectual center and periphery.83

82  Da Qing Dezong Jing huangdi shilu, j. 366, 7, Xinwenfeng photocopy, ce 5, 3322.
83  Therefore between the nineteenth century and twentieth centuries there was an increas-
ing discourse on the various ancient schools of philosophy and they contained even
more profound understanding. See, for instance, the discussions of Xunzi by Xia Zengyou
(1863–1924), Song Shu and Tan Sitong.
296 Chapter 12

3.3
The rapid transformation of the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and
belief from the end of the nineteenth into the beginning of the twentieth
century was quite astonishing. From the point of view of intellectual history,
the one phenomenon among many that most focuses our attention today
is the sudden revival of Buddhist studies after being in decline for quite a
long time. As the nineteenth century reached its end, interest in Buddhist
studies suddenly revived, especially among a number of scholar-officials who
supported the new studies. For example, Wen Tingshi (1856–1904) and Kang
Youwei were both extremely interested in Buddhist studies. The man hailed
as the “first teacher of the modern Buddhist revival.” Yang Wenhui (1837–1911),
collected many lost books, especially lost texts of the Consciousness Only
School of Buddhism from Japan and directly stimulated the twentieth cen-
tury revival of that school. He established the Jinling Sûtra Publishing House
( Jinling kejing chu) and greatly spurred on the twentieth-century study of
Buddhism. His exposition and propagation of Buddhist studies encouraged
the interest in Buddhism of a large number of late Qing literati. A group
of representative individuals of nineteenth century and twentieth century
Chinese Buddhist studies appeared, such as Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao, Song
Shu (1862–1910), Zhang Taiyan (Zhang Binglin, 1868–1936) and the later
Ouyang Jian (1871–1943) and Taixu (Lü Peilin, 1890–1947), all appeared after
Yang Wenhui.84
It is particularly worth noting that the late Qing men who were fond of
Buddhist studies were almost all scholar-officials who were seeking new knowl-
edge. They seem to have received a revelation from the background of Japan’s
rapid rise: that Buddhism was not so conservative, that a belief in Buddhism
could also lead to modernization, and that Buddhism originally had many
connections with Western learning. They even believed that Buddhist studies

84  There has already been some systematic research on the resurgence of Buddhism at this
time, such as Tairyô Makita’s Chûgoku Bukkyô shi kenkyû (1957), Guo Peng’s Zhongguo
jindai foxue sixiangshi gao (1989), and so on. They offer very good explanations of the
relationship between the resurgence of lay Buddhism and Gongyang studies, the relation-
ship between the decline of monastic Buddhism and using monastic assets to establish
schools in the late Qing, and so on. Here I am, however, trying to start with the internal
logic of the late Qing Buddhist revival and discuss how the contemporary Chinese intel-
lectual class turned back to seek support for traditional values and resources to respond
to the tide of Western thought. I discuss how Buddhism moved from the “margin” to
the “center” as a way of understanding the intellectual background of Western learning,
and how, due to the penetration of Western learning and the collapse of the tradition, it
moved again from the “center” to the “margin.”
From Ming to Qing II 297

were also a good intermediary for understanding Western thought. For exam-
ple, Western logic could be compared with the logical reasoning of Hetuvidyâ,
the Indian “science of cause” (yinxue 因學), and Western psychology could
be understood with the help of the Consciousness Only School of Buddhism.
Western concepts of the cosmos had been arrived at by means of astronomical
apparatuses and the mathematics of physics, but Chinese could more or less
understand them with the aid of Buddhist imagination. Western knowledge
of the microcosm relied on biology and observations made with microscopes,
and the imagination and allegories in the Buddhist sûtras could also help the
Chinese to understand these phenomena. Although these were all “analogies,”
at that time such analogies were an aid to understanding in the same way
that people in the Wei-Jin era (265–420) used the Mysterious Learning (Neo-
Daoism, xuanxue 玄學) and the method of geyi 格義, “matching the meaning,”
to interpret Buddhist terms (see page 38 of Volume One of this history).
At the turn of the twentieth century, as the Chinese searched for various
kinds of source materials to “match” (ge) the “meaning” (yi) of Western learn-
ing, besides the previously discussed ancient schools of philosophers, they also
employed Buddhist teachings. Of course, China originally had its own system
of terms and methods of reasoning to interpret natural phenomena, but at
that time these traditional terms and methods had become less and less effica-
cious. This was the background in which Buddhism aroused so much interest.
Comparatively early on, men like Wei Yuan and Yao Ying used Buddhist learn-
ing to explain Western astronomical and geographic knowledge.85 A little later,
Kang Youwei read some Buddhist sûtras and made a connection with views of

85  For example, in his Haiguo tuzhi, Wei Yuan used the Indian Buddhist idea of four great
continents (si da bu zhou 四大部洲), dvîpa, and asserted that the southern continent of
Jambûdvîpa (nanzhan buzhou 南瞻部洲) was what the Westerners called Asia, Europe,
and America. What Buddhism called Aparagodaniya (xiniuhe zhou 西牛賀洲) is actu-
ally North and South America. The Westerners only knew two of the four Buddhist con-
tinents. In fact, Buddhism also had the Pûrva-videha (dongsheng shenzhou 東勝神洲)
that was simply the continent of Australia. Because it was separated (from Europe) by
the Antarctic Ocean, the Westerners did not know about it. These ideas that both incor-
porated new knowledge and provided Chinese scholars a great deal of room for self-
confidence were very influential at the time. Yao Ying for one was very interested in them.
He further quoted the Chaoshi jing (Sûtra of transcending the world) and the Loutan jing
(another name for the Chaoshi jing) to explain “the Westerners’ theory that the earth is
round,” and even suspected that the Loutan jing was “written by the sûtra translators on
the basis of the ancient Chinese mathematical classic Zhou bi suanjing.” Kangyou jixing,
j. 12, 384–385.
298 Chapter 12

things under a microscope and with the speed of photo electricity.86 Song Shu
read the Avatamsaka-sûtra (or the Mahâvaipulya Buddhâvatamsaka-sûtra, the
Flower Garland Sûtra, Huayan jing) and the Scripture of the Jewel Accumulation
(Ratnasamuccaya, Baoji jing) and then also used these Buddhist sûtras to con-
firm new European ideas. He wrote a two-juan book entitled Confirmation of
Indian and European Learning (Yin-Ou xue zheng) putting forth his belief that
the arrival of European learning in the Far East simply confirmed Buddhist
doctrines.87 Wen Tingshi read the “lightning as metaphor for the mind”
story in “On Heterodox Sects of the Three Dharma” in the Collected Works of
Abhidharma and was then very happy to believe that Western learning con-
firmed Buddhist teachings.88 Tan Sitong stated even more clearly that “all of the
various principles that scientists seek using apparatuses and mathematics—
the planets are all round like the earth, so many days for each planet equals a
year for that planet, the smallest particle of dust and one drop of water both
contain thousands of microorganisms, and so on—were already mentioned in
Buddhist writings.89 This common intellectual practice continually increased
and had a very wide influence. A little later, very many scholar-officials looked
at Buddhism in this new way. They believed that Buddhism was something of a
cornucopia that contained virtually everything. As Sun Baoxuan put it:

The so-called technological arts, whether astronomical calculations,

natural science, chemistry, physics (author’s note: like the four elements
earth, fire, water and wind, including infinite subjects in this Western
learning), optics, acoustics, medicine, agricultural science, engineering,
mining and various kinds of technical skills … they are all completely
included without omission.90

Besides using Buddhist learning to “explain” the “principles” of Western sci-

ence, late Qing scholars also relied on the doctrines of Buddhism to “match”
the “meanings” of Western philosophy. Today it would seem that we do not

86  Kang Nanhai zibian nianpu, 1992, 12.

87  Song Shu ji, shang ce, 1993, 85, 1993. Also see Song Shu’s “Da Zong Guancha,” in Song Shu
ji, xia ce, 788–789.
88  Wen Tingshi ji, xia ce, 1979, 952.; Ahbidamo ji, “Yimen zulun,” sanfapin, CBETA, vol. 26, no.
1536. Soothill, Dictionary defines the three dharma as jiaofa 教法 the Buddha’s teaching;
xingfa 行法 the practice of it; and zhengfa 證法 realization or experiential proof of it in
bodhi and nirvāna.
89  Tan Sitong quanji, 1954, 324.
90  Sun Baoxuan, “Wangshanlu riji 184,” in Wang Fansen, et al., Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi de
zhuanxing shidai, 2007, 225.
From Ming to Qing II 299

very well understand the philosophical sophistication of the scholars of that

era; we also have an insufficient comprehension of their passion for absorbing
knowledge from abroad. At the end of the nineteenth century, those men of
learning were actually very concerned about the outside world and they knew
quite a lot about foreign philosophy, literature, and history. Some of them had
already learned a great deal about the Western humanities. Tan Sitong, for
example, had already employed Buddhist thought to understand the cosmo-
logical theories of Western philosophy, to understand Western medical psy-
chology, to survey and assess Western science and technology, and so on. He
had blended nearly all Western ideas into Buddhist doctrines.91 At the turn of
the century, Wen Tingshi began in his note books to use the Buddha to reflect
on Kant, to use Nâgârajuna (ca. 150–250) to draw parallels with Leibniz, to
use Aśvaghosa (ca. 80–ca. 150) to consider Spinoza, and even more to rely on
Buddhist sûtras as aids to reading the Dialogues of Plato.92 Entering the twen-
tieth century, Zhang Taiyan, Liang Qichao, and Liang Shuming all tried “to use
Buddhist studies to interpret and understand Western learning” into the 1910s.93
This practice of using Buddhist teachings to understand the new knowledge
gradually brought the previously marginalized Buddhist studies into the center
of Chinese intellectual history. On this account, at the turn of the nineteenth
century into the twentieth century as the tide of Western thought washed
over China, a thread of hope for the revival of Chinese Buddhism suddenly
appeared. As Zhang Xiang (1877–1945) wrote in his preface to Xie Wuliang
(1884–1964)’s Outline of Buddhist Studies (Foxue dagang):

In the late Qing, the situation reached an extreme and then changed…. In
the last decade [of the dynasty], people who were skilled in reading and
reciting Mahâyâna Buddhist sûtras in Sanskrit arose in great numbers.
Refined and elegant, they were untiring in their exertions, and thus the
scholarly atmosphere was probably about to change again.94

Besides the internal reasons that serve to explain the Chinese educated class’s
return to their tradition to search for the intellectual resources for this tem-
porary revival of Buddhism in the late Qing, we should also mention one
important external background—the stimulus coming from Japan. In fact,
many issues in modern Chinese intellectual history are inseparable from

91  “Yitai shuo,” Tan Sitong quanji, 1954, 119.

92  Wen Tingshi ji, xia ce, 1993, 953–956.
93  Wang Fansen, et.al., Zhongguo sixiangshi de zhuanxing shidai, 2007, 227.
94  Foxue dagang, 1916, 1936 (eleventh printing).
300 Chapter 12

this island nation in the East China Sea; it always formed the background of
recent Chinese intellectual history. The Guangxu reign period (1875–1908) in
the late Qing generally corresponded to the Meiji era (1868–1912) in Japan. The
Meiji Restoration caused a crisis in the traditional Chinese idea of China as a
Celestial Empire and Great Nation (tianchao daguo 天朝大國). The reality of
Japan becoming increasingly rich and powerful forced educated Chinese to
face the changing power situation in East Asia.
At that time, the Chinese people’s feelings about Japan were very compli-
cated. On the one hand, many Chinese continued to regard Japan as a “tiny
little country”; they were dissatisfied with Japan’s abandoning the old (Asian)
ways to learn from Europe. But on the other hand, the rapid rise of Japan made
many Chinese extremely envious; they now felt that the traditional teacher
(China) could not avoid following the example of the modern student (Japan).
Even though they verbally refused to accept Japan’s position, in their minds
they attached extreme importance to various kinds of news coming out of
Japan. Much of this news about Japan’s politics, economy, and culture gave
rise to a series of related reactions in China. Sometimes the Chinese even took
gossip and rumors out of Japan very seriously and tried to emulate what they
heard. Among these things was information from Japan about Buddhism.
At that time, Japanese Buddhism was actually in a rather delicate, posi-
tion. Just as many Japanese scholars have pointed out, ever since the Edo or
Tokugawa period (1603–1868) when Buddhism became the national religion,
it grew steadily more corrupt and degenerated into a largely ceremonial and
utilitarian practice. Because of this, it was continually subject to vehement
criticism by the followers of the Shinto (Shendao 神道) and Confucian reli-
gions (Rujiao 儒教). In the early Meiji, after the proclamation of the decrees
that “church and state are to be unified” and “Gods and Buddhas are to be
clearly separated,” Japanese Buddhism faced an even greater crisis. Under
internal and external pressure, a force for self-reform grew up within Japanese
Buddhism itself. On the one hand, they reached an understanding with the
Meiji government,95 while on the other hand, they opened up new territories
abroad for the expansion of Buddhism. All of these efforts were, of course, a
struggle for Japanese Buddhism to obtain space to survive.
From the nineteenth into the twentieth century, Japanese Buddhism, espe-
cially the orthodox Pure Land School, deeply penetrated Chinese society and
had great influence in China. Many Chinese gentry, scholars, lay Buddhists,
and monks had close secret contacts with monks of the Higashi Hongan-ji

95  Ienaga Saburô, Nihon no kindaika to Bukkyô, in Kôza kindai Bukkyô, j. 2, Rekishi hen, 1961–
63, 16–17.
From Ming to Qing II 301

(東本願寺) School. Various studies of Japanese Buddhism also gradually

came to the Chinese intellectual class, and so-called “alternative academies”
(bieyuan 别院) or “schools” (xuetang 學堂) of Japanese Buddhism appeared in
Shanghai, Suzhou and Hangzhou. Looked at through the mirror reflection of a
Japan that was growing stronger day by day, ever more educated Chinese mis-
read and misunderstood the facts about Japanese Buddhism. From the point of
view of some Chinese intellectuals who envied Japan’s wealth and power, were
anxious about China’s cumulative weakness, and were also fond of Buddhist
doctrines, modern Japan’s respect for and tolerance of Buddhism, Japanese
Buddhism’s adjustment of its modern intellectual position, and Buddhism’s
assimilation to the philosophy of science were all misread as motive forces
for the modernization of Japan, and also as a prescription for the revival of
Chinese Buddhism and the transformation of Chinese society. They believed
that if China could also revive Buddhism, then certainly it too could grow
powerful just as rapidly as Japan had done. Thus from the nineteenth into the
twentieth century when Chinese intellectuals went to Japan, they all wanted
to ask about Japanese Buddhism, and the enlightenment they received from
information out of Japan stimulated the late Qing revival of Buddhism.
At that time, Japanese Buddhism taught the Chinese men of culture a great
many things. Most important for the Chinese intellectual world was, however,
the significance of Buddhism for the reformative transformation of society.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese intellectual world
was pervaded by a feeling of crisis. Strong ships and powerful cannons came
along bringing opium, but they also carried Western thought, and this left the
Chinese intellectual world somewhat at a loss as to what to do about them. On
this account, except for a few pragmatic figures who held political offices and
some clear-headed members of the Westernizing (or Self-strengthening move-
ment) faction (yangwupai 洋務派) who cared more about concrete and practi-
cal innovations involving machines, cannons, laws, and political systems, quite
a few men of learning began to regard vigorous self-exertion at the level of
thought and culture as more crucial. It was precisely for this reason that they
were extremely interested in an important form of contemporary thinking in
Japanese Buddhism. That was its emphasis on “generating confidence” ( faqi
xinxin 發起信心), “protecting the nation, and loving the truth” (huguo aili 護國
愛理), and their reconfiguration of the social function of Buddhism.
We know that many of Japanese Buddhism’s activities during the Meiji
period—opening up border areas, proselytizing among the lower classes,
establishing charitable enterprises, accompanying the army on overseas cam-
paigns—rapidly transformed it from a posture of withdrawal from worldly
affairs to one of entering the secular world, and occupying a place in the
302 Chapter 12

Japanese process of constructing an ethnic state (minzu guojia). New inter-

pretations of Buddhism by Inoue Enryô (1858–1919) and others further
strengthened the idea of Buddhism’s significance in the world. He believed
that two things should be pointed out about Buddhism: an elucidation of the
identity of Buddhism with science and philosophy, and Buddhism’s signifi-
cance for “protecting the nation and loving the truth.”96 With this, Buddhism
fundamentally changed its vague and ambiguous mode of thinking and its
attitude of disregard for worldly affairs. At the turn of the twentieth century
the works of Inoue Enryô, Masaharu Anesaki (1873–1949), Senshô Murakami
(1851–1929), Ôuchi Seiran (1845–1918) and others concerning Buddhism
and science, psychology, philosophy, and history were very popular among
Chinese intellectuals.
This train of thought about Japanese Buddhism obviously inspired a great
number of Chinese intellectuals.97 For example, works like Liang Qichao’s
On the Relationship between Buddhism and Collective Rule (Fojiao yu qunzhi
zhi guanxi), Zhang Taiyan’s Talk at the Reception for Tokyo Overseas Students
(Dongjing liuxuesheng huanyinghui shuoci), and Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940)’s
book modeled on Inoue Enryō’s On Buddhism Protecting the Nation (Bukkyô
morikuni ron) all tried to employ Buddhism as a resource for national cohe-
sion and spiritual mobilization.
In the end, though, regarding Buddhism as an element of social transforma-
tion was only an imaginative idea of a minority of educated Chinese. In the first
place, considering China’s social conditions at that time, in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, with the relentless challenge of Western ideas,
the most urgent priorities facing the Chinese were obviously in the practical
realm of political systems, laws, science, and technology, and not in the spiri-
tual realm of religion and belief. Neither the politicians who exercised control
over social goods nor the common people who were crying out for material
sustenance had any interest in spiritual issues. In the general atmosphere of

96  Inoue Enryō, Kyôiku shûkyô kankei ron, 1893 (Meiji 26), 6. A great many of Inoue Enryô’s
works were translated in China and had a very great influence. According to Xiong Yuezhi,
prior to 1906 over a dozen of his works had been translated, Xixue dongjian yu wan Qing
shehui, 1994, 657.
97  For example, see Kang Youwei. As Xiao Gongquan (Hsiao Kung- chuan) wrote, between
1886 and 1896, Kang Youwei was influenced by Inoue Enryô’s Narrative of an Imaginary
Journey in the Starry Regions (Senkai sôyû ki 星界想遊記), and so he became interested
in astronomy. This book is listed in the bibliography of Japanese books in j. 14 of Kang
Youwei, Riben shumu zhi. See Hsiao, Kung-chuan, A Modern China and a New World: K’ang
Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858–1927, 1975, 170–171.
From Ming to Qing II 303

pragmatic thinking, impractical ideas could only become the topics of fantasy,
but could not be turned into operational processes in society.
Secondly, from the point of view of the social classes involved in the revival
of Buddhist studies, the intellectual class that started the revival had neither
the support of the political powers, responses from Buddhism itself, or any
foundation among the lower classes. The confidence of the educated class and
their disdain for the Buddhist faithful ensured that this revival of Buddhist
studies was from its inception only the intellectual activity of a minority. The
subject of Buddhism was from beginning to end a topic only discussed by an
intellectual elite minority.
Thirdly, looking at the concrete contents of the revival of Buddhist studies,
they did not present any practical steps that could be carried out in society.
Following the traditional Chinese literati interest in Buddhism, many people
continued to regard Buddhist beliefs as a form of spiritual practice or a tran-
scendent state. Even for Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao, Zhang Taiyan, Song Shu and
others who repeatedly called for the revitalization of Buddhism, it was primar-
ily a matter of eliminating the difference between life and death in one’s con-
sciousness, transcending advantage (profit) and disadvantage (harm) in one’s
thinking, maintaining an attitude of mercy toward humanity, and thereby
having an unselfish and fearless spiritual strength. Since they did not practice
Buddhist relief aid, education, ceremonies or other activities, the Chinese reli-
gious revival that was supposed to be able to generate confidence and stimu-
late the spirit was only a matter of theoretical discussions.
That being the case, what was revived in the short-lived late Qing revival
of Buddhist studies was not Buddhism in the religious sense, but rather the
cultural significance of Buddhist studies. Its chief significance for people of
the Chinese intellectual world did not match their subjective aspirations to
make Buddhism into an ideology; rather it was the above-mentioned revela-
tions concerning the use of Buddhist ideas as resources for understanding
Western learning. It was precisely for this reason that the late Qing intellec-
tual world’s interest in Buddhist studies was concentrated on the study of the
Conscious Only School. This was partly because the Conscious Only texts were
lost and then found again; the freshness of the Conscious Only and Faxiang
(Dharmalaksana) texts brought back from Japan piqued their interest. It was
also partly because the reasoning behind the Conscious Only and Faxiang
School’s meticulous analysis of consciousness and their logical methods (yin-
ming, hetuvidyâ) for understanding the world were thought, in the minds of
the Chinese intellectuals, to constitute intellectual resources for responding
to Western science, philosophy, and logic. In recent Chinese history, Buddhist
thought and the sûtras unexpectedly served this temporary role; educated
304 Chapter 12

Chinese originally wanted to use them to hold back the surging tide of Western
knowledge; they never imagined that Buddhism would actually become a
channel for the Western thought tide to flow into China. The Buddhist faith-
ful wanted to take advantage of the opportunity for their religion to rise, but
events unexpectedly went the other way, and Western thought actually seized
the opportunity to enter China. This could rather be said to be “totally beyond
one’s expectations.”
Epilogue: China in 1895: The Symbolic Significance
of Intellectual History

By April 6, 1895, rumors were already rife about whether or not Taiwan would
be ceded to Japan, and this made some scholars extremely agitated. On the
17th when the Treaty of Shimonoseki was finally signed, the feelings of all edu-
cated Chinese suddenly changed; they felt as though Heaven had collapsed
and the Earth had caved in. At that time, not just a few people but everyone
concerned about the fate of China seemed to be overcome by feelings of anger
and humiliation. Such feelings of anger and humiliation were something
that the Chinese had probably never before felt in several thousand years.
Before that time, there were very few among the upper class educated people
of China who had given any particular thought to Japan. Their impressions
and imagination of that island nation of Emishi (or Ebisu), left them with
feelings of arrogance, haughtiness and disdain. (Emishi or Ebisu was an eth-
nic group of ancient Japan, related to the Jômon people and perhaps to the
Ainu also; the Chinese name xiayi 蝦夷 literally means “shrimp barbarians.”)
In the minds of the recent generation of Chinese, it was impossible to men-
tion the “Eastern Ocean” (Dongyang, old name for Japan) in the same breath,
or on the same level, with the “Western Ocean” (Xiyang, the old name for
the West).
If we say that the Chinese government’s attitude toward the West had
changed from arrogance to deference, the Chinese people’s feelings of arro-
gance based on a sense of superiority toward Japan had not changed. Calling
Japan “Eastern Ocean” and juxtaposing it on the conceptual level in compari-
son to the “Western Ocean” was probably something that happened much
later. At that time, however, Japan was developing feelings of superiority and
arrogance toward China, while at the same time maintaining a crisis awareness
in a difficult situation being surrounded by Great Powers. Fukuzawa Yukichi
(1835–1901)’s essay “Escape from Asia” (Datsu-A ron) would seem to have sym-
bolized a very important shift in the trend of events; it symbolized that Japan’s
position was moving from uniting with Asia to resist the Western Great Powers
to proclaiming itself a hegemon in the East and competing for victory with
the West. As a result, in Japan’s preparedness and China’s unpreparedness the
position of strength and weakness between China and Japan was reversed. In

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_008

306 Epilogue

the end “their positions on preserving power versus seizing power changed
completely.”1
At that time, the Great Qing Empire that had always considered itself as a
Celestial Empire and Great Nation as well as an exporter of culture was really
defeated in war by the “Emishi” or “shrimp barbarians” and forced to cede terri-
tory and pay reparations to Japan. That their large country was forced to sign a
humiliating treaty under the cannon barrels of a small country was very painful
to all Chinese. This goes without saying for those who had been continuously
calling passionately for reforms, but it even applied to those officials and schol-
ars who are now regarded as “conservatives.” Under those circumstances, the
change in their feelings is hard for us to imagine today. “Feelings” is only a term
used to describe emotional states, but if “feelings” turn into a mood or state of
mind that universally pervades a whole society, they can become a catalyst for
rational reflection. Intellectual history has to pay attention to this transforma-
tion of feelings into a general mood. It was precisely in such a general mood of
anger and pain that even the most conservative of people also hoped for the
nation to become strong; only their thinking about self-strengthening was dif-
ferent from that of the radicals.
Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Lin Shu (1829–
1898), the Qing imperial clansman and the leading Academician in the
Hanlin Academy, presented Feng Xu (1842–1927)’s essay “Four Beginnings of
Self-Strengthening” (Ziqiang siduan) to the emperor. Feng asserted that the
emperor should carry out realistic policies, search for talented people, manage
state budget expenses, and support the people’s livelihood. Although he criti-
cized the radical reformers, his ideas were really not anti-reform, but he said
“to resist foreign aggression we must first make ourselves secure; and to man-
age change we must first stand firm with our basic principles.” He hoped first to
make the country internally strong and orderly.2 On June 6, 1895, the Inspector-
General of Guangdong, Ma Piyao (?–1895), also memorialized the emperor and
put forth ten recommendations. Although he still listed China’s own thought
and ideology as the first self-strengthening priority, his ideas were already quite
enlightened; such as opening up channels of communication, setting up news-
papers, and criticizing Qing envoys for not understanding Western learning.3
With these general feelings, “self-strengthening” became a consensus among

1  The quotation is from Jia Yi’s famous essay “Guo Qin lun,” translated in de Bary, Sources, 1999,
230 as “… because preserving power differs fundamentally from seizing power.” China was
trying to preserve power, but Japan was seizing power.
2  Guangxuchao zhupi zouzhe, di 120 ji, 1996, 605–622.
3  Ibid., 627–638.
Epilogue 307

the Chinese people. Even though people had been repeatedly calling for “self-
strengthening” for a long time, it was not until 1895 that it became a universal
idea and a central term for the court and the general society at every level,
regardless of whether it was radical or conservative “self-strengthening.”4
Interesting enough, the Western Great Powers that were intruding on
China also continually offered advice to the Chinese, hoping that China would
quickly strengthen itself according to the Western model. In January 20, 1895,
before the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the missionary Gilbert Reid
(1857–1927) called upon the imperial tutor Weng Tonghe (1830–1904), and on
February 5, the Baptist missionary Timothy Richard (1845–1919) visited Zhang
Zhidong; on February 28, Richard also visited Zhang Yinhuan (1837–1900) to
discuss again China’s general situation and strategies for reform. After the sign-
ing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, on April 30, 1895 a Western lawyer promoted
self-strengthening to the Chinese intellectual class. At the end of October,
a British diplomatic envoy, Sir Nicholas Robert O’ Conor, candidly pointed
out to Prince Gong himself (Grand Prince Yixin, 1833–1898): “Today China is
already in extreme peril, and while the various nations of the world are plot-
ting together, China is still sound asleep without waking. Why is this the case?”
What was his reason for promoting China’s reform and self-strengthening?
According to him, it was because British businessmen who had come to China
hoped that China would become rich, strong, and free from danger, and those
who had not yet come to China also had the same hopes.5 On October 26,
Timothy Richard again talked to Weng Tonghe telling him that the five Great
Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States) were
planning to take Chinese matters into their own hands, and so “Chinese poli-
cies to nourish the people must be urgently discussed.” The most important of
these policies, according to Richard, were educating the people, nourishing the
people, pacifying the people and making the people new. What was meant by

4  Just as Jonathan D. Spence wrote in his The Search for Modern China (1990, p. 216), among
scholar-officials “self-strengthening” had already begun in the mid-nineteenth century just
after the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion:
 “The Confucian statesmen whose skill, integrity, and tenacity helped suppress the rebel-
lions of the mid-nineteenth century showed how imaginatively the Chinese could respond
to the new challenges. Under the general banner of restoring order to the Qing Empire,
they had managed to develop new structures to handle foreign relations and collect custom
dues, to build modern ships and weapons, and to start teaching international law and the
rudiments of modern science. “Self-strengthening” had not proved an empty slogan, but an
apparently viable road to a more secure future.”
5  Weng Tonghe riji, ce 5, 2843 (October 31, 1985).
308 Epilogue

“make the people new?” Weng Tonghe recorded that Richard said, “making the
people new is to reform.”
It would seem that both Chinese and foreigners all supported reform for
China. What was different, though, was that when the Chinese discussed
reform, uppermost in their minds was national self-strengthening in order to
resist foreign countries. When Western people advocated the Western way as
a form of universalism, they were hoping that after China entered the arena of
global politics and economics it would play the game by Western rules. Thus
they hoped that the first priority of Chinese reforms would be the develop-
ment of railroads, and military training would be secondary. “China should
employ Western employees along with the Chinese, and also establish Western
academic disciplines.”6

Just as mentioned above, between 1894 and 1895 (the Sino-Japanese War)
very many scholars who were concerned about China’s future were beset by
the complicated emotional turmoil of dejection and indignation. Compared
to the humiliation of the Opium Wars, we can see that this change of feelings
was more obvious and extreme. At that time, He Qi (1859–1914) and Hu Liyuan
(1874–1916) wrote in their Foundations of New Policies (Xinzheng shiji), that the
1894 Sino-Japanese War forfeited China’s sovereignty and humiliated the coun-
try, made the twenty-three provinces look like so much meat being cut up on
the table, and caused China’s four hundred million people to be like prisoners

6  Ibid., 2844 (October 26, 1895). Just as Guo Tingyi pointed out, after 1895 “the reform move-
ment reached its high tide.” First came Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Tan Sitong and other
intellectuals and their Self-strengthening Society (Qiangxue hui) and their publication
Current Affairs (Shiwu bao 時務報) that symbolized the intellectual bloc’s search for change.
Next came the Chinese and foreigners in the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General
Knowledge (Guangxue hui 廣學會) like Timothy Richard, Young John Allen (1836–1907) and
others who also used the Review of the Times (Wanguo gongbao 萬國公報) and translations
of Western books to influence society while urging court officials to move toward reform.
Finally, there were government officials like Chen Baozhen (1831–1900), Huang Zunxian,
Zhang Zhidong and others who also participated in various activities to reform and renew
the political system; even important central government officials like Weng Tonghe also sup-
ported such political activities. All of this meant that “the court and the society at all levels
was moving forward on the same new road.” See “Jindai xiyang wenhua zhi shuru ji qi renshi,”
in Guo Tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo de bianju, 1987, 43–44.
Epilogue 309

bound up underneath the stairs.7 Even the feelings of Emperor Guangxu were
complex and burdensome. After the humiliating peace settlement and fac-
ing a society full of emotional turbulence with popular grievances boiling
over, the helpless emperor sent an imperial edict to the Grand Academicians,
the six Ministries (Personnel, Rites, Revenues, Military Affairs, Justice, and
Construction), and the nine major high ministers in the six Ministries and the
Censorate, the Court of Judicial Review, and the Office of Transmission, as well
as to the Hanlin Academy, the Household Administration of the Heir Apparent,
and the Supervising Secretaries and Investigation Censors. In it, he complained
that the severe reprimands of the people stemmed from their loyal indignation,
but, he said, they do not understand “the sadness of this last resort of mine to
remedy the situation.” He frankly stated that he has already been in this dif-
ficult situation, and “day and night I pace up and down, and weep bitter tears
before holding court, … my extremely difficult feelings are something that those
who submit memorials do not fully understand, and my officials and subjects
throughout the nation should all understand and forgive me.”
In the history of Chinese imperial edicts, this was probably a most unusual
one. The Son of Heaven, in the Imperial Palace in the Forbidden City with all
of his subjects looking hopefully up to him, being able to reveal so frankly his
grievances and feelings of being wronged was also a very rare event. That their
emperor actually had such feelings of humiliation probably left his Chinese
subjects quite astonished or even shocked. The imperial edict’s expression of
complete helplessness and inability to do anything about the situation unex-
pectedly stimulated a radical mood among the populace. In this passionate
state of mind, common at all levels of society, many people arrived at a kind
of consensus. It was just what Emperor Guangxu had written in his edict: “We
should all resolutely unite together to completely eradicate those age-old mal-
practices (problems).”
What, though, really were those “age-old malpractices or problems” that had
to be swept away? This question led to the question of how to carry out “self-
strengthening.” What the emperor saw was a weak military and a declining
economy, but he was now only ready to take action at the last minute. Policies
like training the military and collecting money represented nothing more than
the old “enrich the nation and strengthen the military” ( fuguo qiangbing)
train of thought. Chinese scholars and bureaucrats had long ago exhibited
such foresight. From 1861 on, since Feng Guifen published his Protests from
Jiaobin Cottage, many people had repeatedly advocated such tactics. In 1880

7  He Qi, Hu Liyuan, Xinzheng zhenquan—He Qi, Hu Liyuan ji, 1994, 182. Da Qing Dezong Jing
huangdi shilu, j. 366, 3320.
310 Epilogue

(the sixth year of Guangxu’s reign) the year after Japan occupied the Ryûkyû
Islands, Zheng Guanying (1842–1922) continued the Important Things to Save
the Situation (Jiushi jieyao) that he composed in the 1870s and published
his Essays on Change (Yiyan), an earlier version of Words of Warning for a
Flourishing Era (Shengshi weiyan); in the same year, Xue Fucheng completed
his Proposals for Reform and National Defense (Chouyang chuyi). By that time,
many people had made such recommendations as clear as they possibly could
be made. The problem was that although at the time people had a profound
understanding of the crisis they faced, they still had high hopes for China’s des-
tiny. On the one hand, they greatly admired the Western ways of becoming rich
and powerful, but on the other hand they still had faith in China’s moral prin-
ciples and literary tradition. So they hoped to remedy the situation by means of
a form of thinking that was later on called “Chinese knowledge for substance
and Western knowledge for function” (zhongxue wei ti xixue wei yong).8
In February 1887 Zeng Jize wrote “On China Sleeping First and Awakening
Later” (Zhongguo xian shui hou xing lun). Although he used the word “sleep-
ing” in this article, he listed the things that China was doing—purchasing bat-
tleships, building artillery batteries, defending its vassal states, resisting foreign
enemies, and so on—indicating that he believed China had already awakened.
This essay was emblematic of the feelings of intellectuals like Zeng Jize. They
believed that with the stimulation from the West, China would very quickly
wake up and become a strong and major nation in the world once more.9
In less than a decade, by 1895 when the nation was still not rich and the
military was still not strong, and Japan had really risen, these feelings of calm
and self-confidence had collapsed. People realized that China had actually not
woken up. When China genuinely awakened was in the year 1895, a year that
caused the Chinese people the most profound feelings of anguish. Just as Liang
Qichao wrote in his Record of the Wuxi (1898) Coup (Wuxi zhengbian ji): “Our
country began to awaken from its big dreams of four thousand years due to the
Sino-Japanese War ( jiawu yiyi 甲午一役 1894–95).”10 This kind of waking up
seemed more like being startled into wakefulness. Emperor Guangxu’s awak-
ening to the truth of the situation symbolized the response of all the Chinese;

8  For more on Zheng Guanying, see Gloria Davies, “Fragile Prosperity,” China Heritage
Quarterly, no. 26 (2011), on line at http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?
searchterm=026_davies.inc&issue=026. Also see Guo Wu, Zheng Guanying: Merchant
Reformer of late Qing China, 2010.
9  Zeng Jize “Zhongguo xian shui hou xing lun,” Shenbao, 1 (June 14, 1887) and Tseng Chi-tse,
“China. The Sleep and the Awakening,” Asiatic Quarterly Review 3, no.1 (1887): 1–12.
10  Quoted from Ding Wenjiang and Zhao Fengtian, Liang Qichao nianpu changbian, 1983, 38.
Epilogue 311

it was a form of nervous anxiety accompanying the distress of being at a loss as

to what to do. This response of nervous anxiety led later on to the appearance
of a whole series of radical reform ideas and even of revolutionary thinking.

Thorough reform suddenly became the “consensus” just as radical emotions

suddenly became a universal “mood.” As mentioned above, under the stim-
ulation of events of 1895, officials who before were obstinately conservative,
Westerners who had been pressuring China, common people who did not
very well understand China’s increasing weakness but who had an intimate
personal experience of it, as well as those intellectuals who had always con-
sciously felt they had a mission toward the country … all of these groups seem
to have become “reformers.” Furthermore, the trend of this reform was unex-
pectedly almost unanimously moving toward the West. At that time, many dar-
ing ways of thinking began to appear, and doubts about Chinese tradition and
criticisms of Chinese history also began to be increasingly intense.
Two concepts in the background of this transformation of thought had
become the unquestionable foundations of people’s reflections. One was the
widespread concept of universalism. Supported by the realistic situation that
the weak are prey to the strong, and stimulated by the traditional idea that “the
victor becomes a king and the loser becomes a bandit,” people believed that
the world had to develop in a direction similar to that of the various Western
nations, and China was no exception. The other was the concept of distinctive
nationalism. People believed that only with nationalism and a powerful state
would a nation be able to exist together with the various other nations within
the modern world order; and again China was no exception.
As we know, Chinese scholars originally continued to have hope for their
tradition, at least as long as they could maintain their national pride. They
also hoped to employ the old ways of the former kings to develop new poli-
cies for later generations. The idea that “Western learning originated in China”
as well as the slogan “Chinese knowledge for substance and Western knowl-
edge for function” had always supported this hope for Chinese tradition. As
the very radical Song Yuren (1857–1931) wrote in his preface to Chen Chi’s Book
on Common Activities (Yongshu), many people at the time all saw that China
needed to change the laws and decrees, control the civil service system, estab-
lish schools, and set up a legislative assembly. These were all practical strate-
gies because they saw the crisis right in front of them. But he also said that
there are usually two types of political resources, either those that come from
312 Epilogue

the old ways of the former kings or those that derive from foreign countries.
That is to say, either those that are found by searching in Chinese history or
those that are borrowed from the outside world. Although he admitted the
necessity of studying the West, he also emphasized that

If the governance of foreign domains is superior to the old ways of the

former kings, then there is no harm in learning from foreign domains.
However, when the old ways of the former kings include the [ways of
governing] foreign domains, then [learning from them] would be like
forgetting one’s ancestors and ancestral traditions, and what is the point
of doing that? If learning from foreign domains does not injure the gov-
ernance of former kings, then there is no harm in it. Hindering the teach-
ings of the sages and forgetting our Chinese roots, how can we do such a
thing?11

From 1895 on, though, people started tending to admit, at least in the areas
of practical knowledge and technology, that the West was superior to China,
and even that Japan was superior to China. China had to reform, and the direc-
tion of that reform was to learn from the West, and even to imitate Japan. Li
Hongzhang, the man who signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on behalf of the
Qing court, recorded that at the beginning of the negotiations when he saw
Itô Hirobumi (1841–1909), he felt quite inferior or uneasy. He remembered what
Hirobumi had told him several years earlier about why China should gradu-
ally change and he felt ashamed. He admitted that “our nation should indeed
gradually change; only then can it be independent.”12
If we look back at Chinese history, we can see a profound change of direc-
tion. In their reaction to Western civilization from the late Ming to the early
Qing most Chinese scholars generally insisted on what Edward A. Kracke
called “change within tradition.” This was the case from historical discussions
by Chinese scholars on how “Western learning originated in China” to Ruan
Yuan’s Biographies of Astronomers and Mathematicians in which he expressed
his belief in the great practical importance of astronomy and mathematics
and his contempt for Western learning, as well as the attempts of Li Rui (1769–
1817), Li Shanlan (1811–1882) and others to surpass Western scholarship in the
field of mathematics. It was also true from when Feng Guifen wrote in his
Discussion on Selectively Using Western Learning (Cai xixue yi) that they should

11  Chen Chi, Chen Chi ji, 1997, 2.

12  Li Hongzhang, Zhong-Ri yihe jilüe, “Diyici wenda jielüe,” 7–8; originally published in 1895,
collected in Li Yushu ed., Jindai shiliao congshu huibian, first collection, 1969.
Epilogue 313

“take China’s own teaching about proper human relations and the Confucian
ritual code of behavior as our original foundation, and supplement it with the
various nations’ methods of gaining wealth and power” down to the slogan
of “Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for practical application”
put forward by Zhang Zhidong and others.13 After 1895, however, in Chinese
feelings about seeking wealth and power, everything seemed to change in
the direction of a Western-style “modern” or “modernity,” that is toward
“change beyond tradition.”
Many people began to abandon the old traditional learning and move
toward the search for Western learning. Take for example Song Yuren. He
was always on guard against Westerners “talking about Heaven,” “practicing
medicine,” and “discussing the principles of things [that is, physics].” He said
that they “want to use their teachings to turn ours upside down.” Although
he angrily criticized his fellow Chinese for “thinking highly of Westerners,” in
his On Adopting the Customs of Western Nations (Caifeng ji), he wrote a great
deal about Great Britain’s education, methods of selecting talents (i.e., choos-
ing officials), parliament, government, prisons, currency system, and mili-
tary, and he recommended adopting the Western political system.14 Another
example is Tang Caichang (1867–1900). After the Sino-Japanese War, he turned
even more sincerely toward the West. Ten out of eleven essays in the Record
of Selected Essays on General Arts from the Civil Examinations in Hunan (Yuan
Xiang tongyi lu, edited by Jiang Biao), completely employ Western standards
to discuss Chinese issues. Even though he did not know Western languages and
had not been to the West, he still did his best to absorb various sorts of Western
knowledge from translated books and works recommended to him, such as
the Historical Record of the Myriad Nations (Wanguo shiji), Survey of the Recent
History of the West (Taixi xinshi lanyao), National Gazette of Great Britain (Da
Yingguo zhi), Review of the Times (Wanguo gongbao), and the Chinese Scientific
Magazine (Gezhi huibian). This seems to have become a common practice at
that time.15

13  For research on this historical process, see Ding Weizhi and Chen Song’s Zhongxi tiyong
zhijian and Xue Huayuan’s Wan Qing Zhongti Xiyong sixiang lun (1861–1900): guanding
yishi xingtai de xihua lilun.
14  Song Yuren, Taixi geguo caifeng ji, in Guo Songtao deng shixi ji liuzhong, 1998, 402, also see
337–372 and 375.
15  Tang Caichang had already become conscious that “in today’s world, exegesis to the clas-
sics, literary composition, and eight-legged essays have all become superfluous,” and that
is why he turned toward the West. See Tang Caichang ji, 1980, 242.
314 Epilogue

Of course the “New Policies” (xinzheng 新政) were most influential at this
time. In May of 1895, Kang Youwei sent his third memorial up to Emperor
Guangxu to be followed soon by memorials sent up by over a thousand
scholars urging Guangxu not to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In August,
the Self-strengthening Society (Qiangxue hui 強學會) was established, and
in December twelve imperial edicts concerning “New Policies” were drafted
and sent out. The roots of the later Hundred Days Reform (wuxu bianfa 戊戌
變法) of 1898 were put down that year, and Chinese thinking unconsciously
moved toward the West. As an example, even the democratic forms such as
the Western promotion of assemblies and the importance placed on public
opinion were also regarded as key principles to be respectfully introduced into
China. We know that from ancient times, from the village schools in the Spring
and Autumn era to the Imperial University in the Song dynasty, there were
places in China for scholar-officials to discuss and criticize politics or policies.
However, these did not actually become a tradition of democracy; whether
in the village schools or the Imperial University, the scholar-officials only
hoped to “send up information for the Son of Heaven to hear.” The final key
to resolving social problems still remained with the emperor, and so discuss-
ing policies at court was really the only effective thing to do. In 1895, however,
people were already beginning to realize that “to bring the people together,
we must hold assemblies,” and these assemblies had to be held in the capital
in order to have the effect of “shouting out from high places.”16 This already
amounted to transforming the goals and ideals of “collective striving” into
establishing common practices and initiating knowledge; the common prac-
tices established, however, were Western practices and the knowledge initi-
ated was Western knowledge.
Researchers have all taken note of the fact that after 1895 with the emer-
gence of new media, new-style schools (xuetang 學堂), new scholarly asso-
ciations, and new newspapers and periodicals, “in this age of transformation,
Western culture experienced unprecedented proliferation” and Western
knowledge and thought, with the support of these new mediums, was also dis-
seminated with unprecedented rapidity.17 If we say that before 1895 Chinese
scholars, especially major Confucians and even scholar-officials on the east-
ern seacoast still had “a kind of general contempt” toward Western learning,
and “ordinary scholar-officials were still extremely closed-minded, after 1895,

16  Kang Nanhai zibian nianpu, 1992, 29–30.

17  Zhang Hao, “Zailun wuxu weixin de lishi yiyi,” Ershiyi shiji, 45, February 1998, 19.
Epilogue 315

however, this situation underwent an enormous change.”18 We can take He Qi

and Hu Liyuan’s “Suggestions for New Policies” (Xinzheng lunyi) as evidence
of this change. In this essay, written between 1894 and 1895, they said that
“we must exert ourselves to reform, and government decrees should follow
the new [policies].” According to them, these reforms should not only include
building railroads, increasing shipping, reordering the census, and setting
up daily newspapers; they should also include political reforms like schools,
elections, legislative assemblies, and so on. They even suggested a kind of
compromise system of monarchical democracy ( junzhuzhi de minzhu zhidu
君主制的民主制度).19
In passing we can mention here that in order to introduce new knowledge
faster, people at that time thought of a shortcut. That was to introduce Western
learning by means of Japanese translations. Since Japan had already rapidly
advanced and China could not match Japan, this method of gaining Western
knowledge was adopted by most Chinese who were impatient for success.
That the Chinese who still harbored deep feelings of humiliation about being
defeated in war by Japan could actually very quickly accept Japan as their
teacher was quite an unusual phenomenon; it was also an expression of the
tension and anxiety that Chinese people felt at the time. Under attack then by
both Japan and the West, the Chinese intellectual world began more and more
urgently to travel along a road from which there would be no return.
Zhang Hao once pointed out that very many forms of thought produced
since 1895 “had an intensely strong collective consciousness and hoped to lib-
erate China from its present crisis. They looked forward to a future China and
sought a road toward their goal.” This consciousness was expressed in a tri-
partite structure—an awareness of crisis, looking forward toward a goal, and
channels to accomplish their goal.20 With a crisis awareness of facing national
and ethnic destruction and subjugation, they focused the goal they were look-
ing forward to on learning from the West and made radical political reform
their channel for accomplishing their goal. This fundamental change began

18  Zhang Hao, “Wan-Qing sixiang fazhan shilun—jige jiben lundian de tichu yu jiantao,” in
Zhou Yangshan and Yang Suxian, eds., Jindai Zhongguo sixiang renwu—Wan-Qing sixiang,
1980, 27.
19  He Qi, Hu Liyuan, Xinzheng zhenquan—He Qi, Hu Liyuan ji, 1994, 104.
20  Zhang Hao, “Zailun Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi sixiang de qiyuan,” in Yu Yingshi, et al.,
Zhongguo lishi zhuanxing shiqi de zhishifenzi, 1992, 55–62. Zhang also pointed out that the
“crisis of meaning” started in the last decade of the nineteenth century. See Zhang Hao,
“Xin Rujia yu dangdai Zhongguo de xueshu weiji,” in Jiang Yihua, et al., eds., Gang-Tai ji
haiwai xuezhe lun jindai Zhongguo wenhua, 1987, 280.
316 Epilogue

from 1895, and was already obviously expressed by Kang Youwei and others
like him. In the mood of that time, everything was changing and everyone was
searching for the new.21 By 1898, the year of the Hundred Days Reform, Fan
Zhui (1872–1906) published an essay entitled “On Sincerity” (Kaicheng pian)
in the Hunan Daily (Xiangbao) and for the first time put forth the theory of
total Westernization. In the same year, Yi Nai (1874–1925) also published “China
Should Regard Its Weakness As Strength” (Zhongguo yi yi ruo wei qiang shuo)
in the same paper. He hoped that China could

stand up resolutely and independently in the world, and if we want to be

treated equally in international meetings, we must change the dynasty
(dynastic system), change the color of our clothes, in all cases follow the
Western system, join international society, and respect the laws of the all
the myriad nations.22

We should take note of the fact that behind this major tendency to turn toward
the West and subsequent internationalism there was also concealed a deep un-
dercurrent of nationalism. When a people with a very long history faces a cri-
sis involving internal troubles and external aggression, some people will often
ponder the question of how to preserve their “traditions” under the conditions
of so-called “modernity.” That is because what is meant here by traditions
are not merely some historical remains, popular customs or national (ethnic,
minzu) ideas, but traditions also refer to the foundations for the survival of
this historically long-lived people. To preserve or to abandon these traditions
is extremely important for this people.
Generally speaking, whether or not a tradition, or traditions, are able to be
continued ultimately depends on the following four factors. First is the pos-
session of a territory for collective living; a people that loses its homeland
will often find it difficult to preserve its tradition. In order for a people con-
demned to “wander” to survive, their tradition will often be engulfed by an

21  This is why in his Exposition of Humanity (Ren xue, 仁學 1896/1897). Tan Sitong used
the words “to burst through” (chongjue 沖決) to express his resolve to “seek the new”
(qiuxin 求新). Behind the negation of all history and tradition, they were actually using
the appearance of antitraditionalism to carry forward a type of tradition.
22  See Xiangbao leizuan, 1902, jia ji, shang juan, 37 and 4.
Epilogue 317

alien civilization. Second is a common belief system. A people that loses their
common belief system will have lost a strong force for maintaining their cohe-
sion. Despite the fact that freedom is something that everyone needs, as soon
as the common orientation of their value system is lost, an individual in a
society will come to feel exceptionally lonely and isolated. Third is a common
language. Using a common language is an important foundation of mutual
identity. No matter where people are, their language is like an identity badge
and the local accent of their native place is like a safe conduct pass; it is often
an important factor in making people who use the same language obtain a
sense of security and closeness. A group of people who has lost its common
language is no longer a nation (people, minzu), and so “loss of language” often
signifies the collapse of a tradition. Fourth is a collective historical memory.
Historical memory is stored up deep in each individual’s mind; different his-
torical memories define different historical roots; when people bring them to
light from deep in their minds it is called “seeking for one’s roots” (xungen 尋
根). This is probably the meaning of Cao Zhi (192–232)’s well-known line “we
were originally born from the same roots” (Ben shi tong gen sheng 本是同根生),
and thus “seeking for one’s roots” is an extremely important way to reestablish
one’s identity.
At the end of the nineteenth century, especially after 1895, after China had
received such an extreme shock, the Chinese suddenly lost faith in their tradi-
tion. Although they still lived in a common territory and still had a common
language, their common beliefs began to be shaken and undermined by the
new Western knowledge while their common collective historical memory also
seemed to be gradually disappearing. All of this caused people to worry about
whether or not the confidence of the people (minzu) and the nation (guojia)
had been lost. Before the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed, Zhang Peilun
(1848–1903) wrote in sorrow to a friend that “if we bow down to the Japs at
this time, and the Westerners swarm in, China will have no where to stand.”23
After the treaty was signed, Tang Caichang said even more painfully that “this
treaty that we have agreed to does not make peace with the Japs, it simply
surrenders to them. Treasonous officials have sold out the nation, something
that has never happed before in ancient or modern times.”24 The self-evident
context behind all of these doleful expression was the people (nation, minzu)

23  Zhang Peilun, “Letter in answer to Wang Liansheng,” from Jianyuji: shudu liu, 17 shang;
quoted from Li Guoqi, “Man Qing de rentong yu fouding—Zhongguo jindai Han minzu
zhuyi sixiang de yanbian,” in Rentong yu guojia, 1994, 106.
24  Tang Caichang ji, 223.
318 Epilogue

and the country (state, guojia). Behind the often used slogan of “protect the
state, protect the race, protect the faith” (baoguo, baozhong, baojiao 保國,
保種, 保教) was a profound feeling of suffering and sorrow. Later on, this sor-
row, apprehension, despondency, and stress seem to have increased day by day.
The memorials sent up to Emperor Guangxu by Kang Youwei and over a
thousand scholars (the “Public Vehicle Petition” gongche shangshu) were
the most concentrated expression of the anxiety and nervous tension that
accompanied their feelings of helplessness. Their demands that the emperor
encourage “All under Heaven,” hand down an imperial edict taking the blame
on himself, expunge the national humiliation, support the sacred teachings of
the sages, and eradicate heresies would seem to have been promoting inter-
nationalism and making China enter a universal modernity. The identifica-
tion of the people or nation (guozu rentong 國族認同) and the revitalization
of tradition embodied in their memorials, however, with the support of the
most radical emotions, simply stimulated the most radically nationalist sense
of crisis awareness. Some people had already seen these most deep-seated
latent concerns. In his On Adopting the Customs of Western Nations, Song Yuren
expressed the view that if the influence of Western learning and Western faiths
expanded, they would certainly shake the foundations of Chinese tradition
and undermine the Chinese cosmology and system of values.25

It should be pointed out that modern Chinese nationalism is an extremely

complex phenomenon. Usually in dealing with an alien civilization, a nation
that has a traditional civilization with a very long history will have two differ-
ent kinds of response. One is to adopt an attitude of universalism and to wel-
come the other civilization’s seemingly unquestionable knowledge, thought
and technology in order to merge into the world. The other one is to adopt an
attitude of exceptionalism and to reject the alien things that might undermine
and weaken the native knowledge, thought and beliefs while stirring up radical
nationalism and conservatism. In the minds of Chinese intellectuals, however,
it was not a simple case of either nationalism or internationalism.
Even though the challenges of the West stirred up nationalistic passions and
anxiety about the survival of the nation or people (minzu), yet in the back-
ground of modern Chinese nationalism, surprisingly enough, we can see an
extremely unusual form of internationalism. There were, of course, historical

25  Song Yuren, “Taixi geguo caifeng ji,” in Guo Songtao deng shixi ji liuzhong, 388.
Epilogue 319

reasons for this internationalism because in the traditional Chinese imagina-

tion of the world, there always existed a consciousness that “All under Heaven
is one family” (tianxia yi jia 天下一家) and a concept of universal truth in
which everywhere everyone had the “same mind and [the] same principle”
(xintong litong 心同理同). After the nineteenth century, of course, the “tribute
system” with China as suzerain, and traditional ideas about “All under Heaven”
were undermined and gradually disappeared. Not only did the Western pow-
ers begin to enter China after the Opium Wars, but even the various peripheral
states that seemed to revolve around China also began to move away; the geo-
political picture of the world had been transformed.26 The unusual thing was,
however, that no matter how much “All under Heaven” had already become
the “myriad nations,” for the Chinese intellectual world, the consciousness of
“All under Heaven is one family” and the concept of “same mind and same
principle” still brought about a very complicated orientation when the Chinese
faced the world. The Chinese adopted an internationalist interpretation of
truth and value, but this gave rise to mixed feelings of love and hate toward
“the West” while at the same time bringing about a form of antitraditional
nationalism.
Lin Yusheng raised the concept of “iconoclastic nationalism” ( fanchuantong
de minzu zhuyi 反傳統的民族主義) in a dialogue with Benjamin Schwartz.27
This kind of thinking would seem to be in contrast to protecting the classic
texts and fundamentalist nationalism. It looks like it is radically renouncing

26  Even the Qing government institutions that dealt with foreign affairs also had to change
in accordance with these geopolitical changes. The two Qing foreign affairs organizations
were the Office for Relations with Principalities (Lifan Yuan 理藩院) and the Department
in Charge of Foreign Ceremonies (Zhuke Si 主客司). The former was responsible for
areas inside the country like Mongolia, Tibet, and Nepal, while the latter handled the
tributary states such as Chaoxian (Korea), Vietnam, Burma, Celebes, and Holland
or the Netherlands. However, “since the time of the xianfeng and tongzhi reigns (1850–
1875), the European powers (winds) and Japanese forces (Asian rains) were increasingly
pressing in on us. We communicated with them during their visits, granted them imperial
audiences, and also signed treaties as equal countries. Nevertheless, from the perspective
of rites, we still regarded them as enemies. Our old poems and songs mention ‘having
guests’, and our transmitted documents also record ‘making friends with neighbours’, and
they mean that no matter whether they are from friendly countries or vassal states, it is
essential to treat them all as important guests.” Thus, the Qing attitude had already greatly
changed. See Qingshi gao, 1977, j. 91, “Li shi—Bin li,” 2673.
27  “Shi Huaci, Lin Yusheng duihualu—yixie guanyu Zhongguo jindai he xiandai sixiang,
wenhua yu zhengzhi de ganxiang,” Lin Yusheng, Sixiang yu renwu, 1983, 439–468.
320 Epilogue

tradition, but actually the support system behind such thinking is also a kind
of tradition.
First off, because the ideology of Great China being the center of All under
Heaven (the world) and China’s actual position as the cultural center of East
Asia created an attitude of extreme self-esteem, China was anxious to prove its
great nation status, and so the Chinese were often unable to maintain a calm
frame of mind. Second, the authority of Chinese politics, religion, and culture
were originally very concentrated and mutually supportive. Political authority
relied on religion and achieved its legitimacy by means of various ceremonies,
while it was also deemed to be reasonable through the assistance of the cul-
tural discourse of the intellectual elite. At the same time, both religion and
knowledge received their raisons d’être under the protection of political power.
This was precisely the three in one nature of the so-called political orthodoxy
(zhengtong 政統), Confucian (cultural) orthodoxy (daotong 道統) and spiri-
tual orthodoxy (shentong 神統); each of them did not really have an individu-
ally autonomous realm.28 At this time when the humanistic knowledge that
served as authority and truth in their historical tradition was no longer able to
support the confidence of the state and the nation (guojia, minzu), it was easy
for antitraditional thinking to appear among an intellectual stratum that felt
so painfully that it possessed neither “fundamental essence” (ti) nor “practical
applications” (yong).
Thirdly, in Chinese tradition itself, there were always various internal ten-
sions. These already included antitraditional tendencies and resources such as
“return to the ancients” ( fugu 復古), “revolution” (geming 革命), and “renova-
tion” (genghua 更化). Hence, when people came to the painful conclusion that
their tradition had lost its significance, they could still also find resources in
another area of the same tradition. It was just on this account that the anti-
traditionalists of recent Chinese history started out precisely from tradition
and the classics. In their way of thinking, nationalism derived its power of

28  The sources of ancient Chinese imperial power and authority should include the virtue,
honor and fear mentioned in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, the legal authority, tra-
ditional authority and charismatic authority described in Max Weber’s “The Three Types
of Legitimate Rule” (“Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaf,” rule sometimes
being translated as “Domination” or “Authority”, Preussische Jahrbücher 187, 1–2, 1922,
translated by Hans Gerth, in the journal Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4
(1): 1–11, 1958), or the three types of political system—authoritarian, tyrannical, and totali-
tarian—discussed by Hannah Arendt in “What is authority” (1954) in her Between Past
and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (1993).
Epilogue 321

mobilization from universal world values, and internationalism obtained its

universal significance from an authentic nationalism.
These dilemmas and this contradictory psychology rendered recent Chinese
intellectual history extremely complex. It was precisely under such conditions
that both feelings of nationalism and the pursuit of universalism were acti-
vated in a China that still possessed a common territory, common language
and, at least temporarily, political autonomy. Because China’s “roots” had not
yet been cut off, the inclination to “replenish the roots” (xugen 續根) grew even
more intense. The idea of carrying forward the roots of the nation (minzu) and
culture supported the mood of nationalism, and, with the slogan of “national
salvation through strength” ( jiuwang tuqiang 救亡圖強), was extremely attrac-
tive. Because the yardstick for determining right and wrong or good and evil
had already come under the control of Western discourse, the value orientation
of “searching for wealth and power” and the instrumental rationality of “pursu-
ing the practically useful” also replaced China’s traditional value orientation
and ethical rationality. When compared with the West, everyone seemed to be
in competition racing along the same track. Hence, internationalism became
the recognized form of truth, and just this phenomenon led to the tensions
in Chinese intellectual history between “national salvation” ( jiuwang) and
“enlightenment” (qimeng), “nationalism” and “internationalism,” and “radical-
ism” and “conservatism.”

In 1895, Yan Fu published in the Times (Zhibao) of Tianjin his “On the Speed of
World Change” (Lun shibian zhi ji); the title itself expressed those intellectuals’
nervous anxiety about the situation facing China. In the same year Yan pub-
lished his “On the Origin of Strength” (Yuanqiang); this title also expressed the
road chosen by those intellectuals: only “wealth and power” could successfully
deal with this enormous “world change”; only facing up to this great change,
unprecedented in two thousand years of Chinese history, could guarantee that
the racial heritage of the nation would not be cut off. In order to achieve this
priority goal, China had to accept the Western road to modernization.
It is said that in the same year, Yan Fu completed his translation of Thomas
Henry Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics (Tianyan lun), and before he had taken it
to be printed, it had already spread like wildfire. The Exquisite Taste Book Seller
of Shaanxi rushed to publish it, and it very rapidly became popular. Especially
the two terms “struggle for existence” (wujing 物競) and “natural selection”
322 Epilogue

(tianze 天擇) further increased the nervous anxiety of those late nineteenth-
century Chinese who were living in such a hard to discuss state of mind. The
sentence near the end of the book stating that “the study of evolution will in
the future become an unshakable model for everyone who talks about ruling
or governance” seems to have been a prophetic omen of twentieth-century
Chinese intellectual history.29

29  
Tianyan lun, shang, “Daoyan yi—Chabian,” ibid., xia, “Lun shiqi—jinhua,” in Yan Fu ji,
1986, vol. 5, 1324, 1396. Also see Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu
and the West, 1964.
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Index
achieving enlightenment through sincerity
(chengming 誠明) 75
activity (dong 動) of feelings, desires 79
advanced scholar (jinshi 進士) degree 5, 7,
161
Agriculture, School of (nongjia 農家) 294
Aleni, Giulio (Ai Rulüe 艾儒略, 1582–164)  1611) 208, 213
205n5, 208n9, 221, 222n35, 281
Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records
Office (Zhifang waiji) 1623 221
A Summary of Western Learning (Xixue fan,
1623) taxonomy of Western knowledge  Mathematical Astronomy of the Chongzhen
281
alien cultures/barbarian peoples 6, 12, 15,
16, 17, 65, 78, 96, 98, 111, 158–160, 168,
170, 271, 288, 289, 317, 318
all the ten thousand things are there in me
(wanwu jie bei yu wo 萬物皆備於我),
Mencius said 182
art of ruling (zhengshu 政術) 107–108,
107n16
changing traditional Han Chinese ethical
norms 16
challenging Han Chinese civilization 17
All-Embracing Book or Penetrating the Classic
of Changes (Tongshu) 166
All Under Heaven (tianxia 天下) 3, 64, 66,
75, 96, 98, 102, 111, 120, 123, 129n59, 132,
140, 155n13, 170, 173, 178, 202, 205n5, 216,
218, 219–223, 236, 251n6, 272, 283, 294,
318–320 319
All under Heaven is one family (tianxia yi jia
天下一家) 98, 319
Amoghavajra (Bukong, 705–774) 29
ancient prose (guwen 古文) 77, 81, 83, 103,
112
and Reviving Ancient Prose Movement
( fuxing guwen yundong 復興古文運動)  Parliament 274
77n50
An Account with Illustrations of World Map
(Kun yu tushuo) 224n40
Analects of Confucius (Lunyu) 66, 113n26,
121n44, 133, 136nn70, 71, 145n98, 169,
227, 240, 252, 254, 265n35, 284n65
An Lushan (ca. 703–757)-Shi Siming (703–761)
Rebellion 4, 15, 17–20, 31, 34, 40n39, 64,
70, 76, 78, 85
Asanga (ca. 410–ca. 500) 23
assemblies, popular, called for 314–315
Astronomical Instruments (Jianpingyi shuo,
astronomy, study of Heaven (tianxue) 203,
205–215, 206n7, 215n23, 216, 229, 248,
259, 261–263, 287, 302n97, 312
Imperial Astronomical Bureau 211, 226
Reign completed 1634 210–211
Western astronomy and effect on Chinese
thought 205–216
autocracy 163, 257
Bai Qi (?–258 BCE), Qin general 152, 292
Ban Gu, History of the Former Han Dynasty
first origin of barbarians 218, 231, 270
Bao Ruoyu (f. 11th–12th century) 127n56
barbarian peoples (non-Han peoples, huren
胡人) 65, 78, 82, 87, 158, 173, 269, 270
cruelly treated (manyi 蠻夷) 160
customs (hufeng 胡風) opposed 17,
158
four (siyi 四夷) 96, 99, 210, 216-227, 273
religions 12, 70
western 202, 259, 273
Basic Questions (Suwen, part of the Huangdi
Neijing) 210
being and non-being 138
Benji (840–901) 52, 58, 61
benevolence, compassion, filial piety (ren ai
ci xiao 仁愛慈孝) 232
Benjing (667–761) 36
Bin Chun (1804–?) interest in English
biology (shengwu, living things 277, 297
Bi Yuan (1730–1797) 290
Bodhidharma 50, 56
Bo Juyi (772–846) 21, 42, 69, 92n82
Essay on Chuanfa Tang (Chuanfa Tang bei) 
42
Index 337

Book of History (or Documents, Shangshu)  threat to Chinese intellectual tradition 

18, 138, 173n47 69
Book of Rites (Liji) 13, 173n47 translations used for Western learning 
Ceremonial Usages (Liyun) chapter of  315
13n10 Buddhist Terms and Sayings
boxue 博學 extensive learning 186, 240 absence of thought (wunian 無念) 50
boxue zhuyi 博學主義 broad learning bodhisattva 48
concerning the nature of things 240 calmness (meditation, samâdhi) 44, 91
Brahe, Tycho (1546–1601) 210, 287 calmness of mind, ataraxy (anxin 安心) 
Bridgman, Elijah Coleman (1801–1861) Brief 47, 49, 50
Chronicle of the American Federation chan 禪 dhyâna, meditation 21, 35, 39,
(Lianbang zhilüe) 271 43, 47
bring peace to All Under Heaven (ping dharma, fa 法 phenomena 24, 34, 35,
tianxia 平天下) 75 40n40, 46, 48, 54, 55n6, 56, 60, 298n88
bureaucracy 89, 95, 126, 129, 246 dharmakâya (essence of all beings) 27
scholar-official 111 delusion (mâyâ, mi 迷) 48
Buddha, true realm of the 27 do not establish the written word (buli
Buddha-nature (bhūtatathatā) 27, 28, 36, wenzi 不立文字) 40n40, 54–57
43–56, 73 four dharma-realms (dharmadhâtu) 26
and gradual enlightenment debate 188 four dhyānas and eight concentrations
and human nature 43–47 (sichan bading 四禪八定) 47, 48n54
realm of, what use is the 49 Four Noble Truths (sidi 四諦) 28
Buddhism (Buddhist) genuine truth (zhendi, satya 真諦) of
commentaries on the sûtras 55–56 dharma 60
bodhi, wisdom, enlightenment (wu 悟)  of Chan Buddhism 50
44, 48, 188, 298n88 gong-an 公案 paradoxical anecdotes
conception of the geographical world  (riddles) 53, 59, 59n13, 60, 62
219–220 guanxin 觀心 observing one’s mind 44
cultivation 36, 43, 47, 53 incanting aloud (zhuandu 轉讀) 55
enlightenment 33, 36, 45, 48, 49, 56, 60, intoning the Buddha-name 44–49
75, 183 jifeng 機鋒 keen words 53, 60, 62
gradual 47, 48, 188 linian 離念 abandoning thought 44
sudden (dunwu 頓悟) 28, 35–36, 40n41, meditation 禪法 chanfa, dhyâna 20, 21,
46, 48, 54 35, 36, 39, 40n40, 43, 44, 47–50, 45n50,
in Tang dynasty 22–35 60, 61, 91, 117n37
decline of interest in theory 33–34 mental anxiety (kleśa and âgantu-kleśa) 
patronage of in 11–12 46
rise of meditation and keeping precepts  naïve naturalness or naïve spontaneity
20–21 (tianzhen ziran 天真自然) 50
spread despite Tang regulations 10 no cultivation and no thoughts (wuxiu
three types of Tang Buddhist leaders 21 wunian, 無修無念) 42, 28
nineteenth century revival of  ordinary mind (pingchang xin 平常心) is
296–304 the Way (dao 道) 38, 47, 49–51
Japan, Japanese 300, 301 305, 315 public chanting (changdao唱導) 55,
alternative academies (bieyuan 別院) or 59n13
“schools” (xuetang 學堂) of 301 prajñâ (borezhi 般若智) or shûnya
Chinese disdain for 305 (wisdom) 28, 39, 43–50, 50n50
338
Buddhist Terms and Sayings (cont.)
purity of mind (qingjing 清靜) 50–51
Realm of Dharmas (dharmadhâtu, fajie
法界) 26, 27, 28
self-mind (zixin, svacitta 自心) 36, 59
Shûnyatâ (emptiness, kong) 27, 36, 39,
46, 48, 117–118
spontaneity or freedom (ziran, the
natural) 48, 50, 113, 121, 191
there is no mind and there is no Buddha
(fei xin fei Fo 非心非佛) 46–48, 51,
186
this mind is the Buddha (ji xin ji Fo 即心
即佛) 46–47
three Buddhist dharma 298n88
transmission from mind to mind (yi xin
chuan xin 以心傳心) 57
unsullied mind is originally pure (xinxing
ben jing, 心性本淨) 42, 186
Huichang Period Anti-Buddhist
Persecution (huichang miefo 會昌滅
佛) of Wuzong 40n39, 52, 84–86
Buddhist Schools
Chan Buddhism chanzong 禪宗 21, 30,
33, 35–52, 53–62, 139
Chan departs from speech and words
(chan li yanshuo, 禪離言說) 42
Chan masters ridicule doctrines,
theories, writing 35, 54, 58, 81
history of differs from transmission of
the lamp tradition 36–37, 41,
42n45
language and Chan 52–59
baihua vs. wenyan, dead language vs.
living language 57
Hall of Ancestors Collection (Zutangji),
Chan history 56
quotations (yulu) of Chan masters  jing) 28
49n55, 54, 58, 60
schools of Chan
Northern
Heze (Lotus Marsh) 37–39, 41, 42, 48,
52
Ox-Head 21, 36–37, 38–39, 48, 52
influence of 48–49
Tiantai 21, 37, 38–41, 52, 59n13, 61n16, 73,
119
Hongzhou 37–39, 41, 43, 48, 50, 52
Southern
Index
Mazu Chan, Hongzhou Mazu 38–42, 50
the mind is the Buddha ( ji xin shi Fo 即心
是佛) 38
apart from mind there is no Buddha
( fei xin fei Fo 非心非佛) 38
ridicule of theory in 54
the ordinary mind is the [Buddhist] Way
(pingchang xin shi dao 平常心是道) 
38, 47, 50–51
Quotations (yulu) of Mazu Daoyi 54
Huineng’s Southern Chan in 9th century 
39, 41, 52
Wild or Crazy Chan Buddhism
(kuangchan 狂禪) 139
five schools of Chan, 10th century 52
Hînayâna 28
Huayan (Flower Garland) 22, 26–30, 35,
39, 61, 116, 119
Nâgârajuna (ca. 150–250) 299
Mâdhyamika 34
Mahâyâna 23, 28, 53, 56, 73, 299
School of Discipline (lümen 律門) 33
Sudden Enlightenment 28 see
dun wu
Tantric or Esoteric Buddhism (Vajrayana) 
28, 29n26, 59n13
Yogâcâra (Way of Yoga) or Consciousness
Only, (Weishi 唯識) 23, 24, 28, 29–30,
39, 54, 61, 296–297
main ideas of 24–30, 303
Qing revival of 303
Buddhist texts
Avatamsaka-sûtra (or the Mahâvaipulya
Buddhâvatamsaka-sûtra, the Flower
Garland Sûtra, Huyuan jing) 26, 116,
298
Brahma-viśesa-cintî-pariprcchâ-sûtra (Siyi
Buddhabhûmi-sûtra-shâstra (Fodijing lun) 
24
Dasabhûmikâ-sûtra (Dilun) 23
General Record of Buddhist Masters (Fozu
tongji) 220
Jingde chuandenglu (Records of the
Transmission of the Lamp) 42n45
Lankâvatâra-sûtra (Lengjia jing) 28, 36,
46
Mâdhyamika shâstra (Middle or Three
Treatise school) 23
Index 339

Mahâparinirvâna-sûtra (Da po niepan Cao Duan (Yuchuan, 1376–1434) 178

jing) 43, 73 Cao Zhi (192–232) same roots poem 317
Mahâyâna Śraddhotpada Śastra cartography, Chinese 217
(Awakening of Faith in the Mahâyâna, Cassini, Giovanni Domenico (1625–1712) 
Dacheng qixin lun) 73 287
Mahâyâna-samparigraha (Acceptance of centralization (jiquan zhuyi 集權主義) 
the Great Vehicle, She dasheng lun)  109–110
23 change within tradition 266
Meaning of the Six Characteristics of the Chan, Wing-tsit 90n80, 101n9, 114n29, 132
Huayan school (Huayan liuxiang yi)  Chanyuan Treaty of 1004 with the Liao 97
54 Chart of the Master-Disciple Succession of the
Nirvânasûtra (Niepan jing) 28, 32, 73, Chan Gate that Transmits the Mind Ground
Platform Sûtra of the Sixth Patriarch  in China (Zhonghua chuanxin di chanmen
44n45, 45n50 shizi chenxi tu) 37
Prajñapâramitâ-sûtra (Perfection of chemistry (huaxue, study of transformations) 
Wisdom Sûtra, Boruo jing) 23, 28, 32, 277, 298
46, 51, 56 Chen Baisha receives sacrifices in the
Saddharma Pundarîka-sûtra (Lotus Sûtra, Confucian Temple 180
Fahua jing) 23, 32 Chen Baozhen (1831–1900) 308n6
Satyasiddhi-shâstra (Chengshi lun) 32 Chen Chun (1159–1223), Meanings of
Ten Admonitions for the Fayan School Neo-Confucian Philosophical Terms (Beixi
(Zongmen shiguan lun) 54 ziyi) 162
Treatise on the Three Realms of Chen Dexiu (1178–1235) authors popular
Consciousness Only (Sanjie weixinlun)  education texts 164
54 Chen Fuliang (1141–1203) and practical
Vijnapti-mâtrâtasiddhi (Treatise on the efficacy 140n83
Establishment of the Doctrine of Cheng Duanli (1271–1345) “Preface to Jia
Consciousness Only, Cheng weishi lun)  Xuanweng’s Poetry” 171
24, 26, 124 Chen Gongfu (ca. 1081–ca.1150) prohibits
Vimalakîrti-nirdesa-sûtra 23, 32 Cheng Yi’s “Luoyang Studies” 128–129
Yogâcâra-bhûmi-shâstra (Yujiashi dilun)  Chengguan (737–838 or 738–839 or 760–838) 
24 35, 40
Buglio, Lodovico (1606–1682) refutes Yang Cheng Hao (1032–1085) 100, 104, 106, 113,
Guangxian (1597–1669) 226 114n28, 120, 128n57, 131, 132n65, 147, 198
Qing xiu xuexiao zun shiru qushi zhazi on
Cai Xiang (1012–1067) on Great Peace 103 sage, Way of the teacher 108n18
Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) Buddhism protects Cheng Yaotian (1725–1814) critical of
the nation 302 Principle of Heaven 255
calamities, Heaven-sent, theory of (zaiyi shuo Cheng Yi (1033–1107) 100, 104, 111, 115–116,
災異說) 101, 110 116n35, 117n36, 118n38, 120, 121n44,
calendar, calendrical science/calculation 5, 124n51, 128n57, 129, 131, 132n65, 137,
64, 207, 209, 211, 212, 213, 216, 248, 143n96, 147, 156, 157n15, 159, 173n47, 187,
261–263, 265, 287 198
cannibalism 155n13 for women to starve to death is a small
Canon of the Greatest Mystery of the Genesis thing, but to loose her chastity is a very
Point (Taixuan zhenyi benji jing or serious matter 157
Taixuan jing) 90 Cheng Dachang (1123–1195) and Zheng Bing
Canon of Yao (Yaodian) 287 (1121–1194) forbid Buddhist teaching 163
340
Cheng Tingzuo (1691–1767) criticizes Dai
Zhen 252
Cheng Yaotian (1725–1814) 255, 266
chenwei 讖緯, divination and mystical
Confucianist beliefs 101–102
Chen Jian (1497–1567)’s Thorough Debate on
Three Teachings critique of Wang
Yangming 192
Chen Li (1810–1882) 286, 292
Chen Liang (1143–1194) 98, 128n58, 140–143
critique of Zhu Xi 140–143
Chen Que (1604–1677) 198, 240, 243
Chen Yinque (Chen Yinke, 1890–1969) 8n6,
63n19, 78
On Han Yu (Lun Han Yu), Han’s thought  280
78
Chen Xiang (1017–1080) 112
Chen Xianzhang (Baisha, 1428–1500) 178
Chen Yuan (1256–1330) follows Lu Jiuyuan
thought 177
chenyuan 塵緣 dust (that is, causes of
illusions 44, 45
Chen Zushou (1634 jinshi), Illustrious Ming
Atlas of the World (Huang Ming zhifang
ditu) 1636 222–224
Cobo, Dominican Fray Juan (1529–?) 208
Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and
Seas (Shanhai yudi quantu) 201
Complete Map of the Myriad Countries
(Wanguo quantu) 221
Comprehensive Charts of the Spherical and
Vault
Comprehensive Charts of the Spherical and
Vault of Heaven Astronomical Theories
(Hungai tongxian tushuo) (in Chinese,
Jesuit translation) 201
corruption 18, 105, 267
cosmology 18, 207, 212, 214n21, 243, 318
Counsels of the Great Yu in the Book of
History 138
cultural conservatism 106, 124, 125, 127–128,
144
China, concept of, ethnic, cultural,
civilizational 229–232
Celestial Empire and Great Nation (tianchao
daguo 天朝大國) 300
Chongzhen Emperor (Zhu Youjian, 1611–1644,
r. 1627–1644) 199, 211, 212
faces invasions and rebellion 200, 210
Index
commissioned compilation of Mathematical
Astronomy of the Chongzhen Reign
(Chongzhen lishu) 210–211
Chu Yong (Southern Song), On Dispelling
Doubts (Chuyi shuo) refutes superstitions 
162n23
civilization(s) alien or foreign 158, 159, 170,
171, 201, 203, 204, 208n9, 219, 271, 289,
317, 318
expands through Song dynasty education 
149–166
Han Chinese 12, 15–17, 89, 98–100, 111,
123, 146, 154, 156, 169n39, 170, 176–177,
200, 211, 219, 220, 222, 226, 230–232, 276,
Indian 219
Western 202, 204, 205–226, 267–282, 312
Chongji 61n16
Chujin (698–759) 39
cinnabar elixirs of immortality 86, 88, 91,
95, 229
classical studies ( jingxue 經學) 282n62,
283, 284, 286n68
Classic of Changes (Yijing) 5n3, 116n34, 119,
166, 169, 173n47, 214, 227, 242–243,
253–254, 260, 264
Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing) 3, 12
Classic of Mountains and Seas 224, 292
Classic on Divine Marvels 224
classics, forged (weijing 偽經) 242, 243, 247,
248, 285
Collected Commentaries on the Four Books
(Sishu zhangju jizhu) 133–134, 169
Collection Exposing Heterodoxy (Shengchao
poxie ji) stories against Western
astronomy 213
Complete Atlas of the Illustrious Qing Empire
(Huang qing yitong yudi quantu) 227
Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and
Seas (Matteo Ricci 1684) 201, 207, 216
undermined Chinese views of of tianxia,
Middle Kingdom 217–218
Copernicus (1473–1543) 208, 287
correspondence/resonance theory of order 
206, 255
concept of fenye 分野 field-allocation
(celestial and earth regions) 217
cosmology, Chinese cosmological theory
in all Chinese arts and sciences 206n7
Index 341

impacted by Western astronomy  207–213 textual critique of li 理 (principle, reason) 

apparatuses: sundial, telescope, orrery  250n3
207 undermines Song School of Principle 
assertion that the earth is spherical and 249–252
not square 208 using principle to kill people (against
leads to collapse of [Chinese] Heaven and excessive moral idealism) 258
Earth 209, 217 Daizong, Tang Emperor (Li Yu, 727–779,
celestial globe (diqiuyi 地球儀) 207n8 r. 762–779) patronizes Ox-Head Buddhism 
ideas conforming to ancient Chinese 38
sources 210 Dan Zhu (725–770) skeptical of three
resistence by Chinese “old knowledge”  commentaries to Spring and Autumn
212 Annals 68
transformation of heaven (the heavens)  Dao 道, eternal Way, moral Way 51, 66–67, 71
208 constant Way (changdao 常道) 99, 264
cultivating one’s self (xiushen 修身) 74, nothing is greater than the Way and
129n59, 132, 134, 205n5 principle (dao li zui da 道理最大) 
commerce and consumerism 175 100
Confucian classics (Rujia jingdian 儒家經典)  prevails for All Under Heaven (tianxia
1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, 43, 56, 65, 67–68, 74, 129, youdao 天下有道) 66
133, 135, 138–139, 142, 143, 146, 147, 154, dao wenxue 道問學, see following the path of
166–168, 173n47, 178, 184, 196, 197n102, inquiry and study
198, 227, 239–254, 250n3, 258, 260, daotong 道統, tradition of (Confucian) moral
265–266, 277, 281–288, 282n62, principles, succession of the Way of
290–295, 320 Confucius and Mencius 76–78, 82, 101,
reinterpretation of 184, 283–295 103, 107, 110, 112, 122, 124n51, 125, 130,
Confucian religion (Kongjiao 孔教)  132–133, 139, 141, 147–148, 169, 287, 233,
197n102, 229, 300 238, 273
Confucian temples 76, 83 two meanings of explained 101n9
Confucianism 1–3, 10, 71, 73–74, 76–78, 85, Daoxin (580–651) 50
92–93, 114, 120, 125–148, 160, 168, 173, Daozun (?–784) 39
182, 191, 193, 195, 198, 215, 225–226, 230, Daoism (daojia), Daoist School
233, 237, 241, 246, 248, 253, 256, 291 Daoist adepts ( fangshi, magicians) 88, 93
orthodox decline in Tang 10–11, 19, 68 Daoist masters 85–89, 94
virtues, five Confucian: humanity, Daoist Religion, religious Daoism 6, 10, 11,
propriety, faithfulness, rightness, and 16, 19, 74, 84–95, 114, 120, 139, 215,
wisdom (ren, li, xin, yi, zhi 仁, 禮, 信, 229–230
義, 智) 72 adapts to Confucian ideas 89
Confucius 17, 40–41, 64, 67n27, 76–77, Maoshan Highest Clarity school (Supreme
80n54, 83n60, 85, 101, 102n11, 113, 121n44, Purity, Huayang) 84–85, 90
122, 128, 131, 133, 147, 168, 187, 194, 196, Nanyue school (Mt. Heng) 86
243n72, 251n6, 265, 291 also see Tang patronage of 11
Analects Twofold Mystery (chongxuan 重玄)
cults, improper practices banned 150–156 emphasizing theory 89–90
Zhengyi or Tianshi (Celestial Masters)
Da Dai’s Classic of Rites (Da Dai Liji) 287 Zhengyi 94
Dai Zhen (1723–1777) 248–253, 257, 261, 262, Lingbao or Numinous Treasure 94
265, 266 Dao nature (daoxing 道性) 90
342
De Bary, William Theodore 101n9,
Deng Yankang (773–859) 86
democracy, democratic system 269, 270,
274, 294, 314
monarchical (junzhuzhi de minzhu zhidu
君主制的民主制度) 315
Deshao (891–972) 61n16
destiny (meaningful human life) 74, 100, 113,
113n27, 119–120, 122, 254
Dezong (Li Kuo, r. 779–805), Emperor 62,
64, 91n81
Dharmatâ (Faru 法如, 638–689) 44
Di Renjie (630–700) 151
Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong) 74–75,
83, 103, 133, 147, 153, 169, 184–186, 227,
241, 243, 253
Dong Qichang (1555–1636), 194
Dong Zhongshu (ca. 179–ca. 104 BCE) 41, 72,
101, 110
Donglin faction (Donglin dang 東林黨) 239
Draft Recovered Edition of the Essential
Documents and Regulations of the Song
(Songhuiyao jigao) 156
Du Guangting (850–933) 86
Du Jingxian (fl. 825) 86
Du Shun (557–640) 26
Duan Yucai (1731–1815) 266
Dugu Ji (725–777) criticizes Confucian
classics 67n27
Duke of Zhou (Zhou Gong) 77
dunwu 頓悟 sudden enlightenment 35, 188
duxing 篤行earnest practice 186
Du You (735–812)’s Tongdian calls for strong
government 66n23
dynastic succession 15, 231
orthodox doctrine of (zhengtonglun
正統論) in Song dynasty 158n17
Earth 5, 11, 13, 64, 274n48, 279, 297n85, 298
also see Heaven and Earth
Eastern Inscription (Dongming) 166
Ebrey, Patricia 135
education 18, 19, 25, 72–73, 97, 107, 129,
147–150, 160, 164, 173, 176, 179, 180n56,
183, 185n72, 227, 293, 303, 313
transformation to Western learning  criticism of
280–282
Index
leads to collapse of traditional system 
280n59
power and 1–3, 7, 8
Eight Diagrams Sect (tianlijiao 天理教 or
baguajiao 八卦教) rebellion 1813 266
empty thinking (xuxiang 虛想) 291
enrich the nation and strengthen the military
(fuqiang or fuguo qiangbing 富國強兵) 
102, 276, 280, 309
Euclid’s Elements of Geometry (in Chinese,
Jesuit translation) 20
evidential research see textual criticism and
evidential research
Exact Meaning of the Five Classics, The
(Wujing zhengyi) xiii, 2, 10
examinations keju 科舉 (examination
system, official examinations) 2–7, 10,
15, 19, 67, 77n50, 148, 161, 168, 173n47, 173
and rise in status 14–15, 15n15
based on Cheng-Zhu School of Principle 
177
Collected Commentaries on the Four Books
as subject of 134, 169
Emperor Shenzong concern with
questions of 108, 123n47
Mengzi (Mencius) as subject of 83n60
supported by early Manchu-Qing
emperors 233
key texts fixed in 1312–1313 as the Four
Books with three catagories of
essays (lun 論) 168
meaning of the classics (jingyi 經義),
poetry (cifu 詞賦),
triennial provincial imperial examinations
(xiangshi 鄉試) start 1370 173
content format of 173n47
Cai Chen (1167–1230) commentary on
Book of Documents principle text 
173n47
Hu Anguo and Zhang Qia (1160–1237)
commentary of Book of Rites
principle text 173n47
Zhu Xi’s commentaries on Book of
Songs and Classic of Changes
principle texts 173n47
by Yao Mian (1216–1262) 167n35
Index 343

by Ma Tingluan (1223–1289) 171 filial piety (xiao 孝) 150, 164, 165, 232

by many Ming scholars 179–80 five constant virtues 99, 140, 173
by Wang Yangming 180n56, Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (907–960) 
exceptionalism, Chinese 203, 318 40, 61, 83, 96–97, 155n13
exhaust principle and human nature to the Five Phases (wuxing 五行) 115, 137, 214,
utmost (qiongli jinxing 窮理盡性 116, 214n21
119, 124 five zones, ancient theory of (wufu 五服,
extension of knowledge (zhizhi 致知) 74, royal domain, regional rulers, guests,
75, 124, 129, 137–138, 142, 145, 170, 181, controlled, and wild) 223
184–185, 205n5, 277 following Heaven and accepting the Mandate
(Order) (fengtian chengyun 奉天承運) 
factional struggles, intellectual 69, 241 262
factions 18n19, 69, 80n55, 81, 82n59, 107, following the path of inquiry and study (dao
131n63, 193n91, 197, 213, 329, 241, 284, wenxue 道問學) 118, 137138, 143, 184, 186,
286n68, 301 241–242
Fan Chong (?–1141) 128n57 foreign affairs, Qing institutions of 319n26
Fan Chunren (1027–1101) 106 four barbarians (siyi 四夷, Eastern Yi,
Fang Dongshu (1772–1851) criticizes Dai Zhen  Western Rong, Northern Di, Southern
252, 254 Man) 82, 96, 99, 210, 216–226, 273
Fang Kongzhao (1590–1655) 214n21 four classes (scholars, farmers, artisans, and
Fang Yizhi (1611–1671) 214n21, 221, 230, 232 merchants, shi nong gong shang) 99
Fan Min (936–981) promotes non-shamanistic four elements (earth, air, fire, water), Western
medicine 151 theory of and Chinese Five Phases (metal,
Fan Zhongyan (989–1052) 149 wood, water, fire, earth) 214, 214n21, 225,
Faxian (337–ca. 422) 33n30, 43, 219, 303 298
Fu Shan (1607–1684) 230, 232 Four Legendary Emperors: Yao, Shun, Yu,
Fan Zhui (1872–1906) On Sincerity (Kaicheng Tang 77
pian) 1898 calls for total Westernization  freedom, absolute and spontaneity (ziyou,
316 ziran) 48, 50, 113, 191
Faqin (714–792) 38 Fu Bi (1004–1082), 104, 106
Fazang (642–712) 26, 28, 30 fugu 復古 returning to antiquity (the
Faxian (337–ca. 422) 33n30, 43, 219, 303 ancients) 80, 237, 320
fengshan (Feng and Shan) ceremonies on Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) Escape from
Mt. Tai, 725 6, 64 Asia (Datsu-A ron) 305
Feng Guifen (1809–1874) 273–274 Fung Youlan xi
Discussion on Selectively Using Western Fu Yi (555–639)’s anti-Buddhism 70
Learning (Cai xixue yi) 312–313
Protests from Jiaobin Cottage (Jiaobinlu Gao Panlong (1562–1626) 174, 229n46
kangyi) 1861 273–274, 309 anti-Wang Yangming, pro School of
Feng Qi (1558–?) opposes radical Wang Principle 196
Yangming teachings 194 on decline of Confucian learning 
Feng Weiliang (fl. 806–820) 86 174–175
Feng Xu (1842–1927) Four Beginnings of On valuing correct learning and refuting
Self-Strengthening (Ziqiang siduan) 1895  strange views (Chong zhengxue pi
306 yishuo shu) 195–196
Feng Yingjing (1555–1606) 221, 221n33, 226 Gnomon of the Zhou Dynasty and Classic of
Filial and Incorrupt examination (xiaolian Computations, The (Zhoubi suanjing) 
yike) 76n46 210
344 Index

Gaozong (r. 649–683), Tang 3, 13, 16 guarding the Way (shoudao 守道) vs. going
Gaozong (r. 1127–1162), Song 128n57, 130 along with the times (suishi 隨時) 81
gentry (shishen 士紳), gentry class 101, 109, Great Learning (Daxue) 74–75, 83, 103, 120,
123n47, 124, 127, 129, 135n69, 147–150, 133, 137, 147, 169, 184–185, 227, 243, 253,
154, 157–165, 159n19, 179–180, 232, 236, 280
236n59, 300 most iconic passage 185n71
expansion of gentry class in the Song Great Peace (taiping 太平) 82, 102–103, 122,
dynasty 161–165 167
clan gatherings, (clan settlements or Great Ultimate (Supreme Polarity) 113–114,
villages, jiazu juhui 家族聚會)  114n39, 136, 166, 170
163–164 Great Unity taiyi zhi shen 太一之神 spirit or
clan society, clan organization (xiangli god of 206
zongzu 鄉里宗族) 161, 236 Greek thought, ancient, Chinese knowledge
intermediaries between state and people  of 272
163 Grotto Studies (Fokuxue) of Faqin 38, 86
leaders of local society 163 Guan Zhong (c. 720–645 BCE) 152, 291–292
popular (minjian shishen 民間士紳) 164 Guanzi, The doctrine of “enriching the nation
support for the state 164 and strengthening the military 294
village gentry (xiangshen 鄉紳) 109 Guan Zongde (d. 809), Ox-Head master 38
general rule (tongli 通理) for all knowledge  Guanding (561–632), Tiantai master 39
247, 260–261 Guangxu Emperor (Zaitian, 1871–1908,
genesis point, primal origin of (koti, benji r. 1875–1908) 269, 276, 310, 314, 318
本際 or primal 90–93 sad complaint of bitter situation 309
geyi 格義, matching the meaning 297 sets modern examination questions 295
genuineness (zhen, 真) 191 Guangzong (r. 1198–1194), Song Emperor 130
geography, foreign, world, importance of  Guifeng Zongmi (784–841) 37
217, 220–223, 229, 259, 267–269, 271, Gu Feixiong (fl. ca. 836) 85
288, 293n80, Gu Kuang (725–814) 85
gods and spirits, legally sanctioned list in Gu Lin (1476–1545) defends Zhu Xi vs. Wang
Song dynasty 152 Yangming 192
elevated to list: Guan Zhong (c. 720–645 Guo Songtao (1818–1891) 272, 274, 276, 281
BCE) 152 Diary of Guo Songtao (Guo Songtao riji)
removed from list: Qin general Bai Qi on semi-civilized China 276
(?–258 BCE), Liang general Wang knowledge of the West 272
Sengbian (d. 555), political, military praise for English political system 274
reformer Wu Qi (440–381 BCE), guwen, see ancient prose
military strategist Sun Bin (d. 316 BCE), Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612) 196, 229n46
and the general Lian Po 152 defends Zhu Xi vs. Wang Yangming 195
gongguobu 功过簿 registers of merits and Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) 174n49, 230, 232,
demerits 198 232n52, 236, 236n59, 240n64, 241, 262
Gongyang school and Gongyangzhuan  Five Works on Phonetics (Yinxue wushu) 
67n27, 71, 173n47, 283 242
main principles of 284n65 Record of Knowledge Gained Day by Day
goodness (shan 善) 121, 144, 190–191, 197 (Rizhi lu) 242
Goose Lake Temple Debates, see Zhu Xi, Lu
Xiangshan 125ff Han Fei 291
governing the state, right way of (guoshi 國是)  Han Learning (Hanxue, Han school of
129, 132 classical philology) 245, 247, 265,
government schools 100, 180 286n68 see Song Learning
Index 345

Hanlin Academy 128n57, 306, 309 does not change and Earth does not
Han Qi (1008–1075) 106 change 13
Hanshan (Deqing, 1546–1623) 188 does not change and the Way does not
Han Xin 292 change 273
Han Yu (768–824) 64, 70n34, 76–82, 80nn54, Heaven is constant and unchanging, and the
55, 56, 82n59, 83, 83n60, 100, 103, 112, Dao is also constant and unchanging 
120, 131, 187 also see Chen Yinque On 206, 209
Han Yu Heaven is round and Earth is square,
An Inquiry on Human Nature (Yuanxing)  foundation of Chinese authority 203,
72 20
Dui Yu wen 66n23 foundation of Chinese cosmology 206
Essentials of the Moral Way (Yuandao)  Heaven’s law and Earth’s principle (tianjing
71–72, 76–77 (on daotong) diyi 天經地義) 249
Pacification of Huaixi (Ping Huaixi bei)  Way of 13, 115, 120, 121n44, 136, 136n71,
64, 66 214n20
Hao Jing (1223–1275 169 Will of 154
He Qiutao (1824–1862) A Complete History of Heaven (tiantang) in Western religion 209
the Northwest Regions (Shuofang Heaven and Earth 2, 13, 14, 203, 15, 110, 113,
beisheng) 271 115, 165, 167, 206, 248, 249, 262, 263n31,
He Xinyin (1517–1579) radical Wang 264n33
Yangming 194, 194n92 and the cosmos 75
killed in jail 1579 195 Collapse of Heaven and Earth 205–226,
heart/mind (xin 心) 12, 41, 74, 102, 114–117, 227, 305
117n37, 121–122, 167, 193n90, 240–241, unchanging foundation of social order 
256 13, 206
Hegemon (Overlords, badao 霸道) 107, 305 He Zunshi (?–743) 86
Way of the 122, 140–141, 276 High Tang period (713–756) 4n2,
hegemonic government (bazheng 霸政)  intellectual decline, mediocrity 20–21
123, 287 primacy of poetry and belle lettres 20
He Qi (1859–1914) and Hu Liyuan (1874–1916)  historical memory 65, 82, 158, 164, 166, 210,
308, 315 224, 244, 293, 294, 317
Foundations of New Policies (Xinzheng historiography (historical study, shixue 史學) 
shiji) on Chinese weakness in 158n17, 206n7, 285, 287–288
1895 308 Hongjing (634–712) 39
Suggestions for New Policies (Xinzheng Hong Liangji (1746–1809) letter of criticism
lunyi) 315 letter of crsiticism to Emperor Jiaqing 
Heshen (1750–1799) ordered to commit 266
suicide, 1799 266 Hongren (601–675) 44, 50
Hetu 河圖, River Diagram 243 Honil Gangni Yeokdae Gukdo Ji Do (or
Hetuvidyâ, Indian “science of cause” (yinxue Kangnido) 1402 geography 220
因學) 297, 303 Hongwu Emperor (Ming Taizu, Zhu
Heaven (tian 天), Chinese 5, 11, 13, 13n10, Yuanzhang, 1328–1398, r. 1368–1398) 
14n14, 49, 64, 66n23, 73, 77, 80n57, 100, 173–174
101, 102, 103n12, 121, 122, 129, 142, 142n93, Great Announcements (Dagao 大誥) by 
169, 183, 184, 185n72, 186n75, 193n90, 174
281, 305, 313 also see Mandate of expurgation of the Mencius by 174
Heaven, Principle of Heaven orders official examinations 173
a change in Heaven is not worth fearing Hongzhi Emperor (Zhou Youcheng, 1470–1505,
(tianbian buzu wei 天變不足畏) 110 r. 1488–1505) 181
346
Hong Zhenxuan (1770–1815) reinterprets li
and xing 255
honoring the king (royal house) and
repelling the barbarians (zunwang rangyi
尊王攘夷)  80, 82, 87, 98, 99, 111, 112
honoring the moral nature (zun dexing
尊德性) 119, 138, 143, 184, 241
Hsiao Kung-Chuan xi, xii, 302
Hu Anguo (1074–1138) 127, 128n57, 131,
173n47
Hua Yi (Chinese-barbarian) distinctions 18,
70, 158, 218, 218n25, 231, 284, 284n65
Hu Jin (1438–?) reinterprets li and xing 255
Hu Juren (Jingzhai, 1434–1484) 178, 180
Hu Wei (1633–1714) 243n71, 260
An Investigation into the Cosmograms in
the Classic of Changes (Yitu
mingbian) 242, 243
Casual Remarks on the Tributes of Yu
(Yugong zhuizhi) 242, 243
on Old Text Book of Documents 260
Hu Yuan (993–1059) 112, 131
Huaihai of Baizhang (720–814) 41n42
Huaihui (756–815) and Transmission of the
Masters (Fashi zichuan) 41, 41n42, 42, 52
Huainanzi’s natural science 294, 295
Huihai of Dazhu 41n42, 48
Huang Chuwang (1260–1346) 286
Huang Wan (1480–1554)’s On Illuminating the
Way (Mingdao bian) critique of Wang
Yangming 192
Huangfu Shi (777–835) on human nature  identification of the people or nation (guozu
72n38
Huang Zongxi 125, 140, 193, 198, 230, 232,
n52, 236, 240n64, 241, 243, 262
Huang Zongyan (1616–1686) 243
Huang Zunxian (1848–1905) Treatise on Japan
(Ribenguo zhi) 292, 308n6
Hua-Yi華夷, Chinese-barbarian distinction  ideology and practice become separated in
158, 231, 284n65
criticism of non-Chinese ethnic groups  illuminating principle and discussing nature
158
“debate between Chinese and barbarians”
(Hua Yi zhi bian 華夷之辯) 158, 212,
230, 231, 284
Hui Dong (1697–1758) 250, 266
Huihe (or Huihu, Uighurs) 63, 69
Huineng (?–775) 33n30, 36, 39, 41, 44–48,
50, 52, 56
Index
gâtha on Buddha-nature 45
the self-mind is the Buddha 36
Huiqing of Bajiaoshan 59
Huiji (807–883) 54, 56
Hui Shiqi (1671–1741) 265
Huiyuan (334–416) 49
Huizhen (673–751) 39
Huizhong (?–775) 36, 38
human emotions (renqing 人情) 251, 257
Hundred Days Reform (wuxu bianfa
戊戌變法) 1898 314, 316
humanity, ren 仁 71, 72, 98, 251n6, 254, 255,
316n21
humanity and rightness 67n27, 98, 141
human nature, xing 性 51, 72, 72n38, 73,
74n42, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 89, 91–92, 116,
116n35, 117, 119, 120, 121n44, 122, 124,
126–127, 136, 182–183, 185n72, 240, 249,
251n6, 253, 254n12, 255, 256, 257n22,
and Buddha nature 43–44, 47, 48–59
and feelings (xingqing 性情) 73–74, 82,
103, 112–113, 121
and the Way of Heaven 120, 121n44
basic (benxing 本性)
pure innate nature (tianxing, 天性) 183
hundred schools of philosophers (zhuzi baijia
諸子百家) 102n11, 241,
reinterpreted 289–297
Hu Shi (1891–1962) 237
Hu Yin (1098–1156) 127
rentong 國族認同) 318
ideology, political 6, 12, 13, 14, 19, 64, 70, 89,
99, 104, 123, 126, 148, 160, 167, 168, 170,
171, 173, 181, 195, 199, 208, 213, 222, 227,
228 , 231, 233, 234n56, 246, 248, 258, 283,
294, 303, 306, 320
Ming dynasty 176
(mingli bianxing 明理辯性) 111–112
immortal Dao body (daoshen 道身 or Dao
nature, daoxing) 90
Imperial Library in Four Treasuries (Siku
quanshu, 1773–1782) 224n40, 245, 283
imperial power and authority, Chinese,
sources of 320n28
improper cults (yinci 淫祀) 150, 153
Index
innate knowledge, innate knowing (liangzhi
良知) 178–179, 182, 185, 187, 188n80,
189–191, 187
extension of 184
inner transcendence (neizai chaoyue
内在超越) 116, 122, 141
Inoue Enryô, 302nn96, 97(1858–1919) and
Buddhism for the nation 302
intellectualism 137–138, 198
intellectual order 20, 62–83, 87, 97, 98, 100,
112, 122, 195, 241, 242
international concessions (zujie 租界) 279
investigate things and understand principle
to the utmost (gewu qiongli
格物窮理) 116, 116n35, 118
investigation of things (gewu 格物,
approaches to phenomena) 74–75, 119,
121, 124, 129, 132, 137–139, 137n78, 142,
145, 170, 181, 184–185, 185n71, 186, 189,
195, 215, 240, 277, 280
inward turning (neizhuan 内轉) 116
Itô Hirobumi (1841–1909) 312
Jamal ad-Din (fl. 1250s) 207
James, William 58n11
Japan, influence on China 202, 204, 270,
276, 281, 284n65, 292, 295, 296, 299–303
Meiji Restoration 300
Jesuits in China 201, 214n21, 223, 226, 281n60
Jia Dan (730–805) World Map of Chinese and
Barbarians (Hainei Hua Yi tu) 801 218,
218n25
Jia Gongsong (mid-11th century) 112
Jiajing Emperor (Zhu Houcong, 1507–1567,
r. 1521–1567) forbids study of Wang
Yangming 178
Jiang Fan (1761–1831) 245, 265, 286n68
Record of the Origins of Han Learning
(Hanxue yuanyuan ji, 1811) 245
Record of the Origins of Song Learning
(Songxue yuanyuan ji, ca. 1822) 245
Record of the Transmission of the Masters
of the School of Han Learning (Hanxue
shicheng ji) 265
Jiang Taigong (Lü Shang, or Lü Wang) 291
Jiang Yong (1681–1762) 262
Jiao Xun (1763–1820) 245, 248, 253, 255, 256,
257, 260, 261, 262, 264, 266, 267, 290, 291
347
Author’s Preface to Explanations of
Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication
and Division (Jia jian cheng chu shi
zixu) 264
Explanations of Arcs (Shihu 釋弧) 262
li 理not “principle” in ancient classics 
253–254
three important things for ultimate
understanding of the universe 264
eight essays “On Expediency” (shuo quan
說權) against moral absolutism 256
jinshi 進士 advanced scholar degree 5, 7, 19,
67, 161 進士)
Jizang (549–623), Lotus Sûtra expert 23
Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE) 287
Jurchen Jin state defeat Norther Song dynasty
1127 126
six methods of writing Chinese (liushu
六書) 264
Kaiyuan (Buddhist) temples 12
Rites of Kaiyuan (Kaiyuan li), 732 6
Kang Xi Emperor (r. 1661–1722) 223
Kang Youwei (1858–1927) 296–297, 302n97,
308n6, 316, 318
A Study of Confucius as a Reformer (Kongzi
gaizhi kao) 285
Forged Classics of the Wang Mang Period
(Xinxue weijing kao) 285
third reform memorial to Guangxu 1895 
314
influenced by Inoue Enryô 302n97
killing people to sacrifice to demons” (sharen
jigui 殺人祭鬼) or capturing the living”
(caisheng 採生) 155
Kingly Way (wangdao 王道) 107, 123, 276
King Wuyue (Qian Liu, 852–932) revives
Tiantai Buddhism 40
knowledge or knowing (zhi 知) 116
Khubilai Qaghan (1215–1294, Yuan Emperor
Shizu, r. 1260–1294) 168, 207n8
discusses Confucianism with Zhang Dehui
(1195–1275) 168
takes title Great Scholar of Confucianism
(Rujiao da zongshi, 儒教大宗師) 
168–169
knowledge, conclusive (evidentiary) 240,
241
348
Kong Guangsen (1751–1786) and Gongyang
school 283
Kong Zhenshi (1613 jinshi) 226
Kuiji (632–682) and Consciousness Only 23,
24, 26, 30
Kumârajîva (c. 334–413) 23
Lao-an 老安 (i.e. Daoan 道安) 44
Laozi (Daodejing, Classic of the Way and its
Power) 3, 11, 89, 89n77, 90, 93
Laozi (the person) 11, 88
On Returning to One’s True Nature
(Fuxing shu) 72
legalism ( fazhi zhuyi 法制主義) 123
legal studies (lüxue 律學) 123n47
legitimacy (of government, dynasty) 1, 2, 5,
10–16, 64, 66n23, 71, 75, 76, 77, 96–100,
103, 124, 126, 152, 165, 207, 231, 234–235,
255, 257, 260, 262, 287, 291, 320
cultural legitimacy 99
discourses on dynastic legitimacy
(zhengtong lun) 99, 111, 111n25
leishu (類書) encyclopedias 3, 221
li 吏 minor officials, clerks, functionaries  mathematics 263, 265, 312
108n17
liangzhi 良知see innate knowledge, innate
knowing
Li Ao (772–836/841) 67, 70n35, 76, 78, 79, 112,
120
On Returning to One’s True Nature
(Fuxing shu) 72–73
Liang Qichao (1873–1929) 237–239, 250n3,
253n8, 296, 299, 302, 303, 308n6
On the Relationship between Buddhism and
Collective Rule (Fojiao yu qunzhi zhi
guanxi) 302
Intellectual Trends in the Qing Period
(Qingdai xueshu gailun) on Qing
scholars reading notes and letters  lineages (xiangjian zongzu 鄉間宗族),
238
Record of the Wuxi (1898) Coup (Wuxi
zhengbian ji) 310
Liang Su (753–793) 31n28, 39, 40n40, 69
Shenxian zhuan lun (On the Biographies
of Immortals) 88
Lianchi (Zhuhong, 1535–1615) 188
Liang Tingnan (1796–1861) 271, 274
Index
Four Essays on the Maritime Countries
(Haiguo sishuo) 271
praise for United States democracy 274
Liao Khitan dynasty (916–1125) 96–97
Li Bo (773–831) 84
Li Deyu (787–85) 78, 81, 85, 86–88, 151
Li Fengbao (Qing dynasty) reads of India in
Berlin library 272
Li Guangdi (1642–1718) 233
debates on geography 223
interested in Western knowledge 259
Li Hanguang (682–769) 84–85, 91
Li He (790–816) 79
Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) 280, 312
Li Hua (715–766) 21, 39, 69
Li Jifu (758–814) 78
Li Mi (722–789) 21
Lin Guangchao (1114–1178) 127
Lin Zexu (1785–1850) Chronicle of Four
Continents (Sizhou zhi) 271
Li Rongli (fl. 683) on origin of universe
(genesis point) 93
Li Rui (1768–1817) celebrated for
Li Shangyin (813?–858) defends Yuan Jie’s
critique (see Yuan Jie) 67n27
Li Shanlan (1811–1882) want to surpass
Western mathematics 312
Li Shuchang (1837–18997) 281
asserts England is governed by its people 
274
Li Xinchuan (1167–1244) affirms Zhu Xi’s
daotong genealogy 132n65
Li Yong (Erqu, 1627–1705) 198, 240
Li Zhizao (1565–1630) 205, 208n9, 210, 221,
226
Lin Shu (1829–1898) 306
Li Na (758–792) usurps title of king 62
rural 236
Ling Tingkan (1755–1809) 248, 252n7, 253,
255, 257, 257n22, 261, 265, 266, 267, 291
importance of Western
astronomy 262–263
linguistics, historical 247–248, 257, 261, 265,
288, 292–293
Lingyou (771–853) of Guishan 49, 54
Index
literary inquisitions (imprisonment for one’s
writings, wenzi yu 文字獄) of Qing
dynasty 234
Liu Anjie (f. 12th century) 127n56
Liu Fang (?–?, Tang dynasty) 8–9, 9n8
Liu Feng (?–200 CE) 219, 219n29
Liu Fenglu (1776–1829) and Gongyang
school 283, 285
A Textual Study of Master Zuo’s
Commentary to the Spring and Autumn
Annals (Zuoshi Chunqiu kao) 285
Liu Kai (948–1001 112
Liu Ke (fl. ca. 873) on intellectual situation in
Mid-Tang 68
Liu Kunyi (1830–1902) 280
Liu Renxi (1844–1919) Chunqiu gongfa
neizhuan 285n66
Liu Shi (fl. 8th century) 85
Liu Tui (fl. ca. 850) A Southerner’s Letter
on the Village Drinking Rite (Jiangnan lun
xian yinjiu lishu) on disintegration of
Tang intellectual order 67
Liu Xuanjing (?–851) 86
Liu Yin (1249–1293 169
Liu Zhong, held official examinations in 1237  Luo Rufang (1515–1588) radical Wang
168
Liu Yuxi (772–842) 21, 74
Confucian Middle Way 74
Liu Zongyuan (773–819) 21, 69, 76, 80nn54,
55, 57
On Fengjian (Fengjian lun) for strong
central government 65, 66n23
Liu Zongzhou (Jishan, 1578–1645) praises
Wang Yangming 192, 229n46
Essential principles and developments of
the Learning of the Sages (Shengxue
zongyao) genealogy of Neo-
Confucianism Song to Ming 198
Records of Thoughts and Questions:Outer
Section (Siwenlu waipian) used
traditional Chinese ideas 212
Li Yong (1627–1705) 240
Li Zhi (1527–1602) radical Wang
Yangming 194, 194n93
no sages and no laws (feisheng wufa 非聖
無法) 194
On the Four Seas (Sihai shuo) admits
Western ideas 210
suicide in prison in 1602 195
349
Lizong (Zhao Yun, 1205–1264, r. 1224–1264)
Emperor 167
favors Zhu Xi and lixue 126n53
orders lixue scholars sacrifices in
Confucian Temple 147
Li Zongmin (d. 846?), Discussion of Going
Along with the Times (Suilun), anti-Han
Yu polemic 81
local gazetteers (difang zhi) 135n69, 149, 175,
239
Longqing Emperor (Zhu Zaihou, 1537–1572,
r. 1567–1572) 178, 192
“Lord of Heaven” (tianzhu) Roman Catholic
Godhead 208
loyalty (zhong 忠) 165, 195
Lü Dajun (1029–1080) 106, 127n56, 161
Lü Dazhong (1020–c. 1100) 127n56
Lü Gongzhu (1018–1089) 106
Lü Liuliang (1629–1683) 230, 236
Luo Dajing (1196–1242), Crane Forest Morning
Dew (Helin yulu) 162–163
Luo Hongxian (1504–1564) 193, 197
Luo Qinshun (1465–1547) defends Zhu Xi vs.
Wang Yangming 192
Yangming 194
Luoshu 洛/雒書 , Luo writing 243
Luoyang Studies (Yichuan xue), see Cheng Yi
Lu Guimeng (?–881) 83n60
Lu Huishen (?–716) critique of Tang
officialdom 17–19
Lu Jiuling (1132–1180) 125, 128, 139
Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan) 125–148, 142n91,
161–162, 166, 170, 177, 180, 182, 199,
225–226, 241
attraction for Ming scholars 177
debates with Zhu Xi 125–148
influence of Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan 
144–148
universe is my mind, and my mind is the
universe 225
Lu Longqi (1630–1692) 233
critique of Wang Yangming and Cheng-
Zhu, Ge Zhaoguang disagrees with 
196n101
first Qing Confucian to receive Confucian
temple sacrifices 235
Lu Tong (790–835) 79
Lu Wenchao (1717–1796) 266
350
Lü Family Village Compact (Lüshi xiangyue)
edited by Lü Dajun, revised by Zhu Xi  291n75
161
Lü Zuqian (1137–1181) 125–126, 128, 128n58,
132, 136, 140, 140n83, 147, 170
Lü Yuantai (c. 705–710) against barbarian
customs 16–17
Lü Zhi (1092–1135) defends Cheng Yi 128
magic staffs (shenzhang 神杖) of shamans  Middle Kingdom (China) 201, 217, 218n25,
149
mahadvîpa or Buddhist four great continents
(si da bu zhou 四大部洲) 225
Mao Qiling (1623–1716) 233n54, 243
Mandate of Heaven 2, 6, 64, 75, 97, 262
Manichaeism (monijiao 摩尼教) 12, 159
Ma Piyao (?–1895) ten self-strengthening
recommendations 306
Mao Qiling (1623–1716) 233n54, 243
Map of the Myriad Countries on the Earth
(Matteo Ricci, et al.) 214n20,
marriage and divorce 9n8, 134, 156–157,
remarriage 157n15
Martin, W. A. P. (1827–1916) translation of
Henry Wheaton’s Elements of
International Law 278
Masaharu Anesaki (1873–1949) on Buddhism
and science 302
material force (vital essence, qi 氣) 121, 129,
130, 137, 145, 162
clear and turbid (qingqi 清氣 and zhuoqi
濁氣) 137
material objects (shiwu 事物) 118
mathematics (shu 數) of astronomy and
calendrical calculations 261
Ma Tingluan (1223–1289) 171
Mazu Daoyi (also called Hongzhou Daoyi,
709–788) 41–43, 46, 47, 48, 51, 54 see also
Mazu Chan Buddhism
Quotations (Yulu) of 54
Meeting at Goose Lake Temple (E hu zhi hui
鵝湖之會), see Zhu Xi, Lu Xiangshan
Mei Wending (1633–1721) receives Western
knowledge 259, 259n23
Mencius or the Mengzi 41, 74, 76, 76n46, 77,
80, 80n57, 83, 83n60, 101, 121n44, 128,
131–133, 142, 147, 169, 174, 182, 185, 187,
Index
215n23, 227, 251, 256, 274, 274n48,
and Confucian genealogy of daotong, see
daotong 76
Mengzi made a keju examination text 
169
Meng Anpai (7th century), Pivotal Meanings
of Daoist Teaching (Daojiao yishu) 90
Meng Jiao (751–814) 79
221, 269, 271, 271, 273
Mi Jiasui (mid-17th century) 226
military governors ( fanzhen 藩鎮), Tang
provincial 61–67, 78
Military School (bingjia 兵家), ancient 
293–294
mind of the Way (daoxin 道心) 138–139,
142, 180–184
mind, human 29, 45–46, 138–139, 142,
180–181, 183–185, 243, 248–249,
252–253, 255
and nature as origin of cosmos 115
mind is principle (xin ji li 心即理) 139,
177, 181, 189–190, 197–198
nature of the mind (temperament),
xinxing 心性 139
original mind (benxin 本心) 20, 142, 185
mind, nature and feelings (xinling xingqing
心靈性情) 75
mingjiao (名教) Confucian ritual code of
ethical behavior 234
mingjing enlightening the classics degree 5
Ming loyalists (yimin 遺民) 230–231, 232n52
modernity, modern, modernization 147,
296, 301, 313, 321, 316, 318
mobility (social and ease of movement) 
8–9, 19
and collapse of the great lineages in Tang 
8–9
moral idealism 80–81, 106, 123–128, 144, 176,
257–258
morality and ethics 100, 275
moral principle see daotong
moral principle (yili 義理) vs. evidential
research 228
moral rationality 106, 146
Morrison, Robert (1782–1834) Brief History of
Foreign Countries (Waiguo shilüe) 271
Index
Mozi 114, 215n23, 291n75
Mozi, the 292
Mozi’s logic 294
Mu Xiu (979–1032) 112
Muirhead, William (1822–1900) Chronicle of
Great Britain (Da Yingguo zhi) 271
Mysterious Learning (Neo-Daoism, xuanxue
玄學) 56, 74, 297
nation or state (guojia) 153, 318–319
concept growing in Song dynasty 153
national or ethnic duty (minzu dayi
民族大義) 235
nationalism, discourse of 226, 230–231, 238,
244, 311, 316, 318–321
antitraditional 319
and universalism/internationalism 311,
316, 318–319
iconoclastic (Lin Yusheng, fanchuantong
de minzu zhuyi 反傳統的民族主義)  Nestorian Christianity ( jingjiao 景教) 12,
319
fundamentalist 319
national salvation through strength ( jiuwang
tuqiang 救亡圖強) 321
national salvation ( jiuwang) vs.
enlightenment (qimeng) 321
nature (xing 性) 24, 25–27, 40n40, 43–45,
47–51, 72, 73–75, 72n38, 77–79, 82, 89,
91, 92, 100, 100n8, 102–103, 110, 112–126,
116nn34, 35, 121n44, 127, 128, 130–139,
136n71, 142n93, 182–186, 185n72,
196n101, 240, 241, 245, 249, 251, 251n6,
253, 254n12, 255–256, 257n22,
nature and destiny (xingming 性命) 74, 100,
254
what is inborn is called nature (sheng zhi
wei xing 生之謂性) 254
nature and principle (xingli 性理) 126–129,
139, 166, 185
Neo-Confucianism
School of Principle (lixue 理學),
Cheng-Zhu School of Principle  179
101–178, 130n63, 167n35, 195, 196,
227–228 , 233, 237, 240–254, 265
also called Daoxue 道學, the Learning
of the Way 101n9, 120
as schoolroom textual dogma or
political strategy 172
351
institutionalization in Yuan and Ming 
168, 174n47
On Valuing Correct Learning and
Refuting Strange Views 195, 196
politicization and standardization in
the Yuan 170–172
popularization and decline in Song to
Ming 166
literally, the Learning of Principle 
101n9
popularization in Song dynasty 161
supported by early Manchu-Qing
emperors 233
transformed as official ideology, see
chapter 10 148–200
School of Mind (xinxue 心學) 101n9,
144, 177–187 see Wang Yangming
literally, the Learning of the Mind-and-
Heart 101n9
16
New Etiquette (Xinyi 新儀) 154
New Policies (bianfa 變法), New Laws (xinfa
新法) of Wang Anshi 106, 123–124
New Policies (xinzheng 新政) of late
Qing 308, 311, 314–315
New Text classical learning (jinwen jingxue
今文經學, New Text Confucianism) 
283–286, 285n66, 286n68, 287–288
Changzhou School of New Text
Confucianism 284
Nie Shuangjiang (1487–1563) 193, 197
Niu Sengru (780–849) 82, 88
non-action (wuwei 無為) 47, 90
non-interference, goal of (無為之旨) 90
nonbeing 39, 48, 114
Numa Pompilius (753–673 BCE) 287
O’ Conor, Sir Nicholas Robert supports
self-strengthening 307
official schools (xuegong 學宮) 129, 172n43,
Office of Compiling and Editing (Bianxiusuo
编修所), Yuan 168
Office of Classical Texts (Jingjisuo 經籍所),
Yuan 168
Old Text Book of Documents (Guwen
Shangshu shuzheng 242, 243, 260
352
Old Text classical learning (guwen jingxue
古文經學) 285
one single thread of Confucius’ thought 113,
115, 136, 265n35
On the Gnomon (Biaodu shuo, 1614) 208
On the Subtle Principle of Respecting the
Ruler in the Spring and Autumn Annals
(Chunqiu zunwang fawei) 111
Opium Wars (1840–43 and 1860–61) 275,
308, 319
ordering one’s family (qijia 齊家) 74,
129n59, 132, 134, 205n5
original substance of the mind (xin zhi ben/
benti 心之本/本體) 182, 184, 185–196,
191n86
original substance of heaven 183
orthodoxies, three Chinese: political
(zhengtong 政統), Confucian (cultural)
(daotong 道統), orthodoxy (shentong
神統) 320
Ôuchi Seiran (1845–1918) on Buddhism and
science 302
Ouyang Jian (1871–1943) and Buddhist studies  Principle Meanings of the Mysterious Gate
296
Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072) 99n5, 102n11, 106,
107n15, 111, 112, 131
Discourses on Dynastic Legitimacy
(Zhengtong lun) 111
Essay on Fundamentals (Benlun) 111
paintings of foreign personages 218–219
Paintings of Presentations of Tributes (Zhigong
tu), the oldest 218–219
Paintings of Imperial Audience (Wanghui tu)  printing 109, 128, 150, 179
219
Presentation of Tributes to the Imperial Court
(Chaogong tu) 219
Huang Qing Zhigong tu (Tang copy)  protect the state, protect the race, protect the
219n27
Zhigong tu by Xie Sui (Qianlong era)  種, 保教) 318
219n27
Pan Shizheng (?–682) 84, 91
Paramârtha (499–569) 23
Party Proscription, Qingyuan 126n53, 127,
130, 147
Pei Xiu (224–271) Map of the Regions in the
“Tributes of Yu” (Yu Gong diyu tu) 218
Pei Xiu (791–864) 69
Index
Peng Yan (fl. 766–780) 78n52
Pei Du (765–839) 65, 79, 80n56, 81
fears for the Tang dynasty 65
Pei Lin (d. 838) 88
people are of supreme importance (min wei
gui 民為貴) 274
physics (wuli, principles of matter) 119, 216,
277, 297, 298, 313
Pi Rixiu (834/84–883) 83n60
polemics (Buddhist-Daoist) 91–92, 92n82
pragmatism, or practical approach to politics 
68, 108, 124, 127, 141, 237, 256182n60,
Prajñapâramitâ thought domesticated 51
primal nothingness (benwu 本無) 90
principle (li 理) 27, 100, 102, 182, 226, 250n3,
253, 256
nothing is greater than the Way and
principle (dao li zui da 道理最大) 
100
principle is one but its manifestations are
many (li yi fen shu 理一分殊) 
116–137, 116n35, 117n36
(Xuanmen dayi) 90
Principle of Heaven (tianli 天理) 14n14, 117,
121, 129, 133, 141–142, 142n91, 144–145,
215, 248–258
as the “originating principle” (yuanli
原理) of the universe 249
as the “originating principle” of human
society 249
highest principle of the School of
Principle 249
private schools, academies (shuyuan書院),
village schools (xiangshu 鄉塾, private
learning 100, 109, 129, 179, 236
faith (baoguo, baozhong, baojiao 保國, 保
Ptolemy, Claudius (ca. 90–168) 210, 287
public (gong) and private (si) equal: 235
Public Vehicle Petition (gongche shangshu)
to Guangxu 318
Puji (651–739) 33n30, 36–37
Puyuan of Nanquan (748–834) 52, 54
dialogue with Congshen of Zhaozhou 
50–51
Index
qi 氣 vital energy or life force of the universe  establishes keju examination system
137, 210, 241
Qian Daxin (1728–1804) 248, 250, 265–267,
290
preface to Jiao Xun’s Explanations of Arcs
(Shihu 釋弧) 262
Chinese scholars must learn mathematics  order 206, 255
263
Qian Mu (1895–1990) 237
Qiji (863–937) 60
Qingliang Wenyi 52, 54, 61, 61n16
qingtan 清谈 pure talk, idle talk 178
Qing dynasty
monolithic unity and suppression of
thought 229–237
statism (guojia zhuyi 國家主義) against
power sharing (fenquan 分權) 236
Qi Ying (748–795) 21
Quan Deyu (759–818) 21, 65, 69, 91n81
Discussions on the Fall of the Two Hans
(Liang Han bian wang lun) 65
Quan Zuwang (1705–1755) 241
Qu Shisi (1590–1651) Short Comments on
Account of Countries Not Listed in the
Records Office (Zhifang waiji
xiaoyan) 222, 225
random jottings (biji 筆記) 175
reason or principle vs. passion or desire 253
unity of principle and desire 257n22
Recorded Quotations (Yulu) 167
rectification of the heart/mind (zhengxin
正心) 74, 132, 137
rectifying ones mind and making one’s will
sincere” (zhengxin chengyi 正心誠意)  on astronomy and mathematics:
119–120, 185
reform, weixin 維新 78, 78n52, 98, 311
Regional Commanders, Tang 96
Regional States (zhuhouguo 諸侯 236
regulating the state (zhiguo 治國) 75, 120,
129n59, 132, 205n5
Reid, Gilbert (1857–1927) supports
self-strengthening 307
ren 仁 see humanity
renovation (genghua 更化) 320
Renzong (Zhao Zhen, 1010–1063, r. 1022–1063)
Song Emperor 149
Renzong (1285–1320, r. 1311–1320) Yuan Emperor
353
1312–1313 169
key texts fixed as the Four Books with
Zhu Xi’s Collected
Commentaries on the Four Books 169
resonance/correspondence theory of
return to the ancients (fugu 復古) 320
revolution (geming 革命) 320
revolutionary (thinking, etc.) 148, 192, 248,
279, 311,
Ricci, Matteo (1552–1610) 201, 207, 208,
212–227, 214n20, 224n41, 259
proves earth is round 209
Richard, Timothy (1845–1919) supports
self-strengthening 307, 308n6
rightness, righteousness, justice (yi 義) 
67n27, 71, 72, 98, 129, 140, 141, 157, 195,
198, 254, 255
rites, ceremonies, ritual, ritual system, ritual
order 13, 17, 71, 97, 98
importance of li 禮 rites or propriety
over li 理 principle/reason 256
rites and music 71, 98–99
rites and rightness (liyi 禮儀) 102n11, 157
debates on in Tang 13–14
Roman Catholicism 205, 219
Roman Empire (Da Qin) 217
Ruan Yuan (1764–1849) 248, 251n4, 252, 253,
254, 254n12, 255, 257, 261–263, 265–267,
291, 312
Disputing the Return to the True Nature of
Buddhist/Daoist Teaching (Fuxing
Bian) 254
Biographies of Astronomers and
Mathematicians (Chouren zhuan)
1799 267
on nature and destiny: Interpretations of
Nature and Destiny (Xingming
guxun) 254
On (or Refuting) Buddhist Ideas of Nature
(Ta xing shuo) 254
Ruggieri, Michele Pompilio (1543–1607) 201
Ruhui (744–843) 47
Ruizong (Li Dan, r. 684–690 and 710–712) 5
issued edicts calling for reformation of
social customs 5n4
354 Index

ruler and subject, duty between (jun chen zhi shame, sense of 240
yi 君臣之義) 284 Shanghai Polytechnic Institution (Gezhi
shuyuan, 1874) 279
sacrifices, sacrificial ceremonieses 101 shaman (shiwu 師巫) 88, 93, 149
ceremonial banners and weaponry housolds returned to agriculture 149
prohibited 159–160 suppressed 149–156
cremation forbidden in Song dynasty  Shang Yang 291
159, 159n19 Shao Yong (1011–1077) 100, 100n8, 104,
demonic religious teachings (yaojiao 113–116, 116n34, 118, 120, 131, 132, 243n71
妖教) forbidden 159 Xiantian tu [Chart of eight trigrams] and
erotic ceremonies public nude mind 116n34
performances (luoxi 裸戲) 156 Shen Buhai 114, 291
official (zhengsi 正祀) 152 Shen Defu (1578–1642) 188n81
popular (anti-government) gatherings Shenhui (684–758) 33n30, 36–38, 46, 48, 56
prohibited 160 Shen Jiji (ca. 740–ca. 800) 3
temple sacrifices in Song Shenxiu (?–706) 33n30, 36–37, 41, 44, 50
dynasty 152–153 gâtha on body and mind 44, 188
to heterodox spirits and demons (cishen Shen Yong (710–788) 92, 92n82
sigui 祠神祀鬼) forbidden 159 Shenzong (Zhao Zhongzhen, Zhao Xu,
unorthodox banned 148–151, 153–155 1048–1085, r. 1067–1085), Song Emperor 
use of human bodies for sacrifices (renti 105–125 , 107n15, 110n21, 123n47
xisheng ji 人體犧牲祭) 155n12 Shibei (835–908) 61n16
scholar-officials (shidafu 士大夫) explained  Shi Jie (1005–1045) 82n59, 112
108n17 On China (Zhongguo lun) 99, 111
Scholarly Cases of Song and Yuan Classical On the Bizarre (Guai shuo) 99
Scholars (Song Yuan xue-an) 170 Shinto (Shendao 神道) 300
schools, new (Western) style (xuetang 學堂)  Shrimp barbarians (xiayi 蝦夷) 305–306
301, 314 Shubhakarasimha (Shan Wuwei, 673–735) 
Scripture of the Genesis Point (Benji jing)  28
90–91 Shunzhi (1644–1662) Emperor 212, 232
seeking the real (zhishi 徵實) 241 Shu Yuanyu (d. 835) on Late Tang scholarly
self-cultivation, moral 7, 75, 145, 198 conceit 68n29
self-strengthening (ziqiang 自強) 280, Siku quanshu, see Imperial Library in Four
282n62, 300–307, 307n4, 308 Treasuries
Self-strengthening Society (Qiangxue hui)  silence ( jiran 寂然) and absence of desires 
308n6, 314 117
Western support for 307–308 Sima Chengzhen (647–735) 84, 85
Society for the Diffusion of Christian and Master of Heavenly Immortality
General Knowledge (Guangxue hui (Tianyinzi) 91
廣學會) 308n6 On Sitting in Oblivion (Zuowanglun) 91
Sengzhao (384–414) 51 Sima Guang (1019–1086) 15n15, 104, 108, 120,
Senshô Murakami (1851–1929) on Buddhism 123, 125, 132, 156–157, 159
and science 302 Letters and Etiquette (Shuyi 書儀) 135
sensual desires (qingyu 情欲) 139 sincerity, sincere (cheng 誠) 77, 114n30, 117
seriousness ( jing 敬) 117, 117n37, 118n38, 137 achieve enlightenment through
exercise of seriousness” (jujing 居敬)  (chengming 誠明) 75
139 sincerity of thought (chengyi 誠意) 74, 137
sex, xing 性 156, 251, 254–256 Sino-centrism, Chinese nationalism 217,
Shall, Johann Adam (1592–1666) 205n5 219, 230, 238, 244, 311, 318
Index
Sino-Japanese War ( jiawu yiyi 甲午一役
1894–95) 295, 308, 310, 313
simplification and dogmatism of ideas in the
Tang 6–8
ornamentation and superficiality 8
six arts of ancient China (六術) 262
Smogulecki, Jan Nicolas (1611–1656)
translated Western astronomy works 210
Song Gaoseng zhuan 93
Song Learning (Songxue, Song Neo-
Confucian School of Principle) 245 see
Han Learning
Song Shu (1862–1910) 296, 297, 303
and Buddhist studies 296
Confirmation of Indian and European
Learning (Yin-Ou xue zheng) 298
discusses Xunzi 295n83
uses Buddhist sûtras to explain
European ideas 297
Song Yuren (1857–1931) 227, 311
On Adopting the Customs of Western
Nations (Caifeng ji) for adopting
Western political system 313
preface to Chen Chi Book on Common
Activities (Yongshu), causes of Chinese
weakness, 1896 277, 311
Sosigenes (fl. 75 BCE) 287
soul caps (hunmao 魂帽) of shamans 149
soul headbands (hunjin 魂巾) of shamans  r. 1229–1241) Yuan Emperor 168
149
souls, hun 魂 and po 魄 51, 162
spirit images (shenxiang 神像) of shamans  talismans ( fulu 符箓) of shamans 94, 149
149
spiritual beings (guishen 鬼神) 162
spiritual entities (shenling 神靈) 162
Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu) 13,
67–69, 71, 111, 173n47, 227, 285, 285n66
spirit robes (shenshan 神衫) of shamans  from the Civil Examinations in Hunan
149
statecraft (jingshi 經世) 116n34, 229, 237,
244, 293
Structure and Meanings of the Heaven and
Earth (Qiankun tiyi, 1605 208
study that investigates the phenomena of
nature to acquire knowledge (gezhi zhixue
格致之學) 267
substance (ti 體) 204
substance (zhi 質) derived from material
force 137
355
Su Che (1039–1112) 106
Sun Baoxuan, Buddhism contains all Western
science 298
Sun Fu (992–1057) 98, 111, 112, 114
The Humiliation of the Confucians (Ru ru)
laments decline of Confucianism 
114
Sun Qifeng (1584–1675) 240
Su Shi (1036–1101) 106, 295
Sun Chengze (1592–1676) 232n52
Sun Xingyan (1753–1818) 255
superior man ( junzi 君子), the 67, 75, 185,
190
watchful over himself when he is alone
(junzi shen qi du 君子 慎其獨) 185
full passage 185n72
suppression of popular religious beliefs,
practices 158–159
Tabgatch (Tuoba) 158
taiping see Great Peace
Taiqin (?–d. 974) 61n16
Taizhou School of Wang Gen, He Xinyin and
Li Zhi 193, 193n91, 194n92
Taiwan ceded to Japan in 1895 305
Taixu (Lü Peilin, 1890–1947) and Buddhist
studies 296
Taizong (Ögedei Qaghan, 1186–1241,
Taizong (Zhao Kuangyi, 939–997, r. 976–997)
Song Emperor 96, 152
Tang Bin (1627–1687) 233, 233n53, 234n56
Tang Caichang (1867–1900)
favors learning from the West 313,
313n15, 317
Record of Selected Essays on General Arts
(YuanXiang tongyi lu) 313
Tang imperial Li family’s non-Han origins 15
Tang Taizong, Li Shimin (r. 626–649) 1–2, 295
Tang Xianzu (1550–1616) 194
Tan Sitong (1865–1898) 295n83, 296, 298,
299, 303, 308n6
Buddhist ideas confirm Western science 
298, 299
discusses Xunzi 295n83
Exposition of Humanity (Ren xue, 仁學
1896/1897) 316n21
356
Tao Hongjing (456–536) 84
Tao Wangling (1562–1609) 188n80, 194
teachers (shi 師) vs. officials (li 吏) 107–110
respect for the teacher and valuing the
Way in his teaching (zunshi zhongdao
尊師重道)
way of the teacher (shidao 師道) 111
ten thousand things (wanwu 萬物), material
things of the universe 93, 115, 133,
136–137, 182
Testimony of the True Religion (in Chinese,
Catholic translation) 208
textual criticism (kaoju考據) and evidential
research (also: evidential studies
[kaojuxue 考據學], evidential
investigation, (evidentiary investigation
[kaojiu zhenshi 考究真實 or kaozheng
考證] 227–247, 247–290
contrast with fact-based “reality” (zhenshi
真實) 286
searching for the original meaning of the
classics 242
Three Masters of the Numinous Treasure
Mystery Grotto (Dongxuan Lingbao
sanshi) 86
three sacred islands and ten sacred
continents (sandao shizhou 三島十洲)
Tian Liangyi or Tian Xuying (?–811) 86
Tianqi Emperor (Zhu Youxiao, 1605–1627,
r. 1620–1627) ends private academinies
1625 199
tianxia (All Under Heaven) 3, 64, 66, 75, 96,
98, 102, 102n11, 111, 111n25, 120, 123,
129n59, 132, 140, 155n13, 170, 173, 178,
236, 251n6, 272, 283, 294, 318–320
collapse of 201–227
to age of multi-state world 201–205
making guojia of tianxia (Joseph R.
Levenson) 204
Tian Yue (751–784) usurps title of king 62
three bonds and five constant virtues
(sangang wuchang 三綱五常) 140
ti 體 substance (vs. yong 用 function) 30,
204, 204n4, 214n21
Tianhuang Daowu (748–807) of Jingzhou  cultural 228 , 231
49
tianxia see All Under Heaven, universe
Index
Tianran (739–824) of Danxia 54–55
Song of Appreciating Our Pearl (Wan
zhuyin 玩珠吟) 54–55
Song of the Precious Black Dragon Pearl
(Lilong zhuyin 驪龍珠吟) 54–55
Song of Toying with Our Pearl (Nong
zhuyin 弄珠吟) 54–55
Toynbee, Arnold J., A Study of History on
Chinese world view 206
tradition of political power, orthodoxy, see
zhengtong 116
transcendence 30, 49, 51, 59, 62, 69, 88,
91–93, 95, 113, 116, 122, 135, 141, 143, 165,
172, 181, 183, 200, 229, 233, 255, 258
inner moral transcendence (neizai daode
chaoyue 内在道德超越) 233
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 (defeat by
Japanese) 204, 295, 305–307, 312, 314, 317
treading the void (daoxu 蹈虛) 241–242
Tributes of Yu (Yugong) 218, 223, 242, 287,
288
true nature (of human beings) 72–73
recover your 74
return to 72–73, 254
Shûnyatâ as 118
True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (in
Chinese, Jesuit translation) 201
Tubo (Tibetan) threat 63, 69
Tujue (Türks) threat eliminated 63
Shatuo Türks (Western Tujue) 63
Twofold Mystery (chongxuan jingjie
重玄境界), realm of the 89–91
Two Kings: Wen, Wu 77
twofold forgetfulness (jianwang 兼忘) 90
Ui Hakujû, Researches in the History of Zen
Buddhism (Zenshûshi kenkyu) 37
Ultimate of Nonbeing (wuji 無極) above
Great Ultimate 114
unified society breaks down in Ming 
175–176
universalism 143, 199, 203, 308, 311, 318
and internationalism 226
and nationalism 311, 321
universally applicable “rule” ( faze 法則) for
all knowledge 265
Index
universal kingship 1, 105
universal truth (true principle, zhenli 真理)  Investigation of the Origins of Western
102n11, 125, 130, 146, 167, 174, 226, 266,
275–276, 285n66, 319
universe (tianxia, yuzhou) 12, 24, 28–30, 34,
36, 89, 92–93, 100, 112–116, 126, 136, 142,
144, 182, 197, 203, 210, 225, 241, 249, 261, 240n64, 252, 257n22,
263–264, 279
unorthodox gods (yinci 淫祠) 150, 153,
153n6, 162
urban merchants and great families, wealth
of 175
urging self-injury (qishang起傷) 155
using principle to kill people (yi li sharen 以
理殺人) in Qing dynasty 235, 251, 258
utopian idealism and totalism 79
Vagnoni, Alfonso (1566–1640) 205n5, 214n21
values of Chinese civilization 273, 281
Vajrabodhi (Jin Gangzhi, 669–741) 29
vast and empty tranquility (kongkuo xuji
空闊虛寂) 117
Vasubandhu (ca. 420–ca. 500) 23
Verbiest, Ferdinand (1623–1688) 205n5, 223
Wang Anshi (1021–1086) 104–110, 107n15,
110n21, 125, 131
Wang Fuzhi 230, 232
refutes Matteo Ricci as foolish 212
Wang Gen (1483–1541) 193, 194n92
Wang Ji (1498–1583) 189–190, 190n84, 191,
191n86, 192, 193
ideas equal Chan Buddhism 191n87
leads to “Left Wing” radical Wang
Yangming school 192
mind contains good but not evil 191
leads to naturalism (ziran zhuyi) 191
Wang Jiaxi (1775–1816) reinterprets li and xing  186n75
255
Wang Jiazhi (1604 jinshi) 226
Wang Lai (1768–1813) celebrated for
mathematics 263
Wang Mao (1151–1213) critique of Song
dynasty life 105n13
Wang Mingsheng (1722–1797) 266
Wang Niansun (1744–1832) 290
Wang Qiyuan (fl. 1620s)’s Qing shu jing tan
(1623) sets up Confucian theology  Wang Wujun (735–801) usurps title of king
197n102
357
Wang Tao (1828–1897) Preliminary
Learning (Xixue yuanshi kao) 272
Wang Tong (584–617) 131
Wang Yangming 王陽明 (Shouren 守仁,
1472–1528) 144, 175, 178–200, 228–241,
atmosphere of freedom created,
suppressed 199
Colloquy at the Tianquan Bridge 191n86
continuation of School of Principle 
180–184
critique of keju examinations 180n56
doctrine in four axioms” (siju jiao 四句教) 
189–190
extension of innate knowledge/knowing
(zhi liangzhi 致良知) 178, 184
Yü Ying-shih on 179n55
Instructions for Practical Living (Chuanxi
lu 傳習錄) 181, 198
human mind and mind of the Way not the
same 183
impure desires in the human mind 183
moral mind vs. incorrect human mind 
183
receives Confucian temple sacrifices in
Wanli era 180
mind and principle one or two 197
revisions of Zhu Xi doctrines 181–187
learning of the sages is the “learning of
mind” (xinxue 心學) 182
mind is simply human nature, human
nature is simply principle (xin ji xing,
xing ji li 心即性, 性即理) 182
no principle outside the mind; no event
outside the mind 183
every comes from the mind 186,
re-interpretations of the Confucian
classics 184
study of forbidden by Jiajing Emperor 
178
unity of knowledge (zhi 知) and action
(xing 行) 186–187, 187n76
Wang Qiong (9th century) 86
Wang Shiduo (1802–1889) promotes ancient
schools of philosophers 291
 
62
358
Wang Xichan (1628–1682) receives Western
knowledge 259
Wang Xinbo (f. 12th century) 127n56
Wang Yuanzhi (580–667) 84
Wang Yinzhi (1766–1834) 266
Wang Zhong (1745–1794) 290, 291
On Learning (Shuxue) 291
Wanli Emperor (Shenzong, Zhu Lijun,
1563–1620, r. 1572–1620) 180, 188, 194, 201,
211
Washington, George 269
Way, moral Way, see Dao
Way and principle (daoli 道理) 100, 102,
110–115, 145, 167n35
Way of Heaven 13, 115, 120, 121, 121n44, 136,
214
Way of the Hegemon (badao 霸道) 122, 140,
276
Weber, Max (1864–1920) three types of
domination 1n1
weeding out children (haozi 薅子),
infanticide 156n14
Wei Jun (1553–?) attacked Matteo Ricci’s
world map 223
Weikuan of Xingshan Temple 41, 42, 42n44,
52
Wei Qumou (749–801) 85, 92n82
Wei Xiangshu (1617–1687) 233, 234n56
Wei Yijie (1616–1686) 233, 234n56
Wei Yuan (1794–1856) 269–271, 297
compares Buddhist and Western
geography 297n85
Treatise on the Maritime Countries (Haiguo
tuzhi) 269, 271
use the barbarians to combat the
barbarians, etc. 270
Weng Fanggang (1733–1818) criticizes Dai
Zhen 252, 252n7
Wengong Family Rituals (Wengong jiali)
edited by Zhu Xi 161
Wen Tingshi (1856–1904) 296, 298, 299
and Buddhist studies 296–299
Western learning confirms uses Buddhist
teaching 298, 299
Weng Tonghe (1830–1904) supports self-
strengthening 307, 308n6
Wenyan (864–949) 52, 58
Wen Yanbo (1006–1097) 104, 111
Index
Wenyi (885–958) 52, 54, 61
Western Inscription (Ximing) 117n36, 167
Westernizing (Self-strengthening) faction
(yangwupai 洋務派) 301
Western learning 203, 205, 210, 214, 215,
259–264, 267, 268, 272, 278, 279, 289,
292, 296–299, 303, 306, 311, 313–318
books and periodicals introducing 
278
confirms Buddhist ideas 298
knowledge Chinese absorbed in late
Qing 279
originated in China (xixue zhongyuan
西學中源) 203, 211, 259, 268, 312
Western logic 297
White Lotus, bailianjiao 白蓮教, Rebellion,
1794–1804 266
will, human (yi 意) 113, 190
witness groups (people correcting each
other’s moral failings, zhengrenhui
證人會) 198
women 5, 10, 18, 150, 154, 160, 256
status declines in Song dynasty 156
women’s body unclean 157
female chastity 157, 157n16
Woncheuk (Yuance, 613–696) 23, 24, 26
world history 271
writing expresses the Way (wen yi zai dao
文以載道) 77n50
Wu Chong (1021–1080) favors legal studies 
123n47
Wu Lanxiu (1789–1839) 265
Wu Rulun (1840–1903) 281
Wu Yubi (Kangzhai, 1391–1469) 178
Wu Yun (?–778) 91–92
The Mysterious Network (Xuanganglun) 
91, 91n81
Wu Zetian (624–705, r. 690–705), Empress Wu 
4–5, 5n4, 8, 14, 26
and female interference in government 
14
and rise of educated stratum over
aristocracy 8
Xavier, Francis (1506–1552) 201n1
xenophobia, self-centeredness 69–70
Xia xiaozheng, ritual calendar (from Da Dai
Liji) 287
Index 359

Xianzong (Li Chun, r. 805–820), Tang Synthesis of Mathematical Astronomy

Emperor 34n31, 63n19, 64, 69, 88 (Lixue huitong) 210
patronizes Mazu Buddhism 42 Xue Fucheng (1838–1894) Western democracy
Xia Song (985–1051) 149 accords with Mencius 274, 274n48, 280,
Xia Zengyou (1863–1924 discusses Xunzi  282n62, 310
295n83 Reform and National Defense (Chouyang
xingguohui省過會examination/mistake chuyi) 1880 310
correction groups/meetings 197 Xue Jixuan (1134–1173) 140n83
Xie Liangzuo (1050–1103) 127, 127n56, Xue Xuan (Jingxuan, 1389–1464) 178
143n96 Xu Ganxue (1631–1694) 233
Xie Lingyun ( 385–433) 219, 219n29 Xu Guangqi (1562–1633) 205, 210, 210n12, 215
Xie Zhaozhe (1567–1624) 221 Xu Jiyu (1795–1873) 269
Xiong Cilü (1636–1709) 233, 233n54, 234n56 A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit
Xiujin 61n16 (Huanying zhilüe) 227
xiulian 修煉 Daoist austerities 90 Xu Heng (1209–1281) 169–171
Xi Xia Tangut state (1038–1227) 96 Xu Jingheng (1072–1128) 127n56
xixue zhongyuan see Western learning Xu Mengrong (?–818) 92n82
originated in China Xu Yangyuan (1758–1825) reinterprets li and
Xing Bing (932–1010) 99n6 xing 255
Xianqing Ritual Code (Xianqing li, 658) 2 Xunzi and the Xunzi 72, 74, 83, 83n60, 256,
Xuanlang (673–754) 39 291n75
Xuansu (668–752) 38
Xuanyuan Ji (9th century) 95 Yan Fu (1853–1921) 277, 321–322
Xuanzang 玄奘 (ca. 602–664) 23–24, 26, Evolution and Ethics (Tianyan lun) 321
219 natural selection (tianze 天擇) 322
Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 712–756), Tang 3 struggle for existence (wujing 物競) 322
critical of contemporary intellectual On the Origin of Strength (Yuanqiang)
class 6 1895 321
issues his Commentary on the Classic of on the search for wealth and power 277,
Filial Piety (Xiaojing zhu, 712); Imperial 277n53
Commentary on the Daodejing On the Speed of World Change (Lun
(Daodejing yuzhu, 732 to 733); and shibian zhi ji) 1895 321
annotated edition of the Diamond Yan Ruoqu (1636–1704) 233, 242–243,
Sûtra (Jingangjing, 734) 3, 12, 31 244n72, 260, 261
secularization of Buddhist monasteries  Textual Criticism of the Old Text Book of
5 Documents (Guwen Shangshu
hope to restore old social order & shuzheng) 242, 260
traditions 5n4 Yang Guangxian (1597–1669) 215n23, 226
power struggle with his father, Ruizong  Yang Jian (1141–1226) 129
14 yangqi 陽 氣 bright/positive material force 
revised dynastic history 16 137
attacks Daoists, restores Buddhist Yang Shi (1053–1135) 117n36, 127, 128n57, 131
monasteries 95 Yang Tingyun (1557–1627) 205, 210, 221
Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit Yang Wan (?–777) call for examination reform 
(Yinghuan zhilüe, 1848) 269 19, 76n46
Xuanzong 宣宗 (Li Chen, r. 846–859), Tang  Yang Weizhong (1205–1259), promotes School
3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12–16, 31, 92, 95 of Principle in Yuan 169–170
Xue Fengzuo (1599/1600–1680) 210, 259 Yang Wenhui (1837–1911) and Buddhist revival 
receives Western knowledge 259 296
360
Yang Xiong (53 BCE–18 CE) 77, 131–132
Yan Zhenqing (709–785) 21, 85
Yaodian see Canon of Yao
Yao Jiheng (1647–1715) 243
Yao Nai (1731–1815) 252n7
Yao Ying (1785–1853) 292, 297, 297n85
Record of Travels in Sichuan and Tibet
(Kangyou jixing) 271
Yelü Chucai (1190–1244) 168
Ye Shi (1150–1223) 140n83
Ye Xianggao (1559–1627) 226
yi 義, see rightness, righteousness
Yi Chun (1071–1142) 128n57
Yifu (658–736) 36
Yi Nai (1874–1925) China Should Regard Its
Weakness As Strength (Zhongguo yi yi ruo
wei qiang shuo) 1898: China must change
the dynasty and follow Western
system 316
Yicun (822–908) 52, 61
Yiji (919–987) of Mt. Tiantai 40
Yin and Yang 14, 115, 136–137, 162
Yin Chun or Yin Tun (1071–1143) 127
yinqi 陰氣 dark/negative material force 137
Ying Yijie (810–894) 86
Yixuan (?–886) of Linji 49, 54
Yize (713–770) 38
yong 用 function (vs. ti 體 substance) 30,
176, 184–185, 204, 310–311
Yongle Emperor (Zhu Di, Chengzu, 1360–1424,
r. 1402–1424) 174, 188n81, 202
defends School of Principle 174
Complete Collection of the Five Classics
(Wujing daquan), Complete Collection
of the Four Books (Sishu daquan) 174
Complete Collection on Neo-Confucian
Nature and Principle (Xingli daquan)
published with prefaces by 174
welcomes foreigners to China 202
Yongzheng Emperor (1722–1735) 231,
233n53, 234, 242, 245
Record of Great Righteousness Dispelling
Superstition (Dayi juemi lu, 1730) 231
Violators of the Confucian Ritual Code
(Mingjiao zuiren) 234
You Zuo (1053–1123) 127, 131
Yuan Xie (1144–1224) Zhu Xi’s tradition of the
Way 132n65
Index
Yuan Chuke (8th century) warns of Tang
problems 18
Yuanhao (?–817) 39
Yuan Haowen (1190–1257) 168
Yuan Hongdao (1568–1610) 194
Yuan Jie (723–772)’s Questions for Presented
Scholars (Wen jinshi) and doubting the
classics 67
Yuan to Ming intellectual changes 166–178
Yung Wing (1828–1912) 279
Zeng Guoquan (1824–1890) 280
Zeng Jize (1839–1890) 272, 310
do not fear the Western countries 272
On China Sleeping First and Awakening
Later (Zhongguo xian shui hou xing
lun) 1897 310
Zhang Boxing (1651–1725) 233, 233n53,
234n56
Zhang Dehui (1195–1275) convinces Khubilai
Qaghan to sacrifice to Confucius 168
Zhang Erqi (1612–1678) receives Western
knowledge 259
Zhang Fangping (1007–1091) critique of Wang
Anshi reforms 106, 106n14
Zhang Ji (ca. 766–c. 830) 79, 80n56
Zhang Lichen (fl. 1879) 281
Zhang Peilun (1848–1903) sorrow at defeat by
Japanese 317
Zhang Shi (1133–1180) 126, 128, 128n58, 129,
147, 170
Zhang Taiyan (Zhang Binglin, 1868–1936) 
299, 302
Buddhist studies 296, 303
Talk at the Reception for Tokyo Overseas
Students (Dongjing liuxuesheng
huanyinghui shuoci) 302
Zhang Wenda (1554–1613) accused and
impeached Li Zhi 194
Zhang Xiang (1877–1945) preface to Xie
Wuliang (1884–1964) Outline of Buddhist
Studies (Foxue dagang) 299
Zhang Xuecheng (1772–1851) criticizes Dai
Zhen 252, 291
General Principlesof Literature and History
(Wenshi tongyi) 291
Zhang Yinhuan (1837–1900) supports
self-strengthening 307
Index 361

Zhang Yue (663–730) 18, 44 Zhiyuan (768–844) 39

and Zhang Jiuling (673–740) reform Zhizang (738–817) 41, 41n42, 52
proposals 18 Zhizhe (Zhiyi, 538–597) 23, 39
Zhang Zai (1020–1077) 103n12, 104, 106, 113, Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) 74–75,
115–122, 117n36, 121n44, 131–132, 147, 83, 103, 133, 147, 153, 169, 184–186,
157n15, 161, 167 185n72, 227, 241–243, 250, 253
Letter in Answer to Fan Xunzhi critical of Zhongzong (Li Zhe, r. 705–710), Tang 5, 14,
Song imperial court 107 16
Western Inscription (Ximing) 117n36 Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) 104, 114, 116, 131–132,
Zhang Zhidong 282n62, 294, 307, 308n6, 147, 170, 198
313 Explanation of the Diagram of the Great
Chinese learning as substance, Western Ultimate (Taijitu shuo) 113
learning for practical application Zhou Mi (1232–1298) criticizes School of
(Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong 中學 Principle 166–167
為體, 西學為用) 289 Zhou Xiyuan (mid-9th century) 86
establishes Two Lakes Academy and Zhuge Liang 292
Self-strengthening College 282n62 Zhu Tao (?–785) usurps title of king 62
Zhanran (711–782) 39, 40n39 Zhuang Chuo (?–?) prohibits Manichean
Zhao Fu (?–?) the first Mongol Yuan dynasty “eating only vegetables and serving the
Confucian 169–170 devil” (chicai shimo 食菜事魔) 162n24
Zhao Guizhen (?–846) 86–88, 87n72, 95 Zhuang Cunyu (1719–1788) and Gongyang
Zhao Pu (922–992) 96, 167n35 school 283
Zhao Ruyu (1140–1196) forced out of office  Zhuang Tinglong (?–1655) 238
130 Zhuangzi and the Zhuangzi 11, 90, 210
Zhao Xie (?–1364) follows Lu Jiuyuan thought  Zhu Xi (1130–1200) 101n9, 157n15, 161–165,
177 166, 169, 173n47, 176–177, 178, 180–182,
Zheng Guanying (1842–1922) 280, 310 184, 186–187, 192, 196, 198, 227, 233n54,
Diary of a Southern Tour (Nanyou riji) 243n71, 251n6, 260
praises Western ti and yong 274 Answer to Lu Zijing (Lu Jiuyuan, Lu
Important Things to Save the Situation Xiangshan)” (Da Lu Zijing) 136
(Jiushi jieyao) 310 brought moral and ethical principles to
Essays on Change (Yiyan) 310 common people’s everyday lives 134
Words of Warning for a Flourishing Era Collected Commentaries on the “Great
(Shengshi weiyan)1880 310 Learning” 137
Zheng He (1371–1433) 220 critical of barbarian customs
zhengtong 政統, tradition of political power, (hufeng) 158
loyalty to the ruler, orthodoxy 98–99, debates with Lu Xiangshan 125–148
107, 111, 125, 148, 158n17, 233, 235, edited the Records of the Origins of the
284n65, 320 School of the Chengs (Yi-Luo yuanyuan
Zhenguan Ritual Code (Zhenguan li, 637)  lu), genealogy of lixue 131
2 edited, with Lü Zuqian, Reflections on
Zhenzong (Zhao Heng, 916–1122, r. 997–1122) Things at Hand (Jinsi lu), quotes lixue
Song Emperor 97–98, 103n12, 156 scholars on key concepts 132
zhitong 治統, tradition of political power  endorsed the transmission of the mind of
101, 110, 124n51, 141, 238 the three sages (sansheng chuanxin
Zhi Yan (602–668) 26 三聖傳心) 138
Zhishen (539–618) 36 establishes an intellectual genealogy for
Zhixian (?–898) 61 the School of Principle 132
362
Zhu Xi (1130–1200) (cont.)
establishes the daotong transmission 130
emphasizes Mencius 131
influence of Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan
(Xiangshan) 144–148
knowledge of nature and society too
close 145
privileges morality over natural
world 145
opposes pragmatic, utilitarian lixue  Zhu Yizun (1629–1709) 232n52, 233, 243
139–140
opposes theory of inner transcendence of
Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan) 141–144
produced Collected Commentaries on the
Four Books (Sishu zhangju jizhu) on
the daotong and lixue thought 133
re-established the Confucian classics 133
Four Books (Lunyu, Mengzi, Daxue,
Zhongyong) as preeminent 133
rejects Buddhism, Daoism, and called
“mixed learning” (zaxue 雜學) 139
revised ancient Chinese ceremonial
etiquette in Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals
(Zhuzi jiali) 134–135, 135n69
revised Cheng brothers’ ideas on ancient
rites with Sima Guang’s Letters and
Etiquette (Shuyi) 135
revised the Lü Family Community
Compact (Lüshi xiangyue) 134
wants to establish an orthodox Way
(zhengdao 正道) based on three bonds
and five constant virtues (sangang
wuchang 三綱五常) 140
Index
wrote preface to Cheng Duanmeng
(d. 1191) and Dong Zhu (1152–?), eds.,
Cheng and Dong’s Principles of
Learning (Cheng Dong er xiansheng
xueze) 134
Zhu Guozhen (1557–1632) argued against
western knowledge 212
Zhu Hong (1535–1615) refutes the Western
missionary 212
Zhu Zhen (1072–1138) 127, 128n57
zhuzi baijia 諸子百家 hundred schools of
classical thought 102n11, 241, 272, 289
Zibo (Zhenke, Daguan, 1543–1603) 188, 194
Zizai (741–821?) 47
Zong Bing Essay Explaining Buddhism (Ming
Fo lun) 220
Zongjing 61n16
Zongmi (780–841) Tiantai master 22, 40n41,
46n52
Zoroastrianism 12, 84, 158, 159, 159n18
Zhou Xingji (1067–1125) 127n56
Zou Boqi (1819–1869) earliest Chinese to use
photography 292
Zou Shouyi (1491–1562) 193, 197
Zou Yan (305–240 BCE) 224, 224n41
theory of the greater nine regions 294
theory of the nine great continents
(da jiuzhou 大九州) 224
Zuozhuan (Zuo Commentary to the Spring
and Autumn Annals 69, 71, 173n47, 227,
254, 285
Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885) 293n80