N248 SZ RT 005 Iso3 PDF

Bakhtar Petrochemical Company
Lorestan Petrochemical Company (LPC)

Lorestan Petrochemical Company
NEC IDENTIFICATION CODE TCM IDENTIFICATION CODE TITLE OWNER DOCUMENT Nr.
N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

PLANT LOCATION OWNER SHEET Nr. REV. Nr.
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
KHORAMABAD (IRAN) LORESTAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY 1 of 14 03
SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1
03 Issued for Approval K. K. F. D. A. M. 23.Jun.2010

02 Client Comments Incorporated Revised as Marked K. K. F. D. M. G. 23.Jan.2010
01 Issued for Review K. K. F. D. M. G. 30.Nov.2009
REV. DESCRIPTION DRAWN UP CHECKED APPROVED DATE
This document has been produced by Contractor for LORESTAN. It is confidential and cannot be disclosed to or used by any third party for any purpose without prior written consent.

300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
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20 45 70 ATTACHMENT
21 46 71 A X
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24 49 74 D X X X
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300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
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LIST OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTIN AND SCOPE OF WORK ............................................................................ 4

1.1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 4
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY............................................................................................. 4
1.3. SCOPE OF STUDY ...................................................................................................... 5
2. SIL STUDY BASIS AND DEFINITIONS .............................................................................. 5
2.1. STUDY BASIS .............................................................................................................. 5
2.2. DEFINITION OF SIL ..................................................................................................... 5
2.3. BACKGROUND TO RISK BASED APPROACH ADOPTED FOR SIL SELECTION..... 6
3. SIL METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 8
3.1. OVERVIEW................................................................................................................... 8
3.1.1. Identification of SIFs .............................................................................................. 8
3.1.2. Description of Function, Initiators and Final Elements ........................................... 9
3.1.3. Causes of SIF Demand and Consequences of SIF Failure ................................... 9
3.2. FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE APPROACH ADOPTED................................... 10
3.2.1. Multiple Sensors .................................................................................................. 10
3.2.2. Multiple Final Elements ........................................................................................ 11
3.2.3. Consideration of PSV (Safety Valves) ................................................................. 11
3.2.4. Independent Protective Layers ............................................................................ 11
3.3. SIL STUDY GUIDELINES ........................................................................................... 11
3.4. WORKSHEETS........................................................................................................... 13
3.5. ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................................................................... 13

300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
1 INTRODUCTIN AND SCOPE OF WORK
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The plant is based on Alphabutol® process which produces polymerization grade Butene-
1, using high purity Ethylene as raw feedstock.
The Butene-1 is used as a co-monomer in the production of different grades of
polyethylene.
The Alphabutol process, which operates in a liquid phase in conjunction with a dissolved
catalyst, selectively dimerizes Ethylene into Butene-1.
The Plant is designed to produce 30 KT/Y of Butene-1.
The plant is designed to produce 30000 tons of butene-1 per year. This production is
based on a stream factor of 7500 hours per year. The turn-down ratio is 50%.
The process sections are numbered from 000 to 600 and are identified as follows:
Area 000 – Battery Limit
Area 100 – Catalyst Section
Area 200 – Dimerization Reaction Section
Area 300 – Vaporization and Catalyst Removal
Area 400 – Monomers Recycle and Product Distillation
Area 500 – Product/Byproduct Storage
Area 600 - ISBL Utilities facilities
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
The objective of the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) classification study was to assess the SIL
of the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), based on an assessment of the risk of injury to
people (operators or public) and damage to the environment. This involves evaluating the:
Elements forming the SIF;
SIF Design Intent;
SIF demand scenarios and frequency of demand;
Potential consequences if the SIF is not implemented; and
Effectiveness of Impendent Protective Layers (IPL).
The SIL defines the level of the safety integrity (or reliability) required to be implemented
for each specific SIF application, such that the residual risk due to each hazardous event in
the plant is broadly acceptable. The SIL could range from SIL 4 (SIL 3 being the highest level

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of safety integrity expected in the process industry). SIL ‘-‘ does not call for any safety
integrity requirements. For SIL 4 a requirement to redesign the system to achieve an
inherently safer design is recommended.
1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY
The SIL Classification was performed for the SIFs as identified from Cause and Effects
Diagrams/ Tables (CED) and the Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs).
The SIL study was conducted in accordance with:
IEC 61511 Part 3, which incorporates the requirements from ISA S84.01-1996.
2 SIL STUDY BASIS AND DEFINITIONS
2.1 STUDY BASIS
The study was based on:

Casue & Effect Diagrams (hereafter referred as CED);
Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs);
HAZOP Report; and
Input from the SIL study team.
The basis for the SIL study was primarily the P&IDs and CED.
2.2 DEFINITION OF SIL
The SIF is required to be operated on demand. It will act upon detection of a process upset
leading to a hazardous situation and take corrective action by shutting down the unit/ plant to
bring to a safe status. The SIL defining a minimum level of reliability in terms of Probability of
Failure on Demand (PFD), as shown in Table 2.1 is applied for this project.
Table 2.1 Probability of Failure on Demand for SIL

SIL PFD
1 ≥ 10 -2 to <10-1
2 ≥ 10-3 to <10-2
3 ≥ 10-4 to <10-3
4 ≥ 10-5 to <10-4

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SIL 4 is considered extremely rare in the process industry. If a classification leads to SIL 4,
further study should be performed including a review of the design.
The safety functionality that calls for integrity level below SIL 1 shall be retained in the ESD
system as provided now.
The safety functionality that calls for integrity levels SIL 1, 2 and 3 will be implemented in
the ESD system.
2.3 BACKGROUND TO RISK BASED APPROACH ADOPTED FOR SIL SELECTION
Safety instrumented functions (SIF), such as high level trip, high temperature trip, high
pressure trip etc are widely used in the process industry to protect against hazards of
overfilling, design temperature being exceeded or overpressure respectively. These are
safeguards implemented using instrumentation, and comprise one or more sensors, a logic
solver and one or more final elements. However, they do not provided absolute protection as
they may fail to perform its desired function when required due to various reasons including
failure of the various components that make up the system which is designed to implement
the function.
The probability of failure of a SIF depends on the configuration of the system, i.e. the level
of redundancy, testing/ maintenance frequency etc. for example, a system with two
independent level sensors (1oo2 configuration) is less likely to fail as compared to a system
with only one sensor. Similarly, a system with two shut down valves in series (1oo2
configuration) is less likely to fail to perform as compared to a system with only one shutdown
valve. Redundant systems for all applications are however, not cost effective and may not
provide any significant additional safety benefit for all cases. Hence, a risk based approach is
adopted to determine the level of reliability required for the particular SIF.
Risk is a function of likelihood and consequence, as follows:
Risk (inherent or unmitigated risk)= Likelihood of a unwanted event x consequence (in
terms of fatality or environmental damages)
A SIF reduces the risk, as follows:
Risk (mitigated risk)= Likelihood of an unwanted event x consequence x probability of
failure of SIF on demand (expressed as SIL)
This study assesses the risk posed by each hazardous event in the plant which is resulted
from SIF failure and determines the level of reliability of the SIF to meet a target risk level or
broadly acceptable risk level. A qualitative (or a semi-quantitative approach) is adopted to
determine the risk using the Risk Graphs.

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Probability of failure on demand of SIF (PFD), i.e. the reliability of the SIF is thus derived
as follows
T arg et risk level (ie acceptable risk after mitigation)

PFD=
Likelihood of an unwanted event x consequence
For Example, using safety classification as illustration, and assuming that the target risk
level is 10-4 per year, the likelihood of an unwanted event is 10-1 per year and consequence
is 1 fatality, then.
PFD = 10-4 / (10-1 x 1) = 10-3
The required SIL based on safety classification is therefore 3 for this SIF.
If the likelihood of an unwanted event is 10-1 per year and the Consequence is 0.1 fatality
(i.e. injury), then.
PFD= 10-4/(10-1x0.1)=10-2
The required SIL is 2.

The system configuration is then determined based on the SIL level derived above.
It may be noted that where a SIF is classified as SIL 3 or SIL 2, it means that the inherent
risk is high and hence a higher level of reliability is required for the instrumented function.
Inherent risk may be high due to the system design or the hazard presented by the system.
Similarly, where a SIF is classified as SIL 1, it means that the inherent risk is relatively low.
The above approach ensures that a consistent basis (i.e. a risk based approach) is
adopted in determining the configuration of the instrumented system, while avoiding over
engineering, where not necessary.
The assessment is however, qualitative and is base on guidelines, experience and
judgment. A more detailed quantitative approach may be adopted put is time consuming. The
above approach is therefore considered reasonable and fit for purpose.
A conservative approach to system design may still be adopted for various reasons, such
as licensors’ past experience or other factors which may not be quantifiable easily. In such
cases, although the SIL derived from above may be lower (say SIL a or SIL) a more
conservative SIL may be assigned, say SIL 1 or SIL 2 respectively. This study seeks to set
the minimum requirements, which however, may be exceeded if required.

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3 SIL METHODOLOGY
3.1 OVERVIEW
The methodology defined in the LORESTAN / MAHABAD PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY:

The SIF was first defined with a function description, design intent, one or more initiator(s) (to
detect hazardous situation) and one or more final element(s) (i.e. elements that act to
mitigate the hazardous situation). The study team then described the demand scenario,
consequence(s) of failure on demand (CoFoD) and numerical frequency and consequence
ratings were assigned.
The consequence ratings were based on:
Potential extent of human injury and
Potential extent of environmental damage.
The assessment takes account of the possibility to avert the hazard and the probability of
personnel being in the vicinity of the defined consequence.
A flow chart presenting the steps to assign the SIL classification is shown in Annex B.
Following identification of damage level and likelihood by the team, the SIL of the function
was classified according to Risk Diagrams as shown in Annex C.
3.1.1 Identification of SIFs
The CEDs were first reviewed to identify the SIFs that required SIL classification. These
were also confirmed by reviewing the P&IDs and the HAZOP sheets. Only those functions
within the ESD system and initiated by the process to prevent a specific hazardous situation
were selected for classification, thus, the following types of functions listed in the CED were
not classified:
Hand-switch operated functions (operator activated). A default value of SIL 1 may be
assumed;
Control function (FIC, TIC reset etc);
Functions related to normal process control (e.g. auto-start /stop of pumps as a
means of normal level control);
Proposed or indicative machine related protection functions such as those relating to
lube oil systems;
Emergency equipment isolation functions. A default value of SIL 1 may be assumed;
and

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Fire & gas systems which are not part of the process/ utility system, such as fire &
gas detectors, deluge systems etc.
DCS interlocks were generally not assessed, except in a few cased they were assessed to
see whether the interlocks need to be upgraded. In all of those cases DCS interlocks were
found to be adequate.
3.1.2 Description of Function, Initiators and Final Elements
The SIFs were defined with a function description, design intent, one or more initiator(s)
(i.e. instrument(s) to detect a hazardous situation) and one or more final element(s) (i.e.
elements that act to mitigate the hazardous situation).
The final element(s) of the SIF were chosen as those which directly meet their design
intent. Thus, only one or two final elements were usually defined for any function, and where
more than one was selected, a success criterion was defined for these final elements. The
other elements acted upon by the initiators were left unclassified (they may however, by
retained for implementation in the ESD system). Some of these unclassified elements may
act as primary final element for another SIF and assigned appropriate SIL classification.
Those final elements not covered under any other SIF as primary final element were
checked, where required, to ensure no separate classification was required.
3.1.3 Causes of SIF Demand and Consequences of SIF Failure
The study team then described the demand scenario and consequence(s) of failure on
demand (CoFoD) and the numerical frequency and consequence ratings were then assigned
according to Risk Diagrams as shown in Annex C.
A demand on a SIF may be caused by instrument malfunction, operator error, or
equipment failure to operate such as pump or compressor trip. The frequency of demand is
then assessed, i.e. how often the SIF is likely to be activated (Frequency of Demand, W
classification).
The following aspects were investigated for the consequence of SIF failure.
Potential extent of human injury (S classification); and
Potential extent of environmental damage (E classification).
Different categories of W, S and E are defined and presented in Annex C.
Consequence for personnel safety was assessed assuming operator present in the vicinity,
and exposed to a loss of containment scenario leading to fire and/or explosion.
hazard and the probability of personnel being in the vicinity of the defined ‘consequence’.

300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
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All consequences were classified and the most stringent SIL was selected for that function.
If the demand has different causes, the consequences of failure on demand were usually
different as well requiring a classification for all causes and consequences.
It is noted that the potential consequences may not result in each demand case. The
procedure adopted In the SIL study takes some credit for the intermediate probabilities such
as loss of containment or ignition and explosion probability. For example, if design
temperature is exceeded, metallurgy may fail leading to loss of containment, and potential
ignition and fire/explosion. It is likely that the potential consequences (i.e. fatality) may result
in less that one in ten demand cases, due to the intermediate event probabilities and hence
this may be reflected, where applicable, by a one order of magnitude reduction in the
demand rate for the SIL. Such assumptions are included in the relevant worksheets. For
overpressure scenarios, however, no reduction factor may be considered due to the likely
speed of the event occurrence.
As part of the frequency of demand analysis or following the consequence assessment, the
provision of other safeguards for the specific demand/ consequence scenario was also
reviewed.
For each such safeguard identified, also called ‘Independent Protection Layer (IPL)’, risk
reduction factor was determined. This risk reduction factor may be applied to the “originally
identified frequency of demand”. The study takes credit for the independent protection layers
(IPL) that mitigate the likelihood or consequence. A reduction factor of 10 will reduce SIL by
one level while a reduction factor of 100 will reduce SIL by two levels.
The term ‘independent protection layer’ has been applied to a safeguard which is capable
of preventing a scenario from proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the
initiating event or the action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario.
3.2 FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE APPROACH ADOPTED
3.2.1 Multiple Sensors
Where multiple sensors are provided, success criterion is defined if they detect the same
hazard. This approach for defining the sensor success criteria was taken for all SIF with
multiple sensors.

300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
3.2.2 Multiple Final Elements
For some SIFs several final elements are acted upon simultaneously to put the system to a
safe state. Where more than one action is require4d to be successful in order to put the
system of a safer state, success criteria (eg 1oo2 or 2oo2 etc.) may be selected for the final
elements. Not all of the actions in one particular SIF, however, may be required or important
enough to protect against the particular hazard, some may be secondary in nature, i.e. to
prevent collateral hazards or may be for operator assistance in restarting the unit quickly.
3.2.3 Consideration of PSV (Safety Valves)
Where a SIF is provided in addition to a PSV, PSV will in most cases operate to mitigate
an overpressure hazard. External conditions (send, dust, corrosion), internal vessel
conditions (dirty service, clogging), manufacturing defects, potential inadequate preventive
maintenance, or induced vibrations or ice formation during a release (which may lead to
blockage of line and subsequent line rupture/ leakage) could potentially lead to the PSV
being ineffective. For this study, most PSVs has been considered as an IPL with a risk
reduction factor of 100, except for selected cases where a lower credit (i.e. 10 instead of 100)
has been given as a conservative measure to meet the requirements of risk graph.
3.2.4 Independent Protective Layers
Credit was given to an independent protective layer (IPL). Only if it could be demonstrated
that the IPL could be independent from the SIF studied and independent from the cause of
the hazard studied. However, before taking credit for IPLs, due consideration was made to
the effectiveness of the IPLs, the time required for successful intervention and the level of
independence with the SIF classified and the event causing a demand on the SIF.
3.3 SIL STUDY GUIDELINES
In order to ensure consistency in the assessment, rule sets for assessing independent
protection layer, frequency of demand, presence in danger area and possibility to avert
hazard in Table 3.1 to Table 3.4, these rule sets serve as an aid for assigning the levels for
the various parameters shown in the Risk Graphs in Annex C.

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Table 3.1 Rule Set for Independent Protective Layer

Independent Protection Layer Risk Reduction Factor
Pressure Relief Device (mechanical safety trip) 100
SIS- SIL 1 10
SIS – SIL 2 100
BPCS, when independent of initiating event 10
Internal mechanical safety trips that are independent of 10 to 1000 (Base on actual operating
the SIS or BPCS experience with similar device)
Operator response under high stress, average training 0
Operator response to Alarms with procedures, low stress,
10
recognized event and least 5 minutes to respond
Double check valves designed for the hazardous scenario 10
Single check valve 0
Dikes when capable of mitigating the initiating event. This
100
is an IPL only for environmental events
Notes: where more than one protective measure exists, the highest IPL value assumed, without taking credit for all, as a
conservative measure.
Table 3.2 Rule Set for Frequency of Demand

Initiating Event
Frequency of
Scenario Frequency (per
Demand (W)
year)
Control loop failure >1.E-01 W2
Analyzer failure >1.E-00 W3
Pump Failure loss of flow (conservatively W3) 7.9E-01 W3
Positive Displacement pump trip 1.1E-00 W3
Reciprocating compressor trip 2.1E-00 W3
Single mechanical pump seal leak 1.0E-01 W2
Double mechanical pump seal leak with announcement 1.0E-02 W1
Canned/ magnetic drive pump leak 1.0E-02 W1
Loss of electrical power 1.0E-01 W2
General utility failure 1.0E-01 W2
Heat exch. Tube leak 1.0E-02 W1(<100 TUBES)
W2 (>100 TUBES)
Operator failure (if considered in the analysis):
Under stress, emergency, action performed more W3

than once a quarter
Unstressed, action performed more than once a W2

quarter
Under stress, emergency, action performed once/ Qtr. W2

Or less
Unstressed, action performed once/ Qtr. Or less W1

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Table 3.3 Rule Set for Enabling event Factors

Ordinary Hydrocarbons Easily Ignitable*
Release (kg) Probability of Risk Reduction Probability of Risk Reduction
Ignition Factor Ignition Factor
Minor leak/
Seal leak (<1 1.0E-02 100 1.0E-01 10
tone)
Major leak (1 to
1.0E-01 10 10 0
10 tones)
Large leak
10 0 10 0
(>10 tone)
*Notes: Hydrogen, Acetylene, Ethylene, Ethylene Oxide, Propylene Oxide (above BP), Butadiene
Probability of vessel or pipeline failure due to overpressure will be determined as follows:
1.5 to 2 times man allowable working pressure: flange gasket leaking will be assumed
>2 times working pressure: rupture will be assumed
Probability of vessel or pipeline failure due to significant design temperature exceedance: 0.1
Table 3.4 Rule Set for Exposure Parameter Avoidance parameter

Presence in Danger Zone at the Time of Demand Possibility of Advert Hazard
Assumed when hazard
A1 Default G1 results from manual
operations
Assumed when hazard results from manual
A2 G2 Default
operations
3.4 WORKSHEETS
The session proceedings were recorded using PHA-Pro 7. The records were projected on
a screen for comment and agreement by the team members during the sessions.
Preparation for the study was conducted prior to the commencement of the classification
sessions. This comprised input of the study SIF into the PHA software, based on the
information in CED.
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS
Several assumptions were made regarding the basis of the design during the course of the
SIL study. The main items are:
In case of multiple equipments (with duty a standby/ spare equipment) inside a unit, the study
was conducted for one set of equipment. The recommendations from this study will therefore
apply for such similar systems as well. The study has however, considered the impact of
simultaneous operation of systems in parallel or series including the control requirements
and the effect of trip of one system on the other. In spite of this, the mentioned functions
report has been presented in the worksheet.

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The CEDs were reviewed to identify the SIFs that required SIL classification. Only those
functions within the ESD system and initiated by the process to prevent a specific hazardous
situation were chosen for classification, thus, the following types of functions listed in the
CED were not classified:
Hand-switch operated functions (operator activated). A default value of SIL 1 may be
assumed;
Control function (FIC, TIC reset etc);
Functions related to normal process control (e.g. auto start/stop of pumps as a means of
normal level control); and
Proposed or indicative machine related protection functions.
The final element(s) of the SIF were chosen as those which directly meet their design intent.
Thus, only one or two final elements were usually defined for any function. The other
elements acted upon by the initiators were left unclassified (they may however, be retained
for implementation). However, these unclassified elements may act as a primary final
element for another SIF and assigned appropriate SIL classification. Those final elements
not covered under any other SIF as primary final element were checked, where required, to
ensure no separate classification was required.
Annex A
Attendance List
Team Members
First Name Last Name Title Company Department
Mohammad Golshani Manager Nargan HSE
Farian Daiepour Engineering Nargan HSE
Kianoosh Karimpour Engineering Nargan HSE
Annex B
SIL Classification Flow Chart

CAUSE & EFFECT
START ANALYSIS
INITIATOR AND
FINAL ELEMENT
IDENTIFICATION
SCENARIO
CAUSES OF SIF CONSEQUENCE OF

DEMAND SIF FAILURE
FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION OF
-Personnel Safety
-Environmental Damage
NEXT SIF
ASSESSMENT OF INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYER
SIL FOR SIF
Consider if SIL in necessary for all final
ALL SIF CLASSIFIED

NO
YES
STOP ANALYSIS
Annex C
Risk Diagrams
1 PERSONAL SAFETY
(W) Frequency of Demand
W1= Low (A very slight probability that the unwanted occurrence will occur and
only a few unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 10 years))
W2= Moderate (A slight probability that the unwanted occurrence will occur and a
few unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 1 year & > once per 10 years))
W3= High (A relatively high probability that he unwanted occurrence sill come to
pass and frequent unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 1 year))
(S) Potential extent of human injury per demand if ESD system fails on
demand
S0= No injury
S1= Slight injury, non-permanent
S2= Severe injury, death of 1 person
S3= Death of several persons
S4= Catastrophe, many casualties
(A) Presence in danger zone at time of demand

A1= Rare to more often exposure in the hazardous zone
A2= Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone
(G) Possibility to avert hazard

G1= Possible under certain conditions
G2= Almost impossible
2 ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
(W) Frequency of demand
W1= Low (Avery slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will occur and
only a few unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 10 years))
W2= Moderate (A slight probability that he unwanted occurrence will occur and a
few unwanted occurrences are likely (<once per 1 year & > once per 10 years))
W3= High (A relatively high probability that the unwanted occurrence will come to
pass and frequent unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 1 year))
(E) Environmental damage per demand if ESD system fails on demand
E0= No release or release with negligible damage to the environment
E1= Release with minor damage to the environment that should be reported (e.g.,
moderate leak from a flange or a valve, small scale liquid spill)
E2= Release within fence with significant damage to the environment (e.g., a
could of obnoxious vapor travelling beyond the unit following flange gasket blow-
out or compressor seal failure)
E3= Release outside fence with temporary major damage to the environment
(e.g., a vapor or aerosol release with or without liquid fallout that cases
temporary damage to plants or fauna)
E4= Release outside fence with permanent major damage to the environment
(e.g., liquid spill into a river or sea, a vapor or aerosol release with or without
liquid fallout that causes lasting damage to plants or fauna, solids fallout, liquid
release that could affect groundwater)
(G) Possibility to avert hazard
G1= Possible under certain conditions
G2= Almost Impossible

Annex D
Drawings
Drawing File Path Place(s) Used Comment
3454-XZ-DM-20_001 Nodes: 14, 23
3454-XZ-DM-20-002
3454-XZ-DM-20_10A Nodes: 1, 2, 11
3454-XZ-DM-20_10B Nodes: 3, 4, 5
3454-XZ-DM-20_010 Nodes: 1, 2, 4, 6
3454-XZ-DM-20_011 Nodes: 5, 6, 7
3454-XZ-DM-20_012 Nodes: 7, 8, 9
3454-XZ-DM-20_013 Nodes: 8, 10
3454-XZ-DM-20_014 Nodes: 8
3454-XZ-DM-20_021 Nodes: 12, 25
3454-XZ-DM-20_022 Nodes: 13, 14, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 25
3454-XZ-DM-20_023 Nodes: 14, 15, 19, 20
3454-XZ-DM-20_024 Nodes: 14, 15, 21
3454-XZ-DM-20_025 Nodes: 22, 24
3454-XZ-DM-20_026
3454-XZ-DM-20_030 Nodes: 30
3454-XZ-DM-20_031 Nodes: 26
3454-XZ-DM-20_032 Nodes: 25, 27
3454-XZ-DM-20_033 Nodes: 26, 28
3454-XZ-DM-20_034 Nodes: 28, 29, 49
3454-XZ-DM-20_035 Nodes: 29
3454-XZ-DM-20_041 Nodes: 31, 36, 39, 41
3454-XZ-DM-20_042 Nodes: 32, 33, 34, 38,
39, 40
3454-XZ-DM-20_043 Nodes: 35, 38, 40, 43
3454-XZ-DM-20_044
Drawing File Path Place(s) Used Comment
3454-XZ-DM-20_051 Nodes: 44, 45, 46, 50,
51, 52, 53, 54
3454-XZ-DM-20_052 Nodes: 47, 55
3454-XZ-DM-20_053 Nodes: 48
3454-XZ-DM-20_058
3454-XZ-DM-20_059 Nodes: 13, 49
3454-XZ-DM-20_040 Nodes: 34
3454-XZ-DM-20_043 Nodes: 37
3454-XZ-DM-20_041 Nodes: 42
3454-XZ-DM-20_042 Nodes: 43
1. List "FUNCTIONS"
Area Interlock ID Drawings Initiator Final Element
AREA 100 20-ESD-1001 3454-XZ-DM-20_010 20-HS-1001 20-HV-1005
3454-XZ-DM-20_10A 20-HS-1002 20-HV-1006
20-HV-1007
20-HV-1008
20-HV-1009
20-HV-1010
20-P-1004 A/B
20-FCS-1001
AREA 100 20-FCS-1001 3454-XZ-DM-20_010 20-LT-1001 20-HV-1005
3454-XZ-DM-20_10A 20-LT-1004 20-HV-1006
20-ESD-1001 20-HV-1011
AREA 100 20-FCS-1002 3454-XZ-DM-20_10B 20-LT-1002 20-P-1005
3454-XZ-DM-20_10B 20-HV-1006
20-HV-1007
20-HV-1011
AREA 100 20-FCS-1005 3454-XZ-DM-20_10B 20-HS-1105 20-HV-1102
3454-XZ-DM-20_011 20-HS-1104 20-P-1004 A/B
20-FCS-1006
20-FCS-1007
3454-XZ-DM-20_011 20-FCS-1005
AREA 100 20-FCS-1007 3454-XZ-DM-20_011 20-HS-1103 10-HV-1103
3454-XZ-DM-20_012 20-FCS-1005 20-P-1001 A/B
AREA 100 20-FCS-1008 3454-XZ-DM-20_012 20 UC CALCULATER 20-P-1001 A/B
3454-XZ-DM-20_013 20-FCS-2001 20-P-1003 A/B
3454-XZ-DM-20_014 20-FCS-5001 20-P-1006 A/B
20-FCS-5002
20-FCS-2010
AREA 100 20-FCS-1009 3454-XZ-DM-20_012 20-LT-1202 20-P-1002
AREA 100 20-FCS-1010 3454-XZ-DM-20_013 20-LT-1301 20-P-1003 A/B
AREA 100 20-FCS-1011 3454-XZ-DM-20_10A 20-LT-1005 20-P-1004 A/B
20-HV-1008
AREA 200 20-ESD-2001 3454-XZ-DM-20_021 20-HS-2210 A/B 20-P-5005 A/B
20-ESD-2002
20-FCS 2003
20-FCS-2004
20-FCS 2005
20-FCS 2006
20-FCS 2007
20-FCS 2008
AREA 200 20-ESD-2002 3454-XZ-DM-20_022 20-HS-2209 20-XV-2201
3454-XZ-DM-20_059 20-TT-2205 A/B/C 20-XV-2202
20-TT-5907 A/B/C 20-XV-2203
20-ESD-2001 20-P-2005 A/B
20-XV-5901 A/B/C
20-FCS-2001
20-FCS-3002
3454-XZ-DM-20_022 20-PT-2202 20-HV-2202
3454-XZ-DM-20_023 20-LT-2201 20-HV-0104
3454-XZ-DM-20_024 20-TE-2305 B 20-FCS-1008
20-TE-2306 B
20-TE-2403 B
20-ESD-2002
20-FCS-2002
AREA 200 20-FCS-2002 3454-XZ-DM-20_023 20-FT-2303 B 20-FCS-2001
3454-XZ-DM-20_024 20-FT-2306 B 20-FCS-3001
20-FT-2402 B
AREA 200 20-FCS-2003 3454-XZ-DM-20_022 20-ESD-2001 20-HV-2204
20-HS-2204 20-P-2001
20-HZLH-2204
20-HZLH-2205
20-HS-2203 20-P-2001 B
20-HZLH-2203
20-HZLH-2206
20-HS-2207 20-P-2001 C
20-HZLH-2201
20-HZLH-2207
3454-XZ-DM-20_023 20-ESD-2001 20-P-2001 A
3454-XZ-DM-20_023 20-ESD-2001 20-P-2001 B
3454-XZ-DM-20_024 20-ESD-2001 20-P-2001 C
AREA 200 20-FCS-2009 3454-XZ-DM-20_025 20-LT-2502 20-P-2003
AREA 200 20-FCS-2010 3454-XZ-DM-20_001 20-PT-0101 20-HV-0104
20-FE-0101 20-FCS-1008
AREA 200 20-FCS-2011 3454-XZ-DM-20_025 20-PT-2503 20-P-2003
AREA 200 20-FCS-2012 3454-XZ-DM-20_021 20-HS-3202 20-XV-2202
3454-XZ-DM-20_022 20-FE-3201 20-P-2005 A/B
3454-XZ-DM-20_032 20-XV-5901 A/B/C
AREA 300 20-FCS-3001 3454-XZ-DM-20_031 20-LT-3302 20-FV-3101 A/B
3454-XZ-DM-20_033 20-FC-2002 20-FCS-3002
AREA 300 20-FCS-3002 3454-XZ-DM-20_032 20-ESD-2002 20-P-3007 A/B
20-FCS-3001
AREA 300 20-FCS-3003 3454-XZ-DM-20_033 20-LT-3401 20-FV-3301 A
3454-XZ-DM-20_034 20-FT-3301 B 20-PV-3401
20-HS-3402 20-A-3002
20-HS-3403
3454-XZ-DM-20_035 20-LT-3503 20-HV-3501
20-LV-3402
20-XV-3501
20-P-1002
10-P-1005
AREA 300 20-FCS-3005 3454-XZ-DM-20_030 20-LSL-3001 20-XV-3001
20-HS-4102 A/B 20-P-4001 A/B
20-FCS-4002
AREA 400 20-FCS-4002 3454-XZ-DM-20_042 20-HS-4201 20-XV-4203
20-HS-4202 20-XV-4204
20-FCS-4001
20-FCS-4003
20-FCS-4004
AREA 400 20-FCS-4003 3454-XZ-DM-20_042 20-LT-4201 20-XV-4201
20-FCS-4002
3454-XZ-DM-20_042 20-FCS-4002 20-XV-4202
AREA 400 20-FCS-4006 3454-XZ-DM-20_041 20-LT-4101 20-P-2002
AREA 400 20-FCS-4007 3454-XZ-DM-20_043 20-P-4003 A or 20-P- 20-P-4003 B oR 20-P-4003 A
4003 B
AREA 400 20-FCS-4008 3454-XZ-DM-20_042 20-LT-4302 20-FV-4201
3454-XZ-DM-20_043
3454-XZ-DM-20_042 20-P-4001 A/B
AREA 400 20-FCS-4011 3454-XZ-DM-20_042 20-PT-4301 20-LV-4301
3454-XZ-DM-20_043 20-FV-4304
20-FV-4201
AREA 400 20-FCS-4012 3454-XZ-DM-20_041 20-PT-4106 20-P-4001 A
AREA 400 20-FCS-4013 3454-XZ-DM-20_041 20-PT-4107 20-P-4001 B
3454-XZ-DM-20_043
20-HS-5102 20-P-5001
20-HS-5103 20-P-5004
20-FCS-5003 20-P-5005 A/B
20-FCS-1008
20-HS-5104 20-P-5002
20-HS-5105 20-P-5004
20-FCS-5003 20-P-5005 A/B
20-P-5001
AREA 500 20-FCS-5003 3454-XZ-DM-20_051 20-HS-5107 20-FCS-5001
20-HS-5108 20-FCS-5002
20-HS-5201 20-P-5003 A/B
20-HS-5202
AREA 500 20-FCS-5005 3454-XZ-DM-20_053 20-LT-5302 20-XV-0104
AREA 500 20-FCS-5006 3454-XZ-DM-20_034 20-TT-5902 20-P-5006 A/B
3454-XZ-DM-20_059 20-XV-5902
20-PV-5901
AREA 500 20-FCS-5009 3454-XZ-DM-20_051 20-PT-5109 20-P-5001
AREA 500 20-FCS-5010 3454-XZ-DM-20_051 20-PT-5110 20-P-5004
AREA 500 20-FCS-5011 3454-XZ-DM-20_051 20-PT-5111 20-P-5002
AREA 500 20-FCS-5012 3454-XZ-DM-20_052 20-HZLH-5201 20-P-5003 A/B
2. Function List
Other Final
Function Name Initiators Final Element Unit Interlock ID P&ID
Element
1. On detection of fire, Operator actives 20-HS- 20-HS-1001, 20- 20-HV-1005 NONE AREA 20-ESD-1001 3454-XZ-DM-20_10A
1001 /1002 to transfer to storage drum (20-D- HS-1002 20-HV-1006 100 3454-XZ-DM-20_010
1004), to close N2 supply to TEA cylinder and 20-HV-1007
stop depressurization of TEA cylinder, to open 20-HV-1008
TEA container depressurization valve to let the 20-HV-1009
vapors be transferred to dry flare system, to 20-HV-1010
close pump around discharge line from 20-d- 20-P-1004 A/B
1004 via 20-p-1004 A/B, to stop TEA blending 20-FCS-1001
pumps, to isolate the feed to TEA storage
drum.
2. On high / high high level alarm of 20-LT- 20-LT-1001, 20- 20-HV-1005, NONE AREA 20-FCS-1001 3454-XZ-DM-20_10A
1001, isolating 20-D- 1004 via closure of 20- LT-1004, 20-ESD- 20-HV-1006, 100 3454-XZ-DM-20_010
1001
HV-1005, to stop TEA transfer to TEA storage 20-HV-1011
drum, closure of 20-HV-1006 to stop
pressurization of TEA cylinder by N2, closure
of 20-HV-1011 to stop hexene input to drum.
3. On low low level on piping item at TEA 20-LT-1002 20-P-1005 NONE AREA 20-FCS-1002 3454-XZ-DM-20_10B
storage seal pump out pump suction (20-P- 100
1002) to stop the pump.
4. On high level of TEA seal drum isolate 20-D- 20-LT-1003 20-HV-1005 NONE AREA 20-FCS-1003 3454-XZ-DM-20_10B
1005. 20-HV-1006 100 3454-XZ-DM-20_010
20-HV-1007
20-HV-1011
5. On safety shutdown of 20-D-1001 to isolate 20-HS-1105, 20- 20-HV-1102 The final AREA 20-FCS-1005 3454-XZ-DM-20_10B
the diluted TEA dry drum (20-D-1001). HS-1104 20-P-1004 A/B element 100 3454-XZ-DM-20_011
20-FCS-1006 mentioned in
20-FCS-1007 the final
element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
6. On high high level in diluted TEA day drum 20-LI-1101, 20- 20-HV-1101 The final AREA 20-FCS-1006 3454-XZ-DM-20_010
20-D-1001 to isolate feed flow. FCS-1005 element 100 3454-XZ-DM-20_011
mentioned in
the final
element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
7. On any emergency circumstances identified 20-HS-1103, 20- 20-HV-1103 NONE AREA 20-FCS-1007 3454-XZ-DM-20_011
by personnel, to islate diluted TEA day drum FCS-1005 20-P-1001 A/B 100 3454-XZ-DM-20_012
outlet.
Other Final
Element
8. On Catalyst injection pumps to shut down 20-UC calculator 20-P-1001 A/B, 20-P-1003 A/B, 20-P-1006 NONE AREA 20-FCS-1008 3454-XZ-DM-20_012
TEA pumps (20-P-1001 A/B), LC2253 pumps 1201, 20-FCS- A/B 100 3454-XZ-DM-20_013
2001, 20FCS-
(20-P-1003 A/B) and catalyst solvent pumps 5001, 20-FCS- 3454-XZ-DM-20_014
(20-P-1006 A/B) due to Reactor (20-R-2001) 5002, 20-FCS-
shutdown, isolation of Butene-1 on spec 2010
storage drum, isolation of Butene-1 off spec
storage drum, low pressure ethylene at B.L.,
high high ratio of TEA/LC2253 and operator
intervention.
9. On low low level on piping item at seal 20-LT-1202 20-P-1002 NONE AREA 20-FCS-1009 3454-XZ-DM-20_012
pumpout pump suction to stop the seal 100
pumpout pump 20-P-1002.
10. On low low level of 20-D-1003, to stop 20- 20-LT-1301 20-P-1301 A/B NONE AREA 20-FCS-1010 3454-XZ-DM-20_013
p-1003 A/B, LC2253 pumps. 100
11. On low low level of TEA storage drum (20- 20-LT-1005, 20- 20-P-1004 A/B NONE AREA 20-FCS-1011 3454-XZ-DM-20_10A
D-1004) and 20-HV-1008 malfunction to stop HV-1008 100
the 20-P-1004 A/B.
12. On 20-R-2001 fire case to depressurize the 20-HS-2201 A/B 20-P-5005 A/B, 20-ESD-2002, 20-FCS- The final AREA 20-ESD-2001 3454-XZ-DM-20_021
reactor. 2003, 20-FCS-2004, 20-FCS-2005, 20- element 200
FCS-2006, 20-FCS-2007, 20-FCS-2008 mentioned in
the final
element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
13. On high high temperature of 20-R-2001, 20-HS-2209, 20- 20-XV-2201, 20-XV-2202, 20-XV-2203, 20- NONE AREA 20-ESD-2002 3454-XZ-DM-20_022
high high temperature of CWS line, or external TT-2205 A/B/C, P-2005 A/B, 20-XV-5901 A/B/C, 20-FCS- 200 3454-XZ-DM-20_059
20-TT-5907 A/B/C,
fire case to depressurize the reactor. 20-ESD-2001 2001, 20-FCS-3002
14. Shutdown of reactor 20-R-2001 in any 20-HS-2208, 20- 20-HV-0103 The final AREA 20-FCS-2001 3454-XZ-DM-20_001
emergency circumstances (i.e. high high PT-2202, 20-LT- 20-HV-2202 element 200 3454-XZ-DM-20_022
2201, 20-TE-2305
temperature, high high pressure, high high B, 20-TE-2306 B, 20-HV-0104 mentioned in 3454-XZ-DM-20_023
level and etc.) 20-TE-2403 B, 20- 20-FCS-1008 the final 3454-XZ-DM-20_024
ESD-2002, 20- element is
FCS-2002 included in the
other final
element
section.
Other Final
Element
15. On low low flow in pumparound of 20-R- 20-FT-2303 B, 20- 20-FCS-2001 The final AREA 20-FCS-2002 3454-XZ-DM-20_023
2001 to shutdown of reactor and reactor FT-2306 B, 20-FT- 20-FCS-3001 element 200 3454-XZ-DM-20_024
2402 B
effluent. mentioned in
the final
element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
16. On any emergency circumstances effecting 20-ESD-2001, 20- 20-HV-2204 NONE AREA 20-FCS-2003 3454-XZ-DM-20_022
20-R-2001 outlet pumparound loop A (i.e. fire HS-2204, 20- 20-P-2001 A 200
HZLH-2204, 20-
case and block outlet) to stop pump 20-P-2001 HZLH-2205
A and close 20-HV-2204.
20-R-2001 outlet pumparound loop B (i.e. fire HS-2203, 20- 20-P-2001 B 200
HZLH-2203, 20-
case and block outlet) to stop pump 20-P-2001 HZLH-2206
B and close 20-HV-2203.
20-R-2001 outlet pumparound loop C (i.e. fire P-2207, 20-HZLH- 20-P-2001 C 200
2201, 20-HZLH-
case and block outlet) to stop pump 20-P-2001 2207
C and close 20-HV-2207.
19. On any emergency circumstances effecting 20-HS-2205, 20- 20-HV-2205 NONE AREA 20-FCS-2006 3454-XZ-DM-20_022
20-R-2001 inlet pumparound loop A (i.e. fire ESD, 2001 20-P-2001 A 200 3454-XZ-DM-20_023
case and low low flow in pumparound) to stop
pump 20-P-2001 A and close 20-HV-2205.
20-R-2001 inlet pumparound loop B (i.e. fire ESD-2001 20-P-2001 B 200 3454-XZ-DM-20_023
pump 20-P-2001 B and close 20-HV-2206.
20-R-2001 inlet pumparound loop C (i.e. fire ESD-2001 20-P-2001 C 200 3454-XZ-DM-20_023
pump 20-P-2001 C and close 20-HV-2201.
22. Pump out pump shutdown in low low alarm 20-LT-2502 20-P-2003 NONE AREA 20-FCS-2009 3454-XZ-DM-20_025
in 20-LT-2502. 200
23. On low low pressure and low low flow in 20-PT-0101, 20- 20-HV-0104 The final AREA 20-FCS-2010 3454-XZ-DM-20_001
feed at B.L. to close the ethylene supply and FE-0101 20-FCS-1008 element 200
shutdown of catalyst injection pumps. mentioned in
the final
element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
Other Final
Element
24. On low low pressure at (20-P-2003) 20-PT-2503 20-P-2003 NONE AREA 20-FCS-2011 3454-XZ-DM-20_025
pumpout pump suction to stop the pump. 200
25. On low low flow of 20-FE-3201, malfunction 20-HS-3202, 20- 20-XV-2202 NONE AREA 20-FCS-2012 3454-XZ-DM-20_021
in 20-XV-2202 and failure when open, and FE-3201 20-P-2005 A/B 200 3454-XZ-DM-20_022
operator intervention to shutdown the pump 20- 20-XV-5901 A/B/C 3454-XZ-DM-20_032
P-2005 A/B.
26. On high high level in flash drum 20-D-3001 20-LT-3302, 20- 20-FV-3101 A/B The final AREA 20-FCS-3001 3454-XZ-DM-20_031
and low low pumparound flows to shutdown the FC-2002 20-FCS-3002 element 300 3454-XZ-DM-20_033
reactor effluent outlet. mentioned in
the final
element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
27. On actuation of 20-ESD-2002 and 20-FCS- 20-ESD-2002, 20- 20-P-3007 A/B NONE AREA 20-FCS-3002 3454-XZ-DM-20_032
3001 to stop the amine pumps 20-P-3007 A/B. FCS-3001 300
28. On low low flow to thin film evaporator 20- 20-LT-3401, 20- 20-FV-3301 A NONE AREA 20-FCS-3003 3454-XZ-DM-20_033
E-3002, high high level in receiver of FT-3301 B, 20-HS- 20-PV-3301 A 300 3454-XZ-DM-20_034
3402, 20-HS-3403
evaporator 20-D-3002 and operator 20-A-3002
intervention to close 20-FV-3301 A, 20-PV-
3401 and stop 20-A-3002.
29. On high high level in 20-D-3004 A/B, to 20-LT-3502, 20- 20-HV-3401 NONE AREA 20-FCS-3004 3454-XZ-DM-20_034
close 20-HV-3401, 20-HV3501, 20-LV-3501, LT-3503 20-HV-3501 300 3454-XZ-DM-20_035
20-XV-3501, stop 20-P-1002, 20-P-1005 to 20-LV-3402
stop the feeding of spent catalyst drum. 20-XV-3501
20-P-1002
20-P-1005
30. On low level of 20-LSL-3001 in 6" piping 20-LSL-3001 20-XV-3001 NONE AREA 20-FCS-3005 3454-XZ-DM-20_030
item to close 20-XV-3001. 300
31. On low low level alarm in 20-D-4001, 20-LT-4104, 20- 20-HV-4102 NONE AREA 20-FCS-4001 3454-XZ-DM-20_041
operator intervention by 20-HS-4102 A/B and HS-4102 A/B, 20- 20-P-4001 A/B 400
FCS-4002
actuation of 20-FCS-4002 to close 20-HV-4102
and stop 20-P-4001 A/B.
32. On recycle column to depressurize 20-T- 20-HS-4201, 20- 20-XV-4203 The final AREA 20-FCS-4002 3454-XZ-DM-20_042
4001 by opening 20-XV-4203, closing 20-XV- HS-4202 20-XV-4204 element 400
4204 and actuating 20-FCS-4001, 4003 and 20-FCS-4001 mentioned in
4004. 20-FCS-4003 the final
20-FCS-4004 element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
Other Final
Element
33. On low low level in 20-T-4001 and 20-LT-4201, 20- 20-XV-4201 NONE AREA 20-FCS-4003 3454-XZ-DM-20_042
depressurizing recycle column to close 20-XV- FCS-4002 400
4201 at the bottom of 20-T-4001.
34. On low low level in recycle column reflux 20-LT-4203, 20- 20-P-4002 A/B NONE AREA 20-FCS-4004 3454-XZ-DM-20_042
drum and actuation of 20-FCS-4002 to stop 20- FCS-4002 20-XV-4202 400
P-4002 A/B and close 20-XV-4202.
35. On low low level alarm in 20-D-4003 to stop 20-LT-4303 20-P-4003 A/B NONE AREA 20-FCS-4005 3454-XZ-DM-20_043
Butene1 column reflux pumps. 400
36. On low low level in passiviation drum to 20-LT-4101 20-P-2002 NONE AREA 20-FCS-4006 3454-XZ-DM-20_041
stop 20-P-2002, passivation pump. 400
37. On Butene-1 column reflux pumps to start 20-P-4003 A or 20- 20-P-4003 B or NONE AREA 20-FCS-4007 3454-XZ-DM-20_043
the spare pump instead of operation pump in P-4003 B 20-P-4003 A 400
any emergency circumstances.
38. On high high level in 20-D-4003 to close 20-LT-4302 20-FV-4201 NONE AREA 20-FCS-4008 3454-XZ-DM-20_042
20-FV-4201. 400 3454-XZ-DM-20_043
39. On high high level in recycle column 20-T- 20-LT-4205 20-FV-4103 NONE AREA 20-FCS-4010 3454-XZ-DM-20_041
4001 to close 20-FV-4103 and stop 20-P-4001 20-P-4001 A/B 400 3454-XZ-DM-20_042
A/B after time delay.
40. On high high pressure in (20-T-4002) 20-PT-4301 20-LV-4301 NONE AREA 20-FCS-4011 3454-XZ-DM-20_042
Butene-1 column to close 20-LV-4301, 20-FV- 20-FV-4304 400 3454-XZ-DM-20_043
4304, 20-FV-4201. 20-FV-4201
41. On low low pressure in suction of recycle 20-PT-4107 20-P-4001 B NONE AREA 20-FCS-4012 3454-XZ-DM-20_041
column feed pump 20-P-4001 B, to stop the 400
pump.
42. On low low pressure in suction of recycle 20-PT-4106 20-P-4001 A NONE AREA 20-FCS-4013 3454-XZ-DM-20_041
column feed pump 20-P-4001 A, to stop the 400
pump.
43. On high high level in Butene-1 column 20- 20-LT-4304 20-FV-4201 NONE AREA 20-FCS-4014 3454-XZ-DM-20_043
T-4002to close 20-FV-4201. 400
44. On low low level in 20-D-5001 Butene-1 on 20-LT-5101, 20- 20-HV-5102 The final AREA 20-FCS-5001 3454-XZ-DM-20_051
spec storage drum and product storage safety HS-5102, 20-HS- 20-P-5001 element 500
5103, 20-FCS-
shutdown to close 20-HV-5102/5103, stop 20- 5003 20-P-5004 mentioned in
P-5001, 20-P-5004, 20-P-5005 A/B and 20-P-5005 A/B the final
actuating of 20-FCS-1008. 20-FCS-1008 element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
Other Final
Element
45. On low low level in Butene-1 off spec 20-LT-5103, 20- 20-HV-5103 The final AREA 20-FCS-5002 3454-XZ-DM-20_051
storage drum (20-D-5002) and product storage HS-5104, 20-HS- 20-P-5002 element 500
5105, 20-FCS-
safety shutdown to close 20-HV-5104/5105, 5003 20-P-5004 mentioned in
stop 20-P-5002, 20-P-5001, 20-P-5004 and 20- 20-P-5005 A/B the final
P-5005 A/B and actuating 20-FCS-5003. 20-P-5001 element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
46. On Butene-1 product storage to safety 20-HS-5107, 20- 20-FCS-5001 The final AREA 20-FCS-5003 3454-XZ-DM-20_051
shutdown in any emergency circumstances. HS-5108 20-FCS-5002 element 500
mentioned in
the final
element is
included in the
other final
element
section.
47. On low low level and any emergency 20-LT-5201, 20- 20-HV-5201 NONE AREA 20-FCS-5004 3454-XZ-DM-20_052
circumstances to close 20-HV-5201 and stop HS-5201, 20-HS- 20-P-5003 A/B 500
5202
20-P-5003.
48. On high high level alarm in 20-D-5004 to 20-LT-5302 20-XV-0104 NONE AREA 20-FCS-5005 3454-XZ-DM-20_053
close 20-XV-0104. 500
49. On high high temperature of 20-DS-5001 to 20-TT-5902 20-P-5006 A/B NONE AREA 20-FCS-5006 3454-XZ-DM-20_034
cut off the MP steam header by stopping 20-P- 20-XV-5902 500 3454-XZ-DM-20_059
5006 A/B, closing 20-XV-5902 and 20-PV- 20-PV-5901
5901.
20-FV-5101 to stop feeding by B.L. Butene-1 500
20-FV-5101 to stop feeding by B.L. Butene-1. 500
52. On low low pressure in suction line of 20-P- 20-PT-5109 20-P-5001 NONE AREA 20-FCS-5009 3454-XZ-DM-20_051
5001 to stop the pump. 500
55. On no flow in suction line to 20-P-5003 A/B 20-HZLH-5201 20-P-5003 A/B NONE AREA 20-FCS-5012 3454-XZ-DM-20_052
(C6+ product pump) due to failure of open 500
condition in 20-HV-5201 to stop the pump.
3. SIL STUDY - RISK GRAPH
Node: 1.
Area: AREA 100

Interlock ID: 20-ESD-1001
Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_010; 3454-XZ-DM-20_10A
Initiators: 20-HS-1001, 20-HS-1002

Final Element: 20-HV-1005; 20-HV-1006; 20-HV-1007; 20-HV-1008; 20-HV-1009; 20-HV-1010; 20-P-1004 A/B; 20-FCS-1001
SIL determination
Risk Graph (Semi-qualitative

Risk method)
Design Intent Demand Scenario CoFoD IPLs Red Required Actions
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. Isolation of all inlet flows to 20-D- Operator detects fire in area 100. 1.1. Possibility of overpressure 1.1. 20-PSV-1002 A/B 100 S A G W SIL1
1004, isolation of pumparound due to external fire in 20-D- 3 2 2 2
discharge and inlet to the same drum 1004 and loss of containment
(while opening the depressurization to atmosphere, creating fire.
valve to let the vapor discharge to dry
flare system) to prevent from loss of
hydrocarbon to environment & serious
safety issues.
Node: 2.
Area: AREA 100

Interlock ID: 20-FCS-1001
Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_010; 3454-XZ-DM-20_10A
Initiators: 20-LT-1001, 20-LT-1004, 20-ESD-1001

Final Element: 20-HV-1005; 20-HV-1006; 20-HV-1011
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of containment of High/ high high level in 20-D- 1.1. Possibility of loss of 1.1. 20-PSV-1002 A/B 100 S A G W SIL1
20-D-1004, this can cause serious 1004 due to operator error in containment to flare system/ 3 2 2 2
safety issues and environmental filling drum. environment.
impact.
Node: 3.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_10B
Initiators: 20-LT-1002
Final Element: 20-P-1005
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to TEA storage On low low level alarm of 20-LI- 1.1. Potential damage to 1.1. 20-LI-1003, Operator 10 S A G W SIl ---
seal pumpout pump 20-P-1005 by 1002. pumps due to running under intervention considered to be 0 1 1 2
stopping the pump. no suction flow condition. possible.
Node: 4.
Area: AREA 000

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_010; 3454-XZ-DM-20_10B
Final Element: 20-HV-1005; 20-HV-1006; 20-HV-1007; 20-HV-1011
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. Prevent the high level in 20-D-1005 On high level of 20-D-1005, due 1.1. Possibility of loss of 1.1. 20-PSV-1004 B, Operator 100 S A G W SIL1
via closure of 20-HV-1005 to stop the to loss of control of level on TEA containment and liquid carry interventions consider to be 3 2 2 2
TEA transfer to TEA storage drum, blending drum. over to burn pit. possible.
closure of 20 HV-1006 to stop nitrogen
transfer to TEA container, opening of
20-HV-1007 to depressurize the TEA
container to seal drum and closure of
20-HV-1011 to stop the hexane flow to
20-D-5004.
Node: 5.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_10B; 3454-XZ-DM-20_011

Final Element: 20-HV-1102; 20-P-1004 A/B; 20-FCS-1006; 20-FCS-1007
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. Isolate the 20-D-1001 via stopping On emergency circumstances in 1.1. Possible loss of 1.1. 20-PSV-1101 A/B, Operator 100 S A G W SIL1
20-P-1004 A?B to stop TEA blending local area such as high pressure containment to atmosphere intervention considered to be 3 2 2 2
pumps, opening of 20-HV-1102 to in the diluted TEA day drum, lead to fire. possible.
discharge diluted TEA to burning pit, high level in diluted TEA day
actuation of 20-FCS-1006 to isolate drum.
diluted TEA day drum feed and
actuation of 20-FCS-1007 to isolate
diluted TEA day drum outlet.
Node: 6.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_010; 3454-XZ-DM-20_011
Initiators: 20-LI-1101, 20-FCS-1005

Final Element: 20-HV-1101;
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high level in diluted On high high level in 20-D-1001 1.1. Possible loss of 1.1. 20-PSV-1101 A/B 100 S A G W SIL1
TEA day drum by closing 20-HV-1101 due to loss of control on inlet containment to atmosphere 3 2 2 2
which isolate feed to 20-D-1001. stream or outlet blockage. and fire, liquid carry over to
burn pit.
Node: 7.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 20-HS-1103, 20-FCS-1005

Final Element: 10-HV-1103; 20-P-1001 A/B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent any serious safety issues Any emergency scenario. 1.1. Potential serious safety 1.1. 20-PSV-1201 A/B, Operator 100 S A G W SIL1
caused by any reason. issues. intervention considered to be 3 2 2 2
possible.
Node: 8.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_012; 3454-XZ-DM-20_013; 3454-XZ-DM-20_014
Initiators: 20-UC calculator 1201, 20-FCS-2001, 20FCS-5001, 20-FCS-5002, 20-FCS-2010

Final Element: 20-P-1001 A/B; 20-P-1003 A/B; 20-P-1006 A/B; ;
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. Isolation of reactor and Butene-1 Any causes shutting down (i.e. 1.1. Potential loss of catalyst 1.1. 20-PSV-1253 A/B, 20-PSV- 100 S A G W SIL1
off/on spec storage due to any causes low ethylene in). and loss of on spec product 1305 A/B, 20-PSV-1401 A/B, 20- 3 2 2 2
of reactor shutdown, in addition to from reactor. overpressure on PSV-1402 A/B, Operator
stopping TEA/LC2253/catalyst pumps reactor input lines of intervention considered to be
injecting necessary mixtures to reactor. TEA/LC2253, potential safety possible.
It is notable, mentioned pumps are issues.
stopped on very high TEA/LC2253 ratio
as well.
Node: 9.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_012
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent possible damage due to Low low level alarm by 20-LT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIL1 Study to
low level in pump suction via stopping 1202 due to low inlet flow or inlet pump, Potential loss of considered to be possible. 2 2 1 2
provide low
the pump. blockage containment and safety level alarm on
issues.
20-LI-1253.
Node: 10.
Area: AREA 100

Final Element: 20-P-1003 A/B
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to Low low level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIL1
low low level in 20-D-1003 by stopping 1301 pump, leakage, safety issues. LT-1301. 2 2 1 2
pumps.
Node: 11.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_10A
Initiators: 20-LT-1005, 20-HV-1008

Final Element: 20-P-1004 A/B;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent the possible damage to Low low level alarm of TEA 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. 20-LT-1001, Operator 10 S A G W SIL1
20-P-1004 A/B due to low low level in storage drum, 20-HV-1008 pump, Potential loss of intervention considered to be 2 2 1 2
20-D-1004, inlet blockage and 20-HV- malfunctions. containment and safety possible.
1008 malfunction via stopping the issues.
pump.
Node: 12.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-HS-2201 A/B

Final Element: 20-P-5005 A/B; 20-ESD-2002; 20-FCS 2003; 20-FCS-2004; 20-FCS 2005; 20-FCS 2006; 20-FCS 2007; 20-FCS 2008
Design Intent SIL determination

method)
Risk
Demand Scenario CoFoD IPLs Red Required Actions
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent the reactor (20-R-2001) Fire detection by operator, fire 1.1. Possible overpressure 1.1. 20-PSV-2202 S (In this 10 S A G W SIL3
overpressure due to external fire by detection signal in control room explosion, loss of particular case, the PSV can not be 3 2 1 2
03 stopping 20-P-2005 A/B, and activing initiated by F&G system. containment, production considered as fully efficient to
20-ESD-2002, 20-FCS-2003, 20-FCS- failure, serious safety issues. protect the reactor in a case of fire +
2004, 20-FCS-2005, 20-FCS-2006, 20- loss of the PA pumps (due to the
FCS-2007, 20-FCS-2008. fire), leading to excessive heat of
reaction from runaway in addition to
the heat from the fire.)
Node: 13.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-HS-2209, 20-TT-2205 A/B/C, 20-TT-5907 A/B/C, 20-ESD-2001

Final Element: 20-XV-2201; 20-XV-2202; 20-XV-2203; 20-P-2005 A/B; 20-XV-5901 A/B/C; 20-FCS-2001; 20-FCS-3002
Design Intent SIL determination

method)
Risk
Demand Scenario CoFoD IPLs Red Required Actions
Factor Risk
03 Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent the reactor (20-R-2001) high high temperature alarm in 1.1. Potential explosion of 1.1. 20-PSV-2202 (In this particular 10 S A G W SIL3
overpressure due to high high 20-R-2001. reactor, loss of containment, case, the PSV can not be 3 2 1 2
temperature by opening 20-XV-2201 to serious safety issues, considered as fully efficient to

discharge the gas to flare, closing 20- improper quality of the protect the reactor in a case of fire +
XV-2203 to stop reactor feeding, product. loss of the PA pumps (due to the
closing 20-XV-2202 to stop the product fire), leading to excessive heat of
transfer, stopping 20-P-2005 A/B to reaction from runaway in addition to
stop the flushing pumps , closing 20- the heat from the fire.), Operator
XV-5901 A/B/C to shut the valve on MP intervention considered to be
steam injection loop A/B/C, actuating possible.
20-FCS-2001 to shutdown the reactor
and by actuating 20-FCS-3002 to
shutdown the amine pumps.
Node: 14.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_001; 3454-XZ-DM-20_022; 3454-XZ-DM-20_023; 3454-XZ-DM-20_024
Initiators: 20-HS-2208, 20-PT-2202, 20-LT-2201, 20-TE-2305 B, 20-TE-2306 B, 20-TE-2403 B, 20-ESD-2002, 20-FCS-2002

Final Element: 20-HV-0103; 20-HV-2202; 20-HV-0104; 20-FCS-1008; ; ; ;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent the reactor damage due High high-pressure alarm of 20- 1.1. Potential explosion, 1.1. 20-PSV-2202, Operator 100 S A G W SIL1
to high high pressure, high high level, PT-2202, hihg high level alarm of improper quality of product, intervention considered to be 3 2 2 2
high high temperature in pumparound 20-LT-2201, high high loss of containment, serious possible.
A/B/C (20-TE-2305 B, 20-TE-2306 B, temperature alarm of 20-TE- safety issues.
20-TE-2303 B), actuating of 20-ESD- 2305 B, 20-TE-2306 B, 20-TE-
2002 to depressurize the reactor and 2403 B, actuating of 20-ESD-
actuating of 20-FCS-2002 (due to low 2002 and actuating of 20-FCS-
low flow in 20-R-2001 pumparound) by 2002.
stopping the ethylene feed at B.L.,
ethylene recycle feed, the raw ethylene
feed from B.L. and shutdown the
catalyst injection pumps.
Node: 15.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-FT-2303 B, 20-FT-2306 B, 20-FT-2402 B

Final Element: 20-FCS-2001; 20-FCS-3001;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent the damage of pumps Low low flow alarm in 20-FT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low flow alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIL1
and reactor and off sepc production by 2303, 20-FT-2306 B, 20-FT-2402 pump, loss of containment, FT-2303 A, 2306 A, 2402 A, 2 2 1 2
shutting down of reactor and reactor B. safety issues. Operator intervention considered to
effluent. be possible.
Node: 16.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-ESD-2001, 20-HS-2204, 20-HZLH-2204, 20-HZLH-2205

Final Element: 20-HV-2204; 20-P-2001; ;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop the pumparound loop A by Fire case detection by operator 1.1. Pump running dry and 1.1. 20-PSV-2202, Operator 100 S A G W SIL1
closing 20-HV-2204 and stopping 20-P- or detection system, malfunction potential damage to intervention considered to be 3 2 1 2
2001 A in any emergency in 20-HV-2204, 20-HV-2205 and mechanical seal of the pump, possible.
circumstances (i.e. fire case, blocked failure in valve when opening. potential leak or dispersion of
outlet, operator intervention). reactor containment, potential
safety issue due to spread of
fire in case of fire scenario.
Node: 17.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-ESD-2001, 20-HS-2203, 20-HZLH-2203, 20-HZLH-2206

Final Element: 20-HV-2203; 20-P-2001 B; ;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop the pumparound loop B by Fire case detection by operator 1.1. Pump running dry and 1.1. 20-PSV-2202, Operator 100 S A G W SIL1
2001 B in any emergency in 20-HV-2203, 20-HV-2206 and mechanical seal of the pump, possible.
Node: 18.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-ESD-2001, 20-P-2207, 20-HZLH-2201, 20-HZLH-2207

Final Element: 20-HV-2207; 20-P-2001 C; ;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop the pumparound loop C by Fire case detection by operator 1.1. Pump running dry and 1.1. 20-PSV-2202, Operator 100 S A G W SIL1
2001 C in any emergency in 20-HV-2207, 20-HV-2201 and mechanical seal of the pump, possible.
Node: 19.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-HS-2205, 20-ESD, 2001

Final Element: 20-HV-2205; 20-P-2001 A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop the pumparound loop A, by Fire detection by operator or 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. 20-PSV-2202, Low flow alarm 100 S A G W SIL1
closing 20-HV-2205 at inlet of reactor detection system, low low flow reactor 20-R-2001, damage to provided in 20-FT-2303 A. 3 2 1 2
and stopping 20-P-2001 A. alarm in 20-FT-2303 B, pump due to dry running, leak
malfunction in 20-HV-2204, and or dispersion, safety issues.
failure of valve when opening.
Node: 20.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-HS-2206, 20-ESD-2001

Final Element: 20-HV-2206; 20-P-2001 B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop the pumparound loop B by Fire detection by operator or 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. 20-PSV-2202, Low flow alarm 100 S A G W SIL1
and stopping 20-P-2001 B. alarm in 20-FT-2306 B, pump due to dry running, leak
Node: 21.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-HS-2001, 20-ESD-2001

Final Element: 20-HV-2201; 20-P-2001 C
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop the pumparound loop C by Fire detection by operator or 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. 20-PSV-2202, Low flow alarm 100 S A G W SIL1
and stopping 20-P-2001 C. alarm in 20-FT-2402 B, pump due to dry running, leak
Node: 22.
Area: AREA 200

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pumpout pump damage Low low level in 20-LT-2502 on 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. 20-PT-2503, 20-LT-2501, 10 S A G W SIL1
by stopping 20-P-2003. piping item at pumpout pump pump, safety issues. Operator intervention considered to 2 2 1 2
suction. be possible.
Node: 23.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-PT-0101, 20-FE-0101

Final Element: 20-HV-0104; 20-FCS-1008
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent production of off spec Low low pressure alarm in 20- 1.1. Production of off spec 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIl ---
product, opening 20-HV-0104 to start PT-0101 and low low flow alarm product. considered to be possible. 0 1 1 2
raw ethylene feed supply from B.L., in 20-FE-0101 and operator
and actuating 20-FCS-1008 to intervention.
shutdown of catalyst injection pumps.
Node: 24.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 20-PT-2503
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pumpout pump damage Low low pressure alarm in 20- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIl ---
due to low low pressure in suction line PT-2503. pump, leak and loss of considered to be possible. 1 2 1 2
by stopping the pump 20-P-2003. containment, safety issues.
Node: 25.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-20_021; 3454-XZ-DM-20_022; 3454-XZ-DM-20_032
Initiators: 20-HS-3202, 20-FE-3201

Final Element: 20-XV-2202; 20-P-2005 A/B; 20-XV-5901 A/B/C
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent the reactor effluent pump Low low flow alarm in 20-FE- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL1
(20-P-2005 A/B), damage and improper 3201, operator intervention. pumps due to low low suction considered to be possible. 2 2 1 2
mixture of reactor effluent and amine flow, possible leak and safety
by closing 20-XV-2202 to close reactor issues.
bottom valve, stopping 20-P-2005 A/B
to stop the reactor effluent pumps and
closing 20-XV-5901 A/B/C to close
valve of MP steam injection loops
A/B/C.
Node: 26.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 20-LT-3302, 20-FC-2002

Final Element: 20-FV-3101 A/B; 20-FCS-3002
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to reactor and High high level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible liquid carry over 1.1. Low alarm provided in 20-LT- 100 S A G W SIl ---
overpressure in flash drum by closing 3302 and actuation of 20-FCS- to flare system, improper 3303, 20-PSV-3301 A/B, operator 1 2 1 2
valves of reactor effluent (20-FV-3101 2002. quality of product. intervention cinsidered to be

A/B) and actuating 20-FCS-3002 to possible
shutdown amine pumps (20-P-3007
A/B).
Node: 27.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 20-ESD-2002, 20-FCS-3001

Final Element: 20-P-3007 A/B;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop amine injection while the Actuation of 20-ESD-2002 or 20- 1.1. Improper injection of 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIl ---
effluent of reactor is shutting down or FCS-3001. amine, damage to pump due considered to be possible. 0 1 1 1
depressurization of reactor by stopping to running in shut off pressure.
20-P-3007 A/B.
Node: 28.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 20-LT-3401, 20-FT-3301 B, 20-HS-3402, 20-HS-3403

Final Element: 20-FV-3301 A; 20-PV-3401; 20-A-3002;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate the thin film evaporator by Low low flow alarm in 20-FT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. High/low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIl ---
closing valve at feed of thin film 3301 B, high high level alarm in scrapper, dry run condition, 20-LT-3402, high temperature alarm 0 1 1 2
evaporator (20-FV-3301 A), MP steam 20-LT-3401, operator thermal shock, overfilling of in 20-TT-3409, operator intervention
supply to thin film evaporator (20-PV- intervention (loss 20-HS-3402 & thin film evaporator, loss of considered to be possible.
3401) and stopping electric motor 20-A- 3403). efficiency.
3002 M of thin film evaporator.
Node: 29.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 20-LT-3502, 20-LT-3503

Final Element: 20-HV-3401; 20-HV-3501; 20-LV-3402; 20-XV-3501; 20-P-1002; 10-P-1005
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate the spent catalyst drum by High high level alarm in spent 1.1. Possible overpressure of 1.1. 20-PSV-3502, 20-PSV-3504 100 S A G W SIL1
closing 20-HV-3401 to start the feeding catalyst drum 20-D-3004 A/B. 20-D-3004 A/B, liquid 3 2 2 2
via pass line, closing 20-HV-3501, 20- carryover to flare system, loss
LV-3501 to close the feeding of spent of containment, safety issues.
catalyst drum, closing 20-XV-3501 to
stop amine injection, stopping seal
pumpout pump (20-P-1002) and
stopping TEA storage seal pumpout
pump (20-P-1005).
Node: 30.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 20-LSL-3001
Final Element: 20-XV-3001
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent nitrogen ingression in to Low level alarm in 6" piping item 1.1. No safety issues. 1.1. Operator intervention. 0 S A G W SIl ---
the hexane storage by closing 20-HV- or operator intervention. 0 1 1 2
3001.
Node: 31.
Area: AREA 400

Initiators: 20-LT-4104, 20-HS-4102 A/B, 20-FCS-4002

Final Element: 20-HV-4102; 20-P-4001 A/B;
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate the feed surge drum of low low alarm in 20-LT-4104, 1.1. Damage to pump due to 1.1. low level alarm in 20-LT-4103, 10 S A G W SIL1
recycle column by closing 20-HV-4102 actuation of 20-FCS-4002 and dry running, possible operator intervention. 2 2 1 2
at bottom of drum and stopping 20-P- operator intervention by 20-HS- mechanical failure, leak and
4001 A/B. 4102 A/B. loss of containment, possible
safety issues.
Node: 32.
Area: AREA 400


Final Element: 20-XV-4203; 20-XV-4204; 20-FCS-4001; 20-FCS-4003; 20-FCS-4004
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To depressurize the recycle column operator intervention by 20-HS- 1.1. Possible overpressure of 1.1. 20-PSV-4201, 20-PSV-4202 100 S A G W SIL1
by opening 20-XV-4203 on 4201, 20-HS-4202. recycle column, potential loss 2 2 2 2
depressurization line to flare system, of containment, serious safety

closing 20-XV-4204 to close MP steam issues.
supply in to reboiler (20-E-4001),
actuating of 20-FCS-4001 to isolate the
feed surge drum, actuating of 20-FCS-
4003 to close 20-T-4001 bottom and
actuating 20-FCS-4004 to shutdown
the reflux pump.
Node: 33.
Area: AREA 400

Initiators: 20-LT-4201, 20-FCS-4002

Final Element: 20-XV-4201;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent the low low level in 20-T- Low low level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible reverse flow 1.1. low level alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIL1
4001 and depressurization of recycle 4201, actuation of 20-FCS-4002. from Butene-1 column, gas LT-4202, Operator intervention 2 2 1 2
column by closing 20-XV-4201. flueby to the next column and considered to be possible.
possible safety issues.
Node: 34.
Area: AREA 400

Initiators: 20-LT-4203, 20-FCS-4002

Final Element: 20-P-4002 A/B; 20-XV-4202
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pump damage and Low low level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low alarm provided on 20-LT- 10 S A G W SIL1
depressurization of recycle column by 4203 and actuation of 20-FCS- pumps due to dry running, 4204, operator intervention 2 2 1 2
stopping recycle column reflux pumps 4002. possible loss of containment, considered to be possible.
(20-P-4002 A/B) and closing 20-XV- safety issues.
4202 at the bottom of the recycle
column reflux drum.
Node: 35.
Area: AREA 400

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pump damage due to low Low low level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIL1
low level in drum, by stopping reflux 4303. pump, leak or dispersion, LT-4302, Operator intervention 2 2 1 2
pumps (20-P-4003 A/B). safety issues. considered to be possible.
Node: 36.
Area: AREA 400

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pump damage due to low Low low level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIL1
low level in passivation drum (20-D- 4101. pump, leak and loss of LT-4102. 2 2 1 2
2002) by stopping 20-P-2002. containment, safety issues.
Node: 37.
Area: AREA 400

Initiators: 20-P-4003 A or 20-P-4003 B

Final Element: 20-P-4003 B oR 20-P-4003 A
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To start 20-P-4003 B (or 20-P-4003 stopping one of the reflux pumps 1.1. No reflux stream during 1.1. high level alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIl ---
A) automatically if pump in operation 20-P-4003 A/B. normal operation, possible LT-4302, low flow alarm provided in 1 2 1 1
20-P-4003 A (or 20-P-4003 B) stops. high level in reflux drum, 20-FV-4303, operator intervention
possible liquid carryover to considered to be possible.
flare system.
Node: 38.
Area: AREA 400

Final Element: 20-FV-4201
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop feeding to Butene-1 column high high level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. possible disturbance in 1.1. high alarm provided in 20-LT- 100 S A G W SIL1
20-T-4002 due to high high level in 4302 on reflux drum. column operation, possible 4302, 20-PSV-4302 A/B, operator 3 2 1 1
reflux drum by closing 20-FV-4201. liquid accumulation in inlet line intervention considered to be
to reflux drum, potential possible.
overpressure in column and
loss of containment, safety
issues.
Node: 39.
Area: AREA 400

Final Element: 20-FV-4103; 20-P-4001 A/B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop feeding to 20-T-4001 recycle High high level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Improper quality of 1.1. 20-PSV-4202 A/B, high alarm 100 S A G W SIL1
column due to high high level by 4205. product, overpressure in provided in 20-LT-4202, Operator 3 2 1 1
closing 20-FV-4103 and stopping feed column, possible loss of intervention considered to be
pumps 20-P-4001 A/B after 5 min time containment and safety possible.
delay. issues.
Node: 40.
Area: AREA 400

Final Element: 20-LV-4301; 20-FV-4304; 20-FV-4201
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate Butene-1 column due to High high pressure alarm in 20- 1.1. Possible high high 1.1. 20-PSV-4302 A/B, high 100 S A G W SIL1
high high pressure by closing 20-FV- PT-4301. pressure, possible explosion pressure alarm provided in 20-PT- 3 2 1 2
2001 to stop feeding to 20-T-4002, and loss of containment, 4301.

closing 20-LV-4301 to stop product safety issues.
C6+ to 20-D-5003 and closing 20-FV-
4304 to stop MP steam to 20-E-4002.
Node: 41.
Area: AREA 400

Final Element: 20-P-4001 A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to Low low pressure alarm in 20- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIL1 Study to
low low pressure in suction line by PT-4106. pump, possible leak or considered to be possible. 2 2 1 2
provide low
stopping 20-P-4001 A. dispersion. pressure alarm
on 20-PT-
4106.
Node: 42.
Area: AREA 400

Final Element: 20-P-4001 B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to Low low pressure alarm in 20- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIL1 Study to
low low pressure in suction line by PT-4107 pump, possible leak or considered to be possible. 2 2 1 2
provide low
stopping 20-P-4001 B. dispersion. pressure alarm
on 20-PT-
4107.
Node: 43.
Area: AREA 400

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent to damage to column 20- high high level alarm in 20-PT- 1.1. Improper quality of 1.1. 20-PSV-4302 A/B, high 100 S A G W SIL1
T-4002, improper quality of product and 4301. product, high pressure, pressure alarm provided in 20-PT- 3 2 1 1
overpressure in the tower by closing possible loss of containment 4301.
20-FV-4201 to stop feeding to the and safety issues.
column.
Node: 44.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 20-LT-5101, 20-HS-5102, 20-HS-5103, 20-FCS-5003

Final Element: 20-HV-5102; 20-P-5001; 20-P-5004; 20-P-5005 A/B; 20-FCS-1008
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate Butene-1 on spec storage Low low level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIL1
drum and prevent the pump damage 5101, actuation of 20-FCS-5003 pump, leak and loss of LT-5102, operator intervention 2 2 1 2
due to low level in 20-P-5001 by and operator intervention. containment, safety issues. considered to be possible.
closing 20-HV-5102 to close the
product from Butene-1 on spec drum,
stopping 20-P-5001 Butene-1 on spec
pump, 20-P-5004 Butene-1 common
spare pump, 20-P-5005 A/B flushing
pumps and actuating 20-FCS-1008 to
shutdown the catalyst injection pump.
Node: 45.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 20-LT-5103, 20-HS-5104, 20-HS-5105, 20-FCS-5003

Final Element: 20-HV-5103; 20-P-5002; 20-P-5004; 20-P-5005 A/B; 20-P-5001
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate Butene-1 off spec storage Low low level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIL1
drum and prevent the pump damage 5103, actuation of 20-FCS-5003 pumps due to dry running, LT-5104. 2 2 1 2
due to low level in 20-D-5002 by and operator intervention. possible loss of containment.
closing 20-HV-5103, to close the
product from Butene-1 off spec pump, ,
20-P-5004 common spare pump, 20-P-
5005 A/B flushing pumps, 20-P-5001
Butene-1 on spec pump and actuating
20-FCS-1008 to shutdown the catalyst
injection pumps.
Node: 46.
Area: AREA 500


Final Element: 20-FCS-5001; 20-FCS-5002
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate the Butene-1 product any emergency circumstances, 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. None. 0 S A G W SIL1
storage by actuating 20-FCS-5001 to operator intervention. downstream equipments, 2 2 1 2
isolate Butene-1 on spec storage drum serious safety issues in fire
and 20-FCS-5002 to isolate the scenario in the downstream
Butene-1 off spec storage drum. sections.
Node: 47.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 20-LT-5201, 20-HS-5201, 20-HS-5202

Final Element: 20-HV-5201; 20-P-5003 A/B;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate the C6+ product storage Low low level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 20- 10 S A G W SIL1
drum (20-D-5003) and prevent pump 5201 and operator intervention. pump, leak and loss of LT-5202, operator intervention 2 2 1 2
damage due to low low level in drum by containment. considered to be possible.

closing 20-HV-5201 to close the
product from C6+ product drum and
stopping 20-P-5003 A/B C6+ product
pumps.
Node: 48.
Area: AREA 500

Final Element: 20-XV-0104
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop the feeding of washing High high level alarm in 20-LT- 1.1. Possible liquid carry over 1.1. High level alarm provided in 20- 100 S A G W SIL1
hexane drum from B.L. by closing 20- 5302. to flare system, possible high LT-5301, operator intervention 2 2 1 2
XV-0104. pressure, loss of containment. considered to be possible, 20-PSV-

5301.
Node: 49.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 20-TT-5902
Final Element: 20-P-5006 A/B; 20-XV-5902; 20-PV-5901
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent chocking of thin film High high temperature alarm in 1.1. Possible chocking and 1.1. High temperature alarm 10 S A G W SIL2 SIL 2, just is
evaporator due to high temperature of 20-TT-5902. blockage in thin film provided in 20-TT-5901, operator 3 2 1 2
specified for
MP steam, by stopping 20-P-5006 A/B evaporator 20-E-3002, intervention considered to be primary
(DM water booster pump), closing 20- overpressure, possible loss of possible.
XV-5902 MP steam line on/off valve containment.
element (20-
and 20-PV-5901 upstream control TT-5902) and
valve. the relevant
logic solver on
ESD panel.
final elements
are considered
to have
combination of
SIL 2 due to
serial location
of 20-XV-5902
and 29-PV-
5901
Node: 50.
Area: AREA 500

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To cut off feeding by Butene-1 from High high level alarm 20-LT- 1.1. Possible liquid carryover 1.1. 20-PSV-5103, high level alarm 100 S A G W SIl ---
B.L., due to high high level in 20-D- 5105. to flare system, possible provided in 20-LT-5102, operator 2 2 1 2
5001 by closing 20-FV-5101. overpressure and loss intervention considered to be

containment. possible.
Node: 51.
Area: AREA 500

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To cut off feeding by Butene-1 from High high level alarm 20-LT- 1.1. Possible liquid carry over 1.1. 20-PSV-5106, high level alarm 100 S A G W SIL1
B.L., due to high high level in 20-D- 5106. to flare system, possible high provided in 20-LT-5104, Operator 2 2 1 2
5002 by closing 20-FV-5101. pressure, loss of containment. intervention considered to be
possible.
Node: 52.
Area: AREA 500

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent the pump 20-P-5001 Low low pressure alarm in 20- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIL1
damage due to low low pressure in PT-5109. pump, possible leak or considered to be possible. 2 2 1 2
suction line by stopping the pump. dispersion.
Node: 53.
Area: AREA 500

SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pump damage due to low Low low level alarm in 20-PT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIL1
low pressure in suction line by stopping 5110. pump, leak or dispersion. considered to be possible. 2 2 1 2
pump 20-P-5004.
Node: 54.
Area: AREA 500

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pump damage due to low Low low pressure alarm in 20- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIL1
low pressure in suction line by stopping PT-5111. pump, leak or dispersion. considered to be possible. 2 2 1 2
20-P-5002.
Node: 55.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 20-HZLH-5201
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pumps (20-P-5003 A/B) 20-HZLH-5201 1.1. Possible damage to pump 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIL1
damage due to no flow in suction line due to dry running, possible considered to be possible. 2 2 1 1
by stopping pumps. leak or dispersion.

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Bakhtar Petrochemical Company

Lorestan Petrochemical Company (LPC)

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1

03 Issued for Approval K. K. F. D. A. M. 23.Jun.2010

REV. DESCRIPTION DRAWN UP CHECKED APPROVED DATE

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

LIST OF REVISED PAGES

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

1. INTRODUCTIN AND SCOPE OF WORK ............................................................................ 4

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

1 INTRODUCTIN AND SCOPE OF WORK

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY

2 SIL STUDY BASIS AND DEFINITIONS

2.1 STUDY BASIS

The study was based on:

2.2 DEFINITION OF SIL

Table 2.1 Probability of Failure on Demand for SIL

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

2.3 BACKGROUND TO RISK BASED APPROACH ADOPTED FOR SIL SELECTION

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

T arg et risk level (ie acceptable risk after mitigation)

PFD = 10-4 / (10-1 x 1) = 10-3

The required SIL is 2.

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

The methodology defined in the LORESTAN / MAHABAD PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY:

3.1.1 Identification of SIFs

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

3.1.2 Description of Function, Initiators and Final Elements

3.1.3 Causes of SIF Demand and Consequences of SIF Failure

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

3.2 FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE APPROACH ADOPTED

3.2.1 Multiple Sensors

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

3.2.2 Multiple Final Elements

3.2.3 Consideration of PSV (Safety Valves)

3.2.4 Independent Protective Layers

3.3 SIL STUDY GUIDELINES

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

Table 3.1 Rule Set for Independent Protective Layer

Table 3.2 Rule Set for Frequency of Demand

Under stress, emergency, action performed more W3

Unstressed, action performed more than once a W2

Under stress, emergency, action performed once/ Qtr. W2

Unstressed, action performed once/ Qtr. Or less W1

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

Table 3.3 Rule Set for Enabling event Factors

Table 3.4 Rule Set for Exposure Parameter Avoidance parameter

N248-SZ-RT-005 --------- SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR BUTENE-1 1500-SZ-RT-005

SIL Classification Flow Chart

CAUSES OF SIF CONSEQUENCE OF

ASSESSMENT OF INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYER

SIL FOR SIF

Consider if SIL in necessary for all final

ALL SIF CLASSIFIED

(W) Frequency of Demand

(A) Presence in danger zone at time of demand

(G) Possibility to avert hazard

(W) Frequency of demand

(E) Environmental damage per demand if ESD system fails on demand

E0= No release or release with negligible damage to the environment