Egy - 02-Retbe 2006

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6th International Conference on Role of Engineering Towards a Better Environment

(Nature Inspired Innovations towards a Sustainable Environment), Alexandria, Egypt, 16 – 18 December, 2006
Structural and constructional aspects of ferryboat accidents
El-Gammal, M.M., Frina, Hon. M. Ahwa,

Emeritus Professor, Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering Department, Faculty of
Engineering, University of Alexandria, Alexandria, Egypt, zip code: 21544.
Abstract
One maritime tragedy after another has occurred within the last decade and has been witnessed by all
mankind. Most of them have been identified to happen as a result of human error at sea. The Red Sea,
though it is considered lake-like, has become a graveyard for old scrapped vessels and this has led to
catastrophic consequences. Though its stable climate and normal stable weather conditions prevail all
year round, it has the largest number of recent disasters. The toll of repetitive events has reached a
remarkable level of thousands of lost lives and millions of dollars lost in property and loss of wealth.
The dramatic sinking of m.s. Al-Salam 98 on 3 February 2006 represents one of the greatest ever sea
disasters after the sinking of. s. s. Titanic in the sense of the increase in the number of victims and in
the exaggerated toll of the loss of lives.
The intent of the paper is to put forward a structural scheme towards the minimization of capsizing,
foundering and in global terms in offering immunity to hulls of ferryboat vessels. Also, the theme of
this paper is to highlight reasons for the epidemic, and to investigate liabilities and responsibilities of
all who are concerned with those accidents. Finally, a proposed structural system to reduce the impact
of those accidents has been put forward and suggested.
1. Introduction
This work is devoted to the investigation of the engineering consequences resulting from the disaster
of sunken ferryboats. Also the study is aimed at reviewing and demonstrating views of liabilities and
responsibilities of all concerned parties. Technically, the analysis has been extended to cover
proposed fitting of structural arrangement systems to reduce flooding and damage failure of those
vessels.
In a road accident, even if all who are traveling on the road at the time of accident were crashed by
cars, or even within a collapsed building disaster, the resulted expecting toll is limited in both
numbers and loss of properties. Even in aviation tragedies, although the total number of passengers
could have been lost within few seconds, that number is limited to several hundreds. However, with
the problem of ferryboats accidents both through fire and capsize/sinking, the impact of the toll of
lives lost and in losses in earnings represents a long remembered global tragedy. The toll of lost lives
in one sea accident may be counted in the thousands. Emotionally it is a very hard experience to all
families to face the troubles of losing a family member. If that person is also their family provider,
economically, it represents the loss of the main or sole source of income to most poor families.
Socially, the outrage of repetition of those accidents may cause drastic problems.
Most of those involved ships are either found to be out of age, or sub-standard ones, with all
important safety systems or procedures practically idle or blocked. Though it is expected that all
documents of the ship were theoretically valid, the practical validity of those sub-standard vessels has
not actually been ensured. Economically, the accident has a great impact on marine transportation
activities due to losing such a great number of personnel who share in the development of their
society on the one hand, and the costs of the loss per accident on the other hand.
Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

Although the Red Sea is considered lake-like, it has been the scene of a large number of recent ship
losses through sinking and foundering. This is mainly due to being the sole traffic corridor that links
Africa to Asia through the Suez Canal that links the North to the South and the East to the West.
The Red Sea is stable with normal tropical weather repetition throughout the year’s seasons. Besides
it is nearly limited in wave heights and drift currents, and also its tidal range is extremely low. Hence
it is considered as an enclosed international navigational safe waterway to all countries over the world
[1]. It carries its importance from its location as the greatest waterway to save time and money,
encouraging all financiers to invest their money in marine transportation industry and petroleum
activities. It cuts the time per trip and saves money. The short distances between its banks represent
another beneficially vital aspect in saving fuel consumptions and earning profitable investment in
marine shipping transportation. Also, the seasons of O'Meara and those of Pilgrimage are increasing
ultimately the earning capacity of the ferryboat industry.
Within the described crises of the huge number of losses in a tragic marine accident and in views of
inadequate safety appliances, then the Classification Societies, the Insurance Companies, the P & I
Clubs, and finally the Governmental Authorities, must all be unified and apply adequate safety
standards to those types of ships. The safety standards currently applied are insufficient and
inadequate in global terms. When it comes to the problem of carelessness and recklessness with
licensing a substandard ‘coffin’ ship that is not safe and is unsuitable for marine use, then one shall
expect a disaster to happen. The vessel must be boycotted and the license must be withdrawn until the
vessel is brought up to the required standards and made fit in all aspects. Those aspects are safety of
passengers and crew, promotion of systems of safety appliances including sufficient number of life
jackets of different sizes, life boats and life rafts as well as the use of adequate suitable means of fire
protection, detection and extinguishing systems of different kinds. Also, fitting a voyage data
recorder, as is required per IMO and SOLAS Regulations, must all be installed on board of the vessel
and be in full working condition.
The agony during a disaster may sometime provoke and lead to chaos. When it comes to safeguarding
human lives, then the cost factor must be declined and all safety measures must be adopted. Legal
terms are not enough to harm those who are causing marine disasters. But when it comes to massive
death tolls, then one must be aware about the resulting consequences.
The involved Parties besides the owners, the P & I Clubs and the insurance companies are identified
as the three apexes of a triangle. So far the involved and responsible parties for the current context of
those accidents are:-
1- Classification Society.
2- Flag State Country.
3- License Port State Countries.
2. Highlights of the main reasons behind ferryboat sinking accidents
As far as the documentation issue and the evidenced papers, one may realize how the negligence and
human errors could play as a major cause in increasing of the toll. The papers must be valid in real
sense and shall be a real descriptive for the vessel's condition. Also, they reflect a real effort in issuing
the necessary certificates after thorough physical survey and by carrying out practical actual surveys
to the vessel under consideration. This is made to relieve practically some of the blames that could lie
on those countries that they are encouraging the registration of the sub-standard ships. Also, in second
place comes the Classification Society role. It is issuing safety appliances and adequate sea worthiness
certificates for those sub-standard vessels. Those Classification Societies must be aware when they
are issuing such important documents to those which are categorized as sub-standards and those

considered over-age vessels. Therefore they must decline issuing seaworthiness conditional and
Interim Certificates for very low in safety and structurally substandard ships.
Safety and quality of service are two faces of the same coin. The first serves in the promotion of
enjoyable safe and secure trips. The second is serving in the safety aspects, training of personnel on
board and, finally, leading to the actual ISM Certification in real terms and not in theoretical or paper
work. The paper work sometimes may exempt the owners from legal proceedings towards the
passengers and encourages them to escape from legal liabilities. This in fact is against the
International Maritime Law that protects the passengers and crew against negligence and
incompatibility of safety appliances onboard vessels. Figure 1 shows a typical case of Al-Salam 98
ship which had encountered foundering after fire accident in the Red Sea.
Fig. 1. Al-Salam 98 {Photo has been quoted from references [2 to 4]}.

.
Tragic major ferryboat disasters of the 20th and 21st Centuries have been summarized in table I [6-9].
From the evidence demonstrated within that table, one can reach the conclusion that most of those
disasters were considered a "war loss" and in some quarters are not comparable with the other civilian
disasters. After all, it is argued that military personnel by definition know how to expect mayhem at
every turn in wartime, while the loss of innocent civilians carries a certain aura of deep and personal
tragedy [5].
Table I
Statistical fatalities that have occurred to world Ferryboats in the 20th and 21st Centuries [6-8]
Serial Vessel Year Country Number of Reference Reasons of
No. Lost Fatalities Number loss
1 Goya 1945 Germany 6,000 6 War

2 Wilhem Gustloff 1945 Germany 5,348 6 War
3 Cap Arcona 1945 Germany 4,500 6 War
4 General Steuben 1945 Germany 3,500 7 War
5 Thielbek 1945 Germany 2,800 7 War
6 Woosung 1948 China 2,750 7 Foundering
7 Dona Paz 1987 Philippines 2,000 8 capsizing
8 Titanic 1912 Great Britain 1,503 6, 7 Brittle
failure
9 Lusitania 1915 Great Britain 1,198 6,7 Foundering
10 Assam 98 2006 Panama/Egypt 1,029 8 Fire
11 Estonia 1994 Estonia/Norway 913 8 Corrosion
The discussion of the role played by Classification Societies as such is very important as a
safety barrier for the prevention and reduction of marine disasters.

3. Classification societies role and responsibilities
The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) must make a stand against sub-
standard passenger ships. The sub-standard societies are considered the source of troubles to most of
the world’s crises as well as to marine shipping industry at large. They are providing documents that
enable some of the owners of those steel coffins to use them as ships. Also, they are witnessing the
denial of the evidence that those steel coffins are being identified as ships. They should not certify the
sub-standard till being modified to be acquainted with legitimate requirements of the International
Associations Classification Societies (IACS). Also, actual confirmation of the vessel that she matches
with the International Safety measures. Even satisfying the age problem that is stated within the IMO
Resolutions. They must care about human beings carried onboard of those vessels unless an accident
of this nature takes place.
4. Flag-state liabilities and responsibilities
This is the second barrier in the evidence of applying IMO Regulations. Fortunately the IMO and
IACS have issued blacklists for all countries that waived or blind-folded their information from
applying the introduced IMO Resolutions or IACS Regulations. Yet this is not enough to prevent
those countries from issuing certificates of registration for the non-complying vessels. Thus those
countries will be deemed to represent a headache to the shipping industry unless they will be revealed
by United Nations Human Rights Acts and should be thus liable to responsibilities of the loss of
property and the huge loss in number of victims. They must act as a responsible respected partner to
all human lives on board of their flagged ships. Whatever they will say to wash their hands of the rage
of chaos and panic that follow an accident of this nature, they must carry out actual surveys on all of
their flag vessels and thoroughly apply IMO and the other International Safety Regulatory Bodies
Rules and Conventions. In the meantime they must act to clean their documents of any
miscalculations and stop the issue of registration certificates to the substandard ships. This is the least
expected should they wish to be removed from blacklists of the IMO and IACS. Also, they must be
concerned about human life in the same way that concern is shown to the registration of those sub-
standard vessels. Thus, they will enjoy more respect of ship owners and will gain more profit out of
the registration of new vessels and existing seaworthy ships by several times more than the old or the
sub-standard ones. Otherwise, the United Nations must make a stand against those countries that
allow ship owners to use those steel coffins as vessels. An international resolution for safety against
those countries must be adopted to prevent the flagged ships from entering world international ports
and to totally prevent the misuse of the power of money.
5. Port state license countries’ role
The license-issuing countries represent the third contingency barrier in safety aspects. Yet, the role
played by those countries makes them carry the first prime responsibilities. The liabilities and
responsibilities rest on those countries who allow some owners of sub-standard or even vessels that
should be scrapped to use their authorities to navigate freely in their international water ways. Those
governmental authorities are strong enough to prevent any of the sub-standard or non-complying ships
by refusing them permission to sail. This will encourage the owners to scrap the old ships and to stop
using the sub-standard ones, actions that will all promote the growth of shipbuilding industry by
building and owning vessels that meet the required new standards. Perhaps the least that can be
expected from those countries is for them to encourage and to force the owners to operate vessels that
have been adapted and modified to meet the latest regulations rather than using obsolete ones that
should be scrapped. Also, the conformity of the safety appliances on board of those vessels must be
thoroughly and adequately checked per every individual trip. A check and verification for
seaworthiness of the ship under license must be thoroughly carried out. This action must be done to
eliminate any unforeseeable faults occurring in case of a distress situation arising. Conformance with

the necessary safety standards must be the first and last venue for a vessel to obtain a normal trip
license. The licensees as such will not be able to escape from liabilities and legal proceedings. The
authority is the highest level of power not to issue the license and/or even to offer permission to those
sub-standard ships from departing the embarkation port to their destinations.
6. Owners’ role and responsibilities
Though the ferry owners are considered as those who are investing their capital money, they must not
play with the lives of their vessels’ passengers, who are often weak, poor people. They must
understand the meaning of safety and carry full responsibility to endeavor to ensure that the vessel
making the voyage meets all safety requirements, safety appliances and safety regulations, including
those of the local governmental authorities, and finally offering actual quality of service in real terms
to all passengers onboard of their vessels. Thus they cannot wash their hands of the responsibility by
making all theoretical documents valid and not make use of their paper work against innocent victims.
They must ensure that the number of life boats, number of life rafts and the fire protection systems,
with sufficient number of suitable fire extinguishers, together with telecommunication facilities to all
be in good working condition before commencing a trip. They must rely on the capability of the
vessel’s complement to carry out the necessary actions in the event of any emergency situation
arising. It is also essential to employ qualified masters who care about the life of passengers onboard
as well as of the vessels themselves.
From the foregoing discussion it could be seen that owners cannot escape from legal proceedings if
they are using sub-standard ships in passenger transportation unless they have full confidence in their
ships. They have, therefore to stop using obsolete and over aged ones. Even if they have documents of
evidence from the other three partners stated above, this does not mean that they have the legal cover
or the amnesty against passengers and crew safety. They must allegedly do their utmost to make their
vessels adequately safe in real terms.
7. Role played by insurance companies and p&i clubs
The role of insurance companies and P&I Clubs must not only be in the compensation and coverage
liabilities towards owners, crew, passengers, shippers and cargo. They must be aware that the huge
amount of compensation per accident is possibly unbearable to all. Thus they must extend their role to
the full technical surveys of those vessels. They must use qualified experts for surveying the vessels
with regard to technical terms and financial assets. If those experts have discovered that the ship is
sub-standard, or even over age, then the underwriters must refrain from issuing of the Insurance
Policy. Also, they together with the P&I Clubs must extend their role to cover the entire shipping
operation and to control subsidizing the coverage of the old or the non-conforming vessels. Thus, the
role played by those Insurance authorities can share in the safeguarding and the minimization of
ferryboat accidents at large. The managers of those companies must apply the calculated risk analysis
before issuing the Insurance Policy concerned. Also, they must have accurate information regarding
the safety of appliances of a ship, crew and passengers, together with the surveying tests carried out
by the date and the authority. So, those companies must use qualified technical experts to identify
problems and their trouble shootings taking the time and paying all necessary survey fees and
repair/modification work expenses. Thus, one could say that the vessel is safe and secure to carry
passengers, crew and shipping cargo onboard.
8. Reasons of ferryboat foundering accidents
The construction of those vessels shall be strong enough to sustain the non-predictable wave forces
and sea events. Also, adequate watertight bulkheads and subdivision of all cargo and passengers
spaces shall be estimated within a scheme that will ensure success and take into consideration the

statistical nature of extreme events within the sailed zones and counteract their actions by minimizing
the risk of foundering by complete application of the advanced structural theory and trends in the
construction of ferryboat building industries.
The action of wind blowing onto one side of the vessel should also be included as it may cause the
worsening of the problem due to heeling the vessel down to the level of the garage and the cargo
spaces. This action in the presence of free surface effect and the event of dynamical sudden movement
of crowding of crew and passengers to the wrong side of the davit decks shall be thoroughly studied
and tentatively verified using the respective IMO Resolutions. All accumulated results will tend to
share in the movement of the ship’s center of gravity horizontally, as shown in fig. 2. Thus the vessel
will be lolled to one side. Consequently the vessel will lose the ability of buoyancy and in the
meantime stability completely and foundered instantly to the sea bottom.
Fig. 2. Arrow shows the horizontal shift in the center of gravity.
The total estimated added weight of entering seawater in the cargo space must be under complete
control. Also, the trimming of the vessel shall be determined to safeguard the prevention of any non-
predictable event or non-expected scenario. This together with the sudden panic resulting from the
movement of desperate passengers and crew on one side trying to save their selves from drowning
may cause added dynamical heeling moment. Those accumulated events and desperate actions of
chaotic passengers and crew may all led to the vessel being excessively trimmed by stern causing her
to rapidly sink, as shown schematically in Fig.3. The water depth at the site of the foundering plays an
important role in survival operations [8]. A major dilemma in respect of those types of tragedy lies in
the fact that most of the passengers may be trapped inside the vessel. The excessive trimming
moments described above play a major role in the quick sinking of those vessels, as being estimated
and verified using for example equations given in Ref. [9].
9. Proposed scheme and trends in ferryboats construction
The trend of construction of those ferryboats must be thoroughly studied. That issue could be carried
out with the aim of giving immunity to the vessel against fire hazards and strengthening the hull
girders against non-predictable events. To simplify the problem of ferryboat stability in both intact
and damage stability calculations, it must be known that the dynamical effects of the entered water

were massive and also the garage space was not adequately sub-divided. The dynamical force of the
inrush of water must be included within the verification analysis of those vessels [10-14]. Besides it
must be emphasized that the double-bottom, double-skin theory must also be applied to those vessels
up to the main strength level or up to the freeboard deck whichever is the highest. The appendix
shows the estimated reduction of probability of sinking if the double skin with different structural
configurations is employed. Figures 4 give a schematic non scale configuration of the proposed
scheme of structural arrangements. Figure 5 gives an idea of the complete structural modifications
that will need to be added within the proposed constructional scheme.
Fig. 3. Excessive trimming moments and the failure of the outer side hatch are the reasons for the
sudden loss of this old vessel [9].
* Height of double bottom should depend on height of engine room but should not be less than 4.
Fig. 4. Non scale views showing two different configurations of the double-bottom/double-shell
structure.
The proposed structural components must be approved by IACS and comply with the requirements in
accordance with Refs. [10& 11]. The estimated probability of being susceptible to foundering could
be brought to minimum and the flooded water will come under control. Besides, the fitted fireproof
accordion-folded bulkheads shall act to prevent fire spreading to the cargo spaces. Though it seems at
a glance that the cost of adoption of those structural elements will be high, yet when the problem
comes to dealing with human lives then the operation should be money wise not being profitable.
Therefore, the costs of making the vessel safe at any cost must be adopted. Therefore the most

important objective is to keep all passengers and crew safe while enjoying a normal trip and not take
them to the sea in steel floating coffins with the attendant possibility of them losing their lives.
Safety measures must be thoroughly adopted whatever the cost might be. Also, the adaptation of those
structural items will not only give immunity to the vessel to sustain non-predictable heavy weather
events, but also they will act to prolong the economic working lives of those vessels. By then the IMO
requirements for lifetime of those vessels can be changed to prolong the statutory life from the current
15 years (this is a requirement as per IMO and SOLAS for the safety age of passenger vessels) to be
modified to more than that value. This must be evidently done taking into consideration the history of
accidents accrued to the vessel.
s = ordinary frame spacing
Fig. 5. Body and half schematic plans for the full modifications in accordance with the proposed
structural scheme.
10. Conclusions
IMO Resolution A.637 (16) and A.849 (20) must be thoroughly applied and followed. The first
denotes liabilities in accordance with United Nations Conventions on Law at Sea. The second
represents the Code of Investigations of Marine Casualties. Applying the notes made by the second
resolution the IMO Assembly stated that: Safety of Seafarers and passengers can be enhanced by
timely accurate reports identifying the circumstances and causes of marine casualties". So, the disaster
described above shows the need for more stringent provisions and application of the safety code. The
SOLAS Convention must also include within the Protocols of safety more restrictive safety revisions.
Together with the promotion and the implementation of a comprehensive code of safety, the proposed
structural scheme could offer practical solution for immunity against the rapid sinking of ferryboats.
The main conclusions from the presented work are:
1- Definitely, when the problem comes to human safety, then no bargains whatsoever shall be
made to exempt safety liabilities on the expense of lives.

2- The evacuation and rescue of passengers and crew must all be done in a very short time. The
SOS signal together with the Satellite apparatuses onboard of vessels must all be linked with a
GPS system to reduce time and to determine definite locations of rescuers heading for the site
of the distressed vessel.
3- The vessel shall be equipped with constructional safety appliances to give protection against
sudden sinking. Also, to give adequate time for the passengers and crew to leave safely and
securely the abandoned ship.
4- Advantages obtained from the fitting of those structural items shall be reflected in promoting
a longer and safe lifetime for the vessel, reducing maintenance time and will ease the
inspection and testing of the different safety appliances.
5- More passengers and cargo deadweight could be carried onboard of the vessels. Thus the
earning capacity will subsidize the cost of initial construction of those vessels. This is mainly
due to the safety limits set fourth and due to the added constructional features and the
tightness of the vessels up to the main deck.
11. References
[1] El-GAMMAL, M.M.: "Reasons behind the Sunken Tragedy of Asslam 98 Ferryboat," Asharque
Alwasat International Newspaper, Water Page, (In Arabic), Saturday 11th Feb. 2006, Issue
No.9937, http://www.asharaqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=55&issue=9937&article=347651
[2] WORLDNOW AND KLFY: "Egyptian Passenger Ship with About 1,300 aboard Sinks in
Red Sea," February 3, 2006, http://www.klfy.com/global/story.asp?s=18991
[3] BOAT NEWS: "Dozens dead after Egyptian ship disaster," 3rd, February 2006,
http://rss.topix.net/forum/disasters/boat.
[4] NASRAWI, S.: "Dozens of bodies pulled from Red Sea after Egyptian ship disaster,"
Associated Press, Kenai Peninsula on line, 4th. Feb 2006, http://www.peninsulaclarion.com,
[5] HASAN, R.: "Launch disasters shipping officials oppose system to detect unregistered vessels,"
The daily Star News, Vol. 5 Num 23, Sat. June 19, 2004.
[6] KAPPES, I.J.:"The Greatest Maritime Disaster in History," January 17th 2005,
http://forums.filefront.com
[7] MILITARY HISTORY WEBSITE, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com
[8] THE ASSOCIATED PRESS: "Ship Burned Before Sinking, Passengers Say," The Boston
Channel, 3rd. Feb. 2006, http://www.thebostonchannel.com.
[9] BRIAN TRENHAILE, P. E., "Understanding Ship and Boat Stability (Stability & Trim - Part1
and Part II)" Hawaii Marine Company, Sept. 2005, http://www.hawaii-
marine.com/templates/Trim_Article.htm
[10] ABS, DNV AND LLOYD'S REGISTER: "Joint tank project-section 5-Structural
Arrangements," June 2005, http://www.jtprules.com/background/
[11] ABS: "Common Structural Rules," http://www.eagle.org/rules/csr/index.html
[12] WASHINGTON STATE: "Hazard identification and vulnerability assessment,"
http://emd.wa.gov/3-pet/pal/hiva/hazards.txt
[13] EL-GAMMAL, M.M.: "New Method for Estimating the Fatigue Life of Ship Structures,"
International Shipbuilding Progress, vol. 22, November, 1975.
[14] EL-GAMMAL, M.M.: "Fatigue Life Prediction in the Presence Inherited Defects and Corrosion
with Marine Applications," IMERASET, Proceedings Part B No. B3, Journal of Marine Design
and Operations, 2003.
12. Appendix: structural trends to withstand sinking of ferryboats
As has been mentioned within the text, the IMO Resolution for ferryboats must be definitely modified
to reduce the accidents and to minimize the number of lives lost per accident. The proposed scheme

of structural elements must be approved by the IACS Classification Societies concerned. It calls for
the use of: -
1- Double bottom of suitable height to the engine room and should be at least of 4 m.
2- Double skin from the level of the bilge up to a level of the second deck from below. The distance
of the internal sides shall be by an ordinary frame spacing or 750 mm whichever is the greatest.
3- Use of watertight accordion-like bulkhead, operated from the Captain's bridge by electro-hydraulic
means. They must be made in two halves. Each shall be folded in one side of the vessel. When the
vessel has finished the loading or the discharging operation then it should be closed. This will give
the vessel immunity to a fire spreading and will control the loss of buoyancy in case of flood water
entering. The distance between those transverse watertight and anti-fire accordion bulkheads shall not
exceed 40 m, or the normal subdivision length whichever is less. This distant is liable to and should
match with the type and dimensions of the shipped cargo, e.g., trucks and trailers dimensions etc.
4- Any openings through those bulkheads shall be made watertight and anti-fire. This necessitates the
use of double skin bulkheads through which an inert gas can flow to cool down the fire and to prevent
it from spreading.
5- The sketches shown in figs. 4 and 5 are representing the proposed scheme of constructional
elements. Those structural elements must be first approved by the concerned Regulatory Body and to
be provided and constructed in a ferryboat. Thus immunity against sinking, foundering and control of
fire spreading shall all be acting to safeguard the vessel against casualties.
6- Damage probability defined within this paper is being taken as the ratio of vulnerable intact spaces
divided by the total available space. Hazard models defined in ref. [12] have been applied to ferryboat
sinking accidents. The changes in stability and trim and the effect of the entrained water on the
longitudinal strength of hull girder are also to be the main aspects in the estimated probability. The
latter must also be related to the age of the vessel and the concluded fatigue life estimation as per
investigated in ref. [13].
7- The corrosion effects must be also dealt with in accordance with formulas and procedures as seen
in ref. [14]. Table II gives comparisons of the different estimated values of probabilities of failure for
different conditions.
Table II
Comparison between estimated probabilities of meeting safety aspects under various constructional
features.
Item Item Description Figure Reliability Damage

No. (*) chance
Probability (*)
1 Vessel before modifications 5-B-R 50 % 50 % (**)
2 Vessel with only double shell and bottom 5-B-L 80 % 20 % (+)
3 Vessel with double shell and bottom 4-L 90 % 10 % (++)
4 Modified configuration with fitted accordion 4-R 95 % 5% (-)
bulkheads opened condition.
5 Modified configuration with fitted accordion 5-D & 5-E 99 % 1 % (--)
bulkheads closed water and fire tight condition
Key for table II

(*) Concluded values taking into consideration the viability of age, subdivision, strength of hull
girder, corrosion effects, collision with foreign body (s) and fire accidents
(**) equal chance of surviving an accident
(+) estimated based on fitting of internal side shell plating separated and on top of the double bottom.
(++) estimated based on fitting of internal side shell plating separated from the double bottom side.
(-) estimated based on fitting of internal side shell plating crossing the tank top at side.
(--) estimated based on fitting of internal side shell plating and fitting watertight and anti fire
bulkheads, but in open condition.

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KEYWORD INDEX ‫ ׀‬AUTHOR INDEX ‫ ׀‬TOPICS

6th International Conference on Role of Engineering Towards a Better Environment

Structural and constructional aspects of ferryboat accidents

El-Gammal, M.M., Frina, Hon. M. Ahwa,

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

2. Highlights of the main reasons behind ferryboat sinking accidents

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

Fig. 1. Al-Salam 98 {Photo has been quoted from references [2 to 4]}.

1 Goya 1945 Germany 6,000 6 War

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

3. Classification societies role and responsibilities

4. Flag-state liabilities and responsibilities

5. Port state license countries’ role

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

6. Owners’ role and responsibilities

7. Role played by insurance companies and p&i clubs

8. Reasons of ferryboat foundering accidents

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

Fig. 2. Arrow shows the horizontal shift in the center of gravity.

9. Proposed scheme and trends in ferryboats construction

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

s = ordinary frame spacing

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

12. Appendix: structural trends to withstand sinking of ferryboats

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

Item Item Description Figure Reliability Damage

Key for table II

Email to: profgammal@yahoo.com

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