Transpo CommRev Disc

Transportation - Commercial Review
Deadline on Monday Night March 13 [12MN]
Please try your best to provide an exhaustive discussion for the topics assigned. Kindly use
Divina as primary reference then Memaid and Sundiang-Aquino. Feel free to add doctrines of
landmark cases.
Pinlac Common Carriers → Temporary Unloading or

Shortage
Saguiped Stipulation for Limitation of Liability → Duration

of Liability [DONE]
Samson Liability for Acts of Others → Applicability of

Montreal [DONE]
Simeon Extent of Liability → Foreign state owned

enterprise
Tan Public service as public utility → Powers of the

President DONE
Velasco Investments → Reciprocity Clause [DONE]
Common Carriers [PIN]
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public. (Art. 1732)
What is the test to determine whether a person is a common carrier?

Does the person hold out to the public that it is engaged in the business of transporting or
carrying passengers or goods, or both as a public employment and not a casual occupation? Is
it open to the use and service of all members of the public who may require the service to the
extent of its capacity? If it is open to the public, the carrier is a common carrier.
The true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent of the business actually
transacted, or the number and character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether
the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to the
general public as his business or occupation. If the undertaking is a single transaction, not a
part of the general business or occupation engaged in, as advertised and held out to the general
public, the individual or the entity rendering such service is a private, not a common, carrier
(Spouses Pererna v. Spouses Zarate, G.R. No. 157917, August 29, 2012).
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4C.CommRev.Transpo.Saguiped.Pinlac.Samson.Simeon.Velasco.Tan
The law makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity or that
the carriage was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled or has limited clientele. It is not
necessary that the transportation services be offered to the general public. Offering the services
even to a narrow segment of the public suffices. Thus, the fact that the transportation services
are offered only to the guests of the beach resort is immaterial. Transportation is an integral part
of its business.
NOTE: It is also necessary that the common carrier be the owner of the vehicle/vessel who will
carry out the carriage. The public is not required to inquire as to the ownership of the
vehicle/vessel.
What are the requisites to be a common carrier?

1. He must be engaged in the business of transporting passengers or goods generally as a
business, not just as a casual occupation;
2. He must undertake to carry passengers or goods over established roads by the method
by which the business was conducted; and
3. The transportation must be for hire.
1. Diligence Required of Common Carriers
Under Article 1733, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case. Thus, under Article 1735, in all cases other than those mentioned under Art. 1734,
common carriers shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required by law.
NOTE: Common carriers are synonymous with public service under the Public Service Act. Due
to the public nature of their business, common carriers are compelled to exercise extraordinary
diligence since they will be burdened with the externalities or the cost of consequences of their
contract of carriage if they fail to take the precautions expected of them.
There is no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of
the common carrier. The presumption of negligence applies so long as there is evidence
showing that: (a) a contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier; and (b) the
injury or death took place during the existence of such contract. In such an event, the burden
shifts to the common carrier to prove its observance of extraordinary diligence, and that an
unforeseen event or force majeure had caused the injury. However, for a common carrier to be
absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused
by a fortuitous event. The common carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the
occurrence of the incident due to its own or its employees' negligence.
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Is extraordinary diligence required only in the transportation of passengers and carriage
of goods?
NO. Common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of
their obligations under the contracts of carriage. This extraordinary diligence must be observed
not only in the transportation of goods and services but also in the issuance of the contract of
carriage, including its ticketing operations.The common carrier's obligation to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the issuance of the contract of carriage is fulfilled by requiring a full
review of the flight schedules to be given to a prospective passenger before payment. Even
assuming that the ticketing agent encoded the incorrect flight information, it is incumbent upon
the purchaser of the tickets to at least check if all the information is correct before making the
purchase. Once the ticket is paid for and printed, the purchaser is presumed to have agreed to
all its terms and conditions.
2. Liabilities of Common Carriers
Who is liable in case of breach of contract of carriage? The operator or the driver or
both?
Cause of action is based on breach of contract of carriage - liability of the owner/operator is
direct as the contract is between him and the passenger. The driver cannot be made liable if he
is not a party to the contract of carriage. However, the driver may be sued based on quasi-delict
and/or criminally liable if his negligence can be established.
Are common carriers liable for injuries to passengers even if they have observed
ordinary diligence and care?
YES. The obligation imposed upon them by law is to exercise extraordinary diligence. Common
carriers are bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with a due regard for all circumstances.
Is the presumption of fault or negligence applicable only in case of death or injury to

passengers or loss or damage to goods?
NO. It also applies in case of any breach in the contract of carriage, such as when the
passenger was not able to board despite being given a boarding pass.
Examples:
● Ramos v. China Southern Airlines Co. Lrd., - When an airline issues a ticket to a
passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage
arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on
that date. If that does not happen, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of
contract of carriage.In an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved
party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All
he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by
the carrier, through the latter's failure to carry the passenger to its destination.
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● Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Spouses Fuentabella - if a passenger’s accommodation
is downgraded from first class to economy, the carrier is liable for breach of contract of
carriage
● Cathay Pacific Airways v. Spouses Vasquez - the carrier was made liable for insisting on
the upgrade of the passenger from business class to first class accommodation. The
Supreme Court held that priority upgrading is a privilege which can be waived. By
insisting on the upgrade, despite the passenger’s waiver, the carrier breached its
contract of carriage.
● Fernando v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., - Common carrier may also be held liable in case of
a rude or discourteous conduct on the part of its employees towards a passenger.
Vigilance Over Goods
1. Exempting Causes
What are the defenses available to the common carrier in case of loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods?
GR: Common carriers are liable for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods.
XPN: Not liable in the following cases:
1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
2) Acts of public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3) Act or omission of the shipper or passenger;
4) Character of the goods or defects in the packing or container;
5) Order or act of competent public authority;
6) Exercise of extraordinary diligence
NOTE: Peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Art. 1734, then the
common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it
proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.
FORCE MAJEURE
What are the requisites for natural disaster to be considered an exempting circumstance
in case of loss or damage to goods?
1. The natural disaster is the proximate and only cause of the loss;
2. The common carrier should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss
before, during and after the occurrence of the natural disaster;
3. The common carrier should not incur in delay.
In DSR-Senator Lines v. Federal Phoenix Assurance Co., and Eastern Shipping Lines v. IAC, it
was held that monsoons, during which strong winds were not unusual, would not be
sufficient to categorize the weather condition as a storm. When the loss of the vessel was
caused not only by the southwestern monsoon but also by the shifting of the logs in the hold
due to improper stowage, the defense of force majeure was unavailing.
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Hijacking of goods is NOT considered a force majeure. Nevertheless, a common carrier may
absolve itself of liability for a resulting loss caused by the robbery or hijacking if it is proven that
the robbery or hijacking was attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.
2. Contributory Negligence
What is the effect of contributory negligence on the part of the shipper in case of loss or
damage to his goods?
If the shipper or owner merely contributed to the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods,
the proximate cause thereof being the negligence of the common carrier, the latter shall be
liable in damages, which however, shall be equitably reduced. (Art. 1741)
On the other hand, even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods should be caused
by the character of the goods, or the faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the
common carrier must exercise due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss. (Art. 1742)
3. Duration of Liability
a. Actual or Constructive Liability
In a contract of carriage for goods, when does the obligation to exercise extraordinary
diligence commence and when does it end?
The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until
the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the
person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of Art. 1738. (Art.
1736)
The liability of the carrier as a common carrier begins with the actual delivery of the goods for
transportation, and not merely with the formal execution of a receipt or bill of lading; the
issuance of a bill of lading is not necessary to complete delivery and acceptance. Even where it
is provided by statute that liability commences with the issuance of the bill of lading, actual
delivery and acceptance are sufficient to bind the carrier.
The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter does not impair the
contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit
still unloaded.
In one case it was ruled that when there is no dispute that the custody of the goods was never
turned over to the consignee or his agents but was lost into the hands of unauthorized persons
who secured possession thereof on the strength of falsified documents, the common carrier is
liable.
Does the obligation of a common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence cease when
the goods are turned over to the customs authorities?
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NO. The delivery to the customs authorities is not the delivery contemplated under Art. 1736.
The owner cannot exercise dominion over them.
b. Temporary Unloading or Shortage [PIN]
The obligation of the carrier remains in full force and effect even when the goods are temporarily
unloaded or stored in transit unless the shipper or owner has made use of the right to stoppage
in transit. It continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse
of the carrier at the place of destination until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of
the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose
of them.
What is the effect of a stipulation regarding the exercise of diligence to less than
extraordinary?
In the carriage of goods, the common carrier and the shipper or owner may agree on the
observance of diligence to a degree less than extraordinary diligence (but not total exemption
nor diligence less than ordinary) provided the stipulation is:
1. In writing, signed by the shipper or owner;
2. Supported by a valuable consideration other than the service rendered by the common
carrier; and
3. Reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy.
When is the obligation of the common carrier to observe extraordinary diligence in the
carriage of goods reduced to ordinary diligence?
1. When the seller exercised his right of stoppage in transit;
2. If there is a stipulation between the shipper and the carrier, subject to the conditions;
3. For hand-carried baggage;
4. If the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods should be caused by the character
of the goods, or the faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the common carrier
must exercise due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.
4. Stipulation for Limitation of Liability [SAG]

a. Void Stipulations
Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust, and
contrary to public policy:
a. That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper
b. That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods;
c. That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the custody of the goods
d. That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less than that of a good
father of a family, or of a man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the movables
transported
e. That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omission of his or its
employees;
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f. That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do
not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force, is dispensed with or
diminished;
g. That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of
goods on account of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane, or other
equipment used in the contract of carriage.
LM Case of Sweet Lines v. Teves:

A condition was printed at the back of the tickets which provides that any and all actions
arising out of the ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed before the courts
of Cebu City. Is this stipulation valid and enforceable? Were the passengers deemed to
have acceded to it when they purchased the tickets and took the carrier's vessel for
passage and thus amounted to effective waiver of venue?
The condition is void and unenforceable for two (2) reasons:

First, it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the conditions printed in fine letter at the
back of the tickets. It is hardly proper to expect the passengers to examine their tickets after
they received them from crowded counters. No reasonable opportunity is given to them in order
to carefully examine the said condition prior to the purchase of the tickets. Moreover, it must be
noted that shipping companies are franchise holders of certificates of public convenience and
therefore possess a virtual monopoly of the business of transporting passengers. As such, they
may dictate the terms of passage, leaving the passengers with no choice but to buy tickets and
avail of their vessels and facilities.
Second, it subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings since the same
will prejudice the rights and interests of innumerable passengers. Although venue may be
changed by agreement, such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates
the action of the claimants. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside
of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the said city, he would most probably decide
not to file the action at all.
b. Limitation of Liability to Fixed Amount

A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the
circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.
The fact that the common carrier has no competitor along the line or route, or a part
thereof, to which the contract refers shall be taken into consideration on the question of whether
or not a stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability is reasonable, just, and in consonance
with public policy.
c. Limitation of Liability in Absence of Declaration of Greater Value

A stipulation that the common carrier’s liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing in
the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.
Pursuant to such provision, where the shipper is silent as to the value of his goods, the carrier’s
liability for loss or damage thereto is limited to the amount specified in the contract of carriage
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and where the shipper states the value of his goods, the carrier’s liability for loss or damage
thereto is limited to that amount.
A stipulation in a contract of carriage that the carrier will not be liable beyond a specified amount
unless the shipper declares the goods to have a greater value is generally deemed to be valid
and will operate to limit the carrier's liability, even if the loss or damage results from the carrier’s
negligence. It is the duty of the shipper to disclose, rather than the carrier’s to demand the true
value of the goods and silence on the part of the shipper will be sufficient to limit recovery in
case of loss to the amount stated in the contract of carriage.
If the insurer paid the insured based on the actual value of the goods, how much can the
insurer recover from the common carrier? As to the insurance company, it must be noted
that after paying the claim of the insured, the former is merely subrogated to the rights of the
latter. As a subrogee, it can recover only the amount that is recoverable by the insured. Since
the right of the insured, in case of loss or damage to the goods, is restricted by the provisions in
the bill of lading, a suit by the insurer necessarily is subject to like limitations.
What are the usual stipulations often made in a bill of lading regarding the liability of the
common carrier?
Three (3) kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill of lading.
The first is one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage
occasioned by its own negligence.
The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed
valuation.
And the third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the
shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight.
According to an almost uniform weight of authority, the first and second kinds of stipulations are
invalid as being contrary to public policy, but the third is valid and enforceable. A stipulation
limiting the sum that may be recovered by the shipper or owner to 90% of the value of the goods
in case of loss due to theft is void. Such stipulation is considered unreasonable, unjust, and
contrary to public policy under Article 1745 of the Civil Code.
Notes:
The stipulation limiting the carrier’s liability up to a certain amount “regardless of the actual
value of such cargo, whether declared by its shipper or otherwise,” is violative of the
requirement of the Civil Code that such limiting stipulations should be fairly and freely agreed
upon.” A stipulation that denies to the shipper the right to declare the actual value of his cargoes
and to recover, in case of loss or damage, on that basis would be invalid.
The insertion of an invoice number or reference to a letter of credit does not in itself sufficiently
and convincingly show that the common carrier had knowledge of the value of the cargo. As
such, it does not amount to a higher declaration of the value of the goods. However, the same
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interpretation does not apply if the bill of lading incorporates the invoice value of the goods with
appropriate description thereof and payment of corresponding freight charges
5. Liability for Baggage of Passengers

a. Checked-in baggage
b. Hand-carried baggage
If the baggage is in the custody of the common carrier (checked-in), the latter is obliged to
observe extraordinary diligence. The presumption of negligence applies against the common
carrier. Articles 1733 to 1753 of the Civil Code apply.
But if the baggage is in the custody of the passenger (hand carried), the carrier is liable as a
depositary provided that (a) notice was given to him or his employees; and (b) the passenger
took the necessary precautions which the carrier had advised relative to the care and vigilance
of the baggage. The baggage in transit is deemed as a necessary deposit. The diligence
required of the carrier/ depositary is merely ordinary diligence. In case of loss owing to the fault
of the passenger, the carrier will not be held liable.
Notes:
The responsibility of common carriers in the case of loss or damage to hand-carried baggage is
governed by the rule on necessary deposits. The common carrier is thus liable for the loss of
the personal property caused by its employees or by strangers.
The use of arms (in the staging of the holdup) is force majeure under the rule on necessary
deposits.
Safety of Passengers
What is the diligence required for common carriers in the carriage of its passengers?
1. Void Stipulations
A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard to all the
circumstances.
In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent
when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not
even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This
statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence.
In the carriage of passengers, the failure of the common carrier to bring the passenger safely to
their destination immediately raises the presumption that such failure is due to the carrier’s fault
or negligence. It is not the burden of the aggrieved passenger to establish such fault or
negligence. The carrier instead must rebut such presumption. Otherwise, the conclusion can be
properly made that the carrier failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law.
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Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
The principle of last clear chance applies only in a suit between owners and drivers of two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. Both the
tortfeasor and the common carrier are jointly and severally liable for damages.
stipulations that are considered void in a contract of carriage for passengers

a. Stipulation where the responsibility of the common carrier for the safety of its
passengers is dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on the ticket, or otherwise.
b. Stipulation limiting the liability for willful acts or gross negligence
When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability for
negligence is valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence. The reduction of fare does not
justify any limitation of the common carrier’s liability.
2. Duration of Liability [SAG]

In the carriage of passengers, when does the obligation to exercise extraordinary
diligence commence and when does it end? [LM Case of LRT v. Navidad ]
Utmost diligence starts once the passenger places himself to, and is accepted by, and while he
remains under the proper care and charge of the carrier. It lasts until such time that the
passenger safely alights from and is given reasonable opportunity to leave the premises of the
common carrier, including such time that he looks for and claims his luggage.
For the light rail transit system of transportation, it was held that a contract of carriage was
created from the moment the passenger paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling him/her to all the rights and protection under a contractual
relation.
LM Case of Brinas v. People

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and
buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces
the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus
slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to
disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because
passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to disembark, there is no
way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.
It was negligence on the conductor’s part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was
still a full three (3) minutes ahead. That the announcement was premature and erroneous is
shown by the fact that immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to
full speed. Manila Railroad Company failed to show any reason why the train suddenly resumed
its regular speed. The announcement was made while the train was still in Barrio Lagalag.
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This announcement prompted the victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said
announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the
train jerked as it picked up speed.
While waiting for carrier or boarding a carrier

It was the duty of the driver, when he stopped the bus, to do no act that would have the effect of
increasing the peril to a passenger such as Santiago while he was attempting to board the
same. When a bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the
same to signal his intention to board.
A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. It is
the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances for a reasonable length of
time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are Liable for
injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their
conveyances while they are doing so. Santiago, by stepping and standing on the platform of the
bus, was already considered a passenger and was entitled to all the rights and protection
pertaining to a contract of carriage.
Arrival at the destination

The owner of the S/STamaraw is liable for the death of failing to exercise utmost diligence in the
safety of passengers. Evidently, the carrier did not take the necessary precautions in ensuring
the safety of passengers in the boarding of and disembarking from the vessel. Unless shown to
the contrary, a common carrier is presumed to have been negligent in cases of death or injury to
its passengers. Since X had not completely disembarked yet, the obligation of the ship-owner to
exercise utmost diligence still then subsisted and it can still be held liable.
LM Case of La Mallorca v. CA
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from
the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues
until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises.
And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances. It cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent had exercised the
“utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under
their contract of carriage.
In Aboitiz shipping v. CA
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been
landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once
created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his
destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier’s premises.
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All persons who remain on the premises within a reasonable time after leaving the
conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable
delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable
time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of the business of a shipper, the
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than the
passengers of other common carriers considering the bulk of cargoes and the number of
passengers it can load.
Consequently, such passenger will need at least an hour to disembark from the vessel
and claim his baggage. In the case at bar, when the accident occurred, the victim was in the act
of unloading his cargoes which he had every right to do. As such, even if he had already
disembarked an hour- earlier, his presence in the carrier’s premises was not without cause.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still Aboitiz’s aforesaid failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could
definitely have prevented, the former’s death.
3. Liability for Acts of Others [SAM]

a. Employees
There are 2 bases for the liability of the common carrier for the acts of its employees:
1. Doctrine of respondeat superior
○ The carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of
authority
2. The principle that it is the carrier’s implied duty to transport the passenger safely
○ It is enough that the assault happens within the courtse of the employee’s duty. It
is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carrier’s orders.
○ Art. 1759: Common carriers are liable for the death & injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of their employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers.
In the PH, we follow the 2nd view. The reason for such are as follows:
● The special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full
measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by
law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers, but above all, from the
acts of the carrier’s own servants charged with the passenger’s safety
● Said liability of the carrier for the servant’s hands the performance of his contract to
safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger
with the utmost care prescribed by law
● The carrier has the power to select & remove their employees
It is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense
for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's
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orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the
passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. (Maranan vs. Perez)
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long
as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage. (LRTA vs. Navidad)
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee or in the supervision over him after the
selection, or both. (Mendoza v. Sps Gomez)
b. Other Passengers and Strangers
Art. 1673: A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
It does not, however, make the carrier an insurer ofthe absolute safety of its passengers.
Further, during the ride, the driver and the conductor observed nothing which would rouse their
suspicion that the men were armed or were about to carry out an unlawful activity. With no such
indication, there was no need for them to conduct a more stringent search (i.e., bodily search)
on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be concluded that the common
carrier or any of its employees failed to employ the diligence of a good father of a family. (G.V.
Florida v. Heirs of Battung)
In Pilapil v. CA, the Court clarifed that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no
way due
1. To any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting; or
2. To the negligent or willful acts of the common carrier's employees with respect to the
foregoing—such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers
which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent—there would be no
issue regarding the common carrier's negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable
care, as well as competent employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the
presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not
apply. (G.V. Florida v. Heirs of Battung)
A tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a
cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held
responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being
committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. (Pilapil vs. CA)
________________________________________________________
There must be proof that the deaths were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure
to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as
warranted by law. (Bachelor Express Inc vs. CA)
4. Extent of Liability for Damages
Recoverable damages:
1. Actual and Consequential Damages
Art. 1764 in relation to Art. 2206 holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage
for the death of a passenger, and it is liable to pay the following:
a. Loss of earning capacity
○ Formula:
■ (OK DAHIL BOBO TAYO SA MATH COMPUTE MO MUNA LIFE
EXPECTANCY KASI NEED YUN MALAMAN PARA MALAMAN YUNG
NET EARNING CAPACITY)
■ NET EARNING CAPACITY = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income -
Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)]
■ LIFE EXPECTANCY = ⅔ (80 - age of the deceased)
b. Straight death indemnity of P50K under Art 2206;
c. Moral damages + Attorney’s fees.
In determining the reasonableness of the damages awarded, the factors to be considered are:
a. Life expectancy (considering the health of the victim and the mortality table which is
deemed conclusive) and loss of earning capacity;
○ The loss of earning capacity is based mainly on the number of years remaining in
the person's expected life span. In turn, this number is the basis of the damages
that shall be computed and the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs shall
be fixed.
b. Pecuniary loss, loss of support and sendee; and
c. Moral and mental sufferings.
The loss of earning capacity is based mainly on the number of years remaining in the person's
expected life span. In turn, this number is the basis of the damages that shall be computed and
the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs shall be fixed.
2. Moral Damages
Recoverable if the cases under Art 2219 of the NCC are the proximate result of the breach of
contract of carriage.
Recoverable only when:
________________________________________________________
a. Death of passenger results; or
b. The carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death does not result.
Without the award of moral damages, award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is
improper.
3. Exemplary Damages
May be awarded only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
4. Attorney’s Fees and Interest.
The Montreal Convention of 1999
The Warsaw Convention
What laws govern persons engaged in air transportation business?
The Civil Code, particularly the provisions on common carriers, is the primary law governing
persons engaged in air transportation business. This is on the premise that the place of
departure and place of destination are situated in the Philippines and there is no agreed
stopover in any country which is a party to the Warsaw Convention. The provisions of the Code
of Commerce shall apply suppletorily.
It is not correct that say that Philippine laws, particularly the Civil Code, shall be the primary law
governing air transportation just because the place of destination is the Philippines. If the place
of departure is a country which signed up or adhered to the Warsaw Convention, the latter is the
governing law even though place of destination is the Philippines.
The relevant convention that the country now adheres to is the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, Montreal, 28 May 1999, otherwise known as the
Montreal Convention or “MC99."
It is designed to be a single, universal treaty, governing airline liability around the world relative
to carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo. It amended the now defunct Warsaw
Convention and its related protocols — which compensation system, over time has become
outdated. MC99 espouses a more modern and fair liability regime than its Warsaw counterpart.
MC99 was ratified by the Philippine Senate on 10 August 2015 and became effective on 12
December 2015. To date, 132 of the 191 contracting states of International Civil Aviation
Organization are parties to the MC99.
________________________________________________________
With the Philippines’ accession to MC99, it has the force and effect of law in this country.
1. Applicability [SAM]
When is the Warsaw Convention applicable?
The Warsaw Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods
performed by aircraft for hire. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an
air transport undertaking.
The expression “international carriage” means any carriage in which, according to the contract
made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be
a break in the carriage or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or
authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage
without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be
international for the purposes of the Convention.
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are
situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an
“international carriage.” The High Contracting Parties referred to are the signatories to the
Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it.
The Montreal Convention retained this provision.
As to what is the final place of destination is determined by the contract of carriage. In one case,
the passenger bought a ticket in San Francisco, United States of America (USA) from Northwest
Airlines. His flight itinerary is San Francisco-Tokyo-Manila-San Francisco. Despite
reconfirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his fight from Tokyo to Manila
and therefore had to be waitlisted. He sued in RTC Manila. It was ruled that the Philippine court
has no jurisdiction because the place of departure and place of destination are both in San
Francisco, USA. It is the passenger’s “ultimate destination,” not an “agreed stopping place” that
determines the country where suit against international carrier is to be filed.
2. Extent of Liability of Air Carrier [SIM]

a. Death or Injury of Passenger
The Montreal Convention established a two-tier liability for death or bodily injury to a passenger.
The first tier is on the basis of a strict liability where an airline carrier shall be made liable for
damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger on the condition that the
________________________________________________________
accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. Under this first tier of liability, the carrier
cannot limit or exclude its liability provided the damages sustained does not exceed 128,821
Special Drawing Rights (“SDRs”).
An SDR is a type of foreign exchange reserve asset created by the International Monetary
Fund. Its value is based on an artificial basket of currencies consisting of the US dollar, the
euro, the pound and the Japanese yen. The liability limits are reviewed every five (5) years.
In this regard, the carrier may be held liable even if it is not negligent or at fault. The carrier is
thus presumptively liable up to the amount of 128,821 SDRs. The carrier’s liability may be
reduced or exonerated only in case where damage was caused by contributory or sole
negligence of the passenger or person claiming compensation.
Under the second tier of liability, or for all damages higher than 128,821 SDRs, the carrier shall
be liable unless it can show that the damage was not due to its negligence or wrongful act or
omission, or that the damage was solely due to the negligence or wrongful act or omission of a
third party. Otherwise stated, for those claims above 128,821 SDRs, the carrier shall not be
liable under this tier only if it shall prove that it was not negligent or at fault. To emphasize, the
burden of proof is on the carrier.
This two-tier liability is a departure from the liability regime under the Warsaw Convention (and
its subsequent amendments) where the carrier’s liability was limited to $25,000.00 (or its
equivalent) regardless of whether the airline was at fault or not. Also, the full defense that the
carrier or its agents has taken all reasonable measures to avoid damage is not already availing
under the Montreal Convention.
b. Lost or Delayed Baggage
LOST BAGGAGE
In the case of destruction, or loss of, or of damage to, checked baggage, the carrier shall be
liable for damages as long as the destruction, loss or damage took place on board the aircraft or
during any period within which the checked baggage was under the carrier’s custody. The
carrier may be held not liable if and to the extent that the damage resulted from the inherent
defect, quality or vice of the baggage. In case of unchecked baggage, including personal items,
the carrier shall be Hable if the damage resulted from its faults or that of its agents.
In those cases where the carrier is held liable, the carrier’s liability shall be up to 1,288 SDRs for
each passenger, or approximately US$70 per kg luggage (per current valuation). This is an
apparent increase from the previous limit under the Warsaw Convention of only up to US$20
per kg luggage. The passenger may only claim above the limit of 1,288 SDR if he has made a
special declaration of interest at the time of check-in and has paid a supplementary sum if the
case so requires. In such case, the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared
sum.
________________________________________________________
DELAYED BAGGAGE
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers,
baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay
if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be
required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures.
In the carriage of baggage, the liability of the carrier in the case of delay is limited to 1,288 SDR
for each passenger unless the passenger has made, at the time when the checked baggage
was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of interest in delivery at destination and
has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case, the carrier will be liable to
pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless it proves that the sum is greater than the
passenger’s actual interest in delivery at destination.
May the passenger recover an amount greater than the amount set forth in the
Convention?
The passenger may recover a greater amount in the following cases:
a. If at the time the packages were handed over to the carrier, the passenger made a
special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum; and
b. When the air carrier failed to raise timely objections during the trial when questions
and answers regarding the actual claims and damages sustained by the passenger were
asked.
Note: Where should the action be filed?
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages
before:
1.) the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2.) the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3.) the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been
made; or
4.) the court of the place of destination.
Note: The Montreal Convention retained the jurisdictional rules under the Warsaw Convention
but as a supplement, the MC99 also allows, in respect of damage resulting from death or injury
of a passenger, the filing of action in the territory of a State Party in which at the time of the
accident the passenger has his principal and permanent residence and to and from which the
carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers by air.
If a claim is covered by the Warsaw Convention, may the passenger bring the legal action
under local laws?
________________________________________________________
Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention excludes other remedies by further providing that “(1) in
the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 (of the Convention), any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.”
Therefore, a claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under local
law if the statute of limitations of two (2) years has already lapsed. The same principle applies
under the Montreal Convention.
Jurisprudence where the Supreme Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention does not
apply.
Jurisprudence recognizes that the Warsaw Convention does not “exclusively regulate” the
relationship between passenger and carrier on an international flight. For instance, the Supreme
Court distinguished between the (1) damage to the passenger’s baggage and (2) humiliation he
suffered at the hands of the airline’s employees. The first cause of action was covered by the
Warsaw Convention which prescribes in two (2) years, while the second was covered by the
provisions of the Civil Code on torts, which prescribes in four (4) years. Had the case merely
consisted of claims incidental to the airlines’ delay in transporting their passengers, the
passenger’s complaint would have been time-barred under Article 29 of the Warsaw
Convention.
Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 146, as amended by RA 11659)
1. Critical Infrastructure [Sec. 2(e), RA 11659]
2. Foreign State-Owned Enterprise [Sec. 2(g), RA 11659] [SIM]
A foreign state-owned enterprise refers to an entity in which a foreign State:
a. Directly or indirectly owns more than 50% of the capital taking into account both
the voting rights and beneficial ownership;
b. Controls, through ownership interests, the exercise of more than 50% of the
voting rights; or
c. Holds the power to appoint a majority of members of the board of directors or any
other equivalent management body
3. Public Service as Public Utility [Sec. 4, RA 11659] [TAN]
The Commission shall have jurisdiction and supervision over all public services, including public
utilities, and their franchises, equipment, and other properties, and in the exercise of its
authority, it shall have the necessary powers and the aid of public force: Provided, That public
services, including public utilities, owned or operated by government entities shall be regulated
by the Commission in the same way as privately-owned public services.
Public service includes every person that may own, operate, manage, or control in the
Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,
occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier,
________________________________________________________
railroad, street railway, etc. (traction railway, sub-way motor vehicle, either for freight or
passenger, or both with or without fixed route and whether may be its classification, freight or
carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat or steamship line, pontines, ferries, and
water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine
railways, marine repair shop, [warehouse] wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal,
irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power water supply and power, petroleum,
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications system, wire or wireless broadcasting
stations and other similar public services.)
❖ However, a person engaged in agriculture, not otherwise a public service, who owns a
motor vehicle and uses it personally and/or enters into a special contract whereby said
motor vehicle is offered for hire or compensation to a third party or third parties engaged
in agriculture, not itself or themselves a public service, for operation by the latter for a
limited time and for a specific purpose directly connected with the cultivation of his or
their farm, the transportation, processing, and marketing of agricultural products of such
third party or third parties shall not be considered as operating a public service for the
purposes of this Act.
Public Utility. - refers to a public service that operates, manages or controls for public use any of
the following:
1) Distribution of Electricity;
2) Transmission of Electricity;
3) Petroleum and Petroleum Products Pipeline Transmission Systems;
4) Water Pipeline Distribution Systems and Wastewater Pipeline Systems, including sewerage
pipeline systems;
5) Seaports; and
6) Public Utility Vehicles
All concessionaires, joint ventures and other similar entities that wholly operate, manage or
control for public use the sectors above are public utilities.
Upon the recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the
President may recommend to Congress the classification of a public service as a public utility on
the basis of the following criteria:
1) The person or juridical entity regularly supplies and transmits and distributes to the public
through a network a commodity or service of public consequence;
2) The commodity or service is a natural monopoly that needs to be regulated when the
common good so requires. For this purpose, natural monopoly exists when the market demand
for a commodity or service can be supplied by a single entity at a lower cost that by two or more
entities;
3) The commodity or service is necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation of the
public; and
4) The commodity or service is obligated to provide adequate service to the public on demand.
________________________________________________________
● All public services, including those classified as public utilities under this Act, shall
continue to be regulated and supervised by the relevant Administrative Agencies under
existing laws.
● A public service which is not classified as a public utility under this Act shall be
considered a business affected with public interest for purposes of Sections 17 and 18 of
Article XII of the Constitution.
● Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, nationality requirements shall not be imposed
by the relevant Administrative Agencies on any public service not classified as a public
utility.
● The NEDA shall provide periodic advice to Administrative Agencies on the proper
application of the constitutional and other legal restrictions to local and foreign-owned
subcontractors, without putting operational resiliency at risk.
4. Unlawful Acts [Sec. 9, RA 11659]
a) To provide or maintain any service that is unsafe, improper, or inadequate or withhold or

refuse any service which can reasonably be demanded and furnished, as found and determined
by the Commission in a final order which shall be conclusive and shall take effect in accordance
with this Act, upon appeal of otherwise.
b) To make or give, directly or indirectly, by itself or through its agents, attorneys or brokers, or
any of them, discounts or rebates on authorized rates, or grant credit for the payment of freight
charges, or any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person of corporation or
to any locality or to any particular description of traffic or service, or subject any particular
person or corporation or locality or any particular description of traffic to any prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever; to adopt, maintain, or enforce any regulation, practice
or measurement which shall be found or determined by the Commission to be unjust,
unreasonable, unduly preferential or unjustly discriminatory in a final order which shall be
conclusive and shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of this Act, upon repeal or
otherwise.
c) To refuse or neglect, when requested by the Postmaster General or his authorized

representative, to carry public mail on the regular trips of any public land transportation service
maintained or operated by any such public service, upon such terms and conditions and for a
consideration in such amounts as may be agreed upon between the Postmaster General and
the public service carrier or fixed by the Commission in the absence of an agreement between
the Postmaster General and the carrier. In case the Postmaster General and the public service
carrier are unable to agree on the amount of the compensation to be paid for the carriage of the
mail, the Postmaster General shall forthwith request the Commission to fix a just and
reasonable compensation for such carriage and the same shall be promptly fixed by the
Commission in accordance with section sixteen of this Act.
d) To refuse or neglect, when requested by the Administrative Agency to urgently use, deliver or
render the public service for the purpose of avoiding further loss on human, material, economic,
or environment during a state of calamity.
5. Powers of the President to Suspend or Prohibit Transaction or Investment [Sec. 23, RA

11659] [TAN]
________________________________________________________
In the interest of national security, the President, after review, evaluation and recommendation
of the relevant government department or Administrative Agency, may, within sixty (60) days
from the receipt of such recommendation, suspend or prohibit any proposed merger or
acquisition transaction, or any investment in a public service that effectively results in the grant
of control, whether direct or indirect, to a foreigner or a foreign corporation.
The Philippine Competition Commission (PCC) may be consulted on all matters relating to
mergers and acquisitions.
The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this section.
6. Investments by an Entity Controlled by or Acting on Behalf of the Foreign Government,

or Foreign State-owned Enterprises [Sec. 24, RA 11659] [VEL]
An entity controlled by or acting on behalf of the foreign government or foreign state-

owned enterprises shall be prohibited from owning capital in any public service classified
as public utility or critical infrastructure: Provided, That the prohibition shall apply only to
investments made after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further, That foreign state-
owned enterprises which own capital prior to the effectivity of this law are prohibited from
investing in additional capital upon the effectivity of this Act: Provided, finally, That
notwithstanding the immediately preceding clause, the sovereign wealth funds and
independent pensions funds of each state may collectively own up to thirty percent
(30%) of the capital of such public services.
In the interest of national security, an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of the

foreign government or foreign-owned enterprises shall not make any date or information
disclosure, nor extend assistance, support or cooperation to any foreign government,
instrumentalities or agents.
The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this
section.
7. Reciprocity Clause [Sec. 25, RA 11659]
Foreign nationals shall not be allowed to own more than fifty percent (50%) of the capital
of entities engaged in the operation and management of critical infrastructure unless the
country of such foreign national accords reciprocity to Philippine Nationals as may be
provided by foreign law, treaty or international agreement. Reciprocity may be satisfied
by according rights of similar value in other economic sectors. The NEDA shall
promulgate rules and regulations for this purpose.
________________________________________________________
Unless otherwise provided by law, or by any international agreement, a public service
shall employ a foreign national only after the determination of non-availability of a
Philippine National who is competent, able and willing to perform the services for which
the foreign national is desired.
Any foreign national seeking admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and
any public service which desires to engage a foreign national for employment in the
Philippines must obtain an employment permit pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 442,
otherwise known as the "Labor Code of the Philippines", as amended.
Public services employing foreign nationals issued employment permits in industries to

be determined by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall implement an
understudy/skills development program to ensure the transfer of technology/skills to
Filipinos, whether next-in-rank or otherwise, with the potential of succeeding the foreign
national in the same establishment or its subsidiary, within a specific period as may be
determined by the DOLE, upon consultation with relevant government agencies and
industry experts.
________________________________________________________

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Transportation - Commercial Review

Deadline on Monday Night March 13 [12MN]

Pinlac Common Carriers → Temporary Unloading or

Saguiped Stipulation for Limitation of Liability → Duration

Samson Liability for Acts of Others → Applicability of

Simeon Extent of Liability → Foreign state owned

Tan Public service as public utility → Powers of the

Velasco Investments → Reciprocity Clause [DONE]

Common Carriers [PIN]

What is the test to determine whether a person is a common carrier?

What are the requisites to be a common carrier?

1. Diligence Required of Common Carriers

2. Liabilities of Common Carriers

Is the presumption of fault or negligence applicable only in case of death or injury to

Vigilance Over Goods

b. Temporary Unloading or Shortage [PIN]

4. Stipulation for Limitation of Liability [SAG]

LM Case of Sweet Lines v. Teves:

The condition is void and unenforceable for two (2) reasons:

b. Limitation of Liability to Fixed Amount

c. Limitation of Liability in Absence of Declaration of Greater Value

5. Liability for Baggage of Passengers

stipulations that are considered void in a contract of carriage for passengers

2. Duration of Liability [SAG]

LM Case of Brinas v. People

While waiting for carrier or boarding a carrier

Arrival at the destination

3. Liability for Acts of Others [SAM]

b. Other Passengers and Strangers

4. Extent of Liability for Damages

1. Actual and Consequential Damages

Recoverable only when:

4. Attorney’s Fees and Interest.

The Montreal Convention of 1999

The Warsaw Convention

What laws govern persons engaged in air transportation business?

When is the Warsaw Convention applicable?

The Montreal Convention retained this provision.

2. Extent of Liability of Air Carrier [SIM]

b. Lost or Delayed Baggage

The passenger may recover a greater amount in the following cases:

Note: Where should the action be filed?

1.) the court where the carrier is domiciled;

3. Public Service as Public Utility [Sec. 4, RA 11659] [TAN]

4. Unlawful Acts [Sec. 9, RA 11659]

a) To provide or maintain any service that is unsafe, improper, or inadequate or withhold or

c) To refuse or neglect, when requested by the Postmaster General or his authorized

5. Powers of the President to Suspend or Prohibit Transaction or Investment [Sec. 23, RA

6. Investments by an Entity Controlled by or Acting on Behalf of the Foreign Government,

An entity controlled by or acting on behalf of the foreign government or foreign state-

In the interest of national security, an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of the

7. Reciprocity Clause [Sec. 25, RA 11659]

Public services employing foreign nationals issued employment permits in industries to

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