Lito Corpuz vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

FACTS.

 Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990.

Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that Tangcoy had some
pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of
jewelry on commission basis.

 Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a
woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by
a receipt of even date.

 On the prosecution, it was established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with Tongcoy.
 However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He
claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell
the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
 RTC and CA accused is guilty of estafa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the demand to return the subject jewelry, if unsold, or remit the proceeds, if sold, is a valid demand under one of
the elements of Estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC?

HELD:

YES. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. As expounded in Asejo v. People: With regard to the
necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written.
The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 (1).
 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition last December 8, 1986, for original registration of his title over 648
sq.m. of land under PD 1529 however during the pendency of the petition, Teodoro died hence his heirs
were substituted as applicants, represented by their aunt, who was appointed as their guardian ad litem.
 
The Land registration court dismissed its petition for want of jurisdiction stating that the applicants failed
to comply with the provisions of Section 23 of PD 1529 requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and was only published in the
Official Gazette and thus the court has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant petition for want
of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is
MANDATORY or DIRECTORY in relation to Section 23 of PD 1529.

 HELD:

The Supreme Court held that provision of the law is MANDATORY. The law used the term
“SHALL” and denotes an IMPERATIVE and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute, its
importance ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, and the Court holds that the
present case must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.

The Land registration court dismissed its petition for want of jurisdiction stating that the applicants failed
to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 requiring the Applicants to publish the notice
of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and was only published in the
Official Gazette and thus the court has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant petition for want
of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.

In the present case, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. The
Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application and there is no alternative. Thus, the case was dismissed
without prejudice to reapplication after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

 
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG
G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967

FACTS:
Mario Mapa is appealing the decision convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearms.That
on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made
revolver (Paltik), Cal 22, without serial number, with six (6) round of ammunition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an agent of the governor could carry a firearm without permit.

HELD:
The said agent of the governor could not carry a firearm without a permit.The fact that a person, found in
possession of an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial governor does not exempt him from
criminal liability. The law does not exception for a secret agent.
 Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
GR 179334 Apr 21 2015

FACTS:

In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered to
pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied,
Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable decisions were rendered
by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of
filing of the until full payment. The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should
be based at the time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting
opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental importance of the issue, the case was referred
to the En Banc for resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taking of private property without due process should be nullified

HELD:

No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking
cannot simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject
of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, public policy imposes upon the public utility the
obligation to continue its services to the public.

Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to
the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PATRICIO AMIGO
G.R. NO. 116719 JANUARY 16, 1996

FACTS:

Patricio Amigo was charged with frustratedmurder under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the
RevisedPenal Code, committed as follows: armed with a knife,with treachery and evident premeditation
and with intent tokill willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaultedand stab with said weapon
one Benito Ng Suy, therebyinflicting injuries upon the latter.

Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the crime
of murder, to wit:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously... attacked, assaulted and
stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Say, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which
caused his death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.

Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty
and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply
the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an... accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The
remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but
surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua" be modified or reduced by
virtue of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the imposition of death penalty.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court hold that Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the penalty periods
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only in so far as it prohibits the imposition of
death penalty. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remain the same.

Thus, a person originally subject to death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstances will now be both punishable with the same medium period
although the former is conceitedly more guilty than the latter. But that is the will of the constitution and
the duty of the court is to apply the law, disregarding the sympathy or pity for an accused. Dura Lex Sed
Lex.
 C. BOLOS VS D. BOLOS
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

FACTS:

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity 
of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Art. 36 of the Family Code, docketed 
as JDRC No. 6211.

On January 16, 2007, judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 
69 (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DAN
ILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980as null and void ab initio on the ground of psyc
hological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family 
Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a 
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Vo
id Mariages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages) is not applicablein this case since the marri
age of Cynthia and Danila was solemnized before the Family Code took effect.

Moreover, the appellate court relied on its ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinacelli stating th
at “coverage of  A.M. 02-11-10 SC extends only to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988”.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seekin
g a review of the December 10, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under the Family Co
de” in A.M. 02-11-10-SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages”

HELD:

The Court of Appeals ruled that the categorical language in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope.
The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule extends only to those ma
rriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which became effective on August 3, 1988T
he Court therefore cannot apply merit to the petitioner’s interpretation stating that “petitions” is being cate
gorized in the phrase “under the Family Code” when the Rule took effectivity.
Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear 
and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, only application
It must therefore be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation in what is know
n as “plainmeaning rule” or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is th
e index of intention”. Additionally, there is also the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the 
words of a status there should be no departure.”

Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila VS COURT OF APPEALS

 G.R. NO. 1251183, SEPTEMBER 29, 1997

FACTS:

On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving
for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain
located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. Considering that the land covered by the
above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-
hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters.

To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a
petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association.

The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing
and awarding the parcels of land covered by Proclamation No. 164.

Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by hammering on the issue of res
judicata in view of the fact that an earlier judgment, which had become final and executory, had already
settled the respective rights of the parties under Proclamation No. 164.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the procalamation nNo. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power

HELD:

Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. Not withstanding the fact that the reversal of the decision o the
Court of Appeals would be justified upon the issue of res judicita, it exist more basic reason for setting aside the appealed
decision and this has reference to the fundamental and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164.

The Supreme Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. The appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby set aside. Public respondent DENR is herby permanently enjoined from enforcing
Proclamation No. 164.