Heidegger and Buddhism

Author(s): Takeshi Umehara

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 271-281
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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Takeshi Umehara Heidegger and Buddhism

The modern world has seemingly undertaken a serious experiment with regard
to whether or not a man can live without any god or religion.
"God is dead," said Nietzsche. This was the destiny of modern European
civilization because of science and technology.
Rene Descartes is said to be the founder of modern European philosophy.
According to Hegel, Descartes is truly an originator of modern philosophy as
long as modern philosophy claims "thought" as its principle. After he doubted
everything, Descartes reached a "thinking ego" whose existence cannot be
doubted. This "thinking ego," that is, reason or intellect, was the starting point
of his philosophy. It was not only the starting point of the Cartesian philosophy,
but of the whole modern philosophy or civilization, insofar as it demands the
sundering of mind from nature and a subsequent mechanical conception of
nature, and implicitly affirmed the need for, and right of, man to control this
nature for his own purposes.
Now this event in modem civilization is no longer confined to the European
world. European civilization, particularly its science and technology, conquered
the whole world by its rich productivity and powerful weapons. There is no
country in the world which is not affected by Western science and technology.
Thus the fate of the European civilization has become the fate of the whole
world.
However, as Nietzsche saw, a formidable atheism is inherent in the early
stage of modem civilization. "God is not simply dead, but we killed Him."
God became useless to man when man developed a complete trust in his own
reason and set about to exert an absolute control over the material world at
his own will. God is dead, and man and material nature took over the position
of God.
Dostoevsky, a prophet of historical destiny like Nietzsche, speaks through
the mouth of Ivan: "There is neither God nor immortality. As there is neither
God, nor immortality, man is allowed to do everything." He means that there
is no morality without God. Karamazov asked his son Ivan: "Have we been
deceived by priests for such a long time if there is neither God nor immortality
(as you say) ?" Ivan answered, "There would not be our civilization if there
were neither God nor immortality." As Ivan says, all civilizations heretofore
have been founded on religion. However, contrary to Ivan's words, a civiliza-
tion is now about to be formed without God and immortality.
It is time for us to ask with Dostoevsky: Can man secure his existence in
a civilization without God? Will the day come when mankind must pay its
debt for indulging in a fantasy? Or will the day of reckoning never come since
that day would at once be the day of the total collapse of civilization?
In the past century Japan has made the utmost effort to adopt the European

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272 Umehara

civilization of science and technology, but without accepting Christianity. At

the same time we stopped giving sincere concern to Buddhism or Confucianism.
In other words, we did not import god (religion) from outside and at the
same time we killed our own gods (religions) in the name of modem civiliza-
tion. By killing the gods, Japan achieved her modernization. As the result of
such modernization Japan achieved one of the highest gross national products
in the world. However, with this material prosperity, a monstrous vanity
begins to pervade the atmosphere in our society. We have no god to believe
in. We have become the most godless people in the world and we have no
inspiring motivations but impulses for material goods and sex.
However, can any man of the West laugh at such economic animals? Was
it not the European who taught the non-European people to kill their gods?
If this is the case, we were more diligent in killing gods than were our
teachers. In the terms of an old Japanese expression, we are the students who
excel their teachers.
The death of gods, the collapse of values, the liberation of instincts, and the
consequent disorder are now forming a critical situation in the present world.
In this situation, we cannot but deal with the problem as to whether or not
mankind can survive without any god. This seems to be the most important
and critical problem in the present world.
There may be three possible answers to the problem:
(1) that man can survive without god and should become a kind of god
himself (Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, etc.);
(2) that man must have a god and a new rebirth is possible for man by
regaining his old beliefs in god (Berdyaev, Dawson, D. T. Suzuki, etc.);
(3) that god is necessary, but he should not be the god of the past, and
thus a new god must be sought, though mankind has not yet met him.

II

I propose to discuss the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in terms of the

third viewpoint stated above. He is neither a proponent for returning to
Christianity like Berdyaev or Dawson, nor an atheist like Marx or Sartre.
God is dead, and a new god has not yet revealed himself. In order to receive
a new god, Heidegger must first prepare a place for him. In order to prepare
the place we should find the place where the old god had revealed himself.
The place where the old god had revealed himself is the place for the new god.
In Heidegger's philosophy the key issue is whether or not he has discovered
the place where the old god had revealed himself and whether or not he has
prepared the place for the new god.'
1 Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Brief iiber den Humanismus,"in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949).

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273

The expression "the place for god," whatever it may mean, is apt to be
thought of by a European within the boundary of his own world. However, if
we deal with the above issue beyond the boundary of the European world, we
must consider the fact that there existed many religions as well as many gods.
Needless to say, there have been not only monotheistic religions but poly-
theistic religions as well. In contrast to the monotheism of Europe the
native religions of Japan are regarded as polytheistic. This polytheism might
be criticized by Christianity as not being a true religion, but this does not
mean that Buddhism or Confucianism cannot deal with the issue of the place
for a new god.
We can speculate on the problem proposed by Heidegger beyond the
European cultural boundary by developing the above-mentioned questions
raised for his philosophy as follows: Is it the case that the place for god
argued for by Heidegger is not only appropriate for Christianity, but that
it is also an appropriate place for the god in any other religion? Here I should
like to refer this question only to Buddhism. Our question is whether the
place for god thought by Heidegger can be a right place from the viewpoint
of Buddhism.
I do not intend here to explicate Heidegger's philosophy in detail. It will
be more appropriate for a man whose cultural background is similar to
Heidegger's to do that. It is highly questionable if a man of a different cultural
background can grasp the exact meaning of Heidegger's philosophy. It is
quite possible that I misunderstand Heidegger's philosophy. However, what
I intend to do is not to discuss his philosophy directly, but to discuss my own
thought as it is inspired by Heidegger.
The central issue of Heidegger's philosophy has always been "What is
being?" "Being" had been regarded as self-evident in the European tradition
of thought. But Heidegger throws doubt on "being" when thought of as self-
evident.
What is being? Being is not simply that which exists. A notebook exists
here and a table exists there. But they are not being itself. The distinction
between "being itself" and "beings" Heidegger calls the ontological difference.
He maintains that all traditional metaphysics and ontology have ignored this
difference by regarding "beings" as "being itself."
It is necessary to clarify the very meaning of "being itself" as distinguished
from "beings." Heidegger thinks that the meaning of "being itself" is to be
disclosed through an actual being whose mode of existence is distinctly
superior to all other modes of existence. What is this actual being? It is one
whose mode of existence is superior in the sense that it has awareness of its
own existence. Heidegger thinks such actual being is man (Dasein). Thus,
Heidegger claims that we must examine the meaning of Dasein, that is, human
existence, in order to reach being itself (Sein). What is the meaning of

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274 Umehara

human existence? Heidegger seeks the meaning of Dasein in terms of time.

What he means by "time" is neither time objectively conceived nor time sub-
jectively perceived.
According to Heidegger, "time" means "finitude." "Finitude" means "being
unto death." This is to say, Dasein is temporal and man, being temporal, is
finite, that is, a being unto death. His criticism of ontology since Plato is made
from the standpoint of conceiving human existence in terms of finitude, that
is, death. In the tradition of European ontology, being is sought after through
that which exists (das Seiende), but not through the existence of man
(Dasein). Things which exist are projected in such a way that they are simply
stared at (begafft) by man. When man becomes the subject who absent-
mindedly stares at the world, things look as if they are simply existing before
us. Heidegger calls such an existence Vorhandensein.
Heidegger thinks that such a manner of conceiving things is due to the
ordinariness of Dasein. Man ordinarily forgets his death which is his es-
sence and lives with this or that thing. Living in this manner, he conceives
of being in terms of the function of things.
In contrast to this understanding of existence, Heidegger opens the way to
an existential understanding of being. It is a way of understanding which
reaches being itself through Dasein as the finite being, that is, the being
unto death. Heidegger in his Being and Time refers to this task of under-
standing as fundamental ontology. He tried to develop this fundamental
ontology by adopting the methodology of Husserl's phenomenology, but he
came to realize that it is impossible to develop his new way of understanding
being within a phenomenology whose theme was the analysis of subject-
consciousness. The "turn" or "reversal" in his thinking (Kehre) seems to
begin from this realization, but I will not inquire into this any further.
Now what I wish to ask is: What significance does Heidegger's philosophy
of being have for the present historical situation of the Eastern as well as
the Western world? It should be noted first of all that, even though the ontol-
ogy in which being is sought not through things but through finite human
existence might be thought of as unique in the Western world, it is familiar
to Orientals, especially to Buddhists. We Japanese are brought up with the
following words from Buddhism: "All living beings are mortal and all forms
are to disappear." This is an ontological view which grasps not only human
being but all other living beings in terms of death. This might be said, in
Heidegger's terms, to be the ontological view which grasps being through
human being which is finite, that is, being unto death. Further, our question
is related to Heidegger's criticism that European ontology lacks the concept
of death. As a non-European I cannot but notice that a distinctive character-
istic in the European history of thought is its concern with death. I notice
the two great deaths which have the utmost significance in themselves. The

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two deaths are, needless to say, those of Socrates and Jesus Christ. Despite
Heidegger's criticism, I should say that these deaths were certainly the high-
lights of the European history of thought.
But what does it mean that these two deaths constitute the most significant
events in European spiritual civilization? In the history of the East there
are no deaths of the utmost spiritual significance. In Buddhism, the death of
Buddha had, to be sure, the utmost significance, but in Confucianism there
is no such concern with death. Confucius said: "I have not yet known life, how
can I know death?" We see the decisive significance in the deaths of Jesus,
Socrates, and Buddha, but we do not see any significance in the death of
Confucius. Death does not necessarily have the utmost significance in each
spiritual civilization. Therefore, can it be said that the civilization which has
the great deaths as the highlight of its history also has its roots deeply in
death, contrary to Heidegger's estimate?
The above is not the only thing which amazes us with regard to European
history. What amazes us even more is the fact that the deaths were either
murder or a kind of suicide. For the Oriental, natural death is ideal. Man
is born from Nature and returns to Nature. Returning home, returning to
the motherly earth is the ideal of the Orient. The form of death must be
painless. ~Skyamuni Buddha returns in peace into Nature after he has lived
for eighty years. In the East the man whose death is not natural is not
qualified to be a saint. In this regard the spiritual tradition of the West differs
from that of the East. Here a question arises as to why a man who was
murdered can be the most ideal man in the West.
There arises yet another problem. What does the death of Socrates or
Jesus mean in the spiritual history of the West? The death of Socrates means
neither the mere end of his life, nor a return to nothingness, in the Buddhist
sense. Socrates, facing death, proved the immortality of the soul. And he
died without fear, as if he were going to another splendid world. The soul
which cognizes the eternal is also eternal like the eternal Idea. If the soul is
eternal, it does not fade away at death. Facing death Socrates imagines the
realm of the spirit awaiting his soul. Death here does not mean the returning
to nothingness as in the case of Buddha. Death, for Socrates, is an assurance
of eternal life for man.
In the case of Jesus Christ, his death also does not mean returning to
nothingness. Jesus was the Son of God. As the Son of God, Jesus is essentially
immortal. His Crucifixion was to atone for the sin of man. But he was res-
urrected from death and he will come again to bring the Kingdom of God.
Such death cannot mean what death truly means. His death is to mean the
proof for eternal life-it is a much more decisive proof than Socrates' death.
Through His death the atonement for man's sin as well as immortality of the
soul are promised. Jesus is in eternal Heaven after the Resurrection. Through

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276 Umehara

Him man may ascend to eternal Heaven. In other words, man is promised
his eternal life as well as the coming of the new Kingdom of God. The death
of Jesus promises much more than that of Socrates.
If such is the case, we would think as follows: The two deaths as the
highlights of European tradition are not death as we understand it. They are
seemingly deaths, but they are in fact proofs for eternal life. Through those
two deaths eternity is brought into the European world.
When we consider death in this way, we have to withdraw our previous
question raised about Heidegger's viewpoint that there was no concept of
death in the traditional ontology of the West. His viewpoint after all seems
to be right in grasping the spiritual tradition of the West, since we can
recognize these deaths as the proofs for eternity. The deaths were not the
death of a finite being in Heidegger's sense.

III

Now I should like to proceed to discuss Buddhism. However, we must admit

the difficulty or even impossibility of presenting a thorough explication of
Buddhism. It is much more difficult to talk about Buddhism in general than
about Christianity in general. The reason is that there is not a single Bible
but many Bibles in Buddhism. Buddhist sutras had been written in the name
of gSkyamuni Buddha several hundred years after his death. These texts went
to China without being systematically arranged, and innumerable commentaries
were written on them. In addition Buddhist sutras were written in China, and
once they were completed in China, it became impossible to distinguish them
from those originating in India. Thus all sutras became regarded as the
teachings of Sakyamuni Buddha himself. In such a situation the most im-
portant work for monks in China was to search for the true teachings of
Buddha among innumerable texts. Kumarajiva (A.D. 350409) discovered a
pattern among them and thus brought about a solution to this problem. He
worked on the translation of Mahaymnasutras in Ch'ang-an and at the same
time originated, in the beginning of the fifth century, the Chinese Buddhistic
studies which were carried on thereafter.
Dr. D. T. Suzuki introduced Zen Buddhism to the West. He thought Zen
to be the most excellent school in Mahayana Buddhism. His works taught a
way of learning Zen in the West and even in Japan herself. Westerners have
the preconception, before their visit to Japan, that Japanese culture is in-
fluenced totally by Zen. But contrary to their expectation, Zen does not have
so pervasive an influence in Japanese culture. It is quite questionable whether
the core of Japanese culture is Zen. Mahayana Buddhism is not necessarily
represented by Zen. Even in Japanese Buddhism, Zen is merely a part of it.

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277

And the Zen introduced by Suzuki to the West is that of the Lin-chi school
(Rinzai Zen).2
Although it is very difficult to grasp Buddhism as a whole, I will try to
depict the characteristics of Buddhism just as Heidegger tried to grasp the
characteristics of the metaphysics of the West as a whole.
Buddhism can be said to grasp beings in terms of death or finitude. For
example, let us consider the doctrine of the four noble truths. The truths are
as follows:
1. The truth that suffering exists.
2. The truth that suffering has a cause.
3. The truth that the cause can be removed.
4. The truth that there are eight practices by which the cause of suffering
can be removed.
Let us begin with the first truth. Human being is conceived in terms of
"suffering" (duhkha). This means that man is subject to four sufferings,
namely, birth, aging, disease, and death. Among these four death is the
severest suffering. Buddha himself emphasized the suffering of death. Man is
mortal and therefore his existence is suffering. Here one might notice that
human existence is conceived in terms of death or finitude.
With regard to the second truth, Buddha speaks about the cause of suffering.
It is attachment to or craving for existence. Suffering is caused by man's
attachment to something for which he craves.
Man must be freed from such sufferings. The third truth teaches us to
eliminate the cause of suffering. And in order to eliminate suffering, there
are eight practices which must be followed.
8akyamuni Buddha grasps human existence in terms of death. How to
eliminate the suffering of death ? Buddha does not see the solution in the im-
mortality of the soul or in eternal life in the Socratic or Christian sense.
Buddha regards such doctrines as dogmatic. They meant to him nothing but
an escape from the utter finitude of human existence. The attachment to
existence which is latent in man is the most decisive cause of fear of death.
Man will attain freedom and purity through emancipation from the suffering
of death, that is, through deliverance from the attachment to his own existence.
We find many portraits of takyamuni Buddha entering nirvana, in other
words, at his death. In these pictures he is surrounded by many disciples,
people, and animals. Not only men but even animals grieve over the death
of Buddha. But the Buddha, who is about to die, is in a state of serenity.

2 See my Bi to ShakyJ no Hakken [The Rediscoveryof Traditional Beauty and Religion]

(Tokyo, 1967) and especially the article "CriticalStudies of Suzuki's and Watsuji's Views
on Japanese Culture,"in which I point out in detail the inadequacyof Suzuki's analysis
of some aspects of Japanese culture.

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 278 Umehara

Even the trace of a smile is perceived on his lips. The Buddha's smile does
not mean only satisfaction that he has done all that he had to do. His teaching
itself is to emancipate one from death and this emancipation is now serenely
taking place in his own death.
The notion of "beings" might have determined the ontology of the West
as Heidegger pointed out, but it is certainly not the case in Buddhism. In
Buddhism "nothingness" (sunya) is regarded as far more important than
"beings." This is not because the Buddhist prefers "nothingness" as a subject
matter for theoretical inquiry; rather it is because he conceives man's existence
in terms of death. Human existence is handed over into nothingness or non-
being.
In the past century Japan has brought in philosophy as well as science
from the West. Kitar6 Nishida (1870-1945), a close friend of D. T. Suzuki,
established his own Buddhist-like philosophy while he studied European
philosophy. Nishida systematized a philosophy of "absolute dialectics" and
was profoundly influenced by Hegel's philosophy of "absolute mind." But in
Nishida's philosophy the absolute is not being but nothingness or nonbeing,
as is the case in Buddhistic thinking. Beings, as long as they are beings,
must be determined; hence they are unfree. Buddhism claims that the truly
absolute and the truly free must be nothingness.
However, we should notice that Nishida dealt with "nothingness" within
a logical scheme as Hegel did, while the thought of nothingness in Buddhism
is related to ontological issues whose definite implication was the problem of
death. Man is mortal; hence the essence of his being is nothingness or non-
being.
Death is the central point of inquiry into man's being. For all schools of
Buddhism death is that through which man is conceived from beginning to
end. The greatest Zen master of the thirteenth century, D6gen, quotes from
Nagarjuna's words, as follows: "The mind which introspects transiency
of all sentient beings in this world is named Bodhi mind."3 Here he means that
the Bodhi mind is based on the mind that knows the finitude of man's being.
The very self-awareness of the finitude of being makes man free from attach-
ment to fame, money, and sex. In short, D6gen means that there is no path
for man in Buddhism without his awareness of transiency. From such a
thought he develops a unique theory of time.
As to the problem of so-called being and time, time itself is a being. All beings
are times. A sixteen-foot golden Buddha is a time. Because it is a time, time
is golden light. Three-headed eight-handed Asura is a time. Because it is a
time, the relationship of oneness holds between the "image" and the "present
24 hours." Even though a time of 24 hours has not yet been measured, it is
said to be 24 hours. Since a day's having 24 hours has been obvious to man for
3 Cf. D6gen, Fukanzazengi [Invitation to Zazen].

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 279

a long time, man neither questions the present 24 hours nor has any at-
tachment to the present 24 hours. But though man neither questions nor has
attachment, this does not mean that he is enlightened. Since, needless to say,
men's questions and attachments to unknown things and beings are not con-
stant, previous questions and attachments are not necessarily equal to the
present ones. A question and attachment are a time.4

According to D6gen, not only man but beings in general are temporal
beings. Time changes itself from being to nonbeing. In this sense time is
finite. But without this very time there can be no beings including man's
being. If this is the case, this present time is itself absolute. Beings can be
Buddha in a definite time, or "Asura" in another definite time, or something
else in each definite time. Each is absolute being in each appearance. Each
being has its absolute present.
A man once crossed a river and passed a hill. And now he lives in a splendid
house. He thinks that the time he lives in the house is present and the time
he crossed the river and passed the hill are past. But this is not right. The
time when he crossed the river is the absolute present and the time when he
now lives in the house is also the absolute present. Each time is itself in-
dependent, namely, absolute present.
For D6gen all beings are in absolute present, and this awareness of absolute
present as the ground of beings is satori (enlightenment). Thus man can be free
from changes. It is impossible for man to derive the proof of eternity from the
belief in the unchanging and eternal subsistence of changing time. Contrary to
this, man will find the proof of eternity by throwing himself into this present and
that present and by living up his whole existence in this present. Flowers bloom.
Here is an absolute present. Flowers fall. Here again is an absolute present.
When man moves his eyebrow and opens his eyes with surprise, here is an
absolute present. When he does not move his eyebrow and does not open
his eyes with surprise, there is also an absolute present. Beings exist as they
are. This is what D6gen's view on being and time means.
Here is another passage from D6gen. "If Buddha is there in birth and
death as such, then there is no birth and death. Again, if Buddha is not
there in birth and death as such, then there is no attachment.... Enlighten
yourself that birth and death are Nirvana as they are. Birth and death are not
such things to be weary of and Nirvana is not such a thing to be craved for.
Here man transcends birth and death."5
This finite being (man) enters nirvana as he is. Man should not attach
himself to this finite life, because such attachment is derived from his belief
that this finite life is something to be maintained. At the same time man
should not deny this finite life, because such denial is after all the negative

4 D6gen, Shob5genzd, chapter "Uji" [Being and Time].

5Ibid., chapter "Sh6ji" [Birth and Death].

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280 Umehara

attachment to this finite life. Neither being weary of this life nor craving
nirvana leads man to enlightenment. D6gen does not believe in the im-
mortality of the soul. Buddhism does not seek Buddha apart from this "birth
and death." Freedom is within this "birth and death," namely, this finite life.
In Japanese history D6gen is not the only thinker who bases his thought
on the awareness of such finitude. Kfikai (774-835), the founder of Shingon-
shu, and Saich6 (762-822), the founder of Tendai-shfi, start their thinking
from the awareness of transiency, namely, the finiteness and emptiness of
man's being and the universe. The same can be said about H6nen (1133-
1212), the founder of Jodo-shii, and Shinran (1173-1262), the founder of
Jodo Shin-shfi, who are contemporaries of D6gen. But they came up with an
approach that is different from D6gen's.
Man is finite. This world is impure. Man should detach himself from this
short and impure human world, and should seek to enter the eternal and pure
land. As far as we live in this world, however, we cannot enter that eternal
and pure land. Man can enter the Amida pure land after death. Man can go
to the pure land by virtue of calling "Namuamidabutsu." This thought of the
Pure Land school developed further in Shinran's faith. In Shinran's faith
the pure land is not sought after death, but rather in this actual world and
by man's faith in Amida.
It seems certain that the approaches to death differ in the different schools
in Buddhism, but their point of departure is the same, namely, the self-aware-
ness of death or finiteness. This is the case not only in Buddhism, but in the
whole culture and art of Japan. The thought of death retains great significance
in Japanese art. Japanese dramas can be said to be the dramas of death. For
example, in N6 plays, the dead are often heroes who reappear in this world.
The Kabuki plays often show how man will die a magnificent death whatever
the causes of the death may be.

IV

In conclusion, it seems to me that Heidegger proposes a new philosophical

problem to the entire world in two ways. It is in one sense an inquiry into
the foundation of the novel spiritual situation where nihilism is latent within
the European scientific civilization, a civilization which nonetheless has suc-
ceeded in unifying the whole world. But this civilization lacks a spiritual foun-
dation. In exposing European scientific civilization to total criticism, Heidegger
is perhaps one of the first thinkers of the West to provide a place of dialogue
and confrontation between the European principle and the non-European
principle.
Heidegger proposes a new philosophical problem in a different way through
his criticism of the notion of finiteness or death in the traditional ontology of

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281

the West. Here he reveals himself as a prophet who sees the destiny of beings
in death. Being a prophet of the destiny of death, he is again a severe critic of
the modern civilization of the West. Since Descartes modern philosophy has
not dealt with the problem of death which had in fact been considered in the
philosophy of Plato and Christianity.
History is consequently viewed as characterized by progress and develop-
ment in the West. For Japanese, however, history does not necessarily mean
progress and development, but rather it has meant "decay." For example, Con-
fucius views history as the continuous process of decay since the reign of the
ancient sacred emperor. Buddhism also views history as decaying from the
age of "Right Dharma" to the age of the "Closing of Dharma."
How man should think of death from now on and what the destiny of "man
unto death" in a godless world might be are questions to be asked by the
people of the whole world. These questions should be dealt with in the contin-
uing dialogue between thinkers of the East and the West, and through this
dialogue the answers might be found. Martin Heidegger is a great philosopher
in having opened a new age of such dialogue.

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