Perspectives on Social Science

Indigenous
SOSC1000 6.0
Lecture 11
Jan Krouzil PhD
June 15, 2021
 Agenda
PART I Ecological relations as an ontological
problem
PART II Indigenous relational ontology
PART III Indigenous traditions of thinking and
being
PART IV Indigenous research and social science
Key Words
PART I Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (1)
Ecological crises
pervasive, interconnected, and deepening ecological crises nowhere
near adequately addressed
associated with unsustainable and anthropocentric processes of
modernizing ‘development’
an ethos of world-mastery predicated on the domination and
reworking of the ‘natural’ world
expressions of the dominant ways of thinking and being - of the
limits, externalities, and consequences
 Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (2)
the dominant worldview is structured in fundamental ways by
particular ontological assumptions

shaping what we experience as the problem of ‘nature’ and our relations to it – as

well as the range of alternatives we consider possible to these.
call for thought and for revaluation of how we are used to doing things
ask what it might mean to be open to different ways of thinking and being
predicated upon different ontologies
put to question these fundamental, accustomed assumptions of modern culture –
that are often so familiar as to be invisible
‘Western’ ecologically-informed standpoint

extinction and depletion of species

 Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (3)
pollution caused by extractive industrial projects and our associated capitalist economy and lifeways
acidification of the oceans
climate change
deforestation
impact human beings on the earth and its creatures as a consequence
of transformations in social, political, economic, and other relations

associated with the phenomenon of ‘modernity’ and processes of ‘modernization’

shifts in patterns of subsistence and land use associated with the
development of modern market capitalism
modernity’s dominant ontology as fundamentally ‘atomistic’
assuming ‘the existence of individual, bounded, atomistic “things” or substances possessed of
properties – a tendency that attains its precise character within modern modulations of a
fundamentally Christian interpretation of the world’ (Reddekop 2014)
 Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (4)
‘Defamiliarization’
‘You think it’s a stump, but that’s my grandfather.’ (Robinson 2004)
‘making the familiar strange’ by means of having learned to see the
world and reflect back on the familiar with different eyes
the term is associable with methods of cultural critique through
anthropological comparisons across cultures
signifies experiences that grow and stretch the self and thought -
questioning the sensible and perceptible in a renewed way
de-realize the real and open the face of the world up differently
 Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (5)
‘Western’ worldview delineated by the dominant ontological
contours of modern thought, and by the existential and
comportmental modes that these entail
‘Western’ modernity - dominant ‘atomistic’ ontology
assuming a particular resolution and distinction of nature as
separate from culture
how to conceive it possible or meaningful to relate to the non-
human world that is viewed as ‘natural’?
a basis for comparison on the ‘Western’ (modern side) when
considering different indigenous traditions of thought
 Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (6)
the modern modus operandi as monological, anthropocentric, ‘technological’
and rooted in a story of the will and an ethos of domination
the nature/culture settlement grounds many of our most foundational and familiar
stories and aspirations concerning what it is to be mature, free, and reasonable

the way modern thought typically understands nature relative to culture is also itself constitutive of
the way it understands what it means to be modern
How to characterize the modern relationship to nature?
the nature/culture relation is not separable from the general problem of the modern
subject

the way the latter comes to delineate problems of knowledge and freedom to experience the world
phenomena are studied so that we may ‘know’ them only to increase the extent of our control over the
physical world
 Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (7)
this domination is rooted in an ontology that sets the human ‘self’ apart from
nature
occupying a privileged position relative to the rest of ‘Creation’
understood to be the autonomous and atomistic ground of its own action
the being uniquely endowed with language or reason
only human beings are considered moral persons in the fullest sense –
having reason and free will

being made in the ‘image of God’ and in this sense being ‘highest’ among creatures
the whole modern techno-scientific vocation of intervening in nature so as
to manipulate ‘its’ processes

to improve nature so as to suit our ends and bring about a life finally worth living
 Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (8)
Difference between ‘wilderness’ and civilization
‘wilderness’ or nature is ‘what is out there’ when you don’t do
anything to it (Reddekop 2014)

the physical, biological, and material world when simply left ‘untouched’
as a kind of farm, studied and managed by an elite of expert specialists and productive in
multiple, defined, scientifically validated and calculable ways – ranging from raw material for
resource extraction to oxygen factory
as a playground, on reserve as ‘wilderness experience’ for the outdoor tourist industry, as a
more or less mute backdrop to human recreational and economic activity
as a kind of prison, the ‘Other’ to the domestic, civilized realms of ‘Rational Man’
 Ecological relations as an ontological
problem (9)
the meaning the ‘wilderness’ assumes here cannot itself
be separated from the ontological meaning of nature and its
separation from culture within the terms of modern thought

far from being simply ‘out there’ wilderness as such is inextricable from the
frame of meaning we already carry with us wherever we go (Reddekop
2014)
 PART II Indigenous relational ontology
(1)
Relational ontologies
ontology – ‘those fundamental and most basic dicta that, within a given tradition of
thought and everyday experience of existence, lay out an interpretation of the basic
contours of reality or “what is” as such’ (Reddekop 2014)

to delineate what it is to be an entity, what kinds of ‘entities’ exist, as well as offer interpretations concerning our
own nature as beings, the correlate contours of our basic ethical horizons
reforming our relations to ‘nature’ involves learning to think of ourselves not as dis
-embedded from it but as relationally constituted within it
attempts to rethink ethics and politics and what it means to live ‘a good life’ – on
the basis of more relational ways of thinking

involves the change of ontology, thinking, and the mode of being and doing
 Indigenous relational ontology (2)
the way we might speak of ontologies in the plural – and in the possibility of
thinking across questions of ontology intertwined with questions of theology and
cosmology
‘Relationality’
beginning with an assumption that relations are prior

any atomistic ‘thing’ is rather only a kind of (at least temporary) fixity or concrescence
a gathering constituted in and through these prior, dynamic, and contextual
relations
learning to focus on what happens between (including between levels of structure)
rather than focusing on supposedly individual things

to do so as a way of understanding what any particular thing ‘is’ at any given time
for example, ‘if a stump is a grandfather’ then it is something quite different from a stump as understood by the logging
industry, by environmental science and it will be related to differently
 Indigenous relational ontology (3)
Where worldviews are multiple
disagreement becomes evident in moments of conflict

over resource development, in related differences between Indigenous and Euro-American normative and
legal traditions in this regard, in everyday practices etc
in part because the validity of reducing the land to ‘nature’ qua fungible ‘resources’ – and all the
philosophical and ethical baggage this implies – is not a settled dispute
we must acknowledge that our thinking is always necessarily and
irredeemably local and localized
cross-cultural engagement requires that we seek out and employ
possible interpretive conceptual ‘bridges’ or points of analogy
between ontologies
 Indigenous relational ontology (4)
relational ontology implies a different relationship to ‘truth’
what is at stake in contemporary political relations between indigenous and settler
peoples in ‘colonial’ contexts throughout the Americas is disagreement at the
level of ontology (Reddekop 2014)
thinking alongside more relational ontologies as a way of grappling with the
problem of how we can ‘defamiliarize’ dominant modern ways of relating to
‘nature’
Indigenous philosophical and cultural traditions
indigenous relational thinking in different contexts

how selfhood, animacy, personhood, the non/human can be experienced, understood, and explored
very differently when conceived on relational ontological terms
what relationally-conceived understandings might look like concerning technology and skill, property
relations, what it means to live a thoughtful life or make art or experience beauty
 PART III Indigenous traditions of thinking and
being (1)
Indigenous American traditions (Reddekop 2014)

Algonquian traditions of thought as evinced especially amongst the Ojibwe and related peoples in
central Canada
Northwestern Amazonian traditions in South America, focusing on lowland Quichua speaking and
related peoples
North Pacific Coastal traditions in North America, focusing most on the Tlingit
Animacy, Power, and Relational Personhood
accounts of ‘animism’ have propagated tales of supposedly primitive
peoples understanding everything as ‘alive’, believing in the existence of
anthropomorphic souls ‘behind’ all natural phenomena

being unable to distinguish at all between animate and inanimate beings, etc
Indigenous traditions of thinking and being
(2)
Cree and Ojibwe thought reveals something quite different from this
projected image
an invitation to imagine differently not only animacy or personhood but the very
nature and structure of existence and our ethical horizons within it
in Ojibwe thinking personhood is extended to include things that we would
classify as ‘inanimate beings’
for example, certain stones have been said to be alive, to answer questions put to
them, to change form
the occurrence of phenomena draws questions not about the work of
impersonal forces, but about personalistic actions: who has done X?
in this world full of ‘persons’ no sharp line can be drawn between the
personhood of human beings, or of animals, or of other-than-human
‘grandfathers’ (ätisokának) (Reddekop 2014)
Indigenous traditions of thinking and being
(3)
assumed that it is both possible and desirable to develop a range of
social relationships – including relations of exchange, of empathy
and nurture and obligation, etc – with many of these ‘persons’
many indigenous traditions conceive the relationship of human and other
beings almost inversely to the Western hierarchies (Reddekop 2014)
rather than thinking of humans as being the rational animal above
all others many traditions tell stories which begin by setting all
beings on the same plane
all are persons like us; but at some point something happens which
introduces bodily differentiation and the emergence of distinct species
Indigenous traditions of thinking and being
(4)
animacy for the Ojibwe is not understood as a property of ‘atomistic’ objects
which endure as self-identical through time, but rather as a condition of being
animacy lies in something’s having power - something is ‘animate’ if it stands
in a relation of effecting others, if it manifests ‘the ability and freedom to act
and interact’ (Reddekop 2014)
for ex., spoons are classed as ‘animate’ because they contain and give shape to the
‘inanimate’ liquid they hold whereas forks and knives are ‘inanimate’
the case of the spoon underscores how animacy operates as a relational concept –
by virtue of its effecting something else (i.e., that which it holds) - it is in its
relationship with the liquid that the spoon’s animacy is manifest
tools like canoe paddles or hunting bows are also ‘animate’ in that they add to the
strength of a human arm by being employed in relationship to it
Indigenous traditions of thinking and being
(7)
the Ojibwe view of personhood as such is not the same as our own
a person as a relational focusing of power is not the Christian moral person
or the unique, self-subsisting and individual soul endowed with a creative
power of free will after the image of its Creator (Reddekop 2014)
to attribute personhood to non-human beings here is not the same as to
presume everything modern thought holds to be essential to human beings
and then generalize these attributes throughout ‘nature’
the way a particular being speaks, acts, moves, and sees – in short, its mode
of being – is determined by its body
Ojibwe thought understands communication to normally be
transparent between beings who share the same bodily equipment
 Part IVIndigenous research and social
science (1)
Case for indigenous research
made up of vital, transformative practices that emerge from and for
indigenous peoples
with implications for ‘ordinary’ (mainstream ‘Western’) social science
the political aim of participating in struggles to ‘decolonize’ the social
sciences (Stewart-Harawira 2013)
indigenous research is about knowledge production and application
the philosophical and practical tenets of such knowledge subvert dominant social research
indigenous knowledges are ‘unspeakable things’ (Moreton-Robinson 2002) as they challenge
taken-for-granted assumptions that undergird the ongoing dominance of ‘colonial’ practices
of social science
Indigenous research and social science (2)
Indigenous perspectives as the basis for dialogue
the fundamental ontological challenges that indigenous research poses to
the universality and unity of ‘normal’ social science (Martin 2013)
an ethical basis to recognition of indigenous knowledge claims
recognition of not only the ‘right to respond’ but the ‘right to define’
indigenous research in terms that both reflect and respond to concerns in
indigenous communities (Stewart-Harawira et al 2013)
indigenous perspectives and concerns as the bases for the conversation
rooted in indigenous experiences and knowledge of contemporary realities
of ‘unequal coexistence’ between non-indigenous and indigenous peoples
Indigenous research and social science (3)
re-centering of indigenous perspectives
necessary if something like a genuine dialogue is to be possible among peoples in the radically unequal context of
‘colonialism’
the consequences of indigenous social science for mainstream research
the consequences of indigenous research for indigenous peoples
‘The view from somewhere’
against scholarly traditions that erase place, belonging and identity
the power relations attendant to these
reflections on indigenous research crosses but does not erase boundaries
since boundaries cannot be erased through acts of reflexivity nor of cooperation - including
boundaries across colonial political borders, among indigenous peoples and between indigenous
peoples and settlers (Stewart-Harawira 2013)
Indigenous research and social science (4)
foregrounding indigenous perspectives and concerns

indigenous perspectives are neither uniform nor sealed off from developments in ‘mainstream’
research
indigenous research shaped by a shared ontology of inter
-connectedness with nonhuman life and the land, participating in a
common life through and with indigenous ancestors and the spiritual
world
the idea that social identities and inequalities are germane to the social
sciences informing indigenous declarations of identity and belonging

runs against the assertion that what makes the social sciences ‘sciences’ are safeguards in the form of rigorous
methodologies against the pollution of identity and politics in the research process
Indigenous research and social science (5)
whether an idea is true or at least useful depends upon its fit with the
real social world

not upon the particular personal and social characteristics of the researcher to be ‘bracketed’
during the social scientific endeavour
indigenous research from very specific ‘some-wheres’ challenges still
-dominant positivist and post-positivist approaches to science
social location in unequal relations of power shapes what counts as
knowledge and as worth knowing

this position links closely to feminist debates around ‘standpoint theory’ (Harding 2004)
Indigenous research and social science (6)
Social science as ‘colonialism’
for indigenous peoples, the sciences, including the social
sciences, are seen as a critical part of ‘colonizing’ processes
as a form of violence, part of the naming and claiming of
indigenous peoples (Smith 2004), their lands and histories for the
‘colonizers’
the failure of ‘colonial’ state institutions to take indigenous
peoples and hence indigenous knowledges seriously
deemed not scholarship but merely indigenous ‘bias’ or ‘activism’
Indigenous research and social science (7)
‘Colonial’ science as ‘universal’ science
mainstream research and universities as sites of ‘colonial’
dominance
spaces where ‘colonial’ ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies are
reproduced as ‘best practices’
where the priorities of ‘colonial’ states and capitalist social relations -
including the need to show that research is profit-making - motivate
research and teaching
indigenous research is measured against the ‘colonial’ sciences
taken for granted as the research standard – against this standard
indigenous research is found wanting
Indigenous research and social science (8)
Indigenous ecological knowledge and TEK
a new form of dispossession
the pursuit of ‘traditional environmental knowledge’ (TEK) often
fundamentally ‘denatures’ indigenous knowledge
TEK means extracting indigenous ecological understanding from its meaning-
making contextual and personalized relations, including relations with ancestral
spirits, and then reabsorbing that knowledge into dominant social scientific
traditions, including in commodity form as ‘intellectual property’ (Simpson
2001)
Indigenous research and social science (9)
Indigenous research as resistance and resurgence
‘Western’ research from indigenous perspectives

limited with its strong and nearly-exclusive emphasis on cognitive processes and
tightly-controlled material experiments, so eliminating other sources of
knowledge
social sciences as bound by disciplinary and other conventions that
limit the flexible incorporation of different kinds of knowledge

constrain the ways that knowledge is shared (especially outside the

academy), so limiting their usefulness in everyday life
 Indigenous research and social science (10)
the radical binaries that ‘institutionalized’ research poses
between human beings and the rest of ‘natural’ life and
spirituality

combined with the rigid exclusions of certain types of knowing

the limited range of ‘legitimate’ ways of sharing that knowledge
indigenous knowledge challenges both mainstream social
science and the broader capitalist relations in which these
sciences and research practices are embedded (Stewart-
Harawira 2013)
 Key words
worldview
atomistic
ethos of world-mastery
nature/culture
wilderness
relationality
indigenous relational ontologies
animacy
‘the view from somewhere’
indigenous knowledge