Military and Press Censorship PDF

•'1
INFORMAL CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS IA VIETAVAI BY
THE U.S. MILITARY
by
CHARLES BENTON MOORE, B.G.S.
A THESIS
IN
MASS COMMUNICATIONS
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Approved
Accepted
-r 2
PREFACE
/Jo,^5
f' "^ The author would like to express his appreciation for
the invaluable assistance and cooperation given by his
thesis committee of the Department of Mass Communications
at Texas Tech University.
Thanks and gratitude are extended to Dr. Alexis Tan,
my committee chairman, who suffered through endless ques-
tions on format, style and content; to Dr. Billy I. Ross,
my committee member, who continually offered sound advice
and guidance; and to Professor Robert Rooker who steadfastly
encouraged me to maintain scholarly yet articulate expression
A special thanks goes to the many survey respondents
who took the time and interest to offer their opinions on
the military-press conflict in Vietnam. Their experienced
opinions provided the depth to the survey chapter on
informal censorship.
Credit must be given to Department of Defense officials
who gladly opened their files and provided background data
needed for this study. Space does not permit listing all
military officials who assisted in this study but special
thanks are extended to Major General VJinant Sidle, Army
chief of information, and Colonel Philip Stevens, a long-
time personal friend and the Army's chief of public informa-
tion. Both of these gentlemen were invaluable in their
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11
assistance in opening doors to information which v/ould other-
wise have been unavailable.
Historians may never fully resolve the debate on whether
or not the military censored the press in Vietnam and whether
or not the press performed its role in Vietnam in a profes-
sional and responsible manner. Yet, historians cannot fail
to note the unheralded bravery of civilian and military
journalists who shared death to tell the war's story.
It has been said that a journalist owes nothing to those
who govern his country; he owes everything to the people of
his country. This thesis is dedicated to the 35 civilian
correspondents and the unknown number of military journalists
who gave their lives in covering the war in Vietnam.
The names that follow represent just a few of those
who paid the utmost price in upholding the oft-quoted yet
still meaningful concept—the people have a right to know.

Robert Capa Huynh Thanh My
Life Magazine Associated Press
Killed by Viet Minh, 1954 Killed in Mekong Delta, 1965
Peter Thiel Dickie Chapelle

Killed in Mekong Delta, 1965 Killed by booby trap, 1965
Jerry Rose Margaret Higgins
Associated Press Garden City Newsday
Killed in air crash, 1965 Died of suspected hepatitis,
1966
Bernard Kolenberg
Associated Press Charlie Chellappah
Killed in air crash, 1965 Freelance
Killed near Cu Chi, 1966
111
Sam Castan Tatsuo Sakai
Look Magazine Nipon Keizai Shimbun
Killed by mortar fire, 1966 Killed by rocket, 1968
Bernard Fall Paul Savanuch

Author Stars and Stripes
Killed by suspected booby trap, Killed, 1968
1967
Ollie Noona
Ronald Gallagher Associated Press
Freelance Killed in helicopter, 1969
Killed by artillery, 1967
Gerald Miller
Felipa Schuyler CBS
Correspondent Killed, 1970
Killed in helicopter, 1967
George Syvertsen
Horomichi Mine CBS
International Killed in Cambodia, 1970
Killed by mine, 1968
Rene Puissesseu
Robert Ellison ORTF French TV
Freelance Captured, later reported
Killed in air crash, 1968 killed, 1970
Bruce Pigott Raimanik Lekhi

Reuters CBS
Killed by Viet Cong, 1968 Captured, later reported
killed, 1970
Ronald Laramy
Reuters Frank Frosch
Killed by Viet Cong, 1968 United Press International
Killed in Cambodia, 1970
John Cantwell
Time-Life Kyoichi Sawada
Michael Birch
Associated Press Francois Bailly
Charles Eggleston
United Press International Francois Sully
Killed in street fighting, Newsweek
1968 Killed in helicopter, 1971
Ignacio Ezurra Larry Burrows

La Nacion Life
Missing, assumed dead, 1968 Killed in helicopter, 1971
IV
Henri Huet
Associated Press
Kent Potter
United Press International
Keisaburo Shimamoto
Jiji and Pana Press
V
CONTENTS
PREFACE ii
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Purpose of the Study 2
Limitations of the Study 3
Related Studies 3
Method and Organization 5
Significance of the Study 6
II. THE MILITARY'S PRESS ROLE IN VIETNAM 9
Introduction 9
The Flow of Military News 10
Rules for Discussion with Correspondents 14
Military Assistance to the Press 16
Military Restrictions on the Press 23
Summary 32
III. T H E INDICTMENT AGAINST T H E PRESS 38
Introduction 38
Are W e Getting Through 39
Why Aren't W e Getting Through 43
The Military 59
Summary 59
IV. T H E INDICTMENT AGAINST THE MILITARY 67
Introduction 67
The Case Against the Military 68
vi
In Defense of the Information Officer 90
Summary 93
V. FORMAL CENSORSHIP AND THE VIETNAM WAR 102
Introduction 102
Absence of Formal Censorship in Vietnam 103
Summary 107
VI. SURVEY OF INFORMATION CENSORSHIP IN VIETNAil 111
Introduction 111
Scope and Purpose of the Survey 112
Method and Procedure 113
Limitations of the Survey 115
Related Studies 119
Significance of the Survey 120
Survey Results 120
Summary 152
VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR FURTHER STUDY 161
Introduction 161
Summary 162
Conclusions 169
Implications for Further Study 17 2
BIBLIOGRAPHY 174
APPENDIX 182
A. COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO

MILITARY INFORI'lATION OFFICERS 183
Vll
C. COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO
NEWSMEN 190
D. RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC RELEASE OF US
MILITARY INFORMATION IN VIETNAil (Annex A
to Military Assistance Command Vietnam
Directive 360-1, March 27, 1970) 197
E. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF

INFORMATION (Section II, Military
Assistance Command Vietnam Directive
360-1, March 27, 1970) 203
Vlll
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Complete Roster Versus Selected
List Replies 118
2. Whether or Not Formal Censorship Imposed 122
3. Whether or Not Informal Censorship Imposed 122
4. Newsmen and Military lOs Replies on MACV

Ground Rule Impairment 130
5. Security Reasons Used to Deny Newsmen
Legitimate Information 134
6. Preferential Treatment of Newsmen 140
7. Newsmen Ratings of News Sources in Vietnam 14 6
8. Military Ratings of News Media in Vietnam 149
IX
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure ^^
^ Page
1. Dual Flow of Combat News 12
2. Newsmen's and Military Information Officers'
Biggest Problems in Vietnam 143
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The United States, either directly or indirectly, has
been involved in the Indochina war for most of the past 20
years. The death toll has claimed more than 45,000 Ameri-
cans, more than 95,000 men "of various nationalities in the
former French colonial army" and estimates of one to two
million Indochinese.
War always raises troublesome and even dangerous ques-
tions between the government and the press. The Vietnam war
raised more than most. Even more so than in previous wars
of strict wartime censorship, the government has been vehe-
mently criticized for its press policies in the Vietnam war.
Despite press criticisms of censorship, news management
and government lies, the amount of information that poured
out of Vietnam about the war was staggering. More had been
written and filmed about this conflict than during any other
American war. It was television's first extensive coverage
of a war. In less than 24 hours battles fought in Vietnam
were viewed in living color in homes across the nation. In
the opinion of Fred W. Friendly, former president of CBS
News, the war in Vietnam was " . . . the best reported and
2
least understood war in history."
1
The Vietnam war was the military's first significant
press war. In previous wars, formal censorship was imposed
upon the newsmen with the military reading and editing all
copy or film prior to broadcast. In Vietnam, however, press
freedom, at least in respect to formal censorship, was
virtually complete.
The military information apparatus in Vietnam was com-
plex and proved to be both an asset and a liability to news-
men. Without military support the war could not have been
"the best reported war" in history. Yet, because of mili-
tary press barriers, many writers have echoed Friendly's
concern that the Vietnam war was "the least understood" war
in history.
Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the degree, if
any, of informal censorship imposed by the military over the
press corps in Vietnam. This includes an investigation as
to the extent of military control over the news in Vietnam,
whether the military exercised formal censorship, type re-
strictions imposed, and whether or not such censorship or
restrictions hindered newsmen from informing the American
public about the war.
In addition, this study will highlight military support
to the press and briefly review indictments against both the
press and the military.
Limitations of the Study
This study is limited only to the examination of in-
formal censorship as applied by the U.S. military in the
Republic of South Vietnam. It does not include the military
elsewhere, nor does it include press activities of the U.S.
or South Vietnamese governments. In addition, analyses of
military support, press restrictions and indictments against
both the press and military are limited only to Vietnam.
Related Studies
Although a number of scholarly works have been written
about the military-press conflict in Vietnam, none examined
for this study addressed the specific subject of informal
censorship of the press by the military in Vietnam.
Raymond Funderburk, in a University of Alabama Master's
thesis, discussed in great detail military restrictions im-
posed upon the press. However, Funderburk's analysis repre-
sented primarily the viewpoints of only a small number of
correspondents whom he knew personally and a limited number

3
of quotes taken from various publications.
A Master's thesis by Thomas A. Quinn, University of
Texas, reviewed the military ground rules and press restric-
tions but without analysis or presentation of opposing
positions. 4
5
Other theses examined for this study suffered pri-
marily from presentation of one-sided accounts, either for
the press or for the military. Most were written earlier in
the war and thus are outdated and did not include the recent
military-press conflict generated by the Cambodian invasion
and the Laotian incursion.
A number of books have mentioned the military-press
conflict. David Halberstam's Making of a Quagmire illus-
trated early U.S. effort to control the press yet is dated
prior to the U.S. military and subsequent press buildup in
7
1965. The late Bernard Fall's book. The Two Viet-Nams
examined government press controls in general but not spe-
cific military restrictions. The Information War, by Dale
o
Miner, discussed specific military press restrictions but

presented an obviously one-sided and biased account in favor
of the press.
Professor DeWayne B. Johnson, San Fernando Valley State
College, conducted an opinion survey asking participants
their opinions on how well the press covered the war but did
not address specific military restrictions. Professor
Johnson's respondents were senior, tenured faculty members
at a major West Coast college and news editors, copywriters
and other editorial personnel on a major West Coast metro-
politan daily newspaper. None of the respondents reported
by Johnson had served in Vietnam either in the military or
9
as newsmen.
As will be illustrated throughout this thesis, an
abundance of material has been written in newspapers, news
magazines, and periodicals on the topic of the military-
press relationship in Vietnam. Most, however, addressed
only a small part of the total military-press relationship,
most represented only the writers' opinions, and none would
meet tests of scientific scrutiny.
Method and Organization

Although an extensive literature review was made, the
basic vehicle for the study was a survey of newsmen and mili-
tary information officers who had served in Vietnam and were
the grass-root participants in the military-press conflict.
Personal interviews, correspondence with newsmen and research
of pertinent Department of Defense documents were used to
supplement the literature review and survey. For source ma-
terial, the author drew upon his experiences in Vietnam as
an Army Information officer, 1967-1968.
Chapter II is devoted to a factual presentation of the
military's press support role without evaluative conclusions
or comments.
Chapters III and IV present a compilation of charges
against press performance and military restrictions respec-
tively. Drawn from a wide variety and large number of
sources, specific indictments as expressed by ncvrsmen and
military participants are offered against the press and
against the military. These subjective selections of com-
ments and opinions serve as a background to the survey chap-
ter on informal censorship.
The subject of formal censorship is examined in Chapter
V and only in the context of whether or not it should have
been imposed for the Vietnam war. Opinions for this chapter
were drawn from a wide variety of sources and do not pretend
to exhaust all possible opinions.
Chapter VI, the survey chapter, presents candid opin-
ions of both newsmen and military information officers who
had served in Vietnam on the subject of whether or not the
military imposed informal censorship over the press corps.
These opinions were quantified and subjected to scientific
analysis.
This survey chapter solicited opinions by means of two
mailed questionnaires from both newsmen and military informa-
tion officers who had served or were serving as of May 31,
1971, in Vietnam. As with the entire study, the survey was
limited only to newsmen and military participants in
Vietnam.
Significance of the Study

No other scholarly works examined by this author re-
vealed an in-depth look at the question of press censorship
in the Vietnam war. As stated earlier, several theses
reviewed specific aspects of military control over the press
but none addressed informal censorship by allowing both the
military and the press to support or deny such charges.
Newspapers, magazines and books have displayed a con-
tinuing interest in the military-press conflict of the
Vietnam war yet none devoted more than episodic treatment
to the subject of military censorship.
The significance of this study lies in its broad look
at the total picture of press and military war news report-
ing and its specific analysis of military informal censor-
ship during the Vietnam war.
Historically, this study encompasses the military-press
conflict of the total Vietnam war. As of the cutoff date
of this study, the U.S. was rapidly withdrawing its troops
from Vietnam and, except for occasional television broadcasts
of U.S. air operations or Vietnamese actions, the war ap-
peared to be of less and less press interest.
Historically and descriptively, this study brings to-
gether the opinions of newsmen and military information
officers who were grass-roots participants in the military-
press conflict. The study represents firsthand accounts of
the complex question of the presses' right to know versus
the military's right to conceal in time of armed conflict.
NOTES
Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and

Fox Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers (New York: Banton
Books, Inc., 1971), p. ix. Death toll figures are as of
July, 1971.
2
Fred W. Friendly, "TV at the Turning Point," Columbia
Journalism Review, IX, No. 4 (Winter, 1970-1971), 19.
3
Raymond Funderburk, "News Coverage in Vietnam: An
Analysis of the Barriers in the News Gathering Process"
(unpublished Master's thesis. University of Alabama, 1969).
4
Thomas A. Quinn, "Reporting Vietnam" (unpublished
Master's thesis. University of Texas, 1968).
5
These theses include: Thomas R. Hagley, "An Evalua-
tion Of Information Sources in South Vietnam by United
States Correspondents" (unpublished I4aster's thesis, Ohio
University, 1968); Gilbert Kindelan, "A Study of United
States Government Controls on Combat News from Vietnam,
January 1, 1962 through January 1, 1967" (unpublished Mas-
ter's thesis, Pennsylvania State, 1968); James Ahrens, "War
Reporting from Vietnam" (unpublished Master's thesis, Boston
University, 1968); Robert A. Schultz, "Military News Prior-
ities" (unpublished Master's thesis, Boston University, 1968)
David Halberstam, Making of a Quagmire (New York:
Random House, 1964).
7
Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Praeger,
1963) .
p
Dale Miner, The Information War (New York: Hawthorn
Books, Inc., 1970).
9
DeWayne B. Johnson, "Vietnam: Report Card on the
Press Corps at War," Journalism Quarterly, XLVI, No. 1
(Spring, 1969), 9-19.
Methodological data concerning this survey is given in
the preliminary sections of Chapter VI.
8
CHAPTER II
THE MILITARY'S PRESS ROLE IN VIETNA:-!
Introduction
The focal point of the military press role in Vietnam
was in the Military Assistance Command's Office of Informa-
tion (MACOI). Headed by a brigadier general or colonel,
MACOI was the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (îACV)
commander's official representative for news dissemination
and press support.
The magnitude of MACOI's press support role became
apparent in the millions of words, thousands of photos and
television newscasts released via the Vietnam press corps to
the American public. Summarizing the support for only one
year—October 1965-October 1966--Arthur Sylvester, former
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said that
MACOI had:
1. Arranged more than 4,700 in country trips by news-
men, to include ground and air transportation.
2. Arranged for or conducted almost 6,900 briefings
and 108 background meetings.
3. Answered -ore than 32,000 telephone queries from
newsmen.
4. Been consulted individually by newsmen on 3,300
occasions.
10
5. Conducted daily press briefings in Saigon, 7 days

a week; average attendance 130 correspondents.
6. Conducted the U.S. portion of accreditation for
all correspondents arriving in Vietnam.
In 1968, MACOI arranged a total of 4,079 in country
flights for news media representatives on U.S. military air-
craft. Also in 1968, MACOI issued MACV accreditation and
gave briefings to 720 newsmen. In 1970-1971, MACOI arranged
flights for 1,549 newsmen and issued accreditations to
1,008.^
This chapter will review the military's press role in
Vietnam. It is not intended to provide evaluative comments,
either for or against the military's press support. Rather,
it is to serve as background to the following chapters of
highly opinionated indictments and the survey chapter on
informal censorship.
Specifically, this chapter will examine: the flow of
military news; rules for discussion with correspondents;
military assistance to the press; and military restrictions
on the press.
The Flow of Military News

Collection of Mili-.ary News
When a unit engages in combat with the enemy, informa-
tion of the action was not releaseable news until it made
its way to the MACV Tactical Operations Center located in
11
Saigon. Combat information, a required report each time a
unit was in action, was forwarded by the combat commander
through his intermediate commanders until it reached MACV.
After security evaluations by MACV intelligence personnel
and clearance by MACOI, it was released to the press.
Paralleling the flow of tactical information, most
major combat units had information personnel who also for-
warded this combat information, if unclassified, through
intermediate information officers to MACOI. In Saigon,
MACOI personnel monitored data collected in the Tactical
Operations Center and from information channels.
Figure 1 illustrates this dual flow of combat news.
This illustration depicts the flow of Army combat news where
no newsman was present on the scene. A reporter on the
scene, who complied with security classifications or other
military restrictions, e.g. ground rules, could use the in-
formation as he observed it. Other military services had a
similar news flow.
After MACOI verified the facts of the information, e.g.
compared information received through information channels
with that received through tactical channels, the informa-
tion was cleared and released to the press.
Clearance and Release of

Military News
Most major units in Vietnam (Army brigade or larger)
had an information officer assigned who coordinated press
12
COMBAT NEWS Noncombat news
^
J^
Combat Unit Unit Info. Officers
1^
I
±
All Intermediate r"
Intermediate Information
Commanders Officers
T
T
K
MACV
Tactical Opns MACOI
Center
X
Press
-> Combat News Flow

> News Release Flow
> Monitoring
Fig. 1,—Dual Flow of Combat News

13
activities and prepared releases on his unit's operations.
However, release authority, except in specified items, was
restricted to MACV.
The commanding general of MACV was the "sole authority
for clearance and release of information concerning U.S.
military operations in Vietnam (north and south) or adjacent
3
waters." Thus, all military news concerning operations or
other actions in Vietnam of general news interest had to be
cleared with îACOI.
While the majority of news had to be submitted to MACOI,
local commanders were delegated the authority to clear and
release noncombat information and unit news items. These
included: religious, recreational, sports and similar activ-
ities; construction of new mess halls, post exchanges and
similar buildings; VIP(Very Important Persons) visits on an
after-the-fact basis unless otherwise specified; personnel
actions such as promotions, assignments, awards and educa-
tional achievements; pacification support activities which
were separate from military operations; and local command
policies of local interest not pertaining to combat opera-
tions. 4
There were two other exceptions to the "sole authority
for release" of MACV: (1) the Joint United States Public
Affairs Office (JUSPAO), acting for the U.S. Ambassador to
South Vietnam, retained authority and responsibility for
14
release of U.S. military information to foreign language
news media published in Vietnam, and (2) materials pertain-
ing exclusively to the South Vietnamese armed forces were
released by appropriate South Vietnamese sources. MACV had
no control over information released by the South Viet-
namese. 5
Rules for Discussion with Correspondents

MACV prescribed certain rules which military sources
were required to follow in their discussions with correspon-
dents. Essentially, there were two types of discussions--
unofficial and official.
A military person who engaged in discussions with news-
men as an individual and not as an "official spokesman" for
MACV, was an "unofficial source." He had to limit his dis-
cussions to those matters about which he had personal knowl-
edge, providing that such knowledge was not classified or
violated the ground rules. The purpose behind such a
limitation was to protect the individual from making "ill-
formed and incorrect statements about U.S. national policy
. . . " or relations between the U.S. and South Vietnam.
An "official spokesman" was a commander or his desig-
nated representative who conducted discussions with newsmen
q
as an "official spokesman for MACV." For example among

information officers, only those at MACV were "official
15
spokesmen." Other information officers, because of the
"sole authority for release" clause, were not MACV spokesmen.
Official spokesmen could discuss matters with the press
in one of several types of discussions:
1. On-the-record for attribution--spokesman's remarks
may be quoted directly or indirectly either by a
personal attribution (name, rank and position) or
by a general attribution (U.S. military spokesman,
U.S. military official, U.S. military commander).
2. On-the-record for background--spokesman's remarks
may be reported but the source may not be identified
The purpose of such a discussion was to give corre-
spondents a better understanding of a situation and
only a "general attribution" may be used.
3. Off-the-record--spokesman's remarks may not be used
publicly in any form. The purpose of this discus-
sion was to insure correspondents' understanding of
a situation, to avoid inaccuracies, to avoid inad-
vertent disclosures that could be harmful to an
operation or program, or, in some cases, to facili-
tate their (newsmen) news coverage of military oper-
ations or activities. Off-the-record remarks were
limited t: senior commanders or their representa-
tives. 9
16
In any discussion, official or unofficial, classified
or sensitive information (of the host country) could not be
discussed. A commander was required to confine his remarks
to matters pertaining to his command. And most importantly,
no source could violate MACV's "sole authority to release."
Military Assistance to the Press
In 1962, a world-wide survey revealed only 10 resident
correspondents representing all media in Saigon. By July,
1965, an estimated 50 newsmen were assigned to broadcast
operations in Vietnam. In early 1966, more than 300 news-
men for all media were reporting the war. 12 And in November,
1967, more than 530 correspondents were accredited to MACV. 13
As of May 31, 1971, there were 346 correspondents in
Vietnam, representing 18 countries. Of these, 146 were U.S.
newsmen. 14
It is axiomatic to state that with the introduction of
U.S. combat troops in 1965, press interest intensified. As
the number of correspondents grew, so did the assistance
offered by the military. Military assistance to the press
ranged from the subtle "tip" newsmen received from a friendly
information officer about a forthcoming but classified oper-
ation, to the necessary means of transportation.
For discussion purposes, military assistance can be
grouped into several broad categories: (1) press briefings

17
and releases, (2) transportation, (3) field support, (4)
press camps, and (5) communications support.
Press Briefings and Releases

Although technically outside the scope of this thesis,
JUSPAO, an agency of the Minister-Counselor for Public
Affairs of the U.S. Embassy, conducted daily press briefings

15
on the current 24-hour period of the war. However, a sub-
stantial part of the briefing was conducted by I4AC0I brief-
ers .
Until mid-1968 the "five o'clock follies"—as they were
called by most newsmen and military alike--usually began at
4:45 p.m. daily. Interested correspondents assembled in
JUSPAO's auditorium to receive briefings concerning U.S.
Mission and military activities which took place throughout
the country during the previous 24 hours.
After a 1968 fire in the JUSPAO building, briefings
were held in Vietnamese press facilities at 4:15 p.m. daily.
A Vietnamese military briefer usually led the briefings con-

16
cernmg Vietnamese operations.
The U.S. Mission spokesman usually followed the Viet-
namese briefer and discussed mission activities. A MACOI
briefer followed the Mission spokesman with air and ground
briefings of all major U.S. military actions throughout the
country. MACOI briefers were the "military spokesmen in

18
Saigon" often mentioned in press accounts of the war. Brief-
ing officers usually had no firsthand knowledge of the
action they were reporting since most of their material was
obtained from I4ACV Tactical Operations Center.
In addition to the briefings, MACOI representatives
distributed official morning and evening military communiques
summarizing the previous 24 hour period of all major Ameri-
can actions. These communiques, released under the MACV
"imprint" with a MACV dateline, were prepared by MACOI based
on operational reports and condensed releases from unit in-
formation officers.
In addition to the regular briefings, JUSPAO also had
provided press policy directives to MACOI, "thus helping
assure coordination of U.S. civilian and military official
information.
Although JUSPAO briefings represented the official U.S.
Mission and MACV report of the war, unit information offi-
cers conducted informal briefings for visiting newsmen on
what their units are doing.
Transportation
Perhaps one of the most critical requirements for news-
men in Vietnam was transportation. Throughout the war,
travel by road was extremely hazardous except in heavily
guarded and escorted convoys. For newsmen meeting deadlines.
19
both with copy or film, air transportation from a distant
battle site to a distribution point in Saigon was often the
difference between the report reflecting "today's action"
or "old news."
In the early days of the war, before I4AC0I started
scheduling air transportation for newsmen on a regular basis,
one newsman said, "Reporters employ almost every form of

18
locomotion except water skiing to get to stories."
In 1964, transportation for newsmen, especially air
transportation, was virtually non-existent. Peter Kalischer,
a veteran CBS newsman, put it this way: "We make our own
deals with American or Vietnamese pilots." 19
It was not until late 1965 that the military assigned
the press corps a shuttle aircraft to ferry newsmen and
equipment to and from major points in Vietnam. 20
In early 1966, MACOI discarded the shuttle flight con-
cept and instituted a system of reserving seats for newsmen
on each of nine daily aircraft flights leaving Saigon for
major air bases throughout the country. The Special proj-
ects Division of MACOI had the mission of coordinating and

21
reserving these seats for newsmen. Once the correspondent
reached a major air base, he became dependent on unit infor-
mation officers to provide further transportation. MACOI
reserved transportation included only regular Air Force
flights to and from Saigon.

20
The official military policy on transportation support
for newsmen was to provide only in country and outside
Saigon support. Out-of-country transportation, except to
Navy ships located off the coast of Vietnam, was prohibited.
Concerning in country transportation, the official
military policy stated:
. . . correspondents are to be furnished whatever

transportation is reasonably available to assist
them [newsmen] in the performance of their mis-
sion. They are to be afforded the highest prior-
ity possible next to requirements for tactical
emergency troop movement, emergency resupply, and
movement of high priority personnel such as those
on emergency leave or TDY [temporary duty] . . .
MACV Press Cards are to be accepted as competent
travel orders.22
Despite Department of Defense (DOD) statements such as:
"We run a shuttle airline to the major towns everyday and

23
provide free reserved seats for newsmen," aircraft m most
demand by newsmen were those at the unit level. Local unit
transportation, normally resupply or tactical helicopters,
enabled newsmen to go to the battle scene for firsthand
reports and subsequently get that report back to Saigon for
release.
Field Support
Special Projects Division coordinated newsmen's visits
to field units with Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Media
Liaison Officers. Many correspondents leaving Saigon for
field units normally checked with these officers first for

21
assistance in getting to the unit and informing the unit of
the correspondent's visit so the information officer could
receive him and provide other assistance.
At the unit level, the information officer if assigned,
otherwise the commander, assisted the correspondent by pro-
viding transportation to elements engaged in combat or other
areas of interest to the newsman. Unclassified briefings
were given as well as escort officers to accompany him while
in the unit's area of operation. Other field support in-
cluded: military communications systems where no commercial
system existed; messing and billeting; and emergency medical

24
care.
Unit commanders were directed to provide correspondents
unrestricted movement in tactical areas except when in the
commander's opinion "the nature of an operation warrants such
action [restriction]." However, restrictions were not to be

25
imposed "solely to protect the lives of newsmen concerned."
Correspondents accompanying troops in the field were
"encouraged to wear U.S. military field clothing" which may

26
be purchased through military outlets. Many did and, in
the interest of safety, units usually provided the newsman
27
with a steel helmet and perhaps an armored vest.
Press Camps
The military operated five press camps in Vietnam which
provided lodgings, food, local transportation (vehicle), air

22
flight arrangements, and limited communications facilities.
Manned and operated by information personnel, press camps
also assisted newsmen in arranging flights, coordination
with units to be visited, dispatching reports to Saigon, or
as a facility to relax or write copy.
Static press camps were usually too far from major

actions and were seldom used by newsmen.
Since mid-1971, the military stopped operating press
camps except special press camps set up for major opera-
tions. 28
Communications Support
When transportation difficulties precluded the newsman
from physically returning from the field to file his story,
he had to rely upon military support in communications.
Except when civil communications were adequate, accredited
correspondents were authorized to use:
1. In country military telephone service if such use
did not interfere with military operations.
2. MACOI sole-user teletype circuits. MACOI operated
a 24-hour per day teletype system which connected
all major military headquarters and press camps
with MACV. This system permitted field corre-
spondents to communicate with their bureau chiefs
in Saigon and vice versa.
23
3. Military courier services within the limits of
operational requirements. 29
As with most support for newsmen, the commander was the
final on-scene authority as to what facilities are to be
made available to correspondents and rules for use of such
facilities.
Although not military controlled, newsmen could file

copy from Saigon to the United States via the RCA Telex
facility or the Republic of Vietnam Telephone and Telegraph
Company. On a limited basis, international telephone ser-
vice was available in Saigon. 31
Military Restrictions on the Press

Newsmen accompanying military units in any war have
done so under certain conditions which could be labelled as
restrictions on the free flow of information about that war.
As mentioned before, in the Vietnam war newsmen did not
face a military censor as in World War II. Instead, newsmen
were asked to adhere to a series of voluntary guidelines
when covering events of the war. And, as in previous wars,
newsmen were required to have some kind of official authori-
zation when accompanying military units. In the Vietnam war,
this authorization was accomplished under a dual system of
Vietnamese and U.S. military accreditation.
24
Accreditation
Receiving accreditation as a correspondent to cover the
war was a relatively simple procedure. The first step was
to obtain accreditation from the Government of South Vietnam
Vietnamese accreditation was a formality consisting of
newsmen applying for a visa and then presenting evidence to
Vietnamese accreditation officials that they are employed
by a Free World press agency. Vietnamese accreditation was
a first prerequisite for MACV accreditation.32
Prior to 1967, newsmen were accredited either by Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) in Washington or by MACV in Saigon. 33
This resulted in most American correspondents receiving
their accreditation through the Public Affairs Office, DOD,
while the majority of Free World newsmen applied directly to
MACOI. This dual application did not relieve U.S. newsmen
from obtaining a MACV accreditation; however, those with DOD
credentials needed " . . . no additional documentation." 34
In November, 1967, DOD stopped accrediting and MACOI
became the sole military accreditation agency for all news-
men. After that, newsmen needed only to apply to one U.S.
agency for accreditation.
Specific requirements for MACV accreditation as a cor-
respondent were:
U.S. citizens and Vietnamese citizens employed by
U.S. or other foreign agencies (except Vietnamese
agencies) will be accredited based on a letter.
25
prepared on agency letterhead and forwarded by the
agency direct to the Office of Information, MACV.
This letter must state that the individual is in
fact employed, that the agency assumes full re-
sponsibility for his professional conduct, in-
cluding financial responsibility and personal
conduct as these affect his professional actions
and that immediate written notification will be
provided the Office of Information, MACV, upon
termination of his employment. All Free World
correspondents must, in addition, . . . present
a letter from their respective embassies or dip-
lomatic representatives vouching for their
identity.36
While agency-employed newsmen had little difficulty in

obtaining MACV accreditation, freelance journalists had to
meet additional requirements for both accreditation and re-
newal of accreditation. These were:
Applications received from freelance writers are
examined by the Office of Information, MACV, on a
case-by-case basis. It is not the policy of MACV
to accredit people who are writing on a part-time,
speculative basis for a single agency. Only full-
time, paid employees of a news agency or estab-
lished professional freelance writers who derive
more than fifty per cent of their income from jour-
nalistic efforts and have firm commitments for the
purchase of their material from two or more publi-
cations are eligible. Consequently, applicants
must insure that letters indicating a definite
intent to purchase their material are forwarded
from at least two of their agencies (on agency
letterhead) direct to MACV Office of Information.
In order to maintain accreditation, freelancers who
do not have an established reputation will be ex-
pected to demonstrate that they are in fact submit-
ting material for consideration by appropriate
agencies . . . Freelancers will not automatically
be re-accredirid at time of expiration of their
MACV Press Cards. Freelancers must submit new
letters of 'intent to purchase' from their agen-
cies prior to re-accreditation.37
26
MACV directives did not indicate why freelancers must
undergo greater requirements than agency-employed newsmen.
In 1968, Barry Zorthian, then U.S. Information Agency
spokesman in Saigon, may have been alluding to freelancers
when he addressed a meeting of the National Press Club:
Over the years, about 2,000 different individ-

uals were accredited and, including second and
third and fourth visits by many of these, about
4,000 accreditations were registered. These
correspondents covered the full spectrum of com-
petence—from many of the best journalists avail-
able, to those for whom the label was only a
thing camouflaged for partisan evaluation, to
the inevitable adventurers who somehow obtained
the necessary letter of endorsement. To lump
all of these into a single group labelled the
'press' is obviously unwarranted and mislead-
ing. 38
In July, 1968, 36 freelance correspondents were accred-
ited to MACV while as of May 31, 1971, only 18 freelance
correspondents were in Vietnam.
Upon accreditation, a correspondent was issued a MACV
Press Card for varying periods of validity, based primarily

41
on the length of his Vietnamese visa.
In general, the MACV Press Card indicated that the cor-
respondent had been duly accredited by MACV and thus was
authorized certain privileges. Most of these privileges--
transportation, field support, communications, briefings,
press camps—were discussed earlier in the "Military Assis-
tance to the Press" section. Other privileges include:

27
limited military exchange privileges and use of military
postal system. 42
Area Access
Once a newsman had been accredited by MACV, his move-
ment or access to any area was not to be restricted by the
military unless: (1) his movement endangered the lives of
others, (2) his movement or presence would hamper rescue or
military operations, or (3) his movement was otherwise pro-
A O
hibited by the local commander concerned.
Ground Rules
Without censorship, the military faced problens in Viet-
nam of how to provide maximum release of information without
disclosing information which would be of immediate tactical
value to the enemy.
The solution adopted by MACV consisted of voluntary
reporting guidelines to which reporters were asked to ad-
here in covering the war. Referred to by many newsmen as
"voluntary censorship," these guidelines were usually called
simply "ground rules." While newsmen were asked to abide by
the rules, they were also required to sign a form acknowledg-
ing receipt of the rules and acknowledging that violations
of such "may lead to suspension or cancellation" of their

MACV accreditation. 44
28
The basic philosophy on the release of information in
Vietnam stemmed from principles established by former Secre-
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and later became formal-
ized in military directives. During the course of the war,
this philosophy has remained essentially unchanged.
For example, in 1966, MACV's policy on the release of
information was:
The basic principle governing the public release
of military information in Vietnam is that the
maximum amount of information will be made avail-
able consistent with the requirement for
security.4^
And in 1970, the policy was changed only slightly in
wording: "A maximum amount of factual military information
IS to be released consistent with security requirements." 46
(Emphasis added).
Prior to 1966, rules and guidelines on what was to be
reported were left largely in the hands of local public in-
formation officers of U.S. or South Vietnamese armed forces.
On April 21, 1965, Barry Zorthian, then Minister-
Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy, released "volun-
tary ground rules" for newsmen as a memorandum:
. . . information that will 'normally be released
as soon as available' includes target hit, na-
tionality of striking force, whether the planes
were land-based or not, a general characterization
of the success of the mission, tonnage ordnance
used, the number of striking aircraft, enemy anti-
aircraft, ground fire and pilot sightings of un-
friendly aircraft.47
29
While the first ground rules pertained to air action,
it was not until July 15, 1965, that ground rules were
issued for ground action:
There will be no casualty reports and unit iden-

tification on a daily basis or related to a
specific action except in general terms such as
'light, moderate or heavy.' Casualty summaries
will continue to be reported on a weekly basis
without unit identification in the weekly brief-
ings in Saigon and the statistical summary re-
leased at the Pentagon. Troop movements or
developments will not be announced nor confirmed
until such time as military evaluation deter-
mines such information is clearly in the hands
of the Viet Cong. When battles have been joined,
units participating therein will not be identi-
fied by specific types or number although the
general magnitude of friendly involvement will
be announced.4 8
After several revisions and changes, the ground rules
were formalized and issued to the press on October 31, 1966.
The 1966 rules, as well as those revisions which followed,
contained the provision that violation of the rules would
be regarded as basis for suspension or cancellation of
accreditation.
The 1966 rules categorized information as "releaseable"
and "not releaseable." Later revisions and memos to the
press listed only what "may not be used" until cleared and
released by MACV. There were 15 major areas of news which
could not be used -ntil released by MACV:
1. Future plans, operations, or strikes. This

material is never to be released until after
the plan, operation, or strike has taken
place.
30
2. Information concerning rules of engagement.
Rules of engagement are the prescribed 'do's'
and 'don'ts' under which commanders operate
in combat, particularly tactics and tech-
niques which would be of assistance to the
enemy, if known by him. They include the con-
ditions under which aircraft units, or indi-
viduals may fire upon the enemy under various
given circumstances.
3. Amount of ordnance and fuel moved by support

units or on hand in combat units or depots.
Ordnance includes weapons, systems and ammu-
nition. This ground rule is designed to deny
the enemy knowledge of the combat readiness
of units.
4. During an operation, unit designations and
troop movements, tactical deployments (scheme
of maneuver), name of operation and size of
friendly forces involved.
5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of oper-
ations, or specific locations. This rule
applies to all types of intelligence units
and operations.
6. Exact number and types of casualties or damage
suffered by friendly units. This information
is often released by MACV, but is not useable
until so released. The criteria used are the
value of the information to the enemy and how
much he can expect to know if the information
is not released.
7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance
expended on strikes outside of the RVN [Repub-
lic of Vietnam].
8. Information on aircraft taking off on strikes,
enroute to, or returning from the target area.
Information on strikes while they are in prog-
ress.
9. Identity of air units and locations of air
bases from which aircraft are launched on com-
bat operations.
31
10. Number of aircraft damaged, or any other in-
dicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness
of ground anti-aircraft defenses.
11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes,

courses, speeds, or angle of attack (General
descriptions such as 'low' and 'fast' may be
used.)
12. Information on, or confirmation of, planned

strikes which do not take place for any rea-
son, including bad weather.
13. Specific identification of enemy weapons sys-

tems used to down friendly aircraft. General
terms such as 'ground fire' may be used.
This rule is not designed to preclude analysis
of specific enemy weapons.
14. Details concerning downed aircraft, including

pilots and crews, while search and rescue
(SAR) operations are in progress.
49
15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.
The primary purpose of the ground rules, according to
the military, was the security and safety of U.S. forces.
Few newsmen argued with the basic purpose of the rules; how-
ever, many complained that it was in their (the rules) inter-
pretation that the military withheld legitimate information.
A basic weakness in the system of ground rules was that
no set of rules can cover every tactical situation encoun-
tered by newsmen in the field. Recognizing this, MACV estab-
lished a 24-hour service for any newsman who obtained
information which he felt was subject to interpretation or
if newsmen needed assistance in correctly interpreting any

ground rule "gray area." 51
32
Summary
The military's press role in Vietnam increased in pro-
portion to the increase in the number of newsmen covering
the war.
As a function of MACV's Office of Information, the
military's press role consisted of collecting military news,
checking its accuracy and insuring no information of value
to the enemy was given and then releasing this information
to the press either in press briefings or in MACV press
releases.
Not all news was obtained from briefings or releases;

many newsmen went to the field or other news sources. Mili-
tary news sources, however, had to be guided by the "Rules
for Discussion with Correspondents" which established offi-
cial and unofficial sources. Official sources spoke for
MACV while unofficial sources spoke only for themselves in
areas in which they had personal knowledge.
Military assistance to the press was varied but gener-
ally consisted of briefings, interviews, releases, transpor-
tation, field and communication support and press camps,
and mail privileges through the military postal system.
As in any war, certain restrictions were applied to the
press. In the Vietinam war, these restrictions included:
accreditation--a requirement that allowed newsmen to receive
military assistance; area access--provided newsmen access
33
and freedom of movement except as limited by tactical situ-
ation; and ground rules--a form of "voluntary censorship"
which specified what cannot be released without MACV
approval.
Throughout the war, friction developed between the mili-
tary and the press. As often described by both newsmen and
military information officers, a "true adversary relation-
ship existed."
The press has charged the military denied transporta-
tion, covered up unfavorable or embarrassing information,
used the ground rules and security classifications as a
means to withhold legitimate news, and, in general, were
less than candid in their "maximum disclosure with minimum
delay consistent with security."
On the other hand, the military charged the press with
sensationalism, biased reporting, violating security require-
ments in disregard for U.S. lives, and being unprofessional
in their actions in Vietnam.
The purpose of this chapter was to present the mili-
tary's press support role as it was officially stated.
Charges and counter-charges of how the military actually
performed its press role are the subjects of the chapters
to follow.
NOTES
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate, "News Policies in Vietnam," August 17,
and 31, 1966, p. 67.
2
Philip H. Stevens, Colonel, USA, Deputy Chief of In-
formation, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Saigon, Viet-
nam, personal letter, Sept. 5, 1971.
3
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Directive
360-1, "Public Information Policies and Procedures,"
March 27, 1970, p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as MACV
Dir. 360-1.
Îbid.
5
Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Ground rules are discussed later in this chapter under

"Military Restrictions on the Press."
^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 10.
Ibid., p. 11.
Îbid.
John Wilhelm, "The Re-Appearing Foreign Correspondent:

A World Survey," Journalism Quarterly, XL, No. 2 (Spring,
1963), 168.
Albert Kroeger, "Television's Men at War," Television

Magazine, July, 1965, pp. 38-39. (Hereinafter referred to
as Television's Men).
12
Jack Raymond, "It's A Dirty War For Correspondents,
Too," New York Times Magazine, February 13, 1966, p. 32.
(Hereinafter referred to as It's A Dirty War).
13
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "List of
Accredited Newsmen," Office of Information, Saigon, Viet-
nam, November, 1967.
14
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "List of
Correspondents Accredited to MACV, 1 April-31 May, 1971,
Office of Information, Saigon, Vietnam. (Hereinafter
referred to as List of Accredited Correspondents).
34
35
15
Much of the following data on JUSPAO was collected
by the author when he served as Army Media Liaison Officer
at JUSPAO, May-June, 196 8.
Stevens, personal letter.
17
U.S. State Department, "JUSPAO Vietnam: General
Briefing Book," Bureau of Public Affairs, Saigon, Vietnam,
1967, p. 3.
18
Charles Mohr, "This War—And How We Cover It," Date-
line, X, No. 1 (1966), 20.
19
Kroeger, "Television's Men," p. 38.
20
Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," pp. 32-33.
21
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "Mission
Statement/Functions," 1968, p. 32.
^^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 14.
23 .
Richard Fryklund, former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Public Affairs), in an address delivered to the
Buffalo Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America,
Buffalo, New York, January 10, 1968.
24
As far as facilities permitted, correspondents were
treated as commissioned officers with the simulated rank of
major or comparable grade in such matters as messing and
living accommodations. See MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 14.
25
Ibid., Restrictions on the movement of newsmen are
explained in greater detail later in this chapter, "Military
Restrictions on the Press."
Ibid., p. 16.
27
Author's personal observations as a press escort
officer in Vietnam, 1967-1968.
28
^^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 15.
^Qlbid.
31
Department of Defense, "Information for Use in Plan-
ning A Visit to Vietnam," Memorandum for the Press, January,
1971, p. 4.
36
32
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "MACV
Accreditation Criteria," Enclosure to Memorandum for the
Press, DOD, Washington, D.C. January, 1971, p. 6. (Herein-
after referred to as MACV Accreditation Criteria).
33
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Annex B
to Directive 360-1, February 28, 1967, p. 1.
Ibid.
35
Official letter to U.S. press agencies from Phil G.
Goulding, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs), Department of Defense, Washington, D . C , December
21, 1967.
36
MACV Accreditation Criteria, p. 6.
Ibid.
38
Barry Zorthian, "Press Performance in Vietnam," The
Quill, December, 1968, p. 20.
39
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnairi, "Press
List," July, 1968.
40 .
List of Correspondents Accredited to MACV.
'^•'•MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 13.
"^Îbid. , pp. 14-16
^"^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 14.

44
MACV Dir. 360-1, Annex C, MACOI Form 20, "Correspon-
dents Data," p. 1.
45
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Directive
360-1, Annex A, "Rules Governing the Public Release of
Military Information," October 31, 1966, p. 1. (Hereinafter
referred to as Ground Rules, 1966).
4 fi
MACV Dir. 360-1, Annex A, "Rules Governing the Public
Release of Military Information," p. 1.
"Set-Up in Saigon Described," New York Times, April
21, 1965, p. 4.
48
"New Curbs on War News," New York Times, July 16,
1965, p. 2.
37
49
MACV Dir. 360-1, Annex A, pp. 2-3.
50^^ .
This will be examined in detail in the survey chapter
where opinions of both newsmen and military information
officers' were collected.
^•^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 3.
CHAPTER III
THE INDICTMENT AGAINST THE PRESS
Introduction
On March 7, 1968, the number of correspondents in South
Vietnam peaked at 647. Although 647 represented the highest
number of correspondents in Vietnam at any one time, the
average number of correspondents was more than 4 50 per month
for the years 1967 through 1969, an average of 425 monthly
in 1970 and by mid-1971 the monthly average was 353.
The amount of information written, filmed and broadcast
about the war was staggering. As the war intensified, so
did the media coverage of the war. As the press intensified
its coverage, so did critics of how well the press covered
the war.
For discussion purposes, the war in Vietnam could be
considered as being three separate wars: (1) the fighting
war in the rolling highlands, the sweltering jungles and the
flooded delta region, (2) the political war in secret inner
circles of Saigon, Washington, Hanoi and other capitals
around the world, and (3) the information war which attempted
to put the other two wars into an understandable relationship
There were three combatants in the information war:

(1) the press, (2) the U.S. government, and (3) the U.S.
military. Unlike a conventional military war of conditional
38
39
or unconditional surrender, the victors in the information
war may never be known.
Some newsmen were not content to wait for historians to

tell the story of the information war and one of the most
agonizing questions some newsmen asked themselves was "Did
we get through to the American public about the war?"
A number of newsmen answered this question with a
qualified "no." These qualifications generally fall into
three categories: (1) the American public, for a number of
reasons have not absorbed the mass of information given
about the war, (2) the government and military, by various
machinations, have prevented full access to information
about the war, and (3) the press corps failed to inform
fully the American public about the war.
Only qualification number three above falls into the
purview of this chapter. As stated in Chapter I, this thesis
focuses only on the grass-roots participants in the informa-
tion war. This chapter will examine the indictment against
the press and explore some of the reasons why the press may
not have fully informed the American public about the war.
Are We Getting Through?

A common complaint among journalists in Vietnam in 1966,
and one which still persists today, is that they are not
"getting through to the readers." Despite the millions of
40
words, photos, broadcasts and miles of film relayed to the
public, newsmen felt they [the public] were lamentably
ignorant about the war.
One of the earliest and most bitter charges was made by
Malcome Browne, a Pultizer Prize-winning Associated Press
reporter, an ABC correspondent and later a freelancer. Said
Brown, "None of us really has gotten across to the American
public." As evidence, he cited a Stanford University poll
which showed that seven out of ten Americans (in 1966) could
not correctly identify the Viet Cong as South Vietnamese Com-
2
munists. Support for Browne's charge came almost a year
later when 50 percent of 2,075 university professors (from
17 colleges) could not name any Geneva conference signatories
without naming an equal number of nonsigners, and only 18 per-
cent could correctly name the three countries then supplying
3
troops to the war effort.
War critic Senator J. W. Fullbright accused the press
in Vietnam of suffering from "necrophilia," the love of
death, by concentrating too much time on casualties, death
and destruction. 4 Vice President Spiro Agnew said he was
frustrated because "only one side of the Vietnam war is be-
ing told by some of our most influential newspapers and
television networks . . . ." He added that "overall, their
[press] coverage comes off slanted against American involve-
ment in that war without any attempt to balance."
41
Although Wes Gallagher, general manager of the
Associated Press, lauded correspondents for "the best war
reporting we've ever had," he believed criticisms of news
reporting from Vietnam could be traced to "confusion and
division among the American people." There were "hawks"
and "doves" in the U.S., he said, but "most people are
neither. They are just confused."
One of the most publicized attacks on the press came
from retired Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, historian
and war correspondent:
. . . the overwhelming majority of correspondents
do not get to the front; and in that regard at
least, the American press continues to be dere-
lict in its main responsibility. The story of
the war is not being told in its daily columns;
there we find only the tangents and sidebars.^
Furthermore, said Marshall, the war was covered pri-
marily for "all bleeding hearts and for Senator Fullbright
who casts about for a way to stop it by frightening the
citizenry." War reporting, charged Marshall, was not for
"simple souls" who wanted to know how it was being fought
or the chances of success.
Francis T. Leary, vice president and executive editor
of UPI, countered Marshall's charges by saying "the war in
Vietnam is better and more accurately reported, with more
close-up eyewitness detail on battles, than any previous
.,9
war.
42
Contending that the war coverage was too fragmentary

and war-oriented. Ward Just of the Washington Post, said:
"Through it all, the impression persists that it is not an
especially distinguished press corps doing a not especially
distinguished job."
Agreeing that more perspective was needed, Vermont
Royster, Wall Street Journal, said:
You may get a vivid description of a cut-up bat-
talion with names and addresses of hometown boys.
Rarely, though a perspective description of the
whole day's war much less a thoughtful analysis
of how stands the army in the field.H
The worst press failure, according to some critics, was
television because "television's coverage of a war . . .
carried the highest emotional--if not cerebral--impact of
any reporting medium." 12 Its weakness, said Marshall, was
"though the camera trains only on one luckless fighter or
pans past a few palms, the illusion abounds that it is get-
ting the whole thing." 13
A senior Army information officer upon his return from
Vietnam, told a mixed audience of military and local commu-
nity leaders that television gave the public a distorted
picture of the war. "We see the sensational, the bizarre,
the unusual. We don't see a balanced picture of the good
14
and bad."
In 1966, James Hagerty, an ABC vice president, defended
television by saying:
43
Our people are traditionally the best informed
people in the world. They expect the news media
to present all the news—the good and the bad,
the pros and cons—and then, on the basis of
such information, they form their opinions.
This is what we in television are doing with the
Vietnam war.l^
But in 1968, Howard K. Smith, ABC news commentator,
said: "The American press is contributing to the confusion
and frustration now damaging the nation's spirit . . . Viet-
16
nam coverage is full of one-sided journalism."
Perhaps alluding to both government secrecy (The Penta-
gon Papers) and a failure of the press, Richard Oliver,
formerly of UPI, said:
As a newsman who 'covered' that war, I am deeply
disturbed with my own profession because I be-
lieve that if the American people had been told
the truth this national tragedy would have been
ended by now.17
Why Aren't We Getting Through?

If the preceding indictment against the press were true,
then the most troublesome question is "Why?" Was it the
very nature of the war itself? Was it government and mili-
tary roadblocks? Was it stateside editors with preconceived
biasnesses? Was it an apathetic public? Or, was it a fail-
ure of battlefield reporters?
Although each of these propositions will be discussed
separately, a possible answer may be found in all of these
working in unison. While one may have been more dominant
44
than others for a period of time, the most satisfactory
answer may have been in their collective impairment.
The Confusing War

All wars are confusing and difficult to report. The
so-called "fog of war" enveloped both the combatants and the
most professional observer alike.18 In normal newspaper
work, said Walter Lippmann, the "first rule for a reporter
is, of course, to see and hear from everyone concerned with
the event," but in the Vietnam war this was just v/hat a re-
porter could not do. "This essential and irremediable one-
sidedness makes it necessary to read very skeptically the
reports on the condition and progress of the war as a
w h o l e "•'•^
The problem, said Wes Gallagher, was that the "reader

would like a clear, simple explanation of who's winning and
what he, as a citizen, is paying for in blood and taxes."
But, he noted, this problem cannot always be resolved
because:
It is the war itself, confusing and the most con-
troversial in American history. First there is
the fighting. There are no measuring rods who is
winning and losing each day. No towns are cap-
tured, occupied and put behind the lines. There
is no front and few large battles by the standards
of every other war . . . And when a reporter re-
ports the confusion accurately, he satisfies
neither the readers nor the government, but that's
his job.20
45
One military information officer reported that the
problem was one of instantaneous reporting of a lot of small
incidents, none of which had any serious bearing on the out-
come of the total effort. As one Saigon bureau chief re-
ported to him: "The war out there, in total, was too big
to be covered in one story." 21
If the war were confusing to the print media, it was
as equally, if not more, confusing to TV reporters. "On TV
news pictures make their own frontpage context . . . " and
it is all but impossible to try to put pictures of one burn-
ing village in context and balance with all other activity
that makes up a war. 22
In this respect. Pentagon officers were quoted as
saying:
. . . the camera's eye is all too myopic and its
angle of vision too narrow to convey the full
truth of a military action involving large forces,
and the cameraman thus becomes an 'editor' as he
chooses to record the action's more violent and
dramatic aspects.23
A war as big, as confusing, and as complex as the Viet-

nam war "goes to the heart of limitations of journalism and
the limitations of journalists," reported Charles Mohr, New
York Times. "It begins to strain the limits of the talents
that journalists have for clarity, exposition, just our
abilities. And sometimes it's too much for us." 24
46
An Apathetic Public
A number of newsmen disagreed with Vice President

Agnew's statement that "the public given sufficient informa-
tion can make a sound decision about the war."2 5 According
to Malcome Browne, the public had sufficient information
and still did not absorb it:
There have been millions, possibly billions, of
words written about Vietnam. An American who
really wants to know about Vietnam has had it in
the newspapers, magazines, books, all sorts of
things—and a lot of it good--over the last five
to ten years. It's all been there, and he just
failed to absorb it.26
Many journalists, said one observer, were aware that

a number of intelligent Americans all too often had their
mind "rigidly made up" about the war. They simply refused
to accept the complexity of the war and for these, who
"proclaim magnificently clear-cut solutions to the problems,
what is reported from Vietnam is of less and less impor-
tance." 27
Two former Saigon TV bureau chiefs believed the public
dictated the news about the war.
"The American public is interested in the fact that
their boys are over here fighting and dying," reported Dick
Rosenbaum, former -BC bureau chief in Saigon. "The war is
fighting and killing—that's what it's all about. We do
not report the other things if they are not new and dif-
ferent . . . . "28
47
Responding to a question of why CBS took a negative
outlook on the war, Dan Bloom, former CBS bureau chief in
Saigon, answered: "It's a gloomy war. Bad news, sadly
enough, is usually the hottest news and that's what viewers

29
want to see . . . ."
Government Credibility
For many reporters, a number of whom are still reporting
from Vietnam today, the government's credibility gap began
during Ngo Dinh Diem's regime 30 and still persists today.
John Hohenberg, a correspondent who covered the war dur-
ing Diem's control had this to say on the government's
credibility problems:
They [McNamara and Sylvester] were heavily handi-

capped by the existing situation in Saigon during
the early 1960's where the charming but inexperi-
enced Ambassador Fredrick Nolting and the blunt-
spoken General Paul Harkins put all their trust
in what they were told by Ngo Dinh Diem . . .
Diem was full of glowing claims of victories . . .
At that stage, unfortunately, both the American
Embassy and the top-ranking American military
believed him.31
While some correspondents during this era were content
to remain in Saigon and report the war from there, others
such as David Halberstam of the New York Times and Peter
Arnett of the Associated Press were on field operations re-
porting failures while the U.S. government was reporting

• a. • 32
victories.
48
The problem, said John Mecklin, American Embassy press
officer in 1962-1963, "was the fact that much of what the
newsmen took to be lies was exactly what the (American)
Mission genuinely believed and what was reported to
Washington . . . ." 33
Taking exception to Mecklin's statement that the
"Mission genuinely believed" what it was reporting to Washing-
ton, Neil Hickey, who wrote a series of investigative articles
on the press in Vietnam, said the credibility gap was "part of
an unfortunate hangover from the Ngo Dinh Diem regime and the
period after, when the press was indeed misled and even lied
to by both Vietnamese and American officials" about the suc-
cess of the war.34 (Emphasis added).
In 1966, Wes Gallagher charged: "An examination of the
record in the past four years and what government officials
have said about Vietnam in the same period leaves no doubt
that reporting has been more accurate than official state-
^ ..35
ments.
As a consequence. Jack Raymond, New York Times, felt an
"undercurrent of doubt greets much of the news from
Vietnam."
In summary, Peter Arnett, Associated Press, did not be-
lieve the public was confused because the press failed: "It
37
is more of a failure of government explanations." Arnett,
who covered the war for eight years since 1962, said the
49
Embassy used the "hard sell" and "attempted to shove the
good news down our throats like toothpaste."^^
Editorial Bias
Editorial bias, a possible cause for the press failure

in Vietnam, may have been unavoidable. Said Professor
Verne E. Edwards:
So long as mere humans write and edit the news,
bias is inevitable. The question, of course,
is whether those who process news and views try
to be fair and how talented they are in their
attempts. Like beauty, bias is often in the eye
(or ear) of the beholder. Yet, there is no deny-
ing that bias, far beyond avoidable limits, does K
I-
'
•>
I, a
show up too frequently.39
Any indictment of the press must also look at the edi- !s

i 5
tors because, according to Peter Arnett, "any critical

analysis of the Saigon press corps must also take into con-
sideration that . . . the reporters were surely a reflection
of the organization that sent them over." 40
In this respect, a senior Army information officer
said:
I firmly believe that the editors in the states
concluded a couple of years ago that the U.S.
should get out of Vietnam no matter what hap-
pened and they devoted their resources to con-
vincing the American people of the validity of
their conclusions.41
Malcome Browne, a critic who dealt at length with the

question of "Are we getting through?" felt that editors,
news directors and producers catered too much to a "boobus
50
Americanus" with vignettes and the traditional Ernie Pyle
World War II reporting. As a reporter, Browne said that
"whenever he would toucli on economic or political problems"
people would either turn off their sets or "the producer
switches you off and cuts in footage that he deems most
A O
illustrative of what you're talking about."

Browne felt that preconceived notions of editors dis-
torted the picture of the war. The reason, said Browne,
was:
. . . editors and news directors and so forth at
the desk level back in the States are very little
above the average level of information than the
rest of the American public . . . and it isn't
that these people are not intelligent, it's just
that they're viewing the Viet Nam war in the con-
text of other wars that they do know about--
World War II and Korea and in some cases the
Algerian war . . . .43
Although the Vietnam war was our most difficult war to

interpret, said Hanson Baldwin, there were "very few editors
who are willing or able to allocate the space or time re-
quired for real indepth reporting. Too often the day-by-day
reporting is brief, episodic and partial."44 Echoing
Baldwin's charges. Jack Raymond reported that "one serious
flaw in the coverage of the war was that many newspapers
devote insufficien*: space to it." He added that interpreta-
tive pieces about the war were sacrificed to "straight news"
or "color stories" without interpretative background. 45
51
In som.e cases, a "color story" or a "sensational" piece
may have been too good to pass up. V7alter Cronkite, CBS
newscaster, and Ernest Leiser, executive producer of CBS,
reported that they hesitated and worried for hours whether
or not to run the Morley Safer (CBS Vietnam correspondent)
film sequence showing U.S. Marines burning huts in a Viet-
namese village (August, 1965). They considered such ques-
tions as "Were the pictures fair to the U.S.?" "To the
Marines?" "Or was their message somewhat out of balance?"
The final decision was that "the pictures were sinply too
good to pass up."
While some stories or film may have been "too good to
pass up," there was also the matter of cost. In 1966, it
cost $3,000 an hour to lease a line from the West Coast to
New York for film transmission. This cost did not include
getting the film from Vietnam or developing it on the West
Coast. Even if the film did not live up to the expectations
cabled in by the Vietnam correspondent, the cost may have an
47
overbearing effect on the news editor's judgment.
Too many times, a reporter received a query from a
stateside editor without being told why a particular story
was wanted, said an information officer for the Americal
Division. After the editors edited the story he said that
he "could not recognize it as the one filmed in the Americal
. . .
Division. „48
52
In 1 9 6 9 , B r i g i d i e r G e n e r a l L. G o r d o n H i l l , J r . , then a
c o l o n e l and chief of i n f o r m a t i o n for G e n e r a l C r e i g h t o n
A b r a m s , said a c o m m o n q u e s t i o n he o f t e n received w a s : "Why
d o n ' t w e g e t a true p i c t u r e of V i e t n a m back in the S t a t e s ? "
He a d m i t t e d he did n o t have the answer. H o w e v e r , he cited
a case w h e r e one news agency in V i e t n a m filed "a fascinating
story of a p r o v i n c e in the D e l t a w h e r e few people had ever
h e a r d a shot fired in a n g e r — a real contrast to the g e n e r a l
p i c t u r e of South V i e t n a m . " Y e t , in the two w e e k s after the
story w a s filed. Hill said, n o t one of the 100 largest p a p e r s

49
in the U n i t e d States had carried the story.
The V i e t n a m C o r r e s p o n d e n t
In 1 9 6 7 , Richard F r y k l u n d w r o t e :
. . . w i t h o u t trying to d e t r a c t from the p e r f o r -

m a n c e of the o f f i c i a l s w h o conned the public over
the U - 2 , the Bay of P i g s , the m i s s i l e crisis and
the V i e t n a m w a r , I w o u l d like to give r e c o g n i t i o n
to the m e n and w o m e n w h o contribute to the g o v -
e r n m e n t ' s c r e d i b i l i t y g a p - - m e and my fellow
reporters.50
The m o r a l , said F r y k l u n d , is s i m p l e : "Never b e l i e v e
e v e r y t h i n g y o u r p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s say; they're often w r o n g .
A n d so are the r e p o r t e r s w h o p u r p o r t to tell y o u w h a t those

51
o f f i c i a l s are s a y i n g . "
The V i e t n a m c o r r e s p o n d e n t , if for n o o t h e r r e a s o n than
b e i n g a c o n s t a n t source of w a r n e w s - - b o t h the good and b a d - -
b e c a m e a m a j o r c a n d i d a t e for c r i t i c i s m . As in p r e v i o u s
53
sections, the indictment will generally accentuate the bad,
but this is not to imply that the criticisms apply to all or
even the majority of newsmen who have served in Vietnam. In
many cases, all the previous "reasons" seemed to have con-
verged with the battlefield reporter becoming a convenient
whipping boy.
The press in Vietnam, said Peter Braestrup, who covered
the war in 1966-1967 for the New York Times and later for
the Washington Post, was a "motley crew" consisting of the
best and the worse. At one point, rosters of newsmen in
country included a "demented old lady from an evangelical
journal in Duluth, a brace of dogmatic pacifists, an Irish
Catholic priest, Koreans who doubled as spies, an American
lady who indulged in black-market currency manipulations, a
stalwart girl parachute jumper and Swiss photographers who
52
never took pictures."
Peter Arnett reported that anyone could become a war
correspondent and as a result all kinds were in Vietnam:
"starry-eyed blondes just out of journalism school; alco-
holic Old China Hands trying to dry out; some reporters were
working their way out of debt, and others working their way
into it; some were looking for a wife, others trying to lose
theirs. "^-^
A Newsday correspondent said the Vietnam press corps
over the years have included a "startlingly large number of
54
inexperienced reporters who aren't competent to judge much
54
of anything." Correspondents in Saigon "simply are not
capable of adequately reporting military operations,"
charged a New York Times writer.^^ An Army briefing officer
wrote that not more than a dozen of the press corps were
qualified to report this war.^^
If Vietnam correspondents were derelict, reported some
observers, it was because of the war itself. Frank Stanton,
president of CBS, said: "Besides its baffling intrinsic
nature, the Vietnam war has also been a baffling one for our
newsmen, our reporters and our cameramen." Alluding to a
war of no fixed fronts, no safe rear areas, Stanton continued,
"They [the reporters] have had to use ingenuity, persistence
and sheer guts" to report the war. 57
Even a correspondent with a unit in battle was "hard
put to keep the action in perspective," said Jack Raymond.
"Even when he can see part of it, he is as dependent as a
traffic cop at an accident on the coherence of the partici-
58
pants and other witnesses." Peter Kalischer, CBS, said,
"Once you commit yourself to a company during a military
operation, you're with them. You can't jump in a jeep and
look someplace else for a battle . . . ." 59
General Hill reported that a problem arose when a news-
man returned from action in the field and got a different
report than what he observed. As an example, he cited a
55
25th Infantry Division action where a newsman saw bodies of

21 U.S. dead being evacuated. However, when he returned
that day to the JUSPAO briefings, the military reported only
6 U.S. killed. What the newsman did not know, and refused
to accept after it was explained to him, reported Hill, was
that the additional 15 Americans had been killed earlier in
several other skirmishes and were brought in for evacuation.
While these added losses were reported in perspective at a
later briefing, "if this reporter is touring the country,
he is probably still using this as an example of military
lying," Hill said.^°
Competition, and "animalistic . . . zeal to outdo one
another, even to the point of physical contact," created
"sheer muck-raking," reported a particularly bitter Army
information officer. While pointing out that some Vietnam
correspondents were "personable, ethical and strive to be
fair and objective," others, he said, were so incensed with
competition that "they believe they are there to uncover
goof-ups" rather than responsible reporting.
The "sensational, the bizarre and the unusual" reporting
usually seen on television stemmed, in part, from intense
competition, said a senior information officer. "The net-
works are competing not only with each other, but also inter-
nally . . • the NBC man in Saigon is competing with the NBC
man in London, Tel Aviv or wherever he might be. Hence, he
56
looks for the kind of picture material which will increase
his chance of exposure."
For some newsmen, Vietnam represented a short-cut in
establishing their careers. As one unnamed TV correspondent
confided to Neil Hickey of TV Guide: "For TV newsmen of a
certain age group, you've got to have Vietnam on your record
if you want to succeed. It's like being knighted into full
ft 3
correspondent status."
This desire to "make a name for t h e m s e l v e s " caused some
n e w s m e n t o sensationalize and lose their "allegiance to o b -
j e c t i v i t y , " reported a Navy public affairs officer in V i e t -
nam. He c o n c e d e d , h o w e v e r , that since 19 66 more "mature,
r e s p o n s i b l e c o r r e s p o n d e n t s " were in V i e t n a m "trying to do

64
an o b j e c t i v e , complete job of reporting."
A n o t h e r Navy public affairs officer reported that in
the latter p a r t of 1 9 6 8 , "as the w a r w a s winding down s o m e -
w h a t , many low caliber newsmen began showing up . . . and
m a n y young n e w s m e n w e r e there to try to make a name for
themselves."
In the second of his four part series on television
c o v e r a g e of the w a r , Neil Hickey quoted an "older TV hand"
as s a y i n g : "I'm appalled that some correspondents are
allowed to come here for as little as three m o n t h s . They
h a v e n o i n t e r e s t in A s i a n a f f a i r s . T h e y ' r e here to make a

66
q u i c k n a m e for themselves and g e t o u t . "
57
In 1966, S. L. A. Marshall said "the deplorable thing
is that young writers too lazy to gather the facts for them-
selves sit around and sneer at all that is said."
In 1971 an Army information officer echoed Marshall's
charges: "Frequently newsmen are too content to stay in
Saigon rather than go to the field and get the story. This
results in an over demanding attitude for 'us' to do 'their'
fi 7
work." According to a Navy public affairs officer, "the
Saigon press corps has become fat and lazy, and unreasonably
6Q
demanding" that MACOI do their research for them.

One Army information officer reported that the relation-
ship between the press and military deteriorated because the
press sought the sensational and tended to report that which
"supported their biases and predispositions. As a result,
news stories and TV programs presented an inaccurate, unfair
and unbalanced picture of the war." 69
Those newsmen with "prejudged positions about U.S. in-
volvement" in Vietnam were determined to be "first with the
worst," reported an Air Force information officer. Further-
more, he added, "most of the media are so determined that
we will lose the war that they are going to report it so,
70
even if they have to do so in advance of the event.
While the previous indictments of the Vietnam corre-
spondent seem severe, Galvin Young of the London Observer
said, "Fortunately, there is a hard core of expert reporters
58
of considerable experience and sensitivity—they tend to
write off the rest as 'police reporters.'" These expert
correspondents, he continued, are "painstakingly well-

71
informed about political as well as military developments."
NBC's Jack Fern reported that all correspondents
worried about "achieving a proper balance between combat and
background stories," but then admitted that "there's nothing
more exciting than actual violence." Despite this. Colonel
Roger Bankston, former MACV Chief of Information, said: "I
haven't seen a TV newsman yet who'll show something gruesome
just for the shock of it." 72
Commenting on Vietnam correspondents, military informa-
tion officers felt that older, professional newsmen reported
objectively while young, inexperienced newsmen were prone to
be "instant experts" about Vietnam and warfare m general. 73
"The fast-buck, anti-establishment newsman in Vietnam will
turn out different accounts than the seasoned, honest, yet
anti-establishment reporter," said a Navy public affairs

74
officer.
A field correspondent is not "infallible," said Elmer
W. Lower, president of ABC News, "or that from a single ac-
tion he instinctively grasps the so-called 'big picture.'"
But, he added, seasoned war correspondents "such as we have
in Vietnam now, know how to give an unbiased reading to the
public.
59
In d e f e n s e of the entire press c o r p s , a Navy public
a f f a i r s o f f i c e r said, "Some w e r e very professional--others
m u c h the o p p o s i t e . By and l a r g e , it w a s the finest group

76
of m e d i a w i t h w h o m I have ever been associated."
The Military
The m i l i t a r y , like the correspondents, were a m a j o r
c a n d i d a t e for criticism for any press failures in the w a r .
It w a s the military that controlled the majority of w a r news
and imposed restrictions upon the newsmen who w e r e trying to
r e p o r t the w a r . Even for those reporters w h o traveled e x t e n -
sively throughout Vietnam, military briefings represented a
p r i m a r y source of news about the "big p i c t u r e " of the w a r .
And lastly, it w a s the military which held the key factor in
w a r coverage in V i e t n a m - - t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
T h u s , the m i l i t a r y , and especially its information appa-
ratus k n o w n as M A C O I , w e r e a possible cause for a confused
public. The indictment against the military is the subject
of the next c h a p t e r .
Summary
It has been said that t r u t h — t h e w h o l e t r u t h — i s an

77
i n e v i t a b l e casualty of any w a r . If this is t r u e , at least
p a r t i a l fault can be attributed to the press w h o have always
claimed the m i s s i o n of defending the t r u t h .

60
The Vietnam war has been perhaps the most covered war
in the nation's history. With an average of 500 correspon-
dents per month during the war's peak blanketing the country,
little should have escaped their scrutiny. In the opinions
of such men as Wes Gallagher (AP) and Francis Leary (UPI)
little did and the Vietnam war was the best covered war in
history.
Conversely, both from within and outside the media, a
number of observers and writers felt the press had been
derelict in their mission. A number of factors, however,
may have been responsible for any press dereliction.
For example, the Vietnam war v/as indeed a confusing
war—small unit actions, isolated incidents, no front lines,
no safe rear areas and no standard measuring rods of pre-
vious wars. For these reasons alone, it was a difficult war
to put into proper perspective. As aptly put by Charles
Mohr (New York Times) the Vietnam war strained the "limita-
tions of journalism and the limitations of journalists."
A number of writers contended that it was not a failure
of the press at all but rather an apathetic public who
failed to absorb the millions of words, photos and miles of
film about the war.
Other writers cited the adversary relationship between
the government and a free press as contributing to the con-
fusion about the war. The government's credibility gap
61
consisting of news management, news suppression, secrecy and
cases of informal censorship added to the reasons for a
press failure.
"Bias is inevitable," said Professor Edwards. Charges
were made that editors and their preconceived opinions on
the war resulted in only one side of the war being told to
the American public.
Perhaps the most criticized "cause," however, was the
individual correspondent. Criticisms ranged from the lazy
or inexperienced reporter to those with preconceived "anti"
positions or those seeking only personal glory at the ex-
pense of truth.
And lastly, the military in Vietnam, through various
machinations ranging from cases of outright censorship at
the source to more subtle forms of barriers such as simply
refusing to give newsmen transportation may have contributed
to the press failure.
The most logical answer to the assumption that the
press did in fact fail in Vietnam would be that no single
factor caused such a failure. Rather, all of the reasons
listed previously acting in concert would seem to be the
summary reason for the indictment against the press.
NOTES
Stevens, personal letter. Colonel Stevens also stated

that correspondent data prior to 1967 had been destroyed by
fire.
2
"The Saigon Follies?" Newsweek, August 15, 1966, p. 10,
3
David J. Armor, Joseph B. Giacquinta, R. Gordon
Mcintosh, and Diana E. H. Russell, "Professors' Attitudes
Toward the Vietnam War," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXI
(1967), 163-164.
4
John Maffre, "Fullbright Doesn't Like the Way the War
is Reported," The Washington Post, October 3, 1966.
5
H. L. Schwartz III, "Agnew Raps News Media," Lubbock
Avalanche-Journal, June 15, 1970. (Hereinafter referred to
as Agnew Raps).
Stanton H. Perry, "War Coverage 'Best We've Had' Says
AP's Gallagher," The Seattle Times, October 21, 1966, p. 8.
7
S. L. A. Marshall, "Press Failure in Vietnam," The
New Leader, October 10, 1966, p. 25.
Îbid.
UPI wire copy, release 209B, October 12, 1966.
Ward Just, "Vietnam," Washington Post, February 23,
1966, p. 1.
Veinnont Royster, "Thinking Things Over," Wall Street
Journal, October 27, 1966, p. 18.
Neil Hickey, "Vietnam: Is Television Giving Us the
Picture?" TV Guide, October 8, 1966, p. 27.
•'" S. L. A. Marshall, "TV Covers Bits and Pieces of Frag-
mented Vietnam War," Philadelphia Inquirer, April 3, 1966.
Greg Pinney, "TV and Press Accused of Distorting Viet
News," Denver Post, May 16, 1968. Address was made by
Colonel Joseph R. Meacham before the Armed Forces Week Lunch-
eon, Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado. Although text of
Meacham's speech carried a disclaimer that these were his
opinions and not those of the Department of the Army, the
press report cited did not so indicate.
62
63
15
James C. Hagerty, "TV: Exposing the False Glory of
War," New York Times, December 25, 1966, p. 27.
16
"Disillusioned with Journalism," Time, March 1, 1968,
p. 42.
17 .
Richard Oliver, New York Daily News reporter. New
York, New York, personal letter, June 29, 1971.
18
Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," p. 33.
19
Walter Lippmann, "Reporting from Vietnam," Washington
Post, December 27, 1966, p. 15.
20
Wes Gallagher, "The Press, The Truth, and The Vietnam
War," San Francisco Examiner, June 3, 1966.
21
Comments from a military information officer respon-
dent to author's survey of May, 1971. Survey methods and
results are presented in Chapter VI. (Hereinafter respon-
dents to this survey will be referred to as Survey
respondent).
22
"Television," Time, October 14, 1966, p. 58.
23
Neil Hickey, "Keeping the War m Focus," TV Guide,
October 15, 1966, p. 14.
24
"Are We Getting Through?" Columbia Journalism Review,
V (Fall, 1966), 41-42.
^^Schwartz III, "Agnew Raps," p. 12C.
^^"Are We Getting Through?" p. 41.

27
Galvin Young (The London Observer), "Despite News
Volume From Vietnam, Americans Seem Baffled About War,"
Salt Lake Tribune, December 25, 1966, p. 30. (Hereinafter
referred to as Despite War News).
28
Mimeographed transcript of the United States Army,
Vietnam, Information Officer's Conference, Joint United
States Public Affairs Office, Saigon, Vietnam, June 3-4,
1968. (Hereinafter referred to as Army Information Con-
ference, Saigon).
^Îbid.
30
Ngo Dinh Diem became the head of the government of
South Vietnam in 1954 and was assassinated in 1963.
64
31
John Hohenberg, The News Media: A Journalist Looks
at his Profession (New York: Hoik, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., 1968), p. 142.
32
For an excellent account of this see David
Halberstams's The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random
House, Inc., 1964) ,
33
John Mecklin, Mission in Torment (New York: Double-
day and Co., Inc., 1965), p. 100.
34
Neil Hickey, "When TV Tries to Mirror the War . . . .'
TV Guide, October 22, 1966, p. 37.
35
Gallagher, "The Press, The Truth, and The Vietnam
War. "
36
37
Peter Arnett, "A Time to Tell the Truth About War,"
Seminar, March, 1971, p. 18. (Hereinafter referred to as
A Time to Tell the Truth).
Ibid., p. 15.
39
Verne E. Edwards, Jr., Journalism in a Free Society
(Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company, 1970) , p"] 53.
"^Ârnett, "A Time to Tell the Truth," p. 18.
41
Survey respondent. Colonel Robert J. Berens, USA,
formerly an information officer in Vietnam and currently an
information officer with the Army Material Command, Washing-
ton, D.C.
42
"Viet War as TV 'Entertainment,'" Variety Newspaper,
November 2, 1966, p. 28. Also see "Are V7e Getting Through?"
Columbia Journalism Review, Fall, 1966.
'^"^"Are We Getting Through," p. 42.
44 . . .
Hanson Baldwin, "The Information War in Saigon,"
The Reporter, February 24, 1966, p. 31. (Hereinafter re-
ferred to as The Information War).
^^Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," p. 33.
46 ..
"Television," Time, p. 58.
65
47
Ibid., p. 57.
Survey respondent, Maôr Robert D. Baily, Jr. infor-
mation officer with the Americal Division, May 1970-May
1971.
49
Ma3or Bob Chick, "Military-Press Relations: Like It
Is in Vietnam," The Quill, November, 1969, p. 22.
50 .
Richard Fryklund, "Widening the 'Credibility Gap,'"
The Washington Star, January 3, 1967, p. 8.
Ibid.
52
Peter Braestrup, "Covering the Vietnam War," Neiman
Reports, XXIII, No. 4 (December, 1969), 9.
53
Arnett, "A Time to Tell the Truth," p. 16.
54
Survey respondent, Nev7sday reporter who declined use
of his name.
55
Baldwin, "The Information War," p. 31.
Survey respondent. Army information officer who
declined use of his name.
57
Frank Stanton, "The Face of War," The Quill, March,
1966, p. 13.
59
Neil Hickey, "TV Guide Goes to the Battlefront," TV
Guide, October 1, 1966, p. 8.
Brigidier General Gorden Hill, Directorate of Defense
Infomation, Department of Defense, Washington, D . C , private
interview, March 23, 1971. Hill was a colonel during this
interview and later was promoted to Brigidier General. As of
this report, he was serving again as MACV Chief of Informa-
tion.
61
Survey respondent. Army information officer who de-
clined use of his name.
62
Joseph R. Meacham, Colonel, USA, an address delivered
before the Armed Forces Week Luncheon, Lowry Air Force Base,
Colorado, May 15, 1968.
66
63 . ,
Hickey, "TV Guide Goes to the Battlefront," p. 10.
64
Survey respondent. Lieutenant Commander R. Dale
Klinkerman, Navy public affairs officer.
6 tr
Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who
66
Neil Hickey, "Meanwhile, Back in Saigon . . . ,"
TV Guide, October 8, 1966, p. 32.
67
Survey respondent. Major Jack H. Oswald, Army informa-
tion officer.
68
Survey respondent, Lieutenant Commander George P.
Beinstadt, Navy public affairs officer.
69
70
Survey respondent. Air Force information officer who
71
Young, Despite News Volume," p. 30.
72
Hickey, "Keeping the War m Focus," p. 14.
73
Survey respondent. Major Robert Masters, Army informa-
tion officer.
74
Survey respondent. Commander Jim Eaves, Navy public
affairs officer.
75
Elmer W. Lower, President of ABC News, "Field Corre-
spondents and the Laos Incursion," an address delivered to
Alpha Epsilon Rho, Chicago, Illinois, March 27, 1971.
76
"^"^"The War," Time, August 19, 1966, p. 18.
CHAPTER IV
THE INDICTMENT AGAINST THE MILITARY
Introduction
In the early days of the war, from 1962-1965, the small
number of newsmen in Vietnam dealt with the Chief of the
United States Information Service who was also the U.S.
Embassy press attache. The few Vietnamese Army public rela-
tions officers were also psychological warfare officers and
political education officers.
In mid-1965, the military expanded its information
organization. In addition to MACOI, each major unit had at
least an information officer and many had a full staff of
military reporters, writers, photographers and artists.
For most newsmen, military commanders and their infor-
mation officers in Vietnam represented major sources of
news about the war. As news sources, both frequently in-
curred the wrath of the Saigon press corps.
A Navy public affairs officer stated that upon his
arrival in Saigon he went to dinner with an American newsman
The newsman informed him that "you and your command are my
enemy, not Hanoi." The reason, explained the newsman, was
because he had to fight the information officer and the U.S.

2
command for what he got in the way of news, not Hanoi.
67
68
The Case Against the Military
The indictment against the military's information
effort in Vietnam can be reduced to specifics rather than
the broad generalization that the press 'had to fight the
information officer and the U.S. command' for what they got
in the way of news.
Many of the specific indictments against the military

can be traced to the absence of support. A general press
attitude existed that military information officers acted
first as public relations officers with their press support
role receiving only secondary emphasis.
For discussion purposes, indictments against the mili-
tary can be grouped into seven major areas: ground rules,
briefings, informations officers, commanders, escort
officers, transportation, and enemy body count.
MACV Ground Rules

The basic philosophy behind military ground rules on
release of information was to protect U.S. lives. A form of
"self" or "voluntary" censorship by newsmen, the ground rules
listed specific areas of information which could not be re-
leased without MACV approval. Before becoming accredited by
MACV, corresponder-3 were required to sign that they agreed
to the rules and understood that violations could result in
loss of accreditation and subsequent loss of all military
assistance.
69
"Ground rules are common sense," said General Winant
Sidle, former MACV Chief of Information. "All a reporter
has to do is ask himself, 'Will this help the enemy?'"^
A French reporter in Vietnam, who was reported not in
sympathy with the U.S. position in the war, said:
An Army has the right to protect itself. I think

the ground rules are fair. They may delay you a
bit in telling the story to your readers, but you
can tell it eventually. If there were censorship,
the censors could edit out anything embarrassing
to the United States.4
"Voluntary censorship" or ground rules was accepted by
most newsmen as a reasonable alternative to formal censor-
ship. In July, 1965, newsmen were asked to comply with the
rules voluntarily and no action would be taken against vio-

5
lators. However, one month later, when the military felt
the rules were violated. Colonel Ben Legare, then MACV Chief
of Information, announced that "any future violations of
security rules would be punished by canceling the military
accreditation of the offending journalist." Since this
announcement, ground rules were a major source of friction
between newsmen and the military.
The initial purpose of the ground rules have not changed
substantially since 1965. With the intensification of U.S.
military involvement in Vietnam, the military felt that "in-
formation on the movements to actions and our losses in those
actions give the enemy a tremendous advantage in making tac-

7
tical decisions."
70
As stated in Chapter II, there were 15 areas of non-
releaseable information requiring MACV approval. (See supra,
p. 29). However, the two most persistent press complaints
centered on how military information officers interpreted
the ground rules and embargoes placed on future plans, oper-
ations or strikes.
Newsmen frequently charged that military information
officers interpreted the ground rules in such a manner so
o
as to deny newsmen legitimate information about the war.
Said Jack Walsh, former UPI bureau chief in Saigon:
I think the thing which restricts the press is
the ground rules. The press is not trying to go
out and give aid and comfort to the enemy, but
the ground rules are very interpretive. The mat-
ter of what can and can't be released is at the
entire discretion of MACV, and using these ground
rules MACV is able to answer questions with such
comments as 'I have no knowledge of that' or 'we
have no report on that.' And that doesn't mean
it didn't happen. And we're asking honest ques-
tions about American troops or something like
that, and we can't always get an honest answer.^
Even military information officers were critical of
MACV's interpretation of the rules. An Air Force information
officer said that interpretation of ground rules by "non-
qualified but assigned public information officers" inhibited
full disclosure of information to the press. "One of the
biggest problems m any type of 'censorship' I encountered
was the individual interpretation of the ground rules," said
an Army information officer. "Something 'o.k.' one day
71
would be a 'no no' the next day and 'o.k.' two days
later." A Navy public affairs officer said that MACV in-
terpretation of the rules was what he thought to be censor-
ship. He reported:
I wrote daily news summaries on fleet activities
for distribution at the follies . . . often di-
rect quotes from pilots would be changed at MACV
to say something different. When the pilot would
say 'village,' it would be changed to 'staging
area' or 'transhipment point.' This might have
been true but they were still villages.-^
Perhaps the most troublesome ground rule area for both
newsmen and the military was non-releaseable information
concerning future plans and operations.
The ground rule on future plans stated that the follow-
ing information may not be used until released by MACV:
Future plans, operations, or strikes. This mate-
rial is never to be released until after the
plan, operation, or strike has taken place.13
In effect, a correspondent must agree to accept a volun-
tary embargo on such information—even if the newsman ob-
tained such information independently of military sources.
While embargoes allowed newsmen to cover an operation while
it was in progress; written copy, photographs and motion-
picture footage had to be withheld until MACV announced the
operation.
One of the first major operations embargoed by the mili-
tary was in April, 1965. A U.S. force initiated a tactical
operation against the Viet Cong in the Ashau Valley.
72
Newsmen were allowed to accompany units but were under an
embargo not to release any information until announced by
MACV. Although the military normally announced an operation
after one or two days, the Ashau Valley operation remained
embargoed for 11 days.
According to Gene Roberts of the New York Times, news-
men "suspected the command of having embargoed the operation
to avoid 'embarrassing' the United States while it was try-
ing to get peace talks under way." Roberts added that other
newsmen could see "no valid military reason for not writing
that the Americans were in Ashau inasmuch as the enemy was
shooting at them."
On the fifth day of the operation. General William C
Westmoreland announced the embargo would remain in effect
for days, possibly weeks, in order to protect American

lives. 15 Yet, six days later, on the eleventh day of the
operation, the embargo was broken in Washington by columnist
Joseph Alsop. MACV then followed suit with the announcement
in Saigon.
Vietnam correspondents were enraged over Alsop's ground
rule violation and especially so because Alsop, then on tour
in Vietnam, was never disciplined for having broken the
embargo. Gene Roberts described Alsop as "a strong advocate

16
of United States involvement in Vietnam . . . ." Another
wr iter said Alsop was " . . . the super-hawk of American

73
journalism . . . the Pentagon's best friend—and Westmore-
land's bitter-end supporter. "'''^
Less than two months later, John Carroll, the Baltimore
Sun's only correspondent in Vietnam, had his accreditation
suspended for two months for violating an embargo on the
Marine's abandonment of its garrison at Khe Sanh. Carroll
went to Khe Sanh and observed Marines disassembling the
metal runways and dynamiting bunkers. Convinced the enemy
troops, who then encircled Khe Sanh, could see all this
from their nearby positions, Carroll returned to Saigon and
released the story.18 Carroll's disaccreditation, coming
shortly after Alsop's violation with no discipline, embit-
tered many Vietnam correspondents. 19
In the history of the Vietnam war, few allied opera-
tions generated as much confusion and bitter press com-
plaints as did the joint U.S./Vietnamese drive into Laos in
February, 1971. A Washington Post page one headline illus-
trated the confusion: "News of Embargo is Embargoed, Un-
20
Embargoed, Re-Embargoed."
As the headline suggested, the fact that an embargo was
in effect was embargoed. Temporarily, Jerry W. Friedheim,
deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs,
lifted the MACV embargo in Washington only to re-embargo it
during the same press conference. 21
74
The Laotian news problem started, according to General
S i d l e , when MACV decided that the Vietnamese were "ready to
stand alone" on their own information program. "When the
Laos thing came along, it was decided at the top MACV level
to let the ARVN (Army, Republic of Vietnam) handle the infor-
mation aspects," said Sidle. "They had a good plan too, but
at the eleventh hour for some reason, word came down--no

,.22
press."
MACV officials decided that since President Thieu was
scheduled for a press conference on the second day of the
o p e r a t i o n , he could make the Laotian announcement. For some
reason, however. President Thieu did not make the announce-
m e n t , said Sidle, and on the third day of the operation one
of two Vietnamese helicopters used by the press was shot
down and newsmen killed. Finally, on the fifth day, MACV
felt it had to get back in the act but according to Sidle,
it w a s too late. "It started bad and never got better,"
Sidle said.
Sidle went on to explain that the South Vietnamese Army
commanders had the same authority as did U.S. commanders in
keeping the press out of their operation areas. As a result,
said S i d l e , "the press views on this was that the Vietnamese
were trying to hide something. We really lost the public

23
affairs battle on this one."
75
The Saigon press corps were furious from the beginning
of the Laotian campaign because never before had the U.S.
slapped an embargo on a combat operation of such size, dura-
tion and scope. To most, the military security imposed was
O A
an excuse to "cloak a politically explosive decision."

As press criticisms mounted, MACV and Washington firmly
held to the embargoed status for eight days. Among the many
press complaints, the following were common:
1. While the intent of the embargo was to deny informa-
tion to the enemy about the operation, the Soviet Union's
Izvestia and Tass had been reporting the action for days.
Japan's Kyodo News Agency reported the operation and even
Saigon's Vietnamese newspapers were carrying the stories.
While Hanoi had access to what the U.S. and South Vietnamese
were doing, the American press could not tell the U.S. pub-
25
lie that even an embargo was m effect.
2. At the outset of the Laotian operation, newsmen
were barred from flying in U.S. helicopters into Laos.
This prompted the Associated Press to charge "censorship at
26
the source of the news." A Washington Post reporter wrote
that one reason given by MACV for refusing to fly newsmen
across the border was international commercial aviation
agreements, "even though the command showed no compunction
about doing so during last May's Cambodian incursion." 27
76
E v e n w h e n a c o r r e s p o n d e n t m a n a g e d to slip aboard a U . S .
helicopter, he w a s thwarted in his news gathering efforts.
A S o u t h V i e t n a m e s e c a m e r a m a n w o r k i n g for N B C m a n a g e d to
s l i p a b o a r d a U . S . h e l i c o p t e r b u t w h e n h e b e g a n to film the
A m e r i c a n d o o r g u n n e r , t h e s o l d i e r seized the c a m e r a m a n ' s
$700 c a m e r a a n d t h r e w i t i n t o t h e j u n g l e b e l o w . "I've g o t
28
my o r d e r s , " the soldier explained.
A f t e r four c i v i l i a n p h o t o g r a p h e r s , i n c l u d i n g L i f e ' s
L a r r y B u r r o w s , w e r e k i l l e d in a V i e t n a m e s e h e l i c o p t e r w h i c h
h a d b e c o m e l o s t o v e r L a o s and shot d o w n , m o s t n e w s m e n
s t o p p e d r i d i n g in w h a t they t e r m e d "unreliable V i e t n a m e s e
aircraft." C o n c e r n e d a b o u t the "bad p r e s s " the L a o t i a n c a m -
p a i g n w a s r e c e i v i n g , M A C V l a t e r m o d i f i e d its b a n and a u t h o -
r i z e d o n e U . S . a n d o n e V i e t n a m e s e h e l i c o p t e r to carry
29
newsmen across the border into Laos.
3. A n o t h e r m a j o r c o m p l a i n t w a s t h a t the U . S . w a s n o t
c a n d i d a b o u t i t s a i r c r a f t l o s s e s in L a o s . MACV reported
t h a t b e t w e e n F e b r u a r y 8, 1 9 7 1 , and M a r c h 3, 1 9 7 1 , 22 h e l i -
copters were lost in Laos. Yet, Holger Jensen, Associated

Press, reported U.S. pilots said four or five times that
number were shot down. The U.S. command, said Jensen, did
not consider any helicopter lost if it were eventually re-
covered. "Their crews might be dead or wounded, their
structure so badly damaged they would have to be sent back
77
to the U.S. to be made operative again, but they're not
lost," Jensen said."^^
4. Throughout the Laotian campaign, newsmen complained
that sources either refused to talk or were ordered not to
talk. Jensen reported that U.S. helicopter pilots flew

31
1,000 sorties daily over Laos but were ordered to "keep
(their) mouths shut," by their commanding officers.^^ Two
Air Force fighter-bomber pilots, rescued from Laos after
being shot down, were "absolutely unavailable" to newsmen
said the Air Force chief of information at Da Nang, because
they are undergoing medical observation in a hospital.

Jensen reported a newsman found the pilots drinking beer in
33
an officers' club. Still another case cited by Jensen was
when an Air Force pilot refused to tell newsmen whether the
enemy had radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns. His refusal
was based on "that's classified information." The newsman,
said Jensen, tried unsuccessfully to explain to the pilot
that the enemy knows what kind of anti-aircraft guns they
have. 34 (Emphasis added).
5. A number of newsmen complained about unreliable
South Vietnamese information on Laos. For example, ABC's
Nick George said, " . . . the ARVN reports 13,668 enemy
killed . . . There's got to be at least three wounded for
each killed in action. That would make a total K.I.A.
[killed in action] and wounded of 54,672 for the enemy

78
today. Yet, high U.S. authorities said last Sunday there
were 11 enemy regiments—or about 33,000 men in Laos."^^
In summary, the press castigated the military for offi-
cial censorship and ambiguity during the Laotian campaign.
From the beginning, said Don Farmer, ABC, "coverage of the
Laos invasion has been a nightmare of misinformation, lack
of information, inability to get to the story and apparent
reluctance by the military of both countries to let us do
our jobs . . . ."
A persistent question asked by newsmen was "why?" Why
did the U.S. diminish its credibility by denying informa-
tion already known?
Part of the answer, said George McArthur, Los Angeles
Times, was in the "recollection of the furor" caused by the
Cambodian operation nine months earlier among the American
public and Congress. 37
In any event, MACV seemed to have tacitly, although
belatedly, recognized press failure in the Laotian offense.
As reported in the semi-official Army Times newspaper:
Although late in the game, the Army has one of its
top press officers in Vietnam trying to sell senior
officers on the wisdom of talking (when possible)
to reporters in Vietnam . . . V7ashington officials
are known to believe some flaps in Vietnam could
have been avoided if senior commanders were more
receptive to reporters. A major example is the
alleged lack of cooperation with Vietnamese news-
men during the Laotian invasion.38
79
Briefings
Military press briefings were a constant source of

friction between newsmen and military information officers.
The "five o'clock follies," held at JUSAPO until a
1968 fire caused the briefings to be moved to a Vietnamese
press building in Saigon, represented one way newsmen could
get the story of total war, at least as it was seen and re-
ported by the military. For this reason, most newsmen tol-
erated the briefings and tried to get as much extra
information from them as they could.
The value of the briefings was illustrated by Time's
bureau chief in Saigon in 1965: "There is no way of knowing
where the news may be. It is a fact of life which has led
to the necessity for daily Saigon briefings . . . " 39
Although noting some improvements in the briefings,
Hanson Baldwin commented in 1966 that:
Information was inadequate, late or inaccurate.
Correspondents who had returned from a battle
area found they often knew more about what was
actually happening than the briefing officer.40
Many newsmen in 1966 felt the briefings were too pre-
emptory. "You can't possibly rely on them," said ABC's
Roger Peterson. "I don't feel any animosity to the briefers;
they're doing what they're told." In 1971, Peterson's
1966 charges were echoed by Newsweek which reported that the
Saigon briefings "have become so tense and empty" that one
80
correspondent remarked, "It's like watching silent movies—
the effect would be the same if they hired mutes as
briefers."
Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times, reported, "However well
the war is going at the moment, the American high command
seems unable to speak with candor on battle activity, even

A ^
after the battle is over." A Detroit News correspondent
said it was entirely possible to spend three months travel-
ling throughout Vietnam and find a depressing picture "only
to return to Saigon for an official briefing for the press

44
or visiting VIP that gave an opposite picture."
A basic complaint against the briefings was lack of
information on basic subjects such as bombing missions,
casualties and background details to flesh out stories.
"The reports we get these days [1971] are just too
vague," said George Esper who has been in Vietnam more than
four years for the Associated Press. "There is no depth to
the briefings and when you try to find out on background
basis what's happening, so many guys don't know anything--

45
or at least say they don't."
Alvin Shuster, Saigon bureau chief of the New York
Times, said, "The lack of briefings on specific and vital
subjects is a serious gap in the military information

..46
policy.
81
Joe Fried of the New York Daily News, who may have
spent more consecutive time in Vietnam than any other news-
man, described the information situation in early 1971 as
"the worst I've seen in 7 1/2 consecutive years here, cer-
A T
tainly the worst since the (Ngo Dinh) Diem days."

In general, most newsmen condemned the briefings but
were inclined to forgive individual military information
officers on day-to-day battle briefings. Jack Foisie, Los
Angeles Times, said information officers "are more often
guilty of withholding news than falsifying it."48 Charles
Mohr, New York Times, said, "They [briefers] themselves
don't have a clear idea of what happened" since they can
only pass on information which field commanders report to
the military headquarters m Saigon. 49
Summarizing newsmen's attitudes toward MACV briefings
and briefing officers, Elmer W. Lower, President of ABC
News, said, " . . . I will take the word of a field corre-
spondent over the word of a briefing officer every time.
The correspondent doesn't have a vested interest; the brief-
ing officer does." 50
The Information Officer

The military information officer, who had almost daily
contact with the press, received a considerable share of
press criticisms.
82
Many newsmen felt that information officers were pri-
marily public relation officers. CBS newsman Morley Safer
said that "no government or military press agent ever gives
the whole truth." 51 Agreeing, Malcome Browne reported that
it was the news media's task "to unmask him [the information
officer] when he's lying, which they do." 52
Criticisms of the information officer ranged from lazi-
ness, 53 "uselessness to the newsman save for organizing
transportation," 54 to more bitter comments such as "military
information personnel are idiots that cannot make it in an-
other branch of service." 55
Even information officers were critical of their own.
Said an Army information officer, "I think that 10's fre-
quently are not objective, sometimes are dishonest and very
56
frequently cannot or will not provide timely information."
An Air Force 10 said: " . . . all the information media
[military] made it so tough . . . withholding, lying, re-
stricting, that the newsman lost his sense of responsibil-
•4. ,.57
ity. "
Commenting on the professionalism of information offi-

cers, a Navy public affairs officer said, "When I arrived
in the MACV newsroom there were four briefers, none of whom
had had previous press experience and let their personal
feelings temper their actions with regards to the media." 58
83
In early 1971, newsmen were complaining about being
given an official run-around by MACOI officials. Newsmen
charged that military information officers, instead of
answering questions, referred reporters to someone else who
was likely to say he didn't know the answers or was not
authorized to give out the information.^^
Military Commanders
In many cases, press criticisms against military infor-
mation officers stemmed indirectly from the lOs' commanders.
All information officers, at all levels, worked for or car-
ried out specific policies of their commanders. As one
senior information officer put it: "The information officer
is caught in the middle between the commander who doesn't
want to tell the press anything and the reporter who wants
4-u •
everything. ..6 0
The information officer is a "victim of his boss, the

commander," said George Wilson, Washington Post. "If the
commander doesn't want to speak to the press, the 10 is
limited in what he can say."
A primary press complaint stemmed from commanders re-
stricting their talks with newsmen only on background, mean-
ing that newsmen r,<^st attribute their sources as "military
sources" and the like. Commanders refusing to talk on-the-
record, said Holger Jensen, Associated Press, allov/ed them
84
to be quoted as "sources" and thus avoid responsibility for
their statements."^^
A freelance reporter said senior officers are afraid

of the press. "Middle and junior officers are afraid of
lousing up a career and say nothing" which results in a
63
"rigid, if informal, de facto censorship." An Army infor-
mation officer reported his commander "was afraid of his
shadow and wouldn't have released anything unless told he
had no choice." 64
General Sidle reported that commanders were one of two
major factors responsible for the bad press in Vietnam. 65
"The truth of the matter," said Sidle, "was that we had too
6 fi
many commanders who didn't understand the press."
Peter Arnett, Associated Press, said some commanders
distrusted the press and this distrust was evident in the
actions of the commander's subordinates:
Those [commanders] who are suspicious of our
[press] intentions don't exactly obstruct us, but
they generally set the tone and that generally
means non-availability of helicopters, uncoopera-
tive staff officers in the intelligence and op-
erational fields and powerless information
officers.67
Defending commanders from overt interference with the
press, Don Farmer, ABC, charged that commanders' incompe-
tence caused the same results:
I do not think that American commanders deliber-
ately tried to prevent coverage of the action
[Laotian offense]. They may have but I cannot
85
prove it. But if they did not, then their incom-
petence in dealing with the press and their appar-
ent resentment of press coverage resulted in the
same end.6 8
Escorts
Although no formal written policy existed on military
escorts for newsmen, such a policy unquestionably existed,
at least for television newsmen. 69
General Sidle reported that military escorts for TV
crews originated early in the war when a U.S. force was
conducting a reconnaissance in force in a valley near Ashau.
The operation was to gain information necessary for a later
offense. A TV reporter with the force filmed a two-minute
firefight in which two U.S. soldiers were killed. According
to Sidle, no one had briefed the reporter on the purpose of
the operation (a probing action to gain information) and as
a result, the films and narration of the event depicted "a
needless and senseless way to fight a war" with two men
killed for no reason. Immediately, MACV ordered that every
reporter had to be briefed and every TV crew escorted by
knowledgeable persons who could explain what was going on. 70
The presence of escorts for TV crews, reported a senior
military information officer, "was frequently the difference
between the crews getting transportation, food and other
forms of assistance and getting the cold shoulder from peo-
ple who are not inclined to be helpful without being
^ "71
pressured.
86
Newsmen disagreed with such logic by saying that escort
officers inhibited and discouraged sources from talking to
reporters.
Concerning escorts, Hyman Kurzner, chief of the Saigon

bureau of ABC, said, "What I don't like is the way they
[escort officers] make me feel like a CIA agent to cover a
story . . . they think we are not to be trusted."^^
Transportation
MACV's policy was to provide newsmen transportation
when (1) the travel itself was part of the story being cov-
ered and (2) commercial transportation to the site of the
story was not available.74 The need to transport the press
by military aircraft to the immediate vicinity of tactical
operations was obvious; simply no other way existed to get
to the fighting.
Despite the voluminous flow of information about the
war from Vietnam, aided in part by the military's transpor-
tation system, many newsmen remained highly critical of
this support.
Most criticisms centered upon the fact that denial of
transportation served as a means of censoring the press.
If a newsman could not get to the battle site, he could not
give a firsthand account of it; thus, he would have to ac-
cept MACV's version of the action. A number of survey
87
r e s p o n d e n t s reported denial of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n w a s the m o s t
c o m m o n type of c e n s o r s h i p imposed by the m i l i t a r y .
W h i l e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y a i r c r a f t , was a common
p r e s s c o m p l a i n t t h r o u g h o u t the w a r , newsmen criticisms i n t e n -
s i f i e d d u r i n g the Laos invasion in early 1 9 7 1 .
K e y e s B e e c h , C h i c a g o Daily N e w s , reported that c o r r e -
spondents were denied transportation "both on the ground and
in the a i r " d u r i n g the L a o t i a n i n v a s i o n . 75 Barney S e i b e r t ,
U P I , said the m o s t common type of c e n s o r s h i p w a s "simple
d e n i a l of a c c e s s to t r a n s p o r t a t i o n to allow the correspondent

76
to o b t a i n his information."
A n o t h e r UPI r e p o r t e r said that in the p a s t y e a r (1970-
1971) the d e n i a l of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n from rear to front b a s e s

77
by m i l i t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n o f f i c e r s rose alarmingly.
Newsweek reported that MACV barred correspondents from
A m e r i c a n h e l i c o p t e r s flying into Laos "to guarantee a l i m i -

78
tation on battlefield reporting."
E n e m y Body Count
The m o s t w i d e l y used m e t h o d by the m i l i t a r y to show the
war's progress was statistics. M A C V used statistics to show
p e r c e n t a g e of p o p u l a t i o n u n d e r g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l , n u m b e r s
of e n e m y s o l d i e r s seeking a m n e s t y , c a s u a l t i e s and e v e n the
t o n s of rice captured on o p e r a t i o n . Of all the p r o g r e s s i n -
d i c a t o r s s h o w n by s t a t i s t i c s , enemy body count received the
m o s t s k e p t i c i s m from the p r e s s .
88
The body count system, in theory, was simple. After
each operation or air strike, the enemy dead were counted
and reported. However, in actual practice, it was not that
simple. As early as 1964, writers were reporting that many
of the body counts deserved suspicions, as the counts were
usually made by observation aircraft and fighter-bomber
pilots surveying the battlefield at several hundred miles
an hour. 79
The October, 1966, ground rules differed only slightly
in wording from the 1970 ground rules which explained MACV's
rationale in determining enemy casualties. (In 1970, the
word "enemy" was used in lieu of "viet cong"). The 1966
rules were:
Any 'Viet Cong Killed' figure released by I^CV
will have been verified on the scene by US person-
nel to the extent permitted by the military situa-
tion. It cannot be an exact figure, but it is
probable that duplications and other errors on the
high side are more than offset by the number of
Viet Cong dead who are carried away or buried
nearby, by those who subsequently died of wounds
and by those killed by artillery concentrations
and air strikes not followed up by ground action.
Thus, when the briefer announces a specific num-
ber of Viet Cong killed in a particular operation
or over a given period, that figure is not as pre-
cise as the popular term "body count" would imply.
Neither is it a guess or loose estimate. It is
the best figure that can be developed and as noted,
probably is conservative in the long run.°^
Seldom did newsmen accept enemy casualty figures given

by MACOI or commanders in the field. Associated Press re-
porter Peter Arnett was quoted as saying, " . . . any man
who has ever been in the field in Vietnam knows that there
89
is no such thing as a body count. "^"^ Jack Raymond wrote
that correspondents referred to MACV enemy casualty figures
as "WEG's"—wild-eyed guesses. ^^
During the 1968 enemy Tet offensive, enemy units, nor-
mally hard to find, exposed themselves throughout the coun-
try and became easy targets for massive U.S. firepower.
When MACV reported high enemy casualties, newsmen were
highly skeptical. A New Yorker reporter wrote, "There is
considerable doubt about the accuracy of the Allied claim
of thirty-six thousand Communists killed between January
29th and February 18th."^^
Newsweek cautioned that official estimates of enemy
casualties during Tet should be viewed with the "utmost
skepticism." Said Newsweek:
Body counts of enemy dead are at best always
open to doubt; almost every reporter in Vietnam
has his own personal example of inflated reports
of enemy dead in battle that he himself has ob-
served. To think that in the midst of last
week's chaos and the breakdown of communications,
a careful tabulation of such an enormous number
of bodies was actually made, defies logic and
contributes further to the credibility gap.
"The Vietnam war was the only U.S. war where the body
count became a major yardstick of victory or defeat," said
Hansen Baldwin. "It never should have assumed such signifi-
85
cance."
One author contended "the flick of a pen in Saigon's
office or field headquarters can transform a grin defeat
into the most astonishing of victories . . . " ^
90
Perhaps the most well known example of distorted re-
ports was printed in the 23rd Infantry Division's newsletter
which read: "Contacts through the morning and early after-
noon resulted in 128 enemy killed, 13 suspects detained and
86
3 weapons captured." The report was dated March 16, 1968,
and the battle took place at My Lai under the command of
Lieutenant William Galley.
In Defense of the Information Officer

All information officers, whether in the field or at
MACOI, suffered from an "official spokesman" nemesis. Their
answers became official government or command statements and
thus a matter of public record. While other military per-
sons could engage in estimations or personal viewpoints, the
information officer had to be certain his answers were accu-
rate and represented what his commander wanted released. As
a result, the information officer appeared to many newsmen
as being evasive and censoring or concealing information the
press should have received.
To a number of newsmen, labels of good or bad would not
be applicable to information officers. As one reporter put
it: "One candid officer who tells the truth, and they can
87
always be found, is worth X number of the other kind."
Jack Reynolds, former NBC bureau chief, defended field
lOs (those not serving with MACOI) by saying:
91
When you get out into the field, people level
with you much more quickly. You get more back-
ground information and more briefings. People
are up where the action is, and by and large,
the guys in the field are very good. Occasion-
ally / you find some foot-dragging among lOs,
but this is much less true in the field than in
Saigon. Once it gets in the pipeline and it
gets back to Saigon you find an understandable
fear of getting black marks because you didn't
play a particular piece of information the right
way. In the field, however, the guys are just
as honest and reliable as they ever were . . . 89
Also defending field lOs, former UPI chief John Walsh

said:
lOs in the field are pretty cooperative because
when you have a man out there with them then
you're not so concerned with what repercussions
of a particular thing will be, and they just
give the facts; but when it gets into Saiqon,
there are some political considerations. ^(J
A number of military lOs reported that the 10 was the

man in the middle. He was not trusted by the press because
he was military and commanders didn't trust him because
they were never sure what the 10 would pass on to the press.
Said a Navy public affairs officer: "Many military command-
ers distrust, dislike and fear the press . . . And these
people are hard to convince that the briefing they give the
PAO today won't appear on the front page tomorrow." 91 An
Army 10, a former MACOI news chief, said that many times
reports were not given to the 10 because commanders and
staff think that all leaks of information came from the 1 0 —
"they picture the 10 as being in cahoots with the newsmen." 92
92
A number of newsmen excused evasiveness and news
management exercised by lOs on the grounds that the informa-
tion policies in Vietnam were dictated by Washington.
In early 1966, Hansen Baldwin wrote that "public-
relations policies in Vietnam are tightly controlled from

93
Washington," a viewpoint supported by many newsmen five
years later.
Military information officers were especially vocal in

criticisms of political interference in military press mat-
ters. A senior Naval officer reported, "In the final
analysis, it was the State Department that laid down the
basic public affairs policy for all of Southeast Asia
(Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam)."^4 ;^ p^^^. Force 10
said that while control from Washington did not amount to

censorship, the amount of control v/as excessive. 95 The
problem of MACV's restrictive interpretation of ground rules,
said another Navy public affairs officer, stemmed from "pol-
icy guidance" from Washington.
According to a U.S. News and World Report correspondent,
the military did exercise censorship over the press in Viet-
nam but did so under orders of the U.S. Ambassador and the
U.S. President. The President, through the Ambassador,
dictated press policies in Vietnam, said this correspon-

96
dent.
93
Concerning the Laotian embargo mentioned earlier, News-
vêek reported that General Creighton Abrams, MACV commander,
had been ordered to impose the embargo by Washington to
muffle coverage of the expected bloody engagements in Laos--
"engagements that would have almost certainly sparked anti-

97
war dissent at home."
Summary
The military in Vietnam represented a major obstacle
between the press and the news. Either as a source of infor-
mation itself or as a source of essential support, the mili-
tary was seldom praised and frequently condemned for
interfering with or not supporting the press.
One of the most criticized obstacles facing newsmen was
the MACV ground rules which newsmen said were interpreted in
such a manner as to deny the press legitimate information.
Contending that information about operations should not be
released if such disclosure would endanger U.S. lives or
hinder the operation, the military often embargoed military
operations.
Although the intent of embargoes was legitimate, news-
men reported that some embargoes were allowed to remain in
effect far longer than necessary due to political reasons.
The Laotian embargo was often cited as being such a politi-
cal embargo and remained embargoed even after most of the
world press had reported it.

94
Military briefings, although considered a necessity if
a reporter wanted to get the total picture of the war, were
frequently criticized as being inaccurate, vague and pre-
senting a rosy picture of a gloomy war.
Information officers were viewed by most newsmen as
being basically public relations men and were helpful only
in providing basic support such as transportation, food,
lodgings, and general information about the war.
A number of newsmen felt that the information officer
was a victim of his boss, the military commander. One of
the most frequent complaints against commanders was that
many commanders talked to newsmen only on background, mean-
ing that the name or position of the commander could not be
used. Other newsmen reported that some commanders dis-
trusted the press and this distrust was evident in the ac-
tions of the commander's subordinates, especially in the
actions of the commander's information officer.
Although the military claimed that escorts were
assigned to television crewmen to provide assistance, news-
men felt that military escorts inhibited and discouraged
sources from talking to newsmen.
Of all the support given to the press, the most essen-
tial and most criticized was transportation. Newsmen were
totally dependent upon the military to provide transporta-
tion to and from battles or news events. According to many

95
newsmen, the military could simply refuse to provide trans-
portation, for any number of reasons and thus effectively
censor the press.
Throughout the war, enemy body counts, commonly re-

ferred to by newsmen as WEGs (Wild-Eyed Guesses), provoked
considerable adverse comment. The military's rationale on
body counts was that such counts were verified on the scene
if possible and while body counts could never be precise,
neither were tliey loose estimates. Newsmen disagreed saying
that enemy body counts were inflated depending on the size
of victory MACV or Washington desired to depict.
The credibility gap on the body count was further
widened when, in March, 1968, MACV reported 128 enemy killed
at My Lai. Subsequent investigations revealed the 128 enemy
killed were in fact women and children.
Despite the many indictments against the military, news-
men said that some information officers and commanders were
honest, accurate and professional in their relationship with
the press corps in Vietnam. In general, field lOs received
more favorable comments than those lOs on duty at MACV head-
quarters. MACOI information officers, said many newsmen,
were evasive and censored the press because they were given
such guidance from Washington. Although it was a shooting
war in the field, MACOI briefers were forced to report tne
war according to political dictates from the State Depart-
ment or the Wnite House.
NOTES
"Behind the Vietnam Story," Columbia Journalism Review,

III, No. 4 (Winter, 1965), 17.
2
3
United States Military Assistance Commany, Vietnam,
U.S. Press Playbacks. Mimeographed excerpts of selected
news stories by Vietnam correspondents, July 3, 1968.
Quote taken from an article by Gene Roberts, New York Times
correspondent, dated July 1, 1968. (Hereinafter referred
to as MACV, U.S. Press Playbacks).
Îbid.
5
"New Curbs on War News," p. 2.
"U.S. Warns Nev/smen on Security Rules," New York Times,

August 13, 1965, p. 2.
7
"Military Asks Voluntary Censorship in Vietnam," Over-
seas Press Club Bulletin, XX, No. 30 (July 24, 1965), 1, 6.
p
This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V,
"Survey of Informal Censorship."
9
Chick, "Military-Press Relations," p. 22.
Survey respondent. Colonel William I. Greener, a
former Air Force information officer.
12
Survey respondent, Navy public affairs officer who
"^"^MACV Dir. 360-1, Annex A, p. 2.
•'''^MACV/ "U.S. Press Playbacks," July 3, 1968.

15
Zalin B. Grant, "Alsop Lets His Friends Down," The
New Republic, May 18, 1968, pp. 9-10.
•^^MACV, U.S. Press Playbacks.

96
97
17
Gray, "Alsop Lets His Friends Down."
18
MACV, U.S. Press Playbacks.
19
Author's personal observation after discussions with
many newsmen at JUSPAO, Saigon, Vietnam, June, 1968.
20
Headline appeared in February 2, 1971, edition of
the Washington Post, p. 1.
21
George C Wilson, "News of Embargo is Embargoed, Un-
Embargoed, Re-Embargoed," Washington Post, February 2,
1971, p. 1.
22
Major General Winant Sidle, Chief of Information,
Department of the Army, Washington, D . C , "Press Relations
in Vietnam," an address to the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 3, 1970.
23
^-Îbid.
24
"The Case of the Leaky Embargo," Newsweek, February
15, 1971, p. 22.
25
"News Ban on Laos Binding Only for U.S.," Los Angeles
Times, February 4, 1971, p. 9.
26
"Officials Throw Up Barriers to Laos News Coverage,"
Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, February 24, 1971, p. 12-A.
27
Peter Osnos, "Laotian Drive Continues Under Cloak,"
Washington Post, February 25, 1971, p. A-22.
28
"Information Freeze," Newsweek, March 1, 1971, p. 46.
^^"Frustration Near the Front," Time, March 8, 1971,
pp. 45-46.
30
Holger Jensen, "Newsmen Complain of Curbs on Laos
War Reporting," Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, March 3, 1971
p. 4-D. (Hereinafter referred to as Newsmen Complain of
Curbs).
31 . .
A sortie is one aircraft take off and landing.
32
Jensen, "Newsmen Complain of Curbs."
^Îbid.
98
Ibid.
35
Lower, "Field Correspondents."
^Îbid.
37
George McArthur, "Army Snafu? News Ban Stirs Ques-
tions," Los Angeles Times, February 5, 19 71.
38
"Cooperation with Reporters Backed," Army Times,
September 1, 1971, p. 5.
39
Frank McCullock, "Facts of Life in Vietnam," Time,
May 7 , 1 9 6 5 , p . 6 2 .
40
B a l d w i n , "The I n f o r m a t i o n V7ar," p . 3 1 .
41 .
Hickey, "Meanwhile Back in Saigon."
42
"Information Freeze," p. 46.
43
44
Survey respondent, Detroit News reporter who declined
use of his name.
45
"Withdrawal Including Information," Abilene Reporter
News, January 17, 1971, p. 4-A.
Ibid.
47 . .
"Newsmen Assail Curtain on War Information," Lubbock
Avalanche-Journal, January 22, 1971, p. 12-B.
"^^"The Saigon Follies," p. 46.
Ibid.
50
51
Kroeger, "Television's Men at War," p. 72.
52
Malcome Browne comments- on At Issue, "The Information
War," National Education Television, August, 1966.
53
Survey respondent, Terry L. Reynolds, freelance.
54
Survey respondent. Tine reporter who declined use
of his name.
99
55e
Survey respondent, CBS reporter who declined use of
his name.
56e
57
Survey respondent. Air Force information officer who
58^
59
"Withdrawal Including Information."
60
George Wilson, Washington Post, address to the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, April 30, 1971.
62
Survey respondent, Holger Jensen, Associated Press.
63
Survey respondent, Robert Schwab III, freelance.
64
65
The second factor cited by General Sidle was the
military's insistence on showing progress--"not just the
Army's but for the whole administration." See footnote 4
for reference.
6 fi
Major General Sidle, "Press Relations."
67
John O. Koehler, "The Press-Military Relationship in
the Field," address delivered to the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April 10,
1970.
6Q
69
70
Major General Sidle, "Press Relations."
71
72
Comments made by a number of survey respondents.
100
73
"Information Flow on V7ar Clogged by Army Brass,"
Odessa American, January 17, 1971, p. 3-A.
74
75e
Survey respondent, Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News.
76e
Survey responaent, Barney Seibert, UPI.
77
Survey respondent, UPI reporter who declined use of
his name.
78
"Information Freeze," p. 46.
79
Mecklin, Mission in Torment, p. 101.
^^"Ground Rules, 1966," p. 1.
81
Lieutenant Colonel Richard A McMahon, "Bury the Body
Count for Good," Army Magazine, June, 1969, p. 66.
83
Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Saigon," The New Yorker,
March 2, 1968, p. 45.
84
Everett G. Martin, "Man on the Spot," Newsweek,
February 12, 1968, p. 29.
85
Baldwin, "The Information War," p. 30.
pc
Minor, The Information War, p. 49.
^Îbid., p. 49.
88
George McArthur, Los Angeles Times, Saigon, personal
letter. May 21, 1971.
pq
Chick, "Military-Press Relations," p. 22.
90-r, -^
Ibid.
91
declined use of hi£ name.
92
^^Baldwin, "The Information War," p. 21.
101
94
95
Survey respondent. Major Jack Oswald, Air Force
information officer.
96
97
Survey respondent, U.S. News and World Report corre-
spondent who declined use of his name.
98
"The Case of the Leaky Embargo," p. 22.
CHAPTER V
FORMAL CENSORSHIP AND THE VIETNAM WAR
Introduction
Press censorship in World War II and the Korean War was
almost total with censors reading and editing copy prior to
broadcast or publication. The reporter in World War II was
required to wear a uniform, operate from press camps and
was totally dependent upon the military. In World War II,
an estimated 10,000 persons were classified as "covering the
war," yet as noted by historian Joseph J. Matthews, "even
with the most elastic of definitions, nothing like all of
these could be counted as war correspondents . . . ."
According to some writers. World War II censorship
bordered, at times, on the ridiculous. Correspondents were
required to have their copy cleared by every military ser-
vice 2 mentioned
. . their
in . reports. For example, a dispatch
that mentioned both ground and air units required clearance

by both services. Dispatches were again censored at Washing-
ton after being cleared by field headquarters. 3
In the first year of the Korean war, more than 230
reporters were accredited to the United Nations Command. 4
Press censorship in Korea, said Matthews, experienced the
same problems with the military unprepared to impose censor-
ship. The government and the military "had to work out all
over again" the problems of censorship, Matthews said.
102
103
Absence of Formal Censorship in Vietnam

Despite a history of wartime censorship, the United
States officially did not impose formal censorship in Viet-
nam, although in retrospect, former President Lyndon B.
Johnson was reported to have said it was a mistake not to
have done so. In a Time magazine interview concerning the
"Pentago Papers" published by the New York Times, Johnson
admitted that failing to institute censorship was a mistake
in Vietnam "not to cover up mistakes but to prevent the
enemy from knowing what the U.S. was going to do next."
A number of officials and newsmen have advocated, or
at least hinted, that formal censorship should have been
imposed in Vietnam.
With the buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1965,
increased curbs were placed on what the press could and
could not report. Part of these restrictions prevented
7 , ^ .
newsmen access to certain U.S. air bases. These restric-
tions prompted Wes Gallagher, Associated Press, to state:
. . . so far as the Associated Press is concerned,
our correspondents would be prepared to submit
. . . copy to formal censorship if the United
States Army installs it . . . But correspondents
should be free to see and cover all aspects of
the war as was done in World V7ar 11.^
In early 1966, then Secretary of State Dean Rusk said
he did not want anymore censorship in Vietnam than there
already was but added that to impose formal censorship in
104
Vietnam would also require it be imposed in Washington.
Hinting at formal censorship. Representative Richard Ichord
told the House of Representatives in 1966 that "the country
simply cannot afford distorted, biased, inaccurate, incom-
plete or irresponsible war news coverage" and among controls
imposed in Vietnam might be a "scrutiny" of copy filed.
Also in 1966, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Earle G. Wheeler, said the United States will have
to "take a very hard look" at the possibility of formal cen-
sorship in Vietnam. In 1967, Daniel Z. Henkin, deputy
assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, said the
Department of Defense is hopeful "censorship will not have
to be imposed in Vietnam." 12
Columnist Alice Widener became particularly bitter
about the lack of censorship during the U.S. withdrav/al from
Khe Sanh. She said: "It is impossible to win a war without
censorship. If you spill your guts to the enemy in war, you
feed him the ammunition to murder you." What specifically
upset Ms. Widener was a New York Times front page story head-
lined "Marines At Khe Sanh Find Flaws in Their Defense"
(February 22, 1968). The Times story went on to disclose
that the trenches at Khe Sanli were not deep enough, not
enough mines and barbed wire on the perimeter and "above all,
the bunkers do not have enough overhead protection." And
if this were not enough help to the enemy who were then
105
surrounding Khe Sanh, said Ms. Widener, the Times story
pointed out that the First Cavalry Division, which was to
rescue Khe Sanh, "faced a shortage of manpower and heli-
copters." In summary, she appealed to the President and
Congress to declare a state of clear and present danger and
"impose military censorship on the war in Vietnam. "•'"'^
Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times, correspondent and vet-
eran reporter of World War II and Korea, advocated censor-
ship in Vietnam in 1962 "and since." Keyes Beech of the
Chicago Daily News, said, "Personally, I think formal cen-
sorship should have been instituted in 1965 when U.S. ground

15
troops were committed." George Wilson, Washington Post,
told a class of military officers that he would certainly
have used different procedures on censorship. "I doubt if
World War II type [of censorship] would do, but I agree we
need something better and different this time . . . ,"

16
Wilson said.
Advocates of formal censorship listed "freer access"
as a primary reason. Colonel William T. Coleman, the Air
Force chief of public information in the Pentagon, said "We
should never go into any war without field press censorship
because (1) censorship insures the security of troops,
(2) newsmen get better and more accurate information,
(3) reviewed copy forces newsmen to be accurate, and (4) cen-
sorship would greatly reduce 'flaking' which is public rela-

tion promotion of units." 17
106
Foisie said that formal censorship would have allowed
newsmen to talk to those in command and would have allowed
briefings on forthcoming operations so "we could be in the
right places when they occurred." Also, he added, it would
have taken some "of the judgment burden off us, and, frankly,
I think it would have helped the White House gents by more
objective reporting by us and counterpressures upon the
President to be more forthright with Congress and the peo-
pie." 18 John Randolph, also of the Los Angeles Times, felt
formal censorship would allow a greater access to intelli-
gence and operations news. 19
A military information officer felt it was an error
when formal censorship was not imposed because "tidbits" of
information were very valuable to the enemy who was not in-
terested in grand plans as much as trying to do spectacular
damage "which will influence public opinion in the United
States." He added, "The enemy in this war goes to the news
columns for information and for a place to spread his propa-
20
ganda instead of the battlefield."
Despite theoretical reasons for censorship, practical
reasons probably would have prevented censorship. In an
address, Phil Goulding said:
. . . From a practical standpoint, I do not see
how press censorship could work in Vietnam under
today's [1968] conditions. There are, on occa-
sion, inaccurate, irresponsible, and unreliable
news stories on the war, but the imposition of
107
censorship would have no effect on most such
stories, and it is not the role of the govern-
ment to monitor the opinions of the press.21
Although he believed news releases from Vietnam un-
wittingly assisted the enemy. Major General Winant Sidle
(then Brigadier General and MACV chief of information) said
in 1968 he did not advocate censorship. He said, "I don't
see how it would work. How do you keep a guy from going to
Hong Kong to file his story? And, if the United States im-
posed censorship, this wouldn't affect foreign newsmen. How
22
are you going to censor television films?" In 1971, Gen-
eral Sidle reiterated his 1968 position by saying:
This war is unlike Korea or World War II. We rec-
ognize and honor South Vietnam's sovereignty and
could not legally impose censorship without them
doing so first. Field press censorship would not
work in other countries. Newsmen would go to an-
other country and file their stories. Bureaus
could run men in and out with the news.23
Total censorship would have been extremely difficult in
Vietnam. At one time, there was one correspondent for every
1,000 U.S. troops. Reading and editing the copy of 500 news-
men daily, altliough not a physical impossibility, would have
been a monumental task. Unlike in previous wars, censors
would have had to view and edit thousands of feet of televi-
sion films daily.
Summary
The United States did not impose formal censorship dur-
ing the Vietnam war, although a number of observers, writers
108
and politicians, including former President Johnson, be-
lieved it should have been imposed.
Advocates of formal censorship listed security of
troops and greater access to detailed news as benefits of
censorship. Other reasons for censorship included the
elimination of biased, inaccurate and irresponsible war
news; taking the burden of decision off newsmen; allowing
commanders to brief newsmen on all operations in detail
thus permitting newsmen to be present when the action
started rather than after-the-fact.
Despite the reasons why censorship should have been im-
posed, practical reasons would have prevented it. As General
Sidle said, censorship would not apply to foreign newsmen and
U.S. reporters would simply fly to another country to file
their stories. In addition, bureaus could have run people in
and out to replace those who lost their accreditation for
releasing uncensored material.
NOTES
Joseph J. Matthews, Reporting the Wars (Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p. 254.
The term "military service" was broadly used in World
War II. It meant the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air Corps, U.S.
Navy, U.S. Marines. In addition, it meant any Allied ser-
vice as well as certain field headquarters.
3
Paul Mowrer, "Bungling the News," Public Opinion
Quarterly, II, No. 1 (March, 1943), 118-123.
4
John Hohenberg, Foreign Correspondents: The Great
Reporters and Their Times (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1964), p. 391.
5
Matthews, Reporting the Wars, p. 216.
"Three Principals Defend Themselves," Time, June 28,
1971, p. 15.
7
On March 24, 1965, the Danang Air Base was closed to
newsmen by joint agreement of the U.S. and South Vietnamese.
The reason cited for this closure was "because recently the
Saigon press corps had seriously breached security" by
alerting the enemy, through its releases, of aircraft launch-
ing, thus placing pilots in jeopardy. See "News Curbs Con-
sidered," New York Times, March 13, 1965; "The Lid in
Vietnam," Newsweek, March 29, 1965; and "U.S. Newsmen Are
Barred from Big Danang Air Base," New York Times, March 25,
1965.
p
"Newsmen Report U.S. Imposes Curbs on Coverage in
Vietnam," New York Times, March 18, 1965, p. 4.
9
Geoffrey Gould, "Many want censorship of wartime news,"
Birmingham News, March 4, 196 8.
•'"UPI wire copy, number 203B, March 3, 1966.
•'••'"Raymond, "I^-ls A Dirty War," p. 32.
12
Daniel Z. Henkin, assistant secretary of defense for
public affairs, speech to the Pennsylvania News Broadcasters
Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 22, 1967.
109
110
13
Alice Widener, "Censorship Could Save GI Lives,"
Denver Post, February 27, 1968.
14
Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times, Bangkok, Thailand,
personal letter, June 26, 1971. Foisie, who is former
Secretary of State Dean Rusk's brother-in-law, temporarily
lost his accreditation in 1966 for an alleged security vio-
lation. See "U.S. Reporter in Vietnam Is Suspended for
Month," New York Times, February 1, 1966, p. 14.
15
Survey respondent, Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News.
16^
George Wilson, Washington Post, an address to the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaven-
worth, Kansas, April 30, 1971.
17
William T. Coleman, Colonel, USAF, personal inter-
view, Washington, D.C, March 23, 1971.
18
Foisie, personal letter.
19
Army Information Conference, Saigon.
20
21
Phil G. Goulding, assistant secretary of defense for
public affairs, an address at the Government Relations Work-
shop of the National Newspaper Association, Washington, D.C,
March 15, 1968.
^^MACV, U.S. Press Playbacks.
23
Major General Winant Sidle, chief of information.
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C, personal interview,
March 23, 1971.
CHAPTER VI
SURVEY OF INFORx^LATION CENSORSHIP IN VIETNAM
Introduction
Previous chapters in this study have been basically
historical and descriptive in nature. Taken from a wide
variety of literature, several major areas were examined:
the military's press support role in Vietnam, an indictment
against press performance in Vietnam, an indictment against
military restrictions on the press and whether or not formal
censorship should have been imposed in Vietnam.
One weakness in a literature review of an emotionally-
laden subject such as censorship in Vietnam is in the
patently one-sided nature of arguments, accusations and
counter-charges presented.
In an effort to overcome this one-sided weakness, a
survey was conducted to allow both the military and the
press to express their opinions on the subject of informal
censorship and related topics. In addition to presenting
both sides, the survey also quantifies responses so that
broad conclusions may be made.
As with the entire study, the survey concentrates on
analyzing informal censorship only as it existed at the
grass-roots level--between the military and press in Vietnam,
While it is recognized that considerable public affairs
111
112
guidance emanated from much higher levels than the military--
the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, the Department of
Defense and the White House—the survey was limited only to
the military-press relationship.
Scope and Purpose of the Survey

The general scope of this survey was to analyze informal
censorship of the press by the military in Vietnam during the
period June, 1965, through May, 1971. It was not intended to
provide predictive evaluations.
Specifically, the survey examines (1) v/hether or not the
military imposed formal censorship over the press corps in
Vietnam, (2) whether or not the military imposed informal
censorship over the press corps in Vietnam and, if so, to
what degree did such censorship impair the newsman's ability
to get the story they or their editors wanted, (3) whether
or not MACV ground rules impaired the newsmen's ability to
get the story they or their editors wanted, (4) whether or
not the military used security classifications to withhold
legitimate news, (5) whether or not the military gave pref-
erential treatment to newsmen who favor U.S. policies in
Vietnam, (6) problems facing newsmen and military informa-
tion officers, (7; now newsmen rated news sources in Viet-
nam, (8) how military information officers rated media
groups in Vietnam, (9) officials who imposed informal

113
censorship the most, (10) when informal censorship was im-
posed the most, (11) how newsmen found out about impending
military operations and (12) military guidance on "handling
the press."
Method and Procedure

Two sets of mailed questionnaires were necessary to
accomplish the purposes of this survey. One questionnaire
was sent to military information officers of all services
who were then serving or who had served in Vietnam as infor-
mation officers. A second questionnaire was sent to newsmen
who had served or who were currently serving as newsmen in
Vietnam.
The survey cutoff date was May 31, 1971.
Upon request the chiefs of information of the U.S. Army
and the U.S. Navy provided current rosters of worldwide in-
formation officers with those noted who had served or were
then serving in Vietnam. The chiefs of information of the
U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps provided selected lists
of officers to be queried.
From these and the current roster of military informa-
tion officers in Vietnam, a mailing list of 190 military
information officers was compiled. Of these, 29 were
deleted for various reasons, principally, letters returned
undelivered. This resulted in a revised list of 161 military
114
information officers of which 80 replied; a response rate of
49.7 percent.
Names of newsmen who had served or were serving in Viet-

nam were obtained from files in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Department of
Defense. All 146 U.S. newsmen serving in Vietnam as of the
cutoff date were sent a questionnaire. In addition, 35
names were selected from rosters for the years 1964 through
1970. This resulted in a combined total of 181 of which 30
were deleted primarily because of undeliverable mail. The
revised mailing list of newsmen totaled 151 of which 48
replied; a response rate of 31.8 percent.
Samples of the military questionnaire and the newsmen
questionnaire are at Appendices A and B respectively.
The following definitions apply to the survey:
1. Formal censorship: A formal military policy with
full-time military censors reading and editing copy prior
to broadcast or publication.
2. Informal censorship: An act on part of a military
commander, his representative, or military information per-
sonnel which precluded a member of the press corps from
obtaining a story re wanted or was required to obtain; an
act on part of a military commander, his representative, or
military information personnel which precluded transmission
of that story from the field to Saigon or from Saigon to the
115
United States. Informal censorship includes but is not
limited to: sources refusing to talk to newsmen; denial of
transportation except when military mission had higher prior-
ity, e.g., resupply of men, ammo, equipment, evacuation of
wounded; denial of requests to visit units in the field; un-
reasonable interpretation of MACV ground rules.
3. Voluntary censorship: An agreement by newsmen to
abide by MACV ground rules and security restrictions.
4. Military commander: Officers of the U.S. Armed
Forces who are in charge of men.
5. Military information personnel: Any member of the
U.S. Armed Forces, officer or enlisted, who had assigned
duties in Public Information or support to the press.
6. Newsmen: A bureau chief, correspondent, reporter,
or photographer of any media, i.e., print, radio, televi-
sion, etc.
7. Legitimate or public information: Information
which would not benefit the enemy, jeopardize U.S. lives or
national security or violates restriction imposed by MACV
ground rules.
Limitations of the Survey

A most significant limitation of the survey was the
failure of many respondents to answer the questionnaire. An
initial assumption was made that newsmen, who have been very
116
vocal on this subject, would respond well and military
information officers, fearing impact on their military ca-
reers, would not respond well. The final response rate
belied this assumption; only 31.8 percent of the newsmen
replied while 49.7 percent of the military information
officers replied.
A second major limitation was that respondents were not
selected randomly.
Military information officer (10) respondents were not
selected randomly because of the "selected lists" provided
by the Air Force and Marine Corps and because of the time-
cost difficulties in obtaining a list of names of all offi-
cers who had served in Vietnam. The only way such a list
could be made would be through a time consuming and costly
records check of all officers in the military. While the
service chiefs of information maintain rosters of current-
duty lOs, none professed to have rosters of past information
officers who had served in Vietnam. The revised mailing
list for this survey represented all military officers cur-
rently on duty as an information officer who served or were
currently serving in Vietnam; it does not include those who
are not presently :n duty as an 10 or those who have since
resigned or retired.
Newsmen respondents were selected from rosters in the

Pentagon. Prior to 1970, newsmen rosters were published by
117
MACV on a monthly basis, after 1970 on a bi-monthly basis.
2
Newsmen averaged almost 2 trips each to Vietnam and through
1968 about 2,000 different individuals were accredited with
second, third and fourth visits by many of these. Nev/smen
accreditations since 1968 would increase this figure signif-
icantly. To obtain a complete list of newsmen who had
served in Vietnam would require a tedious cross-check of
more than 86 rosters each containing 300-600 names. Using
the smaller of this figure (300), more than 25,800 names
would have to be cross-checked. It is doubtful that such
a cross-check would have yielded a more randomized sample.
In addition, many newsmen have changed jobs since serving
in Vietnam increasing the difficulty in obtaining mailing
addresses.
Instead, the complete roster for the period ending
May 31, 1971, was used and names of five newsmen were
selected for each of the years 1964 through 1970. Where
possible, these five newsmen selected each year were from
the same monthly roster (September).
The "selected lists" provided by the Air Force and
Marine Corps were initially considered to be biased. How-
ever, a comparison of selected responses between the "com-
plete roster" group (Army/Navy) and the "selected lists"
group (Air Force/Marine Corps) revealed no significant

118
differences in their responses. As shown on Table 1, Chi
Square values did not reach acceptable significant levels.
TABLE 1
COMPLETE ROSTER VERSUS SELECTED LIST REPLIES
Whether or not informal censorship imposed

Army/Navy Air Force/Marines
"Complete Roster" "Selected List"
(N-63) (N-15)
Yes 22 6
No 41 9
X^ = .36 df = 1 n.s.
Whether or not some newsmen given

preferential treatment
Army/Navy Air Force/Marines

"Complete Roster" "Selected List"
(N-63) (N-15)
Yes 42 11
No 21 4
X^ = .15 df = 1 n.s.
Partially offsetting the two major limitations of this
survey are the following factors:
1. The total, population of lOs and newsmen serving in
Vietnam as of the cutoff date were sent a questionnaire.
2. Newsmen respondents averaged 1.8 trips each to Viet-
nam for an average monthly stay of 26.7 months each. Military

119
respondents averaged only slightly more tlian one trip each
for an average 12-month tour.
3. Both newsmen and 10 respondents represented duty
in Vietnam for every year of the war beginning in 1961.
4. More than 37 percent of both newsmen and lOs re-
ported duty in one or more previous wars or conflicts.
5. Newsmen represented 11 different nev/spapers, all
major television networks (CBS, NBC, ABC), both major wire
services (AP, UPI), and 4 news magazines, (Time, Newsweek,
U.S. News and World Report, Life), and free lance writers.
6. More than 60 percent of the newsmen had prior
military service with 29 percent of these in duty related
to public information or nev/s reporting. Military respon-
dents represented backgrounds ranging from actual civilian
newsman experience to educational achievements from B.A. in
journalism to a Ph.D. in mass communications.
Related Studies
As stated in Chapter I, six M.A. theses related to this
subject were reviewed. None of these studies surveyed lOs
and newsmen to solicit opinions on the topic of informal
censorship. Most were historical or descriptive in nature
and those that touched on censorship at all presented only
one side of the argument. Only the study by Hagley used a
survey instrument (questionnaire). His purpose was to
120
determine how U.S. correspondents rated various news sources
in Vietnam.
Significance of the Survey

The basic significance of this survey lies in the fact
that no other quantitative survey has been made soliciting
opinions of both the military and press on the subject of
informal censorship in Vietnam.
This survey attempts to offer frank and candid opin-
6 ^
ions from grass-roots participants who exercised or felt
the impact of informal censorship. The survey represents
specific Vietnam-source replies rather than the glittering
generalities normally stressed at the Department of Defense
level or in editorial viewpoints of the news media.
This survey represents the first such survey which
allows the military to support or counter charges of censor-
ship in Vietnam.
And lastly, the survey could serve to assist the mili-
tary in forming press policy for future conflicts where
the military will again face the questions of imposing re-
strictions on the press.
Survey Results
Survey results for this study are organized as follows:
(1) formal censorship, (2) informal censorship, (3) MACV
ground rules, (4) military security versus free flow of
121
information, (5) preferential treatment of newsmen, (6)
problems facing newsmen and lOs, (7) newsmen ratings of news
sources, (8) lOs' ratings of the news media, (9) officials
imposing informal censorship the most, (10) when informal
censorship imposed the most, (11) how newsmen found out
about impending military operations, and (12) military guid-
ance on "handling the press."
Military respondents' names will not be used v/ith spe-

cific answers or comments on the questionnaire. While a
number of lOs gave answers unfavorable to the military, it
is not the intent of this study to expose a respondent to
possible sanctions or criticisms by his military service.
Newsmen respondents' names will be used if permission
were given.
Formal Censorship
Of all respondents, only five newsmen indicated formal
censorship existed. Four of these five declined use of
their names. The five respondents represented Time, The
Washington Post, CBS, the Associated Press and freelance.
However, a Chi Square analysis as shown on Table 2 illus-
trates that significantly more newsmen (5 out of 43) felt
formal censorship was imposed as compared to military lOs
(0 out of 78).
122
TABLE 2
WHETHER OR NOT FORîAL CENSORSHIP IMPOSED
Newsmen Military lOs

(N-48) N-78)
Yes 5 0
No 43 78
X^ = 4.8 df = 1 P <.05
Informal Censorship
More than 89 percent of the newsmen and 35 percent of
the lOs said informal censorship was exercised by the mili-
tary over the press in Vietnam. As shown on Table 3, these
differences were significant at the .005 level.
TABLE 3
WHETHER OR NOT INFORMAL CENSORSHIP IMPOSED

(N-48) (N-78)
Yes 43 28
No 5 50
X^ = 34.7 df = 1 P <.005
123
While a large majority of newsmen felt informal censor-
ship existed, most said it did not impair their ability to
get the story they or their editors wanted. A majority,
52.3 percent, reported that informal censorship had a "low"
degree of impairment, 2 8.5 percent reported "medium" degree
of impairment and 19 percent reported a "high" degree of
p
impairment. On a scale from 1 (greatly impaired) to 5 (did
not impair) the mean score of newsmen respondents (N-4 3)
was 3.2.
One newsman defined informal censorship as:
Conscious withholding of non-classified informa-
tion by military PIOs—they failed miserably to
live up to their stated policy of maximum infor-
mation consistent with security. Instead, they
acted as Army public relations men--constantly
keeping us 'out of trouble' by any means of
deception available.
A "conspiracy of silence" was how another newsman de-
scribed informal censorship:
In essence, the worst form of censorship being
practiced in Vietnam is a conspiracy of silence.
The Command and the U.S. Embassy intentionally
withhold important information concerning the
progress of the U.S. effort here (of course this
is mainly embarrassing or detrimental material).
MACOI briefers, for example, prepare answers for
controversial questions which are issued only
when some newsmen happens to stumble onto some-
thing which the Command is well aware of but
might be detrimental to the U.S. reputation.
Worse than that, it is next to impossible to get
high ranking officials to comment 'on the rec-
ord' concerning events which are transpiring in
Vietnam . . . .1^
124
Still another correspondent used more graphic terms
by labeling it "insidious bullshit":
MACV hiding behind ground rules, claiming no

knowledge of information asked or insisting it
must come from the Vietnamese even when Ameri-
cans are involved. Most important is the mili-
tary's insistence on 'giving information on
background' which means it doesn't have to take
responsibility for what's reported—but the
reporter does. Insidious bullshit.1
Jed Duvall, CBS, termed "frightened colonels" as the

source of informal censorship:
The occasional frightened 'lifer' or career

officer with so little confidence in himself
that the appearance of a newsman meant to him
that something must be hidden. Colonels in
MACV and USARV [United States Army Vietnam]
were the most affected by these fears. They
of course hid as best they could anything
that needed hiding . . . . 12
Other comments on informal censorship were: 13
. . . denial of transportation when available . . . command-
ers telling men not to talk to newsmen . . . escort officers
accompanying newsmen and intimidating sources . . . labeling
public information as classified information . . . sources
refusing to talk to newsmen . . . tacit or overt lying . . .
limiting, preventing, and restricting newsmen from reporting
on drugs, insubordination, mutinies, atrocities, etc., . . .
failure to release what could be considered bad publicity
. . . a general lack of candor and frequent use of jargon to
camouflage actions, e.g. protective reactions to mean air
strikes against the North . . . the stock answer "that's

125
classified" whether referring to the number of known drug
users in a unit or the number of swimming pools built for
troop recreation ....
Barnet Seibert, UPI, said a correspondent can learn to

live with formal censorship such as in Cambodia but:
Informal censorship is the most insidious type
on earth. . . . Informal censorship is like a
guillotine poised, ready to descend without
warning, often at the most inconvenient time.14
Not all respondents, including some of those who said
informal censorship existed, condemned only the military.
Glen McDonald, a former Army correspondent, now a free-
lancer, said:
Military-press relations are at a very low ebb
due to nearly ten years of deception on the part
of some military commanders and briefing officers
and on the other hand some very biased, slanted
reporting from certain correspondents who had an
axe to grind or 'reputation' to establish.15
While criticizing the military for "costly blindness"
in its "blinder-like insistence on showing progress . . . ,"
a Detroit News reporter stated: "I think it's important to
note that I was free to go almost anywhere and interview
almost anyone at almost anytime during a year and a half in
Vietnam."
Hugh Mulligan, a 34-month veteran of the war for Asso-
ciated Press, conceded that informal censorship existed in
Vietnam because officers would grant off-the-record type
interviews " . . . a bad policy as the unscrupulous could
126
just match one set of blind quotes against the other . . . ."
However, Mulligan had this to say on censorship in general:
The U.S. at this date is much given to self-

flagellation. After covering the wars in Biafra,
Israel, Cambodia and Northern Ireland and experi-
encing various kinds of censorship, I can say
that the U.S. in general and day in and day out
lets you go where you want to go, even helps you
get there, and doesn't really care a fiddle whom
you get to see on your own initiative. A lot of
this censorship crying is just sour grapes from
guys who didn't take the generous transportation
available to see for themselves. In my mind, the
PIO is not obligated to hand you your story on a
platter. The U.S. in Vietnam for all the com-
plaints of official covering up does less to
hinder the reporter than any other war I have
covered.17
A Newsday reporter stressed that "despite the occasional
annoyances, the overall freedom among the military in Vietnam

must be very close to unprecedented for wartime." 18
Advocating formal censorship in Vietnam, Keyes Beech of
the Chicago Daily News said:
It [informal censorship] did not prevent me from

getting information; it merely made it more dif-
ficult. Personally, I think formal censorship
should have been instituted in 1965 when U.S.
ground troops were committed. Philosophically,
I would make this observation: There have been
conflicts of interest between the press and mili-
tary ever since the war began. There always
will be.19
Problems in Vietnam are neither informal nor formal
censorship, said Scanley Karnow of the Washington Post:
The main problem involving the military and press

in Vietnam was not centered on censorship, either
formal or informal. The basic problem was the
difficulty of both the military and the press--
and everyone else—in interpreting what the war
127
was all about. The key challenge by the press
against the military stemmed from the frequent
views of newsmen that armed forces commanders
and information personnel were misinterpreting
the situation, often deliberately. The mili-
tary claimed, of course, that the press was do-
ing the same. This v/as the case in such
instances as the battle of Ap Bac in early 1962,
during the Tet Offensive, etc. This problem
was a reflection of the fact that the war was
so ambiguous. Its objectives were never clearly
defined. Its strategies were often vague and
contradictory (e.g., was the aim military vic-
tory?) . It was also intimately mixed up with
Vietnamese politics. Thus, the faults incurred
in reporting the war lay not in the military or
the press, but in the war itself.20
As with newsmen, military respondents frequently men-
tioned sources refusing to talk and denial of transportation
as common types of informal censorship. One 10 reported
that for particularly "negative" reporters, transportation
was "usually scarce." Also for "negative" reporters, an-
other said "the person to be interviewed was called out on

21
an 'emergency.'"
As a gatekeeper, one 10 said:
I often set up interviews for the media with key

members of the MACV staff. Some key staff offi-
cers would not talk to certain reporters with
whom they had had a previous bad experience. In
these cases, I told the reporter that the source
with whom he wanted to talk was not available
for interview.22
Commenting on why some sources refused to talk to the
press, a senior Army information officer reported:
Every general officer and colonel that I have

talked to about the Information Program can
either cite a personal example of a close
friend who has granted an interview to a
128
newsman and, either intentionally, accidentally,
or due to editing by rewrite men, has been mis-
quoted or comments taken out of context and
therefore indicating a different context. And
the general officer, with his professional repu-
tation at stake, does not care why or how he
was misquoted, the fact is he was misquoted or
taken out of context. Therefore . . . many
senior officers will not grant interviews.^3
Stating "we volunteer nothing," one respondent said

"the military bends over backward to aid the press yet it
has a very deep fear of the press actually finding out the
truth of what is happening." He added that information
will be given in most cases, but only "if the reporter pin-
O A
points in detail what he wants to know."

Other common remarks by lOs were: denying information
in request to queries and in releasing false, misleading,
inaccurate or incomplete information in official releases
. . . denying visitors to certain ships . . . briefing Navy
pilots and commanders on what they could and could not talk
about, e.g., Laos bombing, Shirke missiles, 19th parallel
bombing limit . . . evasion of questions from an individual
who had 'broken faith' with me and referring him to someone
else less qualified . . . covering up bad stories, e.g.,
ambush of 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, 101st Division . . .
keeping newsmen from scene . . . withholding information of
interest to newsmen when, in fact, the information was not
classified but might have made the Navy/DOD look bad . . .
129
commander's policy on haircuts precluded free access by
some newsmen to base.
One respondent compared an 10's duties with those of
public relations men:
The information officer is a proponent for his

organization and commander. If he is other
than that, he is receiving pay under false pre-
tenses. That's his job and to accomplish it,
he follows many of the PR practices from the
business world such as granting interviews to
those he knows will be objective or possibly
a favorable story and withholding information
from those obviously antagonistic to your ef-
forts. When TV film crews arrive and you know
in advance that they are looking for sensa-
tional material on drugs, the exposure of which
will not assist your organization in solving
the drug problem, the 10 denies them access to
unit areas. The PRO [Public Relations Officer]
for General Motors would do the same.2 5
And lastly, a senior information officer, who has
served at high public affairs levels in both Vietnam and the
Department of Defense, felt the problems in Vietnam were not
military but political in nature. He said:
It is a political war and the public relations

was directed from the White House, not the
Pentagon. Good soldiers, even PR men, follow
orders. If we ever get in another one, the
problems will be exactly the same. Political
wars are new to the Americans and somehow sus-
pect. We'll never 'correct' the errors of
this one. 26
MACV Ground Rules

MACV ground rules, restrictions on what and when cer-
tain items can be reported, constituted a system of

130
"voluntary censorship" adhered to by the press. However,
ground rules changed periodically throughout the war and,
more importantly, interpretation differed not only among
military officers, who enforced them, but also among news-
men who had to abide by them.
Newsmen were asked to state whether or not MACV ground
rules impaired their ability to get the story they or their
editors wanted. Military respondents were asked if the
ground rules impaired their ability to provide maximum dis-
closure of information with minimum delay.
Survey results indicated lOs experienced more impair-
ment by the ground rules than did the newsmen. Almost 54
percent of the military respondents replied "yes" while
only 34 percent of the newsmen replied "yes." As shown on
Table 4, these differences were significant at the .05 level
TABLE 4
NEWSI4EN AND MILITARY lOs REPLIES ON MACV
GROUND RULE IMPAIRMENT

(N-47) (N-77)
Yes 16 40
No 31 37
X^ = 3.9 df = 1 P <.05
131
The Navy (60 percent) and the Air Force (50 percent)
felt the ground rules impaired them more than did the Army
(48.3 percent) or the Marines (33.3 percent).
TV/Broadcast reporters (53.8 percent) reported a
greater impairment than the other four media groups (free-
lance—40 percent; wire services--33.3 percent; newspapers--
26.6 percent; and news magazines--00 percent).
A common complaint from both newsmen and lOs against
the ground rules was in how the rules were interpreted.
One military respondent said:
Ground rules as written are fine; however, inter-
pretation by MACV and higher commands was quite
erratic, especially when they involved incidents
with political overtones.27
Other military comments were:

Clearance process was cumbersome and imposed
unevenly on different services.28
Not allowing release of 'spot reports' at the
battle, rather MACOI waiting for official con-
firmation. 29
Unnecessary time to clear 'hard news'—only

features were possible.30
Ground rules were interpreted by timid incom-
petents .31
We felt MACV ground rules were stupid but MACV
wanted all 'to speak with one voice.'32
Ground rules had the effect, if not intent, of
impeding disclosure of information already held
by the enemy. The rules, some of which were
vague at best, were subject to seemingly arbi-
trary interpretation by MACV and intermediate
commands.33
132
Ground rules are fair and strongly oriented in
favor of newsmen.34
More than 21 percent of the newsmen mentioned that
ground rules were used as an excuse for not releasing basic
public information, used to deny information from the press
that the enemy already knew about, and were subject to arbi-
trary, varying interpretations by the military.
One correspondent said:
The ridiculous blackout for eight days [Laos,

1971] barred any sensible reporting of troop
movements already widely known to the enemy.
Ground rules are often only verbal announce-
ments at briefings and were subject to widely
varying interpretations. A burden to our job
because of the pressure-type decisions to be
made. If we guessed wrong, we are subject to
disaccreditation.35
George Allison, NBC, thought the ground rules were
fair, and in most cases fairly applied; however, he cited
a case of a fellow newsman where the ground rules were
applied unfairly:
One example of unfairness was the suspension of

the credentials of an AP reporter in September,
1970, for writing about an ARVN [South Vietnamese]
Army operation which the ARVN, but not the U.S.,
had announced.36
Other newsmen comments were:
Basically, ground rules were not so inhibitive

as informal censorship.37
MACV ground rules, of course, limited what re-

porters could write. It goes without saying
that there have to be some limits. Personally,
I think the rules were tolerant and even gener-
ous, though they could sometimes be misapplied.38
133
Military Security Versus
Free Flow of Information
Both military and newsmen respondents were asked their
opinions on whether or not military information officers
withheld information on security grounds when such informa-
tion would not, in fact, benefit the enemy.
Analysis of responses revealed that most replies could
be placed in one of the following categories: (1) agree--
the information officer does use security as a means of
denying public information from newsmen, (2) disagree—the
information officer does not use security as a means of
denying public information from newsmen, or (3) the reply
was "too general" to place in either of the first two
categories.
Analysis of newsmen replies (N-42) placed 64.2 percent
in the "agree" category, 19.1 percent in the "disagree"
category with 16.6 percent "too general" for either cate-
gory.
Military respondents (N-75) reported 69.3 percent in
the "disagree" category, 12 percent "agree" and 18.6 percent
"too general" for either category.
Table 5 shows that newsmen and military lOs differed
significantly in their replies.
134
TABLE 5
SECURITY REASONS USED TO DENY NEWSiîEN
LEGITIMATE INF0R:-:ATI0N

(N-35)* (N-61)*
Agree 27 9
Disagree 8 52
X^ = 37.5 df = 1 P <.005
*
Uncodeable responses were discarded
In general, newsmen berated the military for using
security as a means to withhold embarrassing military or
political information.
Addressing military embarrassment, Robert Goralski,
NBC, said:
All they had to tell us is that certain informa-
tion would be of benefit to the enemy and we
would have abided by voluntary censorship, but
material distasteful to the military was sup-
pressed by them because it didn't want the
information made public.39
Ron Milligan, former Westinghouse Broadcasting reporter
(now ABC) agreed that the military are normally in a better
position to decide on this issue; however, "the decisions
to withhold, althc ;gh officially made on these grounds, were
made, in fact, for different reasons on the wrong occasions."
The enemy, said Milligan, was often the "political enemy in
the American reading public." Too often, he added.

135
"unsophisticated press relations personnel" acted on the
theory that "when in doubt, withholding is safer. ""^^
Political reasons, or what might embarrass the Adminis-
tration by showing increased U.S. presence in Cambodia or
Laos have accounted for a "significant increase in news
being withheld for security reasons in the last 18 months,"

41
said an ABC correspondent.
A UPI reporter felt that the military's use of security
classifications is to cover up U.S. losses and defeats be-
cause the military is "trying to salvage its tarnished

42
reputation and its congressional appropriations."
The commander on the scene, not the information officer,
has a better feel for what should be released, reported a
Time correspondent. 43 Douglas Warren, UPI, reported that
some military information officers "dislike the hypocrisy
of their position" on passing along security classifications,
most of which should not be classified. He cited that "dam-
age from a rocket attack, for instance may be informative

44
to the enemy but should not be censored."
Warren Rogers, who covered the war for the New York
Herald Tribune, Hearst Newspapers and Look Magazine, stated:
It is a continuing battle with no end in sight--

we each see it from a different perspective.
Usually an honest difference. Newsmen must
constantly push against information people on
this point, but they are not always wrong,
just usually. The big clashes come when they
attempt to substitute their news judgment for
136
ours, on grounds that the information may bene-
fit the enemy.4 5
Two favorable comments illustrate those who agreed
that only the military can make the determination of what
is to be classified. A U.S. News and World Report

reporter said:
Only the commander responsible for his men, and

the men he delegates this authority to, can de-
cide what would benefit the enemy and hurt
allied personnel or activities. Journalists
should learn to work to the best of their abil-
ity within the rules as they assume--rightly--
no responsibility for the lives of men in the
field or for the success or failure of a mili-
tary mission.46
George Allison, NBC, stated:
I found military information personnel to be

quite fair on this question. I can cite no
example of unfairness.47
Military respondents, in general, supported their stand
on this issue on grounds that withholding security informa-
tion saved U.S. lives which was the intent of the classifi-
cation in the first place. A senior Navy information
officer put it this way:
The safety of uniformed personnel comes first.

The needs of the newsmen come next. Newsmen do
not have to answer to anyone if lives are put in
jeopardy, or an operation fails because of dis-
closure of 'questionable' information. The PAO
[Public Affairs Officer] has the duty to judge
what should and should not be disclosed. There
is no doubt that the public affairs officer is
in a better position to judge.48
137
Citing that newsmen generally form their opinions from
hindsight, while information officers must anticipate what
information will aid the enemy, an Army information officer
said:
Sometimes the information officer is wrong, but

he would rather err on the side of withholding
than cause harm to the Allied cause. Newsmen
look back on the operation and see that the
restriction was not necessary. This is an ir-
reconcilable dilemma. Also, newsmen tend to
judge the gravity of information by stateside
standards, several thousand miles from the
threat. Military men judge from the proximity
of the threat.49
An Air Force 10 felt that in almost every case where
the press received a "leak" or "speculated" on a combat
operation, it aided the enemy and caused needless casual-

50 . . .
ties. An Army 10 echoed his position by stating that a
delay of "two days or two weeks" in informing the world of
a pending action or action underway will "in no way hinder
or aid the course of battle . . . but that same information
released to the enemy could certainly do damage and cost

U.S. lives."^-^
Other military respondents felt young, inexperienced
newsmen are never in a position to know what would or would
not benefit the enemy. Said an Army 10"

The question is ridiculous. Anytime a young news-
man without any military experience, or maybe two
years as a draftee, with an axe to grind against
the military feels he knows more about military
requirements of security and what is of value to
138
the enemy, he is simply indicating his complete
lack of understanding of the military he is at-
tempting to cover.52
Information officers are definitely in a better posi-

tion to determine what information would aid the enemy,
reported an Army 10, "since we have access to the advice and
determinations of knowledgeable intelligence and operations
personnel . . . . "S3
-^~'
Some lOs admitted using security as a means to cover up

or withhold legitimate news. For example:
Security is paramount, although, all too often this
excuse is used to hide or cover-up legitimate news
items without particular security implications.54
I agree . . . that in far too many cases, lOs and
commanders are too conservative in their decisions
on what will/will not benefit the enemy.55
Army information personnel sometimes are too sen-
sitive or overreact to possible news stories
which they think might hinder their units.56
In the latter stages of the war, I would agree
with the newsmen. A perfect example is the em-
bargo during Lam Son 719. The Saigon papers were
carrying stories about the excursion. The embargo
in my opinion was purely a political ploy to keep
American public opinion from mounting against the
move.5 7
Security classifications, real or otherwise, did not
always apply to all newsmen. Some lOs stated that trusted
media members would be "tipped off." One Army lO's method
was to use a code name "Whiskey" to signal trusted newsmen
to come to his unit. Others, he said, "would learn about
139
it from MACV briefers" after the operation had started or
was over. 58
A Navy public affairs officer commented: "Some newsmen
can be trusted with this information—PAOs have to know who
can or cannot be trusted. There were some real bastards

59
with the media and some PAOs."
Preferential Treatment
of Newsmen
Based upon the author's personal experience in Viet-
nam, discussions with most Vietnam bureau chiefs in 1967-
1968, and interviews with Department of Defense officials
in Washington, an assumption was made that the military
tends to give preferential treatment to those newsmen who
favor U.S. policies in the war.
Military lOs were asked whether or not they agreed with
this assumption. Of the respondents (N-78), 67.9 percent
agreed that the military does give preferential treatment
to newsmen who favor U.S. policies in Vietnam.
A breakdown of "agree" responses by each military ser-
vice is as follows: Army—61.2 percent; Navy—71.8 percent;
Air Force—66.6 percent, and; Marine Corps—100 percent.
Table 6 shows these differences were not significant.
The most frequent reason for giving preferential treat-
ment to certain newsmen was "It's only human nature."

140
TABLE 6
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF NEWSMEN
Army Navy Air Force Marines

(N-31) (N-32) (N-12) (N-13)
Agree 19 23 9 3
Disagree 22 9 4 0
y} = 1.23 df = 3 n.s.
Most respondents gave other reasons for preferential

treatment than because the newsmen favored U.S. policies.
For example, one senior Army 10 said: "It is damned diffi'
cult to be nice to some slob who has proven that he con-
stantly looks forward to performing major surgery on you
61
without your consent."
Comments of some who agreed were:
I don't recall that the Vice President for Public
Relations for General Motors ever granted an in-
terview to Ralph Nader and any commander with
common sense will not talk to Ronald L. Ridenour.
If you expect otherwise, you are so far from
reality as to be ridiculous.62
One gets very tired of beating one's head against

an unalterable 'anti' position--a true adversary
relationship results.63
'Favorable' stand newsmen will not encounter
transportation or lodging problems.64
The 'favorable stand on Vietnam' is not the key
regarding preferential treatment. A newsman's
'track record' for balanced reporting is more
important.6 5
141
It's not a matter of favoring representatives who
take a favorable stand on U.S. policies but
rather those who seem to sympathize with your po-
sition in a war zone and treat you with respect
and courtesy.66
No question about it. 'Friendly' newsmen get

preferential treatment. 'Hostile' newsmen get
no special favors, no 'extra' information and
as little cooperation as possible.67
Comments of some who disagreed were:
Typical, unfounded allegation of a press corps
almost entirely biased in their opinions and
attitudes.68
Newsmen are susposed to be objective, despite the

fact that many are not. An 10 though has but one
ethical choice—treat all newsmen alike.69
Disagree, but . . . I was personally more inclined
to stay 'late' and dig deeper for a guy who had
been fair—not favorable--to me in the past.70
This comment sounds as if it comes from 'some' of
those self-annointed, non-pro 'newsmen' who op-
erated as free lancers and stringers.71
It is even more likely that certain favors are
done to those 'bigger names' regardless of their
position on the war.72
Problems Facing Newsmen and

Military Information Offi'ce'rs
Newsmen were asked to indicate their biggest and second
biggest problems in accomplishing their mission in Vietnam.
Problem categories were: (1) military control, (2) MACV
ground rules, (3) transportation, (4) enemy action, (5) mili-
tary commanders, (6) military information personnel, and
(7) other (write in).
142
Newsmen replies (N-4 6) were spread across all cate-
gories with "transportation" selected as the biggest problem
(30.4 percent) and "military information personnel" (20.5
percent) as the "second biggest" problem.
Military respondents were asked to indicate their big-
gest and second biggest problems in providing maximum sup-
port to the press. Categories were: (1) MACV ground rules,
(2) transportation, (3) enemy action, (4) military command-
ers, (5) uncooperative newsmen, and (6) other (write in).
As with the newsmen, military replies (N-7 6) were
spread across all categories with "transportation" the big-
gest problem (38.1 percent) and "uncooperative newsmen" as
the second biggest problem (19.4 percent).
Figure 2 depicts newsmen and lOs' "biggest" problems.
"Other" newsmen responses included: difficulty in
finding knowledgeable sources . . . the confused war . . .
no problems--we're paid to get around all of these . . .
censorship . . . using information from good-guy sources
without getting them in dutch . . . lack of phones (communi-
cations) . . . South Vietnamese censorship . . . apathetic,
inefficient military information structure particularly at
command level (MACOI) which obfuscates more than facili-
tates; rapid turnover of military and civilian personnel—
very little accumulated perspective.
143
40
NEWSMEN'S BIGGEST PROBLEMS
35 (N-46)
30
25
23
20
15
10
5
06
0
—1-
w
U .H
fd o (U
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38
MILITARY INFORMATION OFFICERS'

BIGGEST PROBLEMS
(N-76)
0_L
• C
c
Ol OJ
w >i 0 cn 0 B }-l
Id Q) c: S-H h 0 cn <D
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Fig. 2 . — Newsmen's and military information officers'
biggest problems in Vietnam. (Ratings are
in percentages.)
144
"Other" military information officer responses included:
MACV personnel who interpreted ground rules making them more
restrictive than they actually were . . . an over-demanding
attitude by newsmen for 'us' to do 'their' work . . . my own
liability to know what the 'truth' was in a given situation
. . . communications . . . confusing policy . . . State
Department . . . uncooperative MACV staff . . . newsmen dis-
torting news to achieve maximum sensational impact upon peo-
ple back home . . . too many newsmen. A glut of untrained,
inexperienced journalists who had little thought of what
they wanted and occupied our time to the exclusion of the
professionals . . . insufficient number of competent
information officers.
Newsmen Ratings of News Sources

The press in Vietnam is dependent upon many things, one
of which is news sources from which to obtain information
about the war.
A proposition tested in this survey was that "good news
sources" would be rated high on the criteria of objectivity,
accuracy, news value, accessibility, timeliness and reli-
wi-4-
ability. 73
There are many news sources in Vietnam but those most

directly related to the military's press support role are:
(1) the military information officer, (2) U.S. military
145
commanders, (3) U.S. soldiers, (4) JUSPAO briefings,
(5) official briefings (for attribution), (6) background
briefings (not for attribution), (7) U.S. handouts, and
(8) other newsmen not in same organization.
Table 7 depicts how newsmen rated news sources on each
criterion and shows that newsmen rated news sources signifi-
cantly different on all criteria except reliability.
74
In 1968, Hagley conducted a similar survey of news
sources in Vietnam. In his study, newsmen (N-62) rated the
"average soldier" higher than "military information persons"
in the areas of "news value," "timeliness," and "objectiv-
ity." Only in "accuracy" did the military information
person score higher than the average soldier.
This survey supports Hagley's results. As indicated
on Table 7, the "U.S. soldier" was rated a better news
source than "military information officer" on all criteria
except "accuracy" and "reliability." 75
"Other newsmen" were rated highest of all sources on
all criteria except "accessibility" which went to the "U.S.
soldier."
Military information officers were given an opportunity
to comment and staê whether or not they agreed with
Hagley's results. More than 51 percent disagreed.
Hagley's results challenged the information officers
because, in essence, average soldiers were rated higher in
146
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147
areas in which the information officer was trained and being
a good news source was a basic reason for the information
officer's existence.
One information officer dismissed Hagley's results on
the grounds that "disgruntled troops will bullshit the media
shamelessly."
Along this same vein, another said: "GI's would say
anything. Sometimes just to flap the newsmen." 77
The average soldier can be used by the media to

say what the newsman wants to hear. It may not
be true but will sell copy.78
Every reporter tries to be an Ernie Pyle and get

the 'real' story from the GI's on the spot.
Often, they are good color and make great reading
but little knowledge of things beyond their
scope.79
I am most critical of newsmen who look to the

average soldier as a source. How often have
we seen the TV guy stick his mike into the face
of a chopper pilot just back from an air as-
sault mission and ask him, 'How's the war
going?'80
Too many newsmen are prone to getting their news

from 'unofficial,' 'usually reliable' or 'mili-
tary spokesman' sources (which is usually some
private, sergeant or lieutenant who doesn't
know the whole story or real facts) because they
do not care to wait for an official, totally
factual release from information officers, which
would take longer and cost them a 'scoop.'°1
In defense, many information officers accounted for
Hagley's results in one of three ways other than the fact
the individual soldier is good copy.

148
First of all, said several respondents, the information
officer was a scapegoat caught in the middle. Military com-
manders were not prone to admit their mistakes, the press
challenged everything it heard, and the "poor information

p2
man was caught between these contentious points of view."
Secondly, the information officer rarely makes news
but does his best "when he brings the newsmen together with
83
the best available sources." "Public information persons
are really only technicians who ought primarily to be busy

84
getting newsmen and sources together."
The third defense of Hagley's results w a s , according
to a number of respondents, in the "official spokesman"
role of the information officer. Information officers are
more vulnerable because of this and do not "enjoy the

85
anonymity the others had."
Emphasizing this "official spokesman" role, a Navy 10
said:
More than anyone e l s e , information personnel bear

the weight of responsibility and accountability
to the command for abiding by the rules. The
morass accruing from ground rules which are often
arbitrarily interpreted, lower level command
translations laced with special additional pol-
i c i e s , and the memory of being 'burned' in the
press no doubt instills more caution and sensi-
tivity in the information personnel than in the
average soldier, who is not familiar with the
pitfalls of blabbing his brains out.86
149
Military Rating of the Media
Military information officers were asked to rate the
four general types of news media: (1) television, (2) news-
papers, (3) news magazines, and (4) wire services.
The rating criteria were: (1) accuracy, (2) objectiv-
ity, and (3) tended to sensationalize. A five point scale
from high (1) to low (5) was used.
As shown on Table 8, news magazines, wire services and
newspapers generally received high ratings on "accuracy" and
"objectivity with low ratings on "tended to sensationalize."
Television was rated low on "accuracy" and "objectivity" and
high on "tended to sensationalize." However, only ratings
on "objectivity" were significantly different.
TABLE 8
MILITARY RATINGS OF NEWS MEDIA IN VIETNAM*
(N-76)
TV News- News Wire F

papers Mags Svcs Value Sign. DF
Accuracy 3.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 .6 n.s. 3,304
Objectivity 3.7 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.9 P<.05 3,304
Tended to
Sensationalize 1.9 3.1 2.9 2.9 1.7 n.s. 3,303
*Mean scores given. Ratings were on a five-point scale

from High (1) to Low (5).
150
Officials Imposing Informal
Censorship the Most
Those newsmen, who felt informal censorship was imposed,

were asked who imposed it the most, second most and the
least. Of the newsmen who completed this section (N-33),
45 percent indicated "U.S. commanders" as imposing it the
most, with "military information personnel," "JUSPAO offi-
cials (Military)" and "Vietnamese officials" in a three-way
tie as imposing it the second most. "U.S. officials (civil-
ians)" were reported as imposing it the least.
When Informal Censorship Imposed

Newsmen, who said that informal censorship was imposed,
were asked if it were imposed "during," "before" or "after"
major offensives or "during battle lulls." Of those who
replied (N-29), the majority said it was imposed "most"
"before major offensives," the "second most" "during major
offensives," and the "least" "during battle lulls."
How Newsmen Find Out About

Impending Military Operations
Military information officers were asked how newsmen
found out about restricted information such as an impending
military operation. Of those who replied (N-60), 16.6 per-
cent said information was "leaked by military information
personnel," 11.6 percent "other newsmen," 11.6 percent
"leaked by Vietnamese officials," 05.0 percent "leaked by
151
military commanders" and 55 percent elected to write in
"other" sources. "Other" sources frequently mentioned were:
Leaked by low-ranking EM [enlisted men] showing
off their knowledge or paid by newsmen for
leaks.
Leaked by Embassy personnel.

Most reporters can take bits and pieces and come
up with what the big picture would look like.
Everyone in Vietnam was a leak. No way to
stop it.
Most media had paid informers.
In almost every case, bureau chiefs were briefed
and asked if they wish to cover. It was never
'leaked'—ground rules make leaks unnecessary.
Military Guidance On
Handling the Press
Military respondents (N-79) were asked to state if they
had received guidance, and from whom (position only), on
"handling the press" which was counter to the military's
policy of "maximum disclosure with minimum delay," excluding
security matters or liACV ground rules.
Only 34.1 percent replied "yes" listing the following
type officials as giving such guidance: immediate command-
ers such as the division commander or commanding general;
the MACV chief of information; other senior information
officers; senior Naval officer afloat; the U.S. Ambassador
to South Vietnam and; the President of the United States.
152
Summary
The primary purpose of this survey was to analyze
informal censorship of the press by the military in Vietnam.
The survey allowed both newsmen and military information
officers to express their opinions on this and related
topics.
Data collected for the survey came from questionnaires
completed by 4 8 newsmen and 8 0 military information offi-
cers, all of whom had served or were serving in Vietnam.
Briefly, the survey findings were:
1. Newsmen respondents appeared to be well qualified
to express cogent opinions on censorship in Vietnam. Aver-
aging almost 2 trips each for an average of more than 2
years each in country, newsmen represented all major types
of U.S. national news media. Newsmen respondents repre-
sented duty in Vietnam for every year of the war.
2. Military respondents also appeared well qualified.
Respondents were information officers representing all
military services and reported duty in Vietnam for every
year of the war. Military respondents consisted of an Army
and Air Force general, a Navy admiral, and all ranks down
to the rank of captain. The majority were in the major-
colonel bracket.
3. Formal military censorship did not exist in
Vietnam.
153
4. The large majority (89 percent) of newsmen and more
than one-third of the military information officers (35 per-
cent) said the military exercised informal censorship over
the press. Most newsmen reported, however, that informal
censorship did not impair or only slightly impaired them in
accomplishing their mission. The most common types of cen-
sorship reported by both groups were denial of transporta-
tion, sources refusing to talk and withholding legitimate
information.
5. MACV ground rules proved to be more of a hindrance

to the military, who had to enforce them, than to newsmen,
who had to abide by them. The most common complaint by
both respondents was that ground rules could be interpreted
in such a manner so as to deny newsmen legitimate informa-
tion.
6. Most newsmen (64.2 percent) believed the military
used security classifications as a means to withhold other-
wise legitimate or public news; most information officers
(69.3 percent) disagreed. The most common reason given by
newsmen for the military withholding information on security
grounds was to hide military or politically embarrassing in-
formation. Information officers denied this on the grounds
that security classifications are used primarily to protect
U.S. lives and to deny vital information to the enemy.
154
7. A large majority (67.9 percent) of information
officers admitted giving preferential treatment to certain
newsmen although not necessarily because these newsmen
favored U.S. policies in Vietnam. The most frequent reasons
given for preferential treatment were that it was human
nature to do so and because favored newsmen were fair, ob-
jective and friendly.
8. Both groups of respondents reported transportation

as being their biggest problem. Newsmen said information
officers were their second biggest problem while information
officers reported uncooperative newsmen as their second big-
gest problem.
9. The best news source for newsmen in Vietnam was
other newsmen not in the same organization. Overall, the
information officer was rated below other newsmen, U.S.
soldiers and background briefings as a news source.
10. Information officers rated wire services, news-
papers and news magazines generally high on accuracy and
objectivity and low on sensationalism. Television was rated
low on accuracy and objectivity and high on sensationalism.
11. Other findings were: newsmen felt U.S. commanders
imposed informal c.nsorship the most and information officers
the second most; newsmen felt informal censorship was imposed
most before major offensives and least during battle lulls;
information officers reported that most leaks about operations
155
were made by information officers with a variety of other
leaks also responsible; about one-third of the information
officers received guidance from higher level authorities
which was counter to the "maximum disclosure with minimum
delay" principle.
NOTES
An exception to this statement is in the rosters pro-

vided by the Air Force and Marine Corps which listed two
retired officers.
2
Survey results indicated an average of 1.8 trips each.
3
Zorthian, "Press Performance in Vietnam," p. 20.
4
Replies to two major questions were checked. As to
whether or not informal censorship was imposed, 34.9 percent
of the Army/Navy group replied "yes" while 4 0 percent of the
Air Force/Marine Corps group replied "yes." As to whether
or not the military gave preferential treatment to newsmen
who favored U.S. policies, 66.6 percent of Army/Navy group
replied "yes" while 7 3.3 percent of the Air Force/Marine
Corps replied "yes."
5
Thomas R. Hagley, "An Evaluation of Information
Sources in South Vietnam by United States Correspondents"
(unpublished Master's thesis, Ohio University, March, 1968).
(Hereinafter referred to as An Evaluation of Information
Sources).
To obtain frank replies, anonymity was offered to
those respondents who so desired. Of the military respon-
dents, 62.5 percent declined to have their names used with
their answers; 48 percent of the newsmen declined.
7
Of the 30 military respondents who said their names
could be used, 9 stated they exercised informal censorship.
Names of these respondents would add nothing to the report
and could jeopardize the respondents' military careers.
o
Newsmen ratings were on a scale from 1 (greatly im-
paired) to 5 (did not impair). For final tabulations, the
ones and twos were combined to yield a "high" degree of
impairment and the fours and fives were combined to yield
a "low" degree of impairment, resulting in a high (ones
and twos), medium (threes) and low (fours and fives).
9
Survey respondent, Robert Hager, NBC correspondent.
Survey respondent, Paul M. Steinle, Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co. correspondent.
156
157
llo
Survey respondent, TV newsman who declined use of
his name.
Survey respondent, Jed Duvall, CBS correspondent.
13
The frequency of similar comments precluded anno-
tating each with respondent's name or news agency.
14^
Survey respondent, Barney Seibert, UPI correspondent.
15
Survey respondent. Glen McDonald, freelance corre-
spondent.
16^
Survey respondent, Detroit Nev/s correspondent who
17
Survey respondent, Hugh Mulligan, Associated Press
correspondent.
18
Survey respondent, Newsday correspondent who de-
19
Survey respondent, Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily Nev.^s
correspondent.
20
Survey respondent, Stanley Karnow, Washington Post
correspondent.
21
Survey respondents, two Army information officers.
22
Survey respondent. Army information officer.
23
24 . . .
Survey respondent, Air Force information officer.
25 . . .
26
27 . . .
28
29 . . .
30
31
•^Survey respondent. Army information officer.
158
32Survey respondent
Navy public affairs officer.
33Survey respondent
Navy public affairs officer.
34Survey respondent Army information officer,
Survey respondent who declined use of his name or
newspaper.
36
Survey respondent George Allison, NBC correspondent.
37
Survey respondent Robert Hager, NBC correspondent.
38
Survey respondent Newsday correspondent who de-
39Survey respondent Robert Goralski, NBC correspondent.
40Survey respondent Ron Milligan, ABC correspondent.
Survey respondent ABC correspondent who declined

use of his name.
Survey respondent UPI correspondent who declined
use of his name.
43 Time correspondent who declined
Survey respondent
use of his name.
44Survey respondent UPI who declined use of his name.
45Survey respondent Warren Rogers, correspondent.
46 U.S. News and World Report who
Survey respondent
declined use of his name
47Survey respondent George Allison, NBC correspondent.
48Survey respondent Navy public affairs officer.
49Survey respondent Army information officer.
50Survey respondent Air Force information officer.
51,Survey respondent. Army information officer.
159
54
55
Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer.
56e
57^
58
59
The author served in Vietnam from July, 1967 to
July, 1968, as an Army information officer in various
positions at the U.S. Army headquarters at Long Binh,
Vietnam, and as Media Liaison Officer in Saigon.
61
62
63
64
66
Survey respondent. Air Force information officer.
67
68
69
70
71
Survey respondent, Navy public affairs officer.
72
73
A seventh criterion on the questionnaire "biased to-
ward the U.S." was. ieleted because upon re-evaluation a
determination was .-.ade that it did not adequately describe
a "good news source."
Hagley, "An Evaluation of Information Sources."
160
75
"Reliability" was not a criterion on Hagley's study.
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer
83
84
Survey respondent, Army information officer.
85
Qg
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Introduction
The war in Vietnam was known by many names. On the
fighting side, it was called the "shooting war." In early
efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese
natives, it was called the "pacification war." It has been
called "LBJ's war," a civil war, and simply a guerrilla war.
And, by the press and military information officers, it was
called an "information war."
By whatever name it was called, the Vietnam war was
perhaps the most debated war in our history. Public opinion
polarized from one extreme to the other; giving rise to an
anti-war camp, a pro-war camp and the so-called Silent
Majority which did not seem to fit neatly into either camp.
The war was ambiguous to many Americans and was, at
least initially, perplexing to the military who were charged
with the mission of conducting the war. It was on this
ambiguity that public opinion was molded. While public opin-
ion on war may be formed by many reasons, the most tangible
in this war was tho daily diet of both good and bad news
expressed by the press corps in Vietnam.
161
162
The battle cry and historical sword of the press are
"the public's right to know." In war, the government's
shield is "the need to know." The press contends that when
the government uses its "need to know shield" the only in-
formation available to the public is what the government
wishes it to know. The government counters that in a war
situation, the "right to know" must, at times, be subdued
by the "need to know."
The "right to know" embraces the right to an uninter-
rupted free flow of information so every citizen will have
a sound basis for understanding and evaluating government
affairs. The military system of classifying information
is at the heart of the "need to know" limitation.
Most newsmen agree that the government and the military
have a right to protect themselves in war by withholding in-
formation or data or value to the enemy. Disagreement re-
sults in the degree or how much information is withheld
under a false shield of security. At the highest echelons
of government, this disagreement is called the "credibility
gap." At the grass-roots level in Vietnam, it was called
"informal censorship."
Summary
It was the purpose of this study to examine the degree
of informal censorship imposed by the military over'the
press in Vietnam.
163
In addition, this study examined how the military
supported the press in Vietnam, restrictions imposed upon
the press, whether or not formal censorship should have been
imposed and indictments against both the news media and the
military's press performance during the war.
The study was limited to only military-press relations
and did not include press-government relations.
The military's press support role in Vietnam was exten-
sive and increased proportionately to increases in the num-
ber of U.S. troops and newsmen. The Military Assistance
Command's Office of Information (MACOI) was the military
agency charged with providing logistical and press support
to newsmen.
This support included but was not limited to collecting
and releasing military news to the press, transportation,
briefings, communications support and field support of food,
protective gear and emergency medical aid.
As in previous wars, the military imposed certain re-
strictions upon the press corps. One restriction was a
requirement that newsmen receive MACV accreditation before
they could receive any military support.
One of the requirements for accreditation was that news-

men agree in writing to abide by MACV ground rules which
listed types of information which could not be released
until cleared by MACV.
164
In 1968, more than 645 newsmen were covering the war
and until 1970, the monthly average was more than 4 00 per
month.
Yet, despite the large number of correspondents in
country, many writers condemned the press' coverage of the
war. As Malcome Browne put it, "None of us really has got-
ten across to the American public."
A number of writers contended that the press failure
in Vietnam resulted because the war was as confusing a war
to the newsmen as it was to the military who had to fight
it. It was a war of isolated units, no fixed front or rear
lines and no standard measuring rods as used in previous
wars. It was a war which strained the "limitations of jour-
nalism and the limitations of journalists."
Other reasons given for a press failure in Vietnam were
an apathetic public who had received millions of words,
photos, and miles of film about the war but remained igno-
rant about the war; government credibility consisting of
news management, news suppression and censorship; unprofes-
sional correspondents or those with preconceived "anti"
positions; and correspondents who sought only to make a
name for themselve? at the expense of responsible reporting.
A common reason given by newsmen for a press failure
was that the military presented numerous barriers to the
newsmen resulting in de facto if not de jure censorship.
165
It was said that a true adversary relationship existed
between newsmen and the military. This resulted partly from
the fact that newsmen were almost totally dependent upon the
military for support and news about the overall actions of
the war.
One of the most frequent press complaints against the

military was MACV's ground rules. In theory, the ground
rules were written to protect U.S. lives and military in-
stallations; however, many newsmen reported that the ground
rules were used to deny the press legitimate information.
Embargoes, a troublesome ground rule to the press, was
often used by MACV to prevent the enemy from learning about
American actions and operations. This ground rule specified
that newsmen could not report any actions if embargoed until
MACV released the information. Few newsmen argued with the
theory behind embargoes but many charged that embargoes were
used for political motives rather than for security reasons.
Although all embargoes were criticized by the press,
none received more criticism than did the en±)argo on the
Laotian campaign. Even a number of military sources con-
ceded that the Laotian embargo was political rather than
security oriented.
Of all support given by the military, transportation
was the most essential to the press. Only via military
transportation, usually helicopters, could the press go to
166
the scene of battle and obtain a firsthand account. Accord-
ing to many newsmen, the military denial of transportation
was a means of censorship.
Other indictments against the military were: briefings,
which presented only a rosy picture of the war; information
officers acting primarily as public relations officers in-
stead of disseminators of news; military commanders who held
almost absolute power over newsmen's freedom of movement;
military escorts accompanying newsmen resulting in sources
being afraid to talk freely; and use of distorted and in-
flated enemy body counts as a yardstick of the progress of
the war.
In World War II and Korea, formal censorship was imposed
with military editors reading and editing copy prior to pub-
lication or broadcast. Yet, in Vietnam, no formal policy
of censorship was in effect.
Government and military sources reported that the im-
position of formal censorship in Vietnam would have been
extremely difficult to enforce. Had formal censorship been
imposed, editors and bureau chiefs could simply run newsmen
in and out of Vietnam thus circumventing censorship rules.
In addition, newsmen could leave Vietnam, go to another
country, file their stories and return to Vietnam. Through-
out the war the United States had recognized that South Viet-
nam was a sovereign country and any formal censorship would
167
have had to have been imposed by South Vietnam. Histori-
cally, South Vietnam has been noted for its harsh censorship
rules—a situation not desired by the U.S. government in an
unpopular war. Some writers felt that censorship in Vietnam
would have been effective only if censorship were also im-
posed in Washington.
Despite the difficulties of imposing formal censorship,

many writers, including former President Lyndon Johnson,
advocated such a policy. Wes Gallagher (Associated Press)
said in 1965 that Associated Press correspondents would sub-
mit to formal censorship if such freed correspondents to
see and cover all aspects of the war as was done in World
War II. Jack Foisie (Los Angeles Times) advocated formal
censorship in 1962 and as of this report, still believed
formal censorship should have been imposed.
Other writers agreed by saying that formal censorship
would have provided greater access to the news, better
security for U.S. troops, elimination of inaccurate report-
ing, permitted newsmen to be present at the start of opera-
tions rather than reporting after-the-fact, and would have
eliminated the widening credibility gap between the military
and the press, and the government and the press.
A survey was conducted to allow both the military and
press to express their opinions on a wide range of topics
and specifically informal censorship.
168
Newsmen respondents averaged almost two trips each to
Vietnam with an average two years' stay each. Both newsmen
and military information officer respondents represented
duty in Vietnam for every year of the war from 1962 to 1971.
Except for five newsmen, survey respondents confirmed
that formal censorship had not been imposed in Vietnam.
However, a majority of the newsmen and more than one-third
of the military information officers said the military had
imposed informal censorship over the press. The most common
types of informal censorship reported was refusal to provide
transportation, sources refusing to talk to newsmen and
withholding legitimate news on security grounds. Most news-
men respondents did not believe that informal censorship
impaired their ability to cover and report the war.
Both respondent groups said that MACV ground rules were
frequently interpreted in such a manner as to deny newsmen
legitimate information. In addition, newsmen charged the
military with classifying information solely to hide mili-
tary or politically embarrassing information.
Military respondents admitted giving preferential treat-
ment to those newsmen who were considered fair, objective
and friendly.
Other survey results were: newsmen rated military in-
formation low as news sources; information officers rated
television low on accuracy and objectivity and high on
169
sensationalism; newsmen reported that U.S. commanders
imposed informal censorship the most with information offi-
cers imposing it the second most.
Conclusions
Conclusions for this study were based primarily upon
the survey results in Chapter VI. Material presented in
Chapters III and IV provided supportive data to these con-
clusions; however, material in these chapters were drawn
from a wide variety of opinionated sources and did not
pretend to exhaust all viewpoints.
The following conclusions are in order:
1. Formal censorship with military editors reading
and editing copy prior to broadcast or publication did not
exist in the Vietnam war. Although five newsmen (11.6 per-
cent) reported formal censorship had been imposed, the
large majority of newsmen (88.4 percent) and all military
respondents did not believe formal military censorship had
been exercised. In the literature review, few writers men-
tioned "formal censorship" although a number referred to
"censorship."
2. Informal censorship, as defined in this study, was
exercised by the military over the press in Vietnam.
Although newsmen and military information officers dif-
fered significantly in their replies to this question
170
(Table 3), 89 percent of the newsmen respondents and 35
percent of the information officers said informal censorship
was imposed. Materials presented in Chapters III and IV
tended to support this conclusion.
The fact that 35 percent of the military information
officers responded affirmatively to this question indicated
an increasing concern among such military officers who would
risk possible military sanctions to state their opinions
about censorship. Although anonymity was offered, nine mili-
tary officers reported that their names could be used with
their replies that informal censorship was exercised.
3. The most common types of informal censorship exer-
cised by the military were denial of transportation not re-
quired by the military mission, sources refusing to talk to
newsmen, and military withholding of legitimate information
under the guise of security reasons or ground rule restric-
tions .
4. Although informal censorship was imposed, such did
not greatly impair newsmen from getting the story they or
their editors wanted.
5. Ground rules were necessary in the absence of for-
mal censorship to protect vital military information from
the enemy and did not impair newsmen in accomplishing their
mission.
171
However, the embargo ground rule was frequently
violated by the military in that information about opera-
tions remained embargoed even after it became obvious the
enemy was aware of the operation and other world news media
were reporting the action. Data presented in this study
indicated embargoes were often used to avoid revealing
politically embarrassing operations.
This embargo ground rule appeared to be the basis on
which newsmen respondents felt the military withheld infor-
mation on security grounds when such information would not
in fact benefit the enemy.
6. The military gave preferential treatment to some
newsmen. This was inferred from the admissions of a majority
of military respondents. However, the reasons such prefer-
ential treatment was given resulted primarily for reasons
other than whether or not the newsmen favored U.S. involve-
ment in Vietnam. These were: the newsman was accurate; he
was objective; or he was friendly as an individual.
7. The military's support to the press appeared to be
much greater than in previous wars, despite the conclusion
that informal censorship had been imposed. Transportation,
critical to newsmen receiving firsthand accounts of battles,
was generally provided. Field support ranged from food and
lodgings to risking U.S. lives to get newsmen to a desired
location. Briefings, although criticized by newsmen, were
172
given daily and served to give the press their only overall
picture of the total war for the previous 24 hours.
Implications for Further Study

Time and expenses did not allow more than a superficial
treatment of the broad question of military press censorship.
As indicated in Chapter IV, the military received con-
siderable press support guidance from Washington. V7hether
or not guidance from Washington caused the military to exer-
cise informal censorship warrants further study.
Despite predictions of the past that only nuclear war-
fare faced the world, the Vietnam war did occur and other
such wars may occur again in the future. The possibility
of imposing formal censorship in any future wars should be
studied now. Further studies could analyze why formal cen-
sorship was not imposed in Vietnam and whether or not such
would work in similar wars.
Military respondents frequently complained that newsmen
arrived in Vietnam with preconceived opinions about the war
and U.S. involvement. Further studies could attempt to de-
termine if such preconceived attitudes did in fact exist
and whether these attitudes affected press coverage of the
war.
The entire system of ground rules should be re-evaluated
to determine if they were too easily misinterpreted by
173
military information officers. If so, more definitive
ground rules should be written.
The survey in Chapter VI revealed that two important

areas of military press support need further study and eval-
uation: "Is military transportation a right or a privilege
of newsmen?" and "Are military sources under any legal obli-
gation to talk to newsmen about information which is not
classified?"
Perhaps the most important question demanding resolu-
tion and one which impacts on most of the preceding comments
is whether or not military information officers should serve
as public relations officers in a combat environment where
press interest is high and continuous. If the press rela-
tion role of telling only the good is dominant, the military-
press conflict will continue. Conversely, no organization
will willingly expose their "bad news." Further study
should be devoted to resolving this wartime conflict.
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Post, February 27, 1968.
Wilhelm, John. "The Re-Appearing Foreign Correspondent:

A World Survey." Journalism Quarterly, XL, No. 2
(Spring, 1963), pp. 147-168.
Wilson, George C. "News of Embargo is Embargoed, Un-

Embargoed, Re-Embargoed." Washington Post, February
2, 1971.
"Withdrawal Including Information." Abilene Reporter News,
January 17, 1971.
Young, Galvin. "Despite News Volume From Vietnam, Ameri-

cans Seem Baffled About War." Salt Lake Tribune,
December 25, 1966.
Zorthian, Barry. "Press Performance in Vietnam." The

Quill (December, 1968), p. 20.
III. Government Documents

United States Senate. Hearings Before the Committee on
Foreign Relations. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, August 17 and 31, 1966.
179
U.S. Army Vietnam. Mimeographed transcript of Information
Officers' Conference, Saigon, Vietnam, June 3-4, 1968.
U.S. Department of Defense. "Information for Use in Plan-
ning a Visit to Vietnam," Memorandum for the Press,
the Pentagon, Washington, D.C, January, 1971.
. Official letter to the press from Phil G.
Goulding, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs), the Pentagon, V7ashington, D.C, December 21,
1967.
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Directive
360-1, Annex A, "Rules Governing the Public Release
of Military Information," October 31, 1966.
. Directive 36 0-1, Annex A, "Rules Governing the
Public Release of Military Information," March 27,
1970.
Directive 360-1. Annex B, "MACV Accreditation
Criteria," February 28, 19 67.
Directive 360-1, "Correspondents Data," March
27, 1970.
"List of Accredited Newsmen," November, 1967.
"List of Correspondents Accredited to MACV, 1
"April-31 May, 1971."
"MACV Accreditation Criteria," Enclosure to
Memorandum for the Press, the Pentagon, Washington,
D . C , January, 1971.
"Missions Statement/Functions," 1968.
. "Press List," July, 1968.
"Public Information Policies and Procedures,"
March 27, 1970.
U.S. Press Playbacks (Mimeographed), July 3, 1968
U.S. State Department. "JUSPAO Vietnam: General Briefing
Book," Bureau of Public Affairs, Saigon, Vietnam, 1967.
180
IV. Manuscripts
Ahrens, James. "War Reporting From Vietnam." Unpublished
Master's thesis, Boston University, 1968.
Funderburk, Raymond. "News Coverage in Vietnam: An Anal-
ysis of the Barriers in the News Gathering Process."
Unpublished Master's thesis. University of Alabama,
1969.
Hagley, Thomas R. "An Evaluation of Information Sources in
South Vietnam by United States Correspondents." Unpub-
lished Master's thesis, Ohio University, 1968.
Kindelan, Gilbert. "A Study of United States Government
Controls on Combat News From Vietnam, January 1, 1962
through January 1, 1967." Unpublished Master's thesis,
Pennsylvania State, 1968.
Quinn, Thomas A. "Reporting Vietnam." Unpublished Master's
thesis. University of Texas, 1968.
Schultz, Robert A. "Military News Priorities." Unpub-
lished Master's thesis, Boston University, 1968.
V. Letters
Foisie, Jack. Los Angeles Times, Bangkok, Thailand. Per-
sonal letter, June 26, 1971.
McArthur, George. Los Angeles Times, Saigon, Vietnam. Per-
sonal letter. May 21, 1971.
Oliver, Richard. New York Daily News, New York, New York.
Personal letter, June 29, 1971.
Stevens, Philip H. Colonel, U.S. Army. Deputy Chief of
Staff, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam.
Personal letter, September 5, 1971.
VI. Interviews
Coleman, William T. Colonel, U.S. Air Force. Chief of Pub-
lic Information, Department of the Air Force, Washing-
ton, D.C. Personal interview, March 23, 1971.
181
Hill, Gordon. Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Chief of Infor-
mation U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Per-
sonal interview, March 23, 1971. (At the time of
interview. General Hill was a Colonel and Chief of the
Directorate of Defense Information, the Pentagon).
Sidle, Winant. Major General, U.S. Army. Chief of Informa-
tion, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. Per-
sonal interview, March 23, 1971.
VII. Speeches
Fryklund, Richard. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs). An address delivered to the Buffalo
Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America,
Buffalo, New York, January 10, 19 68.
Goulding, Phil G. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs). An address delivered to the Government Rela-
tions Workshop of the National Newspaper Association,
Washington, D.C, March 15, 1968.
Henkin, Daniel Z. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs). An address delivered to the Pennsylvania
News Broadcasters Association, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, May 22, 1967.
Koehler, John 0. An address delivered to the U.S. Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
April, 10, 1970.
Lower, Elmer W. President of ABC News. An address, "Field
Correspondents and the Laos Incursion," delivered to
Alpha Epsilon Rho, Chicago, Illinois, March 27, 1971.
Meacham, Joseph R. Colonel, U.S. Army. An address deliv-
ered to the Armed Forces Week Luncheon, Lowry Air
Force Base, Colorado, May 15, 1968.
Sidle, Winant. Major General, U.S. Army. Chief of Informa-
tion, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. An
address, "Press Relations in Vietnam," delivered to
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, June 3, 1970.
Wilson, George W. Washington Post. An address delivered
to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April 30, 1971.
APPENDIX
A. Cover Letter and Questionnaire sent to Military

Information Officers 183
B. Cover Letter and Questionnaire sent to Newsmen 190
C Rules Governing Public Release of US Military

Information in Vietnam 197
D. Policies and Procedures for Release of
Infor: otion 203
182
183
APPENDIX A
LETTER TO MILITARY INFORMATION OFFICERS
May 10, 1971
Dear Sir:
I am conducting a graduate study to determine the degree of,

if any, "informal" censorship imposed by the military on
the press corps in Vietnam.
Most studies in this area have been patently one-sided in
favor of the civilian press. My study will objectively
evaluate the question from both sides--the military and the
press.
Preliminary research indicates that some informal censorship
did exist. However, the intent of my research is to deter-
mine how much, specific cases, whether or not such was delib-
erate and the means used.
I realize this is a sensitive area for a military officer on
active duty. For this reason, I visited OASD(PA) and your
services' chief of information to explain my research.
While your name and the names of other information officers
were given to me by your chief of information, I carefully
explained my ground rules to protect my sources. He was in-
formed that under no circumstances, whether the comments
were favorable or unfavorable, would your name, the question-
naire, or other identifying data be given to anyone. He
agreed to this condition.
Only by the above safeguards can I be assured of receiving
frank and objective replies.
Your cooperation in completing the enclosed questionnaire
will be appreciated and greatly assist me in my research in
this confused but important area. Please feel free to elab-
orate on the questionnaire as you deem necessary.
184
-2- May 10, 1971
I have enclosed a return stamped envelope for your conven-

ience. Again, thanks for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Charles B. Moore
Teaching Assistant
CBM/s
185
QUESTIONNAIRE TO MILITARY INF0R:'J\TI0N OFFICERS
The purpose of this survey is to obtain information for a

graduate thesis titled, "Informal Censorship in Vietnam."
The survey has been approved by the Department of Mass Commu-
nications, Texas Tech University.
Please complete the questionnaire as thoroughly as time

permits and return it at your earliest convenience.
This questionnaire has been shown to the Department of

Defense and your military service's chief of information.
ALL WERE INFORMED THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE OR YOUR NAME OR OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA BE
GIVEN TO THE MILITARY.
The intent of keeping your name completely confidential,

should you so indicate below, is to obtain frank and objec-
tive answers. in either case, ONLY I WILL HAVE ACCESS TO
THESE FOmiS. THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE DESTROYED AFTER
DATA IS ANALYZED.
Section 1. Background Data

Please check one:
^My name may be used with answers on this questionnaire

I do not want my name used. (If this item is checked
items 1-4 below are optional. Please complete item 5
in such a manner so as not to identify you.)
1. Name:
2. Current address
3. Current duty:
4. Unit in Vietnam:
5. Duty in Vietnam:
6. Inclusive dates served in Vietnam:
7. Please circle the wars/conflicts you have served in:
a. WWII b. Korea c. Dominican Republic
d. Others (write in)
8. How long have you been in the Information Program?9
186
9. Did you attend DINFOS? Yes No. If no, what
training, civilian and military, qualified you for duty
in the Information Program?
Section II. Definitions

1. Fcprmal censorship: A formal military policy with full-
time military censors reading and editing copy prior to
broadcast or publication.
2. Informal censorship: An act on part of a military com-
mander, his representative, or military information per-
sonnel which precluded a member of the press corps from
obtaining a story he wanted or was required to obtain;
an act on part of a military commander, his representa-
tive, or military information personnel which precluded
transmission of that story from the field to Saigon or
from Saigon to the United States.
Informal censorship includes but is not limited to:
sources refusing to talk to newsmen; denial of transpor-
tation except when military mission had higher priority,
e.g., resupply of men, ammo, equipment, evacuation of
wounded; denial of requests to visit units in the field;
unreasonable interpretation of MACV ground rules.
3. Voluntary censorship: An agreement by newsmen to abide
by MACV ground rules and security restrictions.
4. Military commander: Officers of the U.S. Armed Forces
who are in charge of men.
5. Military information personnel: Any member of the U.S.
Armed Forces, officer or enlisted, who had assigned
duties in Public information or support to the press.
6. Newsmen: A bureau chief, correspondent, reporter, or
photographer of any media, i.e., print, radio, televi-
sion, etc.
Section III. Questionnaire

1. Did you impose formal censorship over any newsman in
Vietnam? ^Yes ^No
If YES, please cite specific examples, i.e. date, place
event, how applied
187
2. Did you impose informal censorship? yes no
If YES, please cite specific examples
3. Did MACV ground rules impair your ability to provide

"maximum disclosure with minimum delay?" ^yes ^no
If YES, please explain
4. If you exercised informal censorship against newsmen,

please briefly state the most common type used:
What was your biggest problem in providing maximum sup-

port to newsmen? (Please check one)
MACV ground rules transportation enemy action
military commander uncooperative other
newsmen (write in)
Please explain why this was the biggest problem.
What was your SECOND biggest problem in providing maximum

support to newsmen? (Please check one)
MACV ground rules transportation enemy action
military commander ûncooperative pother
newsmen (write in)
Please explain why
Newsmen often complain that military information person-

nel withhold information on grounds that it would benefit
the enemy, when according to some newsmen, it would not.
Information personnel counter that they are in a better
position to determine what information will benefit the
enemy. What are your opinions on this?^
8. In a recent survey of 62 newsmen who had served in Viet-

nam, "military public information persons" were rated
below U.S. military commanders, U.S. Embassy officials,
and official briefings as news sources in the areas of
"news value," "timeliness," "objectivity," and "accuracy."
The "average soldier" rated above military information
persons in all these areas except "accuracy" and then
were only slightly lower than military information
persons .
188
Do you agree with these results? yes no
Please explain
Impending military operations represent one type of in-

formation not given in advance to newsmen, yet many
times, newsmen still knew about the operation in advance
In your opinion, how did they find out about such?
pother newsmen leaked by military com-
manders
leaked by military in- leaked by Vietnamese offi-
formation personnel cials (military or
civilian)
other (write in)
10. Some newsmen complain that the military tends to favor
representatives of the news media who take a favorable
stand on U.S. policies in Vietnam. Do you agree?
yes no
Please explain:
11. Did you ever receive guidance on "handling the press"

either verbal or written, which was counter to the "maxi
mum disclosure with minimum delay" principle (excluding
security matters or MACV ground rules)?
yes no
If YES, please write in who (position only) gave you
such guidance
12 If you exercised informal censorship against newsmen,
please state the approximate number of times
13 Please evaluate the following types of media coverage
in Vietnam by circling as appropriate:
TELEVISION
High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5
Tended to sensationalize 1 2 3 4 5
Unknown
NEWSPAPERS
High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
Unknown
189
NEWS MAGAZINES
High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
Unknown
WIRE SERVICES
High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
Unknown
I sincerely appreciate your time and interest in completing

this questionnaire. I am very grateful for your contribution
to my study in this area of journalism.
CHARLES B. MOORE
Please use this area (or additional pages) for any other
comments you would like to make concerning informal censor-
ship or military/press relations in Vietnam.
190
APPENDIX B: LETTER TO NEWSMEN
May 10, 1971
Dear Sir:
I am conducting a graduate study to determine the degree of
"informal censorship" imposed by the military on the press
corps in Vietnam.
Preliminary research indicates that some cases of informal
censorship were exercised by the military. The intent of
my research is to determine how much, specific cases,
whether or not such hindered the newsman in accomplishing
his mission, and means used to censor.
Your cooperation in completing the enclosed questionnaire
will be appreciated and will greatly assist me in complet-
ing my requirements for a graudate degree in journalism.
Please feel free to elaborate on the questionnaire as you
deem necessary.
To be objective in this research, I am attempting to get
both sides to this question by sending other question-
naires to military information personnel of division or
higher units who are serving or have served in Vietnam.
I have enclosed a return stamped envelope for your con-
venience. Again, thanks for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Charles B. Moore
Teaching Assistant
CBM/s
191
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE TO NEWSMEN
The purpose of this survey is to obtain information for a

graduate thesis titled, "Informal Censorship in Vietnam."
The survey has been approved by the Department of Mass
Communications, Texas Tech University.
Please complete the questionnaire as thoroughly as time

permits and return at your earliest convenience. The data
will be analyzed collectively and no reference will be made
to you by name if you so indicate. All of the raw data
will be kept confidential.
Section 1. Background Data

Please check one:
My name may be used with answers on this questionnaire
I do not want my name used.
1. Name:
2. Current address:
3. Employed by (while in Vietnam)
4. Time spent in Vietnam: From to
5. Circle the wars/conflicts you have covered as a corre-
spondent:
a. WWII b. Korea c. Cuba d. Middle East
e. Others (write in)
6. If you served in the military, were your duties related
to public information or news reporting? ^N/A ^yes
^no
Section II. Definitions
1. Formal censorship: A formal military policy with full-

time military censors reading and editing copy prior to
broadcast or publication.
192
2. Informal censorship: An act on part of a military com-
mander, his representative, or military information
personnel which precluded a member of the press corps
from obtaining a story he wanted or was required to
obtain; an act on part of a military commander, his
representative, or military information personnel which
precluded transmission of that story from the field to
Saigon or from Saigon to the United States.
Informal censorship includes but is not limited to:
sources refusing to talk to newsmen; denial of transpor-
tation except when military mission had higher priority,
i.e. resupply of men, ammo, equipment, evacuation of
wounded; denial of requests to visit units in the field;
unreasonable interpretation of MACV ground rules.
3. Voluntary censorship: An agreement by newsmen to abide
by MACV ground rules and security restrictions.
4. Military commander: Officers of the U.S. Armed Forces
who are in charge of men.
5. Military information personnel: Any member of the U.S.
Armed Forces, officer or enlisted, who had assigned
duties in Public information or support to the press.
6. Newsmen: A bureau chief, correspondent, reporter, or
photographer of any media, i.e. print, radio, television,
etc.
Section III. Questionnaire

1. Did formal censorship by the U.S. military exist in
Vietnam? ^yes ^no
2. Did the U.S. military exercise informal censorship?
^yes ^no
If YES, please cite specific examples, i.e. date, place,
event, how applied
3. Did MACV ground rules impair your ability to get the

story you or your editor wanted? ^yes ^no
If YES, please cite examples ^__
193
4. Would you briefly state what "informal censorship" meant
to you?
What was your biggest problem in accomplishing your

mission? (Please check one)
military control MACV ground transportation
rules
ênemy action ^military COs military infor-
mation
personnel
other (write in)
What was your second biggest problem in accomplishing
your mission? (Please check one)
military control MACV ground transportation
rules
ênemy action military COs military
information
personnel
other (write in)
Newsmen often complain that military information person-
nel withhold information on grounds that it would benefit
the enemy, when according to some newsmen, it would not.
Information personnel counter that they are in a better
position to decide what information will benefit the
enemy. What are your opinions on this?
8. If informal censorship was imposed on you, who imposed it

the most, the second most, and the least?
(Please insert the numbers 1 for most, 2 for second most,
and 3 for the least.)
Û.S. military commanders Û.S. Officials
(civilian)
Military information ^Vietnamese officials
"personnel (civilian or military)
JUSPAO briefing officers ôther (write in)
'(military)
informal censorship not imposed.
194
If informal censorship was imposed by the military, when
was it imposed the most? The second most? The least?
(Please put 1 for the most, 2 for the second most, and
3 for the least.)
during battle lulls during major offensives
_before major offensives after major offensives
other (write in)
10. Please briefly state the most common type of informal
censorship imposed against you:
11. If informal censorship was exercised against you, to

what degree did such impair your ability to get the
story you or your editor wanted? (Please check one)
Greatly Impaired Did not impair
1 2 3 5
Section IV. Source Evaluation

Please evaluate the sources below as "news sources" in
Vietnam by circling as appropriate.
Military commanders
High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
News value 1 2 3 4 5
Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5
Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5
Reliability 1 2 3 4 5
Biased toward U.,S. 1 2 3 4 5
Military information personnel

High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
Biased toward U..S. 1 2 3 4 5
195
3. Average U.S. soldier
High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
Biased toward U.S. 1 3 4 5
Background briefings
(not for attribution)
High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
Biased toward U.S. 1 2 3 4 5
5. Official briefings
(for attribution)
Hi gh Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
*
Daily JUSPAO t)rief ing s
Hi gh Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
Biased toward ':. S. 1 2 3 4 5
196
U.S. handouts
High Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
8. Other newsmen not in
same organization
Hi gh Low
Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5
I sincerely appreciate your time and interest in completing

this questionnaire. I am very grateful for your contribution
to my study in this area of journalism.
CHARLES B. MOORE
Please use this area (or additional pages) for any other
comments you would like to make concerning informal censor-
ship or military/press relations in Vietnam.
197
APPENDIX C
RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC RELEASE OF US
MILITARY INFORMATION IN VIEWNAM
Annex A, îACV Dir 360-1

1. BACKGROUND
a. A maximum amount of factual military information is

to be released, consistent with security require-
ments .
b. In past wars a great deal of information was denied
the enemy by not releasing it to the press in the
presumption that the enemy did not have ready access
to it. Although this generalization retains some
validity in Vietnam, the very nature of the war
makes it impossible to safeguard several types of
information that once were carefully protected.
Thus, the departures of major US units are normally
announced prior to the time of their redeployment
rather than after their last elements have left the
country. Pinpoint datelines are permitted. In-
country strength figures, by service, are released
at regular intervals.
c. In Vietnam the major problem in providing a full
flow of information to newsmen and thence to the
public is not that of deciding whether information
is releasable, but that of physically gathering,
transmitting, and checking facts from widely dis-
persed locations often linked together primarily
by air transportation and a heavily used communica-
tions system.
d. The prevailing situation in the Republic of Vietnam
(RVN) often enables correspondents to learn of US
military information before it has been released
officially in accordance with the ground rules indi-
cated belov. Such information is not to be trans-
mitted or released to the public until officially
released by a US Military Assistance Comman, Vietnam
(MACV) spokesman. fîACV accreditation is issued on
this condition. Violation of these ground rules is
to be regarded as a basis for suspension or cancel-
lation of MACV accreditation.
198
e. Correspondents' movements may sometimes be re-
stricted in certain tactical areas. These restric-
tions are kept to a minimum but they may be applied
by a commander when, in his opinion, the nature of
an operation warrants such action. Correspondents
are to be advised of such restrictions by the com-
mander of the unit, by the information officer (10)
of the headquarters involved, or by another appro-
priate unit staff officer, if there is no 10
present.
2. GROUND RULES.
a. The Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Viet-
nam (COMUSMACV), is the sole releasing authority for
all information materials, including still photog-
raphy, pertaining to US military operations and
other US military activities of general interest in
Vietnam, gathered or produced by military individuals
or organizations. Local commanders are delegated the
authority to release home town news material and
other materials of noncombat operational matters or
of other than general news interest. As authorized
by COMUSMACV, the Chief of Information or his repre-
sentative is the official MACV military spokesman.
b. The MACV ground rules have been designed to keep
intelligence information from the enemy until such
time as it is of little or no value to him. Newsmen
have been most cooperative in attempting to follow
the rules, thereby stemming this flow of important
intelligence information to the enemy. However,
based on logic and the numerous queries received by
the press, it is obvious that no set of ground rules
can cover every tactical situation encountered by
newsmen in the field. Although relatively few in
number, gray areas in the matter cannot be eliminated.
c. Since the major problems involved with following the

MACV ground rules in the past occurred in connection
with what may not be used, rather than with what may
be used, this annex is to confine itself to what may
not be use I unless, and until, released by MACV.
There are 15 major areas of news involved.
(1) Future plans, operations, or strikes. This mate-
rial is never to be released until after the
plan, operation, or strike has taken place.
199
(2) Information concerning rules of engagement.
Rules of engagement are the prescribed "do's"
and don'ts" under which commanders operate
in combat, particularly tactics and techniques
which would be of assistance to the enemy, if
known by him. They include the conditions
under which aircraft, units, or individuals
may fire upon the enemy under various given
circumstances.
(3) Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support

units or on hand in combat units and depots.
Ordnance includes weapons systems and ammuni-
tion. This ground rule is designed to deny
the enemy knowledge of the combat readiness
of units.
(4) During an operation, unit designations and

troop movements, tactical deployments (scheme
of maneuver), name of operation, and size of
friendly forces involved.
(5) Intelligence unit activities, methods of oper-

ration, or specific locations. This rule
applies to all types of intelligence units
and operations.
(6) Exact number and types of casualties or damage

suffered by friendly units. This information
is often released by MACV, but is not useable
until so released. The criteria used are the
value of the information to the enemy and how
much he can expect to know if the information
is not released.
(7) Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance

expended on strikes outside of the RVN.
(8) Information on aircraft taking off on strikes,

enroute to, or returning from the target area.
Information on strikes while they are in
progress.
(9) Identity of air units and locations of air

bases from which aircraft are launched on
combat operations.
(10) Number of aircraft damaged, or any other indi-

cator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
ground anti-aircraft defenses.
200
(11) Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, courses,
speeds, or angles of attack (General descrip-
tions such as "low and fast" may be used.).
(12) Information on, or confirmation of, planned
strikes which do not take place for any reason,
including bad weather.
(13) Specific identification of enemy weapons sys-
tems used to down friendly aircraft. General
terms such as "ground fire" may be used. This
rule is not designed to preclude analysis of
specific enemy weapons.
(14) Details concerning downed aircraft, including
pilots and crews, while search and rescue (SAR)
operations are in progress.
(15) Aerial photos of fixed installations.
d. To assist newsmen in correctly interpreting any
ground rule gray areas, MACV provides 24-hour ser-
vice to anyone who obtains information which he
feels is subject to interpretation. Any newsman
in the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) who is concerned
about the intelligence value of material he wishes
to use is to contact the Information Officer at the
MACV Press Center, Da Nang (phone Da Nang 957-4025).
Elsewhere in Vietnam, queries are to be addressed
to the MACV Public Information Division, at
923-2865 or 2866.
3. GENERAL NOTES
a. Casualty information, as it relates to the notifica-
tion of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive.
(1) By executive direction, next of kin of US mili-
tary fatalities are to be notified in person
by an officer or senior noncommissioned offi-
cer (NCO) of the appropriate service. There
have been instances in which next of kin have
first learned of the death or wounding of the
loved one through the news media. The problem
is particularly difficult for visual media.
Casualty photographs can show a recognizable
face, name tag, jewelry, or other identifying
feature or item. The anguish that sudden
201
recognition at home can cause is out of pro-
portion to the news value of the photograph
or film. Hence, photographs and films of
recognizable US casualties are not releaseable
until next of kin have been notified. Notifi-
cation of next of kin can be verified with the
MACV Office of Information (MACOI) or the
Directorate of Defense in the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
(2) An assessment of US casualties that a correspon-

dent actually sees in an action may be used.
However, to protect security of the unit con-
cerned and to minimize anguish on the part of
families at home, correspondents are requested
not to identify units smaller than brigade,
regimental or equivalent size, in connection
with casualty figures.
b. Three types of enemy personnel loss figures are

released—"killed in action," "detainees," and
"Hoi Chanh."
(1) Enemy killed figures released by MACV are to
have been verified on the scene to the extent
permitted by the military situation. It can-
not be an exact figure. It is likely that
duplications and other errors on the high side
are more than offset by the number of enemy
dead who are carried away or buried, by those
who subsequently die of wounds, and by those
killed by artillery concentrations and air
strikes not followed up by ground action.
Thus, when a specific number of enemy killed
is announced, that figure is not as precise
as the popular term "body count" would imply.
Neither is it a guess or loose estimate. It
is the best figure that can be developed and,
as already noted, is probably conservative in
the long run.
(2) It is difficult, if not impossible, to get
reliable enemy wounded figures. It is to be
considered that wounded as well as killed
figures are released in the case of US casu-
alties, whereas only killed figures are an-
nounced in the case of enemy casualties.
Hence, any meaningful comparison between
enemy and US casualties is to be based on
killed figures.
202
(3) Enemy or possible enemy persons captured or
taken into custody are called detainees until
such time as their status (prisoner of war,
returnee, civil defendent, or innocent civil-
ian) is finally determined by competent
authority.
c. The initial release of information pertaining to any
US tactical operation in the field is to be made by
MACOI when, in the opinion of the field force com-
mander concerned, the release of such information
will not adversely affect the security of his com-
mand. This condition may exist when it can be
presumed that the enemy is aware of the general
strength and location of friendly forces. It may
occur either before or after there has been signifi-
cant contact. The field force commander's recommenda-
tion for release does not constitute authority for
commanders subordinate to MACV to effect release to
news media. Initial announcement of an operation is
to be made by îACOI only.
d. Official total US casualty figures in Vietnam on a
weekly and cumulative basis are released by the
Department of Defense and MACV on the basis of
reports from the individual services to the Depart-
ment of Defense. Because of unavoidable late
casualty reporting, these figures are subject to
updating.
e. Questions concerning this directive should be ad-
dressed to the Chief of Information, United States
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, APO 96222,
telephone numbers: 923-3163, 4989, or 3897.
203
APPENDIX D
SECTION II
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE
OF INFORMATION
MACV Dir 360-1

7. CLEARANCE AND RELEASE
AUTHORITY.
a. COMUSMACV exercises the sole authority for clearance

and release of information concerning US military
operations in Vietnam (north and south) or adjacent
waters. All military news releases concerning oper-
ations or other actions in Vietnam of general news
interest are to be cleared with COMUSMACV. After
clearance by COMUSMACV, originating commands may
make distribution of the cleared material.
b. When operations in Southeast Asia involve US Forces

other than those based in the RVN, commanders of
forces involved are to provide COMUSîACV with infor-
mation for release in Saigon. COMUSMACV is the
releasing authority for information concerning such
operations. Commanders of forces so involved are
to be authorized to provide amplifying information
on the participation of their forces as approved by
CINCPAC All releases concerning operations are to
be submitted to MACV for clearance as outlined in
paragraph 8, below.
c. Local commanders are delegated the authority to

clear and release home town news material, and other
materials clearly of noncombat operational matters
and of other than general news interest such as:
(1) Relicious, recreational, sports, and similar

actiV Lties.
(2) Construction of new mess halls, post exchanges,

and similar buildings.
(3) VIP visits on an after-the-fact basis unless

specified otherwise.
204
(4) Personnel actions such as promotions, assign-
ments, awards, and educational achievements.
(5) Pacification support activities which are

separate from military operations.
(6) Local command policies of local interest and

not pertaining to combat operations.
8. CLEARANCE PROCEDURES.
a. General. To obtain COMUSîACV clearance, materials

proposed for release are to be submitted to Plans
and Policy Division (PPD), MACOI. All materials
are to be checked for security, accuracy, and
propriety at the source prior to submission for
clearance. Each story, fact sheet, outline, and
audio tape cover sheet submitted for clearance is
to have a heading to include slug, unit, phone num-
ber, and date of action and is to bear in the upper
margin the signature and grade, or unit stamp and
initials, of the responsible information officer.
b. Written Releases. Two copies of proposed written

releases are to be submitted to MACOI.
c. Still Photographs.
(1) Three prints of still photographs are to be
submitted to MACOI. MACOI retains one copy,
forwards one copy to the Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
(OASD (PA)), and returns one copy to the
originator.
(2) Each print is to include or be accompanied by:
(a) Caption attached to the bottom of each

print.
(b) Negative number.
(c) -ccompanying list of proposed recipients.
(3) Negatives or still photographs are to be trans-

mitted through service channels to respective
photo repositories in accordance with appropri-
ate service regulations.
205
d. Audio Tapes. One copy of tapes to be cleared is to
be submitted to MACOI. Each tape submitted is to
be acpcompanied by a cover sheet indicating the
originating headquarters or unit, topic, and a
brief synopsis of the contents.
e. Motion Picture Films.
(1) The ASD (PA) retains authority for clearance

and public release of military motion picture
(MOPIX) films. MACOI has delegated authority
to release MOPIX film of spot news nature on
a pool basis. MOPIX footage intended for pub-
lic release at the national level is to be
sent by the most expeditious means, through
service channels, to parent service processing
installations for processing and forwarding to
the OASD (PA) . V7hen MOPIX footage is for-
warded, three copies of film summary and data
(on respective service forms) are to be fur-
nished Public Information Division, MACOI,
which in turn forwards one copy to JUSPAO and
one copy to the OASD (PA).
(2) Prior to shooting MOPIX footage intended for

public release, other than home town news re-
lease, the proposed filming is to be coordi-
nated with the Public Information Division,
MACOI. In connection therewith, the following
information is to be furnished:
(a) Title.
(b) General theme and treatment of the story.
(c) Length.
(d) Technical details (e.g., size, color or

black and white, sound or silent).
(e) Name of requestor.
9. RELEASABLE AND NONRELEASABLE

INFORMATION.
a. The policy is to provide maximum information to

correspondents, consistent with security.
206
b. Ground rules on release of information applicable
to correspondents are contained at Annex A.
c. Release of information by military agencies and per-

sonnel is to be governed by both the ground rules
and separate instructions issued by this head-
quarters and higher authority.
d. Security of military information is to be maintained

at the source. In situations where a correspondent
has been exposed to classified or nonreleasable in-
formation, the following policy is to govern:
(1) The correspondent is to be made aware of the

fact and requested to cooperate in the protec-
tion of military security.
(2) In the event that the information learned is

only temporarily nonreleasable, such as an
operation which is planned or begun, but not
yet released by MACV, the following policies
govern:
(a) TV/motion picture film or still film in

color may be placed under embargo and
shipped to the correspondent's home
agency. Public announcement by MACV is
to constitute automatic lifting of the
embargo.
(b) Written material and still black and white

photos may be held by the Saigon bureau of
the news agency concerned until the em-
bargo is lifted, but are not to be put on
the wire to the US or elsewhere out of the
RVN.
(3) If correspondents have been exposed to classi-

fied information or material at cordoned-off
scenes, they are to be guided by the provisions
of MACV Directive 190-1.
(4) In situations not covered above, the matter is

to be referred to MACOI.
10. RELEASE PROCEDURE.

a. V'Jhen COMUSMACV clears and releases, or authorizes
release and dissemination, component and subordi-
nate commanders may disseminate the material.
207
b. JUSPAO retains authority and responsibility for
release of US military information to foreign
language news media published in the RVN. Mate-
rials recommended for dissemination to Vietnamese
language news media are to be routed through MACOI
to JUSPAO.
11. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS.
a. Concerned information officers are to report imme-

diately all significant aircraft accidents occurring
within the RVN and territorial waters to the MACOI
Public Information Division via the MACOI dedicated
circuit teletype system, or by phoning 923-2865 or
2866. During the hours from 1800 to 0700 all re-
ports are to be phoned to the I4AC0I duty officer at
923-2865 or 2866. Such reports are to be in addi-
tion to those made through operational channels in
accordance with the provisions of MACV Directive
335-12.
b. Significant aircraft accidents include all category

I and category II losses involving one or more of
the following:
(1) Heavy loss of life.

(2) Conspicuous damage to military installations or
civilian communities.
(3) The death or serious injury of a VIP, an 05 or

higher ranking officer or the civilian equiva-
lent, a USO troupe member, or civilian
correspondent.
(4) Any other circumstances that have attracted, or
are likely to attract, large numbers of media
representatives to the scene.
c. The local information officer having jurisdiction is

to assist the press at the scene of an accident,
answer press queries, and make necessary releases
pertaining to accidents.
d. Significant aircraft accidents occurring in the I

Corps area are to be reported to the XXIV Corps In-
formation Representative at the Da Nang Press Center
(Da Nang 957-4025), who is to in turn notify MACOI
as prescribed in paragraph 11a, above.
208
e. News releases and responses to media queries regard-
ing significant aircraft accidents are to conform
to guidance contained in paragraph 2c, Annex A.
12. RVNAF AND FWMAF INFORMATION,
a. Materials pertaining exclusively to the RVNAF or

FWMAF are released by appropriate RVNAF or FWMAF
sources.
b. Media queries regarding the RVNAF or FWMAF are ans-

wered by appropriate RVNAF or F\mAF officials.
c. Releases or responses regarding incidents or activ-

ities involving both RVNAF and FWMAF personnel are
provided by RVNAF and FV7MAF officials or their
governments.
d. US military personnel are not to act as spokesmen

for the RVNAF or FWMAF.
e. Materials prepared by US military personnel which

pertain to combined operations, or to RVNAF or
FWMAF operations supported by US units, are to be
approved by appropriate RVNAF or FWMAF officials
before they are released.
f. US military spokesmen are to coordinate with appro-

priate RVNAF or FWMAF officials before replying in
detail to media queries regarding operations, inci-
dents, or activities involving US personnel and
RVNAF or FWîAF personnel.
g. If the exigencies of the situation, or common sense,

indicate that preliminary uncoordinated responses
are in order, responsible US military officials may
respond, but are to restrict their comments as
closely as possible to facts concerning only the US
personnel involved.
h. Matters pertaining to North Vietnamese Army (NVA)

and Viet Cong (VC) personnel who are prisoners of
war (PW) fall within the purview of the RVNAF.
Correspondents' requests to visit PW camps and re-
port on PW activities are to be approved by the
Joint General Staff (JGS). MACOI, through its In-
formaticpn Advisory Division (IAD) , may assist in
processing correspondents' requests. References to
209
photographing PW, in consonance with the spirit of

the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, are included in
MACV Directive 190-3.
13. ACCUSED AND SUSPECTED PERSONS.
a. The release of certain information prior to the con-

clusion of an accused person's trial may prejudice
his opportunity for a fair and impartial determina-
tion of the case. Information released before
evidence thereon has been presented in open court
is to include only incontrovertible factual matters
and is not to include subjective observations,
b. Releasable. Subject to paragraph 13c, below, the

following information concerning persons accused of
offenses may be released by the convening authority:
(1) The accused's name, grade or rank, age, resi-

dence or unit, regularly assigned duties,
marital status, and other similar background
information.
(2) The substance or text of the offenses of which

he is accused.
(3) The identity of the apprehending and investi-

gating agency, and the length of the investiga-
tion prior to apprehension.
(4) The factual circumstances immediately surround-

ing the apprehension of the accused, including
the time and place of apprehension, resistance,
and pursuit.
(5) The type and place of custody, if any.
c. Nonreleasable.
(1) Observations or comments concerning an accused's

character and demeanor, including those at the
time of apprehension and arrest or during pre-
trial custody.
(2) Statements, acimissions, confessions, or alibis

attributable to an accused.
210
(3) References to confidential sources, investi-
gative techniques and procedures, such as
fingerprints, polygraph examinations, blood
tests, firearms identification tests, or other
similar laboratory tests.
(4) Statements concerning the identity, credibility,

or testimony of prospective witnesses.
(5) Statements concerning evidence or argument in
the case, whether or not it is anticipated
that such evidence or argument is to be used
at the trial.
d. Photographing or Televising the Accused. No action

is to be taken to encourage or volunteer assistance
to news media in photographing or televising an
accused or suspected person being held or trans-
ported in military custody. Photographs of an
accused or suspect are not to be made available for
public release unless a law enforcement function is
served thereby.
e. Fugitives from Justice. The provisions of this para-

graph are not intended to restrict the release of
information designed to enlist public assistance in
apprehending an accused or suspect who is a fugitive
from justice.
f. Photography at Court-Martial. Photographing of
prisoners except for official purposes is discouraged
Requests from news media for permission to take
photographs during the period of a trial by court-
martial are to be guided by the following:
(1) Photography of the interior of the courtroom

may be permitted when personnel involved in the
proceedings are not present.
(2) During the trial, photography of the accused

may be permitted at such times as he is out-of-
doors in public view. At their option, members
of the court or the accused may be photographed
in the room or rooms assigned to the press.
Any photograph of the accused is to be accom-
plished only under appropriate circumstances;
never in the courtroom, cell, cellblock, prison
yard, or similar area. A military prisoner is
211
not to be photographed v.-hen other prisoners

are present or be forced to pose for photo-
graphs, except for official purposes. Any
photography permitted is not to impede or
interfere with the progress of the trial.

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•'1

INFORMAL CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS IA VIETAVAI BY

THE U.S. MILITARY

CHARLES BENTON MOORE, B.G.S.

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

wise have been unavailable.

Historians may never fully resolve the debate on whether

or not the military censored the press in Vietnam and whether

or not the press performed its role in Vietnam in a profes-

sional and responsible manner. Yet, historians cannot fail

to note the unheralded bravery of civilian and military

journalists who shared death to tell the war's story.

It has been said that a journalist owes nothing to those

who govern his country; he owes everything to the people of

his country. This thesis is dedicated to the 35 civilian

correspondents and the unknown number of military journalists

who gave their lives in covering the war in Vietnam.

The names that follow represent just a few of those

who paid the utmost price in upholding the oft-quoted yet

still meaningful concept—the people have a right to know.

Peter Thiel Dickie Chapelle

Bernard Fall Paul Savanuch

Bruce Pigott Raimanik Lekhi

Ignacio Ezurra Larry Burrows

Purpose of the Study 2

Limitations of the Study 3

Method and Organization 5

Significance of the Study 6

II. THE MILITARY'S PRESS ROLE IN VIETNAM 9

The Flow of Military News 10

Rules for Discussion with Correspondents 14

Military Assistance to the Press 16

Military Restrictions on the Press 23

III. T H E INDICTMENT AGAINST T H E PRESS 38

Are W e Getting Through 39

Why Aren't W e Getting Through 43

IV. T H E INDICTMENT AGAINST THE MILITARY 67

The Case Against the Military 68

V. FORMAL CENSORSHIP AND THE VIETNAM WAR 102

Absence of Formal Censorship in Vietnam 103

VI. SURVEY OF INFORMATION CENSORSHIP IN VIETNAil 111

Scope and Purpose of the Survey 112

Method and Procedure 113

Limitations of the Survey 115

Related Studies 119

Significance of the Survey 120

Survey Results 120

VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

FOR FURTHER STUDY 161

Implications for Further Study 17 2

A. COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO

E. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF

List Replies 118

2. Whether or Not Formal Censorship Imposed 122

3. Whether or Not Informal Censorship Imposed 122

4. Newsmen and Military lOs Replies on MACV

Legitimate Information 134

6. Preferential Treatment of Newsmen 140

7. Newsmen Ratings of News Sources in Vietnam 14 6

8. Military Ratings of News Media in Vietnam 149

The United States, either directly or indirectly, has

been involved in the Indochina war for most of the past 20