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Chiastic Effect 449731
Chiastic Effect 449731
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Literature, 1500-1900
RONALD PA ULSON
of the serious drama and in the careful chronology which shows how
one play or kind of play led, virtually year by year, into the next.
The comedies-what we have thought the great Restoration
plays-balk at this treatment. We are given long sections on the major
plays of the "big three" while being asked to treat them no longer as
peaks in a rather modest range but as nodes of skillful adaptation in a
much larger organism. As Hume admits, one of the things he wishes
to demonstrate as historian is that all the critical "nonsense" about
philosophical background (which he elevates on his own authority
into "philosophical system"), profundity, theme, and unity should
be swept away. I must state my own bias, which tends to see Hume
taking what is good from a good critic (e.g., Barbeau on Dryden's
heroic plays), ridding it of "strident exaggerations, exclusions, and
dismissal of previous critics," and then accepting it as a "substratum"
of the play beneath the bombast or farce of everyone else's view (which
Barbeau was trying to correct). I confess I prefer Barbeau's kind of
criticism, which may ultimately be Alexandrian and cannot avoid
overstating to make an original and striking discovery (it is difficult
not to "inflate to undue prominence" what was not seen before and
will probably not be now if decently subordinated), to Hume's kind,
which seeks to use these insights while defusing them and muffling
the excitement of discovery. My main criticism of Hume's book is that
much of it reads like a very long review article, showing both the
irresponsible power and the scavenging propensity of reviewers. (The
one you are reading is no exception, but it purports to be a review.)
After dealing with all of these erring critics, and an awesome
amount of parsing and quibbling (with sentences like "This reading
is extremely plausible and quite satisfying, but is it right?"), what
does Hume tell us about the great plays? Much of the time he sounds
like Rymer on Othello (as quoted by him, p. 152); but his conclusions
are the ones entombed by Sutherland years ago: The Man of Mode is
"a delightfully satiric entertainment," and The Country Wife is "an
immensely enjoyable play in which we take almost nothing
seriously," in fact "profound it is not, and only a prude, a hypocrite,
or a stuffy academician would have it otherwise." There is a basic
misunderstanding here of "serious" and "profound," apparent in the
analogues Hume adduces-Chaplin, Gilbert and Sullivan, the Marx
Brothers. It is not "significant themes" which (as he claims) mar The
Great Dictator and Monsieur Verdoux but abstractly-stated doctrine,
or what Hume loosely calls "philosophy" (vs. philosophical context
or background). The Gold Rush and City Lights, as well as The Moan
of Mode, have "significant themes," but Hume does not seem to
realize that he is saying this when he asserts (against a subtle critic like
know because when they grew up many of them wrote about their
childhood." But Gardner's example, Charles Lamb, was writing
about them as Wordsworth wrote about Pope, as the nineteenth
century looked back on the eighteenth. I think Isaac Watts' Divine
SotIgs and Mrs. Barbauld's Hymns in Prose were read with the kind of
attention children not brought up on Dr. Seuss would have to give.
Children may have been warped by reading these books, but it is not
easy to say they didn't enjoy them. Gardner complains that Gottlieb is
not to be believed when he says that Pilgrim's Progress "was
enthusiastically seized upon" by youngsters: of course it was. The
children must have been far more fascinated by Vanity Fair and the
fiery death of Faithful, by the sad end of Ignorance, or by the cries of
Christian's wife and children, than by any of Zweig's pure adventure
stories. These are scenes they probably never forgot. I would like to
know more about how a child came at censored or uncensored fairy
tales (of the sort Bruno Bettelheim recommends to children) and how
these served to structure adult "realistic" literature in the next
generation. The process is more easily seen with the tradition of
cautionary tales which burst into literature in the 1790's, as the
children's tale itself became a vehicle for poets and novelists.
TIhe rnost notable Fielding event has been the publication of N. B.
Coley's Jacobite's Journal and Martin Battestin's Tom Jones in the
WVesleyan edition. Both of these are outstanidiing accomplishments,
but since SEL was not honored with copies by the publisher and I
have reviewed both elsewhere (MLR), I will pass on to J. Paul
Hunter's Occasional Form: Henry Fielding & the Chains of
Circumstance (Johns Hopkins, 1975). Following his important book
on Defoe, Hunter has made a broad-fronted attack on Fielding with
lively chapters on the plays, on Joseph Andrews, Tom Jones, and
Amelia. Hunter is most rewarding on the political allusions and the
structuring of the plays and Shamela on multiple figures: C'ibber-
Walpole, Middleton-Cibber, and Richardson (and in later chapters
on historical models like the careers of Chubb and Horlet for
Thwackum and Square). Hunter is also convincing on the rehearsal
play as a manipulation of various kinds of reality, representing the
conventions that play havoc with both living and representing (and
so back to Alter's self-reflexive novels). As to the analytic-perspectival
function of these plays, and its relation to the developing concerns of
the novels, he mentions the subject but seems unaware that anyone
else has written on the subject.
What strikes me about Hunter's book is that he has raised the most
important issues-Fielding's use of examples, journeys, the biblical
myth of expulsion, spatial metaphors; but I find myself disagreeing
than she does Molly Seagrim. The third part has Antiope, daughter of
Idomeneus, whom Telemachus is destined to marry after he has
delivered Penelope from the suitors, and so Mentor stands between
them, despite her father's stratagems (the incident reminds me more
of Sophia in the stag hunt than of Lady Bellaston). In fact, the
parallel is with Joseph Andrews: Mentor, like Parson Adams, keeps
the two lovers apart until Joseph's education is completed. In terms of
Joseph Andrews, the descent into the underworld, with Telemachus
believing his father is dead only to discover that he is still alive and to
be the end of his quest, is paralleled by Mr. Wilson's descent into the
underworld of London, which reveals that he is Joseph's father
(Joseph thinks his father is Gaffer Andrews). In Joseph Andrews the
Telemaque parallel tells that it is the son's quest for a father that we
are to follow, not Joseph's quest for Fanny; and that this is an
education of Joseph. The point of the temptation of Antiope,
Fenelon tells us, is that "he was not now the same Telemachus who
had been such a slave to a tyrannical passion in the island of
Calypso."
Hunter's is a stimulating book that ought to be useful for raising
arguable points in class. A slim and narrowly-focused but exticinilv
fine book is Bernard Harrison's Henry Fielding's 'Tomn Jones': DIe
Novelist as Moral Philosopher (in the Text & Context series, Sussex
Univ., 1975). Harrison, a professional philosopher, is not the first to
see Coleridge's distinction between character and conduct to be at the
heart of Tom Jones, to see how profound an alternative Fielding's
method was to Richardson's, or to see the importance of Empson's
essay on Fielding's "double irony"; but he gives the best account I
know of the particular "mode of representation of the interaction of
character and conduct" developed in Tom Jones. Except for an
occasional slip (Edward Lear, not Lewis Carroll, invented "runci-
ble") he keeps his literary aplomb and shows the value of bringing a
professional philosopher's training to bear on a fictional text-
evident, for example, in his brilliant analysis of the episode Coleridge
singled out, Blifil's freeing of Sophia's bird Tommy.
Harrison's conclusions bear both on the novelistic technique anid
on the philosophical problem of goodness or virtue. He interprets
Empson's "double irony" as meaning that "no one viewpoint is ever
'guaranteed', ever wholly adequate as a basis from which to grasp the
nature of human reality," and argues "that certain kinds of
knowledge of a man's inwardness, of what he is, are easier to convey
through the ironic juxtaposition of viewpoints than through the
creation of an illusion of direct knowledge of a character's stream of
consciousness" (adding Wittgenstein's remark that "even if God
knew the contents of my mind he would still not know what I was
thinking"). This is done by Fielding's "contrast between what all
interlocutor, looking at what a character says and does froml a
particular viewpoint, might make of him, and what a seconld
viewpoint might make of the commerce between them. Fielding's
concept of character, in short, is founded in the notion of the
coherence of a man's speech and action when seen from different
viewpoints" -and further, on the assumption that only truth and
simplicity will survive such close scrutiny. These perspectives do not
suggest relativismn; while indicating the complexity and difficulty of
understanding an action, they show us hoW to understand it-and
just what the "central doctrine" Empson referred to might be.
This is the problemn of goodness or virtue, and Harrison believes
that in this novel Fielding has found a way around (or between) the
dichotomies of reason-sentiment, principle-impulse, duty-pleasure,
and thought-feeling. The literary technique sketched above allows
for this "painstaking construction of an antireductionist phenome-
nology of the moral life." If Fielding is placed in the context of the
opposed traditions of egoism and benevolism, which keep virtue and
precept opposed to pleasure, then we begin to see that the "doctrine
that only acts done solely out of reverence for the Moral Law can be
regarded as moral, or virtuous, acts" is opposed to the idea of "doing
this [good deed] out of fondness for and sympathy with his
neighbours" as moral action. Fielding, says Harrison, clarifies the
pleasure pole of the dichotomy by distinguishing between appetites
and human needs-the latter invoking the conscious states and needs
of other people. Sexual desire, which could be either, thus becomes a
crucially important test case for Tom; and it is equally significant
that he is contrasted to "someone who, because he has no needs
which go beyond appetites, has no grasp of real force and weight of
the concept of friendship, or of any other moral notion." Love of
another, or feeling the needs of another rather than your own need of
him/her, is a good only when it is (now quoting Fielding) "without
any abstract Contemplation on the Beauty of Virtue, and without the
Allurement or Terrors of Religion." Harrison's is the best exposition
in print of Fielding's embodiment of moral doctrine in Tom Jones.
Margaret Anne Doody's A Natural Passion: A Study of the Novels
of Samuel Richardson (Oxford, 1974) is a major contribution to the
criticism of Richardson. After a perfunctory introductory chapter,
and quite a bit of the expected talk about sub-literary context, Doody
gets into some very commonsensical observations on Pamela and the
pastoral tradition, some interesting examples of Richardson's use of
emblems, and then excellent chapters on Clarissa, dwelling in
but finally not very exciting. The main source "of Sternes vision aind
its expression," we learn, is Locke: a subject MIoglen covers
thoroughly. In Tristram Shandy she discusses the old questions of
duration, association of ideas, love and sexuality and death, and thie
uses of language. A final section is an interesting accOuInt of the
contemporaneity of Tristram Shandy which brings in XVilliamn
James, Bergson, and Freud.
One difficult, exasperating, but necessary book on tthe traditioln of
the novel remains to be discussed. Eric Rothstein's thesis in Systelis
of Order & Inquiry in Later Eighteenth-Century Fiction (C(alifornia,
1975), which at first sounds very complex in the dense sentences of Ills
introduction, is that the major eighteenth-century Eiinglish novels
(really ending with Shandy but including later survivors) are
constructed on "formal procedures" or "systems of order" and atre
about "epistemological procedures" or "systems of inquiry" thalt -Ire
also to be found in other eighteenth-century concerns-in philo-
sophy and in the general verbal assumptions of living (Foucatult's
epistemes). What this amounts to is that all of these novels, which
tend to be about the Quixotic situation of organized systems being
tested in a real world, proceed by analogy and (Rothstein's terIn)
modification, which means variation or difference. This v'ery general,
almost unavoidable, mode of composition allows the critic tlhe
opportunity for a great deal of new and ingenious annotationi of
Rasselas, Fielding's Amelia, Smollett's Humphry Clinker, (;odwin's
Caleb Williams, and, of course, Tristram Shandy.
I will take the example of Shandy, Rothstein's centerpiece as it was
Alter's; and I should add that Rothstein not only gives us many nice
details but seriously tries to understand the process-or system-of
the novel, its form of unity, by taking Volume VI and relating its parts
to each other, to Volumes V and VII, and so on. I admire his
perserverance in these pages, where the principle of analogy seems to
work best for him. Shandy is, of course, constructed on analogical
relationships, far more than a novel that relies on succession,
sequence, derivation, filiation, and chronology. But the principle is
so powerful, as Rothstein sees it, that Walter, Toby, and Tristram
become "a trio representing thought, action, and (taking Tristram as
an author) creative force." "Action," however, distorts our sense of
Toby, for whom action was in fact back at Namur; now he is only re-
creating or re-acting; action with the Widow Wadman never
materializes. Such stretching of character to fit category seems
necessary to a scheme of total analogizing. It also follows for
Rothstein that Tristram must derive his own character by analogy
from Walter and Toby, as combination of thought and action.
who knew of Harley's access to the queen through Mrs. Masham and
was aware (with Gulliver) "How a Whore can govern the Back-stairs,
the Backstairs a Council, and the Council a Senate," would have been
interested to learn from Queen Anne's physician how a menstrual
cycle and a mixture of physiological and psychological maladies
influenced events. One thing never made clear by Roberts, however, is
the exact relationship between Hamilton and Arbuthnot, who seems
to have been chief or supervisory physician to the queen.
Another book of background interest to these years is Robert D.
Horn's Marlborough: A Survey (Garland, 1975). Horn lists, describes,
and quotes from the panegyrics, satires, and biographical writings on
the Duke between 1688 and 1788. The annotations, year by year, make
this more than mere bibliography. Another Garland book, just
published, is Stephen Parks's John Dunton and the English Book
Trade, which gives us all the facts from primary sources about this
neglected figure, known vaguely as the author of a precursor of
Tristram Shandy and as a prototypical Swiftean hack. Parks has
documented all Dunton's mottled careers as publisher, polemicist,
and autobiographer. He has carried out a very difficult and relatively
thankless task well, and we should be grateful: the larger part of the
book is a year-by-year checklist of all the works with which Dunton
can be shown to have been concerned in any way.
Two other political biographies are outstandingly successful:
William L. Sachse's Lord Somers (Wisconsin, 1975) and Reed
Browning's Duke of Newcastle (Yale, 1975). Somers, the dedicatee of
Swift's Tale, was the prototypical Whig as Dunton was prototypical
hack and Newcastle was prototypical electioneer. If Newcastle is most
interesting as a man it is because he is most enigmatic: the man who
held second (if not first) place in ministries for nearly forty years, yet
remains for us largely Smollett's Fika-Kaka with his twitches and
inanities. Another biography I found useful after ploughing through
many unsatisfactory books on the subject, was Hugh Douglas'
Charles Edward Stuart (London, Hale, 1975). Though a popular life,
it does live up to its subtitle, "The Man, the King, the Legend" by
giving the reader some sense of how the legend related to the man.
Paul S. Fritz's English Ministers and Jacobitism between the
Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975) also sheds light on these
matters, though it could afford some awareness of R. C. Jarvis' studies
of the '45 (Jarvis does not even get a citation).
Ross J. S. Hoffman, in The Marquis: A Study of Lord Rock-
ingham, 1730-1782 (Fordham, 1975), sorts out Rockingham from
Burke and attempts to rehabilitate the Marquis himself as the driving
force behind the growth of the concept of party and of the minister
Yale University