N248 SZ RT 006 Iso2 PDF

Bakhtar Petrochemical Company
Lorestan Petrochemical Company (LPC)

Lorestan Petrochemical Company
NEC IDENTIFICATION CODE TCM IDENTIFICATION CODE TITLE OWNER DOCUMENT Nr.
SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR
N248-SZ-RT-006 --------- POLYMERIZATION 1500-SZ-RT-006
PLANT LOCATION OWNER SHEET Nr. REV. Nr.
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
KHORAMABAD (IRAN) LORESTAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY 1 of 13 02
SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR POLYMERIZATION
02 Issued for Approval K. K. F. D. A. M. 22.JUN.2010

01 Issued for Review K. K. F. D. M. G. 15.Jan.2010
REV. DESCRIPTION DRAWN UP CHECKED APPROVED DATE
This document has been produced by Contractor for LORESTAN. It is confidential and cannot be disclosed to or used by any third party for any purpose without prior written consent.
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
LIST OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTIN AND SCOPE OF WORK ............................................................................ 3

1.1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 3
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY............................................................................................. 4
1.3. SCOPE OF STUDY ...................................................................................................... 4
2. SIL STUDY BASIS AND DEFINITIONS .............................................................................. 4
2.1. STUDY BASIS .............................................................................................................. 4
2.2. DEFINITION OF SIL ..................................................................................................... 5
2.3. BACKGROUND TO RISK BASED APPROACH ADOPTED FOR SIL SELECTION..... 5
3. SIL METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 7
3.1. OVERVIEW................................................................................................................... 7
3.1.1. Identification of SIFs .............................................................................................. 7
3.1.2. Description of Function, Initiators and Final Elements ........................................... 8
3.1.3. Causes of SIF Demand and Consequences of SIF Failure ................................... 8
3.2. FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE APPROACH ADOPTED................................... 10
3.2.1. Multiple Sensors .................................................................................................. 10
3.2.2. Multiple Final Elements ........................................................................................ 10
3.2.3. Consideration of PSV (Safety Valves) ................................................................. 10
3.2.4. Independent Protective Layers ............................................................................ 10
3.3. SIL STUDY GUIDELINES ........................................................................................... 11
3.4. WORKSHEETS........................................................................................................... 12
3.5. ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................................................................... 12
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
1 INTRODUCTIN AND SCOPE OF WORK
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This plant is based on the most updated version of the Spherilene process technology,
being the complete Plant configuration described below inclusive of two gas phase reaction
steps, which can be operated under different compositions and independent operating
conditions. The Spherilene process is the only gas phase cascade technology, coupling the
capability of gas phase to produce Linear Low density Polyethylenes, with the High Density
Polyethylenes properties flexibility typical of slurry cascade technologies, without the
constraints given by the obligation to switch on different catalyst families.
According to the required product slate, plant configuration has been optimized in order to
cover the whole range of LLDPE/MDPE and HDPE applications field by using a single
family of Ziegler-Natta, titanium based, catalyst systems, having the capability to produce
the following major families of polyethylene polymers in a really swing mode:
-Linear Low Density PE (LLDPE) - density 0.918-0.933 g/cm3
-Medium Density PE (MDPE) - density 0.934-940 g/cm3
-High Density PE (HDPE) Narrow Molecular Weight Distribution - density 0.940- 0.962 g/cm3
-High Density PE (HDPE) Broad Molecular Weight Distribution - density 0.940- 0.962 g/cm3
The process sections are numbered from 000 to 600 and are identified as follows:
Area 100 – CATALYSTS, CO-CATALYSTS AND LIQUID ADDITIVE STORAGE AND METERING
Area 200 – FIRST GAS PHASE POLYMERIZATION, SECOND GAS PHASE POLYMERIZATION
Area 300 – POLYMER DEGASSING AND GAS RECYCLE
Area 500 – STEAMING AND RECOVERY OF MONOMERS DISSOLVED IN THE POLYMER, DRYER
Area 600 – BLOW DOWN, PROCESS FACILITIES, WASTE OIL TREATMENT
Area 700 – ETHYLENE PURIFICATION, BUTENE-1 STORAGE, PROPANE PURIFICATION, PROPANE
RECOVERY, HEXENE-1 PURIFICATION, OSBL PURIFIED PROPANE STORAGE, MONOMER BLOW
DOWN
Area 800 – PE POLYMER TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND METERING TO EXTRUSION, ADDITIVES
METERING TO EXTRUSION, EXTRUSION
Area 900 – PELLET HEMOGENIZATION AND STORAGE
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
The objective of the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) classification study was to assess the SIL
of the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), based on an assessment of the risk of injury to
people (operators or public) and damage to the environment. This involves evaluating the:
Elements forming the SIF;
SIF Design Intent;
SIF demand scenarios and frequency of demand;
Potential consequences if the SIF is not implemented; and
Effectiveness of Impendent Protective Layers (IPL).
The SIL defines the level of the safety integrity (or reliability) required to be implemented
for each specific SIF application, such that the residual risk due to each hazardous event in
the plant is broadly acceptable. The SIL could range from SIL 4 (SIL 3 being the highest level
of safety integrity expected in the process industry). SIL ‘-‘ does not call for any safety
integrity requirements. For SIL 4 a requirement to redesign the system to achieve an
inherently safer design is recommended.
1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY
The SIL Classification was performed for the SIFs as identified from Cause and Effects
Diagrams/ Tables (CED) and the Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs).
The SIL study was conducted in accordance with:
IEC 61511 Part 3, which incorporates the requirements from ISA S84.01-1996.
2 SIL STUDY BASIS AND DEFINITIONS
2.1 STUDY BASIS
The study was based on:

Casue & Effect Diagrams (hereafter referred as CED);
Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs);
HAZOP Report; and
Input from the SIL study team.
The basis for the SIL study was primarily the P&IDs and CED.
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
2.2 DEFINITION OF SIL
The SIF is required to be operated on demand. It will act upon detection of a process upset
leading to a hazardous situation and take corrective action by shutting down the unit/ plant to
bring to a safe status. The SIL defining a minimum level of reliability in terms of Probability of
Failure on Demand (PFD), as shown in Table 2.1 is applied for this project.
Table 2.1 Probability of Failure on Demand for SIL

SIL PFD
1 ≥ 10 -2 to <10-1
2 ≥ 10-3 to <10-2
3 ≥ 10-4 to <10-3
4 ≥ 10-5 to <10-4
SIL 4 is considered extremely rare in the process industry. If a classification leads to SIL 4,
further study should be performed including a review of the design.
The safety functionality that calls for integrity level below SIL 1 shall be retained in the ESD
system as provided now.
The safety functionality that calls for integrity levels SIL 1, 2 and 3 will be implemented in
the ESD system.
2.3 BACKGROUND TO RISK BASED APPROACH ADOPTED FOR SIL SELECTION
Safety instrumented functions (SIF), such as high level trip, high temperature trip, high
pressure trip etc are widely used in the process industry to protect against hazards of
overfilling, design temperature being exceeded or overpressure respectively. These are
safeguards implemented using instrumentation, and comprise one or more sensors, a logic
solver and one or more final elements. However, they do not provided absolute protection as
they may fail to perform its desired function when required due to various reasons including
failure of the various components that make up the system which is designed to implement
the function.
The probability of failure of a SIF depends on the configuration of the system, i.e. the level
of redundancy, testing/ maintenance frequency etc. for example, a system with two
independent level sensors (1oo2 configuration) is less likely to fail as compared to a system
with only one sensor. Similarly, a system with two shut down valves in series (1oo2
configuration) is less likely to fail to perform as compared to a system with only one shutdown
valve. Redundant systems for all applications are however, not cost effective and may not
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
provide any significant additional safety benefit for all cases. Hence, a risk based approach is
adopted to determine the level of reliability required for the particular SIF.
Risk is a function of likelihood and consequence, as follows:
Risk (inherent or unmitigated risk)= Likelihood of a unwanted event x consequence (in
terms of fatality or environmental damages)
A SIF reduces the risk, as follows:
Risk (mitigated risk)= Likelihood of an unwanted event x consequence x probability of
failure of SIF on demand (expressed as SIL)
This study assesses the risk posed by each hazardous event in the plant which is resulted
from SIF failure and determines the level of reliability of the SIF to meet a target risk level or
broadly acceptable risk level. A qualitative (or a semi-quantitative approach) is adopted to
determine the risk using the Risk Graphs.
Probability of failure on demand of SIF (PFD), i.e. the reliability of the SIF is thus derived
as follows
T arg et risk level (ie acceptable risk after mitigation)

PFD=
Likelihood of an unwanted event x consequence
For Example, using safety classification as illustration, and assuming that the target risk
level is 10-4 per year, the likelihood of an unwanted event is 10-1 per year and consequence
is 1 fatality, then.
PFD = 10-4 / (10-1 x 1) = 10-3
The required SIL based on safety classification is therefore 3 for this SIF.
If the likelihood of an unwanted event is 10-1 per year and the Consequence is 0.1 fatality
(i.e. injury), then.
PFD= 10-4/(10-1x0.1)=10-2
The required SIL is 2.

The system configuration is then determined based on the SIL level derived above.
It may be noted that where a SIF is classified as SIL 3 or SIL 2, it means that the inherent
risk is high and hence a higher level of reliability is required for the instrumented function.
Inherent risk may be high due to the system design or the hazard presented by the system.
Similarly, where a SIF is classified as SIL 1, it means that the inherent risk is relatively low.
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
The above approach ensures that a consistent basis (i.e. a risk based approach) is
adopted in determining the configuration of the instrumented system, while avoiding over
engineering, where not necessary.
The assessment is however, qualitative and is base on guidelines, experience and
judgment. A more detailed quantitative approach may be adopted put is time consuming. The
above approach is therefore considered reasonable and fit for purpose.
A conservative approach to system design may still be adopted for various reasons, such
as licensors’ past experience or other factors which may not be quantifiable easily. In such
cases, although the SIL derived from above may be lower (say SIL a or SIL) a more
conservative SIL may be assigned, say SIL 1 or SIL 2 respectively. This study seeks to set
the minimum requirements, which however, may be exceeded if required.
3 SIL METHODOLOGY
3.1 OVERVIEW
The methodology defined in the LORESTAN / MAHABAD PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY:

The SIF was first defined with a function description, design intent, one or more initiator(s) (to
detect hazardous situation) and one or more final element(s) (i.e. elements that act to
mitigate the hazardous situation). The study team then described the demand scenario,
consequence(s) of failure on demand (CoFoD) and numerical frequency and consequence
ratings were assigned.
The consequence ratings were based on:
Potential extent of human injury and
Potential extent of environmental damage.
The assessment takes account of the possibility to avert the hazard and the probability of
personnel being in the vicinity of the defined consequence.
A flow chart presenting the steps to assign the SIL classification is shown in Annex B.
Following identification of damage level and likelihood by the team, the SIL of the function
was classified according to Risk Diagrams as shown in Annex C.
3.1.1 Identification of SIFs
The CEDs were first reviewed to identify the SIFs that required SIL classification. These
were also confirmed by reviewing the P&IDs and the HAZOP sheets. Only those functions
within the ESD system and initiated by the process to prevent a specific hazardous situation
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
were selected for classification, thus, the following types of functions listed in the CED were
not classified:
Hand-switch operated functions (operator activated). A default value of SIL 1 may be
assumed;
Control function (FIC, TIC reset etc);
Functions related to normal process control (e.g. auto-start /stop of pumps as a
means of normal level control);
Proposed or indicative machine related protection functions such as those relating to
lube oil systems;
Emergency equipment isolation functions. A default value of SIL 1 may be assumed;
and
Fire & gas systems which are not part of the process/ utility system, such as fire &
gas detectors, deluge systems etc.
DCS interlocks were generally not assessed, except in a few cased they were assessed to
see whether the interlocks need to be upgraded. In all of those cases DCS interlocks were
found to be adequate.
3.1.2 Description of Function, Initiators and Final Elements
The SIFs were defined with a function description, design intent, one or more initiator(s)
(i.e. instrument(s) to detect a hazardous situation) and one or more final element(s) (i.e.
elements that act to mitigate the hazardous situation).
The final element(s) of the SIF were chosen as those which directly meet their design
intent. Thus, only one or two final elements were usually defined for any function, and where
more than one was selected, a success criterion was defined for these final elements. The
other elements acted upon by the initiators were left unclassified (they may however, by
retained for implementation in the ESD system). Some of these unclassified elements may
act as primary final element for another SIF and assigned appropriate SIL classification.
Those final elements not covered under any other SIF as primary final element were
checked, where required, to ensure no separate classification was required.
3.1.3 Causes of SIF Demand and Consequences of SIF Failure
The study team then described the demand scenario and consequence(s) of failure on
demand (CoFoD) and the numerical frequency and consequence ratings were then assigned
according to Risk Diagrams as shown in Annex C.
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
A demand on a SIF may be caused by instrument malfunction, operator error, or

equipment failure to operate such as pump or compressor trip. The frequency of demand is
then assessed, i.e. how often the SIF is likely to be activated (Frequency of Demand, W
classification).
The following aspects were investigated for the consequence of SIF failure.
Potential extent of human injury (S classification); and
Potential extent of environmental damage (E classification).
Different categories of W, S and E are defined and presented in Annex C.
Consequence for personnel safety was assessed assuming operator present in the vicinity,
and exposed to a loss of containment scenario leading to fire and/or explosion.
hazard and the probability of personnel being in the vicinity of the defined ‘consequence’.
All consequences were classified and the most stringent SIL was selected for that function.
If the demand has different causes, the consequences of failure on demand were usually
different as well requiring a classification for all causes and consequences.
It is noted that the potential consequences may not result in each demand case. The
procedure adopted In the SIL study takes some credit for the intermediate probabilities such
as loss of containment or ignition and explosion probability. For example, if design
temperature is exceeded, metallurgy may fail leading to loss of containment, and potential
ignition and fire/explosion. It is likely that the potential consequences (i.e. fatality) may result
in less that one in ten demand cases, due to the intermediate event probabilities and hence
this may be reflected, where applicable, by a one order of magnitude reduction in the
demand rate for the SIL. Such assumptions are included in the relevant worksheets. For
overpressure scenarios, however, no reduction factor may be considered due to the likely
speed of the event occurrence.
As part of the frequency of demand analysis or following the consequence assessment, the
provision of other safeguards for the specific demand/ consequence scenario was also
reviewed.
For each such safeguard identified, also called ‘Independent Protection Layer (IPL)’, risk
reduction factor was determined. This risk reduction factor may be applied to the “originally
identified frequency of demand”. The study takes credit for the independent protection layers
(IPL) that mitigate the likelihood or consequence. A reduction factor of 10 will reduce SIL by
one level while a reduction factor of 100 will reduce SIL by two levels.
The term ‘independent protection layer’ has been applied to a safeguard which is capable
of preventing a scenario from proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the
initiating event or the action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario.
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
3.2 FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE APPROACH ADOPTED
3.2.1 Multiple Sensors
Where multiple sensors are provided, success criterion is defined if they detect the same
hazard. This approach for defining the sensor success criteria was taken for all SIF with
multiple sensors.
3.2.2 Multiple Final Elements
For some SIFs several final elements are acted upon simultaneously to put the system to a
safe state. Where more than one action is require4d to be successful in order to put the
system of a safer state, success criteria (eg 1oo2 or 2oo2 etc.) may be selected for the final
elements. Not all of the actions in one particular SIF, however, may be required or important
enough to protect against the particular hazard, some may be secondary in nature, i.e. to
prevent collateral hazards or may be for operator assistance in restarting the unit quickly.
3.2.3 Consideration of PSV (Safety Valves)
Where a SIF is provided in addition to a PSV, PSV will in most cases operate to mitigate
an overpressure hazard. External conditions (send, dust, corrosion), internal vessel
conditions (dirty service, clogging), manufacturing defects, potential inadequate preventive
maintenance, or induced vibrations or ice formation during a release (which may lead to
blockage of line and subsequent line rupture/ leakage) could potentially lead to the PSV
being ineffective. For this study, most PSVs has been considered as an IPL with a risk
reduction factor of 100, except for selected cases where a lower credit (i.e. 10 instead of 100)
has been given as a conservative measure to meet the requirements of risk graph.
3.2.4 Independent Protective Layers
Credit was given to an independent protective layer (IPL). Only if it could be demonstrated
that the IPL could be independent from the SIF studied and independent from the cause of
the hazard studied. However, before taking credit for IPLs, due consideration was made to
the effectiveness of the IPLs, the time required for successful intervention and the level of
independence with the SIF classified and the event causing a demand on the SIF.
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
3.3 SIL STUDY GUIDELINES
In order to ensure consistency in the assessment, rule sets for assessing independent
protection layer, frequency of demand, presence in danger area and possibility to avert
hazard in Table 3.1 to Table 3.4, these rule sets serve as an aid for assigning the levels for
the various parameters shown in the Risk Graphs in Annex C.
Table 3.1 Rule Set for Independent Protective Layer
Independent Protection Layer Risk Reduction Factor
Pressure Relief Device (mechanical safety trip) 100
SIS- SIL 1 10
SIS – SIL 2 100
BPCS, when independent of initiating event 10
Internal mechanical safety trips that are independent of 10 to 1000 (Base on actual operating
the SIS or BPCS experience with similar device)
Operator response under high stress, average training 0
Operator response to Alarms with procedures, low stress,
10
recognized event and least 5 minutes to respond
Double check valves designed for the hazardous scenario 10
Single check valve 0
Dikes when capable of mitigating the initiating event. This
100
is an IPL only for environmental events
Notes: where more than one protective measure exists, the highest IPL value assumed, without taking credit for all, as a conservative
measure.
Table 3.2 Rule Set for Frequency of Demand
Initiating Event
Frequency of Demand
Scenario Frequency (per
(W)
year)
Control loop failure >1.E-01 W2
Analyzer failure >1.E-00 W3
Pump Failure loss of flow (conservatively W3) 7.9E-01 W3
Positive Displacement pump trip 1.1E-00 W3
Reciprocating compressor trip 2.1E-00 W3
Single mechanical pump seal leak 1.0E-01 W2
Double mechanical pump seal leak with announcement 1.0E-02 W1
Canned/ magnetic drive pump leak 1.0E-02 W1
Loss of electrical power 1.0E-01 W2
General utility failure 1.0E-01 W2
Heat exch. Tube leak 1.0E-02 W1(<100 TUBES)
W2 (>100 TUBES)
Operator failure (if considered in the analysis):
Under stress, emergency, action performed more than once a W3

quarter
Unstressed, action performed more than once a quarter W2
Under stress, emergency, action performed once/ Qtr. Or less

W2
Unstressed, action performed once/ Qtr. Or less
W1
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
Table 3.3 Rule Set for Enabling event Factors

Ordinary Hydrocarbons Easily Ignitable*
Release (kg) Probability of Risk Reduction Probability of Risk Reduction
Ignition Factor Ignition Factor
Minor leak/
Seal leak (<1 1.0E-02 100 1.0E-01 10
tone)
Major leak (1 to
1.0E-01 10 10 0
10 tones)
Large leak
10 0 10 0
(>10 tone)
*Notes: Hydrogen, Acetylene, Ethylene, Ethylene Oxide, Propylene Oxide (above BP), Butadiene
Probability of vessel or pipeline failure due to overpressure will be determined as follows:
1.5 to 2 times man allowable working pressure: flange gasket leaking will be assumed
>2 times working pressure: rupture will be assumed
Probability of vessel or pipeline failure due to significant design temperature exceedance: 0.1
Table 3.4 Rule Set for Exposure Parameter Avoidance parameter

Presence in Danger Zone at the Time of Demand Possibility of Advert Hazard
Assumed when hazard
A1 Default G1 results from manual
operations
Assumed when hazard results from manual
A2 G2 Default
operations
3.4 WORKSHEETS
The session proceedings were recorded using PHA-Pro 7. The records were projected on
a screen for comment and agreement by the team members during the sessions.
Preparation for the study was conducted prior to the commencement of the classification
sessions. This comprised input of the study SIF into the PHA software, based on the
information in CED.
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS
Several assumptions were made regarding the basis of the design during the course of the
SIL study. The main items are:
In case of multiple equipments (with duty a standby/ spare equipment) inside a unit, the study
was conducted for one set of equipment. The recommendations from this study will therefore
apply for such similar systems as well. The study has however, considered the impact of
simultaneous operation of systems in parallel or series including the control requirements
300 kt/y LLDPE/HDPE
30 kt/y BUTENE-1
and the effect of trip of one system on the other. In spite of this, the mentioned functions
report has been presented in the worksheet.
The CEDs were reviewed to identify the SIFs that required SIL classification. Only those
functions within the ESD system and initiated by the process to prevent a specific hazardous
situation were chosen for classification, thus, the following types of functions listed in the
CED were not classified:
Hand-switch operated functions (operator activated). A default value of SIL 1 may be
assumed;
Control function (FIC, TIC reset etc);
Functions related to normal process control (e.g. auto start/stop of pumps as a means of
normal level control); and Proposed or indicative machine related protection functions.
The final element(s) of the SIF were chosen as those which directly meet their design intent.
Thus, only one or two final elements were usually defined for any function. The other
elements acted upon by the initiators were left unclassified (they may however, be retained
for implementation). However, these unclassified elements may act as a primary final
element for another SIF and assigned appropriate SIL classification. Those final elements
not covered under any other SIF as primary final element were checked, where required, to
ensure no separate classification was required.
Annex A
Attendance List
Team Members
First Name Last Name Title Company Department
Mohammad Golshani Manager Nargan HSE
Farian Daiepour Engineering Nargan HSE
Kianoosh Karimpour Engineering Nargan HSE
Annex B
SIL Classification Flow Chart

CAUSE & EFFECT
START ANALYSIS
INITIATOR AND
FINAL ELEMENT
IDENTIFICATION
SCENARIO
CAUSES OF SIF CONSEQUENCE OF

DEMAND SIF FAILURE
FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION OF
-Personnel Safety
-Environmental Damage
NEXT SIF
ASSESSMENT OF INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYER
SIL FOR SIF
Consider if SIL in necessary for all final
ALL SIF CLASSIFIED

NO
YES
STOP ANALYSIS
Annex C
Risk Diagrams
1 PERSONAL SAFETY
(W) Frequency of Demand
W1= Low (A very slight probability that the unwanted occurrence will occur and
only a few unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 10 years))
W2= Moderate (A slight probability that the unwanted occurrence will occur and a
few unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 1 year & > once per 10 years))
W3= High (A relatively high probability that he unwanted occurrence sill come to
pass and frequent unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 1 year))
(S) Potential extent of human injury per demand if ESD system fails on
demand
S0= No injury
S1= Slight injury, non-permanent
S2= Severe injury, death of 1 person
S3= Death of several persons
S4= Catastrophe, many casualties
(A) Presence in danger zone at time of demand

A1= Rare to more often exposure in the hazardous zone
A2= Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone
(G) Possibility to avert hazard

G1= Possible under certain conditions
G2= Almost impossible
2 ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
(W) Frequency of demand
W1= Low (Avery slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will occur and
only a few unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 10 years))
W2= Moderate (A slight probability that he unwanted occurrence will occur and a
few unwanted occurrences are likely (<once per 1 year & > once per 10 years))
W3= High (A relatively high probability that the unwanted occurrence will come to
pass and frequent unwanted occurrences are likely (>once per 1 year))
(E) Environmental damage per demand if ESD system fails on demand
E0= No release or release with negligible damage to the environment
E1= Release with minor damage to the environment that should be reported (e.g.,
moderate leak from a flange or a valve, small scale liquid spill)
E2= Release within fence with significant damage to the environment (e.g., a
could of obnoxious vapor travelling beyond the unit following flange gasket blow-
out or compressor seal failure)
E3= Release outside fence with temporary major damage to the environment
(e.g., a vapor or aerosol release with or without liquid fallout that cases
temporary damage to plants or fauna)
E4= Release outside fence with permanent major damage to the environment
(e.g., liquid spill into a river or sea, a vapor or aerosol release with or without
liquid fallout that causes lasting damage to plants or fauna, solids fallout, liquid
release that could affect groundwater)
(G) Possibility to avert hazard
G1= Possible under certain conditions
G2= Almost Impossible

Annex D
Drawings
Drawing File Path Place(s) Used Comment
3454-XZ-DM-10-01A-ISO4 Nodes: 1
3454-XZ-DM-10-01B-ISO4 Nodes: 2, 3
3454-XZ-DM-10-10A-ISO4 Nodes: 9, 10, 18
3454-XZ-DM-10-10B-ISO4 Nodes: 9, 10, 17, 22
3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 Nodes: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 15, 16, 27
3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 Nodes: 5, 8, 11, 12, 13,
14, 16, 17, 27
3454-XZ-DM-10-012-ISO4 Nodes: 24, 25
3454-XZ-DM-10-013-ISO4 Nodes: 21, 27
3454-XZ-DM-10-14A-ISO4 Nodes: 19, 28
3454-XZ-DM-10-14B-ISO4 Nodes: 23, 29
3454-XZ-DM-10-015-ISO4 Nodes: 20
3454-XZ-DM-10-016-ISO4 Nodes: 26, 106
3454-XZ-DM-10-017-ISO4 Nodes: 27
3454-XZ-DM-10-018-ISO4 Nodes: 27
3454-XZ-DM-10-020-ISO4 Nodes: 39, 40
3454-XZ-DM-10-21A-ISO4 Nodes: 31, 32, 47, 70
3454-XZ-DM-10-21B-ISO4 Nodes: 31, 47
3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 Nodes: 27, 31, 39, 43,
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49,
50, 51, 52, 67, 68
3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 Nodes: 33, 34, 35, 36,
41, 42, 53, 54, 55
3454-XZ-DM-10-22B-ISO4 Nodes: 52, 65, 67
3454-XZ-DM-10-23A-ISO4 Nodes: 37, 56, 57
3454-XZ-DM-10-23B-ISO4 Nodes: 37
3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 Nodes: 37, 40, 53, 54,
56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,
62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69
3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4 Nodes: 38, 63, 65, 66
3454-XZ-DM-10-30A-ISO4 Nodes: 31, 75, 77
3454-XZ-DM-10-30B-ISO4 Nodes: 76, 77
3454-XZ-DM-10-31A-ISO4 Nodes: 77, 78
3454-XZ-DM-10-31B-ISO4 Nodes: 77, 79
3454-XZ-DM-10-31C-ISO4 Nodes: 80
3454-XZ-DM-10-31D-ISO4 Nodes: 81
3454-XZ-DM-10-32B-ISO4 Nodes: 31, 73, 74
3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 Nodes: 38, 82, 83, 87,
88, 89, 90, 91
3454-XZ-DM-10-051-ISO4 Nodes: 92, 95, 96, 98
3454-XZ-DM-10-052-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-054-ISO4 Nodes: 94
3454-XZ-DM-10-60A-ISO4 Nodes: 110
3454-XZ-DM-10-061-ISO4 Nodes: 101, 102, 111,
112
3454-XZ-DM-10-063-ISO4 Nodes: 103, 104, 105
3454-XZ-DM-10-064-ISO4 Nodes: 109
3454-XZ-DM-10-65A-ISO4 Nodes: 106
3454-XZ-DM-10-65B-ISO4 Nodes: 107, 108
3454-XZ-DM-10-069-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-70A-ISO4 Nodes: 113, 114, 115,
116, 159, 163
3454-XZ-DM-10-70B-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-071-ISO4 Nodes: 142, 143, 144,
145
3454-XZ-DM-10-72A-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-72B-ISO4 Nodes: 4, 117, 127, 146
3454-XZ-DM-10-72C-ISO4 Nodes: 4, 118, 119,
120, 126
3454-XZ-DM-10-72D-ISO4 Nodes: 4, 121, 122,
123, 128
3454-XZ-DM-10-72E-ISO4 Nodes: 161, 162
3454-XZ-DM-10-73A-ISO4 Nodes: 139
3454-XZ-DM-10-73B-ISO4 Nodes: 131, 132, 133,
154
3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 Nodes: 31, 134, 135,
136, 137, 138, 140, 141,
155, 156, 157
3454-XZ-DM-10-73D-ISO4 Nodes: 140
3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4 Nodes: 4, 124, 147,
148, 160
3454-XZ-DM-10-75C-ISO4 Nodes: 149, 164
3454-XZ-DM-10-75D-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-75E-ISO4 Nodes: 124, 150
3454-XZ-DM-40-076-ISO4 Nodes: 125, 129, 130,
151, 152, 153, 158
3454-XZ-DM-10-077-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-080-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-81A-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-81B-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-81C-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-082-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-084-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-086-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-088-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-089-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-090-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-091-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-32A Nodes: 71, 72
3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4 Nodes: 83, 84, 85, 86,
93, 99, 100
1. List "FUNCTIONS"
Area Interlock ID Drawings Initiator Final Element
AREA 100 10ESD-0001 3454-XZ-DM-10-01A-ISO4 10HS-0100 10ESD-0010, 10ESD-0011, 10ESD-1011, 10ESD-1012, 10ESD-
1013, 10ESD-2001, 10ESD-2007,10FCS-7014,10FCS-7015,
10FCS-7040, ELECTRICAL POWER
AREA 100 10ESD-0002 3454-XZ-DM-10-01B-ISO4 10HS-0102 ELECTRIC POWER
AREA 100 10ESD-0010 3454-XZ-DM-10-01A-ISO4 10HS-0101 10HV-0101A, 10HV-0101B, 10HV-0101C, 10HV-0101D, 10HV-
0101E,10HV-0101F,10HV-0101G, 10HV-0101H, 10HV-
0101I,10ESD-0011
3454-XZ-DM-10-01B-ISO4 10ESD-0001
AREA 100 10ESD-0011 3454-XZ-DM-10-72B-ISO4 10HS-0103 10FCS-7006, 10ESD-7008, 10ESD-7011, 10ESD-7012, 40FCS-
7014, 40FCS-7015
3454-XZ-DM-10-72C-ISO4 10ESD-0001
3454-XZ-DM-10-72D-ISO4 10ESD-0010
3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4
AREA 100 10ESD-1001 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10BE-1101 A/B 10HV-1109 A/B, 10HV-1102, 10-9-1001 A/B, 10ESD-1007
3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10BE-1121 A/B
AREA 100 10ESD-1002 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10BE-1102 10HV-1104, 10-P-1001 A, 10HV-1106
AREA 100 10ESD-1003 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10BE-1103 10HV-1105, 10HV-1107, 10-P-1001 B
AREA 100 10ESD-1004 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10BE-1104 10HV-1102, 10-P-1001 A/B, 10HV-1104, 10HV-1105, 10ESD-
1010
3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10BE-1124
AREA 100 10ESD-1005 3454-XZ-DM-10-10A-ISO4 10HS-1001 10HV-1005, 10HV-1006, 10HV-1007, 10ESD-1006, 10HV-1109
A/B
3454-XZ-DM-10-10B-ISO4 10HS-1002
3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10HS-1021
10HS-1022
10BE-1001
10BE-1021
AREA 100 10ESD-1006 3454-XZ-DM-10-10A-ISO4 10HS-1001 10HV-1025, 10HV-1026, 10HV-1027, 10HV-1129 A/B, 10ESD-
1005
3454-XZ-DM-10-10B-ISO4 10HS-1002
3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10HS-1021
10HS-1022
10BE-1001
10BE-1021
AREA 100 10ESD-1007 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10BE-1121 A/B 10HV-1129, 10HV-1122, 10-P-1001 C/D, 10ESD-1001
3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10BE-1101 A/B
AREA 100 10ESD-1008 3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10BE-1122 10HV-1124, 10-P-1001 C, 10HV-1126
AREA 100 10ESD-1009 3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10BE-1123 10HV-1125, 10-P-1001 D, 10HV-1127
AREA 100 10ESD-1010 3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10BE-1124 10HV-1122, 10-P-1001 C/D, 10HV-1124, 10HV-1125, 10ESD-
1004
10BE-1104
AREA 100 10ESD-1011 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10LSH-1104 10ESD-1012, 10ESD-1013, 10FV-1103, BOARD SIGNAL
10ESD-0001
10LSH-1103
AREA 100 10ESD-1012 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10LT-1101 10HV-1109 A/B, 10HV-1005, 10HV-1006, 10HV-1007, BOARD
SIGNAL
3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10LT-1102
10ESD-1011
10ESD-0001
AREA 100 10ESD-1013 3454-XZ-DM-10-10B-ISO4 10LT-1121 10HV-1129 A/B, 10HV-1025, 10HV-1026, 10HV-1027, BOARD
SIGNAL
3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10LT-1122
10ESD-1011
10ESD-0001
AREA 100 10FCS-1002 3454-XZ-DM-10-10A-ISO4 10XS-1002 10HV-1005, BOARD SIGNAL
AREA 100 10FCS-1005 3454-XZ-DM-10-14A-ISO4 10PT-1402 10HV-1405, BOARD SIGNAL
10HV-1403
AREA 100 10FCS-1006 3454-XZ-DM-10-015-ISO4 10PT-1502 10-P-1011 A/B, BOARD SIGNAL
AREA 100 10FCS-1007 3454-XZ-DM-10-013-ISO4 10LT-1301 10HV-1303, BOARD SIGNAL
10HS-1303
AREA 100 10FCS-1008 3454-XZ-DM-10-10B-ISO4 10X-1022 10HV-1025
AREA 100 10FCS-1010 3454-XZ-DM-10-14B-ISO4 10PT-1422 10HV-1425
10HV-1423
AREA 100 10FCS-1011 3454-XZ-DM-10-012-ISO4 10PT-1201 10HV-1201
AREA 100 10FCS-1012 3454-XZ-DM-10-012-ISO4 10TT-1202 10-E-1004
AREA 100 10FCS-1013 3454-XZ-DM-10-016-ISO4 10-P-1006 A OR 10-P- 10-P-1006 A OR 10-P-1006 B
1006 B
AREA 100 10FCS-1014 3454-XZ-DM-10-017-ISO4 10FT-17013 10-P-1001 A/B, 10-P-1001 C/D, 10-P-1004 A/B, 10-P-1010 A/B,
10FV-1701, 10FXV-1701, 10FV-1801, 10FXV-1801, 10FV-1802,
10-A-1001, 10-A-1002, 10HV-2101 C
3454-XZ-DM-10-018-ISO4 10FCS-2003
3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4 10ESD-2001
3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4 10YLH-1701
3454-XZ-DM-10-013-ISO4 10ST-1701
3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10FT-1801
10YLH-1801
10ST-1801
10HZLH-1701
10HZLH-1801
AREA 100 10FCS-1015 3454-XZ-DM-10-14A-ISO4 10TT-1403 10TV-1401 A
AREA 100 10FCS-1016 3454-XZ-DM-10-14B-ISO4 10TT-1423 10TV-1421 A
AREA 100 10PLC-1001
AREA 200 10ESD-2001 3454-XZ-DM-10-21A-ISO4 10ESD-0001 10FCS-1014, 10ESD-2009, 10FV-2102, 10FXV-2102, 10FV-
2101 A/B, 10FXV-2101, 10FV-2105 A/B, 10FXV-2105, 10FV-
2106, 10FXV-2106, 10FV-2104, 10FXV-2104, 10HV-2106 A/B,
10FV-2201, 10FXV-2201, 10FCS-2004, 10-C-2001, 10LV-3201,
10HV-2123, 10HV-2124, 10FV-2121, 10FXV-2121, 10FV-2118,
10FXV-2118, 10LV-3005, 10LXV-3005, 10FV-2119, 10LV-7305,
10LXV-7305
3454-XZ-DM-10-21B-ISO4 10HS-2101
3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10-C-2001
3454-XZ-DM-10-30A-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-32A-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-32B-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4
AREA 200 10ESD-2002 3454-XZ-DM-10-21A-ISO4 10PT-2107 10PV-2107, 10PV-2108 A/B, 10PXV-2108 A
AREA 200 10ESD-2003 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10PT-2203 10HV-2201 A, 10HV-2201 C
10HV-2201 B
10HV-2201 D
AREA 200 10ESD-2004 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10PT-2204 10HV-2202 A, 10HV-2202 C
10HV-2202 B
10HV-2202 D
AREA 200 10ESD-2005 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10HV-2201 A 10HV-2201 B, 10HV-2201 D
10HV-2201 C
10HV-2201 E
AREA 200 10ESD-2006 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10HV-2202 A 10HV-2202 B, 10HV-2202 D
10HV-2202 C
10HV-2202 E
AREA 200 10ESD-2007 3454-XZ-DM-10-23A-ISO4 10ESD-0001 10ESD-2010, 10FV-2302, 10FXV-2302, 10FXV-2301, 10FV-
2301, 10FV-2305, 10FV-2306, 10FXV-2305, 10FXV-2306
3454-XZ-DM-10-23B-ISO4 10-C-2002
3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10HS-2301
AREA 200 10ESD-2008 3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4 10PDT-2408 10LV-2401
3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 10LT-5008
AREA 200 10ESD-2009 3454-XZ-DM-10-020-ISO4 10HS-2023 10HV-2021, 10HV-2022, 10HV-2023 A/B/C/D/E, 10FCS-2005
3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10ESD-2001
10ESD-2010
10TT-2104 A/B/C
10TT-2105 A/B/C
10PT-2021
AREA 200 10ESD-2010 3454-XZ-DM-10-020-ISO4 10HS-2026 10HV-2024, 10HV-2025, 10HV-2026 A/B/C/D/E, 10ESD-2009,
10ESD-2010, 10ESD-2017
3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10ESD-2007
10TT-2305 A/B/C
10TT-2304 A/B/C
10PT-2022
AREA 200 10ESD-2011 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10HZLL-2201 B 10HV-2201 E
10HZLL-2201 D
AREA 200 10ESD-2012 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10HZLL-2202 B 10HV-2202 E
10HZLL-2202 D
AREA 200 10FCS-2003 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10LT-2104 10FCS-1014
AREA 200 10FCS-2001 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10HS-2101 10PV-2101 A, 10-C-2001, 10HV-2101, 10FCS-2004
10ESD-2001
AREA 200 10FCS-2005 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10TT-2105 A/B/C (2OO3) 10PIC-2101 A, 10FV-2105 A/B, 10FXV-2105, 10FV-2106,
10FXV-2106, 10FV-2101 A/B, 10FXV-2101, 10FCS-1014
10TT-2104 A/B/C (2OO3)
10FCS-2014
AREA 200 10FCS-2006 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10HZLL-2106 A 10HV-2106 A,10HV-2106 B, 10HV-2117
10HZLL-2106 B
10HZLL-2117
AREA 200 10FCS-2007 3454-XZ-DM-10-21A-ISO4 10PT-2101 B 10FV-2101 A/B, 10FXV-2101, 10FV-2102, 10FXV-2102, 10FV-
2104, 10FXV-2104, 10HV-2124, 10FV-2105 A/B, 10FXV-2105
A/B, 10FXV-2105, 10FV-2106, 10FXV-2106
3454-XZ-DM-10-21B-ISO4 10PT-2102 B
3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4
AREA 200 10FCS-2008 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10HV-2118 10HV-2118, 10HV-2117
OPERATOR
INTERVENTION
AREA 200 10FCS-2009 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 IT SHALL BE ACTIVE IN 10LV-2101 A
NORMAL OPERATION,
IN SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
10HZLL-2106 A
AREA 200 10FCS-2010 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 IT SHALL BE ACTIVE IN 10LV-2101 B
NORMAL OPERATION,
IN SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
10HZLL-2106 B
AREA 200 10FCS-2011 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10HV-2106 A/B 10HV-2106 A/B
AREA 200 10FCS-2012 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10PT-2202 10HV-2106 A, 10HV-2106 B, 10HV-2117, 10FV-2118,10FXV-
2118, 10FV-2201, 10FXV-2201, 10FV-2208, 10FXV-2208
3454-XZ-DM-10-22B-ISO4
AREA 200 10FCS-213 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10HS-2201 10HV-2201 A, 10HV-2201 B, 10HV-2201 C, 10HV-2201 D,
10HV-2201 E,
3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10LT-2203
10LT-2201
AREA 200 10FCS-2014 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10HS-2201 10HV-2201 A, 10HV-2201 B, 10HV-2201 C, 10HV-2201 D,
10HV-2201 E,
3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10LT-2203
10LT-2201
AREA 200 10FCS-2015 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4 10PT-2202 10HV-2201 A, 10HV-2201 B, 10HV-2201 C, 10HV-2201 D,
10HV-2202 A, 10HV-2202 B, 10HV-2202 C, 10HV-2202 D
AREA 200 10FCS-2016 3454-XZ-DM-10-23A-ISO4 10PT-2301 B 10FV-2301 A/B, 10FXV-2301, 10FV-2302, 10FXV-2302, 10FV-
2304, 10FXV-2304, 10HV-2323, 10HV-2324, 10FV-2305 A/B,
10FXV-2305, 10FV-2306, 10FXV-2306
3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10PT-2302 B
AREA 200 10FCS-2017 3454-XZ-DM-10-23A-ISO4 10TT-2305 A/B/C 10PIC-2301 A, 10FV-2305 A/B, 10FXV-2305, 10FV-2306,
10FXV-2306, 10FV-2301 A/B, 10FXV-2301, 10FCS-2005
3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10TT-2304 A/B/C
AREA 200 10FCS-2018 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10HS-2301 10PV-2301 A, 10HV-2301
AREA 200 10FCS-2019 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10HZLL-2306 A, 10HZLL- 10HV-2306 A, 10HV-2306 B, 10HV-2317
2306 B, 10HZLL-2317
AREA 200 10FCS-2020 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 IT SHALL BE ACTIVE IN 10LV-2301 A
NORMAL OPERATION,
IN SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
10HZLL-2306 A
AREA 200 10FCS-2021 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 IT SHALL BE ACTIVE IN 10LV-2301 B
NORMAL OPERATION,
IN SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
10HZLL-2306 A
AREA 200 10FCS-2022 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10HV-2318 10HV-2318, 10HV-2317
OPERATOR
INTERVENTION
AREA 200 10FCS-2023 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10FT-2401 10FV-2401
3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4 OPERATOR
INTERVENTION
AREA 200 10FCS-2024 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10HV-2306 A/B 10HV-2306 A/B
AREA 200 10FCS-2025 3454-XZ-DM-10-22B-ISO4 10PT-2402 10FV-2401, 10FXV-2401, 10HV-2201 E, 10HV-2202 E, 10FCS-
2026
3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4
3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4
AREA 200 10FCS-2026 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10LT-2404 10HV-2306 A/B, 10FV-2318, 10FXV-2318, 10HV-2317
3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4 10LT-2405
10FCS-2405
AREA 200 10FCS-2027 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10LT-2204 10HV-2106 A, 10HV-2106 B, 10HV-2117, 10FV-2118, 10FXV-
2118, 10FV-2201, 10FXV-2201
3454-XZ-DM-10-22B-ISO4
AREA 200 10FCS-2028 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4 10PDALL-2102 C 10HV-2124
10PLC-3001
10PLC-3002
AREA 200 10FCS-2029 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4 10PDALL-2302 10HV-2324
10PLC-3001
10PLC-3002
10PLC-3003
10PLC-3004
AREA 200 10FCS-2030 3454-XZ-DM-10-21A-ISO4 10LSH-2105 10LV-2102, 10LXV-2102
AREA 300 10ESD-3001 3454-XZ-DM-10-32A 10PT-3201 10PV-3201
AREA 300 10ESD-3002 3454-XZ-DM-10-32A 10PT-3202 10PV-3202
AREA 300 10ESD-3003 3454-XZ-DM-10-32B-ISO4 10PT-3203 10PV-3203
AREA 300 10FCS-3001 3454-XZ-DM-10-30A-ISO4 10LT-3002 10P-3004A/B, 10FCS-3003
10LT-3006
AREA 300 10FCS-3002 3454-XZ-DM-10-30B-ISO4 10LT-3004 10PLC-3004, 10PLC-3003, 10FCS-3003, 10P-3005
10LT-3008
AREA 300 10FCS-3003 3454-XZ-DM-10-30A-ISO4 10V-3107 10FCS-3001,10FCS-3002
3454-XZ-DM-10-30B-ISO4 10V-3108
3454-XZ-DM-10-31A-ISO4 10V-3109
3454-XZ-DM-10-31B-ISO4 10V-3110
10HV-3104
10HV-3102
10HV-3103
10HV-3007
10HV-3006
AREA 300 10PLC-3001 3454-XZ-DM-10-31A-ISO4 10PT-3102A 10-C-3001A
10PT-3103A
10PT-3105A
10PT-3104A
10TT-3101A
10TT-3102A
10LT-3102A
10TT-3103A
10TT-3104A
10PT-3106A
10PT-3107A
AREA 300 10PLC-3002 3454-XZ-DM-10-31B-ISO4 10PT-3102B 10-C-3001B
10PT-3103B
10PT-3105B
10PT-3104B
10TT-3101B
10TT-3102B
10LT-3102B
10TT-3103B
10TT-3104B
10PT-3106B
10PT-3107B
AREA 300 10PLC-3003 3454-XZ-DM-10-31C-ISO4 10PT-3112A 10-C-3002A
10PT-3113A
10PT-3115A
10PT-3114A
10TT-3111A
10TT-3112A
10LT-3112A
10TT-3113A
10TT-3114A
10PT-3116A
10PT-3117A
AREA 300 10PLC-3004 3454-XZ-DM-10-31D-ISO4 10PT-3112B 10-C-3002B
10PT-3113B
10PT-3115B
10PT-3114B
10TT-3111B
10TT-3112B
10LT-3112B
10TT-3113B
10TT-3114B
10TT-3116B
10PT-3117B
AREA 500 10ESD-5001 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 10TT-5001 10LV-5001

AREA 500 10FCS-5001 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 10LT-5302 10LV-5001
3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4
AREA 500 10FCS-5002 3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4 10P-5002A/B 10-P-5002A/B
AREA 500 10FCS-5003 3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4 10TT-5305 10-C-5002A
10PT-5302
10PT-5303
10PT-5308
AREA 500 10FCS-5004 3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4 10TT-5306 10-C-5002B
10PT-5302
10PT-5304
10PT-5309
AREA 500 10FCS-5005 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 10IAHH-5001 10A-5001
10FALL-5002
AREA 500 10FCS-5006 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 10P-5001A 10P-5001B , 10P-5001A
10P-5001B
AREA 500 10FCS-5008 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 10PT-5003 10PV-5001, 10PV-5003
10PT-5005
AREA 500 10FCS-5009 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 10PT-5005 10FV-5002, 1FV-5001, 10FV-5003, 10PV-5003
AREA 500 10FCS-5010 3454-XZ-DM-10-051-ISO4 10P-5004A 10P-5004B, 10P-5004A
10P-5004B
AREA 500 10FCS-5011 3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4 10AAHH-5301 10LV-5301
10AAHH-8001
AREA 500 10FCS-5012 3454-XZ-DM-10-054-ISO4 10LT-5401 10P-5005A/B
AREA 500 10FCS-5013 3454-XZ-DM-10-051-ISO4 10LSL-5102 10LV-5102
AREA 500 10FCS-5014 3454-XZ-DM-10-051-ISO4 10LSL-5106 10LV-5106
AREA 500 10PLC-5001
AREA 500 10PLC-5002 3454-XZ-DM-10-051-ISO4 10PT-5102 10C-5001

10PT-5105
10TT-5103
10LT-5108
AREA 500 10PLC-5004 3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4 10RF-5001B 10XV-5300
10YLH-5304
AREA 500 10PLC-5004 3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4 10RF-5001A 10XV-5300
10YLH-5303
AREA 600 10FCS-6001 3454-XZ-DM-10-061-ISO4 10-P-6001A or 10-P- 10-P-6001B or 10-P-6001A
6001B
AREA 600 10FCS-6003 3454-XZ-DM-10-063-ISO4 10-P-6004A or 10-P- 10-P-6004B or 10-P-6004A
6004B
AREA 600 10FCS-6004 3454-XZ-DM-10-063-ISO4 10PT-6304 10PV-6302
AREA 600 10FCS-6006 3454-XZ-DM-10-016-ISO4 10LT-6501 10FV-1603 A/B
3454-XZ-DM-10-65A-ISO4
AREA 600 10FCS-6007 3454-XZ-DM-10-65B-ISO4 10-P-6007A or 10-P- 10-P-6007B or 10-P-6007A
6007B
AREA 600 10-FCS-6008 3454-XZ-DM-10-65B-ISO4 10-P-6003A or 10-P- 10-P-6003B or 10-P-6003A
6003B
AREA 600 10FCS-6010 3454-XZ-DM-10-60A-ISO4 10PT-6002 10HV-6002
AREA 600 10PLC-6102 3454-XZ-DM-10-061-ISO4 10PT-6102 10PV-6102
AREA 600 10PPLC-6101 3454-XZ-DM-10-061-ISO4 10PT-6101 10PV-6101
AREA 700 10ESD-7001 3454-XZ-DM-10-70A-ISO4 10PT-7001 10PV-7001, 10TV-7001, 10TXV-7001
AREA 700 10ESD-7002 3454-XZ-DM-10-70A-ISO4 10PT-7002 10PV-7002
AREA 700 10ESD-7003 3454-XZ-DM-10-70A-ISO4 10PT-7003A 10PV-7003A
10HS-7003A
AREA 700 10ESD-7004 3454-XZ-DM-10-70A-ISO4 10PT-7003B 10PV-7003B
10HS-7003B
AREA 700 10ESD-7006 3454-XZ-DM-10-72C-ISO4 10PT-7220 10PT-7220, 10ESD-7008
AREA 700 10ESD-7007 3454-XZ-DM-10-72C-ISO4 10PT-7222 10PV-7222, 10ESD-7008
AREA 700 10ESD-7008 3454-XZ-DM-10-72C-ISO4 10LSHH-7222 10FV-7221, 10FXV-7221, 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202, 10LV-7220,
10LXV-7220, 10FCS-7006
10LSLL-7221
10HS-7220
10ESD-7011
10ESD-7006
10ESD-7007
10ESD-0011
AREA 700 10ESD-7009 3454-XZ-DM-10-72D-ISO4 10PT-7230 10PV-7230, 10ESD-7011
AREA 700 10ESD-7010 3454-XZ-DM-10-72D-ISO4 10PT-7234 10PV-7234, 10ESD-7011
AREA 700 10ESD-7011 3454-XZ-DM-10-72D-ISO4 10PT-7232 10FV-7231, 10FXV-7231, 10FV-7230, 10FXV-7230, 10PV-7231,
10PXV-7231, 10ESD-0011
10LSHH-7233
10LSLL-7232
10HS-7230
10ESD-7009
10ESD-7010
40ESD-7013
10ESD-0011
AREA 700 10ESD-7012 3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4 10PT-7501 10FV-7504, 10FXV-7504, 10FV-7503, 10FXV-7503, 10LV-7501,
10LXV-7501, 10FV-7501, 10-P-7061
3454-XZ-DM-10-75E-ISO4 10LSHH-7505
10LSLL-7504
10LSHH-7536
10HS-7504
10ESD-0011
AREA 700 40ESD-7013 3454-XZ-DM-40-076-ISO4 40PT-7607 40PV-7607, 10ESD-7011
AREA 700 10ESD-7014 3454-XZ-DM-10-72C-ISO4 10PT-7014 10LXV-7210, 10FV-7221, 10FXV-7221, 10FV-7202, 10FXV-
7202, 10LV-7220, 10LXV-7220, 10FCS-7006
AREA 700 10ESD-7015 3454-XZ-DM-10-72B-ISO4 10LSLL-7211 10LV-7210, 10LXV-7210
AREA 700 10ESD-7016 3454-XZ-DM-10-72D-ISO4 10LSLL-7234 10PXV-7231
AREA 700 40ESD-7017 3454-XZ-DM-40-076-ISO4 10LSHH-7603 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202
AREA 700 40ESD-7041 3454-XZ-DM-40-076-ISO4 40HS-7607 40HV-7610, 40-P-7042A/B, 40HV-7601, 40HV-7602, 40HV-7606,
40PV-7601
AREA 700 10ESD-7033 3454-XZ-DM-10-73B-ISO4 10PT-7338 10FV-7313, 10FXV-7313, 10LV-7315, 10HV-7306, 10HV-3204,
10HV-3203
10HS-7307
10ESD-7040
AREA 700 10ESD-7034 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 10PT-7303 10LV-7315, 10-P-7052A/B, 10FV-7301, 10FXV-7301, 10HV-7305
10HS-7302
10ESD-7040
AREA 700 10ESD-7035 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 10PT-7300 10PV-7300
AREA 700 10ESD-7037 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 10LSHH-7304 10LV-7315
AREA 700 10ESD-7038 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 10LSHH-7313 10HV-3206, 10HV-3205
AREA 700 10ESD-7039 3454-XZ-DM-10-73A-ISO4 10PT-7302 10-P-7051A/B
AREA 700 10ESD-7040 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 10HS-7308 10ESD-7033, 10ESD-7034, 10ESD-7039, 10HV-0101
3454-XZ-DM-10-73D-ISO4 10ESD-0001
AREA 700 10FCS-7002 3454-XZ-DM-10-071-ISO4 10PSHH-7105 10PV-7101
AREA 700 10FCS-7003 3454-XZ-DM-10-071-ISO4 10PSLL-7103 10HV-7101, 10-P-7031A/B
10PSLL-7104
10HS-7101
10LSLL-7103
AREA 700 10FCS-7004 3454-XZ-DM-10-071-ISO4 10-P-7031B OR 10-P- 10-P-7031A OR 10-P-7031B
7031A
AREA 700 10FCS-7005 3454-XZ-DM-10-071-ISO4 10LSHH-7102 10LV-7101
AREA 700 10FCS-7006 3454-XZ-DM-10-72B-ISO4 10TT-7213 10FV-7210, 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202
10TT-7214
10TT-7215
10TT-7217
10-P-7041
10ESD-7008
10ESD-0011
AREA 700 10FCS-7007 3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4 10PT-7504 10PV-7504
AREA 700 10FCS-7008 3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4 10PT-7502 10HV-7502
10HS-7502
AREA 700 10FCS-7009 3454-XZ-DM-10-75C-ISO4 10LSL-7511 10HV-7511
10HS-7511
AREA 700 10FCS-7010 3454-XZ-DM-10-75E-ISO4 10PSLL-7531 10PV-7534, 10FCS-7011
AREA 700 40FCS-7014 3454-XZ-DM-40-076-ISO4 40HS-7601 40HV-7601, 40-P-7042A
40PSLL-7603
40LSLL-7602
10ESD-0011
10ESD-0001
AREA 700 40FCS-7015 3454-XZ-DM-40-076-ISO4 40HS-7602 40HV-7602, 40HV-7042B
40PSLL-7605
40LSLL-7602
10ESD-0011
10ESD-0001
AREA 700 10FCS-7016 3454-XZ-DM-40-076-ISO4 40-P-7042A OR 40-P- 40-P-7042B OR 40-P-7042A
7042B
AREA 700 10FCS-7030 3454-XZ-DM-10-73B-ISO4 10LSLL-7314 10-P-7051A/B, 10LV-7315, 10HV-7306
AREA 700 10FCS-7031 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 10LSLL-7301 10-P-7051A/B
AREA 700 10FCS-7032 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 10LSLL-7306 10-P-7052A/B, 10HV-7305
AREA 700 10FCS-7034 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4 10-P-7051B OR 10-P- 10-P-7051A OR 10-P-7051B
7051A
AREA 700 40FCS-7035 3454-XZ-DM-40-076-ISO4 40LT-7601 10FV-7202
AREA 700 10PLC-7001 3454-XZ-DM-10-70A-ISO4 10-C-7012 10PLC-7005, 10-C-7012, 10-E-7015
10PT-7018
10PT-7013
10TT-7011
10TT-7012
AREA 700 10PLC-7002 3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4 XA-7512 10HV-7510, 10-E-7045
10HS-7510
10TT-7509
AREA 700 10PLC-7003 3454-XZ-DM-10-72E-ISO4 10PSH-7240 10HV-7243
AREA 700 10PLC-7004 3454-XZ-DM-10-72E-ISO4 10PSH-7241 10HV-7244
AREA 700 10PLC-7005 3454-XZ-DM-10-70A-ISO4 10TT-7002A 10FV-7001
10TT-7003A
10TT-7004A
10AAH-7001
10PLC-7001
AREA 700 10PLC-7006 3454-XZ-DM-10-75C-ISO4 10TI-7511 10HS-7514
2. Function List
Other Final
Function Name Initiators Final Element Unit Interlock ID P&ID
Element
1. on any emergency circumstances to 10-HS-0100 10ESD-0010, 10ESD-0011,10ESD- The final 100 10ESD-0001 1500-XZ-DM-10-01A
shutdown polymerization plant by actuating 1011,10ESD-1012,10ESD-1013,10ESD- element of
10ESD-0010, to cut off general feeding to plant 2001,10ESD-2007,40FCS-7014,40FCS- mentioned
10ESD-0011,to cut off purification, 10ESD- 7015,10ESD-7040, ELECTRICLAL items in final
1011to shut off alkyls transfer, 10ESD-1012 to POWER element
shut off alkyl-1 transfer to 10-D-1001A, 10- column are
ESD-1013 to shut off alkyl-2 transfer to 10-D- included in
1001B, 10ESD-2001 and 10ESD-2007 to other final
actuation general emergency requirements in element section
10-R-2001 and 10-R-2002, 40 FCS-7014 to
stop propane transfer to 40-P-7042A, 40FCS-
7015 to stop propane transfer to 40-P-7042B,
10ESD-7040 to shut off propane recovery, and
cut electrical power to all motors and lighting
system of the polymerization plant with
exception of the instrument UPS (Field
instrumentation and systems directly powered
by 110 V supply or higher shall be cut off).
2. On electric power to extrusion building to cut 10HS-0102 Electric power None 100 10ESD-0002 1500-XZ-DM-10-01B
electric power by starting 10HS-0102
3. On polymerization emergency shutdown and 10HS- 10HV-0101A,10HV-0101B,10HV- The final 100 10ESD-0010 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-01A
10HS-0101 starting to close 10HV-0101A, to 0101,10ESD-0001 0101C,10HV-0101D,10HV-0101E,10HV- element of 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-01B
cut off purified propane feed to polymerization, 0101F,10HV-0101G,10HV-0101H,10HV- mentioned
10HV-0101B, to cut off raw ethylene feed to 0101I,10ESD-0011 items in final
purification, 10HV-0101C, to cut off pure element
hydrogen feed to polymerization, 10HV-0101D, column are
to cut off raw propane feed to purification, included in
10HV-0101E,to cut off pure butene-1 feed to other final
polymerization, 10HV-0101F to cut off raw element section
hexane feed to purification, 10HV-0101G, to
cut off purified propane feed to 40-D-7041,
10HV-0101H, to cut off, off-gas from
polymerization to B.L., 10HV-0101-I, to cut off
purified ethylene feed to butene-1 plant,
actuating 10ESD-0011 to cut off purification
and sending signal to butene-1 plant.
4. On polymerization emergency shutdown and 10HS- 10FCS-7006,10ESD-7008,10ESD- The final 100 10ESD-0011 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-72B
stop feeding due to any emergency 0103,10ESD- 7011,10ESD-7012,40FCS-7014,40FCS- element of 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-72C
0001,10ESD-0010
circumstances, to actuate 10FCS-7006 to shut 7015 mentioned 3)1500-XZ-DM-10-72D
off 10-T-7041, 10ESD-7008, to shut off 10-T- items in final 4)1500-XZ-DM-10-75
7042, 10ESD-7011, to shut off 10-T-7043, element
10ESD-7012 to shut down 10-T-7061, 40FCS- column are
7014 and 40FCS-7015 to stop propane to 40- included in
P-7042A/B. other final
element section
Other Final
Element
5. On 10-D-1001A flame detection by 10-BE- 10BE-1101A/B, 10HV-1109 A/B, 10HV-1102,10P- The final 100 10ESD-1001 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
1101A/B and 10-BE-1121A/B to close 10HV- 10BE-1121A/B 1001A/B,10ESD-1007 element of 2) 150--XZ-DM-10-11B
1109A/B, to stop Alkyl-1 to 10-D-1001A, 10HV- mentioned
1102, to stop outlet from 10-D-1001A, 10-P- items in final
1001A/B, to stop Alkyl-1metering pumps and element
actuate 10ESD-1007. column are
included in
other final
element section
6. On 10-P-1001A flame detection by 10BE- 10BE-1102 10HV-1104,10-P-1001A,10HV-1106 None 100 10ESD-1002 1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
1102 to close 10HV-1104, pump suction,
10HV-1106, pump discharge and stop 10-P-
1001A, alkyl-1 metering pump.
7. On 10P-1001B flame detection by 10BE- 10BE-1103 10HV-1105,10HV-1107,10P-1001B None 100 10ESD-1003 1500XZ-DM-10-11A
1103, to close 10HV-1105, pump suction,
10HV-1107, pump discharge and stop 10P-
1001B Alkyl-1, metering pump.
8. On Alkyl filter (10FT-1001A) flame detection 10BE-1104,10BE- 10HV-1102,10-P-1001A/B,10HV- The final 100 10ESD-1004 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
by 10BE-1104 and 10BE-1124 to close 10HV- 1124 1104,10HV-1105,10ESD-1010 element of 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-11B
1102, Alkyl-1 metering drum outlet, 10HV-1104 mentioned
and 10HV-1105, Alkyl-1, suction pump, stop items in final
10-P-1001A/B, and actuating 10ESD-1010. element
column are
included in
other final
element section
9. On any emergency circumstances, effecting 10HS-1001,10HS- 10HV-1005,10HV-1006,10HV- The final 100 10ESD-1005 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-10A
10-Z-1005A/B, to close 10HV-1005, alkyl from 1002,10HS- 1007,10ESD-1006,10HV-1109A/B element of 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-10B
1021,10HS-
cylinder, 10HV-1006, pressurization nitrogen to 1022,10BE- mentioned 3)1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
cylinder 10HV-1109A/B, alkyl-1 feed line to 10- 1001,10BE-1021 items in final
D-1001A, actuating 10ESD-1006 to stopping element
unloading from alkyl-1 cylinder and opening column are
10HV-1007 to blanket alkyl to 10Z-1001 by included in
actuation of 10HS-1001, 10HS-1002, 10-HS- other final
1021, 10HS-1022, and flame detection by element section
10BE-1001 and 10BE-1021.
10. On any emergency circumstances effecting 10HS-1001,10HS- 10HV-1025,10HV-1026,10HV-1027,10HV- The final 100 10ESD-1006 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-10A
10-Z-1005A/B, to close 10HV-1025, alkyl from 1002,10HS- 1129A/B, 10ESD-1005 element of 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-10B
1021,10HS-
cylinder, 10HV-1129A/B, alkyl feed to 10-D- 1022,10BE- mentioned 3)1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
1001B, and 10HV-1026, pressurization 1001,10BE-1021 items in final
nitrogen to cylinder, actuating 10ESD-1005 to element
stopping unloading from alkyl-1 cylinder and column are
opening 10HV-1027 to blanket alkyl to 10-Z- included in
101 by actuation of 10HS-1021, 10HS-1022, other final
10HS-1001, 10HS-1002 and flame detection by element section
10BE-1001 and 10BE-1021
Other Final
Element
11. On 10-D-1001B flame detection by 10BE- 10BE- 10HV-1129A/B,10HV-1122,10P- The final 100 10ESD-1007 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
1121A and 10BE-1101A, to close 10HV- 1121A/B,10BE- 1001C/D,10ESD-1001 element of 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-11B
1101A/B
1129A/B, alkyl-2 to 10-D-1001B, 10-HV-1122, mentioned
drum outlet, to stop 10-P-1001C/D alkyl-2 items in final
metering pumps and actuating 10ESD-1001 element
column are
included in
other final
element section
12. On 10-P-1001C flame detection by 10BE- 10BE-1122 10HV-1124,10-P-1001C,10HV-1126 None 100 10ESD-1008 1500-XZ-DM-10-11B
1122 to close 10HV-1124, pump suction,
10HV-1126, pump discharge, and stop 10-P-
1001C, alkyl-2 metering pump.
13. On 10-P-1001D flame detection by 10BE- 10BE-1123 10HV-1125,10-P-1001D,10HV-1127 None 100 10ESD-1009 1500-XZ-DM-10-11B
1123, to close 10HV-1125, pump suction,
10HV-1127, pump discharge and stop 10-P-
1001D
14. On alkyl filter (10FT-1001B) flame detection 10-BE-1124,10BE- 10HV-1122,10-P-1001C/D,10HV- The final 100 10ESD-1010 1500-XZ-DM-10-11B
by 10BE-1124 and 10BE-1104 to close 10HV- 1104 1124,10HV-1125,10ESD-1004 element of
1122, alkyl-2 metering drum outlet, 10HV-1124 mentioned
and 10HV-1125, alkyl-2 suction pump, stopping items in final
10-P-1001C/D, alkyl-2 metering pumps, and element
actuating 10ESD-1004. column are
included in
other final
element section
15. On high level in 10-Z-1001 and 10-D-1002 10LSH- 10ESD-1012,10ESD-1013,10FV-1103 The final 100 10ESD-1011 1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
sensing by 10LSH-1104 and 10LSH-1103, and 1104,10LSH- element of
1103,10ESD-0001
actuating 10ESD-0001, to actuate 10ESD-1012 mentioned
and 10ESD-1013 and close 10FV-1103 items in final
element
column are
included in
other final
element section
16. On high high level in 10-D-1001A, high 10LT-1101,10LT- 10HV-1109A/B,10HV-1005,10HV- None 100 10ESD-1012 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
level in 10-Z-1001 and emergency shutdown of 1102,10ESD- 1006,10HV-1007 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-10A
1011,10ESD-0001
plant to close 10HV-1109A/B and 10HV-1005,
alkyl-1 feed to drum, 10HV-1006, to close
nitrogen to cylinder and open 10HV-1007 to
start blanketing to 10-Z-1001.
17. On high high level in 10-D-1001B, high 10LT-1121,10LT- 10HV-1129A/B,10HV-1025,10HV- None 100 10ESD-1013 1) 1500XZ-DM-10-11B
level in 10-Z-1001 and emergency shutdown of 1122,10ESD- 1026,10HV-1027 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-10B
1011,10ESD-0001
plant to close 10-HV-1129A/B AND 10HV-
1025, alkyl-2 feed to 10-D-1001B, 10HV-1026,
to close nitrogen to cylinder and open 10HV-
1027 to start blanketing to 10-Z-1001.
Other Final
Element
18. On earting connection reliability to close 10XS-1002 10HV-1005 None 100 10FCS-1002 1500-XZ-DM-10-10A
10HV-1005, during disconnecting time.
19. On 10-D-1009A to open 10HS-1405, when 10PT-1402,10-HV- 10HV-1405 None 100 10FCS-1005 150-XZ-DM-10-14A
10HV-1403, is open and 10PAH-1402 is not 1403
active (P<0.05 barg), (further more valve
10HV-1403, can be opened when 10PAH-
1402, is not active).
20. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 10PT-1502 10-P-1011A/B None 100 10FCS-1006 1500XZ-DM-10-015
x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
x
x
x
21. On high high level in 10-D-1008, oil drum 10LT-1301,10HS- 10HV-1303 None 100 10FCS-1007 1500-XZ-DM-10-013
and actuation of 10HS-1303, to close 10HV- 1303
1303, to cut of oil feed to 10-D-1008
22. On earthing connection reliability to close 10XS-1022 10HV-1025 None 100 10FCS-1008 1500-XZ-DM-10-10B
10HV-1025, during disconnecting time.
23. On 10-D-1009B, to open 10HV-1425 when 10-PT-1422,10HV- 10HV-1425 None 100 10FCS-1010 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-14B
10HV-1423 is open and 10PT-1422, is not 1423
activated (P<0.05 barg) (further more the valve
10HV-1423 can be opened when 10PAH-1422
is not activated).
24. On high high pressure in 10-T-1001 (donor 10_PT-1201 10HV-1201 None 100 10FCS-1011 1500-XZ-DM-10-012
dryer) to close 10HV-1201, inlet nitrogen.
25. On high high temperature in 10E-1004 10-TT-1202 10-E-1004 None 100 10FCS-1012 1500-XZ-DM-10-012
(Nitrogen heater) to shut it off.
26. On antistatic metering pump to start spare 10-P-1006A or 10- 10-P-1006B OR 10-P-1006A None 100 10FCS-1013 1500-XZ-DM-10-016
pump if the pump in operation stops. P-1006B
Other Final
Element
27. On precontacting pots 10-R-1001/ 1002 to 10-FT- 10-P-1001A/B,10-P-1001C/D,10-P- None 100 10FCS-1014 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-017
shut of the catalyst by cutting of 10-P-1001 1701,10FCS- 1004A/B,10-P-1010A/B,10-FV-1701,10- 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-018
2003,10ESD-
A/B, alkyl-1 pumps, 10-P-1001 C/D, alkyl-2 2001,10YLH- FXV-1701,10-FV-1801,10-FXV-1801,10- 3)1500-XZ-DM-10-11A
pumps, 10-P-1004A/B, donor pumps, 10-P- 1701,10-ST- FV-1802,10-A-1001,10-A-1002,10HV- 4)1500-XZ-DM-10-11B
1010, catalyst metering pumps, closing 10FV- 1701,10-FT- 2101C 5)1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
1701, and 17FXV-1701 to close propane 1801,10YLH- 6)1500-XZ-DM-10-013
1801,10-ST-
stream to 10-R-1001 with 10 seconds delay, 1801,10HZLH-
10-FV-1801 and 17FXV-1801, to close 1701,10HZLH-
propane stream to 10-R-1002, with 10 seconds 1801
delay, 10FV-1802 to close atmer to 10-R-1002
with 10 seconds delay, 10HV-2101 to close
catalyst mud from 10R-1002 to 10-R-2001 with
20 seconds delay, and stopping 10-A-1001 and
10A-1002, the precontactors agitators with 10
seconds delay. In low low propane flow to 10-
R-1001 in 10-FT-1701, high high level in 10R-
1001 and actuation of 10FCS-2003, actuation
of 10ESD-2001 to shut down 10-C-2001,
shutdown of 10-A-1001, low low speed of 10-A-
1001 in 10-ST-1701, low low propane flow to
10-R-1002 in 10FT-1801, shutdown of 10-A-
1002, low low speed of 10-A-1002, activation of
10FCS-2005 in high high temperature in 10-R-
2001, not activation of 10-HZLH-1701 to
discharge 10-R-1001 to blow down and not
activation of 10-HZLH-1801 to discharge 10-R-
1002 to blow down.
28. On catalyst dispersion drum 10-D-1009A, 10TT-1403 10TV-1401A None 100 10FCS-1015 1500-XZ-DM-10-14A
high high temperature to close 10TV-1401A, to
stop steam supply.
29. On catalyst dispersion drum 10-D-1009B 10-TT-1423 10TV-1421A None 100 10FCS-1016 1500-XZ-DM-10-14B
high high temperature to close 10TV-1421A to
stop steam supply
30. 10PLC-1001
Other Final
Element
31. On shutdown of 10-C-2001, Gas 10ESD- 10FCS-1014, 10ESD-2009, 10FV-2102 The final 200 10ESD-2001 1) 1500XZ-DM-10-21A
recirculation compressor, due to 10-ESD- 0001,10HS- AND 10FXV-2102, 10FV-2101A/B AND element of 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
2101,10C-2001
0001activation, and activation of 10-HS-2101, 10FXV-2101, 10FV-2105A/B AND 10FXV- mentioned 3) 1500-XZ-DM-10-21D
to actuate 10-FCS-1014 to shut-off catalyst, 2105, 10FV-2106 AND 10FXV-2106, items in final 4) 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
10-ESD-2009 to emergency killing in 10-R- 10FV-2104 AND 10FXV-2104, 10HV- element 5) 1500-XZ-DM-10-30A
2001,shtu off 10-FV-2102 and 10FXV-2102 to 2106A/B, 10FV-2201 AN 10FXV-2201, column are 6) 1500-XZ-DM-10-32A
close ethylene feed to 10-R-2001, 10-FV- 10FCS-2004, 10C-2001, 10LV-3201, included in 7) 1500-XZ-DM-10-32B
2101A/B and 10-FXV-2101 to close hydrogen 10HV-2123, 10HV-2124, 10FV-2121 AND other final
feed to 10-R-2001, 10FV-2105A/B, and 10- 10FXV-2121, 10FV-2118 AND 10FXV- element section
FXV-2105 to close butene1 feed to 10-R-2001, 2118, 10LV-3005 AN 10LXV-3005, 10FV-
10-FV-2106 and 10FXV-2106 to close hexane 2119 AND 10FXV-2119, 10LV-7305 AND
feed to 10-R-2001, 10FV-2104 and 10FXV- 10LXV-7305
2104 to close propane feed to 10-R-2001,
10HV-2106A/B to close bottom discharge of
10-R-2001 after 10 second delay.
After a 60 sec-120sec adjacent delay the
following actions will be done: shut of 10LV-
3201 to close bottom discharge of 10-D-3020,
vapor/liquid separator, 10-HV-2123 to close
ethylene back-up to 10-R-2001 flushing
header, 10-HV-2124 to close propane back-up
to 10-R-2001 flushing header, 10FV-2121 and
10FXV-2121 to close atmer feed to 10-C-2001,
10FV-2118 and 10FXV-2118 to close atmer
feed to discharge of 10-R-2001, 10LV-3005
and 10LXV-3005 to close heavy hydrocarbons
recycle from 10-D-3007, 10FV-2119 and
10FXV-2119 to close atmer feed to top of
reactor, 10LV-7305 and 10LXV-7305 to close
10-T-7052.
32. On propane vaporizer at start up 10-E-2010 10PT-2107 10PV-2107, 10PV-2108 A/B, 10PXV- NONE 200 10ESD-2002 1500-XZ-DM-10-21A
to shut of 10PV-2107 to close steam 2108A
condensate from exchanger, 10PV-2108 A/B
and 10PXV-2108A to close LP steam to
exchanger, due to tube failure in 10-E-2010.
33. On 10-D-2001A, feeding hopper, high high 10-PT-2203,10HV- 10HV-2201A, 10HV-2201C NONE 200 10ESD-2003 1500XZ-DM-10-22A
pressure and malfunction in 10HV-2201B and 2201B, 10HV-
2201D
10HV-2201D to cut off 10HV-2201A and 10HV-
2201C and send board signal if causes of
action remain active for 2 min.
34. On 10-D-2001B, feeding hopper, high high 10PT-2204, 10HV- 10HV-2202A, 10HV-2202C NONE 200 10ESD-2004 1500-XZ-DM-10-22A
pressure and malfunction in 10HV-2202B and 2202B, 10HV-
2202D
10HV-2202D to cut off 10HV-2202A and 10HV-
2202C and send board signal if causes of
action remain active for 2 min.
Other Final
Element
35. On 10-D-2001A discharge and 10HV- 10HV-2201B, 10HV-2201D NONE 200 10ESD-2005 1500-XZ-DM-10-22A
pressurization cut off by closing 10HV-2201B 2201A,10HV-
2201C,10HV-
and 10HV-2201D, due to malfunction in 10HV- 2201E
2201A, 10HV-2201C and 10HV-2201E.
36. On 10-D-2001B discharge and 10HV-2202A, 10HV-2202B, 10HV-2202D NONE 200 10ESD-2006 1500-XZ-DM-10-22A
pressurization cut off by closing 10HV-2202B 10HV-2202C,
10HV-2202E
and 10HV-2202D, due to malfunction in 10HV-
2202 A/C/E.
37. On shutdown of 10C-2002, Gas 10-ESD-0001, 10- 10-ESD-2010, 10-FV-2302, 10-FXV-2302, The final 200 10ESD-2007 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23A
recirculation compressor, due to 10ESD-0001 C-2002, 10-HS- 10-FXV-2301, 10FV-2301,10FV-2305, element of 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23B
2301
activation and activation of 10HS-2301, to 10FXV-2305,10-FV-2306, 10-FXV-2306, mentioned 3) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23A
actuate 10FCS-2013/ 10FCS-2014 to stop 10- 10-FV-2304, 10-FXV-2304, 10HV- items in final
D-2001A/B sequence, 10ESD-2010 to 2306A/B, 10-FV-2401, 10-FXV-2401, 10- element
emergency killing in 10-R-2002, shut off 10FV- FCS-2018, 10-C-2002 column are
2302 and 10FXV-2302 to close ethylene feed included in
to 10-R-2002, 10-FV-2301A/B and 10FXV- other final
2301 to close hydrogen feed to 10R-2002, element section
10FV-2306 and 10FXV-2306 to close butene
feed to reactor, 10FV-2306 and 10FXV-2306 to
close hexene feed to reactor, 10FV-2304 and
10FXV-2304 to close propane to reactor,
10HV-2306A/B to close reactor bottom
discharge, 10FV-2401 and 10FXV-2401 to
close discharge of flushing gas from reactor,
when 10ESD-0001 or when 10HS-2301 is
started, 10FCS-2018 shall be actuated and
compressor 10C-2002 shall be stopped after
20sec-40sec. adj. delay.
After a 60 sec. adjacent delay the following
actions will be done: shut off 10LV-3202 and
10LXV-3202 to close bottom discharge of 10-
D-3021, 10HV-2323 to close back up of
ethylene to reactor flushing header, 10HV-2324
to close propane to flushing header, 10FV-
2321 and 10FXV-2321 to close atmer feed to
compressor suction, 10FV-2318 and 10FXV-
2318 and 10FXV-2318 to close atmer feed to
compressor discharge.
38. On 10-FT-2002, 10R-2002 recycle gas 10-PDT-2408, 10- 10-LV-2401 None 200 10ESD-2008 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-024
filter, in low low delta pressure in 10-PDT-2408, LT-5008 500 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-050
high high level in 10-D-5001 to shut of 10-LV-
2401, filter discharge.
Other Final
Element
39. On 10-R-2001, to injection of emergency 10HS- 10HV-2021, 10-HV-2022, 10HV- The final 200 10ESD-2009 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-020
killer in activation of 10-HS-2023, 10-ESD-2001 2023,10ESD- 2023A/B/C/D/E, 10FCS-2005 element of 500 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
2001,10ESD-
(to shut down 10-C-2001), 10ESD-2010 2010,10-TT-2104 mentioned
(emergency killer injection in 10-R-2002) and A/B/C, 10-TT-2105 items in final
high high temperature in 10-R-2001 (sensing A/B/C, 10-PT-2021 element
by 10-TT-2104 A/B/C and 10-TT-2105 A/B/C, column are
two out of three) to start opening sequence by included in
shutting vent value to flare 10-HV-2021, other final
opening main valve on CO cylinders, 10-HV- element section
2022 after 3 seconds from 10-HV-2021 closing.
After 3 seconds from mentioned actions, killer
injection values 10-HV-2023 A/B/C/D/E will be
opened automatically, and only if 10-PALL-
2021 is not active in high high temperatures
10-FCS-2005 shall be activated.
40. On 10-R-2002, to injection of emergency 10-HS-2026, 10- 10-HV-2024, 10-HV-2025, 10-HV- The final 200 10ESD-2010 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-020
killer in activation of 10-HS-2026 and 10ESD- ESD-2007, 10-TT- 2026A/B/C/D/E, 10-ESD-2009, 10-ESD- element of 500 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
2305A/B/C, 10-TT-
2007 (to shutdown 10-C-2002) and high high 2304A/B/C, 10-PT- 2010,10-ESD-2017 mentioned
temperature in 10-R-2002 (sensing by 10-TT- 2022 items in final
2304A/B/C and 10-TT-2305A/B/C, two out of element
three) to start opening sequence by shutting column are
vent valve to flare 10-HV-2024, opening main included in
valve on CO cylinders 10-HV-2025, after 3 other final
seconds from 10HV-2024 closing. After 3 element section
seconds from mentioned actions, killer injection
valves 10-HV-2026 A/B/C/D/E will be opened
automatically and only if 10-PALL-2022 is not
activate in high high temperature in 10-R-2002,
10-ESD-2010, 10-ESD-2009 and 10FCS-2017
shall be actuated.
41. On 10-D-2001A depressurization cut off, to 10-HZLL-2201B, 10-HV-2201E None 200 10ESD-2011 1500-XZ-DM-10-22A
close 10-HV-2201E due to 10-HV-2201B, 10- 10-HZLL-2201D
HV-2201D malfunctions.
42. On 10-D-2001B depressurization cut off to 10HZLL-2202B, 10-HV-2202E None 200 10ESD-2012 1500-XZ-DM-10-22A
close 10-HV-2202E due to 10-HV-2202B and 10HZLL-2202D
10-HV-2202D malfunction.
43. On high high level in 10-R-2001 to actuate 10-LT-2104 10-FCS-1014 The final 200 10FCS-2003 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
10-FCS-1014 to shut off catalyst. element of
mentioned
items in final
element
column are
included in
other final
element section
Other Final
Element
44. On 1st stage reactor general emergency, to 10HS-2101, Siganl 10-PV-2101A, 10-C-2001, 10-HV-2101, The final 200 10FCS-2001 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
open 10-PV-2101A after 10-C-2001 shut down, from 10-ESD-2001 10-FCS-2004 element of
and with 20Sec-40Sec adj. delay, 10-HV-2101 mentioned
shall be closed due to activation of 10HS-2101. items in final
element
column are
included in
other final
element section
45. On high high temperature in 10-TT-2105 10-TT-2105A/B/C 10-PIC-2101A, 10-FV-2105A/B, 10-FXV- The final 200 10FCS-2005 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
A/B/C (2OO3) and 10-TT-2104 A/B/C(2OO3) (2OO3), 10-TT- 2105, 10-FV-2106, 10-FXV-2106, 10-FV- element of
2104 A/B/C
or 10-FCS-2017 activation due to high high (2OO3) , 10-FCS- 2101A/B, 10-FXV-2101, 10-FCS-1014 mentioned
temperature in 10-R-2002, to set 10-PIC- 2017 items in final
2101A at 25barg to vent excess of monomer to element
flare in order to hold the pressure, shutting off column are
10-FV-2105A/B, 10-FXV-2105 to close butene- included in
1 feed to reactor, 10V-2106 and 10-FXV-2106 other final
to close hexane to reactor, 10-FV-2101A/B, 10- element section
FXV-2101 to close hydrogen to reactor and
actuation of 10-FCS-1014.
46. On first stage reactor to allow opening of 10HZLL-2106A, 10HV-2106A, 10HV-2106B, 10HV-2117 NONE 200 10FCS-2006 1500-XZ-DM-1021C
10-HV-2106A by activation of 10-HZLL-2106B 10-HZLL-2106B,
10HZLL-2117
and 10-HZLL-2117, opening of 10HV-2106B by
activation of 10-HZLL-2106A and 10-HZLL-
2117 and opening 10HV-2117 by activation of
10HZLL-2106A and 10HZLL-2106B.
47. On first stage reactor high high pressure 10PT-2101B, 10- 10-FV-2101A/B, 10-FXV-2101, 10-FV- NONE 200 10FCS-2007 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-21A
sensing by 10-PT-2101B and 10PT-2102B, to PT-2102B 2102, 10-FXV-2102, 10-FX-2104, 10-FXV- 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-21B
close 10-FV-2101 A/B, 10-FXV-2101, hydrogen 2104, 10-HV-2123, 10-HV-2124, 10-FV- 3)1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
feed to reactor, 10-FV-2102, 10FXV-2102, 2105A/B, 10-FXV-2105, 10-FV-2106, 10-
ethylene feed to reactor, 10-FV-2104, 10FXV- FXV-2106, BOARD SIGNAL
2104, propane feed to reactor, 10HV-2123,
ethylene back up to flushing header of reactor,
10HV-2124, propane back up to flushing
header of reactor, 10-FV-2105A/B, 10-FXV-
2105, butene-1 feed to reactor, 10FV-2106 and
10FXV-2106, hexene feed to reactor.
48. On 10-HV-2117/2118 to open 10HV-2118 10HV-2118, 10-HV-2118, 10-HV-2117 None 200 10FCS-2008 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
at 100% and inhibit the action of 10HIC-2118. Operator
intervention
49. On 10LV-2101A to open/ close this valve it shall be active in 10-LV-2101A None 200 10FCS-2009 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
sequentially. The valve shall be opened at a normal process, in
special
given opening x, for a given amount of time y, circumstances 10-
every z seconds. HZLL-2106A
Other Final
Element
50. On 10-LV-2101B to open/close this valve It shall be active in 10-LV-2101B None 200 10FCS-2010 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
sequentially the valve shall be opened at a normal operation,
is special
every z seconds. HZLL-2106B
51. On discharge valves of first stage reactor 10-HV-2106A/B 10-HV-2106A/B None 200 10FCS-2011 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
10-R-2001 to check the status of opening of
the valves
52. On polymer/gas feed to 10-FT-2001 to stop 10-PT-2202 10-HV-2106A, 10-HV-2106B, 10-HV-2117, None 200 10FCS-2012 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
feeding due to high high pressure in 10-PT- 10-FV-2118, 10-FXV-2118, 10-FV-2201, 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-22B
2202 by closing 10HV-2106A/B, first stage 10-FXV-2201, 10-FV-2208, 10-FXV-2208
bottom discharge valves, 10-HV-2117, 10-R-
2001 side discharge valve, 10-FV-2118 and
10-FXV-2118, atmer feeding to 10-FT-2001,
10-FV-2201 and 10FXV-2201, reactor
discharge flushing gas, 10-FV-2208, 10FXV-
2208, gas to 10-FT-2001.
53. On 10-FT-2001, recycle gas filter and 10-D- 10-HS-2201, 10- 10-HV-2201A, 10-HV-2201B, 10-HV- 200 10FCS-213 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-22A
2001A, first feeding hopper for controlling LT-2203, 10-LT- 2201C, 10-HV-2201D, 10-HV-2201E 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
2201
polymer transfer from filter to hopper during
filling step, pressurization and unloading step
and depressurization step.
54. Refer to interlock 10-FCS-2013 10FCS-2014
55. On hydrocarbon inlet line to recycle gas 10-PT-2202 10-HV-2201A,10-HV-2201B,10-HV- None 200 10FCS-2015 1500-XZ-DM-10-22A
filter, 10-FT-2001, high high pressure to cut off 2201C,10-HV-2201D,10-HV-2202A,10-HV-
feeding form 10-FT-2001 to 10-R-2002 by 2202B, 10-HV-2202C,10-HV-2202D
closing 10-HV-2201A/B/C/D and 10-HV-2202
A/B/C/D.
56. On high hihg pressure in 2nd stage reactor 10-PT-2301B, 10- 10-FV-2301A/B, 10-FXV-2301, 10-FV- None 200 10FCS-2016 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23A
to stop feeding to second stage reactor by PT-2302B 2302, 10-FXV-2302, 10-FV-2304, 10-FXV- 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
shutting off 10-FV-2301A/B and 10-FXV-2301, 2304, 10-HV-2323, 10-HV-2324, 10-FV-
hydrogen feed to reactor, 10FV-2302 and 10- 2305A/B, 10-FXV-2305, 10-FV-2306, 10-
FXV-2302, ethylene feed to reactor, 10-FV- FXV-2306
2304 and 10-FXV-2304, propane feed to
reactor, 10-HV-2323 ethylene back up to
reactor flushing header, 10-HV-2324, propane
back up to reactor flushing header, 10-FV-2305
A/B and 10FXV-2305, butene-1 feed to reactor,
10-FV-2306 and 10FXV-2306, hexane feed to
reactor.
Other Final
Element
57. On high high temperature in 10-TT- 10-TT-2305A/B/C, 10-PIC-2301A, 10-FV-2305A/B, 10-FXV- The final 200 10FCS-2017 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23A
2305A/B/C(2OO3) and 10-TT- 10-TT-2304A/B/C 2305, 10-FV-2306, 10-FXV-2306, 10-FV- element of 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
2304A/B/C(2OO3) to actuate 10-FCS-2005, set 2301A/B,10-FXV-2301, 10-FCS-2005 mentioned
10-PIC-2301A at 25 barg to vent excess of items in final
monomer to flare in order to hold the pressure, element
shutting 10-FV-2305A/B, 10-FXV-2305 to close column are
Butene-1 feed to 10-R-2002, 10-FV-2306 and included in
10-FXV-2306, hexene feed to reactor, 10-FV- other final
2301A/B and 10-FXV-2301, hydrogen feed to element section
reactor.
58. On general emergency of second stage 10-HS-2301 10-PV-2301A, 10-HV-2301 None 200 10FCS-2018 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
reactor 10-R-2002 to depressurize reactor by
opening 10-PV-2301-A after 20-40 sec delay,
closing 10-HV-2301 to flushing flow to 10-R-
2002 system after 0-300sec. delay, due to
actuation of 10-HS-2301.
59. On first stage reactor to allow opening of 10-HZLL- 10-HV-2306A, 10-HV-2306B,10-HV-2317 None 200 10FCS-2019 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
10HV-2306A by activation of 10-HZLL-2306 B 2306A,10-HZLL-
2306B,10-HZLL-
and 10-HZLL-2317, opening of 10-HV-2306B 2317
by activation of 10-HZLL-2306 A and 10-HZLL-
2317, and opening 10-HV-2317 by activation of
10-HZLL-2306 A and 10-HZLL-2306B.
60. On 10-LV-2301A to open/close this valve It shall be active in 10-LV-2301A None 200 10FCS-2020 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
in special
given opening x, for a given amount of time y circumstances 10-
every z seconds. HZLL-2306A
61. On 10-LV-2301B to open/close this valve It shall be active in 10-LV-2301B None 200 10FCS-2021 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
in special
every z seconds. HZLL-2306B
62. On 10-HV-2317/2318 to open 10HV-2318 10-HV-2318, 10-HV-2318, 10-HV-2317 None 200 10FCS-2022 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
at 100% and inhibit the action of 10-HIC-2318 Operator
intervention
63. On transport gas of second stage reactor, 10FT-2401 10-FV-2401 None 200 10FCS-2023 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
to control the flow and pressure in system by operator 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-024
intervention
adjusting 10-FV-2401.
64. On discharge valves of second stage 10-HV-2306A/B 10-HV-2306A/B None 200 10FCS-2024 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
reactor 10-R-2002to check the status of
opening of the valves
Other Final
Element
65. On gas feed to 10-FT-2002 high high 10-PT-2402 10-FV-2401,10-FXV-2401, 10-HV-2201E, The final 200 10FCS-2025 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
pressure in 10PT-2402 to cut off feed by 10-HV-2202E, 10-FCS-2026 element of 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-024
actuating 10-FCS-2026, polymer feed shut off, mentioned 3) 1500-XZ-DM-10-22B
10-FV-2401 and 10-FXV-2401, second stage items in final
reactor discharge flushing gas, 10-HV-2201E, element
depressurization from 10-D-2001A, 10-HV- column are
2202E, depressurization from 10-D-2001B included in
other final
element section
66. On 10-FT-2002 to stop polymer feeding by 10-LT-2404, 10- 10-HV-2306A/B, 10-FV-2318, 10-FXV- None 200 10FCS-2026 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
shutting off 10-HV-2306 A/B, 10-R-2002 LT-2405, 10-FCS- 2318, 10-HV-2317 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-024
2405
bottom discharge piston valves, 10-FV-2318
and 10-FXV-2318, atmer feeding to 10-FT-
2002, 10-HV-2317, 10-R-2002, side discharge
piston valve due to high high level in 10-LT-
2404 and 10-LT-2405, and activation of 10-
FCS-2025
67. On high high level in 10-FT-2001 to 10-LT-2204 10-HV-2106A, 10-HV-2106B, 10-HV-2117, None 200 10FCS-2027 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
shutting 10-HV-2106A/B, first stage reactor 10-FV-2118, 10-FXV-2118, 10-FXV-2201, 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-022
bottom discharge valves, 10-HV-2117, side 10-FV-2201
discharge valve, 10-FV-2118 and 10-FXV-
2118, atmer feeding to 10-FT-2001, 10-FV-
2201 and 10-FXV-2201, 10-R-2001 discharge
flushing gas.
68. On automatic back up of flushing header 10-PDALL-2102C, 10-HV-2124 None 200 10FCS-2028 1500-XZ-DM-10-21C
for 10-R-2001 to open propane to flushing 10-PLC-3001, 10-
PLC-3002
header back-up line by opening 10-HV-2124,
due to very low diff. pressure in header back up
line, activation 10-PLC-3001 and 10-PLC-3002
to shut off 10-PK-3001A/B.
69. On automatic back up of flushing header 10-PDALL-2302, 10-HV-2324 None 200 10FCS-2029 1500-XZ-DM-10-23C
for 10-R-2002 to open propane to flushing 10-PLC-3001, 10-
PLC-3002, 10-
header back up line by opening 10-HV-2324, PLC-3003, 10-
due to low low diff. pressure in header backup PLC-3004
line, activation 10-PLC-3001, 10-PLC-3002,
10-PLC-3003, 10-PLC-3004 to shut off 10-PK-
3001A/B/C/D.
70. On propane vaporizer at start up 10-E- 10-LSH-2105 10-LV-2102, 10-LXV-2102 None 200 10FCS-2030 1500-XZ-DM-10-21A
2010, high level in 10-LSH-2105, to shut of 10-
LV-2102 and 10-LXU-2102 to close propane
feed to 10-E-2010
71. On second hydrocarbon condenser, 10-E- 10PT-3201 10-PV-3201 None 300 10ESD-3001 1500-XZ-DM-10-32A
3006, to shut off CHW outlet by closing 10-PV-
3201 due to high high pressure in 10-PT-3201
caused by tube failure.
Other Final
Element
72. On first hydrocarbon condenser, 10-E- 10PT-3202 10PV-3202 None 300 10ESD-3002 1500-XZ-DM-10-32A
3007, to shut off CWR outlet by closing 10PV-
73. On second hydrocarbon condenser, 10-E- 10PT-3203 10PV-3203 None 300 10ESD-3003 1500-XZ-DM-10-32B
3016 to shut off CHW outlet by closing 10PV-
3202 due to high high pressure in 10PT-3203
74. On first hydrocarbon condenser, 10-E- 10-PT-3204 10-PV-3204 None 300 10ESD-3004 1500-XZ-DM-10-32B
3017, to shut off CWR outlet by closing 10-PV-
caused by tube failure
75. On high high liquid level in 10-C-3001A/B 10-LT-3002, 10- 10-P-3004A/B , 10FCS-3003 The final 300 10FCS-3001 1500-XZ-DM-10-30A
suction k.o. drum, 10-D-3001 or 10-C-3001A/B LT-3006 element of
discharge k.o. drum, 10-D-3007 to shut down mentioned
10-C-3001A (if 10-PK-3001A is aligned to 10- items in final
R-2001) or 10-C-3001B (if 10-PK-3001B is element
aligned t o10-R-2001) and shut down 10-P- column are
3004A and B, compressors condensed included in
hydrocarbons pumps. other final
element section
76. On high high liquid level in 10-C-3002A/B 10-LT-3004, 10- 10-PLC-3004, 10PLC-3003, 10-FCS-3003, The final 300 10FCS-3002 1500-XZ-DM-10-30B
suction k.o. drum, 10-D-3008, or 10-C-3002A/B LT-3008 10-P-3005 element of
discharge k.o. drum, 10-D-3014 to actuate mentioned
10PLC-3003 and 10PLC-3004 to shut down items in final
10-C-3002A/B, gives signal to 10-FCS-3003 to element
shut down 10-C-3001B (if 10PK-3001B is column are
aligned to 10-R-2002) or shut down 10-C- included in
3001A (if 10-PK-3001A is aligned to 10-R- other final
2002) and shut down 10-P-3005A and B, element section
compressors condensed hydrocarbon pumps.
77. On 10-PK-3001A/B recycle compressor 10-V-3107,10-V- 10-FCS-3001, 10-FCS-3002 The final 300 10FCS-3003 1) 150--XZ-DM-10-30A
alignment to check the limit switches and select 3108,10V-3109,10- element of 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-30B
V-3110,10HV-
which of 10-FCS--3001or 10-FCS-3002 shall 3104,10HV- mentioned 3) 1500-XZ-DM-10-31A
acts on 10-PK-3001A/B depending on its 3102,10HV- items in final 4) 1500-XZ-DM-10-31B
alignment to 10-R-2001 or 10-R-2002 3103,10-HV- element
3007,10HV-3006 column are
included in
other final
element section
Other Final
Element
78. On 10-C-3001A, first stage reactor recycle 10-PT- 10-C-3001A None 300 10PLC-3001 1500-XZ-DM-10-31A
gas compressor to shut it down due to low low 3102A,10PT-
3103A,10-PT-
pressure on suction of compressor, low 3105A, 10PT-
pressure on suction of compressor, high 3104A,10TT-
pressure in compressor suction, high high 3101A,10TT-
pressure in first stage discharge, high pressure 3102A, 10LT-
3102A,10TT-
on first stage discharge, high high temp. on first 3103A,10TT-
stage discharge, high temp. on first stage 3104A,10PT-
discharge, high high level in 10-D-3004A, high 3106A,10PT-
high temp. On second stage discharge, high 3107A
temp. on second stage discharge high high
pressure on second stage discharge, high
pressure on second stage discharge
79. On 10-C-3001B, first stage reactor recycle 10-PT- 10-C-3001B None 300 10PLC-3002 1500-XZ-DM-10-31B
gas compressor to shut it down due to low low 3102B,10PT-
3103B,10PT-
pressure on suction of compressor, low 3105B,10PT-
pressure on suction of compressor, high 3104B,10TT-
pressure on compressor suction, high high 3101B, 10TT-
pressure on first stage discharge, high 3102B, 10LT-
3102B, 10TT-
pressure on first stage discharge, high high 3103B, 10TT-
temp. On first stage discharge, high temp. on 3104B, 10PT-
first stage discharge, high high level in 10-D- 3106B, 10PT-
3004B, high high temp. on second stage 3107B
discharge, high temp on second stage
discharge, high high pressure on second stage
discharge, high pressure on second stage
discharge.
80. On 10-C-3002A, first stage reactor recycle 10PT-3112A, 10-C-3002A None 300 10PLC-3003 1500-XZ-DM-10-31C
gas compressor to shut it down due to low low 10PT-3113A,
10PT-3115A,
pressure on suction of compressor, low 10PT-3114A,
pressure on suction of compressor, high 10TT-3111A,
pressure on compressor suction, high high 10TT-3112A,
pressure on first stage discharge, high 10LT-3112A,
10TT-3113A,
pressure on first stage discharge, high high 10TT-3114A,
temp. on first stage discharge, high temp. on 10PT-3116A,
first stage discharge, high high level in 10-D- 10PT-3117A
3011A, high high temp. on second stage
discharge and actuation of 10FCS-3002.
Other Final
Element
81. On 10-C-3002B, first stage reactor recycle 10PT-3112B, 10-C-3002B None 300 10PLC-3004 1500-XZ-DM-10-31D
gas compressor to shut it down due to low low 10PT-3113B,
10PT-3115B,
pressure on suction of compressor, low 10PT-3114B,
pressure on suction of compressor, high 10TT-3111B,
pressure on compressor suction, high high 10TT-3112B,
pressure on first stage discharge, high 10LT-3112B,
10TT-3113B,
pressure on first stage discharge, high high 10TT-3114B,
temp. on first stage discharge, high temp. on 10PT-3116B,
first stage discharge, high high level in 10-D- 10PT-3117B
3011B, high high temp. on second stage
discharge and actuation of 10FCS-3002.
82. On 10-D-5001, steamer bottom valve 10TT-5001 10LV-5001 None 500 10ESD-5001 1500-XZ-DM-10-050
10LV-5001 to shut it off due to low low
temperature inside 10D-5001
83. On high high level in 10DR-5002, dryer, to 10LT-5302 10LV-5001 None 500 10FCS-5001 1) 1500-XZ-DM-10-050
shut of 10LV-5001, steamer bottom discharge 2) 1500-XZ-DM-10-053
valve
84. On automatic start of 10P-5002 spare 10P-5002A/B 10P-5002A/B NONE 500 10FCS-5002 1500-XZ-DM-10-053
pump if the pump in operation stop
85. On 10C-5002A, dryer compressor, to shut it 10TT-5305, 10PT- 10C-5002A NONE 500 10FCS-5003 1500-XZ-DM-10-053
down due to high high temp. In delivery line, 5302, 10PT-5303,
10PT-5308
low low pressure in suction, high pressure in
delivery line and low low pressure in suction.
86. On 10C-5002B, dryer compressor, to shut it 10TT-5306, 10PT- 10-C-5002B NONE 500 10FCS-5004 1500-XZ-DM-10-053
down due to high high temp. in delivery line, 5302, 10PT-5304,
10PT-5309
low low pressure in suction, high pressure in
delivery line and low low pressure in suction.
87. On steamer agitator 10A-5001 to shut it 10IAHH-5001, 10-A-5001 NONE 500 10FCS-5005 1500-XZ-DM-10-050
down due to high high power absorption in 10FALL-5002
agitator and low low steam flow rate to
streamer
88. On 10P-5001A/B, steamer scrubber reflux 10P-5001A OR 10P-5001B or 10P-5001A NONE 500 10FCS-5006 1500-XZ-DM-10-050
pumps, to start 10P-5001A or B if the pump in 10P-5001B
operation stops
89. On steamer scrubber condensate bottom 10LT-5002 10LV-5002 NONE 500 10FCS-5007 1500-XZ-DM-10-050
discharge to close/open 10LV-5002
90. On 10D-5001 and 10T-5001 vacuum 10PT-5003 , 10PT- 10PV-5001, 10PV-5003 NONE 500 10FCS-5008 1500-XZ-DM-10-050
breaker, to open 10PV-5001, steamer scrubber 5005
condenser connection to flare 10PV-5003,
steamer connection to flare due to low low
pressure in down stream (10PT-5003) and
upstream (10PT-5005) of steamer scrubber.
Other Final
Element
91. On, steamer, 10D-5001, high high pressure 10PT-5005 10FV-5002, 10FV-5001, 10FV-5003, NONE 500 10FCS-5009 1500-XZ-DM-10-050
to shut off 10FV-5002, main steam to 10D- 10PV-5003
5001, 10FV-5001, secondary steam to 10D-
5001, 10-FV-5003, steam to 10T-5001 reboiler,
and open 10PV-5003, connection to flare
header.
92. On 10P-5004A/B, heavy hydrocarbons 10P-5004A OR 10P-5004B, 10P-5004A NONE 500 10FCS-5010 1500-XZ-DM-10-051
recovery pumps, to start 10P-5004A or B if the 10P-5004B
pump in operation stops.
93. On hydrocarbon / oxygen ratio in 10AAHH-5301, BACK UP NITROGEN 10LV-5301 NONE 500 10FCS-5011 1500-XZ-DM-10-053
downstream of dryer, 10DR-5002, to control 10AAHH-8001
H/O ratio by nitrogen back up and 10LV-5301,
during activation of 10AAHH-5301 (at 900ppm
hydrocarbon) or 10AAHH-8001 (at 5% vol.
oxygen).
94. On 10P-5005A/B, neutralizer metering 10LT-5401 10P-5005A/B NONE 500 10FCS-5012 1500-XZ-DM-10-054
pumps, to stop pumps due to low low level in
10D-5010, neutralizer pot.
95. On low level of hydrocarbon drum to close 10LSL-5102 10LV-5102 NONE 500 10FCS-5013 1500-XZ-DM-10-051
10LV-5102 to close liquid discharge to portable
drum
96. On low level in hydrocarbon stripper, 10D- 10LSL-5106 10LV-5106 NONE 500 10FCS-5014 1500-XZ-DM-10-051
5007, to close 10LV-5106 liquid discharge to
sewer.
97. Vendor issue 10PLC-5001
98. On 10C-5001, steamer of gas compressor 10PT-5102, 10PT- 10C-5001 NONE 500 10PLC-5002 1500-XZ-DM-10-051
to shut it down due to low low suction pressure 51105, 10TT-5103,
10LT-5108
alarm in 10PT-5102, high high discharge
pressure in 10PT-5105, high high discharge
temp. in 10TT-5103 and minimum water level
alarm for 10D-5005in 10LT-5108
99. On nitrogen flushing to rotary feeder 10RF- 10RF-5001B 10XV-5300 NONE 500 10PLC-5004 1500-XZ-DM-10-053
5001B to close it due to any emergency lead to (10YLH-5304)
feeder shutting down.
100. On nitrogen flushing to rotary feeder 10RF-5001A 10XV-5300 NONE 500 10PLC-5004 1500-XZ-DM-10-053
10RF-5001A to close it due to any emergency (10YLH-5303)
lead to feeder shutting down.
101. On 10-P-6001 A/B, refrigerated water 10P-6001A or 10P- 10P-6001B or 10P-6001A NONE 600 10FCS-6001 1500-XZ-DM-10-061
pumps, to start 10P-6001A or B if the pump in 6001B
operation stops.
Other Final
Element
102. On low level in 10D-6001, chilled water 10LT-6101 10LV-6101 NONE 600 10FCS-6002 1500-XZ-DM-10-061
surge drum, to open make up to the
refrigerated water circuit by opening 10LV-
6101.
103. On 10P-6004, steam condensate pumps, 10P-6004B OR 10P-6004B OR 10P-6004A NONE 600 10FCS-6003 1500-XZ-DM-10-063
to automatic start of spare pump if the pump in 10P-6004A
operation stops.
104. On high high pressure in 10T-6001, steam 10PT-6304 10PV-6302 NONE 600 10FCS-6004 1500-XZ-DM-10-063
condensate stripper, to close 10PV-6302,
medium pressure steam to 10E-6005, steam
reboiler.
105. On high high level in 10E-6005, steam 10LT-6303 10LV-6302 NONE 600 10FCS-6005 1500-XZ-DM-10-063
reboiler, to shut 10LV-6302 to cut off feed to
steam generator.
106. On high level in 10D-6007, oil treating 10LT-6501 10FV-1603A/B NONE 600 10FCS-6006 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-65A
drum, to close 10FV-1603A to close oil to oil 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-016
treating drum an open 10FV-1603B to open oil
flow to antistatic surge drum.
107. On 10P-6007, oil delivery pumps, to 10P-6007A OR 10P-6007B or 10P-6007A NONE 600 10FCS-6007 1500-XZ-DM-10-65B
automatic start of spare pump if the pump in 10P-6007B
operation stops.
108. On 10P-6003, jacket water pumps, to 10P-6003A OR 10P-6003B or 10P-6003A NONE 600 10-FCS-6008 1500-XZ-DM-10-063
automatic start of spare pump if the pump in 10P-6003B
operation stops.
109. On low low level of 10D-6003, jacket 10LT-6401 10LV-6401 NONE 600 10FCS-6009 1500-XZ-DM-10-064
water expansion drum, to automatic filling of
drum by opening 10LV-6401, make up to the
jacket water circuit.
110. On 10D-6009, gas blow down tank, high 10PT-6002 10HV-6002 NONE 600 10FCS-6010 1500-XZ-DM-10-60A
pressure to shut 10HV-6002, tank discharge.
111. On 10E-6001, refrigeration unit 10PT-6102 10PV-6102 NONE 600 10PLC-6102 1500-XZ-DM-10-061
condenser, high pressure in water side to close
10PV-6106, cooling water return.
112. On 10E-6002, refrigeration unit chiller high 10PT-6101 10PV-6101 NONE 600 10PPLC-6101 1500-XZ-DM-10-061
pressure in water side to close 10PV-6101.
113. On 10E-7012, ethylene feed heater, to 10PT-7001 10PV-7001, 10TV-7001, 10TXV-7001 NONE 700 10ESD-7001 1500-XZ-DM-10-70A
close 10PV-7001, condensate from 10E-7012,
10TV-7001 and 10TXV-7001, steam to 10-E-
7012 due to high pressure in 10PT-7001
114. On 10-E-7013, ethylene cooler, to close 10PT-7002 10PV-7002 NONE 700 10ESD-7002 1500-XZ-DM-10-70A
10PV-7002 CWR form 10E-7013 due to high
pressure alarm in 10PT-7002.
Other Final
Element
115. On 10-T-7011A, CO removal package to 10PT-7003A , 10PV-7003A NONE 700 10ESD-7003 1500-XZ-DM-10-70A
control 10PV-7003A. 10HS-7003A
116. On 10T-7011B, CO removal package, to 10PT-7003B, 10PV-7003B NONE 700 10ESD-7004 1500XZ-DM-10-70A
control 10PV-7003B. 10HS-7003B
117. On 10E-7047, recycle propane cooler, 10PT-7210 10PV-7210 NONE 700 10ESD-7005 1500-XZ-DM-10-72B
high pressure in water side to close 10PV-
7210, cooling water out from 10E-7047.
118. On 10E-7042, steam scrubber condenser, 10PT-7220 10PT-7220, 10ESD-7008 The final 700 10ESD-7006 1500-XZ-DM-10-72C
high pressure in water side to close 10PV- element of
7220, cooling water out from 10E-7042 and mentioned
actuating 10ESD-7008 to shut off 10T-7042. items in final
element
column are
included in
other final
element
section.
119. On 10E-7041, hydrogen stripper reboiler, 10PT-7222 10PV-7222, 10ESD-7008 The final 700 10ESD-7007 1500-XZ-DM-10-72C
high high pressure in condensate side to close element of
10PV-7222, condensate out and actuating mentioned
10ESD-7008 to shut off 10T-7042. items in final
element
column are
included in
other final
element section
120. On 10T-7042, hydrogen stripper, high 10LSHH-7222, 10FV-7221, 10FXV-7221, 10FV-7202, The final 700 10ESD-7008 1500-XZ-DM-10-72C
high level in 10LSHH-7222, low low level in 10LSLL-7221, 10FXV-7202, 10LV-7220, 10LXV-7220, element of
10HS-7220,
10LT-7221, starting 10HS-7220, activation of 10ESD-7011, 10FCS-7006 mentioned
10ESD-7011, 10ESD-7006, 10ESD-7007 and 10ESD-7006, items in final
10ESD-0011 to close 10FV-7221 and 10FXV- 10ESD-7007, element
7221 to close steam to 10E-7041, 10FV-7202 10ESD-0011 column are
and 10FXV-7202, to close propane to 10T- included in
7045, 10LV-7220 and 10LVX-7220 to close other final
propane to 10T-7043 and actuating 10fCS- element section
7006 to shut off 10T-7041.
121. On 10E-7044, debutazing tower 10PT-7230 10PV-7230, 10ESD-7011 The final 10ESD-7009 1500-XZ-DM-10-72D
condenser, high high pressure in water side, element of
10PT-7230, to close 10PV-7230, cooling water mentioned
out, and actuating 10ESD-7011 to shut off 10T- items in final
7043, debutazing tower. element
column are
included in
other final
element section
700
Other Final
Element
122. On 10E-7043, debutazing tower reboiler, 10PT-7234 10PV-7234, 10ESD-7011 The final 700 10ESD-7010 1500-XZ-DM-10-72D
high high pressure in 10PT-7234 to close element of
10PV-7234, condensate out and actuating mentioned
10ESD-7011, to shut off 10T-7043. items in final
element
column are
included in
other final
element section
123. On debutazing tower, 10T-7043, high high 10PT-7232, 10FV-7231, 10FXV-7231, 10FV-7230, The final 700 10ESD-7011 1500-XZ-DM-10-72D
pressure in 10PT-7232, high high level in 10LSHH-7233, 10FXV-7230, 10PV-7231, 10PXV-7231, element of
10LSLL-7232,
10LT-7233, low low level in 10LT-7232, starting 10HS-7230, 10ESD-0011 mentioned
of 10HS-7230, activation of 10ESD-7009, 10ESD-7009, items in final
10ESD-7010 and 10ESD-7013 due to tube 10ESD-7010, element
failure in 10E-7044, 10E-7043 and 40E-7040 40ESD-7013, column are
10ESD-0011
and activation of 10ESD-0011 to cut off included in
purification by closing 10FV-7231 and 10FXV- other final
7231 to close steam to tower, 10FV-7230 and element section
10FV-7230 to close tower bottom, 10PV-7231 700
and 10PXV-7231 to close propane from 10FT-
7042 and actuating 10ESD-7008 to shut off
10T-7041.
124. On 10-T-7061, hexene light end stripper, 10PT-7501, 10FV-7504, 10FXV-7504, 10FV-7503, The final 700 10ESD-7012 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-75A
high high pressure in 10PT-7501, high high 10LSHH-7505, 10FXV-7503, 10LV-7501, 10LXV-7501, element of 201500-XZ-DM-10-75E
10LSLL-7504,
level in 10LSHH-7505 low low level in 10LSLL- 10LSHH-7536, 10FV-7501, 10P-7061 mentioned
7504, high high level in 10LSHH-7536, starting 10HS-7504, items in final
10HS-7504 and activation of 10ESD-0011to 10ESD-0011 element
cut off purification to close 10FV-7504 and column are
10FXV-7504, to close steam to 10E-7062, included in
10FV-7503 an 10FXV-7503 to close hexene other final
from B.L., 10LV-7501, to close hexene to 10T- element section
7064, 10FV-7501, nitrogen to 10E-7061, 700
discharge to off gas header, and stopping 10P-
7061
125. On 40E-7040, propane vaporizer, high 40PT-7607 40PV-7607, 10ESD-7011 The final 700 40ESD-7013 1500-XZ-DM-40-076
pressure in condensate side to close 40PV- element of
7607, condensate out and actuating 10ESD- mentioned
7011 to shut off 10T-7043. items in final
element
column are
included in
other final
element section
700
Other Final
Element
126. On 10T-7042 high high pressure in 10PT- 10PT-7014 10LXV-7210, 10FV-7221, 10FXV-7221, The final 700 10ESD-7014 1500-XZ-DM-10-72C
7221 to close 10LXV-7210, propane feed to 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202, 10LV-7220, element of
10T-7042, 10FV7221, and 10FXV-7221, to 10LXV-7220, 10FCS-7006 mentioned
close steam to 10E-7041, 10FV-7202 and items in final
10FXV-7202 to close propane to 10T-7045A/B, element
10LV-7220 and 10LXV-7220 to close propane column are
to 10T-7043 and actuating 10FCS-7006. included in
other final
element section
700
127. On 10T-7041, propane hydrogenation 10LSLL-7211 10LV-7210, 10LXV-7210 NONE 700 10ESD-7015 1500-XZ-DM-10-72B
tower, low low level in 10LSLL-7211, to close
10LV-7210 and 10LXV-7210, propane feed
from 10T-7041 to 10T-7042.
128. On 10E-7044, debutazing tower 10LSLL-7234 10PXV-7231 NONE 700 10ESD-7016 1500-XZ-DM-10-72D
condenser, low low level in 10LSLL-7234 to
close 10PXV-7231, purified propane to battery
limit.
129. On 40D-7041, purified propane storage 40LSHH-7603 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202 NONE 700 40ESD-7017 1500-XZ-DM-40-076
tank, high high level in 40LSHH-7603 to close
10FV-7202 and 10FXV-7202, to close propane
feed t o10T-7045A/B
130. On 40-D-7041, purified propane storage 40HS-7607 40HV-7610, 40P-7042A/B, 40HV-7601, NONE 700 40ESD-7041 1500-XZ-DM-40-076
tank, to depressurize drum due to any 40HV-7602, 40HV-7606, 40PV-7601
emergency circumstances, by closing 40HV-
7610, propane feed to 40-D-7041, stop 40P-
7042A/B, propane feed pumps, close 40HV-
7601 and 40HV-7601 and 40HV-7602, propane
to 40P-7042A/B, open 40HV-7606, 40D-
7041vent and close 40PV_7601, drum propane
recycle.
131. On 10E-7053, stripper column reboiler, 10PT-7339 10PV-7339 NONE 700 10ESD-7031 1500-XZ-DM-10-73B
high high pressure in 10PT-7339, to close
10PV-7339, CWR from 10E-7035
132. On 10E-7051, steamer purge cooler, high 10PT-7335 10PV-7335 NONE 700 10ESD-7032 1500-XZ-DM-10-73B
high pressure in 10PT-7335, to close 10PV-
7335, CWR from 10E-7051
133. On 10T-7051, to shut it off due to high 10PT-7338, 10HS- 10FV-7313, 10FXV-7313, 10LV-7315, NONE 700 10ESD-7033 1500-XZ-DM-10-73B
high pressure in 10PT-7338, activation of 7307, 10ESD- 10HV-7306, 10HV-3204, 10HV-3203
7040,
10ESD-7040, propane recovery shut off and
starting 10HS-7307, by closing 10FV-7313 and
10FXV-7313, to close steam feed to 10E-7053,
10LV-7315 and 10HV-7306, to close HC feed
to 10T-7052, 10P-7051A/B, by opening 10HV-
3204 and closing 10HV-3203 to alignment to
off gas header.
Other Final
Element
134. On 10T-7052, to shut if off due to high 10PT-7303, 10HS- 10LV-7315, 10P-7052A/B, 10FV-7301, NONE 700 10ESD-7034 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
high pressure in 10PT-7303, activation of 7302, 10ESD-7040 10FXV-7301, 10HV-7305
10ESD-7040, propane recovery shut off and
starting 10HS-7307, by closing 10LV-7315,
hydrocarbon feed to 10T-7052, 10FV-7301 and
10FXV-7301, steam to 10E-7055, 10HV-7305,
column discharge valve by stopping 10P-
7052A/B condensed hydrocarbons pumps.
135. On 10E-7054, splitter column condenser, 10PT-7300 10PV-7300 NONE 700 10ESD-7035 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
high high pressure in 10PT-7300, to close
10PV-7300, CWR from 10E-7054
136. On 10E-7055, splitter column reboiler, 10-T-7305 10PV-7305 NONE 700 10ESD-7036 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
high high pressure in 10PT-7305 to close
10PV-7305,CWR
137. On splitter column high high level in 10LT- 10LSHH-7304 10LV-7315 NONE 700 10ESD-7037 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
7304 to close 10LV-7315, HC feed to column.
138. On 10T-7051, stripper column, high high 10LSHH-7313 10HV-3206, 10HV-3205 NONE 700 10ESD-7038 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
level in 10LSHH-7313 to open 10HV-3206 and
close 10HV-3205 to align off gas header.
139. On 10P-7051 A/B, splitter column 10PT-7302 10P-7051A/B NONE 700 10ESD-7039 1500-XZ-DM-10
recovered propane pumps, to stop pumps due
to low low pressure in suction line
140. On propane recovery to shut it off due to 0HS-7308, 10ESD- 10ESD-7033, 10ESD-7034, 10ESD-7039, The final 700 10ESD-7040 1)1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
starting 10HS-7308 and activation of 10ESD- 0001 10HV-0101 element of 2)1500-XZ-DM-10-73D
0001, by activation of 10ESD-7033, to shut off mentioned
10T-7051, 10ESD-7034, to shut off 10T-7052, items in final
10ESD-7039, to stop 10P-7051 A/B pumps, element
and closing 10HV-0101 to route recovered column are
propane to raw propane storage, included in
other final
element section
141. On 10E-7055, splitter column reboiler to 10-PT-7304 10-PV-7304 NONE 700 10ESD-7041 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
cut off LPS feed by closing 10PV-7304 due to
high high pressure in feed line
142. On 10D-7301, butene1 storage tank, to 10PSHH-7105 10PV-7101 NONE 700 10FCS-7002 1500-XZ-DM-10-071
close butene to jacketed steam pipe by closing
10PV-7101 due to high high pressure in 1-
PSHH-7105
143. On 10P-7031A/B, butene1 feed pumps to 10PSLL-7103, 10HV-7101, 10P-7031A/B NONE 700 10FCS-7003 1500-XZ-DM-10-071
stop pumps and close butene to pump (by 10PSLL-7104,
10HS-7101,
closing 10HV-7101) due to low low level in 10LSLL-7103
7103, starting 10HS-7101 and high pressure
drop on pumps suction line
Other Final
Element
144. On automatic start of 10P-7031 spare 10P-7031A OR 10P-7031B OR 10P-7031A NONE 700 10FCS-7004 1500-XZ-DM-10-071
pump due to stoppage of in operation pump 10P-7031B
145. On 10D-7031, butene 1 storage to close 10LSHH-7102 10LV-7101 NONE 700 10FCS-7005 1500XZ-DM-10-071
butene from B.L. by closing 10LV-7101 due to
high high level in 10LSHH-7102
146. On propane hydrogenation tower, 10T- 10TT-7213, 10TT- 10FV-7210, 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202 NONE 700 10FCS-7006 1500-XZ-DM-10-72B
7041, to shut off tower by closing 10FV-7210, 7214, 10TT-7215,
10TT-7217, 10P-
to cut off hydrogen feed 10FV-7202 and 7041, 10ESD-
10FXV-7202, to cut off propane feed due to 7008, 10ESD-0011
high high temperature in tower, 10TT-7213,
10TT-7214, 10TT-7215, 10TT-7217, stoppage
of 10P-7041, recycle pump and actuation of
10ESD-7008, tower shut off and 10ESD-0011,
purification cut off.
147. On 10E-7064. hexene light end stripper 10PT-7504 10PV-7504 NONE 700 10FCS-7007 1500-XZ-DM-10-75A
(10T-7061) bottom outlet cooler, to close
10PV-7504, cooling water out from 10E-7064,
due to high high pressure in water side 10PT-
7504
148. On 10T-7061, hexene light end stripper, to 10PT-7502, 10HS- 10HV-7502 NONE 700 10FCS-7008 1500-XZ-DM-10-75A
breake vacuum by opening 10HV-7502, blow 7502
down connection, due to low low pressure in
10PT-7502 and starting 10HS-7502
149. On 10D-7063. heavy co-monomer drying 10LSL-7511, 10HV-7511 NONE 700 10FCS-7009 1500-XZ-DM-10-75C
tower level indicator, to close 10HV-7511, 10HS-7511
liquid discharge to 10T-7064A/B, due to low
level in 10LSL-7511 or starting 10HS-7511
150. On 10D-7062, purified hexene feed drum , 10PSLL-7531 10PV-7534, 10FCS-7011 The final 700 10FCS-7010 1500-XZ-DM-10-75E
low low pressure in 10PSLL-7511, to open element of
10PV-7534, N2 to 10D-7062, and actuating mentioned
10FCS-7011 to stop 10P-7062A/B items in final
element
column are
included in
other final
element section
151. On 40P-7042A, propane feed pumps to 40HS-7601, 40HV-7601, 40P-7042A NONE 700 40FCS-7014 1500-XZ-DM-40-076
close 40HV-7601, propane to 40P-7042A from 40PSLL-7603,
40LSLL-7602,
40D-7041 and stop 40P-7042A due to starting 10ESD-001,
40HS-7601, low low pressure in 40PSLL-7603, 40ESD-0001
suction of pump line, low low level in 40LSLL-
7602, and activation of 10ESD-0011 and
10ESD-0001 to cut off purifications or plant
emergency shutdown.
Other Final
Element
152. On 40P-7042B, propane feed pumps to 40HS-7602, 40HV-7602, 40HV-7042B NONE 700 40FCS-7015 1500-XZ-DM-40-076
close 40HV-7602, propane to 40P-7042B from 40PSLL-7605,
40LSLL-7602,
40D-7041 and stop 40P-7042B due to starting 10ESD-0011,
40HS7602, low low pressure in 40PSLL-7605, 10ESD-0001
low low level in 40LSLL-7602 and activation of
10ESD-0011and 10ESD-0001.
153. On 40P-7042A/B, propane feed pumps, to 40P-7042A OR 40P-7042B OR 40P-7042A NONE 700 10FCS-7016 1500-XZ-DM-40-076
automatic start of spare pump if in operation 40P-7042B
pump stops.
154. On 10T-7051, stripper column, low low 10LSLL-7314 10P-7051A/B, 10LV-7315, 10HV-7306 NONE 700 10FCS-7030 1500-XZ-DM-10-73B
level in 10LSLL-7314 to stop 1oP-7051A/B,
recovered propane pumps and close 10LV-
7315 and 10HV-7306, to close hydrocarbons
feed t o10T-7052, 10P-7051A/B.
155. On 10E-7054, splitter column condenser, 10LSLL-7301 10P-7051A/B NONE 700 10FCS-7031 1500XZ-DM-10-73C
low low level in 10LSLL-7301 to stop 10P-
7051A/B.
156. On 10T-7052, splitter column, low low 10LSLL-7306 10P-7052A/B, 10HV-7305 NONE 700 10FCS-7032 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
level in 10LSLL-7306, to close 10HV-7305,
discharge value and stop condensed HC pump
10P-7052A/B.
157. On 10P-7051A/B, splitter column 10P-7051A/B 10P-7051A OR 10P--7051B NONE 700 10FCS-7034 1500-XZ-DM-10-73C
recovered pumps, to automatic start of spare
pump if in operation pump stops.
158. On 40D-7041, purified propane storage 40LT-7601 10FV-7202 NONE 700 40FCS-7035 1500-XZ-DM-40-076
40LT-7601 tank, to close 10FV-7202 due to
high level in 40LT-7601.
159. On 10C-7012, nitrogen compressor, to 10C-7012, 10PT- 10PLC-7005, 10C-7012, 10E-7015 The final 700 10PLC-7001 1500-XZ-DM-10-
stop compressor, activation 10PLC-7005, and 7018, 10PT-7013, element of
10TT-7011, 10TT-
shut down 10E-7015, nitrogen heater, due to 7012 mentioned
low pressure in 10PT-7018, high temp. In items in final
10TT-7011, high pressure in 10PT-7013, high element
temp. In 10TT-7012, and stoppage of 10C- column are
7012. included in
other final
element section
160. On 10E-7045, regeneration nitrogen XA-7512, 10HS- 10HV-7510, 10E-7045 NONE 700 10PLC-7002 1500-XZ-DM-10-
heater, to close 10HV-7510, regeneration gas 7510, 10TT-7509
from 10E-7045, and cut off 10E-7045, due to
XA-7512, general alarm from 10E-7045 panel,
closing 10HS_7510, board manual operation,
high temperature in 10TT-7509
Other Final
Element
161. On 10T-7044A , propane drying tower, 10PSH-7240 10HV-7243 NONE 700 10PLC-7003 1500-XZ-DM-10-72E
high pressure on bottom stage, to control
10HV-7243. (Valve 10HV-7243 can not be
opened by 10HS-7243 and it will be opened if
the PSH-7240 is not in alarm mode)
162. On 10T-7044B, propane drying tower, 10PSH-7241 10HV-7244 NONE 700 10PLC-7004 1500-XZ-DM-10-72E
high pressure on bottom stage to control 10HV-
7244 (valve 10HV-7244 can not be opened by
10HS-7244 and it will be opened if the PSH-
7241 is not in alarm mode
163. On 10-T-7011A/B, ethylene feed 10TT-7002A, 10FV-7001 NONE 700 10PLC-7005 1500-XZ-DM-10-70A
preheater, to close 10FV-7001, to close INA for 10TT-7003A,
10TT-7004A,
regeneration due to high high temp. in 10TT- 10AAH-701,
7002A, 10TT-7003A, 10TT-7004A, activating of 10PLC-7001
10AAH-7001, oxygen in BDM line and 10PLC-
7001 to stop
164. On 10E-7045, propane regeneration 10TI-7511 10HS-7514 NONE 700 10PLC-7006 1500-XZ-DM-10-75C
nitrogen heater to control temperature
3. SIL STUDY - RISK GRAPH
Node: 1.
Area: AREA 100

Interlock ID: 10ESD-0001
Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-01A-ISO4
Initiators: 10-HS-0100
Final Element: 10ESD-0010, 10ESD-0011, 10ESD-1011, 10ESD-1012, 10ESD-1013, 10ESD-2001, 10ESD-2007,10FCS-7014,10FCS-7015, 10FCS-7040, ELECTRICAL POWER
SIL determination
Risk Graph (Semi-qualitative

Risk method)
Design Intent Demand Scenario CoFoD IPLs Red Required Actions
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to plant due to Any emergency circumstances 1.1. Possible personnel injury, 1.1. PSV's and other safety 100 S A G W SIL 1 Study on
any serious emergency circumstances which can lead to significant potential leakage or consideration will be activated. 3 2 2 providing
1
by actuating10HS-0100. consequences dispersion, potential spare hand
explosion.
switch.
1.2. Potential leak lead to 1.2. None 0 G W E SIL 2
environmental 2 3
1
Node: 2.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-01B-ISO4
Initiators: 10HS-0102
Final Element: ELECTRIC POWER
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent fire or any other damage Deep seated fire or any other fire 1.1. Possible fire increases the 1.1. Operator interventions 10 S A G W SIL 1
due to electric power existence by scenario, any emergency consequence of fire or considered to be possible. 2 2 1 2
actuating 10ESD-0002. circumstances in extrusion emergency circumstances.
building.
Node: 3.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-01A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-01B-ISO4
Initiators: 10HS-0101,10ESD-0001
Final Element: 10HV-0101A, 10HV-0101B, 10HV-0101C, 10HV-0101D, 10HV-0101E,10HV-0101F,10HV-0101G, 10HV-0101H, 10HV-0101I,10ESD-0011
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate polymerization plant by Any emergency circumstances 1.1. Increasing unrequired 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL2
closing 10-HV-0101 A/B/C/D/E/F/G/H/I need to isolate the plant inventory to plant may lead to considered to be possible. 3 2 2 1
and actuating 10ESD-0011 consequence increment
caused by fire scenarios,
possible overpressure and
leakage.
Node: 4.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-72B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-72C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-72D-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4
Initiators: 10HS-0103,10ESD-0001,10ESD-0010
Final Element: 10FCS-7006, 10ESD-7008, 10ESD-7011, 10ESD-7012, 40FCS-7014, 40FCS-7015
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate purification unit by Polymerization emergency shut 1.1. Possible overpressure 1.1. Operation intervention 10 S A G W SIL2 The SIL
actuating 10-ESD-0001, 10-ESD-0010 down, stop feeding to and leakage, increasing considered to be possible. 3 2 2 1 estimation is
and starting 10-HS-0103 to shut off 10- polymerization unit. unrequired inventory to plant belong for
T-7401, 10-T-7042, 10-T-7043, 10-T- may lead to consequence
7061 and stopping 40-P-7042A/B. increment caused by fire
initiators
scenarios. include 10-HS-
0103, 10-ESD-
0001and 10-
ESD-0010
Node: 5.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10BE-1101A/B, 10BE-1121A/B

Final Element: 10HV-1109 A/B, 10HV-1102, 10-9-1001 A/B, 10ESD-1007
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate alkyl-1 metering drum 10- Flame detection by flame 1.1. Development of fire 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
D-1001A by closing 10-HV-1109A/B, detection system. scenario due to lack of control considered to be possible, double 3 2 1 1
stopping 10-P-1001A/B and actuating on inventory. valves have been considered, 10-
10-ESD-1007 HV-1005 is provided on outlet line
from TIBAL cylinder.
Node: 6.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10BE-1102
Final Element: 10HV-1104, 10-P-1001 A, 10HV-1106
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate pump by closing 10-HV- Flame detection by flame 1.1. Possible fire extension, 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
1104 and 10-HV-1106 and stopping detection system. explosion. considered to be possible, 10-PSV- 3 2 1 1
10P-1001A. 1102-R and 10PSV-XXXX provided
in pump suction/ discharge and
pump.
Node: 7.
Area: AREA 100

Final Element: 10HV-1105, 10HV-1107, 10-P-1001 B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate pump by closing 10-HV- Flame detection by flame 1.1. Possible fire extension, 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
1105 and 10-HV-1107 and stopping 10- detection system. explosion. considered to be possible, 10-PSV- 3 2 1 1
P-1001B. 1103R and 10PSV-XXXX provided
in suction /discharge line and pump.
Node: 8.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10BE-1104,10BE-1124
Final Element: 10HV-1102, 10-P-1001 A/B, 10HV-1104, 10HV-1105, 10ESD-1010
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate alkyl-1 filter (10FT-1001A) Flame detection by flame 1.1. Potential fire extension, 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
by closing 10HV_1002, 10HV-1104, detector system explosion considered to be possible, 10PSV- 3 2 1 1
10HV-1105, stopping 10-P-1001A/B 1102R, 10PSV-1103R, 10PSV-
and actuating 10ESD-1010 XXXX are provided.
Node: 9.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-10A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-10B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4
Initiators: 10HS-1001,10HS-1002,10HS-1021,10HS-1022,10BE-1001,10BE-1021
Final Element: 10HV-1005, 10HV-1006, 10HV-1007, 10ESD-1006, 10HV-1109 A/B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop alkyl-1 and alkyl-2 feeding Any emergency circumstances 1.1. Possible fire extension, 1.1. Operation intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
by closing 10HV-1005, 10HV-1106 and such as fire detection by flame explosion. considered to be possible, double 3 2 1 1
10HV-1109A/B, actuating 10ESD-1006 detection system or valves are provided for isolation.
and opening 10HV-1007 to blanket overpressure.
alkyl-1 to 10-Z-1001.
Node: 10.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-10A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-10B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4
Initiators: 10HS-1001,10HS-1002,10HS-1021,10HS-1022,10BE-1001,10BE-1021
Final Element: 10HV-1025, 10HV-1026, 10HV-1027, 10HV-1129 A/B, 10ESD-1005
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop alkyl-1 and alkyl-2 feeding Any emergency circumstances 1.1. Possible fire extension, 1.1. Operation intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
by closing 10HV-1025, 10HV-1129A/B such as, fire detection by flame explosion. considered to be possible, double 3 2 1 1
and 10HV-1026, actuating 10ESD- detection system, overpressure. valves are provided for isolation.
1005 and opening 10HV-1027 to
blanket alkyl to 10Z-1001.
Node: 11.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10BE-1121A/B,10BE-1101A/B
Final Element: 10HV-1129, 10HV-1122, 10-P-1001 C/D, 10ESD-1001
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate alkyl-2 metering drum (10- Flame detection by flame 1.1. Development of fire 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
D-1001B) by closing 10-HV-1129A/B, detection system. scenario due to lack of control considered to be possible, double 3 2 1 1
10-HV-1122, stopping 10-P-1001C/D on inventory. valves have been considered, 10-
and actuating 10-ESD-1001. HV-1025 is provided on outlet line
from TIBAL cylinder.
Node: 12.
Area: AREA 100

Final Element: 10HV-1124, 10-P-1001 C, 10HV-1126
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate pump by closing 10HV- Flame detection by flame 1.1. Possible fire extension, 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
1126 and stopping 10-P-1001C. detection system explosion. considered to be possible, 10PSV- 3 2 1 1
1122R and 10PSV-XXXX provided
in suction/ discharge and pump
Node: 13.
Area: AREA 100

Final Element: 10HV-1125, 10-P-1001 D, 10HV-1127
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate pump by closing 10HV- Flame detection by flame 1.1. Possible fire extension, 1.1. Operators intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
1125, and 10HV-1127 and stopping detection system. explosion. considered to be possible, 10PSV- 3 2 1 1
10P-1001D. 1123R and 10PSV-XXXX are
provided in suction/discharge pump.
Node: 14.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10-BE-1124,10BE-1104
Final Element: 10HV-1122, 10-P-1001 C/D, 10HV-1124, 10HV-1125, 10ESD-1004
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate alkyl-2 filter (10FT-1001B) Flame detection by flame 1.1. Potential fire extension, 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL1
by closing 10HV-1122, 10HV-1121, detector system explosion considered to be possible, 10PSV- 3 2 1 1
10HV-1125, stopping 10P-1001 C/D 1122, 10PSV_1123, 10PSV-XXXX
and actuating 10ESD-1004 are provided.
Node: 15.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10LSH-1104,10LSH-1103,10ESD-0001
Final Element: 10ESD-1012, 10ESD-1013, 10FV-1103, BOARD SIGNAL
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop feeding to alkyl drum by High level alarm in 10LSH-1104 1.1. Damage to pump due to 1.1. Operator intervention possible 100 S A G W SIL
actuating 10ESD-1012 and 10ESD- an 10LSH-1103. running in shut off pressure, to be considered, 10PSV 1102, 10 2 2 1 2
1013. possible overpressure, PSV -1103 and 10PSV-XXXX
leakage, safety issues. provided in pumps and pump
discharge.
Node: 16.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10LT-1101,10LT-1102,10ESD-1011,10ESD-0001
Final Element: 10HV-1109 A/B, 10HV-1005, 10HV-1006, 10HV-1007, BOARD SIGNAL
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop feeding to 10-D-1001A, alkyl High high level alarm in 10LT- 1.1. Possible overpressure, 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL --
metering drum by closing 10HV-1109 1102 and 10LT-1101, actuation possible extension of fire due considered to be possible, double 2 2 1 2 -
A/B, 10HV-1005, and blanketing alkyl of 10ESD-1011 and 10ESD- to increasing in inventory, loss SIS primary element and final
to 10-Z-1001 by closing 10HV-1006 0001. of containment. element) considered.
and opening 10HV-1007.
Node: 17.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-10B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4
Initiators: 10LT-1121,10LT-1122,10ESD-1011,10ESD-0001
Final Element: 10HV-1129 A/B, 10HV-1025, 10HV-1026, 10HV-1027, BOARD SIGNAL
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop feeding to 10-D-1001B, alkyl High high level alarm in 10LT- 1.1. Possible overpressure, 1.1. Operator intervention 100 S A G W SIL --
metering drums by closing 10HV- 1121 and 10LT-1122, actuation possible extension of fire due considered to be possible double 2 2 1 2 -
1129A/B, 10HV-1025 and blanketing of 10ESD-1011 and 10ESD- to increasing in inventory, loss SIS (primary element and final
alkyl to 10-Z-1001 by closing 10HV- 0001. of containment. element) considered.
1026 and opening 10HV-1027.
Node: 18.
Area: AREA 100

Interlock ID: 10FCS-1002
Initiators: 10XS-1002
Final Element: 10HV-1005, BOARD SIGNAL
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent explosion and damage to cut off ground connection. 1.1. Possible accumulation of 1.1. Operator shall check the 10 S A G W SIL1
cylinder and process upset due to electricity, fire, explosion. connection before start to operation 2 2 2 2
disconnecting of ground connection of cylinder.
and accumulation of electricity by
closing 10HV-1005 to stop feeding.
Node: 19.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10PT-1402,10-HV-1403
Final Element: 10HV-1405, BOARD SIGNAL;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high pressure for better High pressure in 10PT-1402. 1.1. Undesired pressure 1.1. None 0 S A G W SIL --
mixing and transfer catalyst mud from conditions lead to improper 0 2 1 2 -
dispersion drum to metering by catalyst mixing, back mixing of
nitrogen pressure, by opening 10HV- catalyst dispersion in to the oil/
1403 and opening 10HV-1405. grease fine lead to high
pressure in the mentioned
line.
Node: 20.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-015-ISO4
Initiators: 10PT-1502
Final Element: 10-P-1011 A/B, BOARD SIGNAL
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of oil due to low Low/high pressure alarm by 1.1. Loss of propellant for 1.1. (HOLD) HOL S A G W HOLD
pressure /high pressure in oil line by 10PT-1502. syringe and additive for D 0 2 1 2
starting up 10-P-1011A/B stopping catalysts/ high pressure lead
pumps. to over pressure.
Node: 21.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10LT-1301,10HS-1303
Final Element: 10HV-1303, BOARD SIGNAL
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop feeding to oil drum due to High high level alarm in 10LT- 1.1. Possible carry over to 10- 1.1. High level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL --
high level or any other emergency 1301, drum outlet blockage, D-1016, oil hydraulic guard, 10LT-1301, operator intervention 0 2 1 2 -
circumstances by closing 10HV-1303. operator error. lead to overflow from 10-D- considered to be possible.
1016..
Node: 22.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10XS-1022
Final Element: 10HV-1025
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent explosion and damage to cut off ground connection. 1.1. Possible accumulation of 1.1. Operator shall check the 10 S A G W SIL 1
cylinder and process upset due to electricity fire, explosion. connection before start to operation 2 2 2 2
disconnecting of ground connection of cylinder.
and accumulation of electricity by
closing 10HV-1025 to stop feeding.
Node: 23.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10-PT-1422,10HV-1423
Final Element: 10HV-1425;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high pressure for better High pressure in 10PT-1422. 1.1. Undesired pressure 1.1. None 0 S A G W SIL --
mixing and transfer catalyst mud from conditions lead to improper 0 2 1 1 -
dispersion drum to metering by catalyst mixing, back mixing of
nitrogen pressure, by opening 10HV- catalyst dispersion in to the oil/
1423 and opening 10HV-1425. grease line lead to high
pressure in the mentioned
line.
Node: 24.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10_PT-1201
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to donor dryer High high pressure alarm in 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. 10PSV-1201 is provided for 100 S A G W SIL --
packing bed due to high pressure by 10PT-1201. donor dryer lead to loss of donor dryer, high pressure alarm is 2 2 1 2 -
closing 10HV-1201 to stop nitrogen containment explosion and provided in 10PT-1201, operator
feeding. safety issues. intervention considered to be
possible.
Node: 25.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10-TT-1202
Final Element: 10-E-1004
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to heater and High high temperature in 10-TT- 1.1. Decrease of dryer 1.1. High temperature alarm 10 S A G W SIL --
packing in donor dryer by shutting off 1202. efficiency, possible damage to provided in 10-TT-1201. 0 2 1 1 -
10-E-1004. heater.
Node: 26.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10-P-1006A or 10-P-1006B

Final Element: 10-P-1006 A OR 10-P-1006 B
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of antistatic agent Stoppage of each pump 10-P- 1.1. Loss of antistatic agent 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL --
due to pump stoppage by starting 1006A or 10-P-1006B. may lead to damage to reactor considered to be possible. 0 2 1 1 -
space pump.
Node: 27.
Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-017-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-018-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-11A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-11B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-013-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4
Initiators: 10-FT-1701,10FCS-2003,10ESD-2001,10YLH-1701,10-ST-1701,10-FT-1801,10YLH-1801,10-ST-1801,10HZLH-1701,10HZLH-1801
Final Element: 10-P-1001 A/B, 10-P-1001 C/D, 10-P-1004 A/B, 10-P-1010 A/B, 10FV-1701, 10FXV-1701, 10FV-1801, 10FXV-1801, 10FV-1802, 10-A-1001, 10-A-1002, 10HV-2101 C ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent to improper catalyst Loss of propane from battery 1.1. Possible shut down of 1.1. Check valve provided in 100 S A G W SIL --
activation due to loss of propane may limit, or due to any other reason, reactor due to improper propane line, 10PSV-1702 and 10- 2 2 1 2 -
lead to improper reaction in rector, malfunction in 10-HV-1701 or reactions, possible back flow PSV-1801 are provided in
damage to agitators due to high density 10HV-1801, high high level in of propane, possible loss of precontacting pots.
/ viscosity of pot content, plugging of 10-R-2001, shutdown of 10-C- containment due to pot line
pot outlet line, by cutting off 10-P-1001 2001, low low speed of agitators, blockage.
A/B, 10-P-1001C/D, 10-P-1004A/B, 10- tripping of agitators, blow down
P-1010A/B, shutting off 10-FV-1701, of 10-R-1001,1002 contents,
10FXV-1701, 10-FV-1801, 10FXV- high high temperature in 10-R-
1801, 10FV-1802, 10HV-2101C and 2001.
stopping 10A-1001 and 10A-1002.
Node: 28.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10TT-1403
Final Element: 10TV-1401 A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high temp. in the catalyst High high temperature in 10-TT- 1.1. Possible setting of 1.1. High temperature alarm 10 S A G W SIL --
dispersion drum leading to low viscosity 1403 catalyst in the mixture and provided in 10-TT-1403, 10TT-1401 0 2 1 1 -
of catalyst mud, by closing 10TV- thus, non-uniform catalyst provided in steam line.
1401A. feed to reactor lead to process
upset condition.
Node: 29.
Area: AREA 100

Initiators: 10-TT-1423
Final Element: 10TV-1421 A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high temp. In the catalyst High high temperature i n10-TT- 1.1. Possible settling of 1.1. High temperature alarm 10 S A G W SIL --
dispersion drum leading to low viscosity 1423. catalyst in the mixture and provided in 10-TT-1423, 10TT-1421 0 2 1 1 -
of catalyst mud, by closing 10-TV-1421. thus non-uniform catalyst feed provided in steam line.
to reactor, possible process
upset condition.
Node: 31.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-21A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-21B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-30A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-32A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-32B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4
Initiators: 10ESD-0001,10HS-2101,10C-2001
Final Element: 10FCS-1014, 10ESD-2009, 10FV-2102, 10FXV-2102, 10FV-2101 A/B, 10FXV-2101, 10FV-2105 A/B, 10FXV-2105, 10FV-2106, 10FXV-2106, 10FV-2104, 10FXV-2104, 10HV-2106 A/B, 10FV-2201, 10FXV-2201,
10FCS-2004, 10-C-2001, 10LV-3201, 10HV-2123, 10HV-2124, 10FV-2121, 10FXV-2121, 10FV-2118, 10FXV-2118, 10LV-3005, 10LXV-3005, 10FV-2119, 10LV-7305, 10LXV-7305
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate 10-C-2001 and shut it any emergency conditions 1.1. Possible loss of feed to 1.1. PSV's (such as PSV-2101 A/B) 100 S A G W SIL---
down after 10 seconds of 10-ESD- required to stop feeding to reactor leading to loss of provided in Process 2 1 2 2
2001activation by actuating 10-FCS- reactor product, possible increase in
1014 and 10-ESD-2009, shutting off inventory due to nonstop
10-FV-2102, 10-FXV-2102, 10-FV- feeding in fire scenario.
2101 A/B, 10-FXV-2101, 10-FV-
2105A/B, 10-FXV-2105, 10-FV-2106,
10-FXV-2106, 10-FV-2104, 10-FXV-
2104, 10-HV-2106A/B, 10-FV-2201,
10-FXV-2201, for 10-ESD-0001
activation and 10-HS-2101 starting 10-
FCS-2004 shall be activated and 10-C-
2001 stops after 20-40-Sec.
After 60-120 second shutting off 10-LV-
3201, 10-HV-2123, 10-HV-2124, 10-
FV-2121, 10-FXV-2121, 10-FV-2118,
10-FXV-2118, 10-LV-3005, 10-LXV-
3005, 10-FV-2119, 10-FXV-2119, 10-
LV-7305, 10-LXV-7305 and sending
signal to activation of board status
Area 200
Node: 32.
Area: AREA 200

Final Element: 10PV-2107, 10PV-2108 A/B, 10PXV-2108 A
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate tube side of heat High high pressure in 10-PT- 1.1. Loss of containment due 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
exchanger, 10-E-2010, due to tube 2107 to leakage, possible 10-PT-2107, operator intervention 0 2 1 2
failure or high high pressure in steam overpressure, no serious considered to be possible.
side by closing, 10-PV-2107 and 10- safety issues.
PV-2108.
Node: 33.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-PT-2203,10HV-2201B, 10HV-2201D

Final Element: 10HV-2201 A, 10HV-2201 C
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent feeding to first 10-R-2002 High high pressure in 10-PT- 1.1. Build up of level in D- 1.1. High level alarm provided in 10- 100 S A G W SIL --
feeding hopper by closing 10-HV- 2203, malfunction in 10-HV- 2001A, possible blockage in LT-2205, 10-PSV-2201, high high 0 2 1 2 -
2201A and 10-HV-2201C due to high 2201B and 10-HV-2201D outlet of filter discharge, level alarm provided in 10-LT-2201.
high pressure in hopper or malfunction posible overpressure.
of 10-HV-2201B and 10-HV-2201D.
Node: 34.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10PT-2204, 10HV-2202B, 10HV-2202D

Final Element: 10HV-2202 A, 10HV-2202 C
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent feeding to second reactor High high pressure in 10-PT- 1.1. Buildup of level 10-D- 1.1. 10-PSV-2201 provided in 100 S A G W SIL --
10-R-2002, feeding hopper, by closing 2204, malfunction in 10-HV- 2001B, possible blockage in system, high level alarm provided in 0 2 1 1 -
10-HV-2202A and 10-HV-2202C due to 2202B and 10-HV-2202D outlet of filter discharge, 10-LT-2206 and high high level
high high pressure in hopper or possible overpressure. alarm provided in 10-LT-2202.
malfunction in 10-HV-2202B and 10-
HV-2202.
Node: 35.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10HV-2201A,10HV-2201C,10HV-2201E
Final Element: 10HV-2201 B, 10HV-2201 D
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To cut off discharge of 10-D-2001A malfunction in 10-HV-2201A/C/E 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL --
and pressurization line due to second reactor level to 10-PT-2203, 10-PSV-2201 provided 0 2 1 2 -
malfunction in 10-HV-2201 A/C/E by process upset. in system.
closing 10-HV-2201 B/D.
Node: 36.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10HV-2202A, 10HV-2202C, 10HV-2202E

Final Element: 10HV-2202 B, 10HV-2202 D
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To cut off discharge of 10-D-2001B malfunction in 10-HV-2202 A/C/E 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL --
and pressurization line due to second reactor lead to 10-PT-2204, 10-PSV-2201S 0 2 1 2 -
malfunction in 10-HV-2202 A/C/E by process upset. proivded in system.
closing 10-HV-2202B/D.
Node: 37.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-23A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-23B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4
Initiators: 10-ESD-0001, 10-C-2002, 10-HS-2301

Final Element: 10ESD-2010, 10FV-2302, 10FXV-2302, 10FXV-2301, 10FV-2301, 10FV-2305, 10FV-2306, 10FXV-2305, 10FXV-2306
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To shut down 10-C-2002 after 20 Any emergency conditions 1.1. Possible loss of feed 1.1. PSV's 2301 A/B have been 100 S A G W SIL --
seconds of activation 10-ESD-0001 requirded to stop feeding to leading to loss of product, provided in system 2 2 1 2 -
and 10-HS-2301, to isolate 10-C-2002 reactor possible increase in inventory
by giving signal to stop 10-D-2001A/B due to nonstop feeding in fire
(actuate 10-FCS-2013/ 10FCS-2014), scenario.
actuating 10-ESD-2010 , closing 10-Fv-
2301, 10-FXV-2302, 10-Fv-2301A/B,
10-FXV-2301, 10-FV-2305A/B, 10-
FXV-2305, 10-FV-2306, 10-FXV-2306,
10-Fv-2304, 10-FXV-2304, 10-HV-
2306A/B, 10-FV-2401, 10-FXV-2401.
After 60-120 second shutting off 10-LV-
3202, 10-LXV-3202, 10-HV-2323, 10-
HV-2324, 10-FV-2321, 10-FXV-2318,
10-LV-3007, 10-LXV-3007, 10-LV-
7305, and 10-LXV-7305 and sending
signal to activation of board status.
Node: 38.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4
Initiators: 10-PDT-2408, 10-LT-5008

Final Element: 10LV-2401;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent 10-FT-2002, 10-R-2002 High high level in 10-D-5001, low 1.1. Potential plugging of filter 1.1. 10-PSV-2401A/B previded in 100 S A G W SIL --
recycles gas filters discharge by closing low pressure diff. in 10-PDT- bottom and thus overfilling, no filter, 10-LT-2401 and 10-LT-2404 0 2 1 1 -
10-LV-2401 in low low pressure diff. in 2408. safety issues. are proivded
10-PDT-2408 and high high level in 10-
D-5001.
Node: 39.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-020-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4
Initiators: 10HS-2023,10ESD-2001,10ESD-2010,10-TT-2104 A/B/C, 10-TT-2105 A/B/C, 10-PT-2021

Final Element: 10HV-2021, 10HV-2022, 10HV-2023 A/B/C/D/E, 10FCS-2005
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To terminate the reaction quickly in Activating 10-HS-2023, 10-ESD- 1.1. Co kill will not be 1.1. NO IPL 0 S A G W SIL3
any emergency cases such as 2001, 10-ESD-2010, high high achieved, possible process 3 2 1 1
activation of 10-ESD-2001, compressor temp. in 10-TT-2105A/B/C upset, possible safety issues.
shut down, 10-ESD-2010, emergency (2003) and 10-TT-2104 A/B/C
killer injection in 10-R-2002, or starting
10-HS-2023 by closing 10-HV-2021,
vent valve to flare, opening 10-HV-
2022 main valve on CO cylinders,
opening 10-HV-2023 A/B/C/D/E and
actuating 10-ECS-2005.
Node: 40.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-020-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4
Initiators: 10-HS-2026, 10-ESD-2007, 10-TT-2305A/B/C, 10-TT-2304A/B/C, 10-PT-2022

Final Element: 10HV-2024, 10HV-2025, 10HV-2026 A/B/C/D/E, 10ESD-2009, 10ESD-2010, 10ESD-2017
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To terminate the reaction quickly in Actuating 10-HS-2026, 10-ESD- 1.1. Co kill will not be 1.1. No IPL 0 S A G W SIL3
any emergency cases such as 2007, high high temp. Alarm in achieved, possible process 3 2 1 1
activation of 10-ESD-2007, compressor 10-TT-2305 A/B/C and 10-TT- upset, possible safety issues.
shutdown, 10-HS-2026 and high high 2304A/B/C (2OO3).
temp. in 10-R-2002, by closing 10-HV-
2024, opening 10-HV-2025, 10-HV-
2026 A/B/C/D/E, and actuating 10-
ESD-2010, 10-ESD-2009 and 10-FCS-
2017.
Node: 41.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-HZLL-2201B, 10-HZLL-2201D

Final Element: 10HV-2201 E;
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent 10-D-2001A feeding by 10-HZLL-2201B, 10-HZLL- 1.1. Possible buildup of level, 1.1. 10-PSV-2201 provided in 10- 100 S A G W SIL --
closing 10-HV_2201E due to 10-HV- 2201D NOT ACTIVE possible blockage in drum FT-2001 0 2 1 2 -
2201B/D malfunction inlet.
Node: 42.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10HZLL-2202B, 10HZLL-2202D

Final Element: 10HV-2202 E;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent 10-D-2001B feeding by 10-HZLL-2202B, 10-HZLL- 1.1. Possible buildup of level, 1.1. 10-PSV-2201 provided in 10- 100 S A G W SIL --
closing 10-HV-2202E due to 10-HV- 2202D not active possible blockage in drum FT-2001 0 2 1 2 -
2202B/D malfunction inlet.
Node: 43.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4
Initiators: 10-LT-2104
Final Element: 10FCS-1014
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To catalyst shut off in 10-R-2001 due High high level in reactor 10-R- 1.1. High bed level in reactor 1.1. High level alarm in 10-LT-2104, 100 S A G W SIL---
to high high level in reactor 2001 may lead to carry over of 10-LT-2101A/B AND 10-LT-2103 2 2 1 1
polymer fines to gas are provided in reactor, 10-PSV-
circulation compressor 2101A/B provided.
suction, possible damage to
compressor, possible
overpressure, and possible
explosion.
Node: 44.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10HS-2101, Signal from 10-ESD-2001

Final Element: 10PV-2101 A, 10-C-2001, 10HV-2101, 10FCS-2004;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To depressurize 10-R-2001 by Activation of 10-HS-2101 due to 1.1. Possible overpressure 1.1. 10-PSV-2101A/B provided in 100 S A G W SIL1
opening 10-PV-2101A, shutting down any emergency circumstances. and explosion, possible first stage reactor, 3 2 1 1
10-C-2001, closing 10-HV-2101 due to process upset.
starting 10-HS-2101
Node: 45.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-TT-2105A/B/C (2OO3), 10-TT-2104 A/B/C (2OO3) , 10-FCS-2017

Final Element: 10PIC-2101 A, 10FV-2105 A/B, 10FXV-2105, 10FV-2106, 10FXV-2106, 10FV-2101 A/B, 10FXV-2101, 10FCS-1014
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate reactor due to high high High high temp. in 10-TT-2105 1.1. Possible melting of 1.1. High temperature provided in 100 S A G W SIL---
temperature by setting 10-PK-2101A at A/B/C and 10-TT-2104 A/B/C polymer powder followed by 10-TE-2106, 10-TT-2101, and SIS 2 2 1 1
25 barg, closing 10-FV-2105A/B, 10- activation of 10-FCS-2107. plugging of reactor bottom, SIL 2 provided for 10-T-2104 and
FXV-2105, 10-FV-2106, 10-FXV-2106, possible damage to 10-T-2105, 10-PSV-2101A/B
10-FV-2101A/B, 10-FXV-2101, and compressor, possible high provided in system.
actuating 10-FCS-2005. pressure in reactor.
Node: 46.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10HZLL-2106A, 10-HZLL-2106B, 10HZLL-2117

Final Element: 10HV-2106 A,10HV-2106 B, 10HV-2117
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To send signal of discharge To discharge of product polymer 1.1. Possible build up of 1.1. SIS provided for valves 10-HV- 100 S A G W SIL1
permission in 10-HV-2106A/B, 10-HV- continuously polymer bed level in reactor 2106A/B, 10-PSV-2101A/B provided 2 2 1 3
2317, to discharge polymer from will be associated by reduction in system
reactor. in recycle gas flow due to
increased pressure drop
across polymer bed-possible
high temperature in the bottom
of reactor possible plugging,
possible overpressure in
reactor.
Node: 47.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-21A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-21B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4
Initiators: 10PT-2101B, 10-PT-2102B

Final Element: 10FV-2101 A/B, 10FXV-2101, 10FV-2102, 10FXV-2102, 10FV-2104, 10FXV-2104, 10HV-2124, 10FV-2105 A/B, 10FXV-2105 A/B, 10FXV-2105, 10FV-2106, 10FXV-2106;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate reactor due to high high High high pressure in 10-PT- 1.1. Possible reduction in 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL1
pressure, by closing 10-FV-2101A/B, 2101B and 10-PT-2102B polymer production and off- 10-PT-2101B, 10-PT-2102B, PSV- 3 2 1 1
10-FXV-2101, 10-FV-2102, 10-FXV- spec polymer generation, 2101A/B provided in reactor system.
2102, 10-FV-2104, 10-FXV-2104, 10- overpressure in reactor,
HV-2123, 10-HV-2124, 10-FV- possible loss of containment,
2105A/B, 10-FXV-2105, 10-FV-2106 fire and explosion, serious
and 10-FXV-2106. safety issues.
Node: 48.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10HV-2118, Operator intervention

Final Element: 10HV-2118, 10HV-2117;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To open 10-HV-2118 at 100% and High level in reactor, operator 1.1. Possible build up level in 1.1. SIS provided for discharge 10 S A G W SIL1
prevent the action of 10-HIC- intervention reactor may lead to system. 2 2 1 2
2118(when operator requires to open overpressure
10-HV-2117, system asks the value of
opening for 10-HV-2118(20-50%)),
after required action by operator
system forces 10-HIC-2118, to the
valve asked for, then opens 10-HV-
2117 if 10-FCS-2006 is not active. to
the valve asked for,
Node: 49.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: it shall be active in normal process, in special circumstances 10-HZLL-2106A

Final Element: 10LV-2101 A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To open 10-LV-2101A sequentially Activation of 10-HZLL-2106A will 1.1. High level in reactor may 1.1. 10-PSV-2101A/B provided for 100 S A G W SIL---
to discharge the production polymer lead to opening of 10-LV-2101A lead to carryover of polymer reactor, SIS provided for reactor 2 2 1 2
from reactor for a given opening x, at 100%, normal operation fines to gas compressor, discharge.
given amount of time y, every z needs opening of this valve possible damage to
seconds. Moreover if 10-HZLL-2106A sequentially compressor, increasing
would be activated 10-LV-2101A shall pressure drop across polymer
be opened at 100%. bed lead to high temperature,
possible reactor plugging.
Node: 50.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: It shall be active in normal operation, is special circumstances 10-HZLL-2106B

Final Element: 10LV-2101 B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To open 10-LV-2101B sequentially, Actuation of 10-HZLL-2106B will 1.1. High level in reactor may 1.1. 10-PSV-2101A/B, provided for 100 S A G W SIL---
to discharge the production polymer lead to opening of 10-LV-2101B lead to carry-over of polymer reactor, SIS provided for reactor. 2 2 1 2
from reactor for a given opening x, at 100%, normal operation fines to gas compressor,
given amount of time y, every z needs opening of this valve possible damage to
seconds. Moreover if 10-HZLL-2106B sequentially. compressor, increasing
would be activated 10-LLI-2101B shall pressure drop across polymer
be opened at 100% bed lead to high temperature,
Node: 51.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-HV-2106A/B
Final Element: 10HV-2106 A/B
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To check the status of opening Opening of 10-HV-2106A/B 1.1. Misunderstanding of 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL1
values in the discharge of first stage opening valves in the considered to be possible 2 2 1 2
reactor. discharge of reactor may lead
to loss of outlet from reactor
and level build up in reactor
bed.
Node: 52.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-22B-ISO4
Initiators: 10-PT-2202
Final Element: 10HV-2106 A, 10HV-2106 B, 10HV-2117, 10FV-2118,10FXV-2118, 10FV-2201, 10FXV-2201, 10FV-2208, 10FXV-2208
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent feeding to 10-FT-2001 High high pressure alarm in 10- 1.1. Possible rupture in filter 1.1. PSV-2202 provided on 10-D- 100 S A G W SIL---
due to high high pressure in 10-PT- PT-2202 bag may lead to polymer fines 2003 for 10-PV-2205 full open case. 2 2 1 2
2202 by closing 10-HV-2106A/B, 10- carry over to guard filter.
HV-2117, 10-FV-2118, 10-FXV-2118,
10-FV-2201, 10-FXV-2201, 10-FV-
2208, 10-FXV-2208.
Node: 53.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-22A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4
Initiators: 10-HS-2201, 10-LT-2203, 10-LT-2201

Final Element: 10HV-2201 A, 10HV-2201 B, 10HV-2201 C, 10HV-2201 D, 10HV-2201 E, ; ;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To control polymer transfer from 10- Operator intervention, normal 1.1. Build up of level in D- 1.1. Interlock 10-FCS-2014 have 100 S A G W SIL---
FT-2001 to 10-R-2002 during filling, operation requirement, high level 2001A/B, in most case been provided, SIS has been 0 2 1 2
pressurization, unloading and alarm in 10-LT-2201. transfer line from FT-2001 to provided in feeding to second stage
depressurization of polymer. D-2001 A/B will be filled and reactor system.
possibly blocked.
Node: 54.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators:
Final Element: 10HV-2201 A, 10HV-2201 B, 10HV-2201 C, 10HV-2201 D, 10HV-2201 E
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. Refer to interlock 10-FCS-2013
Node: 55.
Area: AREA 200

Final Element: 10HV-2201 A, 10HV-2201 B, 10HV-2201 C, 10HV-2201 D, 10HV-2202 A, 10HV-2202 B, 10HV-2202 C, 10HV-2202 D
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop polymer transfer from 10-FT- High high pressure alarm in 10- 1.1. Possible rupture in filter 1.1. PSV-2202 provided on 10-D- 100 S A G W SIL---
2001 to 10-R-2002 by closing 10-HV- PT-2202 bag may leading to polymer 2003 for 10-PV-2204 full open case. 2 2 1 2
2201 A/B/C/D and 10-HV-2202 fires carry over to guard filter.
A/B/C/D
Node: 56.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-PT-2301B, 10-PT-2302B

Final Element: 10FV-2301 A/B, 10FXV-2301, 10FV-2302, 10FXV-2302, 10FV-2304, 10FXV-2304, 10HV-2323, 10HV-2324, 10FV-2305 A/B, 10FXV-2305, 10FV-2306, 10FXV-2306;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate reactor due to high high High high pressure in 10-PT- 1.1. Possible reduction in 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL1
pressure by closing 10-FV-2301A/B, 2301B and 10-PT-2302B polymer production and off- 10-PT-2301B and 10-PT-2302B, 3 2 1 1
10-FXV-2301, 10-FV-2302, 10-FXV- spec polymer generation, PSV-2301A/B provided in reactor
2302, 10-FV-2304, 10-FXV-2304, 10- overpressure in reactor, system
HV-2323, 10-HV-2324, 10-FV- possible loss of containment,
2305A/B, 10-FXV-2305, 10-FV-2306, fire and explosion, serious
10-FXV-2306. safety issues.
Node: 57.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-TT-2305A/B/C, 10-TT-2304A/B/C

Final Element: 10PIC-2301 A, 10FV-2305 A/B, 10FXV-2305, 10FV-2306, 10FXV-2306, 10FV-2301 A/B, 10FXV-2301, 10FCS-2005;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate reactor due to high high High high temp. in 10-TT- 1.1. Possible melting of 1.1. High temp. provided in 10-TE- 100 S A G W SIL---
temperature by setting 10-PIC-2301A 2305A/B/C and 10-TT-2304 polymer powder followed by 2306, 10-TT-2304A/B/C and 10-TT- 2 2 1 1
at 25 barg, closing 10-FV-2305A/B, 10- A/B/C. plugging of reactor bottom, 2305A/B/C, 10-PSV-2301A/B
FXV-2305, 10-FV-2306, 10-fXV- possible damage to provided in system.
2306,10-FV-2301A/B, 10-FXV-2301 compressor, possible high
and actuating 10-FCS-2005. pressure in reactor.
Node: 58.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-HS-2301
Final Element: 10PV-2301 A, 10HV-2301
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To depressurize second stage Actuation of 10-HS-2301. 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. 10-PSV-2301A/B provided in 100 S A G W SIL1
reactor due to actuation of 10-HS-2301 10-R-2002, possible reduction reactor, 10-PT-2301B and 10-PT- 3 2 1 1
by opening 10-PV-2301A and closing in plant capacity and off-spec 2302B provided to check the
10-HV-2301. polymer generation possible pressure.
loss of containment and safety
issues.
Node: 59.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-HZLL-2306A,10-HZLL-2306B,10-HZLL-2317
Final Element: 10HV-2306 A, 10HV-2306 B, 10HV-2317
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To send signal of discharge To discharge of product polymer 1.1. Possible build up of 1.1. SIS provided for values 10-HV- 100 S A G W SIL1
permission in 10-HV-2306A/B and 10- continuously polymer bed level in reactor 2106A/B, 10-PSV-2301 A/B 2 2 1 3
HV-2317 to discharge polymer from will be associated by reduction provided in system.
reactor. in recycle gas flow due to
increasing of pressure drop
across polymer bed, possible
high temp. in the bottom of
reactor, possible plugging and
overpressure in reactor.
Node: 60.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: it shall be activate in normal operation in special circumstances 10-HZLL-2306A

Final Element: 10LV-2301 A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To open 10-LV_2301A sequentially Activation of 10-HZLL-2306 A 1.1. High level in reactor may 1.1. 10-PSV-2301A/B provided for 100 S A G W SIL---
to discharge the production polymer will lead to opening of 10-LV- lead to carry over of polymer reactor, SIS provided for reactor 2 1 1 2
from reactor for a given opening x, 2301A at 100%, normal fines to gas compressor, discharge
given amount of time y, every z operation needs opening of this increasing pressure drop
seconds. Moreover if 10-HZLL-2306A valve sequentially. across polymer bed lead to
would be activated 10-LV-2301A shall high temp., possible reactor
be opened at 100%. plugging.
Node: 61.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: It shall be active in normal operation, in special circumstances 10-HZLL-2306B

Final Element: 10LV-2301 B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To open 10-LV-2301B sequentially Activation of 10-HZLL-2306B will 1.1. Hid level in reactor may 1.1. 10-PSV-2301A/B provided for 100 S A G W SIL---
to discharge the production polymer lead to opening of 10-LV-2301B lead to carry over of polymer reactor, SIS provided for reactor 2 2 1 2
from reactor for a given opening x, at 100%, normal operation reeds fines to gas compressor, discharge.
given amount of time y, every z opening of this valve possible damage to
seconds. Moreover if 10-HZLL-2106B sequentially. compressor, increasing
would be activated, 10-LV-2301B shall pressure drop across polymer
be opened at 100%. bed lead to high temp.
Node: 62.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-HV-2318, operators intervention

Final Element: 10HV-2318, 10HV-2317;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To open 10-HV-2318 at 100% and High level in reactor, operators 1.1. Possible build up level in 1.1. SIS provided for discharge 10 S A G W SIL1
prevent the action of 10-HIC-2318 intervention reactor may lead to over system 2 2 1 2
(when operator requires to open 10- pressure
HV-2317, system asks the valve of
opening for 10-HV-2318(20-50%)),
after required action by operator,
system forces 10-HIC-2318, to the
valve asked for, then opens 10-HV-
2317if 10-FCS-2019 is not active
Node: 63.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4
Initiators: 10FT-2401 operator intervention

Final Element: 10FV-2401;
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent more or low flow in gas Normal operation needs 1.1. Carry over of polymer 1.1. Low / high flow alarm provided 100 S A G W SIL1
transport by adjusting 10-FV-2401 adjusting valve 10-FV-2401 fines to gas compressor, in 10-FT-2401, PSV provided in 3 2 1 2
possible damage to system such as 10-PSV-2401 A/B
compressor, reduction in and 10-PSV-2301A/B
polymerization reaction high
temp. at the bottom of reactor,
possible plugging at the
bottom, possible over
pressure and safety issues
Node: 64.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-HV-2306A/B
Final Element: 10HV-2306 A/B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To check the status of opening Opening of 10-HV-2306A/B 1.1. Mis-understanding of 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL1
valves in the discharge of second stage opening valves in the considered to be possible 2 2 1 2
reactor. discharge of reactor may lead
to loss of outlet from reactor
and level build up in reactor
bed.
Node: 65.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-22B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4
Final Element: 10FV-2401, 10FXV-2401, 10HV-2201 E, 10HV-2202 E, 10FCS-2026
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate 10-FT-2002, second stage High high pressure in 10-PT- 1.1. No significant 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL---
reactor recycle gas filter, by actuating 2402 consequences will be 10-PT-2401, 10-PSV-2401A/B 0 2 1 2
10-FCS-2026, closing 10-FV-2401, 10- happened for filter provided in 10-FT-2002
FXV-2401, 10-HV-2201E and 10-HV-
2202E.
Node: 66.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-23C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-024-ISO4
Initiators: 10-LT-2404, 10-LT-2405, 10-FCS-2405

Final Element: 10HV-2306 A/B, 10FV-2318, 10FXV-2318, 10HV-2317
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop polymer feeding to 10-FT- High high pressure in recycle 1.1. Possible overfilling of CY- 1.1. High level alarm provided in 10- 100 S A G W SIL---
2002 due to high high level in 10-R- gas filter and inlet separates 2001 followed by plugging of LT-2403, high alarm provided in 10- 2 2 1 2
2002 recycle gas filter and inlet cyclone, actuation of 10-FCS- vapor line and reactor outlet LT-2401, PSV 2401A/B provided in
separators cyclone and actuation of 10- 2025. line, filter may be subjected to system.
FCS-2025 by closing 10-HV-2306A/B, reactor pressure condition,
10-FV-2318, 10-FXV-2318 and 10-HV- possible rupture in filter bag.
2317
Node: 67.
Area: AREA 200

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-21C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-22B-ISO4
Initiators: 10-LT-2204
Final Element: 10HV-2106 A, 10HV-2106 B, 10HV-2117, 10FV-2118, 10FXV-2118, 10FV-2201, 10FXV-2201
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to filter 10-FT- High high level in 10-LT-2204 1.1. Possible build up level in 1.1. High level alarm provided in 10- 100 S A G W SIL---
2001 due to high high level by closing 10-FT-2001 lead to reactor LT-2203, 10-PSV-2201 provided in 2 2 1 2
10-HV-2106 A/B, 10-HV-2117, 10-FV- outlet blockage, possible over filter.
2118, 10-fxv-2118, 10-fv-2201 and 10- pressure in reactor lead to
FXV-2201 process upset, possible loss of
containment.
Node: 68.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-PDALL-2102C, 10-PLC-3001, 10-PLC-3002

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to instruments or Low pressure differential in 10- 1.1. Abnormal reading from 1.1. Low pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
instrument measurement disturbance PDALL-2102, shutting off 10-PK- instrument and thus process 10-PT-2101A 2 2 1 2
due to loss of flushing gas by opening 3001A and 10-PK-3001B upset.
10-HV-2124 to open propane to
flushing header backup line
Node: 69.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-PDALL-2302, 10-PLC-3001, 10-PLC-3002, 10-PLC-3003, 10-PLC-3004

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to instruments or Low pressure differential in 10- 1.1. Abnormal reading from 1.1. Low pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
instrument measurement disturbance PDALL-2302, shutting off 10-PK- instrument and thus process 10-PT-2301A 2 2 1 2
due to loss of flushing gas by opening 3001A/B/C/D upset
10-HV-2324 to open propane to
flushing header back up line.
Node: 70.
Area: AREA 200

Initiators: 10-LSH-2105
Final Element: 10LV-2102, 10LXV-2102
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate 10-E-2010, by closing 10- High level alarm in 10-LSH-2105 1.1. Overpressure of 10-E- 1.1. 10-LT-2102 with high level 100 S A G W SIL---
LV-2102 and 10-LXV-2102 due to high due to operators error value 2010 and possible loss of alarm provided, 10-PT-2108 2 2 1 1
level in propane vaporizer. malfunction. containment. provided in vaporizer
Area 300
Node: 71.
Area: AREA 300

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-32A
Final Element: 10PV-3201
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high pressure in Tube failure in second 1.1. Possible loss of 1.1. Although PSV-8201 considered 100 S A G W SIL---
tube side, contamination of chilled hydrocarbon condenser lead to containment due to for external fire but it could be used 0 2 1 1
water and possible loss of containment high high pressure in tube side. overpressure, process upset during any other overpressure case,
due to overpressure, by closing 10PV- due to contamination of water operator intervention considered to
3201. with hydrocarbon, no be possible
significant safety issues.
Node: 72.
Area: AREA 300

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-32A
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high pressure in Tube failure in first hydrocarbon 1.1. Possible loss of 1.1. 10-PSV-3202 considered, 100 S A G W SIL---
tube side, contamination of CWR and condenser lead to high high containment due to operator intervention considered to 0 2 1 1
possible loss of containment due to pressure in tube side. overpressure, process upset be possible.
overpressure, by closing 10PV-3202 due to contamination of CWR
with hydrocarbon, no
significant safety issues.
Node: 73.
Area: AREA 300

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high pressure in Tube failure in second 1.1. Possible loss of 1.1. 10PSV-3203 considered, 100 S A G W SIL---
tube side, contamination of CHW and hydrocarbon condenser lead to containment due to operator intervention considered to 0 2 1 1
possible loss of containment due to high high pressure in tube side overpressure, process upset be possible
overpressure by closing 10PV-3203 due to contamination of CHW
with HC no significant safety
issues
Node: 74.
Area: AREA 300

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high pressure in Tube failure in first HC 1.1. Possible loss of 1.1. 10PSV-3204 considered, 100 S A G W SIL---
tube side, contamination of CWR and condenser lead to high high containment due to operator intervention considered to 2 2 1 1
possible loss of containment due to pressure in tube side overpressure, process upset be possible
overpressure, by closing 10PV-3204 due to contamination of CWR
with HC, no significant safety
issues.
Node: 75.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 10-LT-3002, 10-LT-3006

Final Element: 10P-3004A/B, 10FCS-3003;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent overfilling of 10D-3001or High high level in 10LT3002 or 1.1. Possible liquid carry over 1.1. High level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
10D-3007 and liquid carry over and 10LT-3006 may caused by outlet and damage to compressor 10LT-3001 and 10LT-3005, 2 2 1 2
possible damage to compressor by blockage, more flow from may lead to leakage
shutting down 10P-3004A/B and compressor, pump trips dispersion and in the worst
actuating 10FCS-3003. case jet fire
Node: 76.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 10-LT-3004, 10-LT-3008

Final Element: 10PLC-3004, 10PLC-3003, 10FCS-3003, 10P-3005;
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent overfilling of 10-D-3014 High high level in 10LT-3004 or 1.1. Possible liquid carry over 1.1. High level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
and liquid carry over and possible 10LT-3008 may caused by outlet and damage to compressor 10LT-3003 and 10LT-3007 provided 2 2 1 2
damage to compressor, by shutting blockage, more flow from may lead to leakage,
down 10P-3005A and B, activating compressor, pump trips dispersion and in the worst
10PLC-3003, 10PLC-3004 and 10ECS- case jet fire
3003
Node: 77.
Area: AREA 300

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-30A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-30B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-31A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-31B-ISO4
Initiators: 10-V-3107,10-V-3108,10V-3109,10-V-3110,10HV-3104,10HV-3102,10HV-3103,10-HV-3007,10HV-3006
Final Element: 10FCS-3001,10FCS-3002
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To select 10R-2001 recycle gas any circumstances lead to select 1.1. Possible loss of recycle 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL 1
compressor units 10PK-3001A/B to one of packages needs 10FCS- flushing gas may lead to considered to be possible. 2 1 1 2
prevent loss of recycle gas/ flushing 3003, 10PK-3001A and 10PK- damage to compressor (due to
gas by actuating 10FCS-3001 an 3001B (as spare) are normally loss of suction gas), plugging
10FCS-3002 and sending warning aligned t o10R-2001 recycle, but of instruments and thus
alarm to control room in cases in which one of them can be occasionally abnormal outputs, process
limit switches not fulfilled aligned to 10R-2002 recycle in upset
case of 10PK-3002A or B failure
Node: 78.
Area: AREA 300

Interlock ID: 10PLC-3001
Initiators: 10-PT-3102A,10PT-3103A,10-PT-3105A, 10PT-3104A,10TT-3101A,10TT-3102A, 10LT-3102A,10TT-3103A,10TT-3104A,10PT-3106A,10PT-3107A

Final Element: 10-C-3001A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to compressor, Low low pressure on compressor 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Double instruments considered 100 S A G W SIL---
10C-3001A, due to any undesired suction, low pressure on compressor, possible for each parameter with low / low 2 2 1 2
process conditions (mentioned in compressor suction, high overpressure, leakage, and jet low / high and high high alarm.
function name column) or emergency pressure on compressor suction, fire.
circumstances high high pressure on first stage
discharge, high pressure on first
stage discharge, high high temp.
on first stage discharge, high
temp. on first stage discharge,
high high level in 10-D-3004A,
high high temp. on second stage
discharge, high temp. on second
stage discharge, high high
pressure on second stage
discharge, high pressure on
second stage discharge.
Node: 79.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 10-PT-3102B,10PT-3103B,10PT-3105B,10PT-3104B,10TT-3101B, 10TT-3102B, 10LT-3102B, 10TT-3103B, 10TT-3104B, 10PT-3106B, 10PT-3107B

Final Element: 10-C-3001B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to compressor, Low low pressure on compressor 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Double instruments considered 100 S A G W SIL---
10C-3001B, due to any undesired suction, low pressure on compressor, possible for each parameter with low/low , 2 2 1 2
process conditions (mentioned in compressor suction, high overpressure, leakage, and jet low / high and high high alarm
function name column) or emergency pressure on compressor suction, fire
circumstances. high high pressure on first stage
discharge, high pressure on first
high high level in 10-D-3004B,
Node: 80.
Area: AREA 300

Initiators: 10PT-3112A, 10PT-3113A, 10PT-3115A, 10PT-3114A, 10TT-3111A, 10TT-3112A, 10LT-3112A, 10TT-3113A, 10TT-3114A, 10PT-3116A, 10PT-3117A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. 1. To prevent damage to Low low pressure on compressor 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Double instruments considered 100 S A G W SIL---
compressor, 10C-3002B, due to any suction low pressure on compressor, possible for each parameter with low/low , 2 2 1 2
undesired process conditions compressor suction, high overpressure, leakage, and jet low / high and high high alarm
(mentioned in function name column) pressure on compressor suction, fire
or emergency circumstances hgih high pressure on first stage
discharge high pressure on first
high high level in 10-D-3011A,
Node: 81.
Area: AREA 300

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-31D-ISO4
Initiators: 10PT-3112B, 10PT-3113B, 10PT-3115B, 10PT-3114B, 10TT-3111B, 10TT-3112B, 10LT-3112B, 10TT-3113B, 10TT-3114B, 10PT-3116B, 10PT-3117B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. 1. 1. To prevent damage to Low low pressure on compressor 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Double instruments considered 100 S A G W SIL---
compressor, 10C-3002B, due to any suction low pressure on compressor, possible for each parameter with low/low , 2 2 1 2
undesired process conditions compressor suction, high overpressure, leakage, and jet low / high and high high alarm
(mentioned in function name column) pressure on compressor suction, fire
or emergency circumstances high high pressure on first stage
discharge high pressure on first
high high level in 10-D-3011B,
second stage discharge
Area 500
Node: 82.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10TT-5001
Final Element: 10LV-5001
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent low low temperature is Low Low temp. in 10TT-5001 1.1. Possible disturbance in 1.1. Low temp. alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
steamer by closing bottom discharge catalyst residue deactivation 10TE-5002 0 2 1 2
10LV-5001. and stripping of the dissolved
HC
Node: 83.
Area: AREA 500

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-053-ISO4
Initiators: 10LT-5302
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent overpressure in dryer and More flow of polymer discharge 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. High level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
possible damage to blower, by closing from steamer to dryer, high high dryer and damager to blower 10LT-5302 and 10LT-5301 0 2 1 2
10LV-5001 level in 10LT-5302
Node: 84.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10P-5002A/B
Final Element: 10-P-5002A/B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent pump stoppage and loss One of dryer scrubber reflux 1.1. Possible plugging in 1.1. Low flow alarm provided on FI- 10 S A G W SIL---
of circulation water by starting 10P- pumps stoppage scrubber, possible blower 5303 on circulation pump discharge 0 2 1 1
5002 spare pump damage, possible loss of
cooling of nitrogen
Node: 85.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10TT-5305, 10PT-5302, 10PT-5303, 10PT-5308

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to blower, due to High high temp. in 10TT-5305, 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. High temp. alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL---
high high temperature in delivery line, low low pressure in 10PT-5302, blower 10TT-5305, high pressure alarm 0 2 1 2
low low pressure in suction and high low low pressure in 10PT-5308, provided in delivery line in 10PT-
high pressure in delivery line by shut high pressure in 10PT-5303 5306, high pressure alarm provided
down 10C-5002A in 10PT-5305
Node: 86.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10TT-5306, 10PT-5302, 10PT-5304, 10PT-5309

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to blower, due to High high temp. in 10TT-5306, 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. High temp. alarm in 10TT-5306, 100 S A G W SIL---
high high temperature in delivery line, low low pressure in 10PT-5302, blower low pressure alarm provided in 0 2 1 2 -
low low pressure in suction and high high pressure in 10PT-5304, and 10PT-5306, low pressure alarm in
high pressure in delivery line by shut low low pressure in 10PT-5309 10PT-5305
down 10C-5002B
Node: 87.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10IAHH-5001, 10FALL-5002

Final Element: 10A-5001
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent agitator damage or Low low flow alarm in 10FV- 1.1. Loss of stripping followed 1.1. 10FCS-5005 provided for flow 10 S A G W SIL1
blower damage due to loss of steam or 5002, high hihg power by carry over of HC and control on steam line 2 2 1 2
high power absorption absorption alarm in 10IAHH- residual activated catalyst to
5001 the dryer, safety issues
Node: 88.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10P-5001A OR 10P-5001B

Final Element: 10P-5001B , 10P-5001A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of reflux in steamer In operation pump trip or 1.1. Loss of reflux in steamer 1.1. Low flow alarm provided with 10 S A G W SIL---
scrubber due to pump trip by automatic stoppage scrubber, carry over of FIC-5004 0 2 1 2
starting of the stand by pump polymer fines to 10E-5001
leading to fouling possible
damage to compressor
Node: 89.
Area: AREA 500

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To control discharge from 10T-5001 High level or low level line 1.1. Loss of level will lead to 1.1. Low / high level alarm provided 10 S A G W SIL 1
Steamer scrubber by closing/opening steamer scrubber HC/steam carry over from T- in LSH-5004 2 2 1 2
10LV-5002 5001 to T-5002, safety issues,
high level lead to high
pressure, breakthrough of
steam from steamer to filter,
process upsets.
Node: 90.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10PT-5003 , 10PT-5005

Final Element: 10PV-5001, 10PV-5003
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent vacuum condition in the Low low pressure alarm in 10PT- 1.1. Potential vacuum 1.1. Equipment in steamer section 10 S A G W SIL1
system lead to damage to equipment 5003 and 10PT-5005 condition followed by air are designed for full vacuum 2 2 1 2
by opening 10PV-5001 an 10PV-5003 ingress into the system. safety condition low pressure alarm
issues, possible equipment provided in 10PT-5003 and 10PT-
collapse 5005
Node: 91.
Area: AREA 500

Final Element: 10FV-5002, 1FV-5001, 10FV-5003, 10PV-5003
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high pressure in High high pressure alarm in 1.1. Breakthrough of steam 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL 1
steamer by closing 10FV-5002, 10FV- 10PT-5005 from steamer to filter, process 10PT-5005 2 2 1 2
5001, 10FV-5003, and opening upset, possible plugging
overpressure and safety
issues.
Node: 92.
Area: AREA 500


Final Element: 10P-5004B, 10P-5004A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent overfilling in 10D-5004, Trip or stoppage of in operation 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. High level alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL---
lead to liquid carry over to compressor pump. compressor, possible 10LT-5101, 10PSV-5104 provided in 2 2 1 1
by automatic start up of 10P-5004 A or overpressure and loss of 10-D-5004.
B. containment.
Node: 93.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10AAHH-5301, 10AAHH-8001

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To control ratio of HC/Ox in Disturbance in HC/Ox ratio, 1.1. Disturbance in HC/OX 1.1. Double analyzer have been 10 S A G W SIL2
discharge of dryer, by opening 100% alarmed by 10AAHH-5301 and ratio may lead to off spec. considered for analyzing the ratio of 3 2 1 2
back up nitrogen, or after 60 seconds if 10AAHH-8001 product or create explosive gases
both hydrocarbon and oxygen levels atmosphere and explosion.
are not dropped below the trip valves
10LV-5301 will be closed.
Node: 94.
Area: AREA 500

Final Element: 10P-5005A/B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pumps 10P- Low low alarm in 10LT-5401 1.1. Damage to pump, 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
5005A/B due to running in low flow possible leakage or loss of 10LT-5401 0 2 1 1
suction by stopping pumps containment.
Node: 95.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10LSL-5102
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent low level in hydrocarbon Low level alarm in 10LSL-5102 1.1. No safety issue 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
drum by closing 10LV-5102 10LT-5101 0 2 1 1
Node: 96.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10LSL-5106
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To close liquid discharge to sewer by Low level alarm in 10LSL-5106 1.1. Loss of level can lead to 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
closing 10LV-5106 due to low level in release of hydrocarbon to 10LT-5105, operator intervention 2 2 1 1
hydrocarbon stripper atmosphere considered to be possible
Node: 97.
Area: AREA 500

Drawings:
Initiators:
Final Element:
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. Vendor Issue
Node: 98.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10PT-5102, 10PT-51105, 10TT-5103, 10LT-5108

Final Element: 10C-5001
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent to damage to compressor Low low pressure alarm in 10PT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. Low pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
due to high temp. due to very high 5102, high high pressure alarm compressor 10PT-5101 and 10PT-5102, high 0 2 1 1
differential pressure, by stopping in 10PT-5105, high high temp. pressure alarm provided in 10PT-
compressor alarm in 10TT-5103 and low 5105, high temp. alarm provided in
level alarm in 10LT-5108. 10TT-5103
Node: 99.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10RF-5001B (10YLH-5304)

Final Element: 10XV-5300
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high pressure or loss of No flow of polymer to feeder, any 1.1. Loss of nitrogen, possible 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL---
nitrogen due to first fine rotary feeder other emergency circumstances overpressure in feeder, fine considered to be possible 0 2 1 1
10RF-5001A shut down. carry over.
Node: 100.
Area: AREA 500

Initiators: 10RF-5001A (10YLH-5303)

Final Element: 10XV-5300
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high pressure or loss of No flow of polymer to feeder, any 1.1. Loss of nitrogen, possible 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL---
nitrogen due to first fine rotary feeder other emergency circumstances overpressure in feeder, fine considered to be possible 0 2 1 1
10RF-5001B shutdown carry over
Area 600
Node: 101.
Area: AREA 600

Initiators: 10P-6001A or 10P-6001B

Final Element: 10-P-6001B or 10-P-6001A
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of chilled water lead in operation pump stoppage. 1.1. Loss of chilled water, 1.1. Flow transmitter provided in the 100 S A G W SIL 1
to process upset by automatic start of process upset, serious discharge line required interlock 3 2 1 2
10P-6001A or B. damage to reactor, possible provided for high temperature in
explosion and fire. concerned equipments.
Node: 102.
Area: AREA 600

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of chilled water due Low level alarm in 10D-6001 1.1. Loss of chilled water, 1.1. Low low level alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL1
to water shortage and automatic filling process upset serious damage 10LSL-6102, required interlock 2 2 1 2
of chilled water surge drum by opening to reactor. provided for high temperature in
10LV-6101. concerned equipment.
Node: 103.
Area: AREA 600

Initiators: 10P-6004B OR 10P-6004A

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent to high level in 10D-6004, Stoppage of in operation pump 1.1. Loss of steam reboiler 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL---
steam condensate drum, loss of feed may lead to damage to considered to be possible. 0 2 1 2
condensate to steam reboiler by reboiler, possible high level in
automatic start of spare pump. steam condensate drum no
safety issues.
Node: 104.
Area: AREA 600

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent to process upset High high pressure in steam 1.1. The poison free process 1.1. 10PSV-6302 provided for 10E- 100 S A G W SIL---
(inadequate stripping) due to high high condensate stripper. will be done inadequately and 6005 0 2 1 2 -
pressure by closing 10PV-6302. it may lead to CO2 remain in
generated steam.
Node: 105.
Area: AREA 600

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high level in steam High high level alarm in 10LT- 1.1. Process upset, 1.1. LT-6302 provided in 10E-6005 10 S A G W SIL---
generator and inadequate heat transfer 6303 inadequate heat transfer 0 2 1 2
by closing 10LV-6302 to cut off feed to
10E-6005
Node: 106.
Area: AREA 600

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-016-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-65A-ISO4
Final Element: 10FV-1603 A/B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high level and overfilling High level in oil treating drum 1.1. Possible liquid carry over 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL---
of 10D-6007, oil treating drum by may caused by block outlet to 10PK-3001 and 10PK-3002 considered to be possible 1 2 1 2
closing 10FV-1603A and opening may lead to compressor
10FV-1603B damage possible loss of
containment
Node: 107.
Area: AREA 600


SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent to loss of oil to Oil delivery pump trip 1.1. Possible process upset, 1.1. Low pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
distribution header by automatic possible damage to 10PT-6501, operator intervention 0 2 1 2
starting of spare pump compressors considered to be possible
Node: 108.
Area: AREA 600

Interlock ID: 10-FCS-6008

SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of jacket water due trip of in operation pump 1.1. Loss of jacket water, 1.1. Two spare pumps provided for 100 S A G W SIL---
to pump trip by automatic start up of process upset more reliability 0 2 1 2
spare pump
Node: 109.
Area: AREA 600

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of jacket water and Low low level alarm in 10LT- 1.1. Gas blow by and possible 1.1. Low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
damage to pumps due to low low level 6401 damage to pumps, process 10LT-6402 0 2 1 2
(air blow by) by opening 10LV-6401 to upset
open make up to the jacket water
circuit
Node: 110.
Area: AREA 600

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent to inadequate treatment High pressure n 10PT-6002 1.1. Off spec. product due to 1.1. Operator intervention 0 S A G W SIL1
of powder due to high pressure by inadequate treatment, considered to be possible 2 2 1 2
closing 10HV-6002 possible release of HC to
atmosphere, safety issues.
Node: 111.
Area: AREA 600

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop return of cooling water due High pressure in 10PT-6102 1.1. Possible high pressure in 1.1. 10PSV-6102 provided in water 100 S A G W SIL---
to high pressure in water site exchanger may lead to loss of line 0 2 1 2
containment
Node: 112.
Area: AREA 600

Interlock ID: 10PPLC-6101
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To stop refrigerated water to 10D- High pressure in 10PT-6101 1.1. Possible high pressure in 1.1. 10PSV-6103 provided in line 100 S A G W SIL---
6002 due to high pressure in water side exchanger may lead to loss of 0 2 1 2
by closing 10PV-6101 containment.
Area 700
Node: 113.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10PV-7001, 10TV-7001, 10TXV-7001
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate 10E-7012 shell side by High pressure alarm in 10PT- 1.1. Leakage of ethylene into 1.1. operator intervention considered 10 S A G W SIL1
closing 10PV-7001, 10TV-7001and 7001 due to tube rupture. the steam condensate and to be possible 2 2 1 2
10TXV-7001. ethylene circulation in steam
system, possible loss of
control on heat transfer may
lead to fire scenario.
Node: 114.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high pressure in shell High pressure alarm activation in 1.1. leakage of HC to the 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL---
side of 10E-7013 by closing 10PV-7002 10PT-7002 due to tube rupture cooling water and HC will be considered to be possible 0 2 1 2
released from cooling tower
top
Node: 115.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PT-7003A , 10HS-7003A

Final Element: 10PV-7003A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To control pressure by closing 10PV- High pressure alarm in 10PT- 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL1
7003 when 10PAH-7003A is active (if P 7003A 10PK-7012 may lead to considered to be possible 2 2 1 2
>4barg) process upset and inadequate
CO2 removal, possible
damage to drying and
removed package, in the worst
case possible loss of
containment.
Node: 116.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PT-7003B, 10HS-7003B

Final Element: 10PV-7003B
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To control pressure by closing 10PV- high pressure alarm in 10PT- 1.1. possible overpressure in 1.1. operator intervention considered 10 S A G W SIL1
7003B when 10PAH-7003B is active (if 7003B 10PK-7012 may lead to to be possible 2 2 1 2
P>4 barg) process upset and inadequate
CO2 removal, possible
damage to drying and removal
package, in the worst case
possible loss of containment
and fire
Node: 117.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent circulation of Tube failure and high high 1.1. Leakage of propane in to 1.1. operator intervention considered 10 S A G W SIL---
contaminated CWR and high pressure pressure alarm in 10PT-7210 the cooling water, possible to be possible 0 2 1 2
in water side due to tube failure and loss of containment, no
leakage of propane. serious safety issues
Node: 118.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10PT-7220, 10ESD-7008
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high pressure in water tube failure and high high 1.1. High pressure in water 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL---
side by closing 10PV-7220 and pressure in 10PT-7220 side, possible loss of considered to be possible 0 2 1 2
actuating 10ESD-7008 to shut off 10T- containment, no serious safety
7042 issues.
Node: 119.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10PV-7222, 10ESD-7008
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high pressure in high high pressure alarm in 1.1. Over pressure in reboiler 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL1
10E-7041 by closing 10PV-7222 and 10PT-7222 may lead to loss of considered to be possible 2 2 1 2
actuating 10ESD-7008 containment and possible fire
Node: 120.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10LSHH-7222, 10LSLL-7221, 10HS-7220, 10ESD-7011, 10ESD-7006, 10ESD-7007, 10ESD-0011

Final Element: 10FV-7221, 10FXV-7221, 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202, 10LV-7220, 10LXV-7220, 10FCS-7006
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent inadequate propane High high level in 10LSHH-7222, 1.1. Inadequate propane 1.1. 10PSV-7221 provided in 100 S A G W SIL---
purification, loss of purified propane to low low level in 10LSLL-7221, purification may lead to off stripper, low and high level provided 2 2 1 2
storage may lead to loss of propane starting 10HS-7220, activation of spec propane storage and in 10LT-7220
feed to reactor, and isolate stripper by 10ESD-7011, 10ESD-7006, thus unspec feed to reactors,
closing 10FV-7221, 10FXV-7221, 10ESD-7007 and 10ESD-0011 possible liquid carry over due
10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202, 10L-7220, to high high level, process
10LXV-7220 and actuating 10FCS- upset, gas flow by to 10T-
7006 7041and 10T-7043, possible
damage to column may lead
to injury.
Node: 121.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To close cooling water outlet from High high pressure alarm in 1.1. Possible contamination of 1.1. operator intervention considered 10 S A G W SIL---
condenser due to tube failure by 10PT-7230 CWR by propane possible to be possible 0 2 1 2
closing 10PV-7230 and 10ESD-7011 over pressure may lead to loss
of containment
Node: 122.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. to prevent circulation of High high pressure alarm in 1.1. Contamination of LPS by 1.1. Operator intervention 10 S A G W SIL---
contaminated LPS due to tube failure 10PT-7234 HC overpressure in exchanger considered to be possible 0 2 1 2
and leakage of HC by closing 10PV- may lead to loss of
7234 and actuating 10ESD-7011 containment, process upset
Node: 123.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PT-7232, 10LSHH-7233, 10LSLL-7232, 10HS-7230, 10ESD-7009, 10ESD-7010, 40ESD-7013, 10ESD-0011

Final Element: 10FV-7231, 10FXV-7231, 10FV-7230, 10FXV-7230, 10PV-7231, 10PXV-7231, 10ESD-0011
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate, 10T-7043 debutazing High high pressure in 10PT- 1.1. Process upset due to loss 1.1. 10 PSV-7230 provided in 100 S A G W SIL---
tower, by closing 10FV-7231, 10FXV- 7232, high high level alarm in of purified propane, high system 2 2 1 2
7231, 10FV-7230, 10FXV-7230, 10PV- 10LSHH-7233, low low alarm in pressure in tower may to
7231, 10PXV_7231 and actuating 10LSHLL-7232, starting of leakage or loss of containment
10ESD-7008 10HS-7230, activation of 10ESD- and possible fire and safety
7009, 10ESD-7010, 40ESD- issues
7013 and 10ESD-0011
Node: 124.
Area: AREA 700

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-75E-ISO4
Initiators: 10PT-7501, 10LSHH-7505, 10LSLL-7504, 10LSHH-7536, 10HS-7504, 10ESD-0011

Final Element: 10FV-7504, 10FXV-7504, 10FV-7503, 10FXV-7503, 10LV-7501, 10LXV-7501, 10FV-7501, 10-P-7061
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate 10T-7061, by closing High high pressure alarm in 1.1. In worst case possible 1.1. 10PSV-7503 provided in system 100 S A G W SIL---
10FV-7504, 10FXV-7504, 10FV-7503, 10PT-7501, high high level alarm loss of containment in pump 2 2 1 2
10FXV-75033, 10LV-7501, 10LXV- in 10LSHH-7505, low low level due to pump seal damage,
7501, 10FV-7501, 10P-7061 alarm in 10LSLL-7504, high high gas flow by due to low low
level in 10LSHH-7504, activation level overpressure and
of 10ESD-0011 possible loss of containment in
stripper
Node: 125.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent circulation of High pressure alarm in 40PT- 1.1. Possible overpressure, 1.1. operator intervention considered 10 S A G W SIL1
contaminated LPS by closing 40PV- 7607 loss of containment may lead to be possible 2 2 1 2
7607 and 10ESD-7011 to fire process upset
Node: 126.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10LXV-7210, 10FV-7221, 10FXV-7221, 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202, 10LV-7220, 10LXV-7220, 10FCS-7006
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To isolate 10T-7042 due to high high High high pressure alarm in 1.1. Overpressure in 10T-7042 1.1. 10PSV-7221, high pressure 100 S A G W SIL---
pressure by closing 10LXV-7210, 10PT-7221 loss of propane to off gas alarm provided in 10PT-7221 2 2 1 2
10FV-7221, 10FXV-7221, 10FV-7202, header, possible lead to loss
10FXV-7202, 10LV-7220, 10LXV-7220, of containment, fire, explosion
and actuating 10FCS-7006
Node: 127.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10LSLL-7211
Final Element: 10LV-7210, 10LXV-7210
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to Low low level alarm in 10LSLL- 1.1. possible damage to 1.1. low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
low low level in 10T-7041 by closing 7211 pump, leakage, jet fire 10LIC-7210 2 2 1 2
10LV-7210 and 10LXV-7210
Node: 128.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10PXV-7231
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to tower and Low low level alarm in 10LSLL- 1.1. Process upset, 1.1. Low level alarm provided 10 S A G W SIL---
exchanger due to loss of level in 7234 inadequate separation inside 10LSLL-7234 0 2 1 2
exchanger and thus loss of recycle fluid tower
to tower, by closing 10PXV-7231
Node: 129.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 40LSHH-7603
Final Element: 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent overfilling of storage tank High high level alarm in 1.1. Overfilling of storage 1.1. low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
by closing 10FV-7202 and 10FXV-7202 10LSHH-7603 drum, possible liquid back flow 40LT-7601 2 1 1 2 -
may lead to over pressure and
loss of containment and pool
fire
Node: 130.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 40HS-7607
Final Element: 40HV-7610, 40-P-7042A/B, 40HV-7601, 40HV-7602, 40HV-7606, 40PV-7601
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To depressurize storage drum Any emergency circumstances 1.1. Possible overpressure 1.1. 40PSV_7601 provided in drum 100 S A G W SIL---
immediately by closing 40HV-7610, may lead to loss of 2 1 1 2
40HV-7601, 40hV-7602 and containment and pool fire,
40PV_7601, opening 40HV-7606 and safety issues
stopping 40P-7042
Node: 131.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent circulation of Tube failure lead to high high 1.1. possible loss of process 1.1. high pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
contaminated LPS by closing pressure in shell side fluid due to loss of propane, 10PT-7339 0 2 1 2
10PV_7339 inadequate separation due to
shortage of recycled propane,
process upset
Node: 132.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent circulation of CWR due to Tube failure lead to high high 1.1. Contamination of CWR 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
tube failure and contamination of CWR pressure alarm in 10PT-7335 may lead to loss of HC, 10PT-7335 2 2 1 2
by HC increasing of effluent, pool fire
Node: 133.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PT-7338, 10HS-7307, 10ESD-7040,

Final Element: 10FV-7313, 10FXV-7313, 10LV-7315, 10HV-7306, 10HV-3204, 10HV-3203
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To shut 10T-7051 off due to high High high pressure in column, 1.1. possible overpressure in 1.1. 10PSV-7330 provided in 100 S A G W SIL---
high pressure in stripper column, any other emergency 10T-7051 may lead to process stripper column. 2 2 1 2 -
starting 10HS-7307, activation of circumstances lead to starting upset improper recovery of
10ESD-7040 shut off propane 10HS-7307, propane recovery propane off spec product,
recovery, by closing 10FV-7313, shut off. possible inventory increment
10FXV-7313, 10LV-7315, 10HV-7306, in case of fire scenario
10HV-3204, 10HV-3203,
Node: 134.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PT-7303, 10HS-7302, 10ESD-7040

Final Element: 10LV-7315, 10-P-7052A/B, 10FV-7301, 10FXV-7301, 10HV-7305
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To shut 10T-7052, off due to high High high pressure in column, 1.1. possible overpressure in 1.1. 10PSV-7315, provided in 100 S A G W SIL---
high pressure in splitter column, any other emergency 10T-7052 may lead to process system 2 2 1 2
starting 10HS-7302, activation of circumstances lead to starting upset, off spec product,
10ESD-7040 shut off propane 10HS-7307, propane recovery possible inventory increment
recovery, by closing 10LV-7315, 10FV- shut off in case of fire scenario.
7301, 10FXV-7301, 10HV-7305, and
stoppage10P-7052A/B
Node: 135.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent circulation of CWR due to Tube failure lead to high high 1.1. Contamination of CWR 1.1. high alarm provided in 10PT- 10 S A G W SIL1
tube failure and contamination of CWR pressure alarm 10PT-7300 may lead to loss of HC, 7300 2 2 1 2
by HC increasing in effluent, pool fire
Node: 136.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10-T-7305
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent circulation of CWR due to tube failure lead to high high 1.1. Contamination of CWR 1.1. High pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
tube failure and contamination of CWR pressure in 10PT-7305 may lead to loss of HC, 10PT_7305 2 2 1 2
by HC increasing in effluent, pool fire
Node: 137.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent overfilling of splitter high high level alarm in 10LSHH- 1.1. possible overfilling may 1.1. high level alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL1
column by closing feed line via 10LV- 7304 lead to process upset, liquid 10LT-7305, 10PSV-7315 provided in 3 2 1 2
7315 carry over to condenser may system
damage to exchanger,
overpressure in tower, loss of
containment and pool fire
Node: 138.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10HV-3206, 10HV-3205
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high high level and high high level alarm provided in 1.1. Possible overfilling of 1.1. high level alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL1
overfilling in stripper by opening 10HV- 10LSHH-7313 stripper column may lead to 10LT-7315, 10PSV-7331 provided in 3 2 1 2
3206 and closing 10HV-3205 to damage to condenser, loss of system
alignment off gas to header containment and pool fire
Node: 139.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to low low level in column 1.1. damage to pumps due to 1.1. low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
loss of suction pressure by stopping condenser lead to low low cavitation, leakage, jet fire 10PT-7302 2 2 1 2
pumps pressure in suction line
Node: 140.
Area: AREA 700

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-73C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-73D-ISO4
Initiators: 0HS-7308, 10ESD-0001

Final Element: 10ESD-7033, 10ESD-7034, 10ESD-7039, 10HV-0101
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. to shut of propane recovery due to Any emergency circumstances in 1.1. Possible inventory 1.1. PSV's provided in system 100 S A G W SIL1
any emergency circumstances may polymerization may lead to increment in fire scenario, loss 3 2 1 2
lead to damage to this unit by activation starting 10HS-7308 or activation of propane due to loss of
of 10ESD-7033, 10ESD-7034, 10ESD- 10ESD-0001 control on polymerization
7039, and close 10HV-0101 process
Node: 141.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to reboiler due to High high pressure alarm in 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. High pressure alarm provided 10 S A G W SIL---
high high pressure in shell side, by 10PT-7304 exchanger may lead to failure in 10PT-7304 0 2 1 2
closing 10PV-7304 of tube side and loss of
containment in HC Side,
process upset
Node: 142.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PSHH-7105
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to buten1 high high pressure alarm in 1.1. Overpressure in storage, 1.1. 10PSV-7101 provided in 10D- 100 S A G W SIL---
storage due to high high pressure, to 10PSHH-7105 possible loss of containment 7031 2 2 1 2
close butene to jacketed steam pipe and pool fire
Node: 143.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PSLL-7103, 10PSLL-7104, 10HS-7101, 10LSLL-7103

Final Element: 10HV-7101, 10-P-7031A/B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to Low low level in drum, high 1.1. Possible damage to pump 1.1. low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
low low level in suction drum high pressure drop in suction line, any due to running in low pressure 10LT-7101, spare pump has been 2 2 1 2
pressure drop or any other emergency other emergency circumstances in suction line, possible provided to avoid loss of butene 1 to
circumstances, by closing 10HV-7101 leakage and jet fire reactor
and stopping pumps
Node: 144.
Area: AREA 700


Final Element: 10-P-7031A OR 10-P-7031B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of butene1 to reactor Failure in operation of butene 1 1.1. Loss of feed to reactor 1.1. 10FT-7101 provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
by automatic start of 10P-7031 spare pump, stoppage of pump lead to loss of product discharge line, low pressure alarm 0 2 1 2
pumps provided 10PT-7109
Node: 145.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent overfilling in 10D-7031, High high level in 10D-7031 1.1. Overfilling of drum may 1.1. high level alarm provided in 100 S A G W SIL 1
by closing 10LV-7101 lead to loss of containment 10LT-7101 2 2 1 2
and pool fire
Node: 146.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10TT-7213, 10TT-7214, 10TT-7215, 10TT-7217, 10P-7041, 10ESD-7008, 10ESD-0011

Final Element: 10FV-7210, 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to tower due to High high temp. in tower 10TT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. high temperature alarm 100 S A G W SIL---
high high temp., stoppage of recycle 7213, 10TT-7214, 10TT-7215, catalyst due to high high provided in 10TT-7213, 10TT-7214, 2 2 1 2
pump 10P-7041 and any other 10TT-7217, stopping of 10P- temperature in tower , loss of 10TT-7215, 10TT-7217
emergency circumstances by closing 7041, actuation of 10ESD-7008, containment can be occur
10FV-7210, 10FV-7202, 10FXV-7202 10ESD-0011
Node: 147.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent water carry over by Tube failure and high high 1.1. Process upset, catalyst 1.1. operator intervention considered 10 S A G W SIL---
hexene to 10T-7064 could affect the pressure in 10PT-7504 will be affected and loss of to be possible 0 2 1 2
activity of catalyst in the reactor catalyst
Node: 148.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PT-7502, 10HS-7502

SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To break vacuum in to top of 10T- low low pressure in 10T-7061 or 1.1. Loss of level in 10E-7061 1.1. low pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
7061 by opening 10HV-7502 any other emergency condition may lead to complete flooding 10PT-7501 and 10PT-7503 0 2 1 2
and process upset
Node: 149.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10LSL-7511, 10HS-7511

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent high pressure in low level alarm in 10LSL-7511 1.1. Possible overpressure in 1.1. operator intervention considered 10 S A G W SIL---
downstream of 10E-7063 due to and 10HS-7511 starting 10E-7064 and the other to be possible 0 2 1 2
injection of nitrogen during downstream equipment,
regeneration and after regeneration in possible loss of containment
normal operation
Node: 150.
Area: AREA 700

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-75E-ISO4
Initiators: 10PSLL-7531
Final Element: 10PV-7534, 10FCS-7011
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent low pressure in 10D-7062 low low pressure alarm in 1.1. potential backflow from 1.1. low pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
by opening 10PV-7534 and actuating 10PSLL-7531 reactor to drum, possible 10PT_7534 2 2 1 1
10P-7062A/B damage to pump leakage an
jet fire
Node: 151.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 40HS-7601, 40PSLL-7603, 40LSLL-7602, 10ESD-001, 40ESD-0001

Final Element: 40HV-7601, 40-P-7042A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to Low low pressure alarm in 1.1. possible damage to 1.1. low pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
running in low pressure in suction line, 40PSLL-7603, low low level pump, leakage, jet fire 40PT-7601, low level alarm provided 2 1 1 2
by stopping pump and closing 40HV- alarm in 40LSLL-7602 starting in 40LT-7601
7601 40HS-7601, activation of 10ESD-
0011, 10ESD-0001
Node: 152.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 40HS-7602, 40PSLL-7605, 40LSLL-7602, 10ESD-0011, 10ESD-0001

Final Element: 40HV-7602, 40HV-7042B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to low low pressure alarm in 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. low pressure alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
running in low pressure in suction line 40PSLL-7605, low low level pump, leakage, jet fire 40PT-7601, low level alarm provided 2 1 1 2
by stopping pump and closing 40HV- alarm in 40LSLL-7602, starting in 40LT-7601
7602 40HS-7602, activation of 10ESD-
0011, 10ESD-0001
Node: 153.
Area: AREA 700


Final Element: 40-P-7042B OR 40-P-7042A
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. to prevent loss of propane feed due Failure or stoppage of in 1.1. loss of feed to reactor 1.1. low flow alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
to pump stoppage operation pump 40FT-7601 0 1 1 2
Node: 154.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10-P-7051A/B, 10LV-7315, 10HV-7306
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to low low level alarm in 10LSLL- 1.1. Possible damage to pump 1.1. low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
low level in suction drum and thus low 7314 may lead to leakage and jet 10LT-7315, status signal provided in 2 1 2 2
pressure in suction line by closing fire valves
10LV-7315 and 10HV-7306
Node: 155.
Area: AREA 700

SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to pump due to low low level alarm in 10LSLL- 1.1. Possible damage to pump 1.1. low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
low level in suction drum may lead to 7301 lead to leakage and jet fire 10LT-7300 2 2 1 2
low pressure in suction line
Node: 156.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10-P-7052A/B, 10HV-7305
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent to damage to pump due low low level alarm in 10T-7052 1.1. possible damage to pump 1.1. low level alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
to low pressure in suction line may lead to leakage and jet 10LT-7305 2 2 1 2
fire
Node: 157.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10P-7051A/B
Final Element: 10-P-7051A OR 10-P-7051B
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent loss of propane due to failure or stoppage of in 1.1. loss of propane may lead 1.1. low flow alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL1
pump stoppage or failure operation pump to process upset, possible 10FT-7202 2 2 1 2
leakage and jet fire
Node: 158.
Area: AREA 700

Final Element: 10FV-7202
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent overfilling of 40D-7041 by high level alarm in 40LT-7601 1.1. Possible overfilling of 1.1. high high level provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
closing 10FV-7202 drum may lead to loss of 40LSHH-7603, operator intervention 2 2 1 2
containment and pool fire considered to be possible
Node: 159.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10C-7012, 10PT-7018, 10PT-7013, 10TT-7011, 10TT-7012

Final Element: 10PLC-7005, 10-C-7012, 10-E-7015
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to downstream Low pressure in compressor 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. operator intervention considered 0 S A G W SIL---
process due to high temperature or suction, high temperature in compressor, possible damage to be possible 0 2 1 2
high pressure and damage to comp., compressor suction, high to downstream equipments
due to low pressure in suction line by pressure in compressor
stopping compressor, activation of discharge, high temperature in
10PLC-7005, and shutting down 10E- 10E-7015
7015
Node: 160.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: XA-7512, 10HS-7510, 10TT-7509

Final Element: 10HV-7510, 10-E-7045
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to catalyst due high high temperature in 10TT- 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. high temp. alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
to high temp. of inlet nitrogen 7509, any other emergency catalyst 10TI-7515, high temp. alarm in 0 2 1 2
circumstances lead to activation 10TT-7514
of 10HS-7510 or general alarm
in XA-7512
Node: 161.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PSH-7240
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to propane high pressure alarm in 10PSH- 1.1. possible damage to filter, 1.1. operator shall check the 10 S A G W SIL---
guard filter due to high pressure in the 7240 no serious safety issues pressure status before opening 0 2 1 2
bottom stage and depressurize tower. 10HV-7243
Node: 162.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10PSH-7241
SIL determination

Risk method)
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to propane high pressure alarm in 10PSH- 1.1. Possible damage to filter 1.1. operator shall check the 0 S A G W SIL---
guard filter due to high pressure in the 7241 no serious safety issues pressure status before opening 0 2 1 2
bottom stage and depressurize tower 10HV-7244
Node: 163.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10TT-7002A, 10TT-7003A, 10TT-7004A, 10AAH-701, 10PLC-7001

Final Element: 10FV-7001
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To prevent damage to catalyst due High temperature in 10T-7011, 1.1. Possible damage to 1.1. high temp. alarm provided in 10 S A G W SIL---
to high temperature in 10T-7011A and stoppage of 10C-7012 catalyst 10TT-7002A, 10TT-7003A, 10TT- 0 2 1 2
oxygen existence in BDM line by 7004A
closing 10FV-7001
Node: 164.
Area: AREA 700

Initiators: 10TI-7511
Final Element: 10HS-7514
SIL determination

method)
Risk
Factor Risk
Estim
S A G W E
ation
SIL
1. To control temp. of regenerator Normal operation needs to 1.1. possible damage to 1.1. 10PLC-7002 provided to control 10 S A G W SIL---
electrical heater to prevent damage to control temp. catalyst temp. 0 2 1 2
catalyst

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Bakhtar Petrochemical Company

Lorestan Petrochemical Company (LPC)

SIL CLASSIFICATION REPORT FOR POLYMERIZATION

02 Issued for Approval K. K. F. D. A. M. 22.JUN.2010

REV. DESCRIPTION DRAWN UP CHECKED APPROVED DATE

1. INTRODUCTIN AND SCOPE OF WORK ............................................................................ 3

1 INTRODUCTIN AND SCOPE OF WORK

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY

2 SIL STUDY BASIS AND DEFINITIONS

2.1 STUDY BASIS

The study was based on:

2.2 DEFINITION OF SIL

Table 2.1 Probability of Failure on Demand for SIL

2.3 BACKGROUND TO RISK BASED APPROACH ADOPTED FOR SIL SELECTION

T arg et risk level (ie acceptable risk after mitigation)

PFD = 10-4 / (10-1 x 1) = 10-3

The required SIL is 2.

The methodology defined in the LORESTAN / MAHABAD PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY:

3.1.1 Identification of SIFs

3.1.2 Description of Function, Initiators and Final Elements

3.1.3 Causes of SIF Demand and Consequences of SIF Failure

A demand on a SIF may be caused by instrument malfunction, operator error, or

3.2 FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE APPROACH ADOPTED

3.2.1 Multiple Sensors

3.2.2 Multiple Final Elements

3.2.3 Consideration of PSV (Safety Valves)

3.2.4 Independent Protective Layers

3.3 SIL STUDY GUIDELINES

Under stress, emergency, action performed more than once a W3

Unstressed, action performed more than once a quarter W2

Under stress, emergency, action performed once/ Qtr. Or less

Table 3.3 Rule Set for Enabling event Factors

Table 3.4 Rule Set for Exposure Parameter Avoidance parameter

SIL Classification Flow Chart

CAUSES OF SIF CONSEQUENCE OF

ASSESSMENT OF INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYER

SIL FOR SIF

Consider if SIL in necessary for all final

ALL SIF CLASSIFIED

(W) Frequency of Demand

(A) Presence in danger zone at time of demand

(G) Possibility to avert hazard

(W) Frequency of demand

(E) Environmental damage per demand if ESD system fails on demand

E0= No release or release with negligible damage to the environment

(G) Possibility to avert hazard

G1= Possible under certain conditions

G2= Almost Impossible

AREA 500 10ESD-5001 3454-XZ-DM-10-050-ISO4 10TT-5001 10LV-5001

AREA 500 10PLC-5002 3454-XZ-DM-10-051-ISO4 10PT-5102 10C-5001

Area: AREA 100

Risk Graph (Semi-qualitative

Area: AREA 100

Risk Graph (Semi-qualitative

Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-01A-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-01B-ISO4

Risk Graph (Semi-qualitative

Area: AREA 100

Drawings: 3454-XZ-DM-10-72B-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-72C-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-72D-ISO4; 3454-XZ-DM-10-75A-ISO4

Risk Graph (Semi-qualitative

Area: AREA 100