,n,erna,,ons, Journal of Law and Psychmtry. Vol 9, pp 143-156. 1966 0160.

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The Illusions of Law - Psychoanalysis and

Jurisprudence in Historical Perspective
Leon Shaskolsky Shejeff*

Psychology in general and psychoanalysis in particular, over the past few decades,
have exercised an increasing influence on the judicial system - from expert evi-
dence in cases involving the determination of the insanity of the accused, through
the use of behavioral research to impugn the credibility of witnesses, to partisan
consultations with social psychologists to guess at the likely propensities, and
even prejudices, of jurors.
In general, judges and lawyers in the judicial process today are more knowl-
edgeable about the behavioral sciences, more willing to rely upon expertise in
these areas, and more sophisticated in applying theoretical principles and research
findings to the facts at issue in a specific trial than they were in previous times
(Loh, 1984).
However, there is relatively little awareness of the manner in which the ac-
cumulated theoretical framework of psychology, and particularly psychoanalysis,
has an impact on the overall perspective of the legal system. This is true in regard
not only to the pragmatic problems in the adjudication of a particular case, but
also to the meaning and role of law in society and to the nature and underpin-
nings of everyday jurisprudential operation.
To fill this gap, some lawyers- from both academic and practical back-
grounds-have attempted to measure the workings of the law against the find-
ings of psychoanalysis and psychology. The first significant attempt to use
psychology was the work in Russian of Leon Petrazycki (1933). Petrazycki is
still largely unknown in the English-speaking world, though increasing attention
has been focused on him because of recent translations and interpretative analyses.
He stressed particularly the importance of the manner in which norms, both legal
and social, were perceived, and the degree to which people consider themselves
bound to obey. When a norm was considered obligatory, it could be said to have
legal force, even if it was not legislated; when a norm was disregarded, it was
not of legal value, even if legislated. In the United States, Jerome Frank (1930/
1963, 1949), Albert Ehrenzweig (1971, 1977) and C. G. Schoenfeld (1973) have
drawn on psychoanalytical ideas to describe their conception of the law.
Traditionally, the major opposing philosophies in law have been natural law,

*Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Department of Sociololgy and Anthropology, Tel Aviv Univer-
sity, Tel Aviv, Israel; Visiting Professor, School of Law, Temple University, 1719 North Broad Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19122, U.S.A.

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