REIAN M.

TUBIS JD 1A DECEMBER 05, 2022

1. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1606 December 10, 1978

FACTS
ISSUES
RULING
2. RUFINO V. NUÑEZ vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS  Nunez, filed a motion to quash and jurisdictional grounds upon being
arraigned, when he was accused before the Sandiganbayan of Estafa.

 Sandiganbayan denied the motion as well as the motion for

reconsideration. Hence the petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the validity of Presidential Decree 1846 creating the
Sandiganbayan.

 Nunez, contends that the creation of Sandiganbayan is violative of the

due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the
Constitution.

 The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to equal

protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized
into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial
evidence; and – there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by
certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances;
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right
covering both law and facts and to CA and SC.
ISSUES  W/N PD 1846 creating Sandiganbayan violated equal protection right?

RULING  Petition dismissed.

 The classification satisfies the that it must be based on substantial

distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only,
and must apply equally to each member of the class.

 The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special

court, the Sandiganbayan precisely in response to a problem –
dishonesty in the public service.

 It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to
have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused
therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is
not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

3. Republic Act No. 6670             August 4, 1988

AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS AND TERMS USED IN
 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177, AS AMENDED, IN ORDER TO INSTITUTE A
MODIFIED PERFORMANCE BUDGET SYSTEM
FACTS SEC. 2. Amendment of Section 34, P.D. No. 4477. - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
hereby amended to read as follows: “Section 31. Automatic Appropriations. -
All expenditures for:

(a) personnel retirement premiums, government service insurance, and other

similar fixed expenditures;

(b) principal and interest on public debt,] & (LJ national government
guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically
appropriated: Provided, that no obligations shall be incurred or payments
made from funds thus automatically appropriated except as issued in the form
of regular budgetary allotments. ”
ISSUES
RULING
4. MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Director, Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas), ALAN FRANCISCO S. GARCIANO, in his capacity as
Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), and JESUS
RODRIGO T. TAGAAN, respondents.

FACTS petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E.
Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The... news reports came out
regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the
contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1]
After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to
criminal and administrative cases... against petitioner and the other city
officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, approved this recommendation.
the Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension
order. On June 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said
order, which motion was denied... petitioner issued a memorandum informing
employees and officials of the Office of the City Mayor that he was assuming
the post of... mayor effective immediately. On July 23, 1999, respondents filed a
motion seeking clarification of our status quo order. Respondents claimed that
the status quo referred to in the order should be that where petitioner is
already suspended and vice mayor Renato Osmeñ a is... the acting city mayor.

ISSUES What is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the investigation of acts
done before his reelection? Did the Ombudsman for the Visayas gravely abuse
his discretion in conducting the investigation of petitioner and ordering his
preventive suspension?
Assuming that the Ombudsman properly took cognizance of the case, what law
should apply to the investigation being conducted by him, the Local
Government Code (R.A. 7160) or the Ombudsman Law (R.A. 6770)? Was the
procedure in the law properly observed?
Assuming further that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction, is the preventive
suspension of petitioner based on "strong evidence" as required by law?... did
respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave abuse of discretion when he
set the period of preventive suspension at six months?... can that... office hold
him administratively liable for said acts?
RULING when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo order which, as the very term
connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and
uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy.
to resolve the present controversy, we must recall that the authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by no less
than the Constitution. Under Article XI, Section 13[1], the Ombudsman has the
power... to:
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."
R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman
the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations.
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority:
"SEC. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary."(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave misconduct and
dishonesty.[10] That the Office of the Ombudsman may conduct an
administrative investigation into the acts complained of, appears clear from
the foregoing provisions of R.A.

the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official

subject to its administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of
law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770
"SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee... involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
the Ombudsman can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by
his office, regardless of the branch of government in which they are employed,
[11] excepting of course... those removable by impeachment, members of
Congress and the Judiciary.
The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman
but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. This is the clear import of Section 24 of
R.A. 6770 abovecited.
Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, to repeat, may be imposed
when, among other factors, the evidence of guilt is strong. The period for
which an official may be preventively suspended must not exceed six months.
In this case, petitioner was preventively suspended... and ordered to cease and
desist from holding office for the entire period of six months, which is the
maximum provided by law.
the inquiry that preceded the filing of an administrative case against petitioner
was prompted by newspaper reports regarding the allegedly anomalous
contract entered into by petitioner, on behalf of Cebu City, with F.E. Zuellig.
[16] In the memorandum to respondent Mojica,[17] respondent Garciano
recommended that petitioner be preventively suspended, based on an initial
 investigation purportedly showing: (1) the contract for supply of asphalt t... we
cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently strong to justify the
imposition of preventive suspension against petitioner. But considering its
purpose and the circumstances in the case brought before us, it does appear to
us that the imposition... of the maximum period of six months is unwarranted.
we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held
administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term
of office.[24] The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him
back... into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life
and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it
still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past
misdeeds.
in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by
petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the
elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate
could not be said to have voted for... petitioner with knowledge of this
particular aspect of his life and character.
That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character... is
presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the
extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible.
Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when
the misconduct was committed, reckoned from... the date of the official's
reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.
Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively liable for an act done
during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig.
deliveries of the asphalt under the contract with F.E. Zuellig and the payments
therefor were supposed to have commenced on September 1998, during
petitioner's second term.
However, respondents argue that the contract, although signed on May 7,
1998, during petitioner's prior term, is to be made effective only during his
present term.
We fail to see any difference to justify a valid distinction in the result. The
agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was
perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioner's prior term.
At that moment, petitioner already acceded to... the terms of the contract,
including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government.
Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already
became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the
deliveries under the... contract are supposed to have been made months later.
the petition is hereby DENIED insofar as it seeks to declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting an inquiry on complaints
against petitioner, and ordering their investigation pursuant to respondents'
mandate under the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Law. But the petition is hereby GRANTED
insofar as it seeks to declare that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion concerning the period of preventive suspension imposed on
petitioner, which is the maximum of six months,

5. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
FACTS In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner
of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the
application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be
 illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act
No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also
a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of
disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by
her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago.
Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a
warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty
since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved.
In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of
Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUES Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the
Senate without violating the Constitution.
RULING Yes. It is true that the Constitution provides that “each house may determine
the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member.  A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of R.A No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation,
is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.  Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The
suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower
House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from
the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is
not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

6. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
FACTS On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against
C.J. Davide, Jr., among others.¹ The House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss the complaint on 22 Oct 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The
Committee Report to that effect has not been sent to the House in plenary. The
following day and just nearly five months since the filing of the first complaint,
 a second impeachment complaint² was filed by respondents house
representatives. Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus against the respondents House of Representatives, et. al., (the
House) most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the Const. which
provides: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.” The House argues: the one
year bar could not have been violated as the first impeachment complaint has
not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same is clear in that it is the House, as a
collective body, which has “the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.” “Initiate” could not possibly mean “to file” because filing can, as
Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be accomplished in three ways, to wit: (1) by
a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at
least 1/3 of all the members of the House.³ Since the House, as a collective
body, has yet to act on the first impeachment complaint, the first complaint
could not have been “initiated”.
ISSUES Is the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3(5) of Art. XI of
the Constitution?
RULING Yes. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that
the framers intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint.⁴ The
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate
the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint. [Thus, under the one year bar on initiating impeachment
proceedings,] no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action [within one year from filing of the first
verified impeachment complaint]. To the argument that only the House as a
body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Sec. 3(1) of Art. XI of the
Const. says “The House x x x shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment,” this is a misreading and is contrary to the principle of
reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with
“impeachment proceeding.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S.
BINAY, JR., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS
•Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman,
the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during
the pendency of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for
the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, finding that: (a) the
evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing
bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City
had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building
project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3)
the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of
funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from
public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them
access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses;
hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to
the OMB Cases filed against them. Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals: •
Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively liable for any
 anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking
Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his
first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering
the administrative cases against him moot and academic. In any event, Binay,
Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show
that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he
did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and
unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the
2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well
as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from
office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office. •At noon of the same
day, the CA issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor earlier that day. • The OMB manifested that the TRO did not state what
act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had
already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain
Proceedings before the SC: • In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition before this Court, arguing that the
condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension
orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr.
before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is
no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB
Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
ISSUES Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, was the
Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject matter
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition;
3. Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”) enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against
Binay, Jr.;
4. Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO
and WPI; and
Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, was the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy; 2. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject matter jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition; 3. Whether the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”) enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.; 4. Whether
the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI; and
RULING
term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected
for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from
an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
 administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section
19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v.
Orbos to apply to administrative offenses…" The SC made it clear that Pascual
has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC
would remove this defense oft-times used by elected officials, of which the SC
was aware of, as it made mention of the data brought forward by the
Ombudsman, to wit: “To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed
the Court that ‘for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases
from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on
the ground on condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred
cases of alleged misconduct – involving infractions such as dishonesty,
oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct – were placed
beyond the reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial
powers.’ Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of
repetition and must therefore, not evade review.
MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN FARAHMAND, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
FACTS An Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan alleging that MARILYN
C. GEDUSPAN, a public officer, being the Regional Manager/Director, of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Regional office in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and
mutually helping with DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a private individual
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi,
Inc., Mandalangan, Bacolod City, release the claims for payments of patients
confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with

Philippine Health Insurance Corp., prior to January 1, 2000, (P91,954.64),

Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite clear
provision in the Deed of Conditional Sale executed involving the sale of West
Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, that the
possession, operation and management of the said hospital will be turned over
by West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. effective January 1, 2000, thus all
collectibles or accounts receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be
due to West Negros College, Inc.

Both accused filed Motion to Quash contending Sandiganbayan’s Lack of

jurisdiction principally on the groud that Geduspan is under Salary grade 26
only.

ISSUES Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
RULING Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of
Philhealth. She, however, contends that the position of Department Manager A
is

classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of

respondent court. She is at present assigned at the Philhealth Regional Office
VI as Regional Director/Manager. Petitioner is a public officer, being a
department manager of Philhealth, a governmentowned and controlled
corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph
a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was
committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the
subject matter of the case.