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RESEARCH ARTICLE   PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES

Autism attenuates the perception of the mind-body divide

Iris Berenta,1 , Rachel M. Theodoreb, and Erick Valenciaa

Edited by Susan Goldin-Meadow, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL; received July 12, 2022; accepted September 20, 2022

People are intuitive Dualists—they tacitly consider the mind as ethereal, distinct from
the body. Here we ask whether Dualism emerges naturally from the conflicting core Significance
principles that guide reasoning about objects, on the one hand, and about the minds of
agents (theory of mind, ToM), on the other. To address this question, we explore Dualist Across cultures, people consider
reasoning in autism spectrum disorder (ASD)—a congenital disorder known to com- the mind as ethereal, distinct
promise ToM. If Dualism arises from ToM, then ASD ought to attenuate Dualism and from the body. But whether
promote Physicalism. In line with this prediction, Experiment 1 shows that, compared to Dualism arises only from culture
controls, people with ASD are more likely to view psychological traits as embodied—as (nurture) or also spontaneously
likely to manifest in a replica of one’s body. Experiment 2 demonstrates that, unlike (from human nature) is
controls, people with ASD do not consider thoughts as disembodied—as persistent in unknown. To address this
the afterlife (upon the body’s demise). If ASD promotes the perception of the psyche as
question, here, we turn to autism
embodied, and if (per Essentialism) embodiment suggests innateness, then ASD should
spectrum disorder (ASD)—a
further promote Nativism—this bias is shown in Experiment 3. Finally, Experiment
4 demonstrates that, in neurotypical (NT) participants, difficulties with ToM corre- congenital disorder that
late with Physicalism. These results are the first to show that ASD attenuates Dualist compromises intuitive reasoning
reasoning and to link Dualism to ToM. These conclusions suggest that the mind-body about the minds of others
distinction might be natural for people to entertain. (theory of mind, ToM). If ToM
promotes Dualist reasoning, then
autism | theory of mind | innateness | intuitive psychology Dualist reasoning ought to be
attenuated in ASD. Our results
A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists—they consider the mind as
show that, compared to controls,
ethereal, distinct from the material body (1–17). For example, adults believe that a person’s
people with ASD are more likely
thoughts will likely persist in the afterlife (3), but they are unlikely to manifest in a replica
of one’s body (compared to physical traits, such as a scar (2)). to view bodies and minds alike
Intuitive Dualist reasoning has been further documented in children (18, 19) and across (in line with Physicalism).
multiple cultures (4, 5, 13, 14, 17, 20–25); it has been implicated in reasoning about the Moreover, a Physicalist stance is
brain (11), psychiatric disorders (8, 26, 27), morality (28, 29), and one’s true self (9). linked to difficulties with ToM.
Why people are Dualists, however, remains unknown. One possibility is that Dualism These results shed light on ASD
is strictly a social invention that arises via cultural transmission alone. On an alternative and on the mind-body distinction
account (1), Dualism emerges naturally, from the tension between two intuitive systems in humans.
of core knowledge that are evident in young infants (30, 31), and arguably, nonhuman
animals (32–39).
One system—intuitive physics, suggests that objects are cohesive entities that can move
only by immediate contact with other objects (40–42). Another system, theory of mind
(ToM), suggests to us that, unlike objects, agents can move by their own accord, guided
by their mental states—their beliefs, desires, and goals (43–45). Thus, seeing a person
reach toward their coffee mug is hardly noteworthy (one tacitly assumes that the movement
was caused by the agent’s desire for coffee), but seeing the converse (a mug moving toward Author affiliations: aNortheastern University, Boston, MA
20115; and bUniversity of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-
the person) would be surprising indeed. The distinct causal principles we invoke to explain 1085
the behavior of agents, on the one hand, and objects (on the other) could lead us to
conclude that minds are ethereal, distinct from the material body.
Dualism, then, could be natural to humans—it could arise, in part from ToM. The Author contributions: I.B. conceived the project; I.B.
hypothesis of “natural Dualism” could further explain why Dualist thinking is prevalent designed the experiments; I.B. contributed to data
analysis;  E.V. performed research; I.B. and R.M.T.
across cultures (46). But precisely because of its prevalence, the roots of Dualism—nature analyzed data; E.V. programmed the experiments and
(ToM) or nurture (cultural transmission)—are difficult to disentangle. curated the data; and I.B. wrote the paper.
To shed light on the origins of Dualism, here, we examine Dualist thinking in adults The authors declare no competing interest.
with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD). ASD is a heritable disorder (47) that compro- This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
mises ToM (43, 48–58). If Dualism indeed arises naturally, from ToM, then a congenital Copyright © 2022 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.
This article is distributed under Creative Commons
impairment to ToM ought to attenuate Dualist thinking in ASD. This is the hypothesis Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0
we evaluate here. (CC BY-NC-ND).
This hypothesis does not necessarily mean that ASD ought to utterly abolish Dualism. 1
To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email:
I.berent@northeastern.edu.
First, many individuals on the autism spectrum (AS) can reason about the mental states
This article contains supporting information online at
of others (49, 52, 54, 58–60), and this partial sparing of ToM could give rise to partial https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.​
intuitive Dualism. In addition, Dualist reasoning could also emerge by cultural transmis- 2211628119/-/DCSupplemental.
sion, independently of ToM. Either way, we expect that, compared to NT controls, Published November 30, 2022.

PNAS  2022  Vol. 119  No. 49  e2211628119 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2211628119   1 of 8

 individuals with ASD would show an attenuated Dualism, rather
than strict Physicalism (the view of body and mind as one and
the same).
In what follows, we examine Dualist reasoning in adults with
ASD. We focus on two hallmarks of Dualism, documented in NT
individuals. The first is the belief that certain mental traits (e.g.,
thoughts) are ethereal—they are less likely to manifest in the body
(in life) and more likely to persist in its absence (in the afterlife);
Experiments 1–2 evaluate embodiment and disembodiment,
respectively.
The second hallmark of Dualism concerns its effects on nativ-
ist intuitions. Past research (discussed below) has shown that
psychological traits that are perceived as strongly anchored in
the physical body are also perceived as innate. For example,
people believe that seeing and walking (which are linked to the
eyes and legs) are innate, whereas thoughts (which are perceived
as disembodied) are not (61). If Physicalism promotes innate-
ness intuitions, and people with ASD lean toward Physicalism
(and away from Dualism), then people with ASD should be
further biased toward Nativism—this bias is evaluated in
Experiment 3. Finally, Experiment 4 examines whether difficul-
ties with ToM are linked to participants’ intuitions about bodies
and minds.
We predict that, compared to NT participants, individuals with
ASD should be a) less likely to consider psychological traits as
embodied, and consequently b) they should also be more likely
to view them as innate. Furthermore, c) difficulties with ToM
should be associated with a more Physicalist stance.
The Embodiment of Psychological Traits
(Experiments 1–2)
Experiments 1–2 examine whether individuals with ASD consider
psychological traits as more strongly embodied (compared to NT
individuals). In each experiment, participants were presented with
a list of 80 psychological traits—either thoughts (e.g., having a
concept of ‘person’, symbolic reasoning)—hereafter, epistemic
states, or traits that correspond to actions (e.g., walking, sitting)
and emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness)—collectively, non-epis-
temic traits.
Experiment 1 evaluated the embodiment of these traits. To this
end, we presented participants with a hypothetical scenario,
whereby it would be possible to create a replica of one’s body.
Participants were asked to determine whether each trait would
likely transfer to the replica. If ASD attenuates Dualism, then
people with ASD should consider psychological traits as more
strongly embodied, hence, as more likely to transfer to the bodily
replica.
In Experiment 2, participants judged the converse, disembod-
iment. Here, participants evaluated the persistence of the same
traits after the body’s demise, in the afterlife. If people with ASD
are less Dualist, then they should now consider psychological traits
as less likely to persist (i.e., as less disembodied).
As explained above, we expect ASD to attenuate Dualist rea-
soning, but not necessarily abolish it altogether. Accordingly, ASD
participants might not categorically reject the persistence of the
psyche in the afterlife nor might they fully embrace its embodi-
ment (in the living). Additionally, like NT participants, the ASD
group may well consider epistemic traits as disembodied relative
to non-epistemic traits, such as actions and emotions (traits that
can be readily linked to specific body organs). Nonetheless, ASD
participants should consider epistemic traits as more likely to
manifest in the body (in Experiment 1), and as less likely to persist
in the afterlife (in Experiment 2).
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Results and Discussion: Body Replication (Experiment 1). In this
and all subsequent experiments, we excluded outliers (participants
whose responses fell 2.5 SD beyond the group mean). Two
participants were removed from Experiment 1 (one per group).
An inspection of the grand means (the proportion of “will trans-
fer to the replica” responses, calculated over by-subject means,
which were averaged across items, see Fig. 1) suggests that both
groups considered epistemic traits as less embodied (i.e., less likely
to emerge in the body-replica) relative to non-epistemic traits.
However, the ASD group considered both types of psychological
traits as more strongly embodied than NT controls.
a. Group comparison. To evaluate these observations, we first
submitted the binary trial responses (1  =  will transfer to the
replica; 0 = will not transfer) to a generalized linear mixed effects
model with the binomial response family, as implemented with
the glmer function of the lmer4 package (62). This model specifies
response to be predicted by the fixed effects of trait, group, and
their interaction, with the random effects structure consisting of
random slopes for trait by subject, random intercepts by subject,
and random intercepts by item. Because subject identifier codes
are unique (i.e., individuals in the ASD and NT groups have
distinct subject codes), this model adequately captures the nested
structure of individual participants within each group. The model
syntax (also employed in Experiments 2–4) is shown below:
response∼ trait ∗ group + (trait|subject)
+ (1|item), family = "binomial".
The significant effect of Group indicates that the mean “embod-
iment” (i.e., “will transfer”) responses of the ASD group were
higher than NT controls (β = 1.50, SE = 0.67, Z=−2.24, P = 0.02).
The significant effect of Trait confirms that epistemic traits were
considered less embodied than non-epistemic traits (β = 0.89,
SE = 0.26, Z = 3.34, P < 0.001). The interaction was not signifi-
cant (β = 0.41, SD = 0.00, Z = 1.24, P > 0.21).
b. Comparison against chance. To further investigate the perception
of psychological traits as embodied, we next examined whether the
proportion of “will transfer to the replica” responses for each of the
four cells (2 Group x 2 Trait) differed from chance. For each cell,
we thus constructed a logistic mixed effect regression model that
predicted the “will transfer” (i.e., embodiment) responses from
random slopes by subjects and by items. Of interest is whether
the intercept differed from chance (0.5; 0 in log odds).
ASD participants responded to all traits above chance—both
non-epistemic (β = 2.81, SE = 0.62, Z = 4.53, P < 0.001) and
Fig. 1. The perceived embodiment of psychological traits, as gauged by the
“will transfer to the replica” responses. Bars show grand means calculated
over by-subject averages. In this and all figures, asterisks mark a significant
difference between the group mean and chance (indicated by the dotted line)
and error bars indicate SE of the subject means.
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epistemic (β = 2.81, SE = 0.62, Z = 4.53, P < 0.001) traits. In
contrast, NT participants’ responses to non-epistemic traits were
above chance (β = 0.99, SE = 0.34, Z = 2.95, P < 0.01), but this
was not the case for epistemic traits (β = −0.06, SE = 0.40,
Z = −0.16, P = 0.87).
To evaluate whether this at-chance performance reflects evi-
dence for the null hypothesis (as opposed to the absence of evi-
dence), we also submitted the responses to a Bayes Factor analysis
(for further details, see SI Appendix). Results showed that for
non-epistemic traits, there was strong evidence for the alternative
hypothesis (H1: that the means differed from chance) for NT
participants (BF1 = 13.39); for the ASD group, the evidence was
extreme (BF1 = 5,124.76). Considering epistemic traits, however,
for NT participants, we found anecdotal support for the null
hypothesis (H0: the mean does not differ from chance: BF0 = 0.43).
ASD participants, in contrast, yielded anecdotal evidence to the
contrary—that performance differed from chance (BF1 = 2.39).
Summarizing, both groups considered epistemic traits as less
likely to be anchored in the body, in line with Dualism.
Nonetheless, the two groups differed with respect to the strength
of this Dualist bias. First, the ASD group considered all psycho-
logical traits as more firmly anchored in the body than the control
group. Additionally, NT participants were uncertain about the
embodiment of epistemic traits, but this was not the case for ASD
participants.
Experiment 2 further investigated the Dualist bias by presenting
participants with the converse of embodiment. Participants here
were asked to determine whether psychological traits would persist
after the demise of the body, in the afterlife. If people with ASD
are less Dualist, then now, they should not consider psychological
traits as likely to persist.
Results and Discussion: The Afterlife (Experiment 2). One NT
participant was identified as an outlier and removed from the
analyses. An inspection of the means (the proportion of “will
persist” responses, calculated over by-subject means, which
were first averaged across items, see Fig. 2) suggested that, in
considering the afterlife, both groups viewed epistemic traits
as relatively disembodied—as more likely to persist than non-
epistemic traits. But while the NT group viewed epistemic traits
as categorically disembodied (i.e., choices were above chance), this
was not the case for the ASD group. Thus, unlike controls, ASD
participants did not view thoughts as disembodied.
a. Group comparison. The mixed effect model (following the
structure described in Experiment 1) yielded a reliable effect of
Trait (β  =  −0.76, SE  =  0.31, Z  =  −2.48, P  =  0.01). The effect
Fig. 2. The perceived disembodiment of psychological traits, as gauged by
the “will emerge in the afterlife” responses. Bars show grand means calculated
over by-subject averages.
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of Group (β  =  0.61, SE  =  0.59, Z  =  1.04, P  >  0.30) and the
interaction (β = 0.08, SE = 0.25, Z < 1) were not significant.
b. Comparison against chance. A comparison of the choices
against chance (following the model described in Experiment
1) nonetheless suggested that the two groups exhibited different
patterns of responses. NT participants’ responses to epistemic
traits were significantly above chance (β  =  1.00, SE  =  0.31,
Z = 3.23, P < 0.01), whereas responses to non-epistemic traits were
at chance (β = 0.29, SE = 0.38, Z < 1). For ASD participants, by
contrast, responses to epistemic traits hovered at chance (β = 0.41,
SE = 0.32, Z = 1.26, P = 0.21), in line with responses to non-
epistemic traits (β = –0.23, SE = 0.57, Z = –0.40, P > 0.6), and
contrary to the choices of NT participants.
We next evaluated the strength of the support for these conclu-
sions using Bayes Factor analysis. For non-epistemic traits, we
found moderate evidence for the null hypothesis that responses
are at chance (for NT: BF0= 0.32; for ASD: BF0= 0.19).
Considering epistemic traits, however, the support for these con-
clusions differed for the two groups. Here, for NT participants,
there was extreme evidence for the alternative hypothesis (i.e., that
response differ from chance: BF1= 107.33), whereas this was not
the case for ASD participants; in fact, there was anecdotal evidence
to the contrary (for the null hypothesis that responses to epistemic
traits were at chance: BF0= 0.85).
Thus, both groups considered epistemic traits as less embodied
than non-epistemic traits, and responses to the two trait types did
not differ reliably by group. But when the choice was evaluated
categorically—as indicating whether or not traits would persist in
the afterlife (relative to chance level), here, the behaviors of the
two groups diverged. NT participants stated that epistemic traits
would persist in the afterlife, but this was not the case for ASD
participants. Thus, unlike NT participants, ASD participants did
not consider psychological traits as disembodied.
The Innateness of Psychological Traits
(Experiment 3)
Experiments 1–2 suggest that people on the ASD spectrum con-
sider psychological traits as more firmly anchored in the body than
NT participants: they believe that psychological traits are more
likely to manifest in the living body, and (unlike controls), they
do not expect thoughts to persist in its absence (in the afterlife).
In Experiment 3, we explore how this Physicalist stance affects
reasoning about the origins of the psyche—its innateness.
Previous research in neurotypical (NT) individuals suggests that
to intuitively perceive a psychological trait as innate, people must
perceive that trait as firmly anchored in the body (8, 10, 26,
63–65). For example, people believe that a person’s thoughts are
ethereal (10), and they arise by learning from experience (61, 66),
whereas walking, seeing, and happiness—traits that can be readily
linked to the body (e.g., to legs, eyes, and face, respectively)—are
likely innate (10, 65). Moreover, the link between embodiment
and innateness is causal. Specifically, when people are presented
with evidence that a psychological trait is embodied (e.g., it man-
ifests in the brain), people become more likely to consider that
trait as innate (compared to when the same trait manifests in
behavior) (8, 10, 26, 65). Conversely, when informed that a psy-
chological trait is innate, people now become more likely to view
that trait as embodied (compared to when the same trait is pre-
sented as learned) (10).
The bias to link embodiment and innateness could arise from
the interaction between two principles of intuitive psychology—
Essentialism and Dualism (63, 64). A large literature has attrib-
uted innateness intuitions to Essentialism (67, 68), and per
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 Essentialism, the innate essence of living things is perceived as
embodied (69–72). But since, per Dualism, people tend to view
the psyche as disembodied, they conclude that psychological traits
are unlikely to be innate. Thoughts (i.e., epistemic traits) are the
psychological traits perceived as least embodied (less than sensa-
tions, actions, and emotions). Accordingly, people perceive epis-
temic traits as the least likely to be innate. Fig. 3.
This hypothesis suggests a novel prediction for ASD. If ASD
participants consider psychological traits as more strongly embod-
ied, and if embodiment triggers Nativism, then ASD participants
ought to also show a stronger Nativist bias—they should be more
likely to view psychological traits as innate (relative to NT partic-
ipants). Experiment 3 evaluates this prediction.
Results and Discussion. Two outliers were removed (one
per group). An inspection of the means suggested that both
groups considered non-epistemic traits as more likely to be
innate (relative to epistemic traits). ASD participants, however,
considered psychological traits as more likely to be innate than
NT participants. In addition, when compared against chance, NT
participants denied the innateness of epistemic traits, but this was
not the case for ASD participants.
a. Group comparison. The mixed effect model (following the
structure described in Experiment 1) yielded a reliable effect of
Group (β = −0.89, SE = 0.29, Z = −3.02, P < 0.01) and Trait
(β = 2.20, SE = 0.35, Z = 6.27, P < 0.001). The interaction was
not significant (β = 0.31, SE = 0.33, Z < 1).
b. Comparison against chance. Responses to non-epistemic traits
were significantly above chance for both the ASD (β=1.54,
SE=0.35, Z = 4.46, P < 0.001) and NT (β = 0.88, SE = 0.36,
Z = 2.42, P < 0.02) groups, suggesting that non-epistemic traits
are considered innate. A Bayes factor analysis confirmed that
the support for this (alternative) hypothesis was very strong for
NT participants (BF1= 51.57) and extremely strong for ASD
participants (BF1= 32,8715.1).
The two groups, however, differed in their responses to epis-
temic traits. Here, NT participants’ innateness judgments were
significantly below chance (β = −1.43, SE = 0.337, Z = −4.25,
P < 0.001), and the evidence for this conclusion was extreme
(BF1= 49,889.37). In contrast, the innateness judgments of ASD
participants hovered at chance (β = −0.46, SE = 0.28, Z = −1.63,
P > 0.10) and the support for the alternative hypothesis was anec-
dotal (BF1= 1.15). Thus, unlike controls, ASD participants did
not deny the innateness of epistemic traits.
Summarizing, participants with ASD showed stronger nativist
beliefs than controls—they were more likely to view psychological
traits as innate, and, unlike NT controls, they did not reject the
Fig. 3. The perceived innateness of psychological traits, as gauged by the
“innate” responses. Bars show grand means calculated over by-subject
averages.
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innateness of epistemic traits. This outcome is expected by the
hypothesis that people essentialize psychological traits that they
consider embodied. Since (as shown in Experiments 1–2)
ASD participants consider psychological traits as more strongly
embodied, they are also more likely to consider them innate.
Is Dualism Linked to ToM (Experiment 4)?
The results of Experiments 1–2 suggest that, compared to NT
controls, individuals with ASD are Physicalists, and, perhaps for
this reason, they also tend to be Nativists, as indeed was shown in
Experiment 3. We hypothesize that these biases arise from diffi-
culties with ToM—a known characteristic of autism (43, 48–58).
But whether this Physicalist stance is indeed linked to ToM is
unknown—Experiments 1 - 3 do not speak to this question.
To shed light on this matter, we next assessed sensitivity to ToM
in a large group of participants—ASD and NT (N = 84 per group)
and correlated these outcomes with the two measures of Dualism—
Embodiment and Disembodiment (using the replication and
afterlife tasks, as in Experiments 1–2, respectively). All participants
were further administered the Autism Quotient (AQ, from
ref. 73).
To evaluate ToM, we presented participants with a statement
about a protagonist’s false belief (adapted from ref. 74). In half
of the responses, this statement corresponded to a false belief
that the protagonist likely holds (e.g., “Lisa believes Jacob is
sleeping”; Lisa is likely to hold this belief as she last saw Jacob
asleep on the beach, but alas, this belief is false—in reality, Jacob
has since gone swimming). The other half captured true beliefs
that the protagonist is unlikely to hold (e.g., “the girls believe
the ice-cream in the fridge is melted”; this belief is actually true,
as a power outage occurred overnight, but the girls have no
reason to hold that belief, as they were meanwhile sleeping).
Participants were asked to quickly evaluate whether or not the
protagonist holds this belief. Sensitivity to ToM was measured
by response accuracy speed.
Since, in high-functioning people with ASD, difficulties with
ToM are typically subtle (49, 52, 54, 58–60), and they can be
masked by compensatory analytic strategies that do not rely on
intuitive ToM (58), we did not necessarily expect our ASD group
to score lower on the ToM task or for their ToM performance to
correlate with the Dualism probes. Thus, in the ASD group, per-
formance on the ToM probe may not reflect intuitive ToM
transparently.
NT participants, by contrast, are more likely to solve the ToM
problem by relying on their (intact) intuitive ToM competence.
We thus asked whether their performance on the ToM probe
correlates with Dualism (Embodiment/Disembodiment). We
hypothesize that NT participants who are sensitive to the minds
of others (i.e., those with faster responses/fewer errors on the ToM
task) ought to lean toward Dualism: they should be more likely
to perceive psychological traits as disembodied—as likely to
emerge in the afterlife, but not in the replication task. This selec-
tive pattern would suggest a link between ToM and intuitive
Dualism.
Results and Discussion
As expected, the ASD group scored significantly higher (more
autistic-like) than controls on the AQ, and this significant group
difference emerged in both the Embodiment (i.e., replication;
(t(118) = 7.93, P < 0.001; d = 7.10) and Disembodiment (i.e.,
afterlife) conditions (t(118) = 11.32, P < 0.001; d = 7.17; for
additional details, see SI Appendix, Table S4). In the ToM task,
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however, the two groups did not differ on either accuracy or cor-
rect response time (RT) (hereafter, “speed”; in both cases, t < 1).
We note that RT data from one NT participant were excluded
because they fell over six SD away from the mean.
We next asked whether difficulties in ToM are linked to partic-
ipants’ Dualist stance. The arrows in the margins of Fig. 4 depict
the directions of the predicted links between intuitive ToM and
responses to the Afterlife and Replication probes (color-coded by
probe). To the extent responses to the ToM probe rely on intuitive
ToM, then participants who excel on the ToM task (i.e., faster
responses) should lean toward Dualism: they should consider psy-
chological traits as more likely to emerge in the afterlife probe (but
not the replication probe).
This was indeed the case for NT participants. NT participants
who excelled on ToM (i.e., had a faster response) were more likely
to state that psychological traits would emerge in the afterlife
(r(57) = −0.307, P < 0.02). And as would be expected, this corre-
lation was primarily due to epistemic traits (r(57) = −0.353,
P < 0.01)—the ones typically perceived as least embodied, hence,
most likely to persist upon the body’s demise (for non-epistemic
traits: r(57) = −0.229, P = 0.08). No other correlations between
ToM and the Dualist probes were significant for NT participants
(for the full correlation matrix, see SI Appendix, Table S5). Thus,
in NT participants, sensitivity to ToM was associated with Dualism.
This, however, was not the case for ASD participants. In fact,
ASD participants who excelled on ToM (i.e., had faster responses)
were more likely to state that psychological traits would emerge
in the body-replica(r(58) = −0.291, P < 0.03)—in line with
Physicalism (and contrary to Dualism). Upon closer inspection,
this link appeared to be stronger for non-epistemic traits—the
ones typically seen as most embodied (SI Appendix, Table S5).
Moreover, participants who considered non-epistemic traits as
embodied also exhibited fewer errors on the ToM task
(r(58) = −0.268, P = 0.04)—a mirror image of the findings from
NT participants.
We suggest that the performance of ASD participants reflects
not their intuitive ToM but rather analytic compensatory strat-
egies. Indeed, many individuals with ASD exhibit superior sys-
tematization and attention to detail (75), and such
(domain-general) skills have been shown to allow ASD partic-
ipants to solve ToM questions even when their intuitive ToM
is demonstrably impaired (49, 52, 54, 58–60). Critically, these
skills are likely to boost performance across tasks. Thus, partic-
ipants who are attentive to the ToM task are also likely to attend
to the Dualism probes, so their performance is more likely to
Fig. 4. The correlation between performance on the ToM task (speed and errors) and Dualism. Errors are mean proportions (across items); the RT is the mean
correct response (in seconds, averaged across items). Significant correlations are indicated by bolded lines. The arrows in the margins indicate the patterns of
performance predicted by each probe. Thus, for the Afterlife probe, higher choice proportions are associated with Dualism, whereas in the Replication task,
they suggest Physicalism.
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faithfully reflect their perception of the mind-body link. And
since, by hypothesis, ASD participants lean toward Physicalism,
in the ASD group, Physicalism is associated with more accurate
ToM responses.
Ultimately, then, intuitive ToM could have contributed to the
performance of both groups (see Fig. 5). But in NT participants,
intuitive ToM directly constrained performance on both the
Dualism and ToM probes, whereas in the ASD group, the link to
ToM was indirect. Specifically, the difficulties of ASD participants
with intuitive ToM elicited a Physicalist stance (in responses to
the Replication task), but they also encouraged compensatory
response strategies (in the ToM task), and it is these strategies (not
intuitive ToM) that engendered the association between perfor-
mance on the ToM and Dualism probes. How ASD participants
approached the experimental tasks is not a matter we can ascertain,
but our findings clearly show that ToM performance is linked to
Dualism.
General Discussion
A large literature shows that people are intuitive Dualists—they
consider the mind as ethereal, distinct from the material body
(1–17). Here, we asked whether this Dualist stance might emerge
naturally—from the core knowledge systems that guide reasoning
about objects, on the one hand, and the minds of agents (ToM),
on the other (1).
To evaluate this hypothesis, we turned to ASD—a disorder that
is known to disrupt the development of ToM (43, 48–58). We
reason that, if Dualism arises, in part, from ToM, then people
with ASD should be less likely to exhibit Dualism, and instead,
lean toward Physicalism—the view of the mind and body as one
and the same.
Results from Experiments 1–2 were in line with this possibility.
Compared to controls, ASD participants were more likely to
expect one’s psychological traits to persist in a manipulation that
preserves the body (in body replication), and, unlike controls, they
did not expect thoughts to persist in its absence (in the afterlife).
Since our experimental tasks did not assess Dualism explicitly,
these results are inexplicable by differences in Dualism judgments
per se. And since the responses of the two groups are doubly
dissociated, depending on the probe (embedment/disembodi-
ment), they are also inexplicable by response biases. Accordingly,
these findings suggest that people with ASD consider the psyche
as more strongly embodied, in line with Physicalism (and contrary
to Dualism).
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2211628119   5 of 8
 Fig. 5. The hypothesized link between intuitive ToM and performance on the ToM and Dualism probes.
Experiment 3 explored another consequence of Dualism—its
potential to promote Empiricism (8, 10, 26, 63–65). We rea-
soned that if Dualism typically begets Empiricism, then, if the
mind-body divide is attenuated (in ASD), then people with ASD
should be less likely to show the Empiricist bias (found in NT
people), and consequently, they should be more likely to lean
toward Nativism. Accordingly, compared to NT controls, indi-
viduals with ASD should be more likely to state that psycholog-
ical traits are innate—this is precisely what was found in
Experiment 3.
Taken as a whole, the findings from Experiments 1– 3 suggest
that, compared to controls, people with ASD are indeed inclined
toward Physicalism, and perhaps for this reason, they also lean
toward Nativism. The conclusion that ASD promotes Physicalist
reasoning agrees with past anecdotal observations (1, 76). To
the best of our knowledge, our results are the first to support
this conclusion experimentally. As such, these findings shed
new light on how people with ASD reason about bodies and
minds.
Experiment 4 next asked whether this Physicalist stance and its
converse, Dualism, are linked to ToM. We found such associations
in both groups, but their directions differed. We suggest that, in
both groups, responses to the ToM probe were linked to the per-
ceptions of the mind-body divide. However, in NT participants,
intuitive ToM directly constrained performance on the two exper-
imental probes (ToM and Dualism), whereas in ASD participants,
performance was mediated by compensatory strategies.
Consequently, in NT participants, sensitivity to the ToM probe
was associated with stronger Dualism, whereas in the ASD group,
it was linked with a greater likelihood that participants’ Physicalist
stance would manifest.
If congenital difficulties with ToM indeed suppress Dualist
reasoning (in ASD), then it is possible that its typical emergence
(in NT individuals) could occur naturally—from the collision
between ToM and core physics (1). Whether Dualism is, in fact
natural, is not a question we can fully settle here. In particular,
the correlation we have documented between ToM and Dualist
reasoning does not establish causation. Nonetheless, the hypoth-
esis that Dualism arises from ToM can readily explain why a dis-
ruption to ToM, in ASD, is associated with a reduction in both
the Dualism and Empiricist biases that plague NT cognition (8,
10, 26, 65). When it comes to reasoning about minds and bodies,
then, ASD presents a silver lining. This is in line with past research,
suggesting that the reduction in ToM could confer children with
ASD with cognitive strengths (e.g., in counterfactual reasoning
(77)).
Moreover, the hypothesis that ToM begets Dualism can further
explain why Dualist reasoning is so pervasive in humans—why
beliefs about disembodied supernatural beings (e.g., gods, ghosts,
disembodied minds (4, 5, 13, 14, 17, 21–25, 46, 78)) are common
across cultures, including those that exercise mind opacity(14)*.
Our findings thus open the possibility that the separation of minds
6 of 8   https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2211628119
and bodies is not solely a cultural invention. Dualism might be
natural for humans to entertain.
Materials and Methods
Experiment 1–3
Participants. Each experiment was administered to two distinct groups of Prolific
participants: ASD participants and NT controls. Altogether, then, Experiments 1–3
were administered to six distinct samples (2 ASD/NT x 3 Experiment). Within
each experiment, the ASD group consisted of individuals who self-identified as
having obtained a formal clinical diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder by a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or other qualified medical specialist. Participants in the
control group self-identified as not having had such a diagnosis. In addition, both
groups were native English speakers, free of reading and language disorders. For
additional characteristics, see SI Appendix, Table S1.
Informed by past research with NT participants using the same tasks (10, 61),
we set the target sample size in Experiments 1–3 to N = 30 participants per group.
One participant in Experiment 1 did not complete the task. As noted, outlier removal
further excluded 2 additional participants from Experiment 1 (one per group), one NT
participant from Experiment 2, and two participants (one per group) from Experiment
3. Accordingly, the analysis of Experiment 1 was based on 29 ASD and 28 NT partici-
pants; in Experiment 2, the analysis included 30 ASD and 29 NT participants, and in
Experiment 3, the analyses included 29 participants per group.
Materials and procedure. The materials in Experiments 1–3 consisted of a list
of 80 psychological traits (from refs. 10 and 61); half captured epistemic states
(e.g., recalling past events, hereafter epistemic traits); the other half consisted of
actions and emotions (e.g., sitting, walking, hereafter non-epistemic traits). The
trait order was randomized. For the full list of traits, see SI Appendix, Appendix I.
In Experiment 1, participants were invited to suppose it was possible to grow
a replica of the body of an adult human donor. The replica preserves every aspect
of the human body and brain. With this in mind, participants were asked to deter-
mine whether or not a given trait would likely emerge in the replica. In Experiment
2, participants were invited to judge whether or not each trait is to persist in the
afterlife. In Experiment 3, participants evaluated whether these traits are inborn
in humans. Participants were told that “inborn traits are ones that develop in
humans spontaneously. Some of these traits (e.g., having five fingers) are present
in birth, but others (e.g., facial hair in men) can appear later in development. All
inborn traits, however, emerge in the typical course of development, even if an
individual has never had the opportunity to witness these behaviors in other
people.” Participants were asked to give a binary response as to whether or not
each trait is inborn in humans. For the full list of instructions in Experiments 1– 3,
see SI Appendix, Appendix II.
*We note that the putative role of Dualism in reasoning about the supernatural does not
imply that supernatural creatures ought to be seen as utterly ethereal, devoid of any
physicalist properties nor does it predict that Dualist reasoning ought to arise at birth (79).
The latter (“at birth”) challenge is a red herring, as innate traits (e.g., secondary sexual
characteristics) can demonstrably develop later in life. Likewise, supernatural creatures
need not be seen as utterly disembodied (contrary to the first challenge above)—this would
only follow if Dualism were were the sole determinant of intuitive reasoning about the
supernatural, and if it were further inviolable. But, Dualism could well be a “soft”, violable
constraint. And as noted, Dualist reasoning often interacts with Essentialism (64) (8–10, 12,
26, 63, 65), which mandates essence to be embodied (69–72). Such interaction would explain
why, on the one hand, the dead is believed to preserve primarily epistemic states (as
expected by Dualism), yet its artifacts (e.g., sweater) can be disgusting, even though disgust
typically requires bodily contact (80–82)—the disgust is predicted by Essentialism.
pnas.org
 All materials and procedures were reviewed and approved by the Institutional
Review Board at Northeastern University. All participants signed (electronically)
an informed consent form.
Experiment 4
Participants. Two groups of Prolific participants (ASD and NT controls, N = 84
each) were assigned to each of the two Dualism manipulations (Embodiment/
Afterlife).
Materials and design. Participants in this experiment took part in three tasks:
Dualism task, ToM task, and an AQ quotient test.
The Dualism task featured the Replication and Afterlife manipulations,
described in Experiments 1–2. One subgroup of participants (N = 96) took
part in the Replication/Afterlife tasks in a between-group fashion (2 (ASD/NT) x 2
task (Replication/Afterlife) x 24 participants per group). This subgroup included
primarily participants who had previously taken part in Experiments 1–2 (their
responses therein were used as their Dualism score), and it was complemented
by additional Prolific participants who were given the Dualism probes sepa-
rately (prior to the ToM and AQ probes). The remaining 72 participants were
administered the Dualism and Replication probes in a within-group fashion
(such that each task featured half of the traits, and tasks were counter-balanced
for order; see SI Appendix, Table S2); this design was adopted to ensure that
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