Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Juryyyy
Juryyyy
Juryyyy
( I ) ORIGIN OF PROPERTY:
“Jurists have often speculated about the origin of property. Blackstone thought that
the right of ownership belonged, by the law of nature, to the first occupant, or in other
words that the ownership arose out of occupation. Savigny, speaking of the Roman
law only, says that, according to that law, property originates in adverse possession,
ripened by prescription, or, in other words, that when a person has been for a
sufficiently long term in possession of a thing he is deemed to be the owner of it. This
is not identical with Blackstone’s theory, but is a statement of a historical fact and has
nothing to do with the ownership as a human institution. But this has been made the
foundation of a theory that property originates in occupation.”1
( II ) MAINE’S THEORY:
Sir Henry Maine points out that it is not the first possession which constitutes the
essential part of property in early Roman law or anywhere else, but rather the element
of long continuance which is represented by the Roman concept or prescription. It is
therefore, not proper to say that ownership originates in occupancy. It would
according to him , be truer to say that the doctrine of occupancy follows ay a later
date, when the right of ownership is already well established and everything is
regarded as necessarily importing the existence of an owner.
Sir Henry Maine further points out that the theory of origin of property as well as all
theories are of a similar character, suppose that man owned property in primitive
society as an individual. But in point of fact it was not the individual but Corporation
of which the individual was a member that really mattered in primitive society.
Sir Henry Maine’s thesis are mainly based upon his reading of the village
communities of India, of Russia and of Slavonic races of the Balkans is that in the
most ancient times property belonged to the entire village, which consisted of people
1
Evolution of law, by Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta, 3 rd Ed.,(1962), p.85
Electronic copy
Electronic copy available
available at:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383160
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2383160
who actually were or suppose themselves to be descended from a common ancestor.
These villages are thus similar to Roman gentes or German Houses. In course of time
property came to be temporarily divided between different families and his system is
found in the Russian villages. Still later, the property is divided permanently so that
the shares assigned become the absolute property of the families, as in the Indian
village community.2
( III ) POSSESSION:
Possession in any sense of the term must imply, first, some actual power over the
subject possessed, and secondly, some amount of will to avail oneself of that power.
Neither the more wish to catch a bird which is out of one’s reach , nor the more power
which one have , without the least notion of exercising it, to seize a horse which one
find standing at a shop door, will suffice to put oneself in possession of the bird or to
the horse.3
Roman law recognise as possessor only the owner, or one holding as owner and on his
way to become one by lapse of time. Some of the Roman jurists stated that
depositories and borrowers have no possession of the things entrusted to them.
The English law always had the good sense to allow title to be set up in defences to a
possessory action. The Common Law has always given the possessory remedies to all
bailees, without exception. The right to these remedies extends not only to pledges,
lessees, and those having a lien, who excludes their bailor, but to simple bailees, who
have no interest in the chattels, no right of detention as against the owner, and neither
gives nor receive a reward.4 To gain possession then, a man must stand in a certain
physical relation to the subject and to rest of the world, and must have a certain
intent.5
Possession may and usually exist both in fact and in law. The Roman Lawyers termed
possession in factas possession naturalis, and possession in law as possession civilis.
Possession may be again corporeal or incorporeal. Corporeal possession is the
2
Ibid
3
Mantha Ramamurti’s Law of Adverse Possession,Ed., 4 th, Delhi Law House
4
Common law by O.W. Holmes Jr., P. 216
5
Ibid
Electronic copy
Electronic copy available
available at:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383160
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2383160
possession of material object such as land, house etc. Incorporeal possession is the
possession of anything other than a material object for example a way over another
man’s land. The Roman lawyers calls corporeal possession as possessio corporis,
while incorporeal possession as possessio juris.Indian Courts in a proceeding is
always concerned with corporeal possession in fact or possessio naturalis under sec
145 of Cr.P.c.A corporeal possession is the continuing exercise of a claim over a
material object to the exclusive use of it.
As Salmond analysis, a man possesses a thing in defiance of the law, no less than in
accordance with it. A thief has possession in law, although he has acquired it contrary
to law. The law condemns his possession as wrongful, but at the same recognises that
it exists, and attributes to it most, if not all, of the ordinary consequences of
possession. Similarly trespasser has possession over the land he has trespassed upon
although he has done it contrary to law. The law condemns his possession as
wrongful, but at the same recognises that it exists, and attributes to it most, if not all,
of the ordinary consequences of possession. The Licensee has possession over the
land granted to him under Licence. Law will protect his possession if he is sought to
be dispossessed by violent self help. He can be dispossessed by the Licenser only in
accordance with law. The possession of a material object involves two distinct
elements, one of which is mental or subjective, and the other physical or objective. the
one consists in the intention of the possessor with respect to the thing possessed;
while the other consists in the external facts in which this intention has realised,
embodied or fulfilled itself. These two constituent elements of possession were
distinguished by lawyers as aud animus corpus. The subject matter is more
particularly the animus possidendi, animus sibihabendi, or animus domini. To
constitute possession the animus domini is itself not sufficient; but must be embodied
in a corpus. The will is sufficient only when manifested in an appropriate environment
of fact, just as fact is sufficient only when it is the expression and embodiment of the
required intent and will. Possession is the effective realisation in fact of the animus
sibi habendi. To constitute possession animus domini must realise itself in both of
these relations. The necessary relation between the possessor and the thing possessed
is such as to admit of his making such use of it as accords with the nature of the thing
and of his claim to it. There must be no barrier between him and it, inconsistent with
the nature of the claim he makes to it. The fact of actual possession will be found
Oliver Webdel Homes view – “to gain possession a man must stand in a certain
physical relation to the object and to the rest of the world and must have certain
intent.”
Holland’s view- “the right of the possessor to continue to possess is called the jus
possessions. In order to ascertain what the right is if any which results from
possession is which is recognised as having legal consequences.”
Bentham’s view- “Defining the concept of possession is like defining the geometric
conception of roundness.”
Salmonds view- “the continuing exercise of a claim, to the exclusive use of a thing,
constitutes the possession of it”.
6
(1986)1 Gau. L.R. 344 at pp. 348,349,350.
7
1988(1) Crimes 86(M.P.).
Both under the Transfer of Property Act and General Clauses Act, as a thing
attached to earth the super-structure would be immovable property. But the
Presidency Small Cause Courts make a departure and statutorily requires the super-
structures to be regarded as movable property. Section 28 of the Act clearly provide
8
1990(3) Bom. C.R. 368 at p. 371
9
A.I.R. 1951 Orissa at p. 185; A.I.R. 1978 Orissa 142 at p. 144.
In the case of Bishambhar nath Vs Nisar Ali11; it was held that possession is not
necessarily the same thing as actual user. It was even held in the case of Bahadur
Chand Vs Nainamal 12 that possession means the physical possibility of a person
dealing with a property exclusively as the likes.
Possession in fact is not manifested in the same way in respect of all objects. Where
the thing is capable of physical possession a man may be in possession personally or
he may let it to tenants and in later case he is possession through tenants. Possession
in fact is manifested by the exercise of such exclusive control as the object is capable
of. In the case of wild un – cleared land payment of taxes may be sufficient evidence
of possession as being the only practical act of domain. As observed above possession
is not thing as occupation or actual user. When land is incapable of being used in any
of the recognised modes by the proprietor , it cannot be said in law he is in out of
possession was being observed Gajadhar Prasad Vs Mst Dhulin Gulab Kuer13case.
A man may cease to use his land because he cannot use it since it is under water. He
does not there by discontinuance his possession, constructively it continues, until he is
dispossessed; and upon the cessation of the dispossession before the lapse of the
statutory period constructively it revives.
10
A.I.R.1970 Mad. 325 at p.326:83 M.L.W.195: (1971)1 M.L.J.460
11
A.I.R. 1932 Oudh 51 at p.54: O.W.N.1281:135 I.C. 693
12
25, I.C. 35:133 P.W.R 1914 : 231 P.L.R 1914: 14 P.R. 1915
13
A.I.R. 1921 Pat. 234 at p. 235
The cases of diluviated lands or jungle or waste lands, however, are no exception to
the general rule that a plaintiff who is dispossessed and brings a suit for recovery of
possession must show that he was in possession within 12 years of the suit. The
plaintiff in a suit for ejectment must prove possession prior to the alleged
dispossession. At the same time in this question of possession the initial fact of
plaintiff’s title comes to his aid with greater or less force according to the
circumstances established in the evidence was being observed in the case of Rani
Hemanta Kumari Devi Vs Maharaja Jogindranath Roy15.
14
A.I.R.1977 Orissa 139 at p.141
15
(1906) 10 C.W.N 630.
16
A.I.R. 1929 Cal. 497 at p. 501
17
1 Q.L.J. 225: 17 O.C. 153 : 24 I.C. 45.
18
A.I.R.1928 Pat. 124 at p. 126:I.l.R. 6 pat. 794
19
A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 504 at P.505
20
I.L.R. 9 Cal. 744(F.B) ( Sec 114, Evidence Act applied)
21
7 L.W. 149 at p. 155 : (1918) 34 M.L.J. 97
22
1994 (55) D.L.T 204 AT P. 208
23
1993 C.T.J. 185 at p.188 (M.P)
24
A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41 at p.63
25
1988 (1) Crimes 271 at P.272 (P. & H)
26
1986 Cr.L.J. 128 at p. 131
This provision, when read with Articles 64 and 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation
Act, 1963 establishes the law of adverse possession as it stands in India today. These
two Articles both prescribe a period of twelve years within which the right to claim a
particular property is extinguished, but the two differ in so far as the date on which
such period of limitation begins to run.
Article 64 deals with cases where the dispute is over possession not necessarily based
title, and in such cases the period of limitation runs from the time when the plaintiff
was dispossessed of the property.
Article 65 deals with cases where the dispute is over title as such also and in such
cases the period of limitation runs from the time when the defendant becomes adverse
to that of plaintiff.
The distinction between the two might seem almost semantically at first blush, but on
further analysis, especially by placing the twin provisions in contradistinction to
Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act, 1908, as seen as an extremely
significant distinction emerge through. In the old Act, whether the alleged possessory
right was based on title or not, the burden of proof always lay on the plaintiff, who
had to prove that he was in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit.
However, the new Act, pursuant to the recommendations of the First Law
Commission in its 3rd Report, 1956, has modified this to benefit plaintiff’s suits based
on title. Article 65, in such cases lays the burden of proof, that the claim is barred by
27
AIR 1958 SC 328
28
pg. 10, 193rd Report, Law Commission of India
10
( IV ) PRESUMPTION AS TO POSSESSION:
Though the presumption of law is that every possession starts legally, where a
plaintiff wants to establish that the defendant’s original possession was permissive it
is for him to prove this allegation and if he fails to do so it will be presumed that the
possession is adverse. It must be assumed in absence of any evidence contrary that the
possession of defendant was adverse till the date of the conveyance in favour of the
plaintiffs.
In Maung Ba Than Vs Maung Sein Win30, it is stated that at the time of the date of
sale, the vendors of the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the land. Any
statement by the defendants, therefore, must have been made based upon a mistake or
misconception of the legal rights of the plaintiffs, and such an admission could not
operate as an estoppels, nor could permission if any by the plaintiffs to the defendants
estop them under Sec 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 from denying the plaintiffs title.
They would undoubtedly be Licensees but they sought the license under a mistake.
Therefore even assuming the Plaintiff’s evidence on this point is true, it is still open to
the defendants to plead that they acquired title by adverse possession, and on evidence
it must be held as thr District Judge held that they had so acquired title to the land.
29
AIR 1990 Ori 124
30
A.I.R. 1929 Rang. 170
11
The title and possession of the respondent had always been disputed by the appellant
from the stage of the written statement hence principle under Sec 6 of Specific Relief
Act would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs
Jagat Singh Advocate31, their Lordships, fail to appreciate as to how the principle of
Sec 6 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 can be applied in facts and circumstances of the
present case. The respondent, who was the plaintiff never, alleged that he had been
dispossessed by the appellant- Municipal Committee. On the other hand he claimed to
be the owner of the land in question and asserted that he was in possession over the
same. He sought for permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering
with his possession. Both the parties led evidences in support of their respective
claims including on the question of title. The Court of Appeal committed a substantial
error of law decreeing the suit of respondent without recording a finding in respect of
his claim of title over the suit land. Their Lordships are of the view that High Court
could not have dismissed the second appeal filed on behalf of the Municipal
Committee in limine. The Court of Appeal never inquired or investigated that
question which was at issue saying that the title of the plaintiff respondent was
admitted by the appellant. This was a serious error of record. The title and possession
of the respondent had always been disputed by the appellant from the stage of the
written statement. In this background the suit of the respondent could not have been
decreed merely on the basis of entries in the revenue record during the pendency of
the earlier suit filed in the year 1971.
31
A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1377 at pp. 1379, 1380.
12
The title suit is not at all barred by limitation because there is no limitation for suits
based on title. The only defence to such an action would be adverse possession and
once adverse possession is alleged, then the plaintiff is necessarily put on guard and in
that case alone he has to institute a suit within 12 years from the date when the hostile
title is assumed was being observed in Trilochan Dandsena Vs State of Orissa33
32
1996 (1) A.L.D. 641 at p. 673
33
A.I.R. 1995 Ori. 239 at p.241
13
The term possession expresses the physical relation of control exercised by a person
over a thing. Salmond says- “the continuing exercise of a claim, to the exclusive use
of a thing, constitutes the possession of it”. Bentham says defining the concept of
possession is like defining the geometric conception of roundness. Absolute
roundness cannot be defined and so with this concept. Maine defines possession as
physical detention coupled with the intention to hold the thing detained as one’s own.
Pollock has given a different view on the meaning of possession. He said: “in
common speech, a man is said to possess or to be in possession of anything which he
has the apparent control, or from the use of which he has the apparent power of
excluding others. The Supreme Court has opined in the case of Superintendent v.
Remembrance R34that “Possession is a polymorphous term which may have different
meanings in different contexts. It is impossible to work out a completely logical
definition of possession uniformly applicable to all situations in context of all
statutes.”
Possession is a conception which is only less important than contract. But the interest
attaching to the theory of possession does not stop with its practical importance in the
body of English law. The theory has fallen into the hands of the philosophers, and
with them has become a corner-stone of more than one elaborate structure. It will be a
service to sound thinking to show that a far more civilized system than the Roman is
framed upon a plan which is irreconcilable with the a priori doctrines of Kant and
Hegel. Those doctrines are worked out in careful correspondence with German views
of Roman law. And most of the speculative jurists of Germany, from Savigny to
Ihering, have been at once professors of Roman law, and profoundly influenced if not
controlled by some form of Kantian or post-Kantian philosophy. Thus everything has
combined to give a special bent to German speculation, which deprives it of its claim
to universal authority.
Why is possession protected by the law, when the possessor is not also an owner?
That is the general problem which has much exercised the minds of jurists. Kant, it is
well known, was deeply influenced in his opinions upon ethics and law by the
34
AIR 1980 SC 52
14
15
Kant says that men are born free and equal. Freedom of will is the essence of
man and it must be recognized, respected, protected and realized by all
governments. Possession is the embodiment of the will of man. By taking
possession of a thing, a person incorporates his will and personality in that
thing. Possession is the objective realization of free will and the will of a
person as expressed in possession must be protected. Puchta writes: "The will
which wills itself, that is, the recognition of its own personality, is to be
protected." The view of Gans is that "the will is of itself a substantial thing
to be protected and this individual will have only to yield to the higher common
will”
4 .Possession is protected as a part of the law of property. Cairne writes:
"Possession was originally protected to aid the Law of Crime and Tort;
it came at length lo be protected in order to aid the law of property."
35
In the early stages of the development of the law of property when
proof of title to property was difficult, it was considered to be unjust
35
the Social Sciences, p. 65
16
17
Possessory remedies are those which exist for the protection of possession
even against ownership. Proprietary remedies are those which are available
for the protection of ownership. In many legal systems, possession is
provisional or temporary title even against the true owner. Even a wrongful
possessor who is deprived of his possession can recover it from any person
whatsoever on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who
retakes his own, must first restore possession to the wrongdoer and then proceed
to secure possession on the ground of his ownership.
18
The Indian legislators have taken care of providing possessory remedies and it is
reflected in various statutes. Some of the statutory provisions are being discussed
below in this chapter.
Specific Relief Act, 1963
Sec. 5 of the said Act deals with action for recovery of possession of specific
immovable property based on title. The essence of the section is that whoever proves
a better title in a person entitled to possession. The title may be on the basis of
ownership or possession. The purpose behind Sec.5 is to restrain a person from using
force and to dispossess a person without his consent otherwise than in the due course
of law. S.6 of the same act provides that if any person is disposed without his consent
of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming
through him may by suit, recover possession thereof.
Sec. 5 &Sec. 6 give alternative remedies and are mutually exclusive. Under Sec. 5 a
person dispossessed can get possession on the basis of title whereas under Sec.6 a
person dispossessed may recover possession merely by proving previous possession
and subsequent wrongful dispossession.
Moving further, Sec. 7 and Sec. 8 of the same act provide for methods for recovery of
possession of some specific movable property.
19
21
CONCLUDING REAMARK
Critical analysis of Henry Maine’s Theory: One of the chief foundations of Maine’s
Theory has been seriously disturbed by the further studies of the Indian village
communities which Maine describes is not the only, nor perhaps the most primitive of
the village in India. Baden Powell, with a command over far ampler material than was
available to Maine, established beyond doubt that the ryotwari village in which the
lands were the absolute separate properties of the families was apparently the more
primitive form of village community. The lands really were the separate property of
the villagers although some common functions were performed by the village
officials. According to Baden Powell, the communal village, in which the enjoyment
were jointly held and apportioned between the families for enjoyment, was a
development out of the original ryotwari type of villages in which the land was held
by each family separately. The existence of village communities in ancient Anglo-
Saxon society, upon which a great deal of reliance was placed by Soobehm, has been
severely criticised by Pallock and Maitland. Who have pointed out that theses
22
Other criticisms that can be levelled against the concept of possession are-
One of the chief difficulties in the theory of possession is that of determining what
amounts to such effective realisation. The true answer seems to be that the facts must
amount to the actual present exclusion of all alien interference with the thing
23
Pallock has given his own view of possession that a man is said to possess or be in
possession of anything of which he has the apparent control, or from the use of which
he has the apparent power of excluding others. Pallock , here, have failed to explain
how servants have custody for some purposes and possession for others.
24
25